PRELIMINARIES

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

ORIGINALUNDERSTANDING,LEGAL
REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION
ROBERT CLINTON (1987)
CONSTITUTIONALEMPIRICISM:QUASI
NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)

ART XVII: REMAKING THE

CONSTITUTION
MALOLOS:THECRISESOFTHE
REPUBLIC
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)
FROMMCKINLEYSINSTRUCTIONSTO
THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS
ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEM
VICENTE MENDOZA
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO

; January 22, 1973

JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
; March 31, 1973
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; October 12, 1976
MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; April 4, 1981
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER
PHILIPPINES V AQUINO
EN BANC; May 22, 1986
FACTS/ISSUES
Petitioners
questioned
legitimacy
of
Aquino
government.
- Her govt was said to be illegal since it was not
established pursuant to 1973 Consti.
- Proclamation No. 3- Aquino govt is installed through
direct exercise of power of the Filipino people , i n
defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.
- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that
they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods.
HELD
Petitions have no merit.
(1) Petitioners have no personality and n o c a u s e o f
action.
(2) Legitimacy of govt is NOT justiciable, and is a
political question where people are the only judge.
(3) People have already accepted such govt, which is in
e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o f t h e c o u n t r y, m a k i n g i t a d e j u r e
govt.
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.
( 5 ) E l e v e n m e m b e r s of S C h av e s wo r n to u p h o l d l a w
under her govt.

IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ

;October 24, 1986

GONZALES V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967

DE LEON V ESGUERRA
; August 31, 1987

TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON

SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997

ELECTIONS
; October 16, 1971
PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS

At ty. Je su s De lf in fi le d to th e C OM EL EC a pe ti tio n to
amend the Constitution through a peoples initiative. In
his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article
6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift
the term lim its of all elective governmen t officials. He
asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the
sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature
stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC took cognizance of
their petition and set the ca se up for hearin g. Senato r
Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the
COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam
Defensor Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil
action for prohibition, sa ying that RA 6735 is deficient
insofar as the initiative for amending the Constitution is
concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners
are willing to propose are not amendments, but
revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their
motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.
ISSUES
1. W ON the cou rt can ta ke action of thi s case despite
there being a pending case before the COMELEC
2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for
peoples initiative
3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid
4 . W ON the COMEL EC acted wi thout jur isdi ction or in
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
petition
HELD
1 . Yes . C o m e l e c s f a i l u r e t o a c t o n r o co s m o t i o n t o
dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2
rule 65 of rules of court
- Case may be treated as a special civil action for
certiorari since delfin didnt come up with the minimum
number of signatures
- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of
transcendental importance.
2. No. The law is inadequate.
- F i r st , i n Se c 2 of th e Act ( S ta te m e n t a n d Po l i c y) , i t
seems that the word Constitution was a delayed
afterthought. The word Constitution was neither
germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves
that it is silent to amendments in the constitution.
- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of
a petition for initiative on the constitution.
- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the
Constitution.
- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on
initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It
failed to provide for details in implementation of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is

incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and
standard for the delegated power.
3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is
incomplete, it does not have the power to prescribe rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also,
comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition.
The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.
D e ci si on Petition granted

SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [concur and dissent]
RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was
to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)

VITUG
The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since
it did not have the required number of signatures.

FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]

looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law
clearl y in tends to include amendmen ts to the
Constitution.

PANGANIBAN
RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the
Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient
to implement Constitutional initiatives.

RESOLUTION
;
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
FACTS
- Nature:

Writ

of

Preliminary

Injunction

against

complaints against him until his term is over

- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo
was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and
both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4 , 2 00 0 ~ Es tra da 's "sha rp de ce n t fr om p o wer "
began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend,
publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a

speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada
of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng mone y
from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200
and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still
from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the
Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for
joint investigation
- T h e H o u se o f R e p s a l so d e c i d e d to i n v e s ti ga te th e
expose of Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's
resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for
resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as
well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as
DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation
bu t Estr ada reall y held on to his offi ce and refused to
resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on
November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted
the Articles of Impea chmen t ( whi ch wa s based on the
g r o u n d s o f b r i b e r y, g r a f t a n d co r r u p t i o n , b e tr a ya l o f
public trust and culpab le violation of the Constitution)
signed by 115 representatives to the Senate.
- Nov. 20 , 20 00 ~ Se na te fi na ll y op en ed th e
impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges
with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI
BAN K. Ocam po te sti fi ed th a t she wa s o ne fo ot a wa y
from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose
Vel a rd e " o n d ocu me n ts i nvo lv in g a 5 00 m il l io n p eso s
investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
C hr i stma s an d wh e n Ja nu a r y ca m e , m or e bo mb she l l s
were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada
j o i n t l y o w n e d BW R e s o u r ce s C o r p o r a t i o n w i t h M r.
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
> Ja n . 1 6 , 2 0 0 1 ~ wi t h a vo te o f 11- 1 0 , th e Se n a to r
judges ruled against opening the 2 nd envelope which

> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press

statement saying that he now leaves Malacaang
Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation.
> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the
a c ti n g p r e si d e n t a n d sa i d l e tte r wa s t r a n s m i t te d to
former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties
o f th e Pre si de n cy. Th e SC i ssu ed a r eso lu ti on , wh i ch
confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the
oath of office to GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter,
House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175
experien cing full suppor t to GM A's admin istra tion and
also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter
c l a i m i n g i n a b i l i t y, S e n a te p a s se d R e s o l u t i o n N o . 8 2
confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP
and the Senate's support of the new gov't. and also in
the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing
that the impeachment court is functus offictio.
- Feb . 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 ce rtifyin g
vacancy in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited
themselves from participating in this case as per
Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge
"that they have compromised their weight on one side"
but nonetheless recused themselves.

allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner

held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under
the name "Jose Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the
Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide
administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the
Philippines.

element of the government only and it was done intraconstitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect
the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better
understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II
sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Se c 11 in this case
so look at those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined
from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and

ISSUES
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act
as president
4 . W ON the p e ti ti on e r en jo ys i m mu ni t y fr om su i t ( an d
a s s u m i n g h e e n jo y s i m m u n i t y, th e ex te n t o f th e
immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1 . The Cour t sha ll con sider as ju sticiable the issue of
W ON t h e c h a n g e i n t h e p r e s i d e n c y w a s d o n e i n t h e
m an ne r pr e scr i be d b y th e 1 98 7 C on sti tu tio n . (In this
p ar t, th e p on en te di ffer en ti a te d ED SA I f ro m ED SA II
saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of
presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas
EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an

p oste ri o r fa cts a nd cir cu m sta n tia l ev id en ce be ar in g a

material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see
Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question W ON it may review
a n d r e v i se th e d e c i s i o n o f b o t h H o u se s o f C o n g r e s s
recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the
Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's
cl ai m o f i na bi l i ty to r est be ca u se of i ts re co gni ti on of
GMA as president. The issue is a political question and
t h e C o u r t ca n n o t r e v i e w C o n gr e s s ' d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t
violating the principle of separation of powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys
immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re:
Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune
from suit or from being brought to court during his
period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity.
D ei ci son The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging
the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure
14 President of the Republic are DISMISSED. th
information is a public right, and the

GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000
FACTS
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or
PCCR was created by then President Joseph Estrada on
N o v 2 6 , 1 9 9 8 b y v i r tu e o f E x e cu t i v e O r d e r N o . 4 3 i n
order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the same.
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or
before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President
i ssu e d Ex e cu ti v e O r d e r N o . 7 0 w h i ch e x te n d e d th e
time frame of the PCCRs work until Dec 31 1999.
> The PC C R su b mi tte d i ts r eco mm en da ti on s to th e
President on Dec 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day.
- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus,
assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR
on two grounds:
> i t is a p ub li c offi ce wh i ch o nl y th e le gi sl a tu re ca n
create by way of law
> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in
a p r o ce ss f r o m w h i ch h e i s t o ta l l y ex cl u d e d b y th e
Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental
charter.
- In this regard, Gonzales:
> seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential
con sul tants, advisers and assi stan ts from acting as
such
> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from
enforcing their advice and recommendations

> s e e k s t o e n j o i n t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t f r o m
passin g in audi t expendi ture s for the PC CR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to
furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.

been defined as nothing more than the legislative

authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury. The funds for the PCCR
was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power
to t r a n sf e r f u n d s p u r su a n t to Se c 2 5 ( 5 ) Ar t V I o f
ISSUES
Constitution.
1. WON the case has become moot and academic
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.
2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this
3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in
4. WON the President has power to create positions (70)
danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the
in the Office of the Pre sident and appoint presidential
appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts
consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)
to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a
5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus
taxpayers interest.
ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, the right of
with names of executive officials holding multiple
the people to information on matters of public concern
positions in government, copies of their appointments,
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.
tr a n sa c ti o n s, o r d e ci s i o n s , a s w e l l a s to go v e r n m e n t
r e se a r ch d a ta u se d a s b a si s f o r p o l i c y d ev e l o p m e n t,
HELD
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer
as may be provided by law.
presen ts a ju sticiable con troversy because the issues
- The right to
involved have become academ ic or dead. It is be yond
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.
fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the
Obiter
The case has already become moot and
general public which possesses the right.
academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief
- matters of public concern is a term which
p r a ye d fo r b y Go n za l e s ( p r o h i b i t i o n ) i s i m p o s si b l e t o
embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the
grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to
public may want to know, either because these directly
be enjo ined no longer exists. An y rulin g regard ing the
affect their lives, or simply because such matters
PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion.
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
government; the injury is fairl y traceable to the
D e ci si on Petition is dismissed, with the exception that
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed
respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with
by a favorable action.
information requested.
Obiter
The interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid,
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
(ART I, II, IV, V)
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merel y that he suffers thereb y in
some indefinite way. 1
3. Ratio
A taxpayer has standing to raise a
con sti tu ti on al issue whe n i t i s e stab l i sh ed th a t p ub li c
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution, the action of which is
properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power.
O b i t e r U n d e r Se c 7 o f E O N o 4 3 w h i ch cr e a te d t h e
PCCR, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its
operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of
th e Offi ce of th e Pr e si de n t. T he ap pr op ri a tio n s we r e
authori zed b y the Pre siden t, not b y Congress. In fact,
there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has
1 in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office

STATE DEFINED

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V

CAMPOS RUEDA
FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
FACTS
- Co ll e ctor of In te rn a l Rev en ue h el d An ton i o Ca mp o s
Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P
161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Phi l ip p in e s, the de ce a se d , a Spa ni sh n ati on al hav in g

been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the

time of her death in 1955.
- Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the
g r o u n d t h a t t h e l a w o f Tan g i e r i s n o t r e c i p r o c a l t o
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision
denying the claim for tax exemption.
However,
respondent denied this request on the grounds that
t h e r e w a s n o r e c i p r o c i t y [ w i t h Tan g i e r , w h i c h w a s
moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign
country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government
of that foreign power which, although not an
in ternational per son in the sen se of interna tiona l law,
does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible
personal properties of our citizens not residing therein,
or whose law allows a similar exemption from such
taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should
h ave be en r eco gn i ze d b y ou r Go ve rn me n t i n or de r to
e n ti tl e the pe ti tio ne r to the ex em p tio n be ne fi ts o f th e
last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so
much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of
a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y, m u s t b e s a t i s f i e d f o r a
"foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
HELD
- S u p r e m e C o u r t a f f i r m e d C o u r t o f t a x Ap p e a l s
Ruling.
- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is
r e qu i r e d i n l i n e wi t h Po u n d 's fo r m u l a t i o n th a t i t b e a
politically organized sovereign community independent
of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legall y
sup re m e wi thi n i ts te r ri to r y, acti n g thr ou gh a
government functioning under a regime of law.
- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing
i t v i e w e d a s a n o r g a n i ze d c o r p o r a te so c i e t y u n d e r a
government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands.
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying
a definite territory, politically organi zed, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality.
- Sta te i s a terri tor ial so ciety divided into governmen t
and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a
supremacy over all other institutions.
Moreover,
similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
government to maintain wi thin its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations.
W ith the la tte r re qu i si te sa ti sfi ed ,
i n te r n a t i o n a l l a w d o e s n o t e x a c t i n d e p e n d e n ce a s a
condition of statehood.

- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be

no doubt that California as a state in the American Union
was lacking in the alleged requisite of international
p e r so n a l i t y. N o n e th e l e s s, i t wa s h e l d to b e a f o r e i g n
country within the meaning of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a
tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the traditional sense, did fall
under this exempt category.

SOVEREIGNTY

AND

SOVEREIGN

IMMUNIT Y
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates form them.

ART V SUFFRAGE
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.
No literacy,
p r o p e r t y, o r o t h e r s u b s t a n t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s h a l l b e
imposed on the exercise of suffrage
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the
disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of
other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on
Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the
ballot.

TANADA V ANGARA
PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
FACTS
- Petition for Certiorari
- DT I se cre tar y Ri zal i no N av ar ro si gne d the Fi na l Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he
agreed on behalf of the Philippines

To su b m i t th e W TO a gr e e m e n t to
competent authorities for their approval
o
Adopt the ministerial declarations and
decisions
( Ba si ca l l y, the fi na l act ai m s to li be ra l i ze an d ex pa nd
world trade and strengthen the interrelationship
be tween trade and econo mic policie s affectin g gro wth
and development.)
- The presiden t then sent to the senate a letter whi ch
submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their
concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he
sub m i ts th e Ur u gua y F i na l R ou nd Act, th e Agr ee me n t
Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and
De ci sio n s an d th e U nd er stan di n g on Co m mi tm en ts in
Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which
e x p r e sse s th e i r co n cu r r e n ce i n th e r a t i f i ca ti o n o f th e
president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of
the Agreemen t Establ ishin g the W TO and the
a gr e e m e n ts a n d a s so c i a te d l e ga l i n s tr u m e n ts o f t h a t
agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other
hand, embodies not only the W TO agreement but also
the ministerial declarations and decisions and the
understanding on commitments in financial services.
- Pe ti tio ne r s assa il th e con sti tu tio na l i ty o f th e tre a ty.
T h e y a l so cl ai m th a t sin ce the Sen a te on l y co n cu rr ed
with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of
the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act.
o

ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. W ON the parity provision s and nationa l trea tmen t
c l a u se s i n t h e W T O a gr e e m e n t v i o l a t e s S e c . 1 9
Ar ti cle 2 , Se c. 10 an d 12 Ar ti cl e 12 of the
Constitution (economic nationalism clauses).
3. W ON th e W TO a gre e me n t u nd ul y l im i ts, re str i cts
and impairs legislative power of the Congress.
4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.
5. W ON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO
agreement and not in the final act implies rejection
of the final act.
HELD
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes.
- The judi ciar y has the duty and power to stri ke do wn
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress
2. No
- T he d ec la rat io n o f p rin c ip les a re no t in t en d e d to
be s e lf-ex ec uting, rather, the y a re jus t a id a nd
g u i d e s b y t h e j u d ic i a r y i n j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , a n d b y

the legislature in enacting laws . These broad

p r i n ci p l e s n e e d l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s t o i m p l e m e n t
them.
- The economic nationalism provisions should be read
with other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and
13 of Article 12.
- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are
specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs,
d om e sti c sub si di e s an d pr o te cti on fr om un fa ir
competition which are intended to help developing
economies.
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy.
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced
bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with total prescription of
foreign competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unkno wn
circumstances.
3. No
- So ve re ign t y is n ot abso lute because it is sub ject
to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines.
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type
isolation of the country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict
the absoluteness of sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- W hen the Philippines join the UN, it consented to
r estr i ct i ts so ve ri gn r i gh ts u nd er th e co n ce p t o f a u to limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)
- T h e u n d e r l yi n g c o n c e p t i n t h e p a r t i a l s u r r e n d e r o f
soverei gn ty is the recipro cal com mitment of the other
contracting states granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of
p a te n t i n f r i n ge m e n t . I t i s s ti l l o n th e p a te n t o wn e r to
introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product.
- The new rule should not really present any problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar
presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is no t the treaty
itself. Rather, it is just a summar y of the proceedings.
The final act onl y required that the senate concur wi th
the WTO agreement, which they did.

- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to

as shown by the members deliberations.

REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
FACTS
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
P e t i t i o n e r : W i l l i a m R e a g a n c i v i l i a n e m p l o ye e o f a n
American corporation providing technical assistance to
the United States Air Force in the Philippines
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
July 7, 1959 Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air
Base
Ap r il 22 , 1 96 0 He im po r te d a tax -f re e C ad i ll a c wi th
accessories valued at $6,443.83
Ju l y 11, 19 60 pe ti tio ne r asked Ba se C om m an de r fo r
permit to se ll the car whi ch wa s gran ted provided that
he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US
citizen employed in the Philippine military bases. On the
same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie
Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps.
- As a r esult of the tr an sa ctio n , r e sp on de n t, a fter
deducting the landed cost of the car as well as
p e ti ti on e r s pe r so na l exe mp ti on , fix ed hi s n e t taxa bl e
i n co me ar isi n g f ro m the sa le a t P1 7 ,9 12 .3 4 re nd er i n g
h im li ab le for P2 ,97 9 .00 i n co me ta x. Af te r p a yi n g th e
su m , p e ti ti o n e r so u gh t a r e f u n d cl a i m i n g th a t h e w a s
exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the
ca se w i t h th e C o u r t o f Tax Ap p e a l s wh i ch d e n i e d h i s
petition.
- Petitioner asse rts tha t he is exempt from paying the
income tax. He contends that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore
beyond its jurisdiction to tax.
- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co
Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue: While in army bases
or installations within the Philippines those goods were
in contemplation of law on foreign soil. The court
r e s o l v e d t h i s b y p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e s ta t e m e n t w a s
merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot
be invoked in this case.
ISSUE
WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory
HELD
Yes. B a s e s u n d e r l e a s e t o t h e A m e r i c a n a r m e d
f o r c e s b y v i r t u e o f t h e M i l i t a r y B a s e s Ag r e e m e n t
of 1947 re ma in pa rt of Ph ilipp ine territ or y.
- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not
thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

- C o n c e p t o f a u t o - l im i t a t i o n : An y sta te m a y, b y i ts
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If
it does so, it by no means follows that such areas
become impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil . The y are sti ll sub je ct to i ts
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the
Ameri can armed force s by virtue of the mi litar y bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory.
- Therefore, the Philippines jurisdictional rights
o ve r t h e b a s e s , c e rt a i n l y n o t e x c lu d in g t h e p ow e r
t o t a x , h a ve b e e n p r e s e r ve d . As t o c e r t a i n t a x
matters, an appropriate exemption was provided
for.
- Jud gme nt (7 conc ur, 2 co ncur in the resu lt , 1 d id
no t t ak e pa rt )
T h e d e c is io n o f t h e C o u rt o f Tax Ap p e a ls d e n yi n g
the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax
pa id b y petit io ner is aff irme d.

REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
CORONA; July 15, 2003
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
- Dec 17 1991 , the Republ ic, th rough the Presidential
Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos,
represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos ,
2
pursuant to RA 1379 .
PCGG was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 1 issued on Februar y 28,
1 98 6 b y th en Pr e sid en t Co ra zo n Aqu in o , a nd
was charged with the task of assisting the
President in the recovery of all ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President
F e r d i n a n d E . M a r c o s , h i s i m m e d i a t e f a m i l y,
relatives, subordina tes and close associate s,
whe ther loca ted in the Ph ilippine s or abroad,
in clu d in g the ta keov er o r se qu e stra ti on o f a ll
business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during is administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue
a d v a n ta g e o f th e i r p u b l i c o ffi ce a n d /o r u si n g
their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationship.
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought:

2
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.

a.

the declaration of the aggregate amount of

US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million

inclusive of interest as of the time of decision)
3
deposited in escrow in the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth.
*T he ff accoun t group s, using various foreign
foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously
held the funds:
1.
Azio-Verso-Vibur
Foundation
accounts
2.
Xandy-Wintrop:
Charis-ScolariValamo-SpinusAvertina-Foundation accounts
3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation
accounts
4.
Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation
accounts
5. Maler Foundation accounts
b.

the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million

in treasur y note s whi ch exceeded the Marco s
couples salaries, other lawful income as well as
i n co m e f r o m l e g i t i m a te l y a c q u i r e d p r o p e r t y.
These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko
Se n tra l n g Pi l ip i na s b y vi r tu e of fr ee ze or de r
issued by PCGG.
- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma.
Im e ld a M Ma no to c, Ir en e M Ar an e ta an d F er d in an d R
Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
T h e Gen e ra l Ag re e men t /Su p p le men t a l Ag re e men t s
- Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement
of the assets of the Marcos family
- T h e G e n e r a l Ag r e e m e n t / S u p p l e m e n t a l Ag r e e m e n t s
sou gh t to identify, colla te , cau se the inventor y of and
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.
- It was stated in one of the whereas clauses the fact
that petitioner Republic obtained a judgment from the
Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356
million belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditions are met. The
decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey
granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared
the various deposits in the name of the foundations to
be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen
to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled
to restitution.
- Sandiganba yan conducted hearings on the motion to
approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
3
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the
fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be in
escrow. (Random House Websters Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)

- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan

- Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary
co mm i tte d gra ve a bu se o f d i scr e tio n i n rev er sin g the
judgment
and/or
judgment
on
the
pleadings.
de ci si on on the gr ou nd th a t th e or i gi na l cop ie s of th e
Respondents filed their opposition.
authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions
- Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion
a n d th e i r a u t h e n t i ca t e d t r a n s l a t i o n s h a v e n o t b e e n
for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan
pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the
quoted exten sivel y a por tion of the Swiss decision s in
c o m p r o m i se a g r e e m e n t ( to o k ) p r e ce d e n ce o v e r t h e
denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner
motion for summary judgment
adds that nowhere in the respondents motions for
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming
reconsideration
and
supplemental
motion
for
she wa s n ot a p ar t y to th e mo ti on f or a pp rov al of the
r e co n s i d e r a t i o n w e r e t h e a u th e n t i c i t y, a c c u r a c y a n d
Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the
admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
funds wi th the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos
- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should
estate.
be denied.
The Fund Transfer
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District
Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for
t h e i m m e d i a t e t r a n s f e r o f t h e d e p o s i t s to a n e s c r o w
account in PNB. This was granted.
- M a r c o se s a p p e a l e d , S w i s s F e d e r a l Su p r e m e C o u r t
affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds
were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998.
The Petition for Summar y Judgment
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for
su mm ar y jud gm e n t pe r ta i ni n g to th e fo rf ei tur e of the
US$356 million, based on ff grounds:
a. essen tia l facts whi ch wa rrant the forfei ture of
the funds are admitted by respondents in their
pleadin gs and other sub mission s made in the
course of the proceeding
b. respondents admission made durin g pre- tria l
that they do not have any interest or ownership
over the funds tenders no genuine issue or
controversy as to any material fact in the
present action
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later
adopted by co-respondents Marcos children.
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment
was conducted
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner s
mo tion for summa r y jud gmen t, stating tha t there is no
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence,
and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully
a cqu ir ed a s i ll - go tte n we al th , for fe i te d i n favo r of th e
State.
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26
2000; Marcos children followed.
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its
Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that the evidence offered
for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the
money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos
spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to
the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds, and thus
denied petitioners motion for summary judgment.
Hence, the present petition.

An al ysis of Respondents Legitimate Income

the
Marcoses
reported
P16,408,442.00
or
U S$ 2 , 4 1 4 ,4 8 4 .9 1 i n t o ta l i n co m e ov e r a p e r i o d o f 2 0
years from 1965 to 1984.
- T h i s a m o u n t i n cl u d e s F e r d i n a n d M a r c o s sa l a r y a s
Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President
from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 19771985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos salary as
Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986
(P75,000/year),
income
from
legal
practice
(P11,109,836), plus other sources.
- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an
extr em e l y pr of i ta bl e l e ga l p ra cti ce be fo re h e b eca me
President, and that he was still receiving payments
almost 20 years after
- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the
amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal
practice is valid)
- The five group accounts have a total balance of
US$356 million.
ISSUES
1 . W ON p e ti t i o n e r R e p u b l i c s a c t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i i s
proper.
2. W ON responden ts raised an y genuine issue of fact
which would either justify or negate summary judgment.
3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
f o rf e i tu r e i n a c co r d a n ce wi t h Se ct i o n s 2 a n d 3 of R A
1379.
HELD
1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with
immense public interest, public policy and deep
historical
repercussions,
certiorari
is
allowed
n o tw i t h s ta n d i n g th e e x i ste n ce a n d av a i l a b i l i t y of th e
remedy of appeal.
Obiter
A l m o s t t w o d e c a d e s h a v e p a s se d s i n c e t h e
government initiated its search for and reversion of illgotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on
the merits is long overdue.

2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact

whi ch wil l be admissible in evidence at a hearin g, are
not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment
O b i t e r Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to
raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings.
S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t sh o u l d ta k e p l a ce a s a m a t te r o f
right.
- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
whi ch is fictitious and con trived, set up in bad faith or
patently lacking in substance.
- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every
allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the
manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure). Their answers include they have no
sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it
happened a long time ago or the funds were lawfull y
acquired without stating the basis of such assertions.
- Question: W hether the kind of denial in respondents
answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the
rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly
and specifically charges a party with having done,
performed or committed a particular act which the latter
did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and
express denial must be made.
- The allegations for forfeitu re on the existen ce of the
Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied
by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted
p u r su a n t t o Se c 11 R u l e 8 o f 1 9 9 7 R u l e s o n C iv i l
Procedure.
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact in the
action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the
trial and rendering summary judgment if it is
demonstrated
by
affidavits,
depositions
or
to
admissions that the issues are not genuine but
sham or fictitious.
motion for summary judgment is
premised on the assumption that the issues
presen ted need not be tried ei ther becau se
t h e se a r e p a t e n t l y d e v o i d o f su b s ta n ce o r
that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact.
It is a procedural device for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings
raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue
as to any material fact.
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to
go to trial and had legally waived right it had to
move for summary judgment.
- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for
summary judgment any time after the respondents
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any
s u b s e q u e n t s t a g e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n . T h e f a c t th a t
petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any
way prevent it from moving for summary judgment.

c.

Whether by the time motion for summary

judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, estoppel by
laches had already set in against petitioner.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
government sues as a sovereign or asserts
governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an
act that contravenes law or public policy.
estoppel by laches is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, warranting a presumption that
the person has abandoned his right or
declined to assert it.
in invoking doctrine of estoppel by
laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair
injury to them might result unless the action
is barred.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law
that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount
o r v a l u e i s m a n i f e s tl y d i sp r o p o r t i o n a te to th e o ffi ci a l
salary and other lawful income of the public officer who
owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and
proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there
are other legitimate sources of income.
O b i t e r burden of proof was on respondents to dispute
presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence
that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that
they had other legitimate sources of income. A
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed,
and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal
presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.
- the Court not only took into consideration that
respondents themselves made admissions in their
pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able
present sworn statements of witnesses who had
personal knowledge of the Marcoses participation in the
illegal acquisition of funds.

RESOLUTION
CORONA; November 18, 2003
- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do
not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.
I s s u m ma r y j u d g m e n t i n f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s a
violation of due process?
- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect,
h e n ce th e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s
enjoyed by accused.
- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive
and procedural. There must be a compliance with both
substantive and procedural requirements in order that a
par ticu lar act ma y not be impugned as viola tive of the
due process clause.

- substantive due process refers to intrinsic

validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his property
- there is no showing that RA 1379 is
unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
Re spo nd en ts wer e n ot de pr iv ed of
their property through forfeiture for
arbitrary reasons.
procedural
due
process
means
compliance with procedures or steps, even
p e r i o d s , p r e s cr i b e d b y t h e sta tu te , i n
co n f o r m i t y wi th th e s ta n d a r d o f f a i r p l a y
and without arbitrariness on the part of
those who are called upon to administer it.
fo rfe i tu r e pr o ce ed in gs a re acti on s i n r e m ,

thus civil in nature, contrary to respondents

contention that they are penal in character.
The proceedings under RA 1379 do not
terminate in the imposition of penalty but
merel y in the forfeiture in favor of the State
of properties illegally acquired.
- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired
p r o p e r t y u n d e r R A 1 3 7 9 m a y b e p r ov e n b y
preponderance of evidence. The Government
is required only to state the known lawful
i n co m e o f r e sp o n d e n t s f o r t h e p r i m a f a ci e
presumption of illegal provenance to attach.
Petitioner Republi c having establ ished this
presumption, burden of proof shifted to
respondents to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were
lawfully acquired and that they had other
le gi ti mate source s of in come. Responden ts
failed on this part.
- essence of due process is found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit ones evidence in support of his
defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded
full opportunity to present their case,
defenses and pleadings. They obstinately
refused to do so and have tried to
confuse the issues and the Court and to
delay the disposition of the case
- the people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, the
salutary objective being to restore the
ownership of the Swiss deposits to the
ri gh tful o wner tha t i s, the Republi c of the
Philippines in the shortest possible time.
M o t i o n s f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d e n i e d w i t h f i n a l i t y.

DOMINIU M AND IMPERIU M

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Ratio Pre scr iption, mentioned in the ro ya l cedula of

- W hile the mo tion was pending, a ne w circu lar of the
1754 states: Where such possessors shall not be able to
Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August
HOLMES; February 23, 1909
p ro du ce ti tle d ee ds, i t sha l l be suffi ci en t if the y sha l l
12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to
FACTS
prescription.
aliens.
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet,
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.
contests dismissal of application of registration of their
times shall be deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years,
ancestral land through writ of error.
uncu ltiva ted 30 ye ars. Plaintiffs father was owner of
ISSUE
- Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle,
land by the very terms of this decree.
Ju r i sd i c ti o n :
cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for
- B y Or gan i c Act of Ju l y 1 , 1 90 2, al l the p ro pe r ty a nd
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an
m ore than 50 yea rs bef ore the Treat y of Pa ri s
rights acquired there by the United States are to be
appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ
(April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.
P r i m a r y I s su e :
accordance to Igorot custom.
O b i t e r Writ of error is the general method of bringing
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the
residential land.
1897, n o d o c u m e n t o f t i t l e w a s i s s u e d by Spanish
exception, confined to equity in the main.
Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under
- Every presumption is and ought to be against the
HELD
mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it
government in a case like present.
T h e C ou r t d en ie d the m o tio n wi th dr a wi n g th e a pp ea l .
only established possessory title.
- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different
Gran tin g a withdra wa l of appeal i s discretionar y upon
(co mpared to occupa tion of wh ite race a gain st Native
the Court after the briefs have been presented.
- Procedure
Americans).
Ou r f ir st o b je ct i n th e i n te r na l
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his
- Court - a p p l i c a t i o n of land registration g r a n t e d
administration of the islands is to do justice to the
appeal only because the constitutional issue should be
(March 4, 1904 )
natives not to exploit their country for private gain.
avoided.
- CFI of Benguet appeal on behalf of Government of
- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to
- Al so , the wi thd ra wa l wa s de ni ed b ecau se u nd er the
the Philippines and US having taken possession of
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept.
property for militar y and public purposes; a p p l i c a t i o n
earlier law.
of Justice issued while this case was pending before the
d i sm i s s e d
Decision REVERSED
C ou r t a nd or de r in g al l r e gi ste r s of d ee d to a cce p t f or
- Philippine SC a f f i r m e d decision of CFI Benguet
- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should
r e gi st r a t i o n a l l t r a n sf e r s of r e s i d e n t i a l l o ts t o a l i e n s ,
- Federal SC w r i t o f e r r o r reviewing judgment of
n o t b e d e p r iv e d o f wh a t b y th e p r a c ti ce a n d b e l i e f o f
together with the circumstance that (2) probably a
Philippine SC
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
similar que stion ma y never come up a gain before the
- Respondents argue:
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to
- Given that
Spain.
the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the
- Spain assumed and asserted that they
C o u r t a f te r l o n g a n d e x h a u st i v e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o n th e
had title to all the land in the Philippines
KRIVENKO
V
REGISTER
OF
DEEDS
OF
constitutional question.
except to permit private lands to be acquired
- To allow the withdra wal under such circumstances is
- No prescription against the Spanish
MANILA
e quivalent to to lerating an offense to the con stitu tion ,
Crown
MORAN; November 15, 1947
offense that may be permanent.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private
re gi stration wi thin a limi ted time to make
FACTS
or public agricultural lands, including residential lands.
the title good
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
(The votes were: 8-3)
- And US succeeded the title of Spain
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of
(through Treaty of Paris)
lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc
the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and
- Plaintiffs land not registered and he had
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE
lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said
TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL
- Also, Benguet never brought under
registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM)
LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS
civil or military government of the Spanish
d e n i e d o n th e g r o u n d t h a t h e i s a n a l i e n a n d ca n n o t
ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
Crown, so it is not certain whether
acquire land in this jurisdiction.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue
registration granted was under Spanish
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a
through which agricultural resources ma y leak into
laws
consulta.
aliens' hands.
- Plaintiff argues:
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.
- This provision should be read in connection with
- Argument seems to amount to denial of
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a
s e c t i o n 1 o f Ar t i c l e X I I I " n a tu r a l r e so u r c e s , w i t h t h e
native titles throughout an important Island of
motion to withdraw the appeal.
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
Luzon
- T h e ca s e w a s a l r e a d y v o te d u p o n a n d t h e m a j o r i t y
alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands,
decision was being prepared.
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
ISSUE
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in
WON Carino owns the land
discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs
Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.
have been presented.
- It wo ul d b e f uti le to pr oh ib i t th e al ie na ti on of pu bl i c
HELD
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.

alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands

the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is
in the hands of the Filipino citizens.
the state which possesses ownership (Cario v Insular
- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion
Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands
withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result
held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored
to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us,
- The Court shall rule that under the provision s of the
in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures and
and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution
consideration not only their present condition, but also
became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
their future and their probable increase, and after
d i str i bu ti n g to th e na tiv es wha t ma y b e ne ce ssar y for
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
tilla ge and pastura ge , confir ming in the m in wh at the y
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us
to dispose of as we may wish.
FACTS
I n M o n ta n o v In su l a r Go v e r n m e n t, u n a p p r o p r i a t e d
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK,
public lands constituting the public domain the sole
petitioners
power is vested in Congress.
- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretar y of Agriculture and
The land in question is not private property; the Director
Natural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of
of Lands and the Secre tar y of Agr icul ture and Na tural
Appeals
Resources have alwa ys sustained the public character
- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
thereof b y vir tue of reclamation (and not by accretion
Appeals.
which the petitioners claim).
- P e t i t i o n e r s w a n te d to d e cl a r e n u l l a n d v o i d D av i d s
T he re fo re , th e on l y re me d y fo r th e a pp el la n ts i s a n
Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud
the disputed lot (226 m Lot 2892, which is a portion of 22
committed by respondents.
Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through a c c r e t i o n .
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open
- Jun 18, 1958 Director of Lands issued David a sales
no ti ce s wer e p ub li she d , sal e a nd a war d in g of la nd to
patent of the lot
David were public official acts of a Government officer.
- Au g 2 6 , 1 9 5 9 U n d e r se c r e t a r y o f Ag r i cu l t u r a l a n d
Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation,
Patent No. V-1209
therefore a public land.
- Oct 21 , 1 95 9 N a ga Ci t y Re gi ste r of D ee ds issue d
David OCT No. 510
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secre tar y of Agr iculture and Na tural
ISSUES
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
1. W ON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent.
b u t b y accretion, t h e r e f o r e a p r i v a t e n o t p u b l i c Plaintiffs are private parties and not government
domain (this court sa ys it does not warrant any further
officials, and therefore cannot institute for the
consideration)
nullification of Davids Torrens Title, since they are not
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party
the registered owners of the land and they had not been
o ther than the governmen t to dispu te the validi ty of a
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
grant (this court says it does)
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
3 . W ON th e i n d e f e a s i b l e ch a r a ct e r o f a p u b l i c l a n d
Maninang v Consolacion states that [t]he fact that the
p a te n t af te r o n e ye a r sh o u l d n o t b e r e co gn i ze d ( th i s
grant was made by the government is undisputed.
court says it should be).
Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not
is a question which the government may raise, but until
HELD
it is raised by the government and set aside, the
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by
defendant (in this case, the respondents) cannot
the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept
question it. The legality of the grant is a question
of sovereignty, and dominium is the states capacity to
between the grantee and the government.
own or acquire property. Dominium enables the state to
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
O n l y t h e g o ve r n m e n t c a n q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f
natural resources, including their disposition, except as
the tit le w hich it ga ve .
l i m i t e d b y th e C o n st i t u t i o n . Th e p r e se n t C o n st i tu ti o n
adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and
lands in Spain and its earlier decrees were held by
during all the proceedings in connection with said

application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent

i n h i s f a v o r, t h e a p p e l l a n t s d i d n o t p u t u p a n y
o p p os it io n o r a d ve rs e c la im t he ret o . This is fatal to
them because after the registration and issuance of the
cer tifi cate and duplica te cer tifi cate of title based on a
p u b l i c l a n d p a te n t , th e l a n d cov e r e d th e r e b y
automatically comes under the operation of RA 496
subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
Af te r r e gi st r a t i o n a n d i s su a n ce o f th e ce r t i f i ca te a n d
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --R A 4 9 6 4 8 sa ys th a t a n y que sti on con cer n in g the
validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should
be raised within one year from the date of the issuance
of the p a te n t. The re af te r th e ce r tif i ca te o f ti tl e b ased
thereon becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), [t]he
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under
the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are
the same in that both are against the whole world, both
take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the
decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final.
In Cabacug v Lao, a holder of a land acquired under a
fr ee pa ten t is mo re f avo ra bl y si tua ted th an th a t o f a n
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent
have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition
the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor
the right to repurchase within a period of five years.
Davids application was a renewal of his deceased wifes
a p p l i ca ti o n , w h e r e i n h i s d e ce a se d wi f e o ccu p i e d L o t
2892 since 1938.
T h e d e c i s i o n o f C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s o f J a n u a r y 3 1 ,
1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed

GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
FACTS
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an
i m p e r m i ss i b l e e n cr o a ch m e n t b y t h e Pr e si d e n t o n th e
legislative prerogative
- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the
Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines to awaken our peoples
consciousness in the nations cultural heritage and
encourage its preservation, promotion and development
- In the Cour t of First Instance , stre ss wa s laid on the
funds administered by the Center as coming from
do na tio n s a nd co n tri bu ti on s an d n o t a si n gl e ce n tav o
raised by taxation

- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of

e x e cu t i v e p o we r a n d th a t 2 ) t h i s i s su p p l e m e n ta r y t o
rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National
Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales
d id n o t hav e th e re qu i si te pe rson a li t y to co n te st a s a
taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the
Cultural Center came from donations and contributions
and not one centavo came from taxation
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of
the Philippines
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative
3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot
and academic
HELD
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal
standing to question executive acts that do not involve
the use of public funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power
t o a d m i n i ste r a t r u s t c r e a te d b y a n a gr e e m e n t w i th a
foreign country
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has
assumed a moot and academic character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the
Philippines came from donations and contributions and
not by taxation
-T here wa s that absence of the re qui site pecuniar y or
monetary interest
(2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman
in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate
as p ar en s p atr ia e , t h e P r e s i d e n t h a s a u t h o r i t y t o
implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by
creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens
to a dm in i ster th e p ri va te co n tr i bu ti on s a nd d on ati on s
given not only by the US government but also by private
persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust
m a y b e c o n c u r r e n t l y e x e r ci s e d b y t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d
Congress
D e ci si on DISMISSED, N o s t a n d i n g a n d e v e n i f t h e r e
was, still no encroa chment and that it is alread y moot
and academic

CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RES
PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997)
- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
-Group of people identified by self-ascription and

ascription by others, who have continuously lived as

organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory;
- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)
- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership,... including residential lots,
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms,
and tree lots.
- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)
- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial continuously to the present... including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources, and lands no longer occupied
exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional
access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still
nomadic or shifting cultivators.
- P r o ce d u r e : CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and
taxpa yers (upon the plea that questions raised are of
"transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION
(directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its
IR; DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular
2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds)
and M AND AMU S (commanding DENR Secretary to
comply with his duty of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions
of R A8371 (IPR A) as UNCONSTITUTION AL.
ISSUES
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing
Rules were questioned (1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an
unlaw fu l dep rivat io n of the State 's ow nersh ip o ver
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the
minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation
of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE.
(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF
PRIVATE LANDOWNERS.
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary
law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUE
PROCESS clause of the Constitution.
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order
No.1, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination", is
invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of
con trol o ve r execut ive depa rt ments .

HELD
There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices
were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then
redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the
same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
- Those in favor of dismissing petition:
J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J.
Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza
- Those in favor of granting petition:
J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon

SEPARATE OPINIONS
PUNO [dismiss]

- De ve lo pment of the Regalia n Doct rine in the

Philippine Legal System
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has
always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time,
yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof
before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner."
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under
the PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government .
The Torrens system requires that the government issue
an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
person named is the owner of such property described.
The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible.
D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was
established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in
the 1973 and 1987 Consti.
-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution
(1) AD and AL are the priva te p rope rt y of the IP
and do not const itute part of the la nd of the
public domains, as the y have acquired such
properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS
TITLE (AL).
a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was
never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title.
b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL
into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by
the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private.
(2) The right of ownership and possession b y the
ICC/IP to their AD is a L I M I T E D f o r m o f o w n e r s h i p
and does not include the right to alienate such
AD.
a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain.
But the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by

one particular person. Communal rights to the land are

held not only by the present possessors but extends to
all generations of the ICC/IP.
b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the
same ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject
to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if
transferred to a non-member of IP.
c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even
without a paper title.
(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as
the right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within
the AD does no t dep rive the Sta te of owne rship
o ver the NR, and of control and supervision in
the ir de ve lo pment and exploitation .
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the
Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural
resources" in such rights of ownership which is
CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA
is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
Managing and conserving these resources, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may
be harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the
1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and
who has the power to grant such preferential rights.
(4) IPR A is a recognition of our active participation
in the Inte rnat io nal In digeno us Mo ve ment .

VITUG [grant]

(1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain

the ancestral domains, as the notion of community
property involves matters of proprietary interest AND
also some forms of self-governance over the property.
(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular
Government cannot override the collective will of the
people expressed in the Constitution.
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get
Congress to look closely into the customary laws and,
with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to,
and make them part of the stream of laws." There
should be a balancing of interests between specific need
of IP and imperatives of national interest.

KAPUNAN [dismiss]

~Preliminary issues(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.

(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that
the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in
violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess
the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy.
(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe

the hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed

in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in
view of the importance of the issues raised.
~Substantive issues(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP
over the ancestral lands and domains are not
unconstitutional.
a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that
certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the
State.
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect
the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend
Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private
property, as they have acknowledged that AD shall be
treated as private property.
(2) The pro visions of R A8371 do not infringe upon
the State's ow nersh ip o ve r the natural resou rces
within the ancestral domains.
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does
not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the IP.
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike
native title to land, has NOT been recognized in the
Philippines.
(3) The provisions of IPR A pertaining to the
utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale
utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State
retains full control over such activities, through the
imposition of requirements and conditions for the
exploration, development and utilization of the NR.
b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly
circumscribed and are limited:
to manage and conserve NR within territories;
to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of NR;
to negotiate the terms and conditions for
exploration of NR in the area (refers only to the
preliminary activity of search and prospecting of
mineral resources);
to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project
that will affect AD;
to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages sustained by such projects;
to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with these rights
c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant
of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to
disregard pertinent laws and regulations.
~Corollary issues(1) IPR A does not violate the Due Process clause.

a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing

property regimes should be protected") belong to those
acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or nonindigenous. Where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish.
b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable,
or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to
the non-IP.
c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes
concerning property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties
involved are members of IP.
(2) Implementing Rules of IPR A does not infringe
upon the President's power of control over the
Execu tive Depart men t.
Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was
placed by Congress "under the Office of the President"
and as such, is still subject to the President's power of
control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.

MENDOZA [dismiss]

(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.

Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do
not involve actual cases or controversies without
upsetting balance of power.
(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public
right and the object of mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest. But in this case, what public
right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA
does not apply to them except in general and in
common with other citizens??

PANG ANIB AN [grant]

- RA8371 is unconstitutional in thatA. It recognizes and grants rights of ow nership

o ver "lands of the public domain which are ow ned
b y the State."
B. It lesse ns the aut horit y of the State to o versee
the "exp lo rat io n, de ve lo pme nt, and ut ilizat io n of
natural resources" which should under be the full
control and supervision of the State."
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to
the Constitution. Because of the State's implementation
of policies considered to be for the common good, all
those concerned have to give up, under certain
conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a
collective right, still perpetually withdraws such property
from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by
other citizens of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL
the Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino
citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of
alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or

term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on

ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that
AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8
and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the
country.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State
may directly undertake exploration, development and
utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned (and such
agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371
relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may
even exercise such right without any time limit.
(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their
AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual
ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth
to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens.

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent

SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS

REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married
to an American who is a member of the United States Air
Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She
had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air
Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years
a t the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had
some reservations regarding Shaufs work experience.
Pe r si the n re que ste d the C iv il i an Pe r so nn e l Offi ce to
initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea
Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then
i n f o r m e d b y C OR R O th a t a n E d w a r d B . I s a k so n w a s
selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls
at Clark Air Base on January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position,
Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity
complain against respondents for alleged discrimination
against the former by reason of her nationality and sex.
Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals
reversed decision.
ISSUES
1. W o N t h e o f f i c e r s o f t h e U S A r m e d F o r c e s
performing official functions in accordance with
the powers vested in them under the Philippine
Ameri can

Militar y

Ba ses

Agreemen t

are

immune from suit (even w/o consent of the

State).
2. WoN
the
respondents
are
guilty
of
discrimination against petitioner Shauf.
3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compen sato r y
damages.
HELD
As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti,
the state may not be sued without its consent. This is a
generally accepted principle of International law under
Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a
suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be
taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
al le ge d l y pe rf or me d b y th e m in th e di scha r ge of the i r
duties. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials by
one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is
not a suit against the State covered by the rule of
i m m u n i t y. T h e r e s p o n d e n t s a r e b e i n g s u e d i n t h e i r
private and personal capacity. T h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t h is
ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
c a n n o t b e u s e d a s a n in s t ru me n t f o r p e rp e t ra t in g
a n i n j u s t ic e . A p u b l ic o f f ic ia l ma y b e l ia b l e in h is
p e rs o na l p ri va te ca pa c it y f o r w ha te ve r d a ma ge he
ma y h a ve c a u s e d b y h is a c t d o n e w it h m a l ic e a n d
i n b a d f a it h , o r b e yo n d t h e s c o p e o f h is a u t h o r it y
or jurisdiction.

A u r o r a R a r a n g w a s a n e m p l o ye e i n t h e O f fi c e o f t h e
Provost Mar shal assigned as the merchandi se con trol
guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of
the Plan of the Da y a dail y publica tion that featured
among other s, an a ction line in quir y. On feb.3 ,1978 ,
an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods
were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the
mer chandise con trol in spector and tha t a cer tain
Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang,
being the onl y person named Auring in the said office,
went to press an action for damages against W ylie and
Williams a n d t h e U S N a v a l B a s e . ( T h a t R a r a n g w a s
indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven
by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent
publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in
performance of their official functions as officers of the
U S Navy and are thus immune from sui t (2) U S Naval
Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the
US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties involved.
Lo wer cou rt ruling: defendants pay damages becau se
acts we re n o t offi cia l a cts o f th e U S go ve rn me n t, b u t
personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the
rule that a sovereign country cant be sued wi thout its
consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.

D o c t r i n e Yes. Regalado is concurred with by MelencioHerrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.

1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even
ISSUES
without the consent of the State.
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine
2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination
Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune
against Shauf. Despite Shaufs qualifications,
from suit.
Persi did not even consider the former s
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act
a p p l i ca t i o n . Si n ce th e p e ti ti o n e r wa s a b l e to
while discharging official functions still covered by the
prove
the
discrimination
in
the
nonprinciple of state immunity from suit?
consideration of her application, the burden
sh i f te d t o th e r e sp o n d e n ts . T h e r e sp o n d e n t s
HELD
however answered with mere denials of the
1. Yes, they are immune.
charges.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the
U S governmen t are immune from suit (but onl y wh en
3. S h a u f n e e d n o t b e a w a r d e d c o m p e n s a t o r y the y are acting/ discharging their official functions.
d am a ge s. Th er e wa s n o pr oo f th a t she r ea ll y
was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the
this is part of the second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not
time. D a m a g e s w h i c h a r e m e re l y p o s s i b l e
are speculative. There must be an actual
be sued without its consent. But even without this
affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of
proof of loss.
4
i n co r p o r a t i o n . T h e d o c tr i n e i s a p p l i ca b l e n o t o n l y to
suits against the state but also to complaints filed
WYLIE V RARANG
against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
discharge of their official duties.
FACTS
P e t i t i o n e r s W yl i e a n d W il l i a m s w e r e th e a s si s t a n t
administrative
officer
and
commanding
officer,
respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent

4 principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a

condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.

Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to
comply with these principles in its relations with other states

T h e tr ad i ti on al ru le o f i m mu ni t y excep ts a Sta te f ro m
b e i n g su e d i n th e co u r ts of a n o th e r St a t e wi t h o u t i t s
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has
been necessary to distinguish them between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
T h e r e su l t i s th a t Sta te i mm un i t y no w exten d s o nl y to
acts jure imperii.
T h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , th a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r s
actively participated in screening the features and
a r ti c l e s i n t h e P OD a s p a r t o f th e i r o ffi ci a l f u n ct i o n s .
Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of
t h e i r o ff i c i a l f u n c t i o n s a r e i m m u n e f r o m su i t , th e n i t
should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable
for the questioned publication.
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued
in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts
in publishing a libelous article.
2. No.
Ratio Our laws and, we presu me, those of the United
S t a t e s d o n o t a l l o w th e c o m m i s s i o n o f c r i m e s i n t h e
n a m e o f o f fi c i a l d u t y. T h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s th a t p u b l i c
o ffi ci a l s ca n b e h e l d p e r so n a l l y a c co u n ta b l e f o r a ct s
claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot
in stitu tiona li ze irrespon sibil ity and non-accountab ili ty
nor grant a privile ged sta tu s not claimed b y any other
official of the Republic.
U n d e r Ar t. 2 1 7 6 o f th e ci v i l co d e , w h o e v e r b y a ct o r
omission, causes damage to another, there being fault
o r ne gl i gen ce i s ob li ge d to p a y f or the da ma ge d on e.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
c o n t r a c tu a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s , i s ca l l e d a
quasi-delict a n d i s go v e r n e d b y th e p r ov i s i o n s o f th i s
Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD
dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the
character and reputation of the private respondent.
Petitioner W ylie himself admitted that the Office of the
Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of
t h e n a m e Au r i n g i f t h e a r t i c l e w e r e p u b l i s h e d . T h e
p e ti t i o n e r s , h o w e v e r, w e r e n e g l i g e n t b e ca u se u n d e r
their direction they issued the publication without
deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra
vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
for the damages they caused the private respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO

CRUZ; February 26, 1990
FACTS

- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles
City
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all
involving state immunity.
G.R. No . 76607
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar
sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barbering services in the said base.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the
award to defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to
allow respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating concessions pending litigation.
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners
to maintain the status quo.
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminar y
injunction on the ground that the action was a suit
against the Un ite d Sta tes, which has not waived
its non-suabilit y, and that as officials/emplo yees
of the U.S. Air Force, defendants were also
immun e fro m su it .
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction as well as the motion to dismiss.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R . No. 79470
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against
Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal
as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City. After investigation, the ff:
facts were ascertained:
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking vegetables served to club customers.
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove
and referred the case to the Board of Arbitrators,
which found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.
- Defen dants , joined b y the United States of
America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force,
w as immu ne f rom suit, and that the suit was in
effect agains t the Un ited States , w hich has n ot
given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R . No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp
O Donnel, an extension of Clark Air Base.
- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye and
Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and

special agents of the United States Air Force Office of

Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed from employment.
- He then filed a complaint for damages against
individual petitioners.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
c o mp la in t o n t he g ro u n d t ha t t he d ef e nd a nt s w ere
acting in their official capacit y when the y did the
acts complained of and that the suit was against
the United States w ithout its conse nt.
- Motion was denied by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R . No. 80258
- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for
injuries sustained as a result of the acts of herein
petitioners.
- According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants
(herein petitioners) beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused
them extensive injuries.
- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested
for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest.
- The United States of America and the
individually named defendants mo ved to dismiss
the case and arg ued that the suit was in effect a
suit against the United States which has not given
its consent to be sued. The defendants also
c laimed immu nit y for acts done b y them in the
performance of their official functions.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the
motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the SC.
ISSUES
1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits
against the United States, to which it has not consented
2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity
from suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by
them in the performance of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States
HELD
1) R a ti o If the case involves the state entering into a
contract in the discharge of its commercial, proprietary
and private function, then the state will be deemed to
have impliedly consented to the suit.
R e a so n i n g
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over the other.

- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is
governmen tal activi tie s. The man tle of sta te im munity
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
dismissed.
cannot be extended to commercial, private and
consents.
G.R . No. 80258
proprietary acts.
- Consent may be express or implied.
- The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the
R e a so n i n g
- Express-embodied in a general or special law
record is too meager to indicate if the individual
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it
petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official
performing a governmental function on behalf of the US
commences litigation
functions, or had actually exceeded their authority.
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have
is, in effect, one against the US and, considering that the
suabilitya distinction must be made between contracts
determined in what capacity the individual petitioners
US has not waived or consented to the suit, the
entered into in a states governmental and sovereign
were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of
complaint cannot prosper.
capacity or private, proprietary and commercial capacity
state immunity is applicable.
- Immun ity of State from suit is one of the universal l y
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former
- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is
recognized principles of international law that the Phils.
does not.
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision.
Reco gni zes and adop ts as part of the la w of the land .
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the
This is anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of
individual petitioners in the performance of their official
states (an equal has no power over an equal).
JUSMAG
PHILIPPINES
V.
NLRC
functions as officers or agents of the United States, then
D i scu ssi on
they may not invoke immunity form suit.
PUNO; December 15, 1994
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable
- wa s cr ea te d pu r su an t to th e M il i tar y Assi stan ce
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
FACTS
Agreement dated March 21, 1947 between the
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
- Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security
Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise
duties.
assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG
a nd a ssi st the Ph i li pp i ne s o n ai r fo rce , a rm y a nd
- The fact tha t the acts were do ne b y the
Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs
naval matters
ind ivid ua l pet it io ners in the perf ormance of their
(1969-1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide
official functions as officers or agents of the
- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and
f un ds to cov er the sa la r ie s of SAS P an d se cu r i ty
Un ite d Sta tes is a mat ter of e vide nce, and charges
Employment (March 31, 1992) on the ground that he
guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of
against them may not be dismissed just by mere
was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for
utilities
assertion. If the individual petitioners are found liable for
reinstatement
- M e m o r a n d u m o f Ag r e e m e n t b e twee n AF P an d
personal torts in which the US itself is not involved, then
- JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its
JUSMAG-Phils
they alone must satisfy the judgment.
immu nit y f rom suit as an agency of US; also alleged
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)
lack of employer-employee relp and it has no juridical
- SAS P ar e em pl o ye e s of the AF P; un de r the
G.R . No. 76607
personality to sue and be sued
total operational control of the Chief JUSMAG- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US
- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for
Phils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement
are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
want of jurisdiction
pay liability for all appointed SASP
The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners
- NLRC reversedJUSMAG had lost its right not to be
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services
cannot plead any immunity.
sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the
of private respondent, it was performing a
- Petition is dismissed.
employer-employee relp under the control test and 2) it
governmental function on behalf of the US. Hence,
G.R . No. 79470
has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired
the suit is, in effect, one against the US
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
Sacramentos services.
Government.
partake of the nature of a business enterprise
- NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (US Govt
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a
undertaken by the US government in its proprietary
waived its immunity from suit by entering into a
universally
accepted
principle.
Immunity
is
capacity. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it
u nd er stoo d as th e ex em p ti on of th e sta te an d i ts
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local courts)
organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.
against them.
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed
- A sta te ca nn o t b e sue d i n th e cou r ts o f a no the r
- However, notwithstanding these considerations,
g r a v e a b u se o f d i s cr e t i o n i n r e v e r s i n g t h e l a b o r
state, without its consent or waiver. An exception
complaint in the court below must still be dismissed.
arbiters decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its
to the doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos,
Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of
immunity from suit, in finding an employeret al vs. Santos, et al: the state itself may be sued,
the strength of evidence that they acted properly in
employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento,
even without its consent, because by entering into a
terminating Genove for his disgusting offense.
and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying
co n tr a ct , t h e so v e r e i g n s ta t e h a s d e s ce n d e d th e
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is
that respondent is its employee for failure to
l e v e l o f t h e ci ti ze n a n d i t s co n se n t t o b e su e d i s
dismissed.
present proof.
implied from the very act of entering into such
G.R . No. 80018
contract.
- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the
ISSUE
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in
exercise of their official functions, and not in their
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the
Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided
private or unofficial capacity.
RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit?
- Exc ep t io n e vo l ve d : existence of contract does
- It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of
not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all
the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for
HELD
times, be sued in local courts.
acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
consent to be sued.
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or

U S v s . R u i z: ...d oes n ot app ly where the

US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: petitioners cannot

i n v o k e t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a t e i m m u n i t y.. . t h e
reason is that by entering into the employment
c o n t r a c t w i t h Ge n o v e i n th e d i s c h a r g e o f i t s
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself
of its sovereign immunity from suit.

HELD
No. Theres no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio
1 . RA No. 4201 has alread y repealed Com monweal th
Act No. 103 , and under thi s law, i t is now the Cler k of
this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
T herefore, the Clerk of th is Cour t has the autho rity to
issue writs of execution and notices
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even
irresolute. And 2 nd, the Peoples Homesite and Housing

- SASP are emplo yee s of the AF P as consistentl y

contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from
denying employer-employee relationship
D i sp o s i t i v e Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of
NLRC is reversed and set aside

Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue

and be sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are
public in character may be accepted in the sense that it
wa s go ve rn me n t- o wn ed . H o weve r, i t do es no t fo ll o w
that they were exempt from garnishment.

PNB V CIR
FERNANDO; January 31, 1978

SSS v CA
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983

contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign

functions

FACTS
- Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which
w a s se r v e d u p o n i t s b r a n ch o n Q C b y a n a u t h o r i ze d
deputy sheriff of the court
*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of
the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
d ep osi ted at th e p eti ti on e r s br an ch in QC i n or de r to
satisfy the decision of the respondent court
- P N B f i l e d a m o t i o n t o q u a sh t h e n o t i ce b a se d o n 2
grounds:
1. t h e a p p o i n t me n t o f r e s p o n d e n t Gi lb e r t L o re n zo
as authorized deput y sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law
*** PNB contends that the service of notice by the
authorized deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec.
5
11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105
*** It argues that i t i s t h e s h e r i f f o f Q C a n d n o t t h e
C l e r k o f t h i s c o u r t w h o i s i t s E x - o f f i c i o S h e r i f f , that
has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and
that the actual service of the latter officer of said notice
is therefore not in order
2. the funds subject of the character may be
public in character
- COIR denied PNBs motion to quash a notice of
garnishment
ISSUE
W ON an order of Cour t of Industr ial Rela tion s (COIR )
d en yi n g, fo r la ck of m er i t, pe ti tio ne r PN Bs mo ti on to
6
quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion.
5

All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed

free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this

court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance
6

Garnishment a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to

satisfy a debt
-- also the attachment of such property

FACTS
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate
loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at
Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this real estate
loan said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the
corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the
amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to
P48,000.00 covering said property.
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the
ground, among others that the conditions of the
mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the
default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the
installments then due and payable on the principal debt
and the interest thereon, and all of the monthly
installments due and payable thereafter up to the
present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the
mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday
Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the
sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property.
Despite plaintiffs letter to defendant demanding the
latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the
publication of the notice of sale of their property
claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of
their monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on
to publish second and third publications of foreclosure.
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for
damages and attorney's fees against the SSS and the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things,
that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS.

Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Courts decision. Hence,

this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES
(1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have
warranted the publications of the notices of as would
have foreclosure
(2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
(3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
HELD
(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence,
factual findings of the lower court are not subject to
review by this Court.
R e a so n i n g The reasoning used precedence to arrive at
this ratio. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that
the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgagedebtors have not in fact violated their contract because
SSS accepted their installment payments although given
late will not be disturbed on appeal.
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions,
by virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is
deemed to have waived immunity from suit, although it
does not thereby concede its liability.
R e a so n i n g Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by
precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National
Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental
functions. In that case it said, It is sufficient to say that
the government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in any
court under its charter. The enabling law is R.A. No.
6395. Applying this rule in the present case, the SSS
own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and
be sued in Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and
P.D. 24. Hence, theres a statutory consent by the SSS to
waive right of immunity from suit.
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be
adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure
proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the
debtor of his installments.
D e ci si on (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain.
While it is true that the payments of the monthly
installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that
as of June 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and
Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the
payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted
the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the
appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior
notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage.
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from
suit.
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
Vot i n g 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.

SEPARATE OPINION
MAKASIAR [dissent]
What was committed in this case was a tortious act
(grossly negligent bordering on malice or bad faith) of
the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage
of the wrong mortgage-debtor
SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by
the tortious acts of its employees in the performance
of their regular functions
SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is
immune from suit despite its Charter provision that it
can sue and be sued.
SSS exercises purely governmental functions and
cannot be sued without its consent for the tortious
acts of its personnel

COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS

V BURGOS
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the
compensation determined is now the issue. The value of
t h e p r o p e r t y w a s p e g ge d a t P 2 .3 7 p e r s qu a r e m e te r
based on the price used in the conve yan ce of several
pieces of property in the same area at about the same
time . Ho wev er, the court a quo in de terminin g due
compensation, considered the value of the pesos to the
dollar at the time the case was being decided. So
instead of just P14,615.79 the amount awarded became
P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided
by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be
P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being multiplied by
6 . 7 7 5 ) . B a se d o n t h i s a m o u n t , t h e co u r t d e t e r m i n e d
interest to be P145,410.44. Total due from the
g o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a t t o r n e y s f e e o f t e n p e r c e n t
amounted to P214,356.75.
- Ap p a r e n tl y, th e co u r t a q u o , i n r ev i s i n g u p w a r d th e
co mpensa tion , relied on Ar ti cle 1250 of the New Civil
Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an
amount different from what has been agreed on because

1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is

proper
2. WON the attorneys fees awarded were exorbitant
HELD
1) In a revie w of the relevan t Article of the New Civil
Code, the Court noted that the provision applies only if
there was a contract or agreement. Using the precedent,
Velasco vs Manila Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971),
the court expressed the view that the taking of private
property by the government in the exercise of its
eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual
obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of
because the obligation of the government sought to be
enforced does not originate from contract, then Article
1250 does not apply. The just compensation is the value
of the property at the time it was taken.
- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of
the land as there was no motion of reconsideration
from the Solicitor General before the decision
became final.
2 ) T h e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t Am g a b l e o n l y s k e d f o r
P5,000 attorneys fees and hence the amount
requested is reasonable.
D i sp o s i t i v e

Judgment appealed is reversed as to the

basis of determining the price of the land. And the price

of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79
plus six percent per annum interest reckoned from the
time the property was taken to the time the
compensation is paid.

GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES V DORR
LADD; May 19, 1903
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted
upon a complaint charging them with the offense of
w r i t i n g , p u b l i sh i n g , a n d c i r cu l a t i n g a s cu r r i l o u s l i b e l
against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The
complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission . The alleged libel was published as an 7
seeking to bring into disrepute by

of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or

deflation.
- The government, through the Solicitor General,

e d i to r i a l i n th e i ssu e of M a n i l a F r e e d o m o f Ap r i l 6 ,
1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its

appealed the decision contending that the court a quo

erred in applying its method and violated the high

7 Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish,

cou r ts or de r to ma ke as a b asi s o f co mp en sa tio n the

p ri ce or th e val ue o f th e la nd wh e n i t wa s ta ken . Th e
Solicitor General also took issue wi th the award of ten
percen t as attorne ys fees as exhorbi tan t con siderin g
that Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
ISSUES

members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as

j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a ce a n d t h e b r a n d i n g o f Tri n i d a d H .
P a r d o d e Tav e r a a s a c o w a r d a n d a r a s c a l , w e r e
explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. W h a t i s m e a n t i n s e c t i o n 8 o f Ac t N o . 2 9 2 b y t h e
expression the Insular Government of the Philippines? 8
2 . W he th e r th e a r ti cl e co n st i tu te s a n o ffe n se u n d e r
section 8 of Act No. 292?
HELD
1. Ratio T he ter m gov er nm en t as e mp lo yed in Act
No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission is
used in the abstract sense of the existing political
system as distinguished from the concrete organism of
the Government the Houses of Congress and the
Executive.
R e a so n i n g There are two admissible meanings of the
term government provided: a. in a general and
abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of the
Islands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whom
th e G ov e r n m e n t o f th e I sl a n d s i s , f o r th e ti m e b e i n g ,
administered. The first admissible definition is derived
from the act of ( the U.S.) Con gre ss on Ju l y 14 , 1798,
commonly known as the Sedition Act) 9
2. Ratio
T he pu bl i ca ti on of an ar ti cle ca n no t b e
punished under Act No. 292 of the United States
Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies
un le ss i t ha s a te nd en c y to pr od uce di saffe cti on o r a
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to its laws.
- T h e p u b l i ca t i o n o f a n a r t i c l e a b u s i v e o f t h e U n i t e d
States Philippine Commission and its members is not a
libel upon the Government and does not fall within said
Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.
R e a so n i n g The article in que stion contains no a tta ck
up on the gove rn me n t s yste m of the U .S., an d th ou gh
grossl y abusive as respects both the Commission as a
body and some of its individual members, it contains no
attack upon the governmental system by which
authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands.
Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that
the writer is
impugning the purity of their motives, their public
in te gr i ty, a nd the i r p riv a te m or a l s, a nd the wi sd o m of
8

or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or

the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such
evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. (Italics mine)

N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve

the next issue.
9

It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to

be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist
or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States,
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said
Government, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite
against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the
United States"

their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no

seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no
offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)
D i sp o s i t i v e The judgment of conviction is reversed and
the defendants are acquitted.

has acquired dominion

September 18, 1968.

TERRITORY

June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring

certain area (the Kalayaan Island Group or more
commonly known as the Spratly Islands) as Philippine
t e r r i to r y a s w e l l a s p r ov i d i n g fo r i ts Go v e r n m e n t a n d
Administration.

said area is vital to the security and economic

survival of the Philippines and much of it is part
of the con tinen tal mar gin of the Ph il.
archipelago

the area does not legally belong to any state or

ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and water embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046

An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines
- Approved: 17 June 1961
Whereas clauses
1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:
All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of
Paris (1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and USBritain treaty (1930).
All waters around, between and connecting the
various islands of the archipelago.
All waters beyond outermost islands of
archipelago but within limits of boundaries set
forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of
Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining
appropriate points of the outermost islands of the
archipelago.
Section 1 It defines and describes the baselines for the
territorial sea of the Phils.
Section 2 All waters within the baselines provided in
sec1 are considered inland or internal waters of the
Phils.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446

R . A. 5 4 4 6 i s si m p l y a n Ac t t o co r r e ct t yp o gr a p h i ca l
errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining the baselines of
the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further says that
the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of
t h e P h i l i p p i n e Ar c h i p e l a g o a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s Ac t i s
wi thout prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils.

and sovereignty. Approved

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596

- It also restricts other countries from exercising the

rights above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs
- The President may authorize a government agency to
promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree
- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall
be subject to a fine (P2,000-P100,000) or imprisonment
(6 mos 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or
articles used shall be confiscated.

PEOPLE

PREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of

Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
nation and by reason of history, indispensable
need,
effective
occupation
and
control
society and establish s Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
e st a b l i sh e d i n a cco r d a n ce w i t h i n te r n a t i o n a l
law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil,
c o n s e r v e a n d d e v e l o p o u r p a t r i m o n y, a n d s e c u r e t o
ou rse lv es an d o ur po ste r i ty, the bl e ssi n gs of
continental margin and air space) must be
deemed to belong to and subject to the
independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
sovereignty of the Phil.
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

other states claims to some of the area cannot

p r e v a i l o v e r t h e cl a i m s o f th e P h i l i p p i n e s o n
legal, historical, and equitable grounds
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

n a m e d i t K a l a ya a n a n d c o n s t i t u t e d i t a s a
AND STATE POLICIES
distinct and separate municipality of Palawan

administration and government shall be vested

Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican
in the Secretary of National Defense or in other
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
Civil govt. or AFP officers as may be designated
government authority emanates from them.
by the Pres.
Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
Establishing an Exclusive Economic
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided
Zone and for Other Purposes
by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which

a state has special rights over the exploration and use of
marine resources Wikipedia
- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and
from the baselines from which the territorial sea
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries
shall be determined by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ?
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration
and exploitation, conservation and management
of the natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to
the establishment and utilization of artificial
islands, off-shore terminals, installations and
structures, the preservation of the marine
environment, including the prevention and control
of pollution, and scientific research
o Other rights recognized by international law or
state practice

Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to
he al th of the pe op le a nd in sti l l he al th con scio u sn e ss
among them.
Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful

ART III BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec 2:
Sec 7:

ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec 4:

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec 2:

ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Sec 25:

TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

VITUG; March 3, 2004
FACTS
- O n D e c e m b e r 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 , F P J f i l e d h i s ce r t i f i ca t e o f
candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented
himself to be a natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or
Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20,
1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
cour se or to cancel his cer tifi cate of cand idacy on the
ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJs parents were
foreigners his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an
A m e r i c a n a n d h i s f a t h e r A l l a n F. P o e w a s a
Spanish national being a son of Loren zo Pou, a
Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Fi lipino citi zen , he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a cer ta in Pa u li ta Go me z bef or e ma rr yi n g
Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified
copy of a supposed certification of the
marriage in July 5, 1936.
- Eve n if no su ch p ri o r ma rr i a ge exi sted ,
Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a
year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage
cer ti fi ca te of the i r ma rr i a ge re fl e cte d the
date of their marriage to be on September
1 6 , 1 9 4 0 wh e r e Al l a n w a s 2 5 , u n m a r r i e d
and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried
and American.
- FPJs earliest established ascendant was his
grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- N o b i r th ce r ti f i ca t e f o r L o r e n zo b u t h i s d e a th
certificate issued upon his death in September 11,
1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino
residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan
was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of
Allan showed that his father was an Espaol
father and to a mestiza Espaol mother.
P r o ce d u r e

- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC,

Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- C e r t i f i e d p h o to co p y o f a n a ffi d av i t b y P a u l i ta
Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy
case against Allan F. Poe because of his
relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)
English translation of (b)
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan
F. Poe
- C er ti fi ca tio n fr om th e di re cto r of the R e co rd s
M an a ge m en t an d Ar ch i ve s Offi ce sta ti n g th a t a
Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before
1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of
the N a tio na l Ar ch iv es sta ti n g th a t the r e wa s n o
available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among
others:
- Certification that there was no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division
of t he Nat ional Ar chiv es tha t the re wa s no
available information about the marriage of Allan
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds
of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
- C op ie s o f ta x d ecl ar a tio n s un de r the n am e of
Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of
San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of
the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946
were destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier
petition for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for
reconsideration on Januar y 26, 2004. The motion was
denied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 Fornier filed a petition before the
Supre me Court, pra ying for TRO, a wr it of preliminar y
in ju n ctio n o r a n y othe r r e so lu ti on th a t wo u ld sta y th e
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
- T h e t w o o t h e r p e t i t i o n s ( Tec s o n a n d D e s i d e r o v .
COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court
h a s o r i gi n a l a n d e x cl u si v e j u r i sd i ct i o n to r e so l v e th e
basic issue on the case.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases
filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on
the ground that he materially misrepresented in his

certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born

Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases
involving a presidential candidate could be
elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the
Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not
i n cl u d e ca se s d i r e c tl y b r o u gh t b ef o r e i t
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
R e a so n i n g
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases
filed?
- Fornier petition - Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the
COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following:
- A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground tha t any mate rial represen tation
contained therein as required under Section
74 is false (Omnibus Election Code, Sec.
78)
- the Commission shall have exclusive
charge
of
the
enforcement
and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of
enduring
free,
orderly
and
honest
elections (Sec. 52, same)
- an y i n te re ste d pa r ty authorized to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate (Art. 69, same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification
c a se s m a y b e r e v i e w e d b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule
65). Aside from that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of
the Constitution, any decision, order or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt thereof.
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court
w h i ch i n c l u d e s t h e d u t y o f t h e co u r t s t o se t t l e
actu al co n tr ov er sie s inv olv in g ri gh ts wh i ch ar e
legally demandable and enforceable and to
de termine whe ther or no t there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch of
instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1,
Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art.
7 , S e c 4 ( 7 ) o f th e C o n st i tu ti o n i n a ssa i l i n g th e
COMELECs jurisdiction when it took cognizance of

the Fornier petition because the Supreme Court

Philippines entitled to

- In th e 1 8 ce n tu r y, th e c o n c e p t w a s c i v i l th

sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- A contest refers to a post-election scenario.

citizenship which established the rights

necessar y for necessar y for individual
f r e e d o m ( e g . R i g h t s t o p r o p e r t y, p e r so n a l
liberty and justice)
- In the 19 cen tu r y, i t ex pa nd ed to in clu de th

protection of the US.

- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 first appearance
of the term citizens of the Philippine islands. A
c i t i ze n o f th e P h i l i p p i n e i sl a n d s u n d e r th i s Act
was:

Election contests are either election protests or a

quo warran to whi ch wo uld have the objective of
dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:

political citizenship which encompassed the

right to participate in the exercise of political
power.
- In the 20 th century, there was the

- An in h a b i ta n t o f th e Ph ilip p in e s a n d a
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- A native born inhabitant

- Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all

contestsrelating to qualifications of the
President
or
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines. (Rule 12)
- An election contest is initiated by the filing
of an election con test or a peti tion for quowarranto against the President or VicePresident. (Rule 13)
- Only the registered candidate for President
or Vice-President who received the second or
t h i r d h i gh e s t n u m b e r of v o te s m a y co n te s t
the election of the President or the VicePresidentby filing a verified petitionwithin
30 days after the proclamation of the
winner. (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President and the Vice
P r e s i d e n t a n d n o t ca n d i d a t e s f o r P r e s i d e n t o r
Vice-President.

development of social citizenship which laid

emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an
ongoing development.

2. Ratio
FPJs citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7
dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and
il legitima cy shou ld onl y remain in the sphere of
c iv i l l a w a n d sh o u l d n o t u n d u l y i m p i n ge o n t h e
domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of
w h e th e r su ch ch i l d r e n a r e l e g i t i m a te of
illegitimate.
R e a so n i n g
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on
the ground that he materially misrepresented in his
certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Ar i s t o t l e d e s c r i b e d a c i t i z e n a s a m a n w h o
shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office and the state would be
composed of such individuals in order to achieve
a self-sufficient existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on
the one hand and with concomitant obligations on
the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18 to 20 th
centuries.

- C i t i ze n sh i p i n th e Ph i l i p p i n e s f r o m th e S p a n i sh
times to the present
- During the Spanish period, no such term as
Philippine citizens, only Spanish subjects. In
church records, natives were identified as
indios.
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined
the politica l statu s of children born in the
Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not
extended to the Philippines because the
colony was to be governed by special laws.
- Accor di n g to th e C iv il C od e of Spa in , the
following were Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- C h i l d r e n o f a Sp a n i sh f a th e r o r m o th e r
even if they were born outside Spain
Foreigners
who
have
obtained
naturalization papers
- Those who, without such papers, may
have become domiciled inhabitants of any
town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the
civil and political status of the native inhabitants
would be determined by the US Congress.
Spanish subjects and natives who choose to
remain in the territory may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a
d ecl ar a tio n of the i r de ci si on wi th in a ye a r fr om
t h e d a t e o f t h e r a ti f i c a t i o n o f t h e t r e a t y. If n o
such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be
held renounced and they would have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
- U p o n r a ti f i ca ti o n of th e tr e a t y, t h e n a ti v e
inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish
subjects.
th
- They did not become American citizens but
were issued passports describing them to be

citi zens

of

the

- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain

- An in h a b i ta n t wh o o b ta in e d Sp a n i sh
papers on or before April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child
born between April 11, 1899 and July 1, 1902
as there was no citizenship law in the
Ph i li pp i ne s. Th e co m mo n la w p ri nci pl e ju s
s o l i ( p r i n ci p l e o f t e r r i t o r i a l i t y) w a s s a i d t o
govern those born in the Ph ilippine s durin g
this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) A native
born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899
if:
- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- S i n ce th a t d a te , n o t a c i t i ze n o f a n o th e r
country
- 1935 Constitution provided that jus sanguinis
(blood relationship) be the basis for citizenship, as
stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- T h o se w h o a r e c i t i ze n s o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e
Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines
- T h o se w h o se m o th e r s a r e ci ti ze n s of th e
Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Th ose wh o ar e na tur al i zed i n acco rd an ce
with law
- 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4)
of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken
together with the existing civil law provisions
w o u l d p r ov i d e th a t w o m e n wo u l d a u to m a ti ca l l y
lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of
their foreign husbands.
This was deemed
discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino
wo ma n fr om tr an sm i tti n g h er ci ti zen shi p to h er
legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
c i t i ze n sh i p u p o n r e a c h i n g t h e a g e o f m a j o r i t y.
The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973

Constitution state that the following are citizens of

the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines
- Tho se who el e ct Ph i li pp i ne ci ti zen sh ip
pursuant to the provisions of the 1935
Constitution
- T ho se wh o a re n a tu ra l i ze d in a cco r da n ce
with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which
provided that a female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien retainers her
P h i l i p p i n e ci ti ze n sh i p u n l e ss b y h e r a ct o r
omi ssion she is deemed to have renounced
her citizenship under the law.
- 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in
A r t i c l e 4 , S e c . 1 th a t th e fo l l o w i n g a r e F i l i p i n o
citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are
citizens of the Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino
mo the r s who e le ct Ph il i pp in e
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- T ho se wh o a re n a tu ra l i ze d in a cco r da n ce
with law.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the
Philippines
should
be,
among
the
many
re quire ments, a natural- born citi zen of the
Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).
- Natural born citizen citizens of the Philippines
f ro m bi r th wi tho u t h avi n g to p er fo rm a n y act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship
- C i t i ze n sh i p o f F P J i n r e l a t i o n t o g r a n d f a th e r
Lorenzo Pous citizenship and father Allan F. Poes
citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because
his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty
to be drawn from the documents
presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and
Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20,
1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
m a r r i e d to e a ch o th e r o n Se p te m b e r
16, 1940.
- T h e f a t h e r o f Al l a n F. P o e w a s
Lorenzo Pou.

- At the time of his death on

September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old.
- The public documents submitted are
deemed trustworthy.
The
three
documents
(birth
certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate
o f Be ssie an d Alla n an d th e d ea th
ce r tif i ca te o f L or en zo) wer e cer ti fi ed
true copies of the originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3)
state that when the subject of the
inquiry is the content of the document,
no evidence shall be admissible except
t h e o r i g i n a l d o cu m e n t i t se l f . O n e o f
the exceptions however is when the
original is a public record in the
custody of a public office is recorded in
a public office.
- As public documents, the three
documents are prima facie proof of
their contents as stated in the Rules of
Court (130, Section 44) that the entries
in official records made by a public
officer in the performance of his duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. This is grounded on:
of official duty in the preparation of the
sta te me n t m ad e . Th e p en al t y affix ed
to a breach of that duty. Rou tine and
disinterested origin of most such
s ta te m e n ts . Pu b l i ci t y o f t h e r e co r d
which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have
occurred
- It i s sa fe to a ssu m e tha t Lo re n zo Pou s
place of residence at the time of death was
the same as his residence before death in
the absence of evidence that would attest
otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the en masse
Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
e ffecte d in 1 90 2 . Th i s ci ti ze n sh ip wou l d
then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJs
father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870
during the Spanish colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not
i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s d u r i n g t h e cr u ci a l
period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no
existing record to attest to that claim.
- F or ni e r fa il ed to sho w th a t L or en zo
was out of the country during that
same time period.
- L o r e n zo s r e s i d e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f
death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- F o r p r o o f o f f i l i a t i o n o r p a t e r n i t y, t h e
mandator y rules of civil law would not appl y

in this case. The duly notarized declaration

b y R u b y Ke l l e y M a n ga h a s, F P J s m a te r n a l
aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
p a t e r n a l r e l a t i o n sh i p w i t h F P J ( l i v i n g w i t h
Bessie and the children in one house as one
family) would be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules
under civil rule should apply because FPJ was
an illegitimate son.
Acknowledgement
needed
to
establish
paternity
(eg.
Acknowledgement
in
the
birth
certificate by signing name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no
signature of Al lan F. Poe in the birth
certificate of FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code acknowledgement
of il legitima te chi ldren of three types
which had to be done during the
lifetime of the presumed parent:
- Vo l u n t a r y ( e x p r e s s l y m a d e i n
r e c o r d b i r t h , w i l l o r a s t a te m e n t
before the court in authentic
writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood
b r o t h e r s a n d s i s te r s o f a n
illegitimate
child
who
was
recognized as natural)
Compulsory
(demanded
generally in cases when the child
h ad i n hi s fav or a n y ev id en ce to
prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized
the rules as stated in Articles 172,
173 and 175 and the rules have
r e tr o a c t i v e e ff e c t ( Ar t i c l e 2 5 5 ) .
These provisions are there to
g o v e r n th e p r i v a te a n d p e r so n a l
affairs of the family. There is little
indication that this should also
govern his political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of civil
l a w, b ei n g t h a t b ra nc h of la w wh i c h i s
concerned with the organization of the
f a m i l y a n d r e gu l a ti o n o f p r o p e r t y.
Th e
relevance of ci ti zenship is exempl ified in
Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of
d e te rm i ni n g ci ti zen sh ip sta tu s sho ul d b e
deemed
independent
from
those
p re scri be d fo r civi l cod e pu rp o se s. T he
ordinary rules should govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also
be resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an
illegitimate child cannot inherit his fathers
citizenship.

- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were

F i li p in o , All an s ci ti ze n sh ip wou l d no t h ave
b e e n tr a n sm i tt e d to F P J b e ca u se F P J w a s
illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of
the bigamous marriage between his parents
A l l a n a n d B e s s i e f o r t h e r e a s o n th a t Al l a n
alle ged l y had a prior existing marria ge to a
certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that
the veracity of this marriage between Paulita
and Allan is doubtful.
- F or ni e r al so co n ten de d tha t eve n i f Al la n
and Bessies marriage was not bigamous, FPJ
was still illegitimate because his parents were
married after he was born. Fornier based his
ar gumen ts on the case s of Morano v. Vivo ,
Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is
important to note the lis mota in each
case. If the pronouncement of jus
sangunis was in the lis mota, it would
co n st i t u te d o ctr i n e co u r te s y o f sta r e
decisis. If not, it is mere obiter dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there
was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of
the case s. If there was ju s san gun is
mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate
ch il d can no t in he ri t th e fa the r s ci ti zen shi p
has no textual basis in the Constitution and
violates the equal protection clause.
- For jur ispruden ce that re garded an
illegitimate child to inherit the mothers
citi zenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the child with the assumption
that the mother would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since
h e w a s b o r n d u r i n g th a t ti m e p e r i o d a n d i t
states that Filipino citizens include those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
D e ci si on
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs
citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor
to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation
i n hi s cer ti fi ca te of ca nd i da c y. F or ni e r v. C OM EL EC
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original
petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.

SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO

Jurisdiction
- SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction

- Tecson and Valdez petitions petitioners cannot

invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution because the
word contest means that the Court can only be
invoked after the election and proclamation of a
President or Vice President. There can be no
contest before a winner is proclaimed.
- Fornier petition as a review under R64 in
relation to R65 of the RoC, Court has jurisdiction.
- C OMELEC did not commi t grave abuse of di scre tion
when it ruled that petitioner failed to prove by
substantial
evidence
that
FPJ
deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizan
in his CoC
- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC
decisions is a limited power
- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC
decision on the ground that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or
capricious)
- T h e r u l i n g o f th e C OM E L E C d e n yi n g th e p e t i t i o n to
disqualify respondent Poe is based on substantial
evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capricious
Romualdez-Marcos
v
COMELEC

misrepresentation must not onl y be material but

also deliberate and willful
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show
that (1) respondent made misrepresentation in his
CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the
position to which he is candidate and (3) that
material misrepresentation was made deliberately
and willfully
- Analysis of petitioners evidence
- Certificate of birth only proved the date of birth
of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-born citizen
- S wor n sta tem en ts of Pau l i ta Gom e z cha r gin g
Al l a n Po e w i th b i ga m y a n d m a r r i a ge l i ce n se o f
between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented
thru Dir. Manapat pulled out because they were
fabricated
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show
that the files submitted by the petitioner are
fabricated by Manapats instructions
- Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not
be considered because of technical grounds
- SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasijudicial body and are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence.
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe also fabricated;
does not prove anything besides birth
- Cer tifi cation of Dir. Manapat that the Na tional
Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered
or resided in the Philippines before 1907
manufactured
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives
D i v t h a t t h e R e g i s t e r o f B i r th s th a t t h e r e i s n o
information on the National Archives on the birth
of Allan Poe to the spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta
Reyes lack of information is not proof

- Po e fr om the tim e of h is inv ol un ta r y bi r th ha s

always conducted himself as Filipino
- F o r f a i l u r e o f th e p e ti t i o n e r to d i sch a r g e th e
burden of proof, Poe is entitled to an outright
di smi ssal of the Fornier petition. Poe does not
need to present contrary evidence for the burden
of proof is not shifted to him.
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction
and the issue of whether respondent Poe is a naturalborn citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier
p e t i t i o n n e e d n o t b e r e m a n d e d to th e C O M E L E C f o r
further reception of evidence
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a
second opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error
- In li gh t of the se erudite opinions of our amici
curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is
not only wring with his facts but also wrong with
his law.
- Remand means a new round of litigation in the
COMELEC when its proceedings have long been
closed and terminated; to give another chance to
prove facts which he failed to prove before
- F a v o r s o f r e m a n d ca n n o t b e e x te n d e d to th e
litigant because of political neutrality
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding
by judicial legislation, hence, unconstitutional
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately
m a d e a m a te r i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n h i s C o C
wh en he wro te that he i s a natural -born Fil ipino
citizen
- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the
ch a r a c t e r o f a S 7 8 p r o ce e d i n g (W O N F O J i s a
natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue
a n d n o t j u s t a n i s su e i n c i d e n ta l to t h e i s su e o f
material misrepresentation)
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is
something only legislature can change by another
law
- Remand will violate respondent Poes right to due
process, hence, unconstitutional
- If ca se we r e r e m a n d e d to th e C OM E L E C , th e
body is no longer an impartial tribunal is there are
thr ee o f th e se ve n me mb er s of th e com m i ssio n
that have given firm view that Poe is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of
w h e th e r r e sp o n d e n t P o e i s q u a l i f i e d . D e l a y w i l l a l so
prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political
opponents.
- T he righ t to run for public offi ce include s the
right to equal chance to compete. The right to run
is empty if the chance to win is diminished of
denied a candidate.
- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue
and declare respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on
the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC

- Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in

determining his status as natural-born citizen --- that is
the law.
- The law does not make any distinction in
applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate children.
- Morano v Vivo WON the stepson was to file the
natural cerebral house.
- Chiongbian v de Leon a legitimate son whose
father became Fi lipino becau se of election to a
public office before the 1935 constitution
- Serra v Republic an illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother
- Paa v Chan Quin tin claim s tha t his fa ther is
Filipino because his grandmother is a Filipina. The
cou r t r ul ed th a t si n ce th er e i s n o p ro of tha t hi s
grandmother is Filipino then his father is not
Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well.
The courts ruling should have stopped here but
the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if
Q u i n t i n s f a th e r we r e F i l i p i n o , h e w o u l d n o t b e
Filipino because he was illegitimate.
- The statements on the illegitimate child
were unnecessary and were just obiter dicta
a n d n o t ratio decidendi , t h e r e f o r e d o n o t
constitute stare decisis.
- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if
repeated endlessly.
- Reasons why court should create new doctrine:
- There is no textual foundation
- It violates the equal protection clause
- People v Cayat established the doctrine on
constitutionally allowable distinctions. Such
distinction must be germane to the purpose
of the law.
- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor The duty
of thi s Cour t is to forsake and abandon an y
doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the
law in force.
- U b i l e s n o n d i st i n g u i t n e n o s d i s ti n gu e r e
debemus, especially if the distinction has no
textual
- Merlin Magallona transmissive essence of
citizenship
- To e s t a b l i sh th a t r e s p o n d e n t P o e i s a n a tu r a l - b o r n
citi zen, all that is needed is proof of his filiation to his
father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical
fact.
- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondents father is
well established.
- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate
will violate our treaty obligation.
D i sp o s i t i v e
Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is
qualified to run for Pre sident involves a con stitu tiona l
issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court
is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent
Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by
the interplay of national and international law. Given the
indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court,

th e be tter po li c y a pp ro a ch i s to l e t the pe op le d ecid e

who will be the next President. For on political
questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people
will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the
u n e l e cte d m e m b e r s o f th i s C o u r t th e r i g h t to e l e c t i n
behalf of the people.
IN VIEW WHEREOF , the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434,
161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED.

DAVIDE

FACTS
- January 9, 2004 Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ
and to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the May 10
e le cti on s b ecau se of h e i s n o t a na tu ra l - bo rn F i li p in o
citizen
- J a n u a r y 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 C OM E L E C d i sm i s s e d t h e ca s e
d e c l a r i n g th a t i ts ju r i sd i c ti o n i s l i m i te d t o a l l m a tte r s
r e l a t i n g t o e l e c t i o n , r e t u r n s a n d q u a l i f i ca t i o n s o f a l l
e le ctiv e re gi on al , pr ovi n ci a l an d ci t y offi cia l s, bu t n ot
those of national officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
ci ti ze n sh ip of na tio na l o ffici al s un de r se c 7 8 o f
OE C o n p e ti t i o n s to d e n y d u e co u r se o r ca n ce l
cer tifi cates of candida cy on the ground of false
material representation.
- Findings:
- Fornier evidence is not substantial
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material
r ep re sen ta tio n wh en he sta te d tha t he i s a
natural-born Filipino citizen
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of
ce r ti o r a r i u n d e r R 6 5 R o C t o ch a l l e n ge ju r i sd i c ti o n o f
COMELEC over the issue of FPJs citizenship. They claim
that only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)
- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues:
- W h e t h e r C OM E L E C h a s j u r i sd i c t i o n o v e r t h e
petitions to deny due course or cancel certificated
of candidacy of Presidential candidates
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of
Tecson, Velez and Fornier
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if hes
a natural-born Filipino citizen
Jurisdiction
- Tecson and Velez petitions
- The provision in the constitution only refers to
past-election remedies, they should have resorted
t o p r e - e l e c ti o n r e m e d i e s i n th e O EC wh i ch a r e
implemented by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
- Pre-election remedies are not within the
jurisdiction of the SC
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original
jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate for
an elective office ineligible for the office for which
h e fi le d hi s cer ti fi ca te of ca nd id a cy b ecau se of
any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.
- Fornier petition

- SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A

S7 Consti )
- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON
C OMELEC com mitted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtVIII S1
Consti)
WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
1 . F P J wa s b or n on 20 Au gu s t 19 39 i n Ma ni la ,
Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3 . Be s s i e K e l l e y a n d Al l a n P o e w e r e m a r r i e d o n 1 6
September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo
Poe , albei t a Spani sh sub je ct, wa s not shown to have
declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty
of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ratio
For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate
ch ild whose fa ther is F ilipino and who se mother is an
alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child
to follow the citizenship of the father
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV
S1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make any
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children
of Filipino fathers.
Petitions are dismissed.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

M a y c o u r t e x e r c is e j u d i c i a l p o w e r t o d is q u a l i f y a
candidate before the election?
- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of
the people to choose their candidates.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of
this Court, in his Separate Opinion said, In my view, the
issue in this case is whether the Commission on
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground tha t the y la ck eli gi bili ty for the office to whi ch
they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that
the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only
in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warranto o r a n e l e c t i o n p r o t e s t i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
forum.
- Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.
- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed
a g a i n s t th e m a s se s , a s i t u a t i o n n o t a l l o w e d b y t h e
Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian
G u a r d i a n C o u n c i l .T h i s C o u r t, a s th e l a st gu a r d i a n o f
d e m o c r a c y, h a s t h e d u t y t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t o f o u r
nation to a genuine, free and fair election.
W h e t h e r t h e C OM E L E C c o m m i t t e d g ra ve a b u s e o f
discretion in dismissinG Forniers petition for
disqualification against respondent

- Salcedo v COMELEC the only instance when a petition

r ai sin g the qua l if i ca ti on s o f a r e gi ste r ed can d id a te is
before election (S78 OEC)
- To justify the cancellation of CoC, false
r ep re sen ta tio n me n ti on ed m ust p er ta in to
material matter
- T he re m ust be d el ib er a te atte mp t to mi sl ea d ,
misinform, or hide fact which would render a
candidate ineligible
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP where
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23
and Feb 6 resolutions holding that considering the
evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial,
we declare that the respondent did not commit any
ma terial misrep resen tation when he stated in his CoC
that he is a natural born Filipino citizen
Allegations in the COMELEC petition:
1. Respondent Poe committed false material
r ep re sen ta tio n b y sta tin g in h i s Ce r tif i ca te o f
Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino
citizen; and
2. He knowingly made such false representation.
s ti l l j u s t a ca n d i d a te ;

- Pe ti tioner s clai m tha t Al lan Fernando Poe is a

citizen of Spain because his
- M a r r i a ge C o n tr a ct wi t h Pa u l i ta Go m e z sh o ws
that his parents are citizens of Spain.
- The marriage certificate was shown to have
been falsified.
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe
is the father of FPJ
- Allans father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject
and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11,
1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of
Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law)
- In r e Bo sq u e ex p i r a ti o n o f th e t e r m o f 1 8 m o n th s
wi th ou t ma kin g an exp re ss d ecl ar a tio n of in ten ti on to
retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the
latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new
soverei gn in the same manner as the na tives of these
islands
- Palanca v Republic
- A person, who was an inhabitant of the
P h i l i p p i n e Is l a n d s a n d a n a tu r a l i ze d su b je ct of
Spain on the 11 day of Ap ril 1899 , is a Fil ipino th

3) W hether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore

qualified to seek election as President.

- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are

citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the
aliens.
Act of Congress on 1 Jul y 1902 and of Sec. 2 of
- Dir e ctor Ma na pa t of the Na tio na l Ar ch ive s
the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the
falsified the marr iage contract of FPJs paren ts
Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines
and his fathers birth certificate.
because he was such at the time of the adoption
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat.
of the Constitution.
he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove;
- Constitution did not specify in referring to those
S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo burden of
whose fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether
proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of
this only applies to legitimate children or not.
an issue
- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of
debemus, e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n h a s n o
certiorari can only be granted if it can be proven
textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no
that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
state interest, and even imposes an injustice on
discretion;
an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)
-Grave abuse of discretion capricious and
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
illegitimacy in the status of the child vis--vis the
gross that it amounted to an evasion of
derivation of his citizenship from the father
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
contemplation of law
In fi ne , I re i te r a te th a t th e C OM EL EC di d no t gr av el y
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that
abuse its discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.
Forniers petition.
Indeed, his availment of the
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his
extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.
ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
Whether the respondent committed a material and false
Separate Opinion DISMISSING Forniers petition
representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a
natural-bron Filipino citizen
CARPIO-MORALES
- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material
Issues for Resolution:
m i sr e p r e se n ta ti o n i n h i s C o C b e ca u se h i s fa th e r i s a
1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive
Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis a nd u nd er the 1 93 5
jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of presidential
constitution.
candidates;
- Val l e s v C O M EL EC P h i l i p p i n e l a w o n ci ti ze n sh i p
2 ) W he th e r th e C OM E L E C a c te d w i t h g r a v e a b u se of
adheres to jus sanguinis
discretion when it issues its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004
- F PJ i s F i l i p i n o ci ti ze n , h av i n g b e e n b o r n to a
and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for
Filipino father
Disqualification;

petition: premature.
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that
the issue of FPJs qualification for the
Presidency may also be brought directly to this
Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specially
considering that the instant case is one of
transcendental importance.
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Cour t is no t availab le wh ere
there is another plain , speed y and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
lawlike in this case: (to intervene in the
Petition for Disqualification)
- in determining whether procedural rules,
such as standing, should be relaxed on the
ground of transcendental importance, the
following should be considered: the lack of
any other party with a more direct and
sp e c i f i c i n te r e s t i n r a i si n g t h e qu e st i o n s
being
raised.
Considering
that
the
su b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s r a i se d b y p e t i t i o n e r s
Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434
a n d 1 6 1 6 3 4 , r e s p e c t i v e l y, a r e v i r t u a l l y
identical to those raised by petitioner
Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not
convinced
that
the
transcendental
importance of the issues raised herein
justifies a direct resort to this Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the
exercise
of its
expanded
certiorari
jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824

1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that
this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a
candidate for President: paragraph 7, Section 4
of Article VII of the Constitution:
- T h e Su p r e me C o u r t , s it t in g e n b a n c ,
s h a l l b e t h e s o le ju d g e o f a ll c o n t e s t s
relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or VicePresident, an d ma y p ro mu l ga te i ts ru le s
for the purpose.
- refers to this Courts jurisdiction over
electoral contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President,
and
not
to
the
qualifications
or
disqualifications
of
a
presidential
ca n d i d a te . F PJ i s

- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the

petition
for
Certiorari
questioning
the
Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004,
issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the
Constitution vests this Court with the power of
review over decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC.
- COMELECs Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of
the Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
- not really a constitutional question
2 ) W h e t h e r The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse
o f D i s c r e t i o n i n D i s m i s s i n g t h e P e t i t i o n f o r is
qualification for Lack of Merit.
- the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing them:
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition
for Disqualification without stating the factual bases
therefore:
- S e c t i o n 1 4 , Ar t i c l e V I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for
Disqualification without ruling categorically on the
issue of FPJs citizenship.
- To j u s t i f y i t s e v a s i o n o f t h e d u t y t o r u l e
squarely on the issue of citizenship, the
COMELEC relies on this Courts ruling in Salcedo
II v. Com mission on Election s , a n d h e l d t h a t
held that Fornier should have presented proof
of misrepresentation with a deliberate attempt
to mislead on the par t of F PJ confined the
issue in the Petition for Disqualification to
wh e the r F PJ m u st h ave kn o wn o r hav e b ee n
aware of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing
on his certificate.
- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the
COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was aware
of a false material representation in his
Certificate
of
Candidacy
without
first
determining
whether
such
material
representation ( i n t h i s c a s e , h i s c l a i m o f
natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact
alone that there is a public document ( i.e., his
bir th cer tifi cate) whi ch FPJ mi gh t have rel ied
upon in averring natural-born citizenship does
n o t au tom a ti ca l l y ex cl ud e the p ossi bi l i ty th a t
( a) th er e i s o th er evi de nce to sho w tha t su ch
averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of
such evidence.
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
- Five crucial factual questions
(1) W hether Lorenzo Pou has been established to
b e a F i li p in o ci ti ze n a t the ti m e of the b ir th o f h i s
son, Allan F. Poe;

- the eviden ce presen ted does no t sho w that

n o th i n g m o r e to d o t o a c q u i r e o r p e r f e c t h i s
Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citizenship by
citizenship ( n o t h i n g m o r e t o d o t o a c q u i r e
virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts
citizenship = natural born).
covering the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as
- no evidence has been submitted to show that
to his residence, only prima facie evidence.)
Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his
(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ
own son at birth
was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter;
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and
- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship
was not ackno wled ged by his father, the onl y
in de pe nd en tl y o f h i s fa th e r s b y vir tue of jus
possible Filipino parent, a t t h e t i m e o f h i s
soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in
birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is
the Philippines on November 27, 1916.
not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was
Co n cl u sio n WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the
born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916,
petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being
su ch f a ct , p e r se , w o u l d n o t su ffi ce to p r ov e
premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated
that he was a citi zen of the Philippine Islands
Ja n u a r y 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 a n d F e b r u a r y 6 , 2 0 0 4 , r e n d e r e d i n
absent a showing that he was judicially
C OM EL EC SPA No . 04 -0 03 N UL L AN D V OID , an d ( 3)
declared to be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v.
DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of
Secretary of Labor , t h i s C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e
Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by
Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.
place of birth was never extended or applied in
the Philippine Islands:
IN RE: CHING
(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999
- FPJs birth certificate indicates that his parents
were married, and that he is a legitimate child.
FACTS
However, the Marriage Contract of his putative
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son
dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating
of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dula y,
that he was born out of wedlock. Since, in the
Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in
Marriage Contract, the two contracting parties,
the Phils
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935
its execution, the entry therein with respect to
Constitution. Fathers citizenship is followed, with a
the date of their marriage should be given
right to elect citi zenship upon reaching the age of
greater weight than the birth certificate, which
majority
was executed by a physician who had to rely on
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis
hearsay as regards FPJs legitimacy.
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an
98 Bar Examinations.
illegitimate child at birth.
- S e p t 1 9 9 8 : C o u r t a l l o w e d C h i n g t o t a ke th e e x a m s
(4)
W h e t h e r Al l a n F. P o e h a s b e e n l e ga l l y
provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship
determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA,
arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have
Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the
acquired Philippine citizenship)
Sa n ggu ni an g Ba ya n of Tub ao , L a U ni on al so fr om
- As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the
COMELEC.
stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the
- Apr i l 19 99 : r e su l ts o f Ba r Exa m s we re r el ea sed an d
C OMELEC and thi s Cour t tha t Al lan F. Poe i s
Ching passed. He was further required to submit more
indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of
proof of citizenship.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy
- J u l y 1 9 9 9 : C h i n g f i l e d M a n i f e s ta t i o n w / Af fi d a v i t o f
of an affidavit of Fernando R. Poe for
Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
Philippine Army Personnel.
- OSG commented that Ching being the legitimate child
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient
of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under
pr oo fs o f f ilia tion un de r Ar ticle 17 2 o f th e
the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to
Family Code.
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
e le cted Ph i l ci ti ze n sh i p . If C hi n g f or ma l l y el e cts Ph il
- Carp io-Morale s adopts the rule that an
citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable
i l l e g i t i m a t e , c h i l d o f a n a l i e n - m o t h e r who
time allowed by present jurisprudence
c l a i m s to b e a n o ffsp r i n g o f a F i l i p i n o f a th e r
- T wo c o n d i t i o n s o f a n e f f e c t i v e e l e c t i o n o f P h i l
may be considered a natural-born citizen if he
citizenship (from OSG):
w a s d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d b y t h e l a t t e r at
b i r t h , t h u s l e a v i n g th e i l l e g i t i m a te ch i l d wi t h

1 the mo ther of the person ma king the election st

marr iage of a Fil ipino woman to an alien,
must be a Phil citizen
2nd election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority (w/c means a reasonable time
interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the
Vel a y o c a s e ; i n C u e n c o , n o t e d t h a t t h i s p d n o t
inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs
not reasonable time)
- C h i n g , to su p p o r t h i s c a u s e , i n v o k e s t h e s e sp e c i a l
circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted say in the
Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected
public official
ISSUE
1. W ON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a
reasonable time
and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time
he took the bar.
2 . W ON C hi n gs sp e ci a l cir cu m sta n ce s en ti tle h im to
citizenship
HELD
1 . N o , C h i n g s e l e ct i o n w a s cl e a r l y b e yo n d , b y a n y
r e a so n a b l e ya r d st i c k, th e a l l o wa b l e p d w /i n wh i ch t o
exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was
already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the
requirements of C.A. No 625 in June 99. He was already
more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight,
controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the Court
in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he
d el a ye d hi s e le cti on o f Ph i l ci ti ze n sh ip , the l a tter no t
being a tedious and painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient . I t s h o u l d b e a v a i l e d o f
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances
c a n n o t v e s t i n h i m P h i l i p p i n e c i t i ze n s h i p a s t h e l a w
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
D e ci si on Court denies Vicente D Chings application for
admission to the Philippine Bar

BENGZON III V HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
FACTS
- Constitutional requirement for members of the House
of Representatives: no person shall be a Member of the
H ou se of Re pr e se n ta ti ve s u nl ess he i s a na tu r al bo rn
citizen.
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November

5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the

consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an
oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he

and political and economic necessity.

Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the

lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the

RP and registering it in the Local Civil
Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his
Registrar of the place where the person
citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
concerned resides or last resided.
co mm i ssio n i n th e a rm ed fo r ce s o f a fo re i gn cou n tr y.
- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original
Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled
nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a
by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.
natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status
- M a y 17 , 1 99 4 h e re acqu i re d hi s ci ti zen shi p th ro u gh
as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation.
repatriation under RA 2630.
Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking
D i st r i c t o f Pa n ga si n a n i n 1 9 9 8 a n d h i s o p p o n e n t wa s
an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said
Bengson.
oath with the Local Civil Registry
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category
HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by
for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship,
the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines
subsequently reacquires it because they are either
n a t u r a l - b o r n ci t i ze n s a s c i t i ze n s f r o m b i r t h without
natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for
h a v i n g to p e r f o r m a n y a ct to acqu i re o r pe rf ect su ch
the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House.
the applicable law for reacquisition.
- C r u z w a s n o t r e qu i r e d b y l a w to go th r o u g h
ISSUES
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
1 . W ON Cru z, a na tural born Fi lipino who beca me an
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
2. No.
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be
via Repatriation, so that the question of W ON he is
the so le ju dge of all contests relating to the elction ,
eligible to be a member of the House might be
returns and qualifications of the members of the House.
addressed
Courts ju ri sdiction is merel y to check W ON there has
2. - W ON the HRET committed serious erros and grave
b e e n gr a v e a b u se ; a b se n t su ch sh o w i n g, th e r e i s n o
abuse of discreation amounting to excess of jurisdiction
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen

SEPARATE OPINION

HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
o
By birth natural born citizens
Additional Facts:
o
Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those
- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of
who
become
Filipino
citizens
through
candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a
naturalization,
generally
under
the
naturalized Filipino citizen
Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be naturalized,
- Thereafter, Cru z ran for Congres, this time declaring
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all
himself as natural-born
the
qualifications
and
none
of
the
Petitioner
an d r espo nd en t p re se n t op po sin g
disqualifications
interpretation of the phrase from birth in Art IV, Sec 2
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of
of the Consti
citizens:
- Pe ti ti on er av er s: me an s star ti n g fr om a de fi ni te
o
Natural born
point and must be continuous, constant and without
o
Naturalized
interruption
- Respondent contends: refers to the innate,
- F i li p in o ci ti ze n s wh o hav e l o st the i r ci ti ze n sh i p ma y
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
reacqu ire i t by natu rali zation, repatria tion or by direct
natural-born
act of Congress.
- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
o
Natura li za tion mode for acqui si tion and
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
wi th ou t pe rfo rm i n g a n y acts. To r ep a tri a te , C ru z
o
Repatriation available for those who have
had to perform cer tain acts before he cou ld aga in
lost their citizenship due to desertion of the
become a Filipino citi zen. Therefore, he does not
armed forces, service in the armed forces
reaquire natural-born citizenship
of the allied forces in WW II, service in the
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning
armed forces of the US at any other time,
and application of the requirement of being natural-

born have become more narrow and qualified over

the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET
in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and
clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can
onl y be accomp lished through con sti amendment;
c l e a r l y, H R E T h a s a c t e d w i t h g r a v e a b u s e o f
discretion.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473

An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of
the Citizenship by Naturalization, and to
re pe a l Ac ts 2 92 7 a nd 34 48
S e c 1 : T it le : R e v i s e d N a t u r a l i z a t i o n L a w S e c 2 :
Qualifications: Who ma y become citizens of the
Philippines b y naturalization?
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the
petition
2. r e s i d e d i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f o r C O N T I N U O U S
period of >10yrs
3. of good moral character
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution (1935 Consti)
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable
manner durin g entire period of residen ce in the
Philippines in relation with constituted government and
community with community in which he is living
4. ( m u s t o w n r e a l e s t a t e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s >
P 5 0 0 0 ) o r P h i l i p p i n e cu r r e n c y o r l u cr a t i v e
trade/profession/lawful occupation
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any
one of the principal Philippine language
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any
of the public schools/private schools during the
e n ti r e p e r i o d o f r e si d e n ce i n th e Ph i l i p p i n e s
required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition
School:
- reco gn i zed b y the Office of Pr ivate Edu cation of
the Philippines
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics
and prescribes it as part of the school curriculum
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 yea r
qua lificat ion req uired in Sec2(2) cou ld be red uced
to a continuous 5 years?
1. had
honorably
held
office
under
the
Gov er nm en t of the Ph i li pp i ne s/ un de r th a t o f
any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly
American citizens, were the ones who were
governing
the
country
prior
to
the
Commonwealth]
2. establi shed new industr y/ in trodu ced a useful
invention in the Philippines
3. married to a Filipino woman

4.

engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2

yrs
scho o l : pu bl i c/r e co gn i zed pr iv a te sch oo l + n o t
established for exclusive instruction of children of
persons of particular nationality/race
5. born in the Philippines
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated
wi th an y asso ciation or gr oup of per sons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
govt
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence/personal assault/assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas
c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable
contagious disease
f.
Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos
g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the
Philippines are at war during such war
h. C i ti ze n s /s u b j e c ts o f f o r e i gn co u n tr y [OT H E R

+present and former places of residence

+occupation
+place and date of birth
+status; if married and the father, include name, age,
birthplace and residence of wife and each child
+approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
+n am e of the po rt of de ba rka tio n + n am e of sh ip (i f
remembered)
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
+declaration that he has complied with sec. 5
+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date
of filing petition to admission as RP Citizen
*2 photographs of petitioner
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of
at least 2
credible persons (see provision for
requirements)
S e c 8 . C o m p e t e n t c o u r t : CFI of province in w/c the
petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr immediately
preceding the filing of the petition
Sec 9 . Not if ication and appea rance . Tasks of clerk of
court
publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in
one of gen circulation newspapers in the province where
petitioner resides
post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain
T H A N U S! ] w h o se l a w s d o n t g r a n t F i l i p i n o s
name, birthplace and residence of petitioner, date and
right to become naturalized citizens/subjects
place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the
Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration
petition)
that it is his bona fide intention to become a
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last
citizen of the Philippines
publication of notice
- under oath
forward copies of the petition, sentence,
- 1 ye ar prior to the filing of pe tition for admission to
na tur al i za tio n ce r tif i ca te an d pe r tin en t d ata to
Philippine citizenship
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial
of the Bureau of Justice
Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province,
-contents+ name
and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner
+ age
resides
+ occupation
Sec 10 . Hearin g of the pet it io n.
+ personal description
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election
+ place of birth
*public hearing
+last foreign residence and allegiance
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial
fiscal
+date of arrival
appear for Commonwealth at all proceedings
+name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to
*upon belief of court of qualifications and nonthe Philippines
disqualification of petitioner, court order proper
+pla ce of residence in the Philipp ines a t the time of
naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required
ma king the declaration *to be valid: estab lish lawfu l
in Sec. 10, Ac t No . 3753)
e n tr y f o r p e r m a n e n t r e s i d e n c e + i s su e d ce r t i f i ca t e
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC
showing date, place, and manner of arrival
Sec
12:
Issuance
of
the
Certificate
of
*a lso sta te tha t he had enrolled hi s minor ch ildren in
Naturalization: 30 da ys after and from date of noti ce
school (see sec2(6))
to the p ar tie s (i n ca se of a pp ea l , SC con fi r me d de ci) ,
*2 pictures of himself
clerk of court issue naturalization certificate
S e c 6 . W i d o w a n d m i n o r c h i l d r e n o f a l i e n s d yi n g
contents of certificate of naturalization
a f t e r d e c la ra t io n o f i n t e n t i o n n o t re q u i re d t o f i le
*file no. of petition
declaration of intention
*number of naturalization certificate
S e c 7 . P e t i t i o n f o r c it i ze n s h i p : re q u ire me n t s f i le d
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the
w ith co mpeten t court
presence of the clerk of court
*a petition in triplicate
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized
contents of petition:
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition
+name and surname
*date of decision granting petition

*name of the judge who rendered deci

*Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of
concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted
Justice: naturalization certificate blanks, etc.
acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of
petition
S e c 2 2 . R e p e a li n g c la u s e : Repeals Act. No. 2927 as
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
*oath declared in open court [refer to the original]
amended by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law]
onl y in connection with his service to said foreign
Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1)
country: & provided that any Filipino citizen who is
record of petition and declarations of intentions in
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530
rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the
chronological order; (2) record of naturali zation
a r m e d f o r ce s of f o r e i g n co u n tr y u n d e r ( a ) o r ( b ) ,
An Act Making Additional Provisions for
certificate
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any
Sec 14. Fees.
Naturalization
election
of
RP
during
period
of
service
*P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings +
to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign
issuance of certificate)
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship
country. automaticall y entitled to full enjo yment of
*P24 .00 (for each appeal and for connected servi ces
(also required by previous law, prob. Act 423, below)
civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his
rendered)
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after
discharge;
sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
the publication
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
*on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just
- Decisions granting the application become executory
( 6 ) h a v i n g b e e n d e c l a r e d b y c o m p e t e n t a u t h o r i t y, a
married or also naturalized)
only after 2 years, and
deserter of the AF P in time of war, unle ss pardon or
*on minor children:
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that
granted amnesty; &
if born in the Philippines: Filipino
during the intervening time, applicant has:
(7) woman : marr iage to a foreigner if , by virtue of the
if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines

NOT left the Philippines
laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his
during naturalization of parent: Filipino

Dedicated himself continuously to
nationality.
if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines
lawful calling or profession
*** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June
during naturalization of parent: Filipino

NOT been convicted of any offense or
2, 1947
d u r i n g m i n o r i t y, u n l e s s r e s i d e s i n t h e
violation of govt. rules
*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
Philippines permanently and still a minor,

NOT committed any act prejudicial to
acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino
then legally Filipino upon age of majority
the interest of the nation or contrary to any
citizen
from
Iberian/democratic
Ibero-American
if foreign-born after naturalization of parent:
govt. announced policies
co un tr ie s/ Un i ted Ki n gd om if the l a w of th a t cou n tr y
F i l i p i n o u n l e ss f a i l s to r e gi st e r a n d ta ke
- After the finding, the order of the court granting
grants same privilege to its citizens agreed upon by
oath 1 yr after age of majority
citizenship will be registered and the oath taken by the
t r e a t y b e t w e e n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a n d f o r e i gn co u n t r y
Sec 16. Right of widow and children of
applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of
from which citizenship is acquired.
petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings,
citizenship.
Section. 2. How citizenship ma y be reacquired.
same legal effect
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.
(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the
Se c 17 . R en u n c ia t io n o f t it le o r o rde rs o f no b il it y:
- Approved, June 16, 1950.
d i s qu a l i f i ca ti o n 's p r e scr i b e d i n se c 2 , Ac t N o . 2 9 2 7
unless w/ express consent of the National Assembly
(repealed by CA 473 so sec 4)
S e c 1 8 . C a n c e ll a t io n o f n a t u ra li za t io n c e rt if ic a t e s
( 2 ) r e p a tr i a ti o n o f d e se r te r s o f t h e Ar m y, N av y o r Ai r
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63
issued
Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may be repatriated
*upon motion made in proper proceedings by SolicitorAn Act Providing for the Ways in which
in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
General/representative/proper provincial fiscal
Philippine Citizenship may be lost or
termination of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more
*cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
reacquired
details)
a.
naturalization
certificate
obtained
(3) direct act of the National Assembly.
fraudulently/illegally
Section 1. How citizenship ma y be lost.
S e c t i o n 3 . P r o c e d u r e i n c i d e n t t o re a c q u i s i t i o n o f
b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
Philippine citizenship. App l y Act N o . 2 92 7 ( no w C A
outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after issuance of
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
4 7 3 ) to th e r e a cq u i si t i o n o f Ph i l i p p i n e ci ti ze n sh i p b y
naturalization certificate
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
n a tu ra l i za ti on p ro vi de d for i n th e n ext pr eced in g se c:
c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
constitution or laws of foreign country upon +21y.o.: a
Provided, qualifications and special qualifications
d . m i n o r ch i l d r e n sh o wn to h a v e f a i l e d t o gr a d u a te
Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship
prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required
from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either
while the RP is at war;
(sorry guys, I cant find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I
by neglect to support or by transferring them to
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the
dont know what these sections are in CA 473): further,
another school(s)
armed forces of foreign countr y: rendering of service
applicant
e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate
to/the acceptance of such commi ssion in, the armed
(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before
con stitutional or legal provision requi ring Ph ilippine
forces of foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
he applies for naturalization;
citizenship
al le gi a n ce i n ci de n t th er e to , wi th th e co n se n t o f R P,
(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable
S e c 1 9 P e n a l t i e s f o r v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s Ac t : f i n e <
shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if
manner during
P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization
either of the ff. is present:
+the entire period of his residence in RP
cancelled
(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
+in his relations with the constituted government
S e c 2 0 . P re s c ri p t io n : f i l e c o m p l a i n t w / n 5 yr s f r o m
with the said foreign country; or
+with the community in which he is living; and
detection/discovery of commission of offense
(b) sa id foreign countr y main tain s armed force s on
(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to
Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen
renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and
*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations

allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of

which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the
nece ssar y oath of alle gian ce to the Common wealth of
the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil
registry. (used in the Bengzon Case)
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473

YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
PADILLA; January 24, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- 1971 Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971
valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon
presentment before Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978 He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
- Apr i l 19 80 si gne d co m me r cia l d ocu me n ts i n Ho n g
Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and
he declared his nationality as Portuguese
- July 21, 1981 He applied & was issued another
Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July
20, 1986.
Procedural Facts:
- July 4, 1988 He filed for a petition for habeas corpus.
He wa s detained becau se the Com mission on
Im m i gra ti on & D ep or ta tio n wa s pr oce ssin g h i s
deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988 oral arguments
- N o v. 1 0 , 1 9 8 8 S C r e s o l u t i o n d e n i e d p e t i t i o n f o r
habeas corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID
over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless
arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed
urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.
- Dec. 5, 1988 Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer
for restraining order.
- Dec. 7, 1988 SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease &
desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings
before Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988 Respondent commissioner filed motion
to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a
summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2,
88.
- Dec. 13, 1988 Yu filed an urgent motion for release
from arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of
TRO.
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered
a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply revealed
aforementioned substantive facts.
ISSUE
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.
HELD

Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO

lifted.
Ratio
- Renunciation made known distinctly & explicitly and
not left to interference or implication (BI Commissioners
vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his
Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation
a s a P o r t u g u e se e v e n a f te r h e h a s a c q u i r e d F i l i p i n o
citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation.
- He does not dispute the facts. He was given the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine
citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due
process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But
due to petitioners insistence, SC had to do it.
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be
di spla yed when requi red and suppressed when
convenient.

SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concur]

Yu h a s f a i l e d t o o v e r c o m e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t h e h a s
forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining
Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only
to nationals. No proof of Yus unequivocal & deliberate
renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its
significance & consequences as provided for in CA No.
63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough
of renunciation.

FERNAN [dissent]
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence
are not enough to reach such decision. Evidence must
be clear & express w/o room for interference or
i m p l i ca ti o n . I n a d e p o r ta t i o n p r o ce e d i n g wh e r e a l i e n
claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, hes entitled
to have his status determined by judicial & not an
executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under
more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is
not a trier of facts.

GUTIERREZ [dissent]

S u m m a r y p r o ce d u r e wo u l d n o t su ff i ce . So m e th i n g a s
important as denaturalization should be filed &
prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due
process clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he
has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be
given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the
facts full y ascerta ined. Dange rous pre cedent to allo w
administrative officials to rule that one has renounced
his citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a
fo re i gn pa ssp or t i s no t ex pr ess re nu nci a tio n . H e ma y
have passport for other purposes (emplo yment,
convenience). Some high govt officials have done acts
w / c a r e m o r e i n d i ca ti v e o f e x p r e ss r e n u n ci a t i o n th a n

mere use of passport or different citi zenship has been

signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yus morality is beside
the point. He deserves his full day in court.

CORTES [dissent]

CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yus

Filipino citizenship has not been established. Evidence
presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine
consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate.

PEOPLE V AVENGOZA
RELOVA; December 7, 1982

FACTS
- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of
Camarines Sur
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese,
together with the formers mother Gavina Avengoza and
Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own
agricultural lands in the Philippines.
- An s e l m a Av e n g o za , u p o n m a r r i a g e t o G o G a m ,
acquired Chinese citizenship
- Th e An ti- Dum m y L a w p rov id e s tha t on ly Filip ino
citizens may own local agricultural land.
- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away.
- Upon Go Gams passing, Anselma executed an oath of
alle gi ance to the R P and filed i t with the Offi ce of the
Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her
citizenship by repatriation, averring by reason whereof
tha t her cri minal liab ili ty is the reb y extin gui shed; and
that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and
academic
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its
opinion that Anselma had validl y reacquired Philippine
citizenship
ISSUES
1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing
a n o a th o f a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e R P a n d f i l i n g i t w i t h th e
Municipal Treasurer
2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted
her from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law
HELD
1. No.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Would-be repatriate
should show conclusive proof that she has the
qualifications to be so repatriated. Anselma became an
alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese
citizen; however this does not necessarily mean that she
was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.
2. No.
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like
an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her
repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.

JAO V REPUBLIC
VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
FACTS
- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because
she was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina
mo ther who were no t legall y married . - She married a
Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship
but he is now dead.
- Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as
a n a l i e n a n d s h e w a s i s s u e d a n Al i e n C e r t i f i c a t e o f
Registration (ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a
petition for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao.
- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as judicially
repatriated, and ordered cancelled her ACR.
- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the
case.
ISSUE
W ON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for
repatriation.
HELD
Ratio Proceed ings to declare a person as judi ciall y
r e p a t r i a t e d a r e a c o m p l e t e n u l l i t y. T h e r e i s n o l a w
requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be
effected by a judicial proceeding.
R e a so n i n g In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held
that there i s no proceedin g establ ished b y law or the
rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may
get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in
regard to his citizenship. All that is needed for a female
citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to
reacquire her Phil. citizen, upon the termination of her
martial status, is for her to take necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the
said oath in the proper civil registry.
D i sp o s i t i o n Decision appealed from is revoked and set
aside. 5 Justices concur.
O b i t e r Petitioners claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her
marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be
established in an action where the mother or her heirs
are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction
that Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a nonadversary suit where the persons whose rights are
affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as
an action for declaratory relief, petition for judicial
repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an
alien.

VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919

FACTS
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the
- Manila Mayor, Ju sto Lukban, wa nting to exterm inate
women is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of
vice, ordered the closing of the citys red light district.
locomotion.
The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women)
R e a so n i n g The essential object and purpose of the writ
were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
the distri ct by the poli ce for a little more than a week.
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and
On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly
to relieve a person from such restraint if it is illegal. Any
hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their
sufficient.
consent,
without
opportunity
to
consult
with
f ri en ds/fa m i l y or to d ef en d th ei r r i gh ts. The y r ea ch ed
2. 1st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring
Davao 4 da ys la ter and we re me t by Fran cisco Sa les,
governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yigo and
Rafael Castillo, etc.
- During their voyage, the womens relatives and friends
initiated an application for habeas corpus, alleging that
Ju sto Lu kb an , al on g wi th An to n H oh ma nn ( the po li ce
chief), and others deprived the women of their liberty.
The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc)

the women before the court on the day named. The

court could have sent the respondents to jail however,
the court forebore drastic action because it did not want
the public to see a clash between executive officials and
the judiciary and because it wanted to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good
faith and to mitigate their wrong.
2nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were

and ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before

the court. Although the y returned with none of the
women, they were given another chance. The court
issued another order this time calling for the
respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila.
The respondents were only able to bring forward 8
women and challenged the issuance of the writ.

able to produce 8 women. The mandate called for all of

th e wo me n n ot in M an il a . H o wev er, the cou r t d eci de d
that there was substantial compliance, noting the effort
(placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to
Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a
sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally closed.

ISSUES
1.
Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WON the petitioners had standing
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. W ON the women were actuall y restrained of their
liberty
2.
WON there was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court
HELD
1a. Yes
Ratio W hen i t i s i s i mp o ssi b le f or a pa r ty to si gn a n
application for the w of hc, another person may submit it
in his/her behalf.
R e a so n i n g It wa s im po ssib l e fo r th e wo me n to h ave
si gned a petition for habeas corpus wi th the wa y their
expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from
society and then shipped. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
1b No
Ratio T h e w o f h c m a y b e g r a n t e d b y t h e S u p r e m e
Cour t or an y jud ge thereof enforcible an ywh ere in the
Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall
be made returnable to (whether before the SC or before
a lower court).
R e a so n i n g The CFI of Davao was not in session. The
case involves parties from different parts of the country.
Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
1c. Yes

3.
Ratio O n l y L u k b a n i s g u i l t y o f c o n t e m p t . H i s
intentions were commendable, his methods were
unlawful. An office r s failure to produ ce the bod y of a
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he
has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of
the court.
R e a so n i n g He wa s pr im a ri l y r e sp on sib l e fo r se tti n g
forth this whole chain of events and had under his power
as head of the city government to facilitate the return of
the women to Manila but failed. The rest of the
respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of
contempt. Some were merely following the orders of
their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was
merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.
D i s p o s i t i o n No further action on the w of hc. Lukban
found in contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within
5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt
of court.

KURODA JALANDONI
MORAN; March 26, 1949
FACTS
Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being
charged by the Military Commission with failure to
perform
duties
as
commander
in
preventing
crimes/atrocities against civilians, and POWs. In defense,
he is alleging that Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which
established a Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional
and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port (both
American) have no authority to practice law in the

country. As such, the respondents should be prohibited

from proceeding with this case.

- The Le gi slature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to

HELD
Re gula te the Reta il Bu sine ss. It prohibi ts aliens and
1. No. The act does not tran scend the limi t of equa l
associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not
pro tection establ ished b y the Consti tu tion if the re is a
ISSUES
wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly
question of public interest involved or pursued and the
1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional
i n th e r e ta i l t r a d e . In e ffe c t i t n a ti o n a l i ze s th e r e ta i l
cla ssifi cation or distin ction used b y the legislatu re, in
2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
business.
this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real
A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with
- P r o ce d u r e Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf
and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
the Rules of Court
of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships
alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is
B. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of
a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d b y R A 1 18 0 f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r
patently unreasonable and unfounded.
the Constitution
I n j u n c ti o n a n d M a n d a m u s a ga i n s t Ja i m e H e r n a n d e z,
R e a so n i n g
S e c r e t a r y o f F i n a n c e a n d M a r c e l i n o Sa r m i e n to , C i t y
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has
HELD
Treasurer of Manila.
sho wn di sre ga rd for h i s cu sto me r s a nd the p eo pl e on
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles
wh om he make s his profi t. Alien s lack spiri t of lo yal ty
empowered to consummate an unfinished aspect of war
involved
and enthusiasm for the country. Alien participation in the
which is the trial and punishment of war criminals
A. Police Power
retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices
through the issuance and enforcement of EO68.
- the most positive and active of all governmental
like the ff:
R e a so n i n g
EO68 was issued by the President to
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable
- hoarding essential commodities
establish a Natl. War Crimes Office and provide for rules
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
- violating price control laws
and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It
B. Equal Protection Clause
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who
conforms to the generally accepted principles/policies of
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
would not cater or yield to their demands
international law, including the Hague Convention and
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
- believed to have evaded tax laws
the Geneva Convention, which are part of the law of the
ine qual ity; it requi res that all person s shall be treated
- bribing public officials
nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President
alike, under like circumstances and conditions
b. Economic reason alien retailer never really makes a
of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed
- i s n o t i n f r i n g e d b y l e gi sl a t i o n w h i ch a p p l i e s o n l y to
genuine contribution to national income and wealth
force s. Iin Yam ashi ta v. Tyer, the cour t held tha t the
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in
power to create a militar y commission for the trial and
ali ke to all persons wi th in such class, and reasonable
industrie s tha t would help the countr ys econom y and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war.
grounds exists for making distinction between those who
increase national wealth.
A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a
fall within such class and those who do not.
c. precedents
technical state of war continues.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military
1. presence of public interest and welfare
Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar
tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules
2. existence of reasonable relation between
vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
of Court.
purposes and means
- Essentially held that the difference in status
R e a so n i n g There is nothing in EO68 which requires that
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
co u n se l a p p e a r i n g b e f o r e sa i d co m m i ss i o n s m u st b e
classification made
reasonable classifica tion in the exercise of poli ce
attys. qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance
C. Due Process clause
power.
with the Rules of Court.
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in
Takahash i vs. Fi sh and ga me Commi ssion, Fraser vs.
2B. No
pursuance of the police power
McConway & Tarley
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is
- Questions for test:
- held that the distinction between aliens and
not violative of our national sovereignty.
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
citizens is not valid because the laws were found to
R e a so n i n g It is only fair and proper that the US, which
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessar y for the
be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the
has submitted the vindication of crimes against her govt.
accompl ishmen t of the le gi sla tures purpo se; is i t
result or product of racial antagonism and hostility,
a n d h e r p e o p l e to a t r i b u n a l o f o u r n a ti o n , sh o u l d b e
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
and there was no question of public interest
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
involved or pursued.
D i sp o s i t i o n
The Military Commission having been
means used or is it merely an unjustified
convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over
interference with private interest?
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen
th e cr i me s ch ar ge d wh i ch fa ll u nd er th e pr ovi sio n s of
to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative
Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the
ISSUES
purpose, the mean s are reasonabl y nece ssar y for the
person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its
1 . W ON R A 1180 de ni e s to al ie n r esid en ts the e qua l
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
c u s t o d y, t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e d u e
protection of the laws.
oppressive upon individuals.
processes of such Military Commission. Petition denied.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty
R e a so n i n g
With costs de oficio.
and property without due process of law.
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to
of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
nationali ze the retail business and prohibit aliens from
economic life\
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957
engaging therein.
- F r e e d o m a n d l i b e r t y a r e n o t r e a l a n d p o si ti v e i f th e
4 . W O N R A 110 8 v i o l a t e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d t r e a t y
people are subject to the economic control and
FACTS
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
domination of others, especially if not of their own race
- Injunction and Mandamus
or country.

b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the

Constitution
- Se cti on 8 of Ar ti cl e X IV p rov id e s tha t n o f ra nch i se ,
ce r ti f i ca t e , o r a n y o th e r fo r m o f a u th o r i za ti o n f o r th e
opera tion of a publi c utili ty shall be granted excep t to
citizens of the Philippines
c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of
an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
p re su m p tio n i s in f avo r of i ts val id i ty, an d th ou gh th e
Cour t ma y hold vie ws incon sisten t with the wi sdom of
the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess
of the legislative power.
3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms
in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index
to the entire contents of the law.
R e a so n i n g
a. The term regulate is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always
been included within the term regulation.
4. N o t r e a t y h a s a c t u a l l y b e e n e n t e r e d i n t o o n t h e
su b j e c t a n d th e p o l i ce p o we r m a y n o t b e cu r ta i l e d o r
s u r r e n d e r e d b y a n y t r e a t y o r a n y o th e r co n v e n t i o n a l
agreement.

GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
FACTS
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of
foreign rice and created rice procurement committee.
Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, filed petition.
P r o ce d u r e Case is an original action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of
decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were
required to file answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioners stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of
rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any
other govt agency.
Respondents stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available before coming to court.
- Petitioners action is not sufficient and not governed
by RA 3452 because importation was authorized by
President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile
purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats
without waiting for any special authority.

- Also, they say its not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs
prohibit importation of rice and corn by government
agency and not the government itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it
can still be permitted because it is for the benefit of the
people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with
contracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma.
In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts,
the contracts should prevail because it came later.
These contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils.
has already paid.
ISSUE
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction
HELD
- RA 3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic
foods directly from farmers in Phils. Petitioner has
sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal
one. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and
RA 3452 bec it covers all importations of rice and corn
into the Phils.
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the
government itself bec. RA 2207 talks about imports
authorized by the President, by and on behalf of
government. RA 3452 also indicates that only private
parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs
are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which
says that in all purchases by govt, incl. those for armed
forces, preference is given to materials produced in the
Phils.
- The benefit of the people argument cant be
accepted because there is no local rice shortage. And
the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not
for the civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive
agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being
against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not
render this case academic. The contracts may have
already been entered into and the payment may have
been made but the actual importation has not yet taken
place.
D i s p o s i t i o n - For lack of requisite majority, injunction
prayed for is DENIED.
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize
importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in
granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by
law and is contrary to its provisions.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS

V SECRETARY OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989

FACTS
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social
justice to "insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people," especially the, less privileged.
- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
o wn er shi p , u se , en jo yme n t a nd d ispo si ti on o f p ri va te
property and equitabl y diffuse property ownership and
profits. Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian
reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these
sentiments, also adopted one whole and separate Article
X I II o n So ci a l Ju st i ce a n d H u m a n R i g h t s. On e o f i t s
sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
co l le cti ve l y th e l an ds th e y ti l l or, i n th e ca se o f o the r
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary landsharing.
- R .A , N o . 3 8 4 4 , o th e r wi se kn o w n a s th e Ag r i cu l tu r a l
La nd R ef or m Co de , h ad a lr ea d y be en e na cte d b y the
Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line
with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
s u p e r s e d e d a l m o s t a d e c a d e l a te r b y P.D . N o . 2 7 ,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with
martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and
to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
E. O . N o . 2 2 8 , declaring full land ownership in favor of
th e be ne fi cia ri e s of P.D . No . 2 7 an d p ro vi di n g f or the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree
as well as the manner of their payment.
This was
followed
on
July
22,
1987
by
Presidential
P r o c l a m a t i o n N o . 1 3 1 , i n sti tu ti n g a co mp re he n si ve
agra rian reform pro gram (CARP), and E . O . N o . 2 2 9 ,
providing the mechanics for its implementation.
- W ith its formal organi zation, the revived Congress of
the Philippines (formally convened on July 27, 1987) took
over legislative power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings,
o n th e i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e i n te r e s t s o f f a r m e r s . T h e
resul t, after almo st a ye ar of spiri ted debate , was the
enactment of R . A. N o . 6 6 5 7 , otherwise known as the
Comprehe ns i ve Agra ria n Re f orm Law of 19 88 ,
which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This

law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned

enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect

corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the

uniformity rule. 10

t h e r i g h t s co n f e r r e d a n d t h e l i a b i l i t i e s i m p o s e d . T h e
argu ment that not onl y landowner s but al so owners of

insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

ISSUES
1. WON petitions are justiciable.
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131,

k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement

other proper tie s must be made to share the burden of
that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
its title.
su b s ta n ti a l d i st i n c ti o n b e t we e n t h e se t w o cl a sse s o f
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
HELD
see.12

E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R .A. 6657 con travene the
Con stitu tion on the ground s in ter alia of separa tion of
powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Sub issues
a. The determination of just compensation may be made
only by a court of justice and not by the President of the
Philippines.
b . The ju st co mp en sa tio n con te mp la te d b y th e Bi l l of
Rights is payable only in money or in cash but not in the
form of bonds or other things of value.
c . I n co n s i d e r i n g r e n ta l s a s a dv a n ce p a ym e n t o n th e
land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the
burden of solving the agrarian problems is placed on the
owners only of agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be
the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228

1 . R D : Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a

2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession
constitutional question only if it is shown that the
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
question are first satisfied but even if they are not
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
contemplated either.
the serious constitutional questions raised.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
2a. T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n m a d e b y t h e D A R i s o n l y
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was authorized
preli minar y unless accep ted b y all parties con cerned.
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to
Constitution. It is not correct to say that these measures
review with finality the said determination in the
ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec.
for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
16f)
m o d i f i e d o r r e p e a l e d b y su b se q u e n t l a w o r d e cl a r e d
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for
invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto
the payment of just compensation is money and no
become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of
other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been
the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the
paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do
Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not
not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power
rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged
of eminent domain. 11 This is not an ordinar y
measures and has specifically provided that the y shall

ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due

expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
process.
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
inconsistent with its provisions.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs
deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is
to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its
not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
agree that the President could exercise legislative power
Section 1 that:
primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the
until the Congress was convened, they contend that she
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full
release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of
could do so only to enact emergency measures during
owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired
the fund is onl y incidental to the main objective of the
the period.
by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
proclamation, which is agrarian reform. Section 24 and
g. The mone y needed to crea te the P50 bil lon special
It was obviously referring to lands already validly
S e c t i o n 2 5 ( 4 ) o f Ar t i c l e V I , a r e n o t a p p l i c a b l e . W i t h
fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it
acquired under the said decree, after proof of fullparticular reference to Section 24, this obviously could
has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that
fl ed ged me mb er shi p i n th e fa rm e r s' coo pe ra ti ve s an d
not have been complied with for the simple reason that
time.
full pa ym ent of just co mpensa tion . Hence , i t was also
the House of Representatives, which now has the
h . The su ga r plante rs ar gued tha t the y are a separa te
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had
group with problems exclusively their own and by being
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner
not yet been convened when the proclamation was
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their
b y t h e f a r m e r - b e n e f i c i a r y a f te r O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 2
issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in
right to equal protection has been violated.
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
th e Pre si de n t of the Ph i l ip pi ne s, wh o em bo di ed , as i t
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment
were, both houses of Congress.
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the
for the land.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that
powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or
the requisites of a valid classification have been
fundamental right to own property.
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for nono f p e r so n s o r th i n g s s i m i l a r t o e a ch o t h e r i n ce r t a i n
re gi stration of the lands, whi ch is the expropria tion of
10
particulars and different from each other in these same
t h e sa i d l a n d f o r a n a m o u n t e qu a l t o th e g o v e r n m e n t
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No.
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the
1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation,
he is unjustly required to immediately pay the

would be.

11

The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the
State. It is the power to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It is inherent
because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not
sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution, the State may exercise it.
Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other
two are police power and taxation.

distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of

12

Frankly, I dont like the way this ponente argues. Hes like saying, now I
dont want to explain why. If you cant see the reasoning its your fault.
Anyway, were infallible remember? His next sentence: There is no need
to elaborate on this matter. Tsk

the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions

- 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the
meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which includes the
and poultry industries in its coverage;
the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have
raising of livestock, swine and poultry
there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands
been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary
1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated
in agrarian reform
and discriminatory.
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
-S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute.
Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32)
and is thus violative of due process
T h e l i mi ta ti on i s f ou nd in th e co n sti tu tio na l i n jun cti on
- 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations
that "private property shall not be taken for public use
implementing S11 (commercial farms)
SEPARATE OPINION
without just compensation" and in the abundant
-Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of
livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA 6657
this principle. Basicall y, the requirements for a proper
-petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is
SARMIENTO
ex er ci se o f th e po we r ar e : ( 1) p ub li c u se an d ( 2) ju st
also prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to
-agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue
compensation. 13
enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction
is one of consti construction and interpretation
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum
denied)
A13, S4: ..in case of other farm workers, to receive a
retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution and
8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on
just share of the fruits thereofthis phrase provides a
under
P.D.
316
which
was
promulgated
in
injunctive relief
possible coverage of livestock, poultry and swine
implementation of P.D. 27.
-Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA
-every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
2j. R.A. No . 6657 does provide for su ch limi ts now in
6657:
constitutionality of a statute
Sec. 6 of the law, whi ch in fact is one of its most
S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of
ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection
controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5
Agricultural Enterprise/Activity
clause of the consti
hec. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at least 15 yrs
S11: defines commercial farms as agricultural
-clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms
old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)
lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
are not similarly situated, hence the inclusion of the
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be
swine raising
former in CARP would be violative of the equal
a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the
protection clause
S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3%
m a tt e r s e m b o d i e d i n th e te x t a r e r e l e v a n t to
of gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as
each other.
additional compensation)
GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
D e ci si on
S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine
CRUZ; December 2, 1991
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
6657
FACTS
N o s . 2 2 8 a n d 2 2 9 a r e S U S T AI N E D a g a i n s t a l l t h e
Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:
S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-the constitutional provision under consideration is A13,
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred
reliant and independent national economy effectively
S4, Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino
which grants farmers and farm-workers who are
their respective owners.
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
landless, the right to directly or collectively own the land
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers
practices
they are tilling
under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
- He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of
-livestock and poultry raising is different from crop
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights
foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair
farming in that land is not a primary input in the former
of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
advantages over local investments which are practically
r i gh ts gr an te d b y R .A. N o . 6 65 7 u nd er th e co nd i ti on s
elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their
ISSUE
therein prescribed.
own government
WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the
- Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may
insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock,
petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its
do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic
costs.
enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior
Implementing Rules and Guidelines
SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)
approval
HELD
o All that it has to do is register with the Securities
LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR
Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657
and Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade
PARAS; December 4, 1990
are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising
Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
of a single proprietorship
FACTS
in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby
o The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the
impose any limitations on the extent of foreign
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made
ownership in an enterprise additional to those
permanent
provided in the Act
Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional
- Under Section 7, non-Philippine nationals may own up
13
construction; in construing any ambiguous provisions,
to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why
the courts may look to the debates of the concon
enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is
the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the
Constitutions the just distribution of all agricultural lands clause. Then
he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution
would be private lands first.

-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the

meaning of the word agricultural (its dictionary

prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign

Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof."

- However, the system of negative list under Section 8

abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise
of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it
assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in
areas covered by the list, such investments are not
detrimental to but are good for the national economy.
o List A merely enumerate areas of activities
already reserved to Philippine nationals by
mandate of the Constitution and specific laws
o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises
already regulated according to law and includes
small and medium-sized domestic market
enterprises or export enterprises which utilize raw
materials from depleting natural resources with
paid-in equity capital of less than the equivalent
of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for
Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to
go big.
o List C - contain areas of investment m which
"existing enterprises already serve adequately the
needs of the economy and the consumers and do
not need further foreign investments."; However,
existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino,
if not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too
- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine
national believes that an area of investment should be
included in list C, the burden is on him to show that
the criteria enu me rated in sa id sect ion are met
- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042.
- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987
Omnibus Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further
abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing
away with important requirements for doing business in
the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow
practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for
three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory
Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely
deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino
enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.
S o l - Ge n a n s we r s:
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to
equity restrictions alone
o
prior to the effectivity of RA 7042,
Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine
national could, without need of prior authority
from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1)
any enterprise registered under Book I
(Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises
not registered under Book I, to the extent that the
total investment of the non-Philippine national did
not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital
o
On the other hand, under Article
47 thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine
nationals in an enterprise not registered under

Book I was such that the total participation by

non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital
thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the
BOI was required.
- With the introduction of the Negative List under
Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments not open to
foreign investors are already determined and outlined;
hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case
may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign
investors.
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of
authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and
BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first
comply with certain requirements before they can be
issued a license to do business in the Philippines.
- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to
own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in
areas of investments outside the prohibitions and
limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership
and interest.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8
reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List
C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of
activities where existing enterprises already serve
adequately the needs of the economy and the
consumer.
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments
only after securing to Filipinos their rights and
interests over the national economy.
o List A The provisions of the Constitution and
other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of
foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas
of activity reserved for Filipinos
o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant
to law already makes it clear that it is regulatory.
It channels efforts at promoting foreign
investments to bigger enterprises where there is
an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for
foreign investments to supplement Filipino capital
in big enterprises.
o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities
which do not adequately meet-the needs of the
consumers should not be included in list C; if not,
consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous
producers
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to
the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come
within the protection of the law.
- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA
in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in
List C
o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public
hearing at which affected parties will have the
opportunity to show whether the petitioner
industry adequately serves the economy and the
consumers."

o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as

not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria
inclusion in List C.
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus
Investment Code
o purposely removed because the determination of
the areas of investment open to foreign investors
is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative
List formulated and recommended by NEDA
following the process and criteria provided in
Sections 8 & 9 of the Act
- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
o it practically includes the same areas of
investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5",
and the SEC shall disallow registration of the
applying non-Philippine national if the existing
joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino
partners therein, can reasonably prove they are
capable to make the investment needed for the
domestic market activities to be undertaken by
the competing applicant.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a
self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed
to promote full employment for Filipinos
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be
rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites
of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the
decision of the case.
ISSUES
1. WON there is actual controversy
2. WON petitioners have legal standing
3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case
4. WON this entails a political question
HELD
1.There is at this point no actual case or controversy,
particularly because of the absence of the
implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act
into effect
a.A controversy must be one that is appropriate or
"ripe" for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory
2.The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and
particularly as a member of the House of
Representatives, comes under the definition that a
proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of.
3.The constitutional question has not been raised tardily
but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely.

- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for

failure to show that there is an indubitable ground for it,
not to say even a necessity to resolve it.
a.Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
b.based on the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments
c.theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been
carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally enacted.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by
the petitioner
d.Act does not violate any of the constitutional
provisions the petitioner has mentioned
4.What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the
efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we
are not competent to rule.
a.In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation."
b.allowed only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the
political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical.
c.There is no irregularity also, that shows that there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
D e ci si on Petition dismissed.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Se cretar y of Pub lic Works and Communi cations
(PW C) approved with modification the recommendation
t h a t o r i g i n a te d f r o m th e N a ti o n a l Tra ffi c C o m m i ss i o n
(NTC), which was favorably indorsed by the Director of
Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between
the points and during the hours from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.,
for a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
u p p a s se n g e r s i n t h e p l a ce s a b ov e - m e n ti o n e d to th e
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.

- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public

Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public
Works and Communications the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the

welfare of the public. (police power of the State)
R e a so n i n g
1.
precedents (US vs. Go me z, Dobbin s vs.

P r o ce d u r e Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private

citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a
writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director
of PW, Acting Secretar y of PW C, Mayor of Manila and
Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.

2.

ISSUES
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
2.
WON the rules and regulations promulgated
constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate
business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe
the upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all
the people.
HELD
1. No.T he Legislature cannot delegate power to make
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determ ine some fact or state of things upon whi ch the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
R e a so n i n g
1.adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincia l Board of Mindoro , Wayman vs.
So u th a r d i t wa s h e l d h e r e th a t d i scr e ti o n m a y b e
d el e ga te d to exe cu ti ve d ep ar tme n ts o r su bo rd i na te
officials the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact.
2.textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communications,
shall
promulgate
rules
and
r e gu l a t i o n s t o r e g u l a t e a n d c o n t r o l th e u se o f a n d
t r a f f i c o n n a t i o n a l r o a d s , i s a n ad ministra tive
function whi ch canno t be directl y discharged b y the
National Assembly.
3.practicality
T h e co m p l e x i t i e s o f m o d e r n g o v e r n m e n t s, th e
multiplication of the subjects of govtl regulations, and
the increased difficulty in administering the law give
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the
d el e ga tio n of gre a ter po we r s b y th e l e gi sl a tiv e a nd
vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with
personal libe rty, wi th property, and wi th business and

Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar)

Paradox - T h e a p p a r e n t c u r t a i l m e n t o f
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation

3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is

brought about to the greatest number.

BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND

GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was
granted franchise under PD 1067-B to establish, operate
and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a
potential source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed
for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was
passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance, giving it
territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
PAGCOR became 3 largest source of govt revenue, rd
next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It sponsored sociocultural and charitable projects and at that time
employed 4,494 employees in its 9 casinos.
P r o c e d u r e This is petition seeking to annul the
PAGCOR charter PD 1869
ISSUES
Procedural Issue
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers
can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
Substantive Issue/s
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff
grounds:
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City
governments right to impose taxes and license fees
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes
PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from
monopolistic and crony economy
HELD
Procedural Issue:
- Considering transcendental public interest and the
Courts duty to check on limits of other branches of
govt, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
took cognizance of the petition.
Substantive Issues:

1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But

prohibition does not mean that govt cant regulate it in
exercise of police power. Police power is state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare. PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to govt,
but to society as well.
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no
inherent right to impose taxes, its power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress, therefore Charter of
Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can
grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can
also provide exemptions or even take back the power.
Also, Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling
has long been revoked. The power is now vested
exclusively on national government.
Local governments, too, have no power to tax
instrumentalities of national government, such as
PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.
The power of local govt to impose taxes and fees is
always subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. It
cant be violative, but consistent with principle of local
autonomy.
Local autonomy doesnt make local govt sovereign w/in
state; it simply means decentralization. The local govt
has been described as a political subdivision of state
constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a
sovereign nation, it cant be an imperium in imperio.
3. Equal protection doesnt preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded diff. treatment as long
as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact
that some gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery,
races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are
prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD
1869 unconstitutional.
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for
Congress to determine. But as of now, every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law
to be nullified, there must be a showing of clear and
unequivocal breach of Constitution.
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to govt policies, it is for
Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or
amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.
D i sp o s i t i o n Petition is DISMISSED.

OPOSA V FACTORAN
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
FACTS
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the
prevention the misappropriation or impairment of
Ph i li pp i ne ra in fo re sts a nd a rr e st the un ab a te d
hemorrha ge of the countr ys vita l life suppor t system s
and continued rape of Mother Earth.

- In 1 99 1 a ca se wa s fi le d b y mi no r s ( re pr e se n te d b y
3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave
t h e i r p a r e n ts) a n d t h e Ph i l i p p i n e E co l o gi ca l N e t wo r k
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by
(PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of
declaring the petitioners to have no legal right?
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio
4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the
Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new secretary,
non-impairment clause found in the Constitution?
A n g e l Al c a l a . T h e c o m p l a i n t w a s i n s t i t u t e d t o b e a
taxpayers class suit as it alleges that all citizens of the
HELD
Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the
the cou n tr ys vi r gin tr op i cal ra in fo re sts. Th e su i t a lso
complaint is of common and general interest to all
alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing
citizens of the Philippines and that it would be
t h e s a m e s e n t i m e n t to w a r d s t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f o u r
impracticable to bring them all to court. The plaintiffs in
natural resources (since not all of them could go before
this case are numerou s and representative enou gh to
the cou r t) . F ur th er m or e , th i s wa s a l so a sse r ted to be
ensure that all interests is protected.
representative of the current generation and generation
2.
Yes the y can , follo wing the concep t of
that are yet to be born.
intergenerational responsibility. Every generation has a
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the
r e sp o n si b i l i t y t o th e n e x t t o p r e se r v e th e r h yth m a n d
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
(DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on
healthful environment.
its behalf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license
3 . Yes r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e co m m i t t e d g r a v e a b u se o f
agree ments in the countr y and 2. to cea se and desist
di scre tion amoun tin g to lack of jur isdi ction becau se it
from receiving, accepting, processing, and renewing or
failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners
approving new timber license agreements.
wh ich is the righ t to a balanced and healthful ecology
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the
that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under
country, the countrys islands, its natural resources, and
Section 16 Article II.
scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the
- Moreover, th is ri gh ts need not be wr itten in the
cou n tr y to ma in ta in a b al an ced a nd h ea l th fu l eco lo g y
Constitution for this deals with rights that are assumed
(54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for
from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and
it was written was because the framers feared that
other uses). They asserted that deforestation resulted in,
without a mandate as stated in the state policies future
a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and
gen er a tio n s wo u ld i nh er i t no th i n g to su stai n l if e . It is
loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of the countries
clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced
flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of
healthful ecology and the right to heal th. Given tha t i t
indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g.
could also be said that this right is further supported by
drought h. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i.
Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
flooding of lowlands j. siltation and shortening of the life
1987 making the cause of action existent.
span of dams k. reduction of earths capacity to process
4 . N o i t d o e s n o t v i o l a te t h e n o n - i m p a i r m e n t c l a u s e
carbon dioxide.
because licenses are not contracts, properties or a
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of
property right that is protected by the due process
lack of cause of action, of being political question, and of
clause of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v.
ca u s i n g th e i m p a i r m e n t o f co n tr a ct s. T h e p e ti ti o n e r s
Director of Forestr y, a l i c e n s e i s m e r e l y a p e r m i t o r
filed for certiorari hence this case. They contend that
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is
there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of
not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive
the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment),
may validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the
when national interests so require.
creation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment
Resources (DENR) to safeguard the peoples right to a
clause cannot be invoked.
healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in
No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section
the case still does not affect it given that no law or
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the
action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace,
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be
As well as the concept of generational genocide in
i n v o k e d . An d f u r t h e r m o r e , i f t h e r e w o u l d b e a l a w
Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right
passed it would not be considered as a violation of the
to self-preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law.
n o n - i m p a i r m e n t cl a u s e a s t h e v e r y n a tu r e o f t h e l a w
deals with the exercising of the police power of the state
ISSUES
t o a dv a n ce t h e r i g h t o f t h e p e o p l e to a b a l a n ce d a n d
1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit?
healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to
2 . W ON m i n o r s ca n a sse r t th a t th e y r e p r e se n t o th e r
the police power of the state.
generations and those succeeding theirs?

D e ci si on Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend

complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

DECS V SAN DIEGO

CRUZ; December 21, 1989
FACTS
- decided en banc, unanimous decision
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology
graduate from UE. He has taken the NM AT four ti mes
and flunked it as man y times. His application to take a
fifth examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the
basis of the three-flunk rule under MECS Order #12,
Series of 1972.
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the
Val e n zu e l a RT C , i nv o k i n g h i s co n st i t u t i o n a l r i gh ts to
academic freedom and quality education. In an amended
complaint, he raised the additional grounds of due
process and equal protection and also challenged the
constitutionality of the aforementioned order.
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he
w a s a l l o w e d t o t a k e a f i f t h a t t e m p t a t N M AT. T h i s
attempt he also failed.
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition
and declared the chal lenged order invalid. It held tha t
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power.
ISSUE
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the
police power of the State
HELD
Ratio M ea su r e s, su ch a s a dm i ssi on exam s a nd the
three flunk rule, designed to gauge the
academic preparation of an applicant fall within
t h e va l i d e x e r ci se o f t h e p o l i ce p o we r o f t h e
State.
R e a so n i n g
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,
unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
- a n a lo g y: Tab l a r i n ca s e & ca s e a t b a r i s s u e i s
academic preparation of the applicant. Admission test
and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the
regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of
the practice of medicine in all its branches is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public. This power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine also includes the power to

regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to

practice medicine.
2. The police power of the State is va lidly exercised
if
- ( a ) th e i n te r e s ts o f th e p u b l i c ge n e r a l l y, a s
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State <lawful subject>; &
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
t h e a tta i n m e n t o f t h e o b je ct so u gh t to b e
accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals
<law ful meth od >
- The case at bar complies with this requisites...
<subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility
of the Sta te to insure that the medi cal profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
<method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors.
3. T he rig h t t o q ua lit y e du ca t io n is N OT ab so lu t e .
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the
right to choose a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements."
- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
e d u ca t i o n a s a g u a r a n t e e o f th e C o n s t i t u t i o n : o n e
must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise.
4 . W h a t t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e re quire s is
equality among equals. A law does not have to operate
with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
- A su b s t a n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s b e t w e e n m e d i c a l
students and other students who are not subjected to
t h e N M AT a n d t h e t h r e e - f l u n k r u l e . T h e m e d i c a l
profession directly affects the very lives of the people,
u n l i ke o th e r ca r e e r s wh i ch , f o r th i s r e a so n , d o n o t
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, wh ile belon gin g to an equal l y re spectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not
be similarly treated.
- There would be unequal protection if some
a pp li can ts wh o hav e p assed th e te sts a re a dm i tted
and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance.
Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a
doctor, he does not have a con stitu tiona l right to be a
doctor. The Court suggests the notion of app ro priate
calling. It is time indeed that the Sta te took decisive
steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best
suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.
D e ci si on Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela
RTC r ev er se d . C osts a ga i n st p ri va te re sp on de n t Sa n
Diego.

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT

MALCOLM; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- An a p p e a l t o r e v i e w t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e S u p r e m e
Court of the Philippine Islands which affirmed a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Benguet, dismissing an application for the registration of
certain land.
- M a te o Ca r in o , a n I gor o t, f il ed a n ap pl i ca ti on f or the
registration of a certain land in the Province of Benguet.
F or mo re tha n 5 0 ye a r s b ef or e th e Tre at y of Pa r i s, i n
1899, the applicant and his ancestors had held the land
as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it and
maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His
father had cultivated parts and had used parts for
pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his
father in accordance with Igorot customs and had used it
for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of
the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however,
had issued from the Spani sh cro wn and al though I, in
1893-1894 , and again in 1896-1897, he made
application for one under the royal decrees then in force,
nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition,
a l l e gi n g o w n e r sh i p , u n d e r t h e m o r t g a g e l a w, a n d th e
lands were registered to him, that process establishing
only a possessory title.
- Ap p l i ca n t cl a i m s th a t h e n o w o wn s th e l a n d , a n d i s
entitled
to
registration
under
the
Philippine
Commissions Act No,496 of 1902, which established a
court for that purpose wi th juri sdi ction throu ghou t the
Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms
applications to be made by persons claiming to own the
land.
- The government claims that Spain had title to all the
land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to
permi t priva te ti tle s to be acqu ired; that there wa s no
prescription against the crown and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration wi thin a
limited time to make the title good; that the applicants
land was not re gi ste red, and therefore became publi c
l a n d ; t h a t h e U n i t e d S t a te s su c c e e d e d t o t h e t i t l e o f
Spain, and that the he has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.
ISSUE
WON the applicant owns the land
HELD
- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property
and rights acquired by the United States are to be
admin istered for the benefi ts of the inhabi tan ts of the
Ph i l i p p i n e s. T h u s, wh e n , a s fa r b a c k a s te st i m o n y o r
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed

to have been held in the same way before the Spanish

conquest, and never to have been public land.
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he
does not own the land. Spain did not assume to convert
all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into
tr e sp a sse r s o r even i n to te na n ts a t wi l l . Th e f act wa s
that ti tle s we re admitted to exist tha t o wed noth ing to
the powers of Spain.
- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 Where such
p osse sso r sha l l no t b e ab le to p ro du ce ti tle d ee ds, i t
shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as valid title by prescription. As prescription,
even against the Crown, was recognized by the laws of
Spain, the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it
was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 For private ownership, there
must have been a grant by competent authority. For all
l e gal effe cts, th o se wh o h ave be en i n po sse ssio n fo r
cer ta in tim e s sha l l be d ee me d o wn e r s. F or cu l tiv ated
l a n d , 2 0 ye a r s ; f o r u n cu l ti v a te d , 3 0 ye a r s. W he n th i s
decree went into effect, the applicants father was owner
of the land by the very terms of the decree. This being
the case and the fact that his possession was not
unla wful (no a tte mpt at an y su ch proceed ings a gain st
him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the
registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not
apply to him. Moreover, the decree was not calculated
to th e mi nd of an Igo ro t Ch ie f th e n oti on th a t a ncie n t
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it.
D i sp o s i t i o n
Judgment reversed. Law and justice
r e qu i r e th a t th e a p p l i ca n t sh o u l d b e g r a n t e d wh a t h e
seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice
and belief of those among whom he live, was his
property.

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF

MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
M i n d o r o to r e m o v e th e i r r e s i d e n c e f r o m t h e i r n a t i v e
habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there,
or be punished b y impri sonment if the y escaped . This
reservation, as appears from the resolution of the
provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
of land, wh ich i s approxima tel y 2,000 acres, on wh ich
about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of
the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation
and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of

habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are

deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
- T h e r e t u r n o f t h e S o l i c i t o r - G e n e r a l a l l e g e s th a t o n
February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro
adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial
g o v e r n o r, H o n . Ju a n M o r e n te , j r.. T h e l a w s p r i m a r y
objective is the advancement of the welfare of the nonChristian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas
clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of
the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a
p l a ce m o s t co n v e n i e n t fo r t h e M a n g ya n e s to l i v e o n .
Pursuant to the Governors powers under section 2077 of
the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the
Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Ad m in i stra ti ve Co de . Th e r e so lu ti on of th e p rov in cia l
board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
ex ecu tiv e o rd er o f th e gov er no r of the sa me p rov in ce
copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
ISSUES
1 . W ON th e Ma n gya n s we re d ep ri ve d o f d ue p ro ce ss
when their liberty to choose their homes were limited by
the law.
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in
enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the
Mangyanes.
HELD
1 . N O . N o n e o f th e r i gh ts of th e ci t i ze n ca n b e ta ke n
away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
th e co ur se of the ar gu me n t i n th e D ar tm ou th C ol le ge
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic li tera ture , sa id tha t the meaning of
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held,
a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a
rule which is especially true where much must be left to
the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Nei ther i s due process a stationar y and
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced
b y p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y, w h e t h e r s a n c t i o n e d b y a g e a n d
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power in furtherance of the public good which
re ga rd s a nd p re se rv es th e se pr in cip l e s of li be r ty a nd
justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado

vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of

law" means simpl y * * * "first, that there shall be a law
p re scri be d i n ha rm on y wi th the ge ne ra l p o wer s of th e
legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it
shall be enforced accordin g to the regu lar method s of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of
a cla ss." (U . S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil ., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.1) "W hat is due process of law depends on
circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909],
212 U. S., 82.)
- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a
right conception of liberty and does not practise liberty
in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to
do anything they will-going from one place to another in
the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caigins thereon. Not knowing what true
liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, how can
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without
due process of law?
- But does the Con stitu tiona l guaran ty tha t no person
sha ll be deprived of his libe rty without due process of
law apply to a class of persons who do not have a
correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty
in a rightful way?
- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an
erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty i s. It wi ll mean, in the case at bar, that the
Government should not adopt any measures looking to
the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let
alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savager y without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing
with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either
letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one
more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden
to the State and on account of their ignorance they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will
be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
wa n t to a b u se t h e m . . Th e y u n d e r st a n d l i b e r t y a s th e
r i gh t to d o a n yth in g the y wi l l- go i n g f ro m on e pl ace to
another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests
and makin g il legal cai gi ns thereon. To allow the m to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this
time will leave the Government without recourse to
p u r su e th e wo r k s o f c i v i l i zi n g th e m a n d m a ki n g th e m
u se f u l ci t i ze n s. T h e y wi l l th u s b e l e f t i n a p e r m a n e n t
state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of
attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of
the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen

is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of
the police power, the cou rts canno t fairl y sa y that the
L e g i sl a t u r e h a s e x ce e d e d i t s r i g h tf u l a u t h o r i t y. I t i s ,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
- As a p o i n t w h i c h h a s b e e n l e f t f o r t h e e n d o f t h i s
decision and which in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude
w h i c h t h e co u r t s sh o u l d a s s u m e t o w a r d s th e s e t t l e d
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which
we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public
policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last
a n a l y s i s , d e t e r m i n e d o n t h a t t h e o r y, w h e n n o t
d e te rm i ne d b y di ffer en ti a tio n of the p ri n cip le of a
prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior cases. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the
scale s wh ich the cour t believes wil l best promo te
t h e p u b l i c w e l f a r e i n i t s p r o b a b l e o p e r a ti o n a s a
general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We
are furthe r of the opinion tha t se ction 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
p o l i ce p o we r, so m e w h a t a n a l o g o u s t o th e I n d i a n
p o l i c y o f t h e U n i te d S t a t e s . S e c t i o n 2 1 4 5 o f th e
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
D e ci si on Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue.

SEPARATE OPINION
CARSON

- The legislative and administrative history of the

Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of
civ il i za tio n to wh i ch a spe ci fi c tr i be m u st b e f ou nd to
h a v e a d v a n ce d , t o j u s t i f y i t s r e m o v a l f r o m th e c l a s s
embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as

that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that

d e g r e e o f c i v i l i za t i o n w h i ch r e su l t s i n a m o d e o f l i f e
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to
extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general
l a ws an d r e gu l a tio n s, a dm in i stra ti ve , l e gi sla tiv e , an d
j u d i c i a l , w h i ch co n tr o l t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e a d m i t t e d l y
civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
f u r th e r m o r e , wh i ch d o e s n o t f i n d ex p r e s si o n i n t r i b a l
customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch
the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or
practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or
pr op er t y of th o se who ma y b e b ro u gh t i n co n ta ct wi th
the members of the tribe.
- So the standard of civilization to which any given
number or group of inhabitants of a particular province
i n t h e se I sl a n d s, o r a n y i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r of su ch a
group must be found to have advanced, in order to
remove such group or individual from the class
embraced within the statutory description of "nonC h r i s t i a n , " i s t h a t d e gr e e o f ci v i l i za t i o n w h i c h w o u l d
naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such
persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "nonChristian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would
qualif y them whe ther the y re side within or be yond the
habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a
mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not
be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of
the civili zed inhabitants of the Islands with whom the y
are brought in contact.
- The contention that in this particular case, and without
cha llengin g the validi ty of the statu te , the wr it should
issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as
well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by
th e r e co n ce n t r a t i o n o r d e r a n o p p o r tu n i t y to b e h e a r d
b e f o r e a n y a tt e m p t wa s m a d e t o e n f o r ce i t, b e g s th e
question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention
that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such
an order.

MOIR

- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight,

b u t m y se n se o f j u s t i ce w i l l n o t p e r m i t m e t o l e t t h i s
d e c i s i o n g o o n r e co r d w i t h o u t e x p r e s s i n g m y s t r o n g
dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in
by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze
the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall
simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and human
side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no
treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by
which the y have agreed to live within a certain district
where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are
citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are
Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges
o f a n y o t h e r c i t i z e n o f t h i s c o u n t r y. An d w h e n t h e

provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted

to take them from their native habitat and to hold them
on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he
d ep ri ve d th em of th e ir ri gh ts a nd the i r l ib er t y wi th ou t
d u e p r o ce s s o f l a w, a n d t h e y w e r e d e n i e d t h e e q u a l
prote ction of the law. The ma jor ity opinion sa ys "the y
are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the
civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they
want it or not. They are backward and deficient in
culture and must be moved from their homes, however
humble they may be and "brought under the bells" and
m a d e to s ta y o n a r e se r v a ti o n . Ar e t h e se p e ti t i o n e r s
charged with any crime? There is no mention in the
return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of
any cri me havin g been com mitted by the se "pea ceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
- It has been said that this is a government of laws and
not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals;
that the constitutional principles upon which our
government and its institutions rest do not leave room
for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by
th e se p r ov i si o n s wh i ch t h e p e o p l e h av e , th r o u gh t h e
organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of
all control exercised over them. In particular the
fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
p r o te ct i o n cl a u se , th e r e o f , f o r b i d s t h a t th e i n d i v i d u a l
shall be subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and
does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty,
or arbitrary spoliation of property.
- As w e h a v e s e e n , a s t a t u t e w h i c h m a k e s a p u r e l y
arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or which singles
ou t any particula r individual or cla ss as the sub je ct of
hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly
u n co n s t i t u t i o n a l a s b e i n g o p p o se d t o t h e f o u r te e n t h
amendment and especially to the equal protection
cl a u se th e r e o f . T h i s i s a p l a i n ca se , a n d r e qu i r e s n o
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . " ( Vo l . 4 , E n c y c l o p e d i a o f U . S .
Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we consider the
nature and the theory of our institutions of government,
the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and
r e v i e w th e h i s to r y of th e i r d ev e l o p m e n t, we a r e
constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave
room for the play and action of purely personal and
a r b i t r a r y p o we r. S o v e r e i g n t y i t se l f i s , o f co u r s e , n o t
subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but
in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agen cie s of government, soverei gn ty itself remain
wi th the people by whom and for whom all government
e x ist s a n d a c ts . An d t h e la w is th e d e f in it io n a n d
li mitation of po wer. It is, indeed , qu ite true , tha t there
must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person
o r b o d y, th e a u th o r i t y o f f i n a l d e c i si o n ; a n d , i n m a n y
cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal
of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure

of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the

f u n d a m e n ta l r i gh t s t o l i f e , l i b e r t y, a n d t h e p u r su i t o f
happine ss, con sidered as individual posse ssion s, are
secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are
the monuments sho wing the victorious progress of the
r a c e i n se c u r i n g t o m e n t h e b l e s si n g s o f ci v i l i za t i o n
u nd er the re i gn of ju st an d e qua l l a ws, so th a t, in the
f am ou s l an gua ge of Ma ssa chu se tts Bi l l o f R i gh ts, th e
Government of Commonwealth 'may be a government of
law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjo yment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
- It i s sa i d tha t th e p re se n t l a w is an ol d Act b ei n g i n
substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But
it has never been brought before this court for
d e te r m i n a t i o n o f i t s co n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y. N o m a t t e r h o w
beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law
t e n d s t o d e p r i v e a n y m a n o f l i f e , l i b e r t y, o r p r o p e r t y
without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the
acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
s e c t i o n 2 1 4 5 o f t h e Ad m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e n o t o n l y
deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due
process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of
their life , wi thout due pro cess of la w. Histor y tea ches
that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native
fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines
of a reservation is to invi te disea se and sufferin g and
death.
- From my long experience in the Islands, I should sa y
that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take
the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have
reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
f r u i tf u l n e s s a n d t o t r a n s f e r t h e m t o t h e m o r e f e r t i l e ,
u no ccu p ie d , m al ar ia in fe ste d va ll e ys wh i ch th e y l oo k
d o wn up on fr om th ei r f ie ld s- tha n i t wo u ld b e to or de r
their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that
the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are
in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the
Man guiane s ma y be so taken from their na tive habi tat
and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open
air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes,
who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so
may the Moros.
- There are "non-Christian" in nearl y ever y province in
the Phi lippine Island s. All of the thir ty- nine governor s
upon the prior approval of the head of the depar tment
have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes
and put them on a reservation for "their own good and
the general good of the Philippines," and the courts will
grant them no relief. These unfortunate citi zens of the
Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives,
may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the
provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the
rese rvation i s once establi shed mi gh t not a provincia l

governor decide that some political enemy was a nonChristian, and that he would be safer on the reservation.
No matter what his education and culture, he could have
n o t r i a l , h e co u l d m a k e n o d e f e n se , th e j u d g e o f t h e
court might be in a distant province and not within
reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "nonChristians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same
category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be
so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on
a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more
progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and
2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are
unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners
a r e i l l e g a l l y r e s t r a i n e d o f t h e i r l i b e r t y, a n d t h a t th e y
have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and
order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the
petitioners.

PIT-OG V PEOPLE
FERNAN; October 11, 1990
FACTS
- Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt.
Province called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan
group whose members were descendants of the original
o wner s thereof named Ja kot and Pang- o. One of the ir
d e s c e n d a n t s , Pe l - e y C u l l a l a d , w a s r e q u e s t e d b y t h e
tomayan t o a ct i n th e i r b e h a l f i n se l l i n g t h e 4 0 0 - s qm
r e s i d e n t i a l p o r t i o n o f t h e tayan, i n o r d e r t h a t t h e
tomayan w o u l d h a v e s o m e t h i n g t o b u t c h e r a n d e a t
during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in
consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of
Edward Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It
w a s a gr e e d t h a t t h e u n r e g i s t e r e d p r o p e r t y w o u l d b e
registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad,
several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures
or thumb marks on the notarized deed of sale.
Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for
taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon.
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og
( a ka M a r y P i t - o g) a n d h e r co m p a n i o n s d e s tr o ye d th e
fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away
the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits
valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the
matter to the police. Three days later, the police filed a
complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the Municipal
Trial Court of Bontoc.
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the
t a ya n b e l o n ge d t o h e r, h e r f a th e r L o b ch o ke n b e i n g a
descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land for
taxation purposes because no one in the tomayan was
allo wed to declare the land as his o wn. However, an y

m em be r of the to m a ya n co u ld m a ke i mp r ov em en ts o n
t h e la n d a n d c la i m t h e m a s h is o wn . An yo n e wh o
abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other
members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed
to the cultivation of the tayan.
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and
when he died, his widow Pidchoy and their children
continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary
thereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy
for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to
b u i l d a h o u se b e h i n d th e p l a ce w h e r e P i t - o g a n d h e r
family used to have a house because Edward was
E r ke y' s u n c l e b e i n g t h e b r o th e r o f h e r f a th e r. E r k e y
planted the bananas and avocado trees in the area and
h arv este d the su ga r ca ne . No o ne ha d ever p rev en ted
her from cutting the sugarcane and the other plants.
T h e m u n i c i p a l t r i a l c o u r t d i s cr e d i t e d P i t - o g ' s s t o r y
emphasizing that her claim of continuous occupation and
p o s se s si o n o f th e l a n d w a s b a se l e ss a s sh e h a d "n o
papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an
the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were
present and accordingly rendered the judgment of
conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower courts with the following findings and
observations:
- P a si te n g s cl a i m of o wn e r sh i p i s d o cu m e n te d b y a
Deed of Conveyance, a public document which was
executed between him and the members of the tomayan
gro up . Th e val id i ty o f th i s p ub li c d ocu me n t h as n eve r
been questioned by any one of the previous owners
belonging to the to ma yan group. Furthermore , the tax
declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments
by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of
ownership, are, nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his
possession of the land in question. In contrast to these
documentary evidence, petitioner offers nothing better
t h a n h e r b a r e c l a i m . T h e p e r so n a l p r o p e r t y t a ke n b y
accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng,
and she gained from the taking thereof without the
consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the
crime of theft.
ISSUES
1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the
sugarcane and the bananas.
2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.
HELD
1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent
because she took the sugarcane and bananas believing
them to be her own.
- Ed wa rd Pa si te n g r el ie d h eav il y o n hi s d ocum en ta r y
ev id en ce to pr ove o wne r sh i p ove r the su gar can e a nd
bananas. A careful study of these documents, in
con junction wi th the testimonial evidence extant in the
record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of
d o u b t u p o n P i t - o g s c u l p a b i l i t y. T h e d e e d o f s a l e

describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm,

while the tax declarations show that the property
contains an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presented
by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas
cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so
close to each other that the possibility of confusion as to
who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before
the filing of this case, Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son,
Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had
p l a n te d i n th e a r e a . T h e f a ct th a t Ed wa r d h a d b u i l t a
fence around the area he claimed as his does not
necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square
meters he had purchased from the tomayan. After all, he
h a d d e c l a r e d a s h i s o w n f o r t a x a t i o n p u r p o s e s 112
square meters more than the area he bought.
- T he re i s o n r eco rd a sur ve y pl an o f th e 51 2 squa re meter area claimed by Edward but there are no
i n d i ca t i o n s th e r e i n o f th e e x a ct a r e a i nv o l v e d i n th i s
ca se. Proof on the matter, ho wever, i s important for i t
means the Identification of the rightful owner of the
stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove
the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to
clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal
act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully
deprived of a thing belonging to him.
2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard
to claims of ownership over the tayan should be
threshed out in an appropriate civil action.
- Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22
re
Indigenous Community
- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a
cl ai m o f o wn er shi p fo un de d on cu sto m s a nd tra d i tio n
and another such claim supported by written evidence
but nonetheless based on the same customs and
tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it
can never be too careful More so in this case, where the
accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be
e x p e c te d t o r e s o r t t o w r i t t e n e v i d e n ce o f o w n e r s h i p ,
stands to lose her liberty on account of an oversight in
the court's appreciation of the evidence.
D i sp o s i t i o n Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime
of theft. No costs.

KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO

MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
FACTS
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this
case
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case
has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing
to sue and
( 2 ) w h e t h e r u n d e r i t s c h a r t e r ( R . A . N o . 116 9 , a s
amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office

can enter into any form of association or collaboration

w i t h a n y p a r t y i n o p e r a t i n g a n o n - l i n e l o t t e r y, a n d
these questions can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners ar gue that the two ju stices who chan ged
their votes did not act according to law and that the two
n e w a p p o i n t e e s r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e m e r i t s o f t h e ca s e
must of necessity align themselves wi th all the Ramos
a pp oi n te e s wh o we re di sse n ter s in the fi rst ca se a nd
constitute the new majority in the second lotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split
decision: 7-6. W ith the retirement of one of the original
majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it
was not surprising that the first decision in the first case
was later reversed.
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split
decision) which was overturned in People v. Yang.
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II
Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners
m a y b e r e s o r t e d t o f o r s tr i k i n g d o wn l a w s o r o ff i ci a l
actions which are inconsistent with them
2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on
con stitutional ground s, given that the Consti tu tion
g u a r a n t e e s t o p e o p l e s o r g a n i za t i o n s e f f e c t i v e a n d
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its
charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into
any form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery.
HELD
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are
not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can
be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for
legislative or executive action . B y a u th o r i zi n g t h e
h o l d i n g o f l o t te r y f o r ch a r i t y, C o n g r e s s h a s i n e ff e c t
d e te r m i n e d t h a t co n si s t e n t l y w i t h t h e se p o l i c i e s a n d
principles of the Constitution, the PCSO ma y be given
thi s author ity. That i s wh y we sa id wi th respe ct to the
opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro,
"the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit ." (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question
the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which
petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot
raise.
- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not
give it the requisite personality to question the validity
of the con tra ct in thi s case . The Consti tu tion provides
t h a t " t h e S t a t e s h a l l r e sp e c t t h e r o l e o f i n d e p e n d e n t
people 's organi zations to enable the people to pursue

and protect, within the democratic framework, their

legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to
"effe ctive and reasonab le parti cipa tion a t all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule
that only real parties in interest or those with standing,
as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s , i s l i m i te d b y t h e " c a s e a n d
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the
courts from decision-making in the political departments
of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just
any party.
- P e t i t i o n e r s ' r i g h t t o s u e as taxpayers ca n n o t b e
su s ta i n e d b e ca u se t h i s ca se d o e s n o t i n v o lv e i l l e ga l
disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens
can they bring this suit because no specific injury
suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who
a r e m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s , t h e i r r i g h t t o s u e as
legislators c a n n o t b e i n v o k e d b e c a u s e t h e y d o n o t
complain of any infringement of their rights as
legislators.
3 . I n d e e d i n th e f i r s t ca se i t wa s h e l d t h a t th e P C S O
under its char ter (R .A. No. 1169, as amended) canno t
enter into any form of association or collaboration with
any party in operating an on-line lottery HOW EVER THE
QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL
QUESTIONS
AND
THE
CLAIMS
INVOLVED
ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN
THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY
STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST
CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions
of the first contract, which were considered to be
features of a joint venture agreement, had been
removed in the new contract.

VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR
CORTES; February 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm
repor ts tha t cer tain members of the Bata sang
Pambansa, including some members of the opposition,
w e r e g r a n te d c l e a n l o a n s f r o m t h e GS I S b e f o r e t h e
F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 6 e l e ct i o n s . P e t i t i o n e r Val m o n t e f i l e d a
special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
i n j u n c t i o n , p r a yi n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t B e l m o n t e , i n h i s
capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to:
1 . F u r n i sh p e ti t i o n e r s w i t h a l i s t o f t h e n a m e s o f t h e
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were

able to secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately

prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the
intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.
2 . Furni sh peti tioner s with cer tified true cop ies of the
documents evidencing said loans.
3 . Al l o w p e t i t i o n e r s a c c e s s t o p u b l i c r e c o r d s f o r t h e
subject information.
ISSUES
P r o ce d u r a l :
Have petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies?
Substantive:
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under
matters of public concern?
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS
and its borrowers?
3 . Ar e l o a n t r a n s a c t i o n s o f t h e G S I S , b e i n g m e r e l y
incidental to its insurance function, private in nature?
HELD
P r o ce d u r a l : No. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved.
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, can be passed upon by the court more
competently than GSIS or its Board of Trustees.
Substantive:
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public
office held by the alleged borrowers make the
i n f o r m a ti o n so u gh t c l e a r l y a m a t te r o f p u b l i c i n te r e st
and concern.
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in
his private capacity and not to public and governmental
agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by
juridical entities, as a corporation has no right to privacy
in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
H o we v e r, e v e n th e co n ce r n e d b o r r o we r s th e m se l v e s
may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right. Public
figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, en jo y a more limi ted ri gh t to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.
3.
No.
The
constituent-ministrant
dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been
r ep ud ia ted . Th e gov er nm en t, whe th er ca rr yi n g o u t i ts
sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function in
granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
informa tion . Transa ctions entered in to by the GSIS, a
government-con trolled corpora tion crea ted b y specia l
legislation, are within the ambit of the peoples right to
be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.

Pe ti tio n s ar e en ti tle d to a cce ss to th e do cu m en ts

sub je ct to reasonable regu lations. The peti tion is
h e l d t o b e m e r i t o r i o u s a s t o t h e 2 nd a n d 3 rd
alternative acts sought by petitioners.
T h e sa m e ca n n o t b e sa i d , h o w e v e r, o f t h e 1 a c t st
sought. Although citizens are entitled to access to
official records, the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of public records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
t h e i r d e si r e t o a c q u i r e i n f o r m a ti o n o n m a t t e r s o f
public concern. It is essential for a writ of
mandamus to lie that the applicant has a welldefined, clear and certain right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required.

CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
FACTS
- Th ese ar e the m ai n qu e stio n s ra i se d in th i s o ri gi na l
action see king (1) to prohibit and enjo in responden ts
[PC GG and i ts cha irman ] from privatel y enter ing into ,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
he ir s o f th e la te Pr e si de n t F er d in an d E. Ma r co s x x x
relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard; and
(2) to compel respondents to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
p er fe cte d , a nd a ll d ocu me n ts r el a te d to o r re la tin g to
su ch ne go tia ti on s a nd a gre em en t be twe en th e PC GG
and the Marcos heirs.
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general,
brought this action in response to news reports in
September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
cod ed accou n ts i n Swi ss ba nks, an d ( 2) th e re po r ted
e x e c u t i o n o f a co m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n th e g o v e r n m e n t
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order dated March
2 3 , 1 9 9 8 , e n jo i n i n g r e sp o n d e n t s, th e i r a ge n t s a n d /o r
representatives from entering into, or perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning
t h e i r i l l - g o t t e n w e a l t h . O n Au g u s t 1 9 , 1 9 9 8 , G l o r i a ,
Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed
b ef or e th e Co ur t a mo tio n fo r in ter ve n ti on . Th e y aver
that they are among the 10,000 claimants whose right
to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate
is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos.

ISSUES
P r o ce d u r a l :
1 . W ON t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a s t h e p e r s o n a l i t y o r l e g a l
standing to file the instant petition; and
2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this
action may be filed.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to
the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or
not, with the Marcoses; and
2. W ON there exist any legal restraints against a
compromise agreement between the Marcoses
and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses illgotten wealth.
HELD
Procedural:
1. Yes. W hen the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties
in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is
a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has
any legal or
special interest in the result of the action.
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of
respondent that petitioner should have properly sought
relief before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of
t h e c o m p r o m i se a g r e e m e n t s w a s p e n d i n g r e s o l u t i o n
seems to have merit, if
petitioner was merely seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to
compel the PCGG
t o d i s cl o se to th e p u b l i c t h e
terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner
is here seeking the
public
di sclo sur e of al l
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
p e r f e cte d , a n d d o cu m e n ts r e l a t e d o r r e l a t i n g to su ch
negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs. In other words, the petition is not merely
c o n f i n e d t o t h e Ag r e e m e n t s t h a t h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n
drawn, but
likewise to any other ongoing or future
undertaking to wards any settlement on the alleged
Mar cos loo t. The core issue boils down to the preci se
in terpre tation, in ter ms of scope , of the twi n
constitutional
provisions on public transactions.
Substantive:
1 . Yes . T h e r e i s n o d o u b t t h a t t h e r e c o v e r y o f t h e
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten
wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character.
The assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
that
transactions
contemplates
inclusion
of
negotiations leading to the consummation of a
transaction, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its

officers, as well as other government representatives, to

disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and
Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws.
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly
authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as
regards criminal liability. The authority must be
specifically conferred. In the present
case,
the
power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on
PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 as amended by EO No.
14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the
principal defendants i n t h e s p a t e o f i l l - g o t t e n w e a l t h
cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. The
provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide
information or testify against a respondent, defendant or
accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property
to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
vi ol a tio n of the C on sti tu tio n . The p o we r to tax a nd to
gr an t tax exe mp tio n s i s ve ste d i n Co n gr e ss a nd , to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG
has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even
under
the cover of its authority to compromise illgotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts
the law exemp tin g the Marco ses from pa yi ng taxes on
their properties, such law will
definitely not pass
the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of
Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of
the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate the constitutional rule that taxation shall be
uniform and equitable.
iii) The government binds itself under the General
Agreement to cause the dismissal of all cases against
the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and
other courts. This is a direct
encroachment
on
judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal
jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that once a case
has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the
full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a
resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG
cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases
a ga i n st th e M a r co se s p e n d i n g i n th e co u r ts , fo r sa i d
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
iv) The government also waives all claims and
counterclaims, whether past, present, or future,
m a tu re d o r in ch oa te , a ga in st th e M ar co se s. Thi s a ll encompassing stipulation is contrar y to law. Under the
Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived.
This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal

protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively

submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of
ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;
v ) T h e Ag r e e m e n t s d o n o t p r o v i d e f o r a d e f i n i t e o r
4 . W ON t h e r e w a s r a t i f i ca t i o n o f th e Ag r e e m e n t s b y
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill
partial implementation; and
their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an
the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
actual case and a justiciable question.
v i ) T h e Ag r e e m e n t s d o n o t s ta t e w i t h sp e c i f i ci t y t h e
standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited
HELD
b y the governmen t and whi ch shall be re tained b y the
Procedural:
Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides
that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the
that a motion to intervene should be filed before
$356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery
r e n d i t i o n o f j u d gm e n t. In te r v e n ti o n ca n n o l o n ge r b e
expense s), such sharing arran gemen t per tains only to
allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined
Substantive:
wi th re sp e ct to th e o th er pr op er tie s. Ne i the r i s the r e ,
1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the
anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis
la w i s n ul l an d voi d ab initio an d vests n o ri gh ts an d
for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have
vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos approval
r e a l l y n o i n t e r e s t to p r o te c t o r r i g h t t o a s s e r t i n th i s
of the principal Agreement, an express
condition
proceedin g. Moreover, the movants are merel y
therein, renders the compromise incomplete and
incidental, not indispensable , p a r t i e s t o t h e i n s t a n t
unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were
case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought
obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to
determine whether the latter has been acting within the
RESOLUTION
bounds of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999
applies to cases involving factual questions, since
the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts . Inasmuch as the
FACTS
p e ti t i o n a t b a r i n v o l v e s o n l y co n s t i tu t i o n a l a n d l e g a l
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and
questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved
Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for
to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
l e a v e to i n te r v e n e a n d a m o ti o n f o r p a r ti a l
3 . N o . T h e C h a v e z p e ti t i o n w a s n o t co n f i n e d t o t h e
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a l l e g i n g t h a t th e y w e r e p a r ti e s a n d
co n c l u d e d t e r m s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e Ag r e e m e n t s , b u t
signatories
to
the
General
and
Supplemental
l i ke w i se co n ce r n e d o th e r o n go i n g a n d f u tu r e
Agreements which this Court declared NULL AND VOID
ne gotiations and a greemen ts, perfected or no t. It wa s
f o r b e i n g co n t r a r y t o l a w a n d t h e C o n si t u t i o n . T h e y
th er ef or e no t r en de re d mo o t a nd acad e mi c si m pl y b y
claim to have a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
or in the success of either of the parties or an interest
4 . No . The PC GGs gr an t to th e cla i ma n ts m o th er of
against both as to warrant their intervention. They add
a c c e s s r i gh t s t o o n e o f th e i r se q u e s te r e d p r o p e r t i e s
that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a
cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they
denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to
are not subject to ratification.
e qual pro tection . The y al so the rai se the princip le of
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original
h i e r a r ch i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e to i m p u g n t h e
jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a citizen to
Courts cognizance of petitioners direct action before it.
enforce a public right. There is no political
question involved. The power and authority of the PCGG
ISSUES
to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating
P r o ce d u r a l :
the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused
WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be
its discretion.
allowed.
Substantive:
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the
p ro ce ed i n gs r e gar d in g the Agr ee m en ts to wh i ch th e y
(BAYAN) V ZAMORA
were parties and signatories was a denial of their
BUENA; October 10, 2000
property right to contract without due process of law;
2. W ON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical
FACTS
admin istration of ju stice by rulin g upon the validi ty of
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the
the Agreements;
constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement.
3. WON the issue of right to information raised by
(Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the

- March 14, 1947 The Philippines and USA forged a

Military Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others,
the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US
military personnel.
- August 30, 1951 The Philippines and USA entered into
a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate
rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye but Mutual
Defense Treaty still in effect.)
- February 10, 1998 President Ramos approved Visiting
Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and
negotiations.
- October 5, 1998 President Estrada, through Secretary
of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18,
concurring with the ratification of the VFA. (Who
concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad,
Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay
Jr, Osmea, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile,
Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who
rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmea III, Pimentel,
Legarda-Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed
Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which defines
treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It also defines the rights of the US and the
Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21,
Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the
Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the
Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate,
and when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of
votes cast by the people in a national referendum, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine
sovereignty.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of
their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed
by the US Military personnel.
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher.

4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with
the VFA?
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal
protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against
nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal
standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation
in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess
the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues
raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and
of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL
importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural
barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25
Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
(The or is important to take note as it signifies
independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can
just be an agreement covering only troops not bases
like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no
distinction whether the troops or facilities will be
transient or permanent, so the VFA is covered by
this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article
VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the
sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate
(Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the
Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says duly concurred
in by the Senate with no specified number).
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied
with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
a)
it must be under a treaty. -- Complied
with. We treat VFA as a treaty.
b)
the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate, and so required by the Congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23
Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was
elected VP). Requirement of ratification in a
national referendum unnecessary since Congress
has not required it.

c)

recognized as a treaty by the other

contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador
Hubbards letter states that the VFA is binding on
the US go vt and that in international legal terms
such agreement is a treaty.
- A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, is an international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed

by the international law, whether embodied in a single

instrument or in two or more related instruments.
- In international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers.
3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that
the xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land xxx (this doesnt really answer the issue above,
but the ponente didnt really discuss an answer WON the
VFA is an abdication of sovereignty.. oh well here
goes)
- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. As a member of the family of nations,
the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally
accepted rules for the conduct of its international
relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a
convenient excuse for non-compliance with our
obligations, duties and responsibilities under
international law.
- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of
States adopted by the International Law Commision
1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out
in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention:
pacta sunt servanda.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with
the VFA? No.
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despostic manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties
or
International agreements in the President, subject only
to the concurrence of the members of Senate. The
negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the
lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic
powers granted by the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the
Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone.
Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises
its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the
Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to
constitute an abuse of power.
D e ci si on Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO [dissent]
- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec
25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see requirements
above).
- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do
not apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of
the troops, while the provision applies to a permanent
presence of foreign troops.
The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand.
Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense Treaty between
RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the
duration of the visits. VFA does not provide for a specific
and limited period of effectivity.
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state is crystal clear and
was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the
anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases
agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the
US treated it as an executive agreement.
- The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in
the US. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if
it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the
same constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still
questions on the constitutional basis and legal effects of
sole executive agreements under the US law.
- With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the
exact legal force of sole executive agreements under the
US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for
the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line
between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast
with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish
it, The VFA as a sole executive agreement cannot climb
to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can
reach. Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set
by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military
troops on Phil soil must be recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting state. I vote to grant the petitions.

KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.

DAVIDE; May 5, 1994
FACTS
N a t u r e : Special civil action for prohibition and
injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction,
to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of
Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with online lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169),
PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system
for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested
i n o p e r a t i n g a n o n - l i n e l o t t e r y s ys t e m , Berjaya
Group Berhad, a multinational company in

Malaysia, be ca m e in ter e sted to o ffer i ts se rv ice s

conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
and resources to PCSO and organi zed with some
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B)
Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation
o f R .A. N o . 1169 , a s a me nd ed b y B.P. Bl g. 4 2, wh i ch
known as the Philippine Gaming Management
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
Corporation (PGMC).
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities
2. B e f o r e Au g u s t 1 9 9 3 , P C S O f i n a l l y f o r m a l l y
"in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of
p e r s o n , a s s o c i a t i o n , c o m p a n y o r e n t i t y, f o r e i g n o r
C o n tr a c t o f a n o n - l i n e l o t te r y s ys t e m f o r P C S O .
dome stic." And tha t there are ter ms and condi tion s of
Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP
t h e C o n tr a c t " s h o w i n g th a t r e sp o n d e n t P G M C i s t h e
( "Le sso r sh a ll be a do me sti c cor po ra ti on , wi th a t
actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
least 60% of its shares owned by Filipino
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of
shareholder s"), PGMC claim s tha t Ber ja ya Group
Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
under took to reduce i ts equi ty stake s in PGMC to
t e l e co m m u n i ca t i o n s n e tw o r k th a t wi l l co n n e c t a l l t h e
40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC
stockholdings to local investors.
cannot do that because it has no franchise from
3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO.
Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the
The bids were evaluated by the Special Prene twork pursuant to Section 1 of Act No . 3846, as
Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC)
amended.
for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled
thereafter submitted to the Office of the President.
corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a
(This was preceded by complaints from the
franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article
Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
X II o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n st i t u t i o n . F u r th e r m o r e , si n ce " th e
4. O c t . 2 1 , 1 9 9 3 , t h e O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t
subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about
announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to
7 5%, as sh o wn b y pa ra gr ap h EIGH T o f i ts Ar ti cle s of
operate the countr's on-line lotter y system.
Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract
Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI,
in question because all forms of gambling and lottery
and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
is one of them are in cluded in the so-ca lled foreign
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter
investments negative list under the Foreign Investments
to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up
Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital
of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious
is allowed.
moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN
- F i n a l l y, t h e p e t i t i o n e r s i n s i s t t h a t t h e Ar t i c l e s o f
re i te r a te d i ts v i go ro u s op po si tio n to l o tto a t the
Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish
meeting of the Com mittee on Games and
and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications
Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
systems.
6. N o v . 1 9 , 1 9 9 3 , t h e m e d i a a n n o u n c e d t h a t
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS
despite the opposition, Malacanang will push
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely
th ro u gh wi th o pe ra ti on o f l o tto , tha t i t i s a ctu a ll y
an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as
PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning
such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator
corporate bidders merely lessors.
of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of
its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint
all documents pertaining to the lotter y award from
venture' with PGM.
Exe cu ti ve Se cre ta r y Teof isto Gu in go na , Jr., wh o
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation
informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be
of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the
transmitted before the end of the month. However
laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery
o n th e sam e d ate , a n a gr ee me n t d en om in a ted a s
franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial
Contract of Lease was fi nally executed by PCSO
or lega l, wh ich shou ld be ventilated in another forum ;
and PGMC.
and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal
8. C o n s i d e r i n g t h e d e n i a l b y t h e O f f i c e o f t h e
standing or real in terest in the sub je ct contra ct and in
President of its protest and the statement of
obtaining the reliefs sought."
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant
"only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO
the imminent implementation of the Contract of
maintain that the contract of lease in question does not
Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its coviolate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
Bl g . 4 2 , an d th a t th e pe ti tio ne r 's in ter pr e ta tio n of the
PETITIONERS' CLAIM
phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into
S e c t i o n 1 i s " m u c h t o o n a r r o w, s t r a i n e d a n d u t t e r l y
the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it
devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a
i s a n ar ra n ge m en t whe r ei n the PC SO wo u ld ho ld a nd
corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential

p r e r o g a t i v e t o e n t e r i n to a l l k i n d s o f t r a n sa c t i o n s o r
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its
purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks
to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture"
or partnership where there is "community of interest in
the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual
right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain
in a contract of lease." They further claim that the
establishment of the telecommunications system
stipu lated in the Con tract of Lease does not requ ire a
congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a
public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not violate the
F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t Ac t o f 1 9 9 1 ; t h a t t h e Ar t i c l e s o f
I n c o r p o r a t i o n o f P G M C a u t h o r i ze i t to e n te r i n to t h e
Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom,
morality and propriety of acts of the executive
department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."
F i n a l l y, t h e y a l l e g e t h a t t h e p e ti t i o n e r s h a v e n o
standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES
P r o ce d u r a l : WON the petitioners have locus standi.
S u b s t a n t i v e : WON the Contract of Lease is legal and
v a l i d i n l i g h t o f R A 116 9 a s a m e n d e d b y B P B l g . 4 2 ,
which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association, or joint venture
w i t h a n y p e r s o n , a s s o c i a t i o n , c o m p a n y, o r e n t i t y,
whether domestic or foreign."
HELD
1. T h e p r e l i m i n a r y i s s u e o n t h e locus standi o f t h e
petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party's standing before this Court is a procedural
te c hn i ca l i ty wh i ch i t ma y, i n the ex er c i se o f i ts
d i scr e ti o n , se t a si d e i n vi e w o f th e i m p o r ta n ce o f th e
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demand s tha t the y be settl ed promptl y and definitel y,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
- The Court found the instant petition to be of
transcendental
importance
to
the
public.
The
r a m i f i ca t i o n s of su ch i s su e s i m m e a su r a b l y a ffe c t t h e
so cia l , e co no m i c, a nd m or al we l l - be in g of the p eo pl e
even in the remotest baranga ys of the countr y and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lotter y system are as staggering as
th e bi l li on s in p eso s i t i s exp ecte d to ra i se . Th e l e gal
sta nd in g the n of the pe ti tio ne r s de se r ve s re co gn i ti on
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of
2 . Contra ct of Lease is void for bein g con trar y to law.
PGM C is no t o nl y a Le sso r, PC SO in th e le a st wi l l b e
con du cti n g lo tter i e s in co ll ab o ra ti on o r asso ci a tio n
and in the most in joint vernture with PGMC. The
manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are

i n d e s p e n si b l e t o t h e o p e r a ti o n o f th e o n - l i n e l o t t e r y
- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law
system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
no ma tter how the assistan ce is ca lled or the contract
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B,
denominated.
Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another by way of collaboration,
PADILLA [concurring]
association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint
transfer, or lease such franchise.
venture because each part contributes its share in the
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government
enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities,
to individual s or corpora tion s of ri gh ts, privile ge s and
technology and expertise, while PCSO contributes the
f r a n c h i s e s , t h e w o r d s a r e to b e t a ke n m o s t s tr o n g l y
market through the dealers and in the totality the mass
against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or
of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of
privilege in derogation of the common rights of the
gross receipts; the residue of the whole exercise will go
p ub li c mu st p rov e hi s ti tl e the re to b y a gra n t wh i ch i s
to PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.
clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge
i t b y e qu i v o ca l o r d o u b tf u l p r ov i si o n s o r b y p r o b a b l e
MELO [dissenting]
i n f e r e n ce s. W ha te v e r i s n o t u n e qu i v o ca l l y gr a n te d i s
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of
withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."
a statute nor an attempt to restrain expenditure of
- W he th e r t h e co n t r a c t i n q u e s ti o n i s o n e of l e a se o r
p u b l i c f u n d s. T h e co n tr a ct i n v o lv e s s tr i c tl y co r p o r a te
whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
money.
sh ou l d no t b e de ci de d o n t h e ba s i s of t he title or
- By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not
designation o f t h e c o n t r a c t b u t b y t h e i n t e n t o f t h e
cure the lack of locus standi on the part of the
parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of
p e ti t i o n e r s . T h e co n t r a c t d o e s n o t i n v o l v e a n i l l e g a l
the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The
disbursement of public funds. No public fund raised by
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
taxation is involved.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of
the
contract
and
a
consideration
of
the
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
PUNO [dissenting]
indubitabl y disclose that the contract is not in reality a
- C o u r t s a r e n e i th e r f r e e to d e ci d e a l l ki n d s o f ca se s
contract of lease under whi ch the PGM C is merel y an
dumped in to the ir laps nor are the y free to open the ir
independent contractor for a piece of work, but one
doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.
where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not
association, in the least, or joint venture , a t th e mo st,
been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands
exists between the contracting parties.
c o u r t s i n n o u n c e r t a i n t e r m s t o s e t t l e on l y a ctua l
(C o l l a b o r a t i o n i s d e f i n e d a s t h e a c t s o f w o r k i n g
controversies involving rights which are legally
together in a joint project. A s s o ci a t i o n means the act
demandable and enforceable/
o f a n u m b e r o f p e r s o n s i n u n i t i n g t o g e t h e r f o r so m e
- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a
special purpose or business. Jo i n t v e n t u r e is defined as
vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and
an association of persons or companies jointly
perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's
undertaking some commercial enterprise; g e n e r a l l y a l l
overruling
the determ ination
of
a
coordinate,
contribute assets and share risks. )
democratically elected organ of government.
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC
reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery
MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
system, and that although it wished to have the system,
it would have it "at no expense or risks to the
FACTS
government." Because of these serious constraints and
- As a r e su l t o f o u r d e ci sio n in G .R . No . 113 3 7 5
unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the
(Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
PCSO wa s candid enough to state in its RF P that it is
(1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the
seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
o wn ex pe nse , a ll th e fa ci l i tie s ne ed ed to op er a te an d
Philipp ine Gam ing Management Corp. (PGMC ) on the
maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital,
ground that it had been made in violation of the charter
operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks."
of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a
new agreement that would be "consistent with the
SEPARATE OPINION
latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this
Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment
CRUZ [concurring]
Lease Agr eement (thereaf ter ca lled EL A) whe reb y the

PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories

to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3
% of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO
from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall
be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00
per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be
computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly
r e n t a l s i n a n y ye a r f a l l sh o r t o f t h e a n n u a l m i n i m u m
fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the
deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales.
(Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of
tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, (B) )
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing
f r o m th e s t a r t o f c o m m e r c i a l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e l o t t e r y
equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the
agreed schedule. (Par. 3)
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ
its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss
of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for
t h e co s t o f th e i r m a i n te n a n ce a n d r e p a i r. ( Pa r s. 7 - 8 )
U p o n t h e ex p i r a ti o n o f th e l e a se s , th e PC SO h a s th e
o p ti o n to p u r ch a se t h e e qu i p m e n t f o r th e su m of P2 5
million.
- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the
PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior
case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to
declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of
Lease s nullified in the first ca se. Pe ti tioner s seek the
declaration of the amended ELA as null and void.
- T he PC SO an d PGM C fi le d a se pa ra te com m en ts in
wh i ch the y que sti on th e pe ti tio ne r s' sta nd in g to b ri n g
suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in
its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens,
pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are
co mm i tte d to the cau se of tru th , ju sti ce , an d na tio na l
renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual
and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned
citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen.
Wigberto Taada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members
o f th e C o n gr e ss su i n g a s su ch a n d a s " ta x p a ye r a n d
concerned citizens."
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring
this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the
contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no
personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by
the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other
hand contend that the ruling in the previous case
sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the
first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law
of the case". and therefore the question of their standing
can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and
State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
l i f e , l i b e r t y, a n d p r o p e r t y, a n d t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e
general welfare are essential for the employment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy. (5)]

The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in

the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nacionalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
T he sta te shal l give prior ity to education, scien ce and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism
and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development. (17)
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)
ISSUES
1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona
constitute the law of the case, thus precluding
respondents from assailing the legal standing of
petitioners?
3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in
the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., selfexecuting)?
HELD
Ratio
1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as
the specific issue in that case is concerned. Parties may
be the same but cases are not.
2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and
States are not self-executing.
Ge n e r a l R e a so n i n g
- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of
the case ", nor tha t of conclusive of jud gm ent poses a
barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to
maintain this suit.
- Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case,
concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recentl y been laid down as the
rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners'
intervention may itself be considered a departure from
settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no
con stitutional issues were actua ll y involved. Just five
years before that ruling this Court had denied standing
t o a p a r t y wh o , i n q u e s ti o n i n g th e v a l i d i t y of a n o th e r
form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity
of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept .
22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of
Congress have standing to question the validity of
presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the
ille gal ity of the veto wo uld impai r thei r prerogative as
members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not
grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress,
legislators do not have stnding the question the validity

of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution

Association v Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))
- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the
ruling on standing. The voting on petitioners' standing in
t h e p r e v i o u s ca s e w a s a n a r r o w o n e , w i t h se v e n ( 7 )
m e m b e r s su s ta i n i n g p e ti ti o n e r s' st a n d i n g a n d si x ( 6 )
denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority
was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be
m a i n t a i n e d i n a n y su b se q u e n t l i t i g a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n ,
there have been changes in the members of the Court,
with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the
a p p o i n t m e n t of th e wr i te r o f t h i s o p i n i o n a n d Ju s ti ce
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on
the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
S p e ci f i c R e a so n i n g
1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have
stan di n g to que sti on th e Equ ip m en t or EL A i s a le ga l
question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the
petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is
e s se n t i a l l y d i ffe r e n t f r o m th e 1 9 9 3 C o n tr a c t o f l e a se
e n te r e d i n to b y t h e PC S O w i th t h e PG M C . H e n ce th e
determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that
the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of
the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not
preclude determination of their standing in the present
suit.
- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may
be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking,
not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A
CONCEPT IN C ON ST IT UT IONAL L AW AND H ERE N O
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 14
The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real
parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, 2 of
the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may
b e p r o s e cu t e d a n d d e f e n d e d i n t h e n a m e o f t h e r e a l
party in interest."
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that
they are the real party in interest. They have not
demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the
PCSO would directly injure or affect their rights.
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquir y into their right to
br in g thi s su i t i s b ar re d b y the d octr in e of "l a w of the
case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable
considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to
G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine
applies only when a case is before a court a second time
after a ruling by an appellate court.
- The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of
an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the
courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It
differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first
14 COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now

becomes clearer: The concept of legal standing is a constitutional

law concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE
NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no
constitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be
th e co ncep t of real party in interest in the Rules of Court.

j u d gm e n t i s n o t d e p e n d e n t u p o n i t s f i n a l i t y. T h e f i r st
j u d g m e n t i s g e n e r a l l y, i f n o t u n i v e r sa l l y, n o t f i n a l , I t
relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its
q u e s t i o n s o f l a w, a n d i s c o n f i n e d i n i t s o p e r a t i o n t o
subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ."
(Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503,
521 (1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same
one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375,
the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the
law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases
are not.
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit
foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually
and directly passed upon the and determined in a former
s u i t c a n n o t a ga i n b e d r a w n i n q u e s t i o n i n a n y f u tu r e
action between the same parties involving a different of
action. (Pealosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912);
Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))
- I t h a s b e e n h e l d t h a t th e r u l e o n co n cl u s i v e n e ss o f
judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel
does not appl y to is sues of la w, at leas t when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222
(1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2
(3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898
(1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife
interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was
determined that the money paid to his wife for the years
1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of
his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive
in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to
h i s w i f e u n d e r a n o th e r d e e d o f a s si g n m e n t f o r o t h e r
years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is
decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as
to any other contract which was not then in issue,
however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
co ll a ter al estop pe l . i t wa s h el d , "m u st b e co nf in ed to
situations where the matter raised in the second suit is
i d e n ti ca l i n a l l r e sp e ct s w i th t h a t d e ci d e d i n th e f i r st
preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable
legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92
L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the
two cases are separate even though they may be similar
or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal
issues which occur in the second case. Thus the second
p r o ce e d i n g m a y i n v o l v e a n i n str u m e n t o r tr a n sa c ti o n
identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt
wi th in the first proceedin g. In tha t si tua tion a cour t i s
free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S.
at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)

3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions,

the disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in
the courts.
- T h e y d o n o t e m b o d y ju d i ci a l l y e n f o r ce a b l e
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus,
while constitutional policies are invoked, this case
i n v o l v e s b a s i c a l l y q u e s t i o n s o f c o n t r a c t l a w. M o r e
sp e cif i ca l l y, the que sti on i s wh e the r p eti ti on er s hav e
legal right which has been violated.

SEPARATE OPINION
FELICIANO [dissent]

- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the

majority opinion written by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Mendoza, J.
- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my
e s t e e m e d b r o th e r s R e g a l a d o a n d D a v i d e , Jr., J J . I n
respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also
reiterate the concurring opinion I wrote on that subject
in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my
mind, pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part
of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and
demand, with equal weight and insistence, such
recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case, I
fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future
profoundly to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we
have today clamped on our own limbs.

PADILLA [concur]

- I jo i n th e m a jo r i t y i n v o ti n g fo r th e d i sm i ssa l o f t h e
petition in this case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court
to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by
the President, (unless they are violative of the
Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a
Member's personal conviction that gambling should be
totally prohibited by law.
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case
(G.R. No. 113375), expressed the view that the rule on
locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be
r el ax ed , a s the i ssue th en wa s of pa ra mo un t na tio na l
interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease
contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereb y the former
sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, undeniably a form
of ga mb l in g, the te r m s of wh i ch cl ea r l y p oi n te d to an
"association, collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.

REGALADO [dissent]

- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now

evolved other adjective theories which are represented
to be either different from or ramifications of the original
"standing to sue" objection raised in the first lotto case. I
will hazard my own humble observations thereon.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the
"law of the case" doctrine in the original majority
ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for
its applicability, an issue involved in a case originating

from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate

co u r t, th a t ca se b e i n g th e n r e m a n d e d to t h e co u r t o f
origin for further proceedings and with the prior
re so l u tio n b y th e h i gh e r co u r t of tha t i ssu e be in g the
"law of the case" in any other proceeding in or a
subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuated
that said doctrine exists only under such a scenario.
- It m a y be con ced ed th a t, i n the con te xt of th e ci ted
cases wherein this doctrine was applied, two "appeals"
are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first
appeal cannot be reexamined in the second appeal. If
so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first
re co u r se to th e hi gh er co ur t is ei the r a n i n te r lo cu tor y
order of the court a quo elevated on an original action
for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which
n on e th el e ss d id n ot di sp o se of th e e nti re ca se be lo w
because it was either a special proceeding or an action
admitting of multiple appeals.
- That is the present reglementary situation in the
P h i l i p p i n e s w h i ch , u n f o r tu n a te l y, d o e s n o t a p p e a r to
have been taken into account when the double-appeal
procedure involved in one particular American concept
was cited as authority in the majority opinion. No
attempt was made to ascertain whether in the American
ca se s ci te d the l ex for i p rov id ed fo r id en ti cal or eve n
substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of
review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari
or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. Yet on such unverified
premises, and without a showing that the situations are
in pari ma teria , we are told tha t since the case at bar
does not posses the formatted sequence of an initiatory
action in a lo wer court, an appeal to a highe r court, a
remand to the lower court, and then a second appeal to
the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot
a p p l y. I h a v e p e r f o r c e t o r e je c t t h a t su b m i s s i o n a s I
cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused by this
majority view.
- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the
factua l and procedural situa tion s where su ch doctrine
may apply, through its undue insistence on the remedial
procedu re involved in the pro ceedings rather than the
juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher court.
Even in American law, the "law of the case" doctrine was
essentiall y desi gned to expre ss the practice of cour ts
generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5
a n d , t h e r e b y, t o e m p h a s i z e t h e r u l e t h a t t h e f i n a l
judgment of the highest court is a final determination of
the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic
role that it was conceived to play in judicial
determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of
res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.
- Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from
an original holding of a higher court on a writ of
certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent
appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a
subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish
to underscore is that where, as in the instant case, the

h o l d i n g of th i s h i gh e st C o u r t o n a sp e c i f i c i ssu e w a s
handed do wn in an original action for ce rtiorari , i t has
the same binding effect as it would have had if
promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in
our jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control
and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be
c o m m e n c e d i n t h e Su p r e m e C o u r t i t s e l f , i t w o u l d b e
absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of
the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court
w h i c h n a t u r a l l y co u l d n o t b e t h e c o u r t o f o r i g i n f r o m
which the postulated second appeal should be taken.
2 . Ob v i o u sl y r e a l i zi n g t h a t co n t i n u e d r e l i a n ce o n th e
l o cu s sta nd i b ar to pe ti tio ne r 's su i t i s n o t an i ro n cl ad
gu ar an t y a ga i n st i t, th e m a jor i t y po si ti on ha s ta ke n a
d i ffe r e n t ta ck . I t n o w i nv o ke d th e co n ce p t of a n d th e
rule s on a ri gh t of action in ordinar y civil action s and,
prescinding from its previous positions, insists that what
i s suppo sedl y de termina tive
of the issue of
representation is contract law and not constitutional law.
On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the
co n tr a ct , p r i m a r i l y o r su b s i d i a r i l y, th e y th e n a r e r e a l
p ar tie s in i n te re st, a nd fo r la ck of cau se of acti on on
their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot
maintain the present petition.
A s a m a t t e r o f a co n v e n ti o n a l r u l e o f p r o c e d u r e , t h e
syllogism of the majority can claim the merit of logic but,
even so, only on assumed premises. More importantly,
h o w e v e r, th e b l e m i s h i n i t s n e w b l u e p r i n t i s t h a t t h e
d e f e n se o f l a c k o f a r i g h t o f a c t i o n i s e ff e c t i v e l y th e
same as lack of locus standi, that is, the absence of the
remedial right to sue. As the commentators of Castille
would sa y, the objection under the new terminology is
"lo mismo perro con distinto collar." That re-christened
ground, as we shall later see, has already been
foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto
case.
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to
enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority
u r ge s th e a d o p t i o n o f t h e st a n d a r d co n ce p t of a r e a l
party in interest based on his possession of a cause of
action. It could not have failed to perceive, but
none theless refuses to con cede, that the con cept of a
cau se of action in public intere st case s should no t be
straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private
interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there
i s the caveat that "the adop tion of provision requirin g
t h a t a n a c t i o n b e p r o se c u t e d i n t h e n a m e o f t h e r e a l
party in interest does not solve all questions as to the
p ro pe r pe r so n or p er so n s to i nsti tu te sui t, a l th ou gh i t
o b v i o u sl y si m p l i f i e s p r o ce d u r e s i n a ct i o n s a t l a w. . .
There is no clearly defined rule by which one may
determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has
there been found any concise definition of the term. Who
is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts
of each separate case, and one may be a party in

interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest." 9

the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to
(Emphasis supplied.)
the situation where a judgment promulgated by the
The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author
C o u r t i s h e l d u p b y a m o ti o n f o r r e co n si d e r a ti o n a n d
but unfortunately fails to put the proper emphasis on the
w h i ch m o ti o n , ju st b e ca u se th e p r e se n t R u l e s d o n o t
p o r ti o n th e r e o f w h i c h I b e l i e v e s h o u l d b e t h a t w h i c h
p r o v i d e a t i m e l i m i t f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n t h e r e o f , s t a ys
should
correctly
be
stressed,
and
which
I
u n r e so l v e d u n ti l t h e a p p o i n tm e n t of m e m b e r s
correspondingly reproduce:
sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of
It is impor tant to no te. . . that standing becau se of i ts
" m a g i s t r a t e s h o p p i n g " o r " c o u r t p a c ki n g " l e v e l l e d b y
constitutional and public policy underspinnings, is very
disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.
different from questions relating to whether a particular
- I hold the view that the matter of the right of
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to
petitioners to file and maintain this action - whether the
s u e . Al t h o u g h a l l t h r e e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e d i r e c t e d
objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain
right of action - has already been foreclosed by our
an action, standing restrictions require a partial
judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the
consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy
majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law
con cerns relating to the proper role of the judi ciar y in
of the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular
certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have its
i s su e ca n s ti l l b e ve n ti l a te d n o w a s a su r v iv o r o f th e
wa y i n thi s ca se , the re wou l d be n o av ai la b le ju d i cia l
doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11
remedy against irregularities or excesses in government
It i s u n d e n i a b l e th a t i n th a t ca se a n d th e o n e a t b ar.
contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or
there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
capacity to sue. This legal dilemma or vacuum is
action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was
supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an
the majority opinion, to wit:
adjudica tion on the merits, and has lon g become final
D e n i a l to p e ti t i o n e r s of th e r i g h t to i n te r v e n e w i l l n o t
and executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show
l e a v e w i t h o u t r e m e d y a n y p e r c e i v e d i l l e g a l i t y i n th e
t h a t t h e su b j e c t m a t t e r i n t h e f i r s t a c t i o n i s d i f fe r e n t
execution of government contracts. Questions as to the
from that in the instant case, since the former was the
nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for
original contract and the latter is the supposed
a public bidding before they may be made can be raised
expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered
in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on
distinction.
Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In addition, the
T h e r e m o v a l a n d r e p l a ce m e n t o f so m e o b je c ti o n a b l e
Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo
te r m s o f a co n tr a ct , wh i ch n e v e r th e l e ss co n t i n u e s t o
warranto if it should be thought that a government
operate under the same basis, with on the property, fore
corporation . . . has offended against its corporate
t h e sa m e p u r p o se , a n d th e sa m e co n tr a ct i n g p a r t i e s
charter or misused its franchise. . .
does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own
matter in both cases,. This would be to exalt form over
argument that in the present case petitioners are not the
substance.
Furthermore,
respondents
themselves
r ea l pa r tie s, he nce the y can no t ava il of an y re me di a l
admitted that the new contract is actually the same as
right to file a compla int or suit. It is, the refore, hi ghl y
the original one, with just some variants in the terms of
improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to
the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The
deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to
contrary assumption now being floated by respondents
the contract. Again , should thi s Court now sustain the
would create chaos in our remedial and contractual laws,
assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested
o p e n t h e d o o r t o f r a u d , a n d su b v e r t t h e r u l e s o n th e
recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing
finality of judgments.
suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to
- Ye t , e v e n a s s u m i n g p u r e l y e x h y p o t h e s i t h a t t h e
bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex
amended terms in the expanded lease agreement
relatione, not only because one has to contend with that
created a discrete set of litigable violations of the
official's own views or personal interests but because he
statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes
is himself the counsel for respondents in this case. Any
Office, thereb y collectively resulting in a disparate
p ro po se d r em ed y m u st ta ke in to accou n t n o t on l y the
actionable wrong or delict, that would merely constitute
legalities in the case but also the realities of life.
at most a difference in the causes of action in the former
and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of
3 . The ma jo rity believes that in vie w of the re tire ment
th e R u l e s o f C o u r t , w e w o u l d s ti l l h a v e a si tu a ti o n o f
and replacement of two members of the Court, it is time
collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as
to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous
conclusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues
judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if
finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive
the ostensib le basi s is the change of membership and
between the parties in the case now before us and that
kn o wn p o s i t i o n s o f th e n e w m e m b e r s a n e n t a n i ssu e
definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment
pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit well wi th

therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right

to sue respondents on the contracts concerned.
In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist,
or of conclusiveness of judgment, which I assume
ar guendo - what is no w bein g pri maril y resi sted is the
r i gh t o f p e ti ti o n e r s to su e , a si d e f r o m th e p o stu l a te d
invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored
l o t t e r y s ys t e m . I t d o e s se e m o d d , i f n o t a r ca n e , t h a t
petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi
or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that
m a tt e r, w e r e l i ke wi se so r e co g n i ze d i n th e e xp a n d e d
value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now
mysteriously divested of the "place of standing"
allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a compelling need
f o r r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f th e d o c t r i n e , a n d , f o r e co n o m i c
reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation.
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should
be decided on the merits and on substantive
considerations, not on dubious technicalities intended to
prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed
amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the
benefi t of a dul y clarified and translu cent tran saction ,
just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and should
even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any
suspicions or lingering doubts arising from the fact that
the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different.
- On th e m e r i ts , to o b v i a te u n n e ce ssa r y r e p l i ca t i o n I
reiterate my concurrence with the findings and
c o n c l u s i o n s o f M r. J u s t i c e D a v i d e i n t h i s d i s s e n t i n g
opinion, the presentation whereof is completely devoid
of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has
the virtue of being based on his first-hand knowledge as
a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in
dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative
data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and highly
meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract.
- O n e co n cl u d i n g p o i n t . I a m n o t i m p r e s s e d b y t h e i r
stance of the majority that our taking cognizance of this
case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite
o thers to undul y overburden thi s Cour t with avoidable
importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since
the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside
objections grounded on judge-made constitutional
theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice
and paramount public interest.
O n th e co n tr a r y, to p a y u n qu a l i f i e d o b e d i e n ce t o th e
beguiling locos standi or right of action doctrines posited
by the majority in this case would only not be an
abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably
r e su l t i n d e p r i v i n g th e p e o p l e o f r e co u r se to u s f r o m
dubious government contracts through constitutionally
outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such
s tu l ti f i ca t i o n . T h i s i s a co n ti n ge n c y wh i ch i s n o t o n l y
p ossi bl e , b u t pr ob ab le u nd er o ur o li ga r ch i c so cie t y in
esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant wi thin a
just regime of law still in posse.

DAVIDE [dissent]
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
- I register a dissenting vote.
respondents tried to take advantage of.
- I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in
- In th i s con cu rr i n g o pi ni on , Mr. Ju sti ce F lo r en ti no P.
Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to
Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or
as the first lotto case) regarding the application or
co n sid er a tio n s of im po r tan ce wh i ch stre n gth en ed th e
interp reta tion of the excep tion clau se in para graph B,
le gal stand ing of the peti tioner s to bring and mainta in
Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as
the action, namely: (a) the public character of the funds
a m e n d e d b y B .P. Bl g. 4 4 2 , a n d o n th e i ssu e of l o cu s
or other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the
standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
involving the on-line lottery system entered into
or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c)
between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
the lack of any other party with a more direct and
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
specified interest in raising the questions involved
Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary
therein; and (d) the wide range of impact of the contract
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare
of lease and of its implementation.
decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of
O n l y l a s t 6 Ap r i l 1 9 9 5 , i n t h e d e c i s i o n i n Tat a d v s .
the p eo pl e , spe cia l l y the la w ye r s an d li ti ga n ts, i n the
Garcia, 3 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo
ce r ta i n l y a n d s ta b i l i t y o f th e p r o n o u n ce m e n t s o f th i s
D. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in
Court. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for
the first lotto case the petitioners, locus standi therein,
re-examina tion of su ch pronouncemen ts and wea kens
invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first
this Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from
lotto case. He stated:
lower courts obedience thereto and to impse sanctions
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
for their opposite conduct.
t a x p a ye r s t o q u e s t i o n c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e
- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case
national government or government-owned or controlled
was unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the
corporations allegedly in contravention of the law
PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate
(Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and
manifestations that they would not ask for its
to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b u t w o u l d , i n s t e a d , n e go t i a te a n e w
involved (Bugna y Construction and Development
equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989].
and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is
Court a copy of the new agreement. The decision has,
n o t r e v e r s e d , w e h a v e n o ch o i ce b u t t o f o l l o w i t a n d
thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2
uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
- As the writer of the said decision and as the author of
institute the present action.
the exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
- Mr. Justi ce San tia go M . Kapunan , who had also
116 9 , a s a m e n d e d , I ca n n o t a c ce p t th e s tr a i n e d a n d
di ssen ted in the fi rst lo tto ca se o n th e i ssu e of l ocu s
ten uo u s ar gu me n ts a dd uced i n the m a jo ri t y op in io n i t
standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion
justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case.
in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of
W hile there are exceptions to the aforementioned
the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi
doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to upsetting
ruling in the first lotto ca se to deny legal standin g to
prior
decisions
if
warranted
by overwhelm ing
Tatad, et al. He said:
considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as
a n e r r o r, n o n e o f su ch co n si d e r a ti o n s a n d n o th i n g of
citizens. In the cases in which citizens were authorized to
substance or weight can bring this case within any of the
su e , th i s C o u r t f o u n d s ta n d i n g b e ca u se i t th o u gh th e
exceptions.
constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of
- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the
"transcendental importance," as in fact it subsequently
petitioners, and in no uncertain terms declared:
granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in the
i m p o r t a n ce t o t h e p u b l i c . T h e i s su e s i t r a i s e d a r e o f
Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
paramount public interest and of a category even higher
(1994)] relief by the majority for upholding petitioner's
than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
standing, thi s Cour t too k into accoun t the "para mount
r a m i f i ca t i o n s of su ch i s su e s i m m e a su r a b l y a ffe c t t h e
public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed]
so cia l , e co no m i c, a nd m or al we l l - be in g of the p eo pl e
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
even in the remotest baranga ys of the countr y and the
people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system."
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
Accord ingl y, the Court invalida ted the contract for the
the bil lions of peso s it is expected to raise . The legal
operation of the lottery.
stan di n g th an of th e p eti ti on er s d ese rv es r eco gn i tio n
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno,
Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his

concurring opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took

part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco who was
no t ye t a member of this Court at the time , the rest of
the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of Justice
M e n d o za h a d d i sse n te d i n th e l o t to ca se o n th e sa i d
issue.
- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res
j u d i ca t a , th e P C S O a n d th e P G M C a r e b o u n d b y t h e
r ul in g i n th e f ir st l o tto ca se o n th e lo cu s stan di of th e
pe titioners and the applica tion or interpre ta tion of the
exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or
interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of
stare decisis and has also become part of our legal
s ys t e m p u r su a n t to Ar t i c l e 8 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e w h i ch
provides: 'Judi cial decision s appl yi ng inte rpreting the
laws or the constitution shall from part of the system of
the Philippines."
- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or
capriciously. They are based on public policy and other
con sidera tion s of grea t impor tan ce and should not be
discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. Yet, the y
are now put to naught in this case.
- The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a
matter of policy to end litigation. There would be no end
to a sui t if eve r y ob stin a te li ti ga n t cou l d , b y re pe a te d
a pp ea l s, com pe l a cou r t to l i ste n to cr i ti ci sm o n th e ir
opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its
members." 7
- It i s, however, contended that the la w of the case i s
inappl icable that doctrine applie s onl y when a ca se is
before an appellate court a second time after its remand
t o a l o w e r co u r t. W h il e i n d e e d th e sta te m e n t m a y b e
correct, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but
a sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and
purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their
conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason
the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case
a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners
co mmenced the instan t petition also in the said ca se.
Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be
decided in the said case because the decision therein
had became final does not detract from the fact that this
case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new
chapter in the raping controversy between the
p e ti t i o n e r s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d th e P C S O a n d t h e
P G M C , o n t h e o t h e r, o n t h e o p e r a ti o n o f th e o n - l i n e
lottery system.
Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection
of the related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment of
the ground that the question of standing is a question,
as this case involves a different or unrelated contract.
The legal question of locus standi which was resolved in
favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same
in this case and in every subsequent case which would
involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or
holding of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration,
association; or join t ven ture wi th an y person,

a s so c i a t i o n , c o m p a n y o r e n ti t y. An d , th e c o n t r a c t i n
qu e stio n i s n ot di ffer en t f ro m or u nr el a te d to the fi rst
nullified contract, for it in nothing but a substitute for the
latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to
admit that no new and separate public bidding was
conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was
of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified
contract was sufficient.
Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8
that preclusion or collateral estoppel does not apply to
i s s u e s o f l a w, a t l e a s t w h e n s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n r e l a t e d
cl a i m s a r e i n v o l v e d , i s m i sp l a ce d . F o r o n e th i n g , t h e
qu e st i o n o f th e p e t i t i o n e r s ' l e ga l s ta n d i n g i n th e f i r s t
lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of
law. For another, these cases involve the same and not
substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second
contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the
operation of the on-line lottery system.
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in
the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the
r u l e o f i s s u e p r e c l u s i o n ( Tes t a m e n t o f t h e L a w, 2 d
Judgments $ 28), the second illustration stated therein is
subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis
may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question
of sovereign immunity," which simpl y means that stare
decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior
judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim
that a principle or rule of law which has been established
by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will
be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It
i s founded on the necessity for secu ring cer tain ty and
stability in the law and does not require identity or
privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article
8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall
form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume
the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to
aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
o b e d i e n ce th e r e to . " 1 0 Ab a n d o n m e n t th e r e o f m u st b e
based only on strong and compelling reasons - which I
do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue
of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would
be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in
the stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the
issue of locus standi and a re-examination of the
application or interpretation of the exception clause in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended.
Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on effects of
judgment expressly provides:
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with
r espe ct to the m a tter ca se s the ju d gm en t or o rd er i s,
w i t h r e sp e c t t o t h e m a t t e r d i r e c t l y a d j u d g e d o r a s t o
other matter that could have been parties and their

successors in interest by title subsequent to the

co m me n ce m en t of th e a ctio n or spe cia l p ro cee di n gs,
litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the
same capacity.
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the
p ro se cu tio n of a se con d a ctio n up on the sa me cl a im ,
demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the
relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
11 Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial
ti me, and the intere st of li ti gan ts as well as the peace
and order of society, all require that stability should be
accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on
th e i r m e r i t s sh a l l r e m a i n i n r e p o se ; th a t i n co n si s te n t
judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of
facts; and that there be an end to litigation which,
without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only
pu ts a n en d to str if e , b ut re co gn i ze s tha t ce r tai n ty i n
legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty
as to individual rights and gives and respect to judicial
proceedings. 12 The justifications given in the majority
opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to
u l t i m a t e l y d i sca r d i t a r e u n co n v i n ci n g . It i s n o t a t a l l
true, as the majority opinion contends, that "[t]he
previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact
be con sid er ed a d ep ar tu re f ro m se ttl ed ru li n g on re al
party in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved."
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil
p r o ce d u r e o n r e a l p a r t y i n i n te r e s t w a s n e v e r p u t i n
issue in the previous case. It was the clear
understanding of the Members of the Court that in the
li gh t of the i ssue s r ai sed a nd the ar gu me n ts a dd uced
therein, only locus standi deserved consideration.
A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n a n d t h e s e p a r a t e
dissenting opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus
standi and brought in the process a vast array of
authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed
in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano, both
co n sti tu tio na l a nd le ga l i ssu e s we re inv ol ve d th er ei n .
Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public law the
rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the
doctrine of locus standi.
- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's
contention that the ruling locus standi in the first lotto
case may not be prese rved becau se the majority vote
sustaining the petitioners' standing was a "tenuous one"
that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation,
and that there had been changes in the membership of
the Court due to the re tire ment of Ju stice s Isagani A.
Cru z and Abdul wahid A. Bidin and the appointmen t of
Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Ricardo J. Francisco. It
has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was
reiterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his
concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza
denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case
did not have the same importance as the lotto case, he
thereby accepted the concession of standing to the

petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that

all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case
on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority
opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case.
Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and
strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this
case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but
whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This
proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayer's
suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring
strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in
ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating
to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not
prepared to be a party to that proposition.
- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination
to the restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be
ju sti f ie d b y th e cla i m tha t i s inv ol ve d h er e i s co n tra ct
l a w, n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . T r u e , c o n t r a c t l a w i s
i n v o l v e d . W e a r e n o t , h o we v e r, d e a l i n g h e r e w i th a n
ordinary contract between private parties, but a contract
between a corporation wholly owned by the government
- hence , an instrumen tal ity of the government - and a
private corporation for the contract of the lotto, which is
invested with paramount and transcendental public
interest and other public policy considerations because
t h e l o t t o h a s co u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e a n d r e t r o g r e s s i v e
effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it
is expected to raise and provokes issues that
i m me a su ra bl y affe ct the so cia l , econ om i c, an d m or a l
we l l - be in g of th e p eo pl e . W e sa id so i n the f ir st lo tto
case.

GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990

FACTS
- A peti tion to annul and set aside the deci sion of the
Board of Investments ( BOI) / Depar tmen t of Trade and
Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed
p e tr o ch em i cal pl an t f ro m Ba ta an to Ba ta n ga s a nd the
sh i f t o f f e e d sto ck fo r th a t p l a n t f r o m n a p h th a o n l y to
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain
in Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial
Zone under the administration, management and
ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC).
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed
the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied
with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one
of the terms and conditions for registration was the use
of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for
its plant, which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC
was issued a certificate of registration on Feb. 24, 1988.
- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and
other incentives, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw

m a te r i a l s, ( 2 ) e l i m i n a t i n g th e 4 8 % a d v a l o r e m t ax o n
naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials for the
petrochemical plant.
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC expressed to DTI
Secretary his desire to amend the original registration
certification of its project by changing the job site from
Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and
unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in
Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell
Corporation. Other requested amendments are as
follows: (1) increasing the investment amount from $220
m i l l i o n to $ 3 2 0 m i l l i o n ; ( 2 ) i n cr e a si n g t h e p r o d u ct i o n
capa ci ty of i ts naph tha cracker, polyth ylene plant and
po l yp ro p yl en e p la n t; ( 3) cha n gi n g th e fe ed sto ck fro m
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision sta tin g
that, The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that
the final choice is still with the proponent who would in
the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for
the project.
- In the petition entitled Congressman Enrique T. Garcia
v. The Board of Investments, this court ordered BOI as
follows: (1) to publish the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2)
to allo w the petitioner to have access to its records on
the original and amended applications for registration,
a s a p e tr o ch e m i c a l m a n u f a c tu r e r, o f t h e r e sp o n d e n t
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however,
privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other
business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing
the petitioners opposition to the amended application in
order that he may present at such hearing all the
evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to
the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to
Batangas.
- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court
to rule on whe ther or not the investor given the ini tia l
indu cements and other cir cumstan ces su rrounding i ts
first choice of plant site may change simpl y because it
h a s th e f i n a l ch o i ce o n th e m a tt e r. T h e C o u r t m e r e l y
ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in
the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was
set by BOI.
- A m o t i o n f o r r e co n si d e r a t i o n o f sa i d r e so l u ti o n wa s
filed , asking tha t the Court resolve wh ether or not the
foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site;
that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing
was because the decision was not yet final and
executor y, and therefore petitioner has not waived his
right. Court resolution stated that BOI, not the investor
has final choice on the matter and tha t even a cho ice
approved by BOI may not be final for supervening
circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place
m a y d i c ta t e a co r r e sp o n d i n g ch a n g e i n th e ch o i ce of
plant site in order that the project will not fail. However,
petition was denied.

- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no

right of final choice.
ISSUES
1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan
or should be transferred to Batangas
2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be
changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC)
3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the
investor who has the final choice of the site and the
decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding
HELD
1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The
Court has constitutional duty to step into this
controversy to determine the paramount issue.
2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the
use of feedstock is unjustified.
- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
- The re spondents have not shown nor rei terated tha t
the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or
unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant
site in Batangas.
- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned
Filip ino co rporation, can provide the feedstock
requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the country
is short of LPG and there is a need to import for the use
o f t h e p l a n t i n B a t a n g a s . Tra n sf e r w i l l d i v e r t s c a r ce
dollars unnecessarily.
- R . A. 6 7 6 7 ex e m p te d n a p h th a a s fe e d s to ck f r o m a d
valorem tax but excluded LPG from the exemption. This
l a w w a s s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h e p e t r o c h e m i c a l i n d u s t r y.
Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or
contravene expressed policy by shif tin g the feedsto ck
from naphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC
d o e s n o t h a ve to b u y th e l a n d f o r th e p r o j e c t a n d i t s
feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.
- W i th t h e p l a n t s i t e i n B a t a a n , t h e P N O C s h a l l b e a
partner, thus giving the government participation in the
management of the project instead of a firm which is a
huge multinational corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for
the main reason that the final say is in the investor all
other circumstances to the contrary not withstanding.
- The government has already granted incentives for this
particular venture. Through the BOI decision, it
surrenders even the power to make a company abide by
its initial choice, a ch o i ce f r e e f r o m a n y su sp i ci o n of
unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is
undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.

- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the

g o v e r n m e n t ex p r e s se d i n n u m e r o u s l a w s ( i .e . Ar t . 2 ,
1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution
(Sec. 1 and 10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own
affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
D i s p o s i t i o n : Petition granted. Decision set aside as
null and void.

SEPARATE OPINION
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]

- T he re i s n o p rov i si on in the 19 87 Inv estm en ts Co de

prohibiting the amendment of the investor s application
for registration of its project, neither does the law
prohibi t the BOI from approving the amended
application.
- T h e m a t t e r o f c h o o si n g a n a p p r o p r i a t e s i te f o r t h e
investor s pro je ct is a poli ti cal and economi c deci sion
which only the executive branch, as implementer of
p ol i cy fo rm ul a ted b y the le gi sla tu re , i s em po we r ed to
m a ke . It i s n o t fo r th i s C ou r t to d ete rm i ne wh a t is, or
should be, the BOIs final choice of plant site and
feedstock.
- The petitioners recourse against the BOIs action is by
an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments
Code), not to this Court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]

- [T he ma jor ity Decision ] has made a sweeping poli cy

determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into
what might be termed a government by the Judiciary,
something never intended by the framers of the
Constitution when they provided for separation of
powers among the three co-equal branches of
g o v e r n m e n t a n d e x c l u d e d t h e Ju d i c i a r y f r o m p o l i c ymaking.

ART VI: LEGISLATURE

TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
FACTS
- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and
prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716.
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT s ys t e m b y a m e n d i n g N a ti o n a l I n te r n a l R e v e n u e
Code.
- Be t Ju l 2 2 , 1 9 9 2 a n d Au g 3 1 , 1 9 9 3 , b ills we r e
introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to
VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means
Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197.

- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was

3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in
approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.
preparation of BCC Report because Report didnt
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate
contain detailed and explicit statement of changes
Com mittee on Ways and Means. The Comm ittee
4. It is required that the Committees report undergo
submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630,
three rdgs in the two houses.
s u b m i t t e d i n s u b s t i t u t i o n o f S N o 112 9 , t a k i n g i n t o
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:
consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)
- Sena te approved S No 1630 on second rd g, and on
1 . N ei the r H N o 1119 7 no r S N o 16 30 pr ovi de d fo r
third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.
removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment
H N o 1 11 9 7 a n d S N o 1 6 3 0 w e r e r e f e r r e d t o
of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was
conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times,
not reflected in the title.
recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be
2 . Be si de s, am en dm en t of PALs fr an ch i se ma y b e
approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and
made only by special law which will expressly amend
approved by the conferees.
the franchise (24 of PD 1590).
- T h e C o n f e r e n ce C o m m i t t e e B i l l w a s a p p r o v e d b y
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines
House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was
contends:
presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It
Re: Art III Sec 1
b e c a m e R A 7 7 1 6 . O n M a y 1 2 , i t w a s p u b l i sh e d i n 2
1 . W i th d r a w a l o f e x e m p ti o n o f so m e co o p e r a t i v e s
newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May
while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives
28.
not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives
- RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject
but also violate equal protection of law.
t o VAT i n a l l a sp e c t o f o p e r a ti o n s. H o we v e r, Se c of
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94
Association contends:
exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr
2 . VAT w i l l r e d u c e m a r k u p o f i t s m e m b e r s b y a s
advertisements are still subject to VAT.
much as 90%.
- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
time for registration of businesses. Implementation was
3 . V AT w i l l d r i v e s o m e o f i t s m e m b e r s o u t o f
stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
circulation.
- Petitioners contend:
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 24
Re: Art III Sec 4
1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it
1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted
wa s n o t pa sse d b y Sen a te bu t wa s co n so l id a te d w /
to press under NIRC was withdrawn.
Although
Senate version in the Conference Committee to
e x e m p t i o n w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y r e s t o r e d , P P I s a ys
produce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified
theres possibility that exemption may still be
by the word exclusively.
removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power
Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press
i n r e v e n u e b i l l s to co m p e n sa t e f o r th e g r a n t to th e
f r e e d o m b e c a u s e o f VAT o n g r o s s r e c e i p t s o n
Senate of treaty-ratifying power.
advertisements.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No
2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory
11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate
treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment.
merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting
3 . Im p o si n g VAT o n l y o n p r i n t m e d i a wh o se g r o ss
S No 1630.
sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
is discriminatory.
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day,
4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when
Mar 24, 1994.
applied to the press.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was
Re: Art III Sec 5
not an unusual condition in this country.
1 . Se cr e ta r y of F i n a n ce h a s n o p o we r to gr a n t t ax
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent,
exemption because that power is vested in Congress
not H No 11197.
and the Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the
Re: BCC acted within its power
r e m o v a l o f e x e m p t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s a r t i c l e s v i o l a te s
1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC
freedom of thought/conscience.
included provisions not found in the HB or SB and
- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
these were surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind
Association contends:
closed doors.
Re: Art III Sec 10
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision
stenographic notes by ellipses.
on no law impairing obligation of contracts

- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association

contends:
Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will
violate govt mandate to prioritize education
ISSUES
Procedural
1 . W O N t h e r e s v i o l a t i o n o f Ar t V I 2 4 o f C o n s t i
(revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps)
2 . W ON t h e r e s v i o l a t i o n o f Ar t V I 2 6 ( 2 ) o f C o n s t i
(three readings on separate days)
3 . W ON th e Bi ca m e r a l C o n f e r e n ce C o m m i t te e a c te d
within its power
4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only
one subject which is expressed in title) / WON
amendment of 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of
RA 7716 although no mention is made therein
Substantive:
5 . W ON Ar t III 1 (deprivation of life /liber ty/p roperty;
equal protection) is violated
6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press)
is violated
7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8 . W ON Ar t I I I 1 0 ( n o l a w i m p a i r i n g o b l i g a t i o n o f
contracts) is violated
9 . W ON Ar t V I 2 8 ( 1 ) ( u n i f o r m / e q u i ta b l e ; e v o l v e
progressive system of taxation) is violated
1 0 . W ON Ar t V I 2 8 ( 3 ) ( c h u r ch / p a r s o n a g e e t c . f o r
religious purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science
and tech) is violated
HELD
- N o t a l l a r e j u d i ci a l l y co gn i za b l e , b e c n o t a l l C o n s ti
provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also
charged w/ enforcement of Consti.
Procedural
W hatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity
of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy
of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of
its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled
bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are
nothing more than surreptitiously inserting provisions,
SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives
is a mere administrative
due respect to other branches of govt.
1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24
a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required
t o o r i g i n a t e ex c l u si v e l y i n th e H o u se of R e p s . A b i l l
originating in House may undergo extensive changes in
Se na te . To in si st th a t a re ve nu e sta tu te (a nd n ot th e
bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the
S e n a t e s p o w e r to c o n c u r w i t h a n d p r o p o se
amendments.
It would violate coequality of the
legislative power of the two houses.

b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power

i s n o t l e g i s l a t i v e p o we r b u t a n e x e r ci s e o f c h e c k o n
executive power.
c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill
then writing its own version on one hand and on the
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the
subject matter. Consti simply says that its the initiative
for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The
R e p s a r e e x p e c t e d to b e m o r e s e n s i t i v e t o t h e l o ca l
needs.
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as
action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House
b i l l . I t w a s o n l y a f t e r S e n a t e r c v d H N o 1119 7 t h a t
le gi sla tion in respe ct of i t be gan w/ referral to Senate
Committee on Ways and Means.

the compromise bill.

That requirement must be
construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time
in either house, not the BCC report.
4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the
V AT s y s t e m , o n e w a y i s t o w i d e n t h e b a s e b y
withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in
addition to 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be
t o i n s i s t t h a t t i t l e o f a b i l l b e a co m p l e te i n d e x o f i t s
content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an
incon sisten t statute .
And under Consti, grant of
franchise for operation of public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when
common good requires.

2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)

Substantive
a. It wa s becau se Pre s cer tified S No 1630 as ur gent.
- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in
This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill
the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in
on separate days. The phrase except when the
Congress.
President certifies to the necessity qualifies two
s t a te d c o n d i t i o n s : ( 1 ) t h e b i l l h a s p a s se d 3 r d g s o n
5 . N O t h e r e i s n o cl e a r sh o wi n g th a t Ar t II I Se c 1 i s
separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form
violated
a n d d i s t r i b u t e d 3 d a y s b e f o r e f i n a l l y a p p r o v e d . To
- W he n f r e e d o m o f th e m i n d i s i m p e r i l e d b y l a w, i t i s
construe that the except clau se dispen ses onl y wi th
freedom that commands respect; when property is
p r i n ti n g w o u l d vi o l a te g r a m m a r r u l e s a n d w o u l d a l so
imperiled, lawmakers judgment prevails.
negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the
a. This is actually a policy argument.
bill.
b. This is a mere allegation.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2 nd a n d 3 r d g s o n th e rd
c. This is also short of evidence.
same day after bill had been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the
certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When
matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H
No 9210 then pending.
3. YES the BCC acted within its power
a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC.
There was also nothing unusual in the executive
sessions of the BCC.
Under con gr essional rule s, BC Cs are no t expected to
make material changes but this is a difficult provision to
enforce. The result could be a third version, considered
an amendment in nature of substitute, the only
requ iremen t tha t the 3 version be germane to sub je ct rd
of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an
en tirel y new provision . After all, report of BC C is no t
f i n a l a n d s t i l l n e e d e d a p p r o v a l o f b o t h h o u se s t o b e
valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographers
limitations
or
to
incoherence
that
sometimes
characterize conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capi tal le tters to indi cate
the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting.
Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of

6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated

a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is
not immune fr general regulation by the State.
b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because
of re mo va l of exem p tio n pr ev io usl y gr an te d to i t b y
law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only
privilege wi thdra wn i s tha t to the press. But tha t is
not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of
goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax
has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not
apply to press alone but to all sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of
the cost of registration. Registration is a central
feature of the VAT system. It
fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.
7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally
applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious
materials by religious org.
8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated
a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing
power of State . Essen tia l attribu te s of soverei gn i s
read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs
as possib le, parti cularl y to those w/in reach of higher

income grps. Business establishments with annual gross

sales of < P500,000 are exempted.
Also , re gre ssivi ty is not a ne gative standard . W hat is
required is that we evolve a progressive taxation
system.
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally
applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious
materials by religious org.
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17
a . Sam e re ason /r a tio un de r i ssue s on fr ee
speech/press.
D e ci si on Petitions are dismissed.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods
and svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross selling price
Narvasa, Separate Opinion
Cruz, Separate Opinion
Padilla, Separate Opinion
Vitug, Separate Opinion
Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
Romero, Dissenting Opinion
Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
Puno, Dissenting Opinion

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
FACTS
- The increasing budget problems of the government in
t h e f o r m of f i s ca l p r o b l e m s, r ev e n u e g e n e r a t i o n , a n d
fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to
create a law to address such problems. This gave way to
the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as
Republ ic Act No. 9337 . The case revolves around the
constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that increased
the Value -Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In
t h i s ca se t h e r e we r e 4 d i ffe r e n t p e ti ti o n e r s: Ab a ka d a
Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./
Estrada , J. / Lacson/ Lim / Madrigal/ Osmea ,
C o n gr e ssm a n Es cu d e r o , a n d Go v e r n o r Ga r ci a . Al l o f
them question the constitutionality of RA 9337.
- Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
> VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied
o n th e sal e , b ar ter, ex ch an ge , or l ea se of goo d s or
properties and services.
> I t i s a n i n d i r e c t t a x o n e xp e n d i tu r e . T h e se l l e r of
goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid
to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate
buyers and end-consumers.
- RA 9337s legislative history is as follows:
It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on
th
the 27 of Januar y 2005 and House Bi ll 3705 tha t was
th
approved on the 28 of Februar y 2005 and Senate Bil l
th
1950 that was approved on the 13 of April 2005. This

was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference

Committee. The Bicameral Conference Committee
inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. The
Bill was approved on the 11 of May 2005 by the Senate th
and 10 of May 2005 by the House of Representatives. th

reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense

were not really part of the House version of the E-VAT
La w the re fo re i n vi ol a ti on of th e o ri gi na ti on cl au se in
Article VI Section 24.

BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON

ISSUES
Procedural
COMMITTEE
1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has
PADILLA; November 20, 1991
strictl y complied with the rules of both houses thereb y
re ma in i n g wi thi n the ju ri sd i ctio n co nf er re d u po n i t b y
FACTS
congress.
- Pe ti tio n fo r p ro hi b i tio n to rev ie w the de ci si on o f th e
2. W ON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Article VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential
be done after three readings.
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the
3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause
Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Benjamin
as stated in Art VI Sec 24.
Kokoy Romualdez, et al.
Substantive
-The comp laint alleges that defendants Ben jam in and
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and
Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship
Secretary of Finance.
w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage
5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation
in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the
o f t h e C o n s ti tu t i o n a l p r o v i si o n Ar t VI Se c 2 8 ( 1 ) th a t
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and that the
-o b ta in i n g con tr o l ove r Me ra l co , Ben gu e t M in in g C o .,
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings,
Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment
HELD
of the assets sub ject to the comp laint from the PCGG
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on
under the veil of corporate identity, etc.
the violation of the senate and house rules unless there
8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the
is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional
Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value)
provision or of the rights of private individuals. (favorite
without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group,
ratio )
owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa
2 . No, because the amendment rule refers onl y to the
Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a
pr oced u re to b e fol lo wed b y e ach ho use of C on gr e ss
possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses
Corrupt Practices Act w/c p ro hi bi ts an y re la ti ve of the
before the bill i s tran smi tted to the othe r house for its
rd
President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3 civil
concurrence and amendment.
degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed
government
amendments after the House Bills were approved. The
- the m a tter wa s r ef er re d to th e Sen a te Co m mi tte e o n
Bill still originated through the House of Representatives.
Accountability
of
Public
Officers
(Blue
Ribbon
4. No, because the President is just executing the law
Committee)
and is still working within the standard and policy of the
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo
law. The Secretar y of Finance is also not given undue
L op a to te sti f y on wha t the y kno w a bo ut th e sal e of
d el e ga tio n as he i s co n sid er ed a s a n a l te r e go of the
the 36 Romualdez corporations
president thus following the same logic, he is only
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testif y,
executing the law.
the former invoking the due proce ss clause , and both
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is
averring that such testimonies would unduly prejudice
directed towards a goal of a progressive taxation.
the defendants of civil case no.0035
-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition,
SEPARATE OPINION
praying for a temporary restraining order and/or
in jun ctive rel ief, claimin g that the Com mittee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose
PANGANIBAN
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the
Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1)
of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers
the increase of tax rates on domestic, resident foreign
(quoting Angara v. Comelec)
and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of
-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the
tax cre d i t a gai n st tax es du e f ro m no nr esi de n t fo re i gn
view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
co r p o r a ti o n s o n i n te r co r p o r a te d i v i d e n d s , a n d 3 ) th e

boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the

power of the Blue Ribbon Committee
ISSUES
1.W ON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid
of legislation.
2 .W O N C o n g r e s s i s e n c r o a c h i n g o n t h e e x c l u s i v e
domain of another branch of government.
3 .W ON th e i n qu i r y v i o l a te s th e p e ti ti o n e r s r i gh t to
due process.
HELD
1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of
legislation
- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out W ON
R i ca r d o L o p a h a d a n y p a r t i n th e a l l e ge d sa l e o f t h e
Romualde z corporationsthere was no intended

R e : W O N t h e B l u e R i b b o n C o m m i t t e e s i n q u i r y i s
in aid of legislation.
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is
inherent and needs no textual granteven so, it is
expressly granted by A6 S21.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid
le gi sl a tio n mi gh t en su e fr om a n in qu ir y do es n o t li m i t
the power of inquiry
U S v. Deu tch : C o n g r e s s h a s t h e r i g h t t o s e c u r e
information in order to determine WON to legislate on a
particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its
constitutional powers to act.
U S v. Or man : wh er e the i nf or ma ti on so u gh t con cer n s
w h a t C o n gr e s s ca n l e gi sl a te , a l e g i t i m a t e l e g i s l a t i v e
purpose must be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation
is easier to establish here where Congress legislative

Re: WON the inq uir y vio lates the pet it io ners right
to due process.
-t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a r e n o t f a c i n g c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s ; a s
ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when such a question is
posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand
outright.

SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES;
FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O.
no. 46415 issued Sept. 28, 2005

legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As

field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21,
h el d in Je a n L . Ar n a u l t v. L e o n N a za r e n o e t a l . , the
necessary that every question be material to the
22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII
inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of
proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject
Sec. 16
a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In
of the inquiry.
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate
Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power of inquiry
-the le gi sla tive purpose i s distin ctl y differen t from the
Investigation Committees issued invitations to various
is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private
judicial purpose; Congress ma y investigate for its own
officia ls of the Execu tive Dep t. includin g the AF P and
affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a
purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation
PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries
legitimate task of congressno inquiry is an end in itself.
are currently under trial.
co n ce rn i n g m ai n l y: ( A) T he al le ge d ove rp r i ci n g in the
2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain
NorthRail Project (B) the W ire-Tapping activity (C) the
of another branch of government
Re: WON the in qu ir y vio lates the petitione rs rig ht
Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the
to due process.
- Th e r e sp e ctive o ffici al s of th e Exe cu ti ve D ep t. fi le d
Sandiganba yan, any further investigation by Congress
-A6 S21 provides that the rights of persons appearing in
requests for postponement of hearings for varying
w o u l d o n l y se r v e to co m p l i ca te m a t te r s a n d p r o d u ce
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters,
c o n f l i c t i n g o p i n i o n s a s h e l d i n B a r e m b l a t t v. U S ,
However, such a restriction does not call for the
more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc.
Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively
complete prohibition of such investigations where a
Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests
the concern of the Judiciary.
violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only
because the requests were sent belatedly and that
3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due
requires that such rights be respected.
preparations and arrangements have already been
process
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked
completed.
- I t h a s b e e n h e l d t h a t a co n g r e s si o n a l co m m i tt e e s
when incriminating questions are posed, but the witness
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which
right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations
may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In
took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive
placed by the Constitution on governmental action,
the ca se at bar, n o i n cr i m in a tin g que sti on s ha d b ee n
Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed
includingthe Bill of Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US,
asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is
that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate
i t can t be assumed tha t le gi sla tive purpose is alwa ys
premature.
or Congressional hearings without consent (written
justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on
approval) from the President, which had not been
private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states
CRUZ [dissent]
granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of
that the Consti tu tional righ t a gain st self-in crim ination
appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O.
e x te n d s to a l l p r o ce e d i n g s s a n c t i o n e d b y l a w a n d i n
R e : W O N t h e B l u e R i b b o n C o m m i t t e e s i n q u i r y i s
4 64 . The re af te r, seve ra l ca se s we r e f il ed cha l le n gin g
cases in w/c the witness is an accused.
in aid of legislation.
E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining
D i sp o s i t i o n the pe titioners may not be co mpelled b y
Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that
r espo nd en ts f ro m i mp l em en ti n g, e nf or cin g, an d
the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence
an action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it
o b se r v i n g t h e a ssa i l e d o r d e r. R e sp o n d e n t Ex e cu t i v e
before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of
is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to
Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions
legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the
assume the contrary.
for lack of merit.
principle separation of powers between the legislative
-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in
and the judicial departments, as ordained by the
this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the
ISSUES
Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.
disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an
Primary Issue
indispensable duty of the legislature
SEPARATE OPINION
M c gr a i n v. D a u gh e r t y : i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e
reso lution orderin g an investigation expressl y sta te
15
E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers,
that the object of the inquir y is to obtain data in aid of
adherence to the rule on execu tive p rivil eg e and respect for the rights of
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
proposed legislation
public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under
the Constitution, and for other purposes.

1. W ON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry

vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:
a. Legal standing of petitioners:
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG)
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)
b. Actual Case or Controversy
3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
4 . W ON r e sp o n d e n t s h a v e co m m i tt e d gr a v e a b u se o f
discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD
Primary Issue
1. Ratio I t i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e t o a l l o w t h e e x e c u t i v e
branch to withhold information sought by the Congress
in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so,
and without stating reasons therefor.
- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of
executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right
to kno w wh y the ex ecu tiv e d ep t. co n si de r s r e qu e sted
i nf or ma ti on p ri vi le ge d . E. O. 46 4 a ll o ws the ex ecu tiv e
branch to evade congressional requests for information
w i th o u t th e n e e d o f cl e a r l y a s se r t i n g a r i g h t to d o so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power
of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed to be valid.
R e a so n i n g
Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level
ex ecu tiv e b ra nch o ffice r s to wi th ho ld ce r tai n t ype s of
information of a sensitive character from Congress, the
courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
This is the power of the Legislature to make
investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives
th e Co n gre ss th e po we r to com pe l th e ap pe ar an ce of
executive officials to comply with its demands for
information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
A s d e te r m i n e d f r o m t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f t h e
Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended
to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in
that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part
of the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited
only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the

question hour (because of its specific reference to sec.

a s s a i l a n e x e cu t i v e o r d e r w h i ch a l l e g e d l y s t i f l e s t h e
22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.
ability of the members of Congress to access information
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
cr u c i a l to l a w - m a ki n g . It h a s a su b sta n ti a l a n d d i r e c t
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads
interest over the outcome of such a controversy.
of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered
Party List (BayanMuna, COUR AGE, CODAL)
b y t h e e x e c u t i v e p r i v i l e g e . I t d o e s n o t p u r p o r t to b e
- T h e p a r t y- l i s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a v e s t a n d i n g , i t i s
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on
b e co n s tr u e d a s a m e r e e x p r e ss i o n o f o p i n i o n b y th e
their constitutional rights and duties as members of
Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive
Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation
privilege.
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation
- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
of laws.
Provides that once the head of office determines that a
IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of
certain info. is privileged, such determination is
public concern)
presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the
- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and
C o n g r e s s, o n l y to th e e x p r e ss p r o n o u n ce m e n t o f t h e
personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that
Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It
when a proceeding involves assertion of a public right,
allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere
the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies
silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary
the requirement of personal interest.
to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact
PDP-Laban
(claiming
standing
due
to
the
tha t execu tive privilege is of extraordinar y po wer, the
transcendental importance of issue)
Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it.
- There being no public funds involved and there being
Such power must be wielded only by the highest official
parties with more direct and specific interest in the
in the executive hierarchy.
controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Laban no standing.
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to
b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
Court)
be fo re ei the r h ou se of Co n gre ss. The e nu me ra ti on i s
- A challenged order which has already produced results
broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert
consequent to its implementation and where such
b u t me re l y i mp l ie s th e cla i m of exe cu ti ve pr iv il e ge . It
results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is
d o e s n o t p r o v i d e p r e ci se a n d ce r ta i n r e a so n s f o r th e
ripe for adjudication.
claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an
- T he im p le me n ta tio n of E.O. 4 64 ha s r esu l te d i n th e
announcement that the President has not given her
officials excusing themselves from attending the Senate
consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to
hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the
determine whether the withholding of information is
Court
would
refrain
from
passing
upon
the
justified under the circumstances of each case, severely
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
frustrating its power of inquiry.
3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation
are presumed to be a matter of public concern,
Secondary Issues
therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:
to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
R u l e 1 : Legislators h a v e s t a n d i n g t o m a i n t a i n
investigations deprives the people of information.
i n v i o l a t e t h e p r e r o g a t i v e , p o we r s a n d p r i v i l e g e s
4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
ve s te d b y t h e C o n s ti tu t i o n i n th e i r o ffi ce a n d a r e
executive branch , i t has a dire ct effect on the right of
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
the people to information on matters of public concern
action which they claim infringes upon their
therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication.
prerogatives as legislators.
Due process requires that the people should have been
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of
apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was
transcendental importance there must be a showing
implemented.
of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets
D e ci si on Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections
involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a
2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1
co n sti tu tio na l o r sta tu tor y pr oh ib i tio n 3 . l ack of a
and 2(a) are VALID.
party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions raised.
The Senate of the Philippines
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue
of their fundamental right for intelligent public decisionmaking and sound legislation is the proper party to

GUINGONA V CARAGUE
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991

FACTS

- T h e 1 9 9 0 b u d g e t c o n s i s t e d o f P 9 8 .4 B i n a u to m a t i c
appropria tion (86.8 goin g to debt servi ce) and P155 .3
f r o m th e G e n e r a l Ap p r o p r i a t io n s Ac t o r a t o t a l o f
P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as
members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said
budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117,
and 1967.
- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary
to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided
by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to
the Constitution, it shall be void.
- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are
n o lo n ge r o pe ra tiv e si n ce th e y b ecam e functus oficio
after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress
replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation
regarding appropriation should be passed. Current
appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be
unenforceable.
- Moreover, the y contend that assuming arguendo that
the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of
M ar co s, af ter ad op tio n of the 1 98 7 Co nsti tu ti on , sa id
decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the
Constitution which stated that:
Sec. 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall
originate
exclusively
in
the
House
of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then
a l a w m u st b e p a s se d b y C o n gr e ss t o a u th o r i ze sa i d
automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
d e c r e e s v i o l a te Se c t i o n 2 9 ( 1 ) o f Ar t i c l e V I o f th e
Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(1).
No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
T hey asse rt that there must be defini tene ss, cer tain ty
a n d e xa c tn e ss i n a n a p p r o p r i a ti o n , o th e r w i s e i t i s a n
undue delegation of legislative power to the President
who determines in advance the amount appropriated for
the debt service.
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic
appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example,
it enables the Government to take advantage of a
favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high
in terest se curi tie s and borrowin g a t lower ra tes, or to
s h i f t f r o m sh o r t - t e r m to l o n g - te r m i n s t r u m e n t s , o r to
enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset,
d e b t - to - d e b t o r o th e r su c h s c h e m e s . S e c o n d , t h e
automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties
in deb t servicin g arisin g from an y devia tion from what
has been previously programmed. The annual debt
service estimates, which are usually made one year in
advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or,
in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and

interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ

wi th the Constitution shall remain operative
from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on
until amended, repealed or revoked.
t h e b a s i s o f t h e a s s u m p t i o n s . Ab s e n t a n a u t o m a t i c
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has
appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to
preci sel y been adop ted by i ts framer s to preserve the
await and depend upon Congressional action, which by
so ci a l o r d e r so th a t l e gi sl a t i o n b y t h e th e n P r e s i d e n t
the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in
in ten de d con di ti on s wh i ch i n the m ea n tim e m a y have
f or ce a nd e ffect un le ss the y ar e in co n si ste n t wi th the
already drastically changed. In the meantime, also,
Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or
delayed
payments
and
arrearages
may
have
revoked.
su p e r v e n e d , o n l y to w o r se n o u r d e b t se r v i ce - t o - t o ta l
- W ell -kno wn i s the r ul e tha t re pe al o r am en dm en t b y
expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
- C l e a r l y, t h e c l a i m t h a t p a y m e n t o f t h e l o a n s a n d
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively
indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the
unless it is so clearly stated.
p er so n of Pr e si de n t M ar co s a nd hi s l e gi sla tiv e po we r
g o e s a g a i n s t t h e i n t e n t a n d p u r p o s e o f t h e l a w. T h e
3 . N o . T h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n te n t i o n i n R . A . N o . 4 8 6 0 , a s
purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person
amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
of Marcos."
is that the amount needed should be automaticall y set
aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to
ISSUES
pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
1 . W ON a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f P 8 6 .8 B f o r d e b t se r v i c e a s
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in
in cur re d a s gua r an tee d b y i t wh en th e y sha l l be co m e
violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
due without the need to enact a separate law
T h e S ta te sh al l a ssi gn the h i ghe st bu d ge tar y
appropriating funds the refore as the need ari ses. The
priority to education and ensure that teaching
p ur po se of th e se la ws i s to en ab le th e gov er nm en t to
wi l l a ttra ct an d r e ta i n i ts r i gh tf ul sh ar e of the
make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
best available ta lents throu gh adequa te
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
r e m u n e r a t i o n a n d o th e r m e a n s o f j o b
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state
satisfaction and fulfillment.
spe cifi c amounts to be paid , nece ssi ta ted b y the ver y
2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and
na tur e of the p ro bl e m be in g a dd re sse d , th e am ou n ts
if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
Constitutional.
parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed
by automatic appropriation.
for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
HELD
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are
b o n d s , d e b e n tu r e s o r se c u r i t y o r o th e r e v i d e n ce s o f
hamstrung b y the provision provided. There are
indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
other imperatives of national interest that it must
virtue of the law, as and when the y shall become due.
attend to; the amount allotted to education,
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the
27 .8 B, i s th e hi gh e st i n al l de pa r tme n t b ud ge ts
limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of
t h e r e b y c o m p l yi n g w i t h t h e m a n d a te o f h a v i n g
the Treasury.
the highest priority as stated above. The
enormous national debt, incurred by the previous
SEPARATE OPINION
ad mi n i str a tio n , h o wev er, sti ll ne ed s to be p ai d .
N o t o nl y fo r th e sa ke o f h on or b u t be ca u se th e
national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if
CRUZ [dissent]
Congress allotted more for debt service such an
appropriation cannot be considered by this Court
He sees that an essential requirement for valid
as unconstitutional.
a p p r o p r i a t i o n i s th a t t h e su m a u th o r i ze d f o r r e l e a se
should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential
2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision
D e c r e e s d o n o t s a t i s f y t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . As t o t h e
p r o v i d e d i n S e c . 3 , Ar t i c l e X V I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
ponencias reference to legislative parameters provided
recognizes that:
by law, Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist.
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and
PADILLA [dissent]
o th er ex ecu tiv e i ssua n ce s n o t in con si sten t

- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by

saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law
enacted by Congress (and approved by the President)
appropria tin g a par ti cular sum or sums must be made
before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws
s h o u l d b e co n s tr u e d i n l i g h t o f cu r r e n t l a w s a n d n o t
those made by a one-man legislative branch.
- Be sid e s, th e se d ecre e s i ssu ed b y Pr e sid en t Ma r co s
r e l a ti v e to d e b t se r v i ce w e r e ta i l o r e d f o r t h e p e r i o d s
c o v e r e d b y s a i d d e c r e e s . Tod a y i t i s C o n g r e s s t h a t
should determine and approve the proper appropriations
for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his
opinion , per tains to the legisla tive depar tment, as the
policy-determining body of the Government.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ
QUIASON; August 19, 1994
FACTS
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993.
- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill
i n to la w, an d d ecl ar ed th e sa m e to hav e be co me
Republic Act No. 7663 16, the General Appropriation Act
(GAA) of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions
of the bil l he vetoed and on wh ich he impo sed cer tain
conditions. No step was taken in either House of
Congress to override the vetoes.

- In G . R . N o . 1 1 3 7 6 6 , Senators Romulo and Taada

act of the Executive which injures the institution of
together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a nonCongress.
stock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers,
R e a so n i n g : Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v.
challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto
Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. American Tel.
o f th e sp e cia l p rov isi on i n the a pp ro pr ia ti on s for d eb t
& Tel . C o ) a s s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e t o r e c o g n i ze l e g a l
service and the automatic appropriation of funds
standin g. Then in forming the ratio decidendi , i t aga in
therefor.
relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v.
- In G . R . N o . 1 1 3 8 8 8 , Senators Romulo and Taada
Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of
contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four
Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae.
special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for
Substantive
t h e Ar m e d F o r c e s o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ( A F P ) a n d t h e
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be
(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed
implementation of certain appropriations for the
and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority
R e a so n i n g : The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
(NHA).
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
- In vie w of the impo rtan ce and novel ty of most of the
and other priority projects and activities and credit
i s su e s r a i se d i n t h e f o u r p e t i t i o n s , th e C o u r t i n v i t e d
faci lities to qualified beneficiaries" It was Congress
former Chief Justi ce En rique M . Fernando and former
itself
that
determined
the
purposes
for
the
Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves
implementation of the priority projects specified in the
G.R. No . 113105
law. The authority given to the members of Congress is
only to propose and identify projects to be implemented
ISSUES
by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of
Procedural
1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing 17
the CDF, it is the President who shall implement them. In
Substantive
sh o r t, th e p r o p o sa l s a n d i d e n ti f i ca t i o n s m a d e b y th e
2 . W ON the Countr ywi de Development Fund (CDF) or
members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
pork barrels is an encroachment by the legislature on
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State
executive power, since said power in an appropriation
shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education
act is in implementation of a law
is merely directory.
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not
R e a so n i n g : It relied on precedence , Guingona, Jr. v.
education18 as th e h i gh e st p ri or i t y in the al lo ca tio n of
Carague. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article

- In G.R. No. 113 1 0 5 , Philippine Constitution

A s s o c i a t i o n ( PH I L C O N S A ) e t a l . p r a ye d f o r a w r i t o f
budget unconstitutional
prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a)
4 . W ON t h e s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n a l l o w i n g a m e m b e r o f
Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or
Congress to realign his allocation for operational
pork barrels, the special provision in Article I entitled
expenses to any other expense category is
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b)
uncon stitutional, as i t is con trar y to Article VI Se ction
25(5) of the 1987 Constitution 19
Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of
the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the veto of
HELD
the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the
Procedural
GAA of 1994
1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to
- In G . R . N o . 11 3 1 7 4 , 16 Sen a tor s que sti on : (1 ) th e
question the validity of a presidential veto or any other
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
Pr e sid en t in the i te m s of the GAA of 1 99 4: (a ) fo r th e
17
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners
S u p r e m e C o u r t , ( b ) C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t ( C O A ) , ( c )
in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),
petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they
(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's)
do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2)
the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision
in the appropriation for debt service.
16

Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES"

18 Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "T he State

shall assign the highest budget ary priorit y t o education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
t hrough adequate remuneration and ot her means of job sat isfact ion and
fulfillment."
19 "N o la w shal l be pass ed aut h orizin g an y t ransf er of ap propr iat io ns;
however, the President, the President of the Senat e, t he S peak er of t he
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
h e a d s o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n s m a y, b y l a w, b e a u t h o r i z e d t o
augment any it em in the general appropriations law for t heir respect ive
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."

XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to assign

the highest budgetary priority to education it does not
thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and
for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
4 . T h e m e m b e r s o n l y d e t e r m i n e t h e n e ce s s i t y o f t h e
r e a l i gn m e n t of th e sa v i n g s i n th e a l l o t m e n t s f o r th e i r
operating expenses but it is the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall
approve the realignment.
De ci sio n
Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
Substantive
2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, hence constitutional
3 . No . Co n gr e ss act i s no t u ncon sti tu ti on al . It si m pl y
exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the
na tio na l i n te re st an d for th e a tta i nm en t of o th er sta te
policies or objectives.
4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
G.R . No. 113105
G.R . No. 113174

ISSUE
W ON ve to of the special provision of Article 48 of the
GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service
wi thou t vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is
unconstitutional
Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by the Constitution 20

ISSUES
1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities
and Colleges (SUCs) is unconstitutional
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for
the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70%
(administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance is unconstitutional
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of

exerci se by the Pre sident of hi s consti tu tional duty to

see that laws are faithfully executed.

HELD
An y p rov i si on wh i ch d oe s n ot re la te to a n y p ar ti cul ar
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation,
is
considered
an
inappropriate
provision 21 w h i c h c a n b e v e t o e d s e p a r a t e l y f r o m a n

medicines by AFP is unconstitutional

4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval
of Congress for purchase of military equipment is
unconstitutional
5. W ON the veto of provision on use of savings to
augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional

item.
R e a so n i n g : The issue, according to the ponencia is a
m e r e r e h a s h o f t h e o n e p u t t o r e s t i n Gonzales v.
Macaraig, Jr. Hen ce, it used thi s case as precedent. It
also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its
ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that
the provision which Congress can include in an

6.
WON
the
Presidents
directive
that
the
A F P, t h e s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n c a n n o t b e v e t o e d b y t h e
implementation of the Special Provision to the item on
President without also vetoing the said item.
the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential
4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
the con gre ssional wil l to imp lement the Con stitu tion 's
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
command
to
dissolve
the
CAFGU's,
therefore
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate"
unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment 22)
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly

D e ci si on
1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions.
2 . Yes . T h e S p e c i a l P r o v i s i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s n o t a n
in ap pr op r ia te p rov isi on wh i ch can b e th e sub je ct of a
veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and
30% by contract.
3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
a p p r o p r i a ti o n i te m o n p u r ch a se s o f m e d i ci n e s b y th e

appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some

par ticu lar appropria tion therein " and "be limi ted in i ts
o p e r a t i o n t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n t o w h i c h i t r e l a te s , " i t
follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond
an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate

7. W ON veto of the President setting conditions or

guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional
HELD
[ 1 ] t o [ 5 ] An y p r o v i s i o n w h i c h d o e s n o t r e l a te to a n y

vetoed.
5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of
Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AF P being managed b y the AFP Re tiremen t and
Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5)25 and 29(1) 26 of the Article VI of the Constitution.

provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item.

Citing Henry v. Edwards: W hen the legislatu re inser ts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill,
such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes

particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond

an item of appropriation, is considered an inappropriate
provision which can be vetoed separately from an
item23

Thus veto is not unconstitutional.

6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be
used to repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an
inappropriate provision which can be vetoed

o f th e G ov e r n o r 's ( Pr e si d e n t s) i te m ve to p o we r ov e r
general appropriation bills.

R e a so n i n g : Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the

previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section.
Hen ce the reason ing for the ra tio is the same as we ll .
(Notice how the ratio is applied in the ruling or
dispositive)
6 . An y p r ov i si o n b l o c ki n g a n a d m i n i st r a t i v e a ct i o n i n
i m p l e m e n t i n g a l a w r e q u i r i n g l e g i sl a t i v e a p p r o v a l o f
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate
substantive bill.
R e a so n i n g : T h e p o n e n c i a s i m p l y c i t e d n o t e s f r o m
journals24 i n d i s cu s s i n g t h e i s s u e o f I m p o u n d m e n t t o

separately.
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the
President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to
implement the laws faithfully.

D e ci si on
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including
th e pr ovi so s tha t th e a pp ro pr ia ti on a u th or i zed i n sa i d
i t e m " s h a l l b e u se d f o r p a ym e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p a l a n d
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that
"in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." The
said provisos, being appropriate provisions since the y
germane to and have a direct connection with the item
on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the
item veto of said provisions is void.

support his reasoning in the present case.

7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use
o f p u b l i c f u n d s a u t h o r i ze d b y C o n g r e s s i s s i m p l y a n

G.R . No. 113174

G.R . No. 113766
G.R . No. 113888

22 This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President

20 A r t i c l e V I S e c t i o n 2 7 ( 2 ) o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s t h a t : T h e

President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
21 A lso included in t he cat egory of inappropriat e prov isions which are
intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an
appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.

t o i m p o u n d i s p u t i n i s s u e . I mp ou ndment r e f e r s t o a r e f u s a l b y t h e
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress.
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authorit y of any type (Notes:
Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review)
23 Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I
formulated there. This can be implied from, Again we state: a provision in
an ap p ro p r ia t i o n s ac t c a nn o t be u s ed t o re p e al or a me n d o t h er l a w s.
Hence, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately.
24 Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential
Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown
L a w J o u r n a l ; N o t e s P r o t e c t i n g t h e F i s c : E x e c u t iv e I mp o u n d m e n t a n d
Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal

D i sp o s i t i v e
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to
[1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 onl y insofar as the y
pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service specifying that the fund
therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the
prin cipal and in terest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to
pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it
p r a y s f o r t h e a n n u l m e n t o f t h e v e t o o f : ( a ) t h e 2 nd
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of
appropriation for the DPW H; and (b) Special Provision

25 "N o la w shal l be pass ed aut h orizin g an y t ransf er of ap propr iat io ns;

howev er, t he P resident , t he P resident of t he S enate, the Speaker of the

House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
h e a d s o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n s m a y, b y l a w, b e aut horized t o
augment any it em in the general appropriations law for t heir respect ive
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. "
26

"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law"

No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is

GRANTED.
Vot i n g : 1 4 C o n c u r, 1 D i s se n t

SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur and dissent]
-

I concur wi th the ponencia of Mr. Justi ce Camilo D.

Q u i a s o n e x c e p t i n so f a r a s i t r e - a ff i r m s t h e C o u r t ' s
decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an
item and therefore outside the veto power of the
Executive.

VITUG [concur]
- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress,
more than the President and his colleagues, would have
the best feel on the needs of their own respective
constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law,
to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may
b e m i n d e d ; t o g i v e t h a t a u t h o r i t y, h o w e v e r , t o t h e
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am
afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

GONZALES V MACARAIG
MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990
FACTS
- T h e S e n a te q u e s t i o n e d t h e co n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e
Presidential veto of special and general provisions,
particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for
1989
- T h e p e ti ti o n e r s c l a i m t h e y h a v e l o cu s s ta n d i o n t h e
ground of:
- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance
Committee
- substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be
affected
- The respondents in this case are member of the
C ab in e t wh o a re sue d in th ei r o ffi ci a l ca pa ci t y for th e
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Ge n e r a l Ap p r o p r i a ti o n s Ac t o f
1989
- Dece mber 16, 1988 - The House of Represen ta tives
passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)
- eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed
Budget of the President
- presented to President for approval
- December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law
(became RA 6688)
- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec.
55
- Februar y 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate
Resolution No. 381 that the veto of Sec. 55 was

unconstitutional
3 ) T h e p o w e r o f th e p r e si d e n t t o a u g m e n t i te m s i n
- April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r t h e e x e cu t i v e b r a n ch e s a l r e a d y
filed
provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45
- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
of PD 1177 as amended by RA 6670)
- enjoined the implementation of RA 6688
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of
- No restraining order was implemented by the
other distinct and severable parts.
Supreme Court
- September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course
ISSUES
to the petition
1. WON the issue is justiciable
- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
Supplementary Petition which raised the same issue as
App ro pr i a tio n s Bi l l an d i ts co un te rp ar t Se c. 1 6 o f th e
the original petition (questioning the presidential veto)
1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without
- The vetoed provisions include:
effect
- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item
submi tted b y the Pre siden t whi ch has been reduced
HELD
by Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is
1. The issue is justiciable, not political.
deemed disapproved if there is no corresponding
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy
appropriation in the Act.
between the Senate and the Executive that the
- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to
Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria
Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this
v. Alba case declared that the Supreme Court has the
was lumped together with the use of savings
du t y to d ecl ar e acts of a gov er nm en t br an ch vo id i f
- The basic difference between both provisions is that
beyond that branch's powers
in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "use of savings" is
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners
in Se ction 12, apar t from Se ction 55 wh ereas in the
stress the imperative need for definitive ruling by the
1 9 9 0 \ Ap p r o p r i a t i o n s Act , "u se of sa v i n gs " a n d t h e
Court
vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is
- The reason for the veto:
a taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad ruling (the Court may
- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the
- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of
Tolentino v.
COMELEC ruling (members of the
the President, the Senate President, Speaker of the
Senate have personality when a Constitutional issue is
House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the
raised) were used. This is also not the first time
Supreme Court and the Heads of Con-Coms to
that the veto power was discussed.
augment any item in the General Appropriations law
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the
- I f a l l o w e d , th e P r e s i d e n t a n d th e o t h e r
veto but reversed by the US Supreme Court because
ab ove me n ti on ed offi cia l s can no t au gme n t a n y i te m
of the Appropriations Bill was not involved.
and appropria tion from their savin gs even if specia l
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto
circumstances like calamity
in an Appropriations Bill
- Petitioners' arguments:
2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
1) The president's line veto power regarding the
Ap pr op r ia ti on s Bi l l a nd i ts cou n ter pa r t Se c. 16 of the
ap pr op ri a tio n s b il l i s l im i ted to i te m /s a nd d oe s no t
1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional
cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority
*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing
(Sections 55 and 16 are provisions)
of provisions.
2) When the president objects to provisions of an
- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President
a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l , i t i s n o t p o s si b l e t o ex e r c i se t h e
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and
item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well
if exercised would veto the entire bill
3) The item veto power does not carry with it the
Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
over a particular item in an appropriations, revenue or
would be legislation already (violative of separation of
tariff bill. The president may not veto less than all of
powers)
an item (no authority to veto part of an item and
4) Power of augmen ta tion in Ar ti cle 6 , Se c. 25(5) is
approve the remaining portion of that item).
provided by law so Congress has prerogative to
- Original l y referred to ve to of i tem s of appropria tion s
impose restrictions in the exercise of that power
bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916
- SolGen's arguments:
- 1 9 3 5 C o n st i tu ti o n , Ar t. 6 , Se c 11( 2 ) - T h e v e to w a s
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners
more expansive since it included provisions and items in
have a political remedy which is to
override the
revenue and tariff bills
veto.
- 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the
the Prime Minister as the only official who has the power
Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.
- 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973

provision except that a different public official (the

President) was now involved and eliminated the
reference to a veto of a
provision
- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of
a n y ref er en ce to the ve to pr ovi sio n , th e exten t of the
P r e s i d e n t ' s v e t o p o we r a s p r e v i o u s l y d e f i n e d b y t h e
1935 Constitution has not changed.
- An i te m i n a b i l l r e l a t e s t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r s , d e t a i l s ,
distinct and severable parts of the bill whereas a
provision is of a more general nature.
- A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the
petitioners disregards the basic principle that a distinct
a nd seve ra bl e p ar t o f th e bi l l ma y b e th e sub je ct of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional
mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation and that any such provision shall
be
li mited in its operation to the appropria tion to wh ich it
relates.
- A provision does not relate to the entire bill.
- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a
legislative power as stated in the Bengzon case:
- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the
Chief Executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will
of the legislature.
- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the
con stitutionali ty of a veto in the same wa y tha t the y
presume constitutionality of an act passed by the
Legislature.
* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the
ex ecu tiv e p o wer to ve to , Se c. 5 5 an d Se c. 16 a re no t
provisions in the budgetary sense.
- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate
sp e ci f i ca l l y to so m e p a r ti cu l a r a p p r o p r i a t i o n th e r e i n .
Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.
a) no relation to a particular or distinctive
requirement. They apply generally to all items
di sapproved or reduced b y Congress in the
Appropriations Bill.
b ) di sa pp r ov ed or r ed uced i te m s a re n o wh er e to b e
found in the Bill.
c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs.
55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the veto power.
*Se ctions 55 and 16 are inappropria te condi tion s and
are therefore susceptible to a veto.
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose
conditions in an Appropriations Bill and
where
con d i tio n s ar e atta che d , ve to po we r s do n ot have the
power to strike them out.
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can
impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the
Execu tive canno t veto a condi tion of an appropriation

while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.

8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the
seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
re al sen se of the te r m . Re str i ctio n s sh ou l d exh ib i t a
or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned
co nn e ctio n wi th mo ne y i tem s in a bu d ge ta r y se n se in
provi sion. However, the 2000 GAA has lon g been
the sch ed u le of ex pe nd i tu re s.
The test is
implemented, the issuance is already moot and
appropriateness.
academic. But the Court shall pass upon the
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate
constitutional issues.
conditions.
- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative
- Actuall y general la w mea sures more appropriate for
Region (CAR):
substantive and therefore separate legislation.
- Presiden t Aqu ino initiated a series of peace talks to
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a
deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras. These dialogues
schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or disapproved
focused on the establishment of an autonomous
by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be
government in the Cordilleras.
d e te cte d wh e n co m p a r e d w i t h th e o r i g i n a l b u d ge t a r y
- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains
submittals of the President.
the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and Section 18,
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they
Ar ti cl e X m an da te s the co n gre ssi on al en actm en t of
nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads
the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions.
o f d i f fe r e n t b r a n c h e s o f g o v e r n m e n t t o a u g m e n t a n y
- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July
ite m in the G eneral Appropr iat ions La w f or the ir
15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is the interim and
respective office s from savings in o ther i tems of the ir
prepara tor y body ta sked to admini ster the affair s of
respective appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec.
government in the Cordilleras.
25(5)).
-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989,
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by
Co n gre ss e na cted R A 6 76 6 ( A n Ac t P r o v i d i n g f o r a n
law.
Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region ). A
- The constitution allo wed the transfer of funds for the
plebiscite was held where the people of the Cordilleras
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another
could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an
item in the appropriation of a government branch so as
autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of
t o a ff o r d co n si d e r a b l e f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e u s e o f p u b l i c
the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao province. The Court
funds.
ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.
and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair
also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect.
the constitutional and statutory authority of the
-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law
President in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
t h e 2 0 0 0 G A A w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h e a s s a i l e d Special
- T h e sp e ci a l p o we r o f a u gm e n ta t i o n f r o m sa v i n g s i s
Provisions:
merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The GA Bill is one of
1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated
primary and specific aim to make appropriation of
shall be used to wind up the activities and operations
m o n e y f r o m t h e p u b l i c t r e a s u r y.
The power of
of the CAR, including the payment of separation and
augmentation from savings is not considered a specific
retirement benefits of all affected officials and
appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item
employees
inserted in an appropriation measure.
-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270
- To sa n ct i o n th i s p r a c ti ce wo u l d w i t h h o l d t h e p o w e r
extending the implementation of the winding up of
from the Executive and other officials and put in
operations of the CAR.
jeopardy the exercise of that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the
ISSUES
veto po wer s by the executive we re unconsti tu tional , a
1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a
veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the
rider and as such is unconstitutional
members of Congress. But Congress made no attempt
2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress,
to do so.
can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O. No. 220
3 . W ON t h e R e p u b l i c sh o u l d b e o r d e r e d t o h o n o r i t s
commitments as spelled out in EO 220.

ATITIW V ZAMORA
TINGA; September 30, 2005

FACTS
- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the declaration
of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA

HELD
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a
rider TF it is constitutional
a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane
to th e su b je ct of th e b il l i n wh i ch i t is in co rp o ra ted . 2
provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec

25(2) No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in

1. Contention that Congress cant unilaterally amend or
decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
repeal EO 220: Rejected. There is no such thing as an
the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions.
specificall y to some particular appropriation therein
irrepealable law.
- Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.
and Sec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative
embra ce onl y one sub je ct wh ich shall be embra ced in
while the sourcing of funds to support CARs activities is
ISSUES
the title thereof
legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court
1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the
cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.
a . p r o c e e d i n g t o d e c i d e t h e p r o t e s t b a s e d o n AS
hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the
precinct level document based anomalies/evidence"
provisions are either appropriation items, or nontheory;
ARROYO
V
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
a pp ro pr ia to n i te m s wh i ch re la te sp e ci fi ca ll y to
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before
appropriation items.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
it and the manner in which the evidence was
- Test: It must be 1) Particular if it relates specifically to
FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
procured; &
a distinct item of appropriation; 2) Unambiguous when
c. annulling election results in some contested
i ts a p p l i ca ti o n i s a p p a r e n t o n th e fa ce of th e b i l l a n d
FACTS
precincts.
needs no reference to details/souces outside the bill; 3)
- Petition for review of the decision of the HRET
2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
Appropriate when its subject does not necessarily have
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P.
to be treated in a separate legislation.
Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of
HELD
- The assa iled provision does not con stitu te a rider : i t
Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS
1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
passes the above test.
files an election protest before HRET, seeking revision
a.
The
"precinct
level
document
based
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and
and recoun tin g of ballots in 75 % of the precin cts. Hi s
anomalies/evidence" theory
appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs,
grounds:
alleged
irregularities/anomalies
in
the
- T h i s i n n o v a t i v e t h e o r y b r o a d e n e d t h e s co p e o f t h e
it shall not be considered to be a rider
tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files
election protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is
b. Petitioners allege:
counter-pro test question ing residen ce qua lifica tion of
cle ar l y sub stan ti a l am en dm en t of the e le cti on p ro te st
that instead of providing a budget for
AS; dismissed by HRET.
expressl y proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET inte rnal
the CAR, it had the effect of abolishing the CAR
- HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious
rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of
sin ce a specia l law crea ted the CAR,
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s f o u n d . J u s t i c e G a n c a yc o s R e p o r t a n d
the or y wa s se n se d b y ma jo r i ty m em be r s o f H R ET bu t
the 2000 GAA is not the place for amending or
Recom mendation confirm ir regulari tie s and anomalies
t h e y s ti l l r e so l v e d n o t to d i s m i s s th e p r o te st t h i s a
repealing a standing law.
engineered by some HRET officials and personnel:
c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f g r a ve a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . No
- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been
Arroyo votes were consistently reduced while Syjuco
further hearings were conductedJA's r i g h t t o d u e
deactivated.
was always constant
process was clearly violated .
- Abo l i sh to d o a wa y wi th , a nn ul , a br o ga te , de stro y
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed
completely, office ceases to exist;
submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and
only within the same period for the filing of the election
- Deactivate render inactive, break up by discharging
e l e ct i o n r e tu r n s. AS su b m i ts ov e r 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 p a ge s of
protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten
or reassigning personnel, office continues to exist, albeit
documentary evidence, mere photocopies and not
(10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rule
dormant.
certified or authenticated by comparison with the
in an election protest is that the protestant or
- But even if the limitation of the CARs budget had the
original documents or identification by any witness."
counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he
effect of abolishing certain offices, the Congress has he
- In his memorandu m cum addendum , AS chan ge s his
had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior
power to do so.
original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what
to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of
- creation of public offi ces i s primar il y a le gi sla tive
he calls a truly innovative and NON-TRADIT IONAL
protest
or
counter
function
process" the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED
protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the
EVIDENCES.
the cause of action he stands on and cannot be
power of that body, and it may abolish the office if it
- By reason of the new allegations and substantial
permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his
sees fit.
amendments ( whi ch broaden the scope of his pro test,
theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the
ch an ge hi s the or y of th e ca se o r in tr od u ce a dd i tio na l
to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. EO
causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of
or on appeal. <p rinc ip le of esto ppe l>
220 has not established an autonomous regional
the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his
b. T h e k i n d o f e v i d e n c e u s e d a n d h o w t h e y w e r e
government;
rather,
it
has
only
created
an
protest should not be dismissed.
procured
admin istrative region. It can be considered a regional
- 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen- P h o t o co p i e s v i o l a te th e b e s t e v i d e n c e r u l e : n o
coordinating agency of the National Government.
members as against the three Justices-members), HRET
evidence
sh a ll b e re ce i ve d
w h i ch i s m e r e l y
resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the
substitutionary in its nature so long as the original
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed
examination and evaluation of the evidence on record,
evidence can be had. Certain vital election documents
paragraph is a rider, the rest of the arguments look into
and thereafter to decide the case on the merits.
(such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered
t h e w i s d o m a n d e ff i c a c y o f s a i d p r o v i s i o n s . Po l i t i ca l
- JA mov ed to d ism i ss the pr o te st bu t to n o av ai l . N o
vo te r s p er p re cin ct an d p ho to co pi e s of sta tem en ts of
questions
hearings were conducted thereafter.
votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente
- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered
of the majori ty decision, never offered in eviden ce by
Still
its now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation, &
either of the parties.
d e c l a r i n g AS a s t h e d u l y e l e cte d co n g r e s sm a n . Sa i d
- M a j o r i t y co n g r e s s m e n - m e m b e r s o f th e T ri b u n a l b y
themselves without the participation of any of the three

(3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of

the contested signature are fake. This grossl y violates
Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be
submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at
least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a
valid quorum).
c. Nullification of election results
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of
c o m p l i a n ce w i t h t h e 2 m a n d a t o r y r e q u i si t e s f o r t h e
annulment of election returns based on fraud,
irregularities or terrorism:
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
number of votes in the precinct or precincts were
involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected
or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.
- Election s should never be held void unless the y are
cl ea rl y il le ga l ; i t i s the d u ty of the cou r t to su sta in a n
election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as
to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and
the actual result thereof is clearl y ascertained. Absent
f r a u d , m e r e i r r e g u l a r i t i e s o r o m i ss i o n s co m m i tt e d b y
election officials which do not subvert the expression of
popular will cannot countenance the nullification of
election results. Corollarily, the misconduct of election
officers or irregularities on their part will not justify
re je cting the whole vote of a precin ct (as was done in
this case) where it does not appear that the result was
affected thereb y, even though the circu mstance s ma y
b e s u c h a s t o s u b j e c t t h e o f f i c e r s t o p u n i s h m e n t . 32
These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and
e l e c t i o n b y r e gi s t e r e d v o te r s h a d t a ke n p l a ce i n t h e
questioned precincts.
- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be
given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion
for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the
members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown,
recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes
nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can
be had based on the fundamental principle of due
process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be
di spensed wi th if petitioner's fundamenta l right to due
process was violated.
- Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own
governing rules and of even the most basic rules of
e v i d e n ce ca n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d b y si m p l y i n v o k i n g t h a t
procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of
the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules
of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral
Tribunal decisions of suppletory application.
- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as
p r o v i d e d b y t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t a n d j u r i sp r u d e n ce i s
because they have been tested through years of
experience as the most effective means of ferreting out
the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and
uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth
and exactness in elections as in anything else.

- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings

be fo re HR ET a nd i ts m a jo ri t y de ci si on in the el ecti on
protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyos proclamation as the
winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati
is deemed not to have been challenged at all.
2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
- S in ce h is s ta t e m e n t s in h i s Ad d e n d u m wh i ch h e
prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously
undermine the integrity of some members of the Court
- W an t o f i n te n t i o n t o u n d e r m i n e t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e
Court is no excuse for the language employed by private
responden t for i t is a well -kno wn and establ ished rule
tha t de ro ga to r y wo r d s a re to be ta ke n i n th e o rd in ar y
meaning attached to them by impartial observers
De ci sio n W HEREFORE, in vie w of the foregoing, the
p e ti t i o n i s h e r e b y G R A N T E D , a n d p u b l i c r e s p o n d e n t
HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET
ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having
been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereb y fined
the a mo un t of on e th ou san d pe so s ( P1 ,00 0 .00 ) to be
paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision.

BONDOC V PINEDA
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991
FACTS
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11,
1 9 8 7 , M a r ci a n o M . Pi n e d a o f th e L a b a n n g
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc
of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
the province of Pampanga.
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc
filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
R e p r e se n ta t i v e s El e ct o r a l Tri b u n a l ( H R ET ) wh i ch i s
compo sed of (9) membe rs: 3 Justi ces of the Supreme
Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r ti e s a n d t h e p a r t i e s o r o r ga n i za t i o n s
registered under the party-list system represented
therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA
Chairman
Associate Justice, SC
ISAGANI A. CRUZ
Member
Associate Justice, SC
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO
Member
Associate Justice, SC
HONORATO Y. AQUINO
Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON
Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR.
Member
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR.

Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN
Member
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES
Member
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).
- July 1989 Bondoc filed petition
- Oc t 1 9 9 0 - Bo n d o c w o n o v e r Pi n e d a b y a m a r gi n o f
twenty- three (23) vote s. LDP member s in the Tribunal
insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots
cast in some precincts, dela ying the finali zation of the
decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and
r e - a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e b a l l o t s r e s u l t e d i n increasing
Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura
voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.
- March 4, 1991 Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose
S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc
in th e fi na l tal l y i n the ca se . Th is rev el a tio n stir r ed a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of
plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
majority in the Tribunal.
- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of
Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in
HRET Case No. 25.
- Ma r ch 1 3 , 19 91 Co n g. Co ju an gco i nf or me d Co n g.
C a m a su r a b y l e t te r th a t o n F e b 2 8 , 1 9 9 1 L D P h a d
a lrea d y ex pe lle d h im and Cong Benjamin Bautista for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino
o f " D a n d i n g " C o j u a n g c o , a n d f o r h a v i n g i n v i te d L D P
me mb er s in D ava o de l Su r to jo i n sai d p ol i ti ca l p ar t y.
Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about
the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and
asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it
especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite.
- March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme.
Ju s H er re ra , re ce i ve d a l e tte r d a te d Ma r ch 1 3 , 19 91 ,
from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and
re s c in d t h e e le c t i o n o f C o n g C a ma s u ra , J r. t o t h e
House of Electoral Tribunal .
- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised
t h e C J a n d As s o c J u s o f t h e S C o f t h i s " d i s t r e s s i n g
development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the
decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is
sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote)
may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have
been defeated. It was also said that:
> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI,
Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instead
for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate
upon nomination of the party having the largest

number of votes and (3) of the party having the

second largest number of votes: and a judicial
component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
> Suggestions:
+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice
versa. So that there would be lesser chances of nonjudicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
+ There should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership
in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity. (like thats possible)
- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution
canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case
No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the
5 members without Cong Camasura's vote as required
b y Sec 24 of the Rule s of the Tribunal and , therefore ,
cannot be validly promulgated.
- March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the
justices to be relieved of their membership in the
tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court
even said that all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations
in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the memberslegislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their
p o l i t i ca l p a r t i e s b u t a s i m p a r t i a l j u d g e s . T h e te r m o f
office of every member thereof should be considered coextensive wi th the corre sponding le gi slative term and
m a y n o t b e l e g a l l y te r m i n a t e d e x c e p t o n l y b y d e a t h ,
resignation, permanent disabil ity, or removal for valid
cause, not including political disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda,
Pa la co l , C am a su ra , Jr., or a n y o the r r ep wh o ma y b e
appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to
wi thdra w the nomina tion and to rescind the
nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever
may be designated in place of Camasura from
assuming and discharging functions as a member of
the HRET
3 . Is su e a w r i t o f m a n d a m u s o r d e r i n g C a m a su r a to
immediately reassume and discharge his functions as
a member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and
equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of
the petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that

nominates and elects from its members. HRET

allegedl y has the sole power to remove any member
whenever the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House or Senate is materiall y
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
e x p u l s i o n f r o m t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y; t h a t a Tri b u n a l
member's term of office i s not co -extensive with his
legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the
Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be
comple tel y nullified ;
and that the expulsion of

Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the

House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
R e p r e se n ta t i v e s E l e c to r a l Tri b u n a l , G. R . N o . 8 6 6 4 7 ,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function
as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea
of politicians.
- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET
must be independent.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created
for the specific purpose of determining contests relating

Co n gre ssma n C am a su ra fr om the LD P, i s "p ur e l y a

to election returns and qualifications of members of the
party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his
National Assembly m a y n o t b e i n te r f e r e d w i t h b y th e
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judiciary wh e n an d wh il e a ctin g wi th in th e l im i ts of i ts
prerogative
of
the
House-of-Representative
au thority, but the Supreme Cour t has jur isdi ction over
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining
beyond the reach of judicial review.
th e ch a r a ct e r, s co p e a n d ex te n t o f th e co n st i t u t i o n a l
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the
gra n t to th e co m m i ssi on as so le ju d ge o f a ll co n te sts
petitioner has no cause of action against him because
relating to the election and qualifications of the
he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
to implead the House of Representatives as an
+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET
the independence of the HRET.
that
withdrew
and
rescinded
Congressman
The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the
Camasura's membership in the HRET.
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET
t o b e t h e sole judge o f th e el e ctio n co n te st b et wee n
as a party respondent is erroneous because the
Pineda and Bondoc.
petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal.
+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination
The peti tione r does not que stion any act or order of
of membership in the HRET.
the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is
As ju d g e s , th e m e m b e r s of th e tr i b u n a l m u st b e n o n the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and
partisan. They must discharge their functions with
rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of
comple te de tachmen t, impar tial ity, and independence
the HRET.
even independence from the political party to which they
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
b y cancel ing the promul ga tion of i ts decision in HRET
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that
member of the tribunal.
Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents
+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right
because after the HoR had announced the termination of
to security of tenure.
Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
newspapers reported that the HoR would nominate and
election contests are entitled to security of tenure just as
elect Palacol to take Camasuras seat in the Tribunal.
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Consti tu tion ( Sec. 2 , Art. VIII, 1987 Consti tu tion) .
ISSUE
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
W ON the H oR ca n in te rf er e wi th th e di spo si tio n of a n
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the
the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent
representation in the tribunal of the majority party
disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
HELD
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y, o r r e m o v a l f o r o t h e r v a l i d c a u s e . A
- S e c 1 7 r e e ch o e s S e c 11, Ar t i cl e V I o f t h e 1 9 3 5
member may not be expelled by the House of
Constitution, except the provision on the representation
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that
of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now
he has formally affiliated with another political group. As
b a s e d o n proportional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m a l l t h e
the records of this case fail to show that Congressman
political parties, instead of equal representation of three
Camasura has become a registered member of another
members from each of the first and second largest
political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
political aggrupations in the Legislature.
HR ET was not for a valid cau se; hence, it viola ted his
- The use of the wo rd "sole" in both Section 17 of the
right to security of tenure.
1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935

- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House

- The question that must be asked in testing the validity
that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was
of such legislative act is, does the House of
since subjects are of profound and general interest.
not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere
Representatives have the power to do what it has done
with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
and not whether the Hou se of Repre sentatives should
ISSUES
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in
have done what it has done.
1.W ON petitioners had standin g to file for peti tion for
his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is
- Th e ju d i cia r y can no t que sti on a l e gi sl a tiv e a ct d on e
mandamus
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17,
within the constitutional authority of the legislature The
2.WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
j u d i ci a l d e p a r tm e n t h a s n o p o we r t o r ev i e w ev e n th e
3 .W O N Ar t . V I I I , S e c . 5 ( 2 ) i n t h e 1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
i nd ep en de n t of the le gi sla tu re , ma y n ot be in te rf er ed
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
with by the House
exclusively to it by the Constitution . To hold otherwise
HELD
D e ci si on
W HER EF OR E, th e p eti ti on f or certiorari,
w o u l d b e t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f se p a r a t i o n o f
1.petitioners had no standing to file for petition for
prohibi tion and mandamu s is gran ted . The deci sion of
powers.
mandamus
the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the
- As t a x p a y e r s , p e t i t i o n e r s m a y n o t f i l e t h e i n s t a n t
election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of
SARMIENTO [dissent]
petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money
the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
i s b e i n g i l l e g a l l y s p e n t . Ac t i o n c o m p l a i n e d o f i s t h e
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and
- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it
inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, and
Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its
therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. It is
position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution
House Electoral Tribunal? is a political question and a
o nl y wh e n an a ct com p la in ed of , wh i ch ma y i ncl ud e a
No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the
question in which the Court cannot intervene.
l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t o r s t a t u te , i n v o l v e s t h e i l l e g a l
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr.
- T h e ju r i sd i c ti o n of th i s C o u r t i n c l u d e s t h e p o w e r to
expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer
E m i gd i o Bo n d o c v s. M a r c i a n o A. Pi n e d a ") i s a l so se t
strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but
suit may be allowed.
aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in
the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of
- As vo te r s, ne ith er have p etition er s th e r e qu isite
the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
separation of powers.
intere st or personal ity to qual ify the m to main tain and
speed y resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
- Evidentl y, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the
prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers wi thin the
is to have personal and substantial interest in the case,
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and
or su sta in direct in ju r y as a resu lt of i ts enforce ment.
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof
Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
Interest held in common by all members of the public is
on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.
"dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be sustained)
Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
independence.
and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury,
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
Jr., JJ., concur.
element for one to have personality in a dispute.
Gu ti er re z, Jr., J., co n cu r s as ce r tif ie d to b y the C hi ef
LOZADA V COMELEC
Justice.
DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
2.SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is
took no part.
FACTS
only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders
- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition
or rulings. Thi s is as clearl y provided in Article XII-C ,
for mandamus as a representative suit 27 to compel the
Section II of the 1973 Constitution 29. In this case, there is

SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [dissent]

-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is

th a t the po wer s of gov er nm en t ar e d i stri bu te d am on g
th re e (3 ) gr ea t de pa r tm en ts. Ea ch se pa ra te f ro m , ye t
coordinate and co-equal with the others each one
deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law.
- This does not extend to the point that those in
a u th o r i t y i n o n e d e p a r tm e n t ca n i gn o r e a n d tr e a t t h e
acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to
the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not
binding in every other department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the member s of
the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
- T he po we r to a pp oi n t or d esi gna te a m em be r of the
House of Representatives to be a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to
remove said member.

respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up

existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim
Ba ta sa n Pa mb an sa . T he pe ti tio n i s b ased o n Se cti on
28
5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution .
- Lo zada claim s tha t he is a taxpa yer and a bona fide
e l e cto r of C e b u C i t y a n d a t r a n si e n t v o te r o f Qu e zo n
City, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan
Pambansa; while Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has
standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a
special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution.
As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they
are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and

27

for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election

irrespective of party affiliation

28 Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa
eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after
the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.

no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the

st a n d p o i n t o f a n a c ti o n f o r m a n d a m u s , w i th t h e to ta l
a b se n ce of a sh o wi n g th a t C OM EL EC h a s u n l a w f u l l y
ne gl e cte d o r r ef used th e p er fo rm an ce of a m in i ste ri a l
duty, it is not shown that petitioners have a clear right to
t h e h o l d i n g o f a sp e ci a l e l e ct i o n w h i ch i s e qu a l l y th e
clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC.
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary
appropriation for special elections, and this power of the
may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the Batasan to
exercise its power of appropriation. From the role
Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special
elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the
ex pe nse s the re of , i t wo ul d see m tha t the i ni ti a tiv e o n
t h e m a t t e r m u s t co m e f r o m s a i d b o d y, n o t th e
29Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the

Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof.

C OM E L E C . T h e p o we r to a p p r o p r i a te i s th e so l e a n d
the appointment in view of derogatory information which
consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the
he had received.
ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect
exercise of which may not be compelled through a
at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval
petition for mandamus.
ISSUES
b y the CA o r un ti l the n ext ad jou r nm en t in C on gr e ss.
4.Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not
1.
WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration
There must either be a rejection by the CA or
apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
nonaction on its part.
wi th the Commission on Appointments (CA), without
- T h e c i te d p r o v i s i o n o f t h e 1 9 7 3 C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t
being acted on, suffices to set at naught a
intended to apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question
confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim
involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is
2.W ON the issue is a justiciable question, wi th the CA
Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the
untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political
being an independent organ of the Constitution.
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as
question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts
the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and
a re cal l ed u po n to se e to i t tha t pr iv a te r i gh ts a re n ot
HELD
the members or the Senate and House of
invaded.
Representatives
of
Congress
under
the
1935
1.
A s p e r Al t a r e j o s v. M o l o , t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system
Constitution. W ith such number of representatives
stands; it must be given force and effect.
of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the
representing each congressional district, or a province,
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on
Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its
not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no
the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even
a u th o r i t y, a n i n d e p e n d e n t o r ga n . It s a ctu a ti o n i n th e
need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim
on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an
exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted
Na tional Asse mbl y, con sider ing the uncer tain ty of the
appointment duly confirmed, was without force and
to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from
duration of its existence.
effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular
R e a so n i n g
sh o wi n g of su ch ar bi tr ar y an d i mp ro vi de n t u se o f th e
Batasang
Pambansa,
because
a
province
or
a. The controll ing principle is supplied b y Alta rejos v.
powers as will constitute a denial of due process.
representative
district
would
have
only
one
Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s a i d b o d y. T h e n e e d t o f i l l u p t h e
the Commission on Appointments, which reads:
AVELINO V CUENCO
In ter i m Ba ta sa n g Pa m ba n sa i s n ei the r i mp er a tiv e no r
Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may
u r g e n t , a s t h e r e w o u l d a l w a ys b e a d e q u a t e
be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949
representation for every province which forms only part
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority
of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is
of the members present concur to grant a
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC
only transitory in character.
r e co n si d e r a ti o n , t h e a p p o i n t m e n t m a y b e l a i d o n th e
- T h a t th e p r o v i si o n i s f o u n d i n t h e m a i n b o d y o f th e
table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.
FACTS
Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions
H o ld in g o f t h e C o u rt w a s t h a t t h e me re f il in g o f a
- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review
adds to the intention that the provision applies only to
re c o n s id e ra t io n d i d n o t h a ve t h e e f f e c t o f s e t t in g
of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to
the regular, and not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguers
look into the legality of the election of a Senate
(respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the
President, in view of the separation of powers, the
D e ci si on Petition dismissed.
mere filing o f a m o ti o n f o r r e co n s i d e r a t i o n th e e ffe ct
p o l i t i ca l n a tu r e o f t h e co n t r o v e r s y a n d t h e S e n a t e s
which it would have if the motion approved, and hence,
constitutional power to elect its own president
would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for
Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate,
PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
w h i c h t h e co n cu r r e n c e o f a m a j o r i t y o f t h e m e m b e r s
Senators Lorenzo Taada and Prospero Sanidad
FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of
prepared a resolution enumerating charges 30 against the
the Revised Rules of the Commission.
then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided
FACTS
In case of an adjournment s ine die the period
the session and called the meeting in order, and except
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the
f o r f i li n g t h e mo t io n f o r re c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a vi n g
for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another
then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as
expired, under Section 22, then the motion for
who is in the United States, all the Senators were
Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed
reconsideration not having been acted upon is
present.31
office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties
not approved and therefore, has no effect
- TAADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his
as such. As his appointment was made during recess of
whatsoe ve r.
followers prevented TAADA from delivering his
Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not
privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which
Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment
n u l l i f i e d si m p l y b y a m o ti o n o f r e co n s i d e r a t i o n b e i n g
AVE L I N O a n d 9 o th e r s e n a t o r s l e f t th e s e s si o n h a l l .
was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with
filed, without its being voted upon and approved.
Subsequentl y, the Senate President Pro-tempore took
Senate President and Chairman of Commission on
b. The President shall have the power to make
the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining
A p p o i n t m e n t s F e r d i n a n d M a r co s ev e n se n d i n g h i m a
a p p o i n tm e n ts d u r i n g th e r e ce ss of th e C o n g r e s s, b u t
congratulator y telegram). Nine months after his
such appointments shall be effective only until
30 BRYAN SJ: A m o n g w h i c h w e r e a d v o c a c y o f t h e g r a f t a n d
confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of
disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
co rru p ti o n i n th e g o vern men t (p arti cu l arl y tho s e co mmi tted b y th e
Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as
Congress.
L i b e r a l P a r t y, t o w h i c h AV E L I N O w a s a m e m b e r ) ; q u e s t i o n a b l e
municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21,
- A d i s ti n ct i o n i s m a d e b e tw e e n th e ex e r ci se o f su ch
possession of ch ecks to taling more th an P500, 000 after AVE LI NOs
1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the
C o m m i s si o n o n Ap p o i n tm e n ts ) wr o te to i ts C h a i r m a n
stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of

presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA

when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In
the former, the President nominates, and only upon the

assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud.

31 Simil ar to th e 1987 Con st, th e Senate is co mp osed of 24

sen ators und er the 1935 Co nst.

senators unanimously approved, among others, a

resolution declaring vacant the position of the President
of the Senate and designating Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
P r e s i d e n t of th e Ph i l i p p i n e s r e co g n i ze d C U E N C O a s
acting Senate President.
- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court
to d ecl ar e hi m the ri gh tfu l Sen a te Pre si de n t a nd ou st
CUENCO.
ISSUE
WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD
NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio
The issue of the validity of the election of the
new Senate President is a political question.
R e a so n i n g
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not
in the Supreme Court.
- The Court wi ll not sal l y in to the legitimate domain of
t h e S e n a te o n t h e p l e a t h a t o u r r e f u s a l t o i n t e r ce d e
might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of
things has been proved that might change the temper of
the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens .
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded
by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to
adop t the hands- off policy enuncia ted b y this Court in
matters of similar nature.
D e ci si on Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive
prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of
the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate
and its opportunity to transact official business cannot
b e le ft to th e d iscre ti on of a si n gle in di vi du al wi tho u t
jeopardi zin g the high purpose s for wh ich a le gi slative
deliberative body is established in a democratic social
order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate
which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment
without the consent of the body or one which authorizes

t h e p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r t o d e c r e e mo tu propio said
ISSUES
adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and
1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case
experience in this countr y and in the Uni ted State s of
2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
America, upon which ours is patterned, would not
authorize the existence of such a provision.
HELD
- AVE L I N O a l l e g e s th a t h e o r d e r e d th e a d jo u r n m e n t
1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume
because the motion of a senator to said effect was
ju r i sd i c ti o n o v e r th e ca se i n th e l i gh t o f su b se qu e n t
properly made and met with no objection. The evidence,
events which justify its intervention.
however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of
circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal
this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria
a d j o u r n m e n t a n d t h e w a l k o u t o f AVE L I N O a n d h i s
[and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare
s u p p o r t e r s f r o m t h e se s s i o n h a l l h a d th e p u r p o se o f
that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO
defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed
was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice
investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his
[Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's
i mp ed i n g o uste r, b y th e de ci si ve vo te s of CU EN C O's
pr on ou nce me n t o n th e quo r um , i t a pp ea ri n g f ro m th e
group.
e v i d e n ce th a t a n y n e w se s s i o n w i t h a q u o r u m w o u l d
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO
result in CUENCO's election as Senate President, and
group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact
that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the
business. T h e C o n st i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s: A m a jo r i t y o f
co n sti tu tio na l ] fo rm al i sm b y issu in g co mp ul so r y
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business
processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to
[cf A r t . V I , S e c . 1 6 ( 2 ) , 1 9 8 7 C o n s t ] . T h e m a j o r i t y
n o a va i l , b e ca u se o f th e l a tte r ' s p e r s i s te n t e ffo r t s to
m e n t i o n e d i n t h e p r o v i si o n ca n n o t b e o t h e r t h a n t h e
block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words
reason, [the Chief Ju stice ] believes that the CU ENC O
" e a ch H o u s e " i n t h e a b o v e p r o v i s i o n r e f e r to th e f u l l
group has done enough to satisf y the re qui rements of
membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is
the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in
composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot
conformity with substantial justice and with the
be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no
requirements of public interest.
t i m e h a s o n e - h a l f e v e r b e e n t h e m a j o r i t y. M a j o r i t y
De ci sio n The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that
necessarily has to be more than one-half.
CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President
and the petition is dismissed.

FERIA [concur]

- If the rump session was not a continuation of the

morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the
b e gin ni n g of th e r um p se ssio n the r e we re at le ast 14
senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country
of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of 23 senators. W hen the Constitution declares
that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members.
There is a difference between a majority of "all the
members of the House" and a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

RESOLUTION on Motion for

Reconsideration
FACTS
- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to
Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to
the session hall despite the compulsory process served
upon them), reversed its original decision and now
assumed jurisdiction over the case

SEPARATE OPINION
FERIA [concur]
I ma in ta in m y op in io n tha t th er e wa s a qu o ru m i n th e
( ru mp ) se ssio n . Amo n g o the r s, th e am en dm en t of the
quorum provision from "the majority of all the members
o f t h e N a t i o n a l As s e m b l y c o n s t i t u t e a q u o r u m t o d o
business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quo ru m to d o b usi ne ss," sho ws the in ten ti on o f th e
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on
the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but
o n a c tu a l m e m b e r s o r i n c u m b e n t s , a n d th i s m u s t b e
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other
causes which make attendance of the member
con cerned impo ssib le, even throu gh coercive proce ss
which each House is empowered to issue to compel its
members to attend the session in order to constitute a
quorum.

PERFECTO [concur]

- The words "all the members" used in the original, for

the determination of the quorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as
regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a
mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed
the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of
each House" can mean only the majority of the members
t h e r e o f , w i t h o u t e x c l u d i n g a n yo n e , t h a t i s , o f a l l t h e
members.
T h e w o r d m a j o r i t y i s a m a th e m a t i ca l wo r d . I t h a s, a s
s u ch , a p r e c i se a n d e x a c t m a t h e m a t i ca l m e a n i n g . A
majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be
identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The
Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said
senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not
constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units.
No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly
w i l l co n v i n ce a n yo n e t h a t o n e o f t w o e q u a l n u m b e r s
constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined.
The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the
combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e qu a l i t y. I t i m p l i e s t h e i d e a of
superiority. Majority presupposes the existence of a total
and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators
composing the Senate.
- The above pronouncemen ts notwi th standing, we are
now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President,
th e pr esen ce of the 12 se na to r s wa s en ou gh quo r um .
T h e C on sti tu tio n p rov id e s: A ma jo r i ty of e ach Ho u se
shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI,
Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred
to h as to act co l le ctiv el y a nd can no t act as co ll e ctiv e
body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by
t h e C o n s ti tu t i o n u n l e s s p r e si d e d b y o n e a m o n g th e i r
number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller
number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance
o f a b se n t m e m b e r s , " so a s to a v o i d d i sr u p ti o n i n t h e
f u n c ti o n s o f t h e r e sp e c ti v e l e gi sl a t i v e ch a m b e r. S a i d
"smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12
se n a to r s to co n st i t u te a q u o r u m fo r t h e e l e c ti o n o f a
temporary or acting president, who will have to act until
normalcy is restored.
- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he
was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position
of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should
attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming
the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to
preside over the sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend
the sessions, notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to
allow him to preside over them, can and should logically
be interpreted as an abandonment which entails
forfeiture of office.

OSMENA V PENDATUN
BENGZON; October 28, 1960

1 .W O N th e C o n s t i t u t i o n g i v e s m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s
complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in
the House
2.W ON the Speech of Osmea constituted unrul y
behavior for which he could be punished
3.W ON Osmea can be held to answer for or be
censured by the House, given that other business had
intervened after gave the speech in question
4 .W ON the House has the po wer to su spend its
members

FACTS
- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., in
a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President. The
House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59,
created a special committee of 15 members to
investigate the truth of the charges against the
HELD
President. It summoned Osmea to appear before it to
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which
substantiate his charges.
provide s tha t "for any speech or debate" in Con gress,
- On July 14, 1960, Osmea filed with the Supreme Court
the Senators or Members of the House of
a petition for "declarator y relief, certiorari and
Represen tatives "shal l not be questioned in an y other
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction"
against
p la ce ." Thi s se ctio n wa s ta ken or i s a co p y of se c. 6 ,
Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other
clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States,
members of the Special Committee. He asked that said
wh er ei n the pr ovi sio n h as a l wa ys b ee n u nd er stoo d to
r e so l u t i o n b e a n n u l l e d a n d th a t sa i d m e m b e r s o f th e
mean that a l t h o u g h e x e m p t f r o m p r o s e c u t i o n o r
special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
accordance with it, particularl y the portion authori zing
t h e m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s m a y, n e v e r t h e l e s s , b e
them to require him to substantiate his charges against
questioned in Congress itself .
the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do
- Ou r C o n st i tu ti o n e n sh r i n e s p a r l i a m e n ta r y i m m u n i t y
so, he must show cause why the House should not
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
punish him. Osmea alleged: (1) the Constitution gave
legislative assembly of the democratic world. It
him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words
gu ar an te e s th e l e gi sla to r co mp le te fr ee do m o f
spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2)
ex pr essi on wi tho u t fe ar of b ei n g m ad e re sp on si bl e i n
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for
crim inal or civil actions before the cou rts or an y o ther
which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not
be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took
p r o te ct h i m f r o m r e sp o n si b i l i t y b e f o r e th e l e gi sl a t i v e
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of
body itself whenever his words and conduct are
the House provides that if other business has intervened
co n s i d e r e d b y t h e l a t t e r d i s o r d e r l y o r u n b e c o m i n g a
after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in
member thereof.
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
2 . YE S . T h e H o u s e i s t h e j u d g e o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s
subject to censure by the House
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution
- Aware of the petition, the special committee continued
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
defend him self , submi tted i ts repor t on Jul y 18, 1960 ,
which the House knows best but which can not be
fi nd in g sa i d co n gre ssm an gu i l ty o f se ri ou s di so r de rl y
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
the same day-before closing i ts se ssion -House
a s s u m e d t h e p o w e r t o d e te r m i n e w h e t h e r O s m e a ' s
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby
recommended, and suspending him from office for
have assumed appellate jur isdi ction, whi ch the
fifteen months.
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
- Thereafter, Osmea too k the additiona l posi tion that
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
t h e H o u s e h a s n o p o w e r, u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o
powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
suspend one of its members.
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer,
department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
own sphere.
m e m b e r s w i t h su s p e n si o n , u p h e l d H o u s e R e s o l u t i o n
- "T he Le gi slative po wer of the Phil ippine Con gre ss i s
No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that
plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in
Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed
Commi ttee-who se member s are the so le respondentsto b e l e gi sl a t i v e b y u sa g e o r tr a d i t i o n , i s n e ce ssa r i l y
had thereby ceased to exist.
p o s s e s se d b y t h e P h i l i p p i n e C o n g r e s s , u n l e s s th e
Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77
ISSUES
Phil., 192, 212.)

3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by

the House, such approval amounted to a suspension of
the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous
consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular
measure."
4 . Y E S . F o r unparliamentary c o n d u c t , m e m b e r s o f
Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice
a nd the tr ad i ti on al po we r of le gi sl a tiv e a sse m bl i e s to
take, disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been
recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine
House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
p r a c t i ce s o f th e C o n g r e s s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s sh a l l
apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
D e ci si on Petition DISMISSED.

ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
FACTS
- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction
- H B No . 9 26 6 wa s f il ed a nd wa s p assed on the th ir d
r ea di n g wi th ou t a me nd me n ts in th e Ho use of
R ep re sen ta tiv es (H oR ) . It wa s re fe rr ed to the Sen a te
C om m i ttee on Pro vi nce s a nd Mu ni ci pa l Gov er nm en ts
and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested
a m in or am en dm en t on H B 92 66 . H o wev e r, th i s
recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate
during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto
Sen. Tolentinos substantial amendment on the section
definig the powers and duties of the VM.
- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to
the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate with amendments. However, the attached
amendments were not Sen. Tolentinos but Sen.
Roxasamendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB
No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of
it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of
the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the
Senate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the
House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of
th e Phi l ip p in e s, wh o a ffixe d h i s si gna tu re s b y wa y of
32
approval enacted the bill into R.A. No. 4065
32 An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the

City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA

No. 409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicl y denounced

the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a press statement that
the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is
n o t the ve rsi on p assed b y th e Sen a te si n ce i t di d no t
contain the amendments he made. The Senate President
then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the
signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that his signatu re is invalid and had no
effect, and could not validate the bill which was not the
version approved by the Congress. The President then
withdrew his signature on the HB 9266.
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate
President and the President of the Philippines, Villegas
issued circulars ordering city government officials and
operator s of business establi shmen ts to disregard the
provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of
Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vicemayor presumably under the said RA.
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed
a petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
wi th Preliminary Mandator y and Prohibitory Injunction
to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of
RA 4065.
- Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law
since (1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2)
entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled
b i l l sh o u l d b e d e ci si v e i n th e r e so l u t i o n o f t h e i s su e .
Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip,
Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise
the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA
4065.
ISSUES

1.

WON the Court could resolve

regarding the enrolled bill doctrine

the

issue

2.

WON the attestation of the presiding officers of

the Congress approves the bill and validates it into a
law
3.
W ON in th e ab se n ce of th e a tte sta ti on of th e
presiding officers, the journal entry in the Journals of
Congress could constitute proof of due enactment
4.
WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore
did not become a law
HELD

1.

Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution

and the legisla tive jo urnal s are conclusive upon the
Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by
Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a
bill.
Obiter
- co m p a r e d t h i s ca se t o th e M a b a n a g v. L o p e z Vi to
where the Court denied to resolve the issue of W ON a
r e so l u t i o n o f b o th H o u se s o f C o n gr e ss p r o p o si n g a n
amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as

a n o r d i n a n ce th e r e to h a d b e e n p a sse d b y a v o te f o r
three-four ths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution, saying that it involved a political
question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the
province of the judiciary.
- using J. Bengzons separate opinion in the same case, J.
Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciable since
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of
due
enactment
of
provisions
of
acts.
- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal
and independent departments which requires the judicial
department to accept, as having passed the Congress,
all bills authenticated by it.
2.
Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the
lawmaking process and the certification/attestation of
the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the
Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor
cure any defect already present upon it.
O b i t e r effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of
authentication; signify the Chief Executive that the bill
being presented to him has been duly approved by
Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval
3.
Ratio YES. If atte sta tion is absen t and is no t
mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment.
Obiter Attestation b y the presid ing officer s is no t
mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due
enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the
Co n gre ss p ro ce ed i n gs [co mp a ri son of Co nsti tu ti on s:
1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26
(2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)]
4.
Ratio N O . G i v e n t h a t ( 1 ) t h e C o u r t c o u l d
resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine,
(2) that the Court could use the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress and, in the absence of
the latter, the records of the proceedings of the
Co n gre ss e n te re d i n to th e Jo u rn al s of Co n gr e ss a s
proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is
rd
deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3
readin g and the attestation of the presiding office rs
j u s t se r v e a s a m o d e o f a u th e n ti ca t i n g th e b i l l , ( 3 )
that, upon referring to the journal entries of the
proceed ings of congre ss, the Court discovered tha t
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced
to the HB but were not incorporated in the printed text
which was signed by the President of the Philippines,
and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the
S e n a te a l r e a d y w i th d r e w th e i r si g n a t u r e s , t h e n R A
4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law.

D e ci si on RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly

enacted and therefore did not become law. TRO made
permanen t. [8 con cur, 2 no par t, 1 did no t ta ke part ( I
dont know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]

MARTINEZ V MORFE
FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr.
were dele ga tes of the 1971 Con stitu tiona l Convention
facing criminal prosecution
o Martine z was charged wi th falsification of a public
docu ment for stating under oath in his cer tifi cate of
can d id a cy f or d el e ga te to th e Co nsti tu ti on al
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when
in truth he was born on June 20, 1946
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the
Revised Election Code in that he gave and distributed
f r e e o f c h a r g e , f o o d , d r i n k s , a n d ci g a r e t t e s a t t w o
public meetings
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued
against them to be quashed, by virtue of the
parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates,
traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as
construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest
2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should
be con strued together with Ar ti cle 145 of the Revised
Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional immunity
HELD
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal
arrests.
U n d e r S e c t i o n 1 5 o f R e p u b l i c Ac t N o . 6 1 3 2 ,
otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative.
Article VI Se ction 15 of the Consti tution provides:
The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
f e l o n y, a n d b r e a c h o f p e a c e , b e p r i v i l e g e d f r o m
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
C on gr e ss, a nd in go i n g to a nd r e tu rn i n g f ro m th e
sa m e ; a n d f o r a n y sp e e ch o d e b a te th e r e i n , th e y
shall not be questioned in any other place.
Im m un i ty fr om ar re st d oe s n o t cov er an y
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace
o T re a so n - l e v yi n g w a r a ga i n s t t h e R e p u b l i c a n d
adhering to enemies and giving them aid and
comfort
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law

o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether

defined by RPC or any special statute
History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was
never intended to exempt members of the National
Assembly from criminal arrest
The power or right of the State to claim privileges is
due to the fact that it has the right to carr y out its
function without obstacle
I n E n g l a n d , o p e r a t i o n o f p a r l i a m e n ta r y p r i v i l e g e
excludes all crimes, applies only to prosecutions of
civil nature
There is a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of the Congress, and likewise, delegates
o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n , e n ti t l e d to th e
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
responsibilities

- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums

of mone y by wa y of dama ges for the publica tion of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang
- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is
a p riv il e ged co m mu ni ca tio n a nd no t l ib e lo u s sin ce he
w a s a m e m b e r o f t h e H o u se o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n d
Chairman of House Committee on National Defense
- The letter in question is an open letter to the President
of the Philipp ines da ted Nov 14 , 1958 wh ile con gre ss
was presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in
several newpapers.
- The open letter was an expos on allegedly three
operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious
plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Natl
Defense , Jesu s Vagas, by propagand i zin g and
g l a m o r i zi n g h i m i n s u c h a w a y a s t o b e p r e p a r e d t o
become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II A coup
detat;Plan III A modification of Plan I)
- T h e l e t t e r a l s o i m p l i ca t e d th a t t h e p l a n n e r s h a v e
under their control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert,
(4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose
Reyna.I t i s o f c o u r s e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s
mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge.
- Lower Court dismissed
- Petitioners appealed

However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it

would amount to the creation of a privileged class if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense,
th e y wo ul d b e i m mu ne d ur in g the i r a tte nd an ce i n
C o n gr e ss a n d i n g o i n g to a n d r e tu r n i n g fr o m t h e
same.
A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well without the need for any
transgression of criminal law.
If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal
p r o se cu t i o n , h e sh o u l d b e tr e a te d l i ke a n y o th e r
c i t i ze n c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a s t r o n g p u b l i c
in terest in seein g to i t tha t a cri me should no t go
unpunished.
ISSUES
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is
1. WON the publication is a privileged communication
inoperative.
2. (if not) WON it is libelous
Article 145 penali ze s a public offi cer or emplo yee
who shall, during the session of Congress, arrest or
HELD
sea r ch an y me mb e r the re of , excep t i n ca se su ch
1 . N O . T h e p u b l i c a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n i s n o t a b so l u te l y
m em be r h as co mm i tte d a cr i me pu ni sh ab l e un de r
privileged. It was an open letter to the President
the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
published by the defendant when the Congress was not
RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the
in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was
enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: All
Congress or as officer of any House Committee.
laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force
- T h e p h r a se s p e e ch o r d e b a t e t h e r e i n a s u se d i n
until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the
A r t i c l e V I , S e c 1 5 o f t h e 1 9 3 5 C o n s t i tu t i o n r e f e r s to
P h i l i p p i n e s ; th e r e a f t e r, s u ch l a w s s h a l l r e m a i n
utterances made by congressmen in the performance of
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
t h e i r o ff i c i a l f u n c t i o n s , s u ch a s s p e e ch e s d e l i v e r e d ,
until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress
Congress of the Philippines
while it is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Ar ti cle 1 45 wh i ch accor d s l e gi sl a tor s a ge ne r ou s
Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts
treatment exempting them from arrest even if
performed by Congressmen, either in congress or
warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with
outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge
the Constitution, and is consequently inoperative.
of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
function as such, at the time of the performance of the
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
acts in question.
CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs action for damages. Although the letter sa ys
FACTS
that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the
defendant likewise added that it was possible that

plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may

h a v e a b so l u te l y n o kn o w l e d g e . T h e s t a t e m e n t i s n o t
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them
to recover damages.

PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL

CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965
FACTS
- During the period from September 4 to October 29,
1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities.
- RAC Section 68
- provides, among others, that the President may by
executive order define the boundary of municipality,
increase or diminish its territory provided that the
authorization of the Congress of the Phil shall first be
obtained.
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void
because of R A 2370 Section 3 which provides that
barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Acts of Congress or
of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a
majority of the voters in areas affected and the
recommendation of the council of the municipality in
which the proposed barrio is situated.
- P r o c e d u r e Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing
in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs
intervened in the case.
- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma QuisumbingFernando appeared as amici curiae.

complete in itself it must set forth the policy to be

executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
- and (b) fix a standard the limits of which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
- Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented
by the President. Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of the power
the President.
R e a so n i n g
a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs.
US)
- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an
undue delegation of legislative power because it supplies
no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and
inconsistent with RAC)
- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by LAW. (take note: such control does not
include the authority either to abolish or create)
D e ci si on The Executive Orders are declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent are permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Eos or any
disbursement by the municipalities concerned.

ARNAULT V NAZARENO
OZAETA; July 18, 1950

FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the
Philippine government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Phi lippine government leased from San Juan de
Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate
and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0
ISSUES
million. This purchase option was exercised by the then
1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the
occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P
ground that Section 68 of RAC, which was the basis of
3 .0 m i l l i o n a n d , o n i t s r e j e c t i o n , d e p o si t i n g th e s a i d
the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.
funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the
2. WON the power of the President to create
accrued rentals of P 324,000.
municipalities under RAC amount to an undue delegation
- S a n Ju a n d e D i o s o n Ju n e 2 9 , 1 9 4 6 so l d t h i s sa m e
of legislative power.
property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for
P 5,000,000 wi th the initial downpa yment of P 10,000
HELD
wi th the b al an ce pa ya b le u nd er ve r y favo ra bl e ter m s.
1. Yes. RA 2370s denial of the presidential authority to
Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
power to create municipalities, each of which consists of
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from
several barrios.
Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P
2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is
1 .2 m i l l i o n w i t h a d o w n p a ym e n t o f P 1 0 ,0 0 0 . 0 0 a n d
essentially legislative in nature. There could only be a
terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de
due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a)

D i o s. T h e r e wa s h o we v e r n o o th e r p a ym e n t r e ce i v e d
from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a c q u i r e d t h i s sa m e p r o p e r t y f r o m i t s
original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and
subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for
the resolution and cancellation of his contract of
p u r ch a se w i t h P h i l i p p i n e Tru st f o r n o n p a ym e n t . Th e
Court of First Instance in this case ordered the
cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one
under the name of Rural Progress Administration.
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the
Phi l ip p in e gov er nm en t al re ad y o wn ed b o th th e ab ove
e sta te , i t a gai n b ou gh t the sa me fro m Bur t fo r a to ta l
consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for
Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The
government paid initially P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and
the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate
through two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-infact. These two we re represen ted in the tra saction b y
one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress
Admini stration was headed a t tha t time b y the Justi ce
se cr e ta r y w h o w a s a t th e sa m e t i m e C h a i r m a n o f t h e
Ph i l i p p i n e N a ti o n a l Ba n k , t h e i n s ti tu t i o n th a t l e n t th e
funds to Rural Progress.
- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led
into the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which
created a special committee to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with
determining:
a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
- During the public hearings of the Committee, various
witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the
m o st imp or tan t wa s Jea n Arn au lt, th e p er so n wh o
represented Burt in the transactions.
- During the said hearin g, Arnaul t confir med receivin g
the money from the government and withdrawing, in
cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on
instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he
gave the mone y to, he replied that he did not know his
name despite the fact that he met the person on many
occasions. W hen pressed to answer, he also said that
answering the question might incriminate him. Based on
this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May 15,
1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently
found him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals
the name of the person he gave the money to. The
Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the
Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.
- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ
of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his
release cited the following grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for

contempt since the requested information is not
material to the intended legislation and his refusal to
answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated
process. The Senate has already approved bills related
to the transactions.
b . t h e S e n a te l a c k s t h e a u th o r i t y t o co m m i t h i m i n
contempt for a term beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went
into the general principles of law with regard the power
o f e i th er ho use of Co n gre ss to pu ni sh a p er son n o t a
member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind
to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing,
the Supreme Court had to draw from American
precedents in recognition of the fact that the
Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after
largely American institutions and practices. The
discussions were as follows:
a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution
whi ch grant powe r to ei ther Hou se to investigate or
e x a c t te s t i m o n i e s to e x e r c i se l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n .
H o we v e r, t h i s p o we r o f i n qu i r y, a n d th e p r o ce ss to
enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body
to wisely and effectively perform their respective
l e gi sla tiv e fun ctio n s. In th e ab se n ce of in fo rm a tio n
that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to
ge t the sa me f ro m othe r s wh o h ave the m . At ti me s,
the information required are not entirel y accurate or
complete. Given this, Congress has the implied
coercive to obtain such information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information
required in a matter into which Congress has
jurisdiction to inquire.
ISSUES
WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD
a. The requested information is needed to compl y wi th
the direction of the sena te as conta ined in Resolu tion
Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons
respon sible for the tran saction . The mate riali ty of the
question asked in the public hearing should be
d e te r m i n e d b y i t s d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to th e m a t te r b e i n g
inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the
Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a
petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are
n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h e m a t t e r i n q u i r y. I n t h i s c a s e a n d
citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of
a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As
to whether the information sought to be elicited is
material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not
say as this is not within their scope.
- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was
jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to
answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his

co mp an y, th e Sup r em e C ou r t he ld th a t the Phi l ip p in e

- The Committees report has been submitted to the
Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so
entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were
refuses to give the information, also the power find him
passed by the Senate in connection wi th the
in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with
investi ga tion . Thi s being the ca se the re is no need to
said requirement.
e x t r a c t n a m e s . T h e i m p o r t a n ce o f n a m e s i s w h e n i t
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison
comes to a criminal prosecution.
does not end with the termination of the legislative
- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation
session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with
of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main
regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the
objection lies in the fact that the Senate has
im pr i son me n t o f L op e z te r m in a te s whe n the Ho use of
overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory
Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain
of o ther brache s of government when it impri soned a
ca s e a g a i n , t h e C o u r t sa i d th a t , u n l i k e t h e H o u s e o f
wi tne ss f or co n tum a cy o n a p oi n t tha t is un im po r tan t,
Representatives which losses all its members every four
useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot.
years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate is
deemed as a continuing body whose members are
LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a
third of the seats become vacant every two years.
SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
H e n c e , t h e p o w e r o f t h e S e n a t e t o h o l d Ar n a u l t i s a
continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court
FACTS
in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper
- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law
limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with
House Bill 1247, kno wn as Republi c Act 4790, now in
the Court.
d i sp u te . Th e b o d y o f th e s ta t u te , r e p r o d u ce d i n h a e c
c . Ar n a u l t s c l a i m t o s e lf i n c r im i n a t i o n c a n n o t b e
verba, reads:
sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court
S E C T I O N 1 . Ba r r i o s Toga i g , M a d a l u m , B a ya n g a ,
must be given the chance to determine from all the facts
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
a nd cir cu m sta n ce s whe th er th e wi tn e ss i s ju sti fi ed in
Tabangao,
Tiongko,
Colodan,
Kabamakawan,
refusing to answer any question which could incriminate
Kapata gan , Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Ba kikis,
him. Arnaults testimony was obviously false. He
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
obviously knew the name of the person he gave the
M u n i ci p a l i t i e s of B u t i g a n d Ba l a b a ga n , P r o v i n ce o f
money to. His refusal to testif y truthfully is punishable
Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
with contempt.
and constituted into a distinct and independent
De ci sio n Petition is denied
municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in
SEPARATE OPINION
Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of
TUASON [dissent]
the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local
- The power of the legislative body to punish for
officials.
contempt is based on the necessity for its attainment of
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum
precisely where disagreement occur.
j u s t m e n ti o n e d a r e w i th i n th e m u n i ci p a l i t y o f B u l d o n ,
- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being
P r o v i n ce o f C o t a b a to , a n d th a t B a ya n g a , L a n g ko n g ,
asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting
Tio n g k o , C o l o d a n , a n d K a b a m a k a w a n a r e p a r t s a n d
an answer to the question as to who received the money
p a r c e l o f a n o t h e r m u n i c i p a l i t y, t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y o f
i s s u p p o s e d l y t o v i n d i ca t e o r cl e a r t h e n a m e s o f t h e
P a r a n g , a l s o i n t h e P r o v i n c e o f C o ta b a t o a n d n o t o f
persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio
Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President
P a r a n g , C o t a b a t o , p r a ys t h a t R e p u b l i c Ac t 4 7 9 0 b e
Quirino) . The Sena te i s not the proper forum for such
declared
unconstitutional;
and
that
Comelec's
vindica tion . The Senate investigation seems to have
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
o n l y o n e o b je c ti v e a n d th i s i s t o p r e p a r e th e wa y f o r
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be
c o u r t a c t i o n s i n c e t h e y co u l d n o t e x p e c t th e J u s t i ce
nullified.
department to take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the
ISSUES
Secretar y of the Justice department had a hand in the
1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the
t r a n s a c t i o n . T h i s i s n o t th e a d u t y o f t h e L e g i s l a t i v e
constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill shall
department.
be expressed in the title NO

2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to

the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO
3 . W ON pe titioner has lega l standing to challen ge the
statute YES
HELD
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 - projects
the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did no t apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and

vote should be cast for the officials in the town before

d i sm e mb er me n t. Sin ce b y co n sti tu tio na l d ir ecti on th e
purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the
benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
t h e r e b y, 1 6 i t s t a n d s t o r e a so n t o s a y t h a t w h e n t h e
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of
that community is affected, he ma y become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by
Congress.

MILLER V MARDO
BARRERA; July 31, 1961
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they
present only one identical question
- 1 case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill st

Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself

that part of their territory is being taken away from their
Mil ler at the DoL , clai ming tha t he is a driver of Miller
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province
and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay
of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no
2 . W here a portion of a sta tu te is rendered
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A
be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But
did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original
when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re
and
connected,
as
conditions,
considerations,
violations of labor standards
- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL
i nd u ce me n ts, or co m pe n sa ti on s f or e ach o th er, a s to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
a ga in st Ch in H ua Tra di n g C o ., f or n ot be in g pa id
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the
le gi sla ture would no t pass the residue independentl y,
company
- s a m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s 1 c a s e , a n d c o u r t i s s u e d st
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
p r o v i si o n s w h i ch a r e th u s d e p e n d e n t , co n d i ti o n a l , o r
permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the
Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.
connected, must fall with them. W hen the foregoing bill
RD
was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality
- 3 case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint
of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios - was in the
against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid,
mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly
not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation
evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted
leave pay, as a seamstress
i n to l a w, sta te s th a t th e se a t of th e go v e r n m e n t i s i n
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI
Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
does not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4 case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at th
to compel respondent public officials to
question s, thus: Could the observa tions as to
p r o g r e s si v e c o m m u n i t y, l a r ge a g g r e g a t e p o p u l a t i o n ,
the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision
collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
wa s rendered in favor of Rome ro. Bu t Labor
muni cipal ity, still apply to a mo tel y group of onl y nine
Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of
barrios out of the twenty-one?
execu tion of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng
3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in
deserved to be heard
t h e 1 9 6 7 e l e ct i o n s H i s r i gh t to vo te i n h i s o wn b a r r i o
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly
before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may
passed as a statute and unconstitutional
- 5 case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint th
th e pe ti tio n con cer n s a pu bl i c ri gh t an d i ts
not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different
from his actual residence. He ma y not desire to be
against Fred W ilson and Co., as he was summarily
considered a part of hitherto different communities
d i sm i ssed wi h ou t ca u se , wi th ou t se pa ra ti on p a y, an d
whi ch are formed into the ne w to wn; he ma y prefer to
without sufficient notice.
remain in the place where he is and as it was
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
body, with no power to adjudicate money claims
benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well
cand idate s of the ne w to wn; he ma y express a lack of
that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest
desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his
original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims

ISSUES
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and
submitted under the authority of RA 997 as amended by
RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on
clai ms of laborers for wa ge s, overtime and separa tion
pay, etc.
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by
Congress
HELD
1. No it is not valid.
- W hi l e t h e R e o r g a n i za t i o n C o m m i ss i o n co u l d cr e a te
function s, it referred merel y to administra tive and not
ju d i c i a l f u n ct i o n s su ch a s d e ci d i n g o n m o n e y cl a i m s.
Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary
- W hi l e l e gi sl a tu r e m a y co n f e r a d m i n i st r a t i v e b o a r d s
quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise
of administrative dunctions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be
implied from a mere grant of power to create functions
in connection with reorganization of the Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of
Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997
It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood
parliamentary law- that two houses are to hold separate
sessions for their deliberations and the determination of
the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other.

TANADA V TUVERA
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985

FACTS
- Petition to review the decision of the Executive
Assistant to the President.
- Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of th e 1 97 3 con sti tu ti on , pe ti tio ne r s see k a wr i t of
mandamus
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of
instruction s, gene ral orders, pro clama tion s, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality
to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the
su b je ct of
object is to compel public duty, they need not show any
specific interest. Respondents further contend that
publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement
f o r th e e ffe c ti v i t y of l a ws wh e r e th e l a w s t h e m se lv e s
provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE

W ON publication in the Official Gazette is an

indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs,
LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates
HELD
Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of
public concern & corollarily access to official records, &
to documents & papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens
su b j e c t to su ch l i m i t a t i o n a s m a y b e p r o v i d e d b y l a w
(Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid &
enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states
its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication
in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially informed of its contents.
D e ci si on R e sp o n d e n t s o r d e r e d to p u b l i sh i n O ffi c i a l
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general
application, and unless so published shall have no
binding force and effect.
I m p o r t a n t P o i n t It illustrates how decrees & issuances
issued by one man Marcos are in fact laws of
general application and provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative
powers.
- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o
constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that
publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice
& is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.
- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

TANADA V TUVERA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
FACTS
- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
a ffi r m e d th e n e ce ssi t y f o r th e p u b l i ca t i o n o f so m e o f
th e se d ecre e s, d ecl ar i n g i n the d i sp o si ti ve p or tio n as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
p r e s i d e n t i a l i ssu a n ce s w h i ch a r e o f ge n e r a l
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect."
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the
first decision, specifically, on the following questions:
ISSUES
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?
HELD
1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
s o me t h a t d o n o t ap pl y t o t h em di re c t l y. W e h ol d
therefore that all statutes, including those of local
a p p l i ca ti o n a n d p r i v a te l a w s, sh a l l b e p u b l i sh e d a s a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
b y the Pre sid en t in th e exe rci se of le gi sl a tive p o we r s
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
l e g i s l a t u r e o r, a t p r e s e n t , d i r e c t l y c o n f e r r e d b y t h e
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of
t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c r e e , t h e t i t l e o f su c h d e c r e e , i t s
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
o f t h e Offi ci a l Ga ze tt e ca n n o t sa ti sf y th e p u b l i ca ti o n
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. 33
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided by
the legislature.
5. W e a l s o h o l d t h a t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n m u s t b e m a d e
forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect
to the la w pursuant to the said Ar ti cle 2. There is tha t
p o s si b i l i t y, o f co u r se , a l th o u g h n o t su g ge st e d b y th e
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusa l of the execu tive, for wha tever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TINGA; February 24, 2004
FACTS
- LDP together with other political parties formed a
coalition called Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)

33

This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY

1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest,

was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

- KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for

the President of the Phils in the May 2004 elections
- LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination
of candidates for the upcoming elections
- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the
COMELEC
a ) th a t o n l y t h e P a r t y C h a i r m a n , S e n a t o r E d g a r d o
Angara or his authorized representative may endorse
the certificate of candidacy of the partys official
candidates
b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General,
Representative Agapito Aquino, on indefinite forced
l e a v e a n d Am b a s s a d o r E n r i q u e Z a l d i v a r w a s t h e
Acting Sec-Gen
- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does
not have authority to impose disciplinar y sanctions on
the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the
Manifestation
- p en di n g r eso lu ti on , a C er ti fi ca te of No m in a tio n wa s
filed with COMELEC, naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDPs
Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed
by Rep. Aquino
- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal
party matter and that the period for filing for the
Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the
petition for both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor
(Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates
nominated by both parties as the official candidates of
the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the
Angara Wing and the Aquino Wing
- Angara filed the present petition assailing the
COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion
ISSUE
W ON C OM ELEC gravel y abused its discretion when i t
applied equity and divided LDP into wings
HELD
YES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue
to be resolved by the Commission was who as between
the Chairman and the Secretary General had the
a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s o f c a n d i d a c y. To
resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the
Party Constitution. Equity is applied only if there
absence of law that can be applied to resolve the issue
which is not the case here.
- as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC
has the authority to ascertain the identity of the
political
parties
and
its
legitimate
officers;
consequently it has the power to settle any
con troversy re gardin g leader ship of the par ty as an
incident to its power to register political parties. This
matter is important in determining as to who between
Aquino and Angara had the authority to certify LDPs
candidates
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the
C h a i r m a n wh o h a s th e p o we r to s i g n d o cu m e n ts i n

behalf of the party; the Sec- Gen has po wer to si gn

according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of
documents only when authori zed by the Chairman.
has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and
a c cr e d i te d p o l i ti ca l p a r ti e s a n d a l l ca n d i d a t e s o f th e
That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as
VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the
proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec
found by the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it
authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional
52 of the Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions
does not follow that said authority is still existing since
authority
t h a t C OM EL EC m u st co m p l y wi t h b e f o r e u n d e r ta k i n g
i t c a n b e g a t h e r e d i n An g a r a s M a n i f e s t a t i o n t h a t
- Aside from Drilons apprehension, there were budget
technology for electoral purposes: take into account the
Aquinos authority had been revoked, which the
problems for implementation because the money
situation prevailing and the funds available, and notify
Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his
allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1
au thori zed represen tatives. These condi tion s give the
authority to grant such power
and 2. COMELEC, however, still conducted a field test of
affected people an opportunity to object if need be.
- Ho wever, the lack of au thority of Aquino to certif y
the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on
Details on p 302-303.
candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed.
04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for
The candidates named will only be treated as
on p. 277. Read just in case.)
COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial
independent
candidates
following
COMELEC
- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local
ta bu la ti on of re su l ts. It a l so d oe sn t ma ke se n se th a t
Resolution No. 6453, section 7
elections, approved R ES OL U T I ON 6 7 1 2 st a t i n g th e
Phase 3 of the program should go on when the first two
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate
implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of
phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a
their o wn candida te s, confused the electorate as to
each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted
wh ol e a nd no t i nd ep en de n t of e ach o th er. In the fi rst
which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies
in a dva nce to C OM EL EC , M an il a . T he y esta bl i she d a
place, there is a great possibility that the unofficial
that the LDP represents
National
Consolidation
Center
(NCC),
Electronic
results will differ greatly from the official count so what
- T he co n sti tu tio na l p ol i cy to wa rd s a fr ee a nd op en
Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality
is the use of spending all that money for something
p a r t y s ys te m e nv i s i o n s a s yst e m t h a t sh a l l e v o l v e
and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters.
u n c e r t a i n , so m e th i n g t h a t t h e N AM F R E L h a d a l w a ys
a cco rd i n g to th e fr ee cho i ce of th e p eo pl e a nd n ot
(procedure p. 278). Note that the results garnered in the
undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government
one molded by the COMELEC
procedure are of unofficial character.
funds and effort.
- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
- C OM EL EC u se s t h e p r o b l e m o f d a gd a g- b a w a s a s a
brought their misgivings to SC.
reason for the resolution. Accdg to them, modernization
BRILLANTES V COMELEC
of the ele ction wi ll decrease the possibili ty of da gdag
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004
ISSUES
bawas but it doesnt make sense because dagdag-bawas
FACTS
1. WON petitioners have locus standi
is a result of human intervention. No matter how modern
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
the technology for electoral purposes is, there will
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA
always be the need for human intervention so the
the proce ss of votin g, counting of vote s and
6712
problem will not be eradicated.
canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local
De ci sio n PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is
elections for May 11 98. Also allowed the acquisition of
HELD
NULL AND VOID.
automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices
1 . P e t i t i o n e r s cl a i m th e i r s t a n d i n g a s t a x p a ye r s a n d
t o a d o p t n e w e l e c to r a l f o r m s a n d p r i n t i n g m a te r i a l s .
since the Resolution obviously involves the expenditure
H o w e v e r, t h e f a i l u r e o f th e m a c h i n e s t o r e a d b a l l o t s
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question
c o r r e c t l y d e f e r r e d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f m o d e r n i za t i o n
i ts validi ty. Mo st of the peti tioner s-in- inte rven tion are
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975
plan.
also part of NAMFREL, the citi zens authori zed arm to
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a
conduct an unofficial quick count during elections.
FACTS
three-phase modernization program for the 2004
Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress, the
- S e p te m b e r, 1 9 6 4 th e P u b l i c Se r v i ce C o m m i ssi o n
elections.
sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.
assessed
several
public
utilities
for
supposed
o Phase 1 computerized registration and validation
2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results
supervision and regulation fees for that year
E n c o u n te r e d p r o b l e m s i n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n b e c a u s e
b a se d o n a co p y o f t h e e l e c ti o n r e tu r n s th e so l e a n d
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company machine was reverting to old listing of voters
ex cl u si v e a u th o r i t y o f C o n gr e ss to ca n v a s s vo te s f o r
P727,526.00;
Bolinao
Electronics
Corporation
o Phase 2 computerized voting and counting
P r e s i d e n t a n d V P. C O M E L E C s c l a i m t h a t i t i s n o t
P11,61 0 .40 ; Ph i l ip pi ne Stea rn Nav i ga tio n Co mp an y Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual
prohibi ted because i t i s an unofficial vote is
P23 .92 1 .60 ; a nd Ge ne ra l Shi pp i n g Co mp an y v o t i n g a n d co u n t i n g s ys t e m d u e t o t h e p r o b l e m s
unacceptable.
P33,146.80
encountered with validation
- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision
- T he a ss es se d fe es w e re ba se d u p o n th e va lu e of
o P h a s e 3 E l e c t r o n i c t r a n s m i s s i o n o f u n o f f i c i a l that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in th e res p ec t ive p ro pe rt ies o r eq u ip me nt pursuant to
results (which is challenged in this case)
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art
Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by
- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through
VI). Because the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial
Republic Act 3792
its commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3
in character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said
- GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to
fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under
corporations sent Separate letters to the Commission,
fund the AES for the May 10 04 elections. Also issued
the Penal Code (malversation of public funds/property).
(except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which
EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting
filed a formal petition instead) requesting for
project.
o f vo te s is do ne b y N AM F R EL b y usi n g a cop y o f th e
rec ons ide rat ion of the assessme nts their ground:
- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the
election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use
u n d e r t h e s a i d S e c t i o n 4 0 ( e ) , s u c h a s s e s s me n t s
p r o p o se d e l e ct r o n i c tr a n sm i ss i o n o f r e su l t s b e ca u se
a copy of election returns for counting.
shou ld be based not on the va lue of the pro perties

but upon the subscribed and paid up capital

stocks of the corporations .
- 28 September 1966Public Service Commission denied
request for reconsideration. Their reason:
o the clau se " o r o f t h e p r o p e r t y a n d e q u i p m e n t ,
w h i c h e v e r i s h i g h e r " in section 40(e) of the Public
Service Act as an alternative base for supervision
fees collectible, applies to both stock and non-stock
corporations.
o to use the value of proper ty and equip ment as an
alternative base for fixing the rates only in case of
publi c service s not issu ing share s wo uld resul t in
unreasonable discrimination against the latter
o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or
paid" and another after the words "Capital
invested," immed iate l y precedin g the clau se
" p r o p e r t y a n d e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h e v e r i s h i g h e r ,"
indicates the intention of the legislature to
constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock
and non-stock corp.
ISSUES
1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public
u t i l i t i e s i s su i n g s h a r e s a n d t h o se t h a t d o n o t a s th e
capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares
have been issued. Thus, the value of their property or
equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for
this class of operators
2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation
should have bearing
3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total
amount to be collected as supervisory fees

De ci sio n
judgment MODIED in the sense that the
supervision fees payable under Republic Act No. 3792
should be computed upon present values of properly and
equipment in use; the appealed resolution of the Public
Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT

DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT
AUTHORITY
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5 , 1 99 2 APC D br ou gh t sui t to en jo in PC A fr om
i ssui n g pe rm i ts to a pp li can ts for th e esta bl i shm en t of
new desi cca ted co conut processing plan ts issuance
would violate PCAs Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991
as applicants were seeking to operate in congested
areas
- N o v.6 t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d T R O e n j o i n i n g P C A f r o m
ussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the
PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing
industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring
of their volumes of production and admin of quality
standards
- PCA then issued cer tifi cate s of regi stration to those
wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants

HELD

ISSUE
- W he th e r o r n o t th e P C A ca n r e n o u n ce th e p o we r to
regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the
resolution in question actually is.

1 . NO. No sho wi ng of diffi cul ty in ascer tainin g actua l

cap i ta l inv estm en t of pu bl i c ser vi ce op er a to r s tha t do
n o t i s su e s t o c k s . T h e se co m p a n i e s a r e r e q u i r e d to
submit annual reports of finances and operations
2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of
statutory construction
- the punctuation of the provision in question has
undergone no alteration at all
- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed
to r ei nf or ce i ts m ai n ar gu me n t th a t n oth in g in th e la w
justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the
property or equipment (as alternative rate base) solely
to operators not issuing shares of capital stock.
3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are
t h e r e i n f i x e d w e r e d e s i g n e d t o r a i se r e v e n u e f o r th e
general expenses of the Commission, and were not
limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in
supervision.
- we a r e i n a cco r d wi th p e ti ti o n e r o p e r a to r s th a t th e
Commission was in error in collecting the fees in
question on die basis of the original cost of their
property and equipment without due allowance for
depreciation.

HELD
- The power given to the PCA to formulate and adopt a
general program of devt for the coconut and other
palms oil industry is not a roving commission to adopt
any program deemed necessary to promote the devt of
the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be
exercised in the context of the regulatory structure.
R e a so n i n g
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973
to ta ke ove r th e p o we r s a nd fu ncti on s of th e C ocon u t
Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil.
Coco Research Institute
- B y PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an
independent public corp...charged with carrying out
States policy to promote the rapid integrated devt and
gr o wth of th e co co a nd o th e r pa lm oi l in du str y a nd to
ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants
and beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by
law
- Au g.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporari l y prohib ited
the opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec.6
phased out some of the existing ones--- because of

overproduction in the industr y resul tin g, ul tima tel y, in

th e d e c l i n e o f th e e xp o r t p e r f o r m a n ce of co co - b a se d
products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87
authori zin g establ ishmen t and opera tion of additiona l
DCN plants because of increased demand in world
market
- The above measures were adopted within the
framework of regulation as established by law to
promote rapid integrated devt and growth of coco and
other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco
farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate
opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of the
regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the PCA is
to formulate and adopt a general program of devt for
the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring
v o l u m e s o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d a d m i n . Of q u a l i t y
standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and
l eav es i t al mo st co m pl e tel y to ma r ke t for ce s ho w
the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o S e c .6 . .. d u t y o f th e S ta te t o p r o m o t e d i s tr i b u ti v e
justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when public interest so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the
legislative dept of the govt. The regulatory system
has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an
administrative agency to dismantle it.
De ci sio n Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID

SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO [dissent]
- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid
exercise of delegated legislation. Such resolution is in
h ar mo n y wi th th e ob je cti ve s so u gh to b e a ch i ev ed b y
t h e l a w s r e ga r d i n g th e co co i n d u s tr y, p a r ti cu l a r l y to
promote accelerated growth and devt of the coco
industr y and the rapid integrated devt and growth of
the coconut industry
- The time has come for admin policies and regulations
to adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to
accommodate traditional acts of the legislature
- Trimming do wn an admin a gencys functions of
registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate
but is regulation itself

SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998

FACTS
- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines
con ve ne d f or the fi rst re gu la r se ssi on of th e e lev en th
Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were
held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated
to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate. The following
we r e li ke wi se e le cted : Sen a to r Op le a s p re sid en t pr o
tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the
position of minority leader, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
onl y those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body
th a t h e wa s in r ece ip t of a l e tter si gn ed b y th e se ve n
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had
e l e cte d Se n a t o r Gu i n g o n a a s th e m i n o r i t y l e a d e r. B y
virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
- O n J u l y 3 1 , 1 9 9 8 , S e n a t o r s S a n t i a g o a n d Tat a d
instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek
the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the
S e n a t e a n d t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f S e n a t o r Tat a d a s t h e
ri gh tful minori ty leader. The y alle ge tha t Senator
G u i n g o n a h a d b e e n u su r p i n g , u n l a w f u l l y h o l d i n g a n d
e x e r c i s i n g t h e p o s i t i o n o f S e n a t e m i n o r i t y l e a d e r, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.

or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever

r e sp o n d e n t . In th i s c a se , p e t i t i o n e r s d i d n o t p r e se n t
t h e t r i b u n a l " f i n d s co n s t i tu t i o n a l l y i m p o s e d l i m i t s o n
suffi cient proof of a clear and indubi table franch ise to
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or
the office of the Senate minority leader.
previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse
i n d e f i n i n g t h e s c o p e o f j u d i c i a l p o w e r. T h e p r e s e n t
of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
minority leader.
d e te r m i n e i n a n a p p r o p r i a te a c ti o n th e v a l i d i t y o f th e
- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
acts of the p ol i ti ca l d ep ar tme n ts. It spe a ks of ju d i ci a l
o r wh im si cal exe rci se of jud gm e n t a s i s e qu i va le n t to
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
duty or a vir tual refusal to perform a duty enjoined b y
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
by reason of passion and hostility.
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
Government."
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona
2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
as the minority leader.T he latter belongs to one of the
- W hile the Constitution mandates that the President of
minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.
the Se na te m ust be e le cted b y a nu mb er co n sti tu ti n g
By unanimou s reso lution of the members of th is par ty
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does
tha t he be the mi no ri t y le ad er, h e wa s r eco gn i ze d as
not provide that the members who will not vote for him
such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition
sh a l l i p so f a c t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e " m i n o r i t y " , w h o c o u l d
by Respondent Fernan came only af ter at least two
t h e r e b y e l e c t t h e m i n o r i t y l e a d e r . Ver i l y, n o l a w o r
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
automatically become the minority leader.
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
- W hil e th e Co n sti tu ti on is expl i ci t o n th e ma nn er of
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
exercise of ju dgment" or of "an arbitrar y and despo ti c
h o w e v e r, d e a d s i l e n t o n th e m a n n e r o f se l e c t i n g t h e
m a n n e r b y r e a so n o f p a s s i o n o r h o s t i l i t y." W h e r e n o
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
o ff i ce r s a s i t m a y d e e m n e ce s s a r y." T h e m e th o d o f
v i o l a t e d , d i s r e g a r d e d o r o v e r l o o ke d , g r a v e a b u se o f
ISSUES
c h o o s i n g w h o w i l l b e s u ch o t h e r o ff i c e r s i s m e r e l y a
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
done within their competence and authority.
2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
3. W ON Guingona is usurping, unlawfull y holding and
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE
exercising the position of Senate minority leader
Court.
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
COALITION V LIM
recognizing Guingona as the minority leader
provide for such officers as it ma y deem. And it is
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003
ce r ta i n l y w i th i n i t s o w n ju r i sd i c ti o n a n d d i scr e ti o n to
HELD
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
FACTS
1 . Yes, the cou r t ha s ju ri sd i ctio n . It i s we l l wi th in th e
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
- P e t i t i o n e r s : John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition,
po wer and juri sdi ction of the Court to in quire whe ther
u n i l a t e r a l l y i n t r u d e i n to th a t ex cl u si v e r e a l m , w i t h o u t
Ma teo C ar i no F ou nd a tio n In c., C en te r fo r Al te rn a tive
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound
Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin
t h e C o n s t i tu t i o n o r g r a v e l y a b u se t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n i n
to pro tect and uphold - the very duty tha t justif ies the
r e p r e se n te d a n d jo i n e d b y h e r m o th e r E l i sa Be n a f i n ,
exercise of their functions and prerogatives
C ou r t's b ei n g. Co nsti tu ti on al re sp e ct a nd a be co m in g
Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother
- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe represented and joined by
the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection
prevents this Court from prying into the internal
her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia Pacalso
o f t h e S e n a t e m i n o r i t y l e a d e r. T h e y a l s o i n v o k e t h e
workings of the Senate.
alias Kevab, Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez
Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping,
alias Ba-ya y, Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina,
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
minority leader.
- R e s p o n d e n t s : Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion
of respondents.
- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
and Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point
- Avel ino v. Cuenco ta ckled the scope of the Cour t's
assumption and exercise of power by one without color
D e v e l o p m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n , C i t y o f Ba g u i o , T U N T E X ,
power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo
ASIAWORLD, DENR
interpretation or application of a provision of the
warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing
- Pe ti ti o n f o r p r o h i b i ti o n , m a n d a m u s a n d d e cl a r a to r y
C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e l a w, i n c l u d i n g t h e r u l e s o f e i th e r
must show that he or she has a clear right to the
relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of
of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative
office allegedl y usurped or unlawfull y held by the
P r e s i d e n t i a l P r o c l a ma t i o n N o . 4 2 0 , Series of 1994,

Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered

by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special
Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227
- R A 7 2 2 7 : An Ac t Ac c e l e r a t i n g t h e C o n v e r s i o n o f
Military Reservations into other Productive Uses,
Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and
for Other Purposes OR B a s e s C o n v e r s i o n a n d
D e ve lo p me n t Ac t o f 19 92
> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of former
military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States
of Ameri ca Mili tar y Ba ses Agreement, namel y Cla rk
a nd Sub i c m i li ta r y r eser va tio n s i ncl ud in g ex te n si on
Camp John Hay Station in Baguio
> created Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free
port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)
> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses from local and
national taxes
> ga ve au tho r i ty to the Pre sid en t to cre a te th ro u gh
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of
t h e l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t u n i t s d i r e c t l y a ff e c t e d , o th e r
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga),
Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay
(Baguio)
- A u g 1 6 , 1 9 9 3 BCDA entered M o A a n d E s c r o w
Ag re e me nt wi t h T U N T EX a n d AS I AW OR L D , p r i v a te
c o r p o r a t i o n s u n d e r l a w s o f B r i t i sh Vi r g i n I s l a n d s , i n
p re pa ri n g for a jo i n t ven tur e fo r dev el op me n t of Po ro
Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier
tourist destinations and recreation centers
- D e c 1 6 , 1 9 9 3 BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
executed a J o i n t Ven t u re Ag r e e me n t (JVA) binding
t h e m se lv e s to p u t u p a j o i n t v e n tu r e co m p a n y ca l l e d
Baguio
Inte rnat io nal
D e ve lo p me n t
and
M a n a g e me n t C o rp o ra t io n leasing areas within Camp
John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and recreation
S a n g g u a n i a n g P a n g l u n g s o d of Baguio Citys
Resolutions to BCDA
> S e p t 2 9 , 1 9 9 3 to exclude all the barangays partly
a n d to ta l l y l o ca te d wi th i n C a m p Jo h n H a y f r o m th e
reach and coverage of any plan or program for
development
> Jan 19, 1994 abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its
ownership over homelots being occupied by residents
of 9 barangays surrounding CJH
> F e b 2 1 , 1 9 9 4 15-point concept of the
development of CJH which includes protection of the
environment, making of a family-oriented tourist
destination, priority in emplo yment of Baguio
residents, free access to base area, guaranteed
p a r ti c i p a t i o n o f t h e c i t y go v e r n m e n t i n th e
management and operation of the camp, exclusion of
t h e p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d 9 b g ys , l i a b i l i t y f o r l o ca l
taxes of businesses
BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response

> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare

1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and
CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full development
illegal a s i t i s a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x e r c i s e b y t h e
according to RA 7227
President of a power granted only to the Legislature
- M a y 11, 1 9 9 4 sanggunian passed resolution asking
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with
mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may
the au tonom y of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal
be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH
and unconstitutional
real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the
from local and national taxes
rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable
- J u n e 1 9 9 4 sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255
4 . M o A h a v i n g b e e n e n t e r e d i n t o o n l y b y direct
(Series of 1994) seeking and supporting sub ject to its
negotiation is illegal
concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential
5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal
p r o c l a m a t i o n d e cl a r i n g a r e a o f 2 8 8 .1 h e c ta r e s of th e
6 . the con ceptual developmen t plan of respondents
camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227
n o t h a v i n g u n d e r g o n e e n v i r o n m e n ta l i m p a c t
- Ju l y 5 , 1 99 4 Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing
assessment i s b e i n g i l l e g a l l y co n s i d e r e d w i t h o u t a
a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads
valid environmental impact assessment
Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the
- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to
resolution of concurrence by the City Council of
enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government from
Ba guio crea te and desi gna te former Camp John
implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and
Hay as John Hay Special Economic Zone
ASIAW ORLD from pro ceeding wi th the ir plan
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out
respecting CJHs development pursuant to the JVA
of 677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENR
P ub li c res pon dents (BC D A, JH PP DC, Ci t y of
Se c 2. Governing Bod y: p u r s u a n t t o S e c 1 5 o f R A
Baguio) Allege
7227, the Bases Conversion and Development
1. issues are moot and academic because in
Autho rity ( BCD A) is estab lished to govern JHSEZ ,
November 21, 1995 BCDA formall y notified TUNT EX
authorized to determine utilization and disposition of
and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA
lands subject to private rights and in consultation and
2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420,
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after
extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives to those
consultation with its inhabitants , a n d to p r o m u l ga te
enjo yed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the
necessar y policies, rules, and regulations to govern
proclamation merely implements the legislative intent
and re gulate the zone thru the John Ha y Poro Point
of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing
business activity or investment
arm for its economic development and optimum
3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local
utilization
a u to n o m y of Ba gu i o C i t y o r v i o l a t i v e o f t h e e q u a l
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec
protection clause
5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point
4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as
Development Corporation shall implement necessary
taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy
po li ci e s, r ul es an d r e gul a tio n s go ve rn in g th e zo n e ,
5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of
including investment incentives, in consu lta tion wi th
exhaustion of administrative remedies
p er tin en t gov er nm en t de pa r tm en ts. The zo n e sh a ll
- Petitioners Reply
h ave al l the ap pl i ca bl e i ncen ti ve s of the SEZ u nd er
1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
Se c 1 2 of R A 7 2 2 7 and those applicable incentives
does not apply since they are invoking the exclusive
granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus
authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin
Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act
or restrain implementation of projects for conversion
of 1991, and new investment laws t ha t wi l l be
of the base areas
enacted.
2.
they possess standing to bring petition as
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices,
taxpayers
Agencies and Instrumentalities:
Al l h ea ds of
d ep ar tme n ts, etc of th e go ve rn me n t a re directed to
ISSUES
give full support to B C D A a n d /o r i m p l e m e n ti n g
Procedural
subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary
1 . W ON petitioners viola ted doctrine of exhaustion of
approvals to expedite programs.
administrative remedies
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government
2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is
units shall retain basic autonomy and identity.
moot and academic
- A p r i l 2 5 , 1 9 9 5 petition for prohibition, mandamus
3. WON present petition complies with the requirements
and declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420s
of SCs exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues
constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA
Substantive
and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
- P e t i t i o n e r s Al l e g e :

4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for

n a ti o n a l a n d l o ca l ta x ex e m p t i o n wi t h i n a n d gr a n t i n g
other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
5 . W ON Proc. No . 420 is con stitu tiona l for limi tin g or
interfering with local autonomy of Baguio City
HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining
declarator y relief or direct resort to it except when the
redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts,
or when exceptional and compelling circumstances
warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of SCs primary jurisdiction, u n d e r S e c 2 1 o f
RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin
imp le menta tion of pro jects for the de ve lo pment of
the former US milita ry rese rva tions therefore SC will
take cognizance of this petition.
R e a so n i n g
- Al so S C r e ta in s f u ll d i scr e tio n a r y p o we r t o ta ke
co gn i zan ce of su ch petition. Beside s, remandin g this
case to the lower courts may unduly prolong
adjudication of the issues
- transforma tion of an area in CJH in to a SEZ is not a
simple re- classifi cation of an area TF a crucial issue.
Conversion involves
> focal point for investments by local and foreign
entities
> site for vigorous business activity spurring countrys
economic growth
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center
> critical links to a host of environmental and social
con cerns affectin g co mmuni tie s are loca ted and
nation in general
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable,
environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in
CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of
scarcity of water supply in Baguio City
2 . Revocation of the agree ments wi th private
respondents made issues regarding them as moot and
academic.
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for
judicial review.
R e a so n i n g
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and
concrete; parties pitted against each other due to
their adverse legal interests
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests
and rights between petitioners and respondents
arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting
a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist
Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and
the respondents claiming otherwise
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment
of the questioned law or the approval of the
ch a l l e n g e d a c t, th e d i sp u te i s d e e m e d to h av e

ripened into a judi cial controversy even wi thou t

an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken
judicial duty
2 . pe rs on a l a n d su b st a nt ia l in t e re s t of th e pa rt y
raising the constitutional question
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected
lo cal gove rn me n t u ni ts to th e cre a tio n of SEZ s
and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to
concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal
standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of
communities in the utilization of such base areas)
> as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No.
420, is personal and substantial tha t th e y h ave
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the go ve rn me n t a ct b ei n g cha l le n ged ; material
interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of
Pr o c. N o . 4 2 0 i s th e v e r y e co n o m i c a n d so ci a l
existence of the people of Baguio City
> Ga r ci a v B o a r d o f In v e st m e n t s : r esi de n ts of
L i m a y, B a t a a n w h e r e S C c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e i r
interest in the establishment of a petrochemical
plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal
for it would affect not only their economic life but
even the air they breathe
> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon
were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the
time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents on the question of concurrence
to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which
supported Proc. No. 420
3. p leade d in the earliest opp ortun it y
4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case
- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to
bring forth constitutionality issues
4 . Unless lim ited by a provision in the Con stitu tion , if
there is no express extension of tax exemption and
other economic incentives granted by law, any
presidential proclamation granting such extension
through implication is unconstitutional because it
violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature, not
the execu tive, the full po wer to exemp t any person or
co rp o ra ti on o r cla ss o f p ro pe r ty f ro m ta xa tio n an d i ts
power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
R e a so n i n g
- Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress.
- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ:
the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the
SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable
incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the
Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991 and ne w investment laws that
may be hereinafter enacted
> Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ

(b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties,

national and local taxes of business entities
(d) free market and trade of specified goods or
properties
(f) liberalized banking and finance
(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
- deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic
SEZ of the tax and investment privileges
(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)
Angara: we must confine these policies to Subic
and provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
OF
SUBIC
SHALL
BE
ESTABLISHED
IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES
it is very clear that these principles and policies
are applicable only to Subic as a free port
so we agreed that we will simply limit the
definition of pweors and description of the zone to
Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of
creating other economic zones within the
baselands
the provision now will be confined only to Subic
> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
- privilege of export processing zone-based
businesses of importing capital equipment and raw
materials free from taxes, duties and other
restrictions
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holida y, tax credit,
and other incentives
> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing
foreign investments in the Philippines
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption,
investment incentives and the like and no express
extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to
be cre a te d a t the tim e vi a pr esi de n tia l p ro cl a ma ti on ;
also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the
other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. No. 420 which are
already extant before the issuance of the proclamation
or the enactment of RA 7227
- SC can void an act or policy of the political
departments of the govt on two grounds infringement
of the Consti tution or gr ave abuse of discretion and
clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution
5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or
r e i te r a te s th e s ta t u to r y r o l e o r f u n c ti o n s i s h a s b e e n
granted.
R e a so n i n g
- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military
reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station,
O Do nn el l Tran smi tte r Sta tio n wh i ch ma y be
transferred to it by the President
- su c h b r o a d r i g h t s o f o w n e r sh i p a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over
it subject to certain limitations of law

D e ci si on Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and

declared no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420,
without the invalidated portion, remains valid and
effective

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS
- June 16, 2000 N T C , p u r s u a n t t o it s r u l e - m a k i n g
a n d r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r s , issued M e mo r a n d u m
C irc ular (M C) No . 13-6-2000 . It promulgated rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications
services:
1. Billing statements shall be received by the service
subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end
of each billing cycle. In case it is received beyond 30
days, SS shall have a grace period within which to
p a y th e b i l l . D u r i n g su ch p e r i o d , S S sh a l l n o t b e
disconnected
from
service
by
the
public
telecommunications entity (PTE).
2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted
to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message
or similar facility excluding the customer s own
equipment.
3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each
purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards
and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from
the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards
shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully
consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of
first use to replenish SIM card. The validi ty of an
invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of
the SS at no addtl charge except the presentation of
a valid prepaid call card.
4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their
cards before the start of every call using the cards.
5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone)
CMT service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be
reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The
authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10.
- T he MC pr ovi de d th a t i t sh al l t a k e e f f e c t 1 5 d a y s
after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP
Law Center.
- June 22 , 2000 MC wa s publi shed in the Philipp ine
Star; MC provisions regarding sale and use of prepaid
cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity
of MC
- August 30, 2000 NTC issued a Me mo ran d u m to a ll
CMT service operators (SO) which contained
meas ures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell
phone units . It directed CMT SO to:
1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation

and verification o f t h e i d e n t i t y a n d a d d r e s s e s o f
prepaid SIM card customers
2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to
comply with MC
3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers
u sin g stol en ce l l ph on e un i ts o r ce l l p h o n e u n i ts
registered to somebody else when properly
informed of all information relative to the stolen cell
phone units
4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to
all other CMT SO in order to prevent their use
5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to

HELD
O b i t e r Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative
or
rule-making
powers
and
quasi-judicial
or
administrative adjudicatory powers.

Qu as i- le g is la t i ve p ow e r i s t h e p o w e r t o m a k e
r ul e s an d re gu la ti on s, wh i ch sho u ld b e wi th in th e
scope of the statutory authority granted by the
l e g i s l a t u r e t o s u c h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c y. T h e
regulations must be germane to the purposes of the

la w, an d no t i n co n tr ad i c t i on t o t h e s t an da rd s
prescribed by law.
register and present valid identification cards.
- October 6, 2000
NTC issued anothe r
Quasi-judicial power i s ex e r c i se d b y a n
Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, which was
administrative agency when it performs in a judicial
fo r s t ri c t c om p l i a n c e .
manner an act which is essentially of an executive
1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by
nature, where the power to act in such a manner is
sub scr ibers of prepaid card s sold on Oct. 7, 2000
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from
performance of the administrative duty entrusted to
date of first use.
it.
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective
October 7, 2000.
1. Yes.
- P r o ce d u r e
Ratio
In cases assailing the validity of a rule or
O c t o b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 I S L A C O M a n d P I LT E L f i l e d r e gu l a t i o n i s su e d b y a n a d m i n i st r a t i v e a ge n c y i n th e
against the NTC an action for Declaration of
performance of its QUASI- LEGISL ATIVE function , the
Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the
regular courts have jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL
O c t . 6 M e m o r a n d u m , with prayer for injunction and
REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. The
TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds thatDoctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when
a . NT C h as no ju r i sd i ctio n to r e gu l a te th e sal e of
the administrative agency is exercising its QUASIconsumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to
JUDICIAL function.
the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils
- Ar t . V I I I S e c . 1 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i : Judicial power includes
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process
the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or
Clause (deprivation of property)
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the
c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of
part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt.
prepaid service by undul y prolonging the
- Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not
expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards
determ ine a controversy involving a que stion wh ich is
d . R e q u i r e m e n ts of i d e n ti f i ca ti o n of p r e p a i d ca r d
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
buyers and call balance announcement are
to the resolution of that question by the administrative
unreasonable
tri bu na l , whe r e the qu e stio n d em an ds th e exe r ci se of
so u n d a d m i n i st r a t i v e d i scr e ti o n r e qu i r i n g th e sp e ci a l
G L O B E a n d S M A R T f i l e d a j o i n t M o t i o n t o Ad m i t
knowledge, experience and services of the admin.
Complaint-in-Intervention
tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.
October 27, 2000 RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC 2. No.
f rom implement ing MC
Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a
Nov em be r 2 0, 20 00 RT C de ni ed NT C s m o ti on to
rule issued by an administrative agency, in exercise of
dismiss for lack of merit. Injunction is granted, pending
its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust
finality of the decision of the case.
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s b e f o r e g o i n g to co u r t . Only
judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
certiorari
October 9, 2001 C A g r a n t e d N T C s p e t i t i o n f o r
made in the exerci se of their quasi -judi cial function i s
and prohibition .
subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil.
January 10, 2002 Motions for Reconsideration were
Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
denied by CA
- Even if the Doctrine on Exhau stion of Adm inistra tive
Remedie s is appli cable , record s sho w that peti tione rs
ISSUES
have complied with such requirement:
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered
this case
their protests and submitted proposed schemes for the
2 . W ON the D o ctri ne on Ex ha u stio n of Ad m in i stra ti ve
Billing Circular.
Remedies is applicable

- Af t e r i s su a n ce o f M C , p e ti ti o n e r s w r o te su cce ssi v e
letters asking for the suspension and reconsideration of
the MC.
- Su ch le tte r s we re no t a cte d u po n a nd i nste ad , NT C
issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This was taken by
petitioners as a clear denial of their requests.
D e ci si on C on sol i da ted pe ti tio n s ar e GR ANT ED . The
decision of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The case
i s R EM AN D ED to the RT C- QC for con ti nu a tio n of the
proceedings.

ART VII: EXECUTIVE

GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
CORTES; September 15, 1989
FACTS
M r. Ma rco s a nd the i m me di a te me mb e r s of hi s f am il y
filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents to issue travel documents
to them and to enjoin the implementation of the
Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6
of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to
travel may be impaired by any author ity/agency of the
g o v e r n m e n t , t h e r e m u s t b e l e gi sl a t i o n to th a t e ffe ct .
They also invoke generally accepted principles of
i n te r n a t i o n a l l a w : ( 1 ) Ar t . 1 3 , p a r. 2 of th e U n i v e r sa l
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that
everyone has the right to leave any countr y, in cludin g
his own, and to re turn to his o wn coun tr y , and (2) Art.
1 2 , p a r. 2 of th e In t e r n a t i o n a l C o v e n a n t o n C i v i l a n d
Political Rights, which states that no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country. Respondents contend that the issue of whether
the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the
more primordial and transcendental right of the state to
se curi ty and safe ty of i ts na tional s involves a poli ti cal
question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they
cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They also point
out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents.

ISSUES

1. W O N t h e P r e s i d e n t h a s t h e p o w e r u n d e r t h e
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2 . W ON t h e P r e s i d e n t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y o r w i t h g r a v e
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marco ses to the Philipp ines pose s a seriou s th reat to
nationa l intere st and we lfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
l i m i t a t i o n s o n th e ex e r ci se o f specific p o w e r s o f t h e
P r e s i d e n t , i t m a i n t a i n s i n t a c t w h a t i s tr a d i t i o n a l l y
co n sid er ed a s wi th i n the scop e of exe cu ti ve po we r.
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Consti tution. In o ther wo rds, executive po wer is more
than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to
re turn to the Ph ilippine s canno t be considered in li gh t
solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
co n te m p l a te d si t u a t i o n s e v e n r e m o te l y si m i l a r to th e
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare.

History and time-honored principles of constitutional law

have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers
in times of crisis or grave and imperative national
em er ge n cy. M an y te rm s ar e a pp li ed to th e se po we r s:
residual, inherent, moral, implied, aggregate,
emergency. Whatever they may be called, the fact is
that these powers exist, as they must if the governance
f u n c ti o n o f th e Ex e cu ti v e B r a n ch i s to b e ca r r i e d o u t
effectively and efficiently.

GUTIERREZ [dissent]
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon
lawful order of the court, not of an executive officer, not
even the President. I do not think that we should
differen tia te the right to re turn home from the ri gh t to
go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all,
t h e r i g h t to co m e h o m e m u s t b e more preferred than
any other aspect of the right to travel.

CRUZ [dissent]
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty
of abode that Aquino then invoked.

PARAS [dissent]
The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right
to return to his own country, except only if prevented by
the demands of national safety and national security.

2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and

ca p r i c i o u s l y a n d w h i m s i c a l l y i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e
r e tu r n of th e M a r co se s p o se s a se r i o u s th r e a t t o th e
PADILLA [dissent]
n a ti o n a l i n te r e s t a n d w e l f a r e a n d i n p r o h i b i ti n g th e i r
r e t u r n . T h e d o c u m e n t e d h i s t o r y o f th e e ff o r t s o f t h e
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national
and the precarious state of the economy were the
security, public safety, and public health. Power of the
f a c t u a l b a s e s f o r th e P r e si d e n t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t th e
state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant
return of the Marcoses during that time would only
support in police power. The government failed to
exacerbate and intensif y the violence directed against
present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos right to
the State and instigate more chao s. The Sta te , actin g
return to this country.
throu gh the Governmen t, is no t precluded from takin g
p r e e m p ti v e a ct i o n a ga i n s t t h r e a t s t o i t s e x i ste n ce i f ,
S ARMIENTO [dissent]
though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. The preservation of the State
The right to return to ones own country cannot be
th e f r u it io n o f t h e p eo p le s s o ve re ig n t y is a n
d i st i n g u i sh e d fr o m t h e r i g h t to t r a v e l a n d f r e e d o m o f
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
a b o d e . W hi l e th e P r e s i d e n t m a y e x e r ci se p o we r s n o t
p r e se r v e a n d d e f e n d th e C o n s ti tu ti o n a n d to se e th e
expressl y granted by the Constitution but may
f a i th f u l e x e cu t i o n o f t h e l a w s , ca n n o t sh i r k fr o m t h a t
nece ssar il y implied therefrom , the latter must yi eld to
responsibility.
t h e p a r a m o u n t c y of th e Bi l l o f R i g h t s. U n d e r th e n e w
C on sti tu tio n , th e ri gh t to tra ve l ma y b e i mp a ir ed o nl y
SEPARATE OPINION
within the limits provided by law. The President has been
divested of the implied power to impair the right to
FERNAN [concur]
travel. The determination of whether the Marcos return
p o se s a th r e a t to n a ti o n a l se cu r i t y sh o u l d n o t b e l e f t
so lel y to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be

satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also

present.

ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE
CONSTITUTION)
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
LAUREL; April 21, 1939
FACTS
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain
th e Se cr e tar y o f th e In te r io r ( SI) a nd h is a ge n ts f ro m
proceeding with the investigation against him until this
case was settled by the SC.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation
of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into
the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed
b r i b e r y, e x t o r t i o n , m a l i c i o u s a b u s e o f a u t h o r i t y a n d
unauthorized practice of the law profession.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that
Villena be suspended so as to prevent the coercion of
wi tne sse s. The Pre sid en t ve rb al l y gra n ted the
recommendation on the same day.
- F e b . 9 ,1 9 3 9 ~ SI su sp e n d e d Vi l l e n a f r o m o ffi ce a n d
i n str u ct e d th e P r o v i n ci a l Go v e r n o r o f R i za l to a d v i se
Villena of his suspension.
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges
against him and notifying him that Emiliano Anonas was
the special investigator of the case.
- F e b . 1 7 , 1 9 3 9 ~ t h e d a t e s e t b y An o n a s w h e n t h e
formal investigation would begin. But eventually
p ostp on ed to M ar ch 28 ,19 39 d ue to sev er al i nci de n ts
and postponements.
- Hence, this petition for Prelim In junction. Villena
contends that:
> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to
file administrative charges against him, and to decide
the merits of the charges because the power to
suspend, to try and punish municipal elective officials
is lodged in some other agencies of the government.
> SIs acts are null and void because:
+ SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to
the President when SI suspended him (Villena).
+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in
accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing the trials and charges of
against elective municipal officials are those
contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code
as amended.
+ SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting
himself into a complainant and at the same time the
judge of the charges he filed against him.
+ SIs action didnt follow the procedure under Sec.
2188 of the AC, which requires that a complaint be

based on a private persons or citizens sworn

statement.
- Vil lena pra ys tha t a wr it of Prel iminar y In junction be
i ssue d to stop th e SI an d h i s a ge n ts f ro m pr ocee d in g
f ur th e r wi th th e in ve sti ga tio n un ti l thi s ca se i s he ar d ;
that SI be declared as without authority to suspend him
and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared
as without authority to file charges against him and to
investigate such charges.
- His petition for the writ of preliminar y injunction was
denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC
expressly empowers the SI to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of
a n y b u r e a u o r o ff i ce u n d e r h i s d e p a r tm e n t a n d i n
connection therewith to designate an official or
person who shall conduct such investigation.
> Se c. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena ,
doesnt preclude SI from exercising the powers stated
in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked
s e c t i o n , m u s t b e r e a d i n r e l a t i o n t o se c . 3 7 o f t h e
Reorganization Law of 1932.
> Villena didnt que stion the jur isdi ction of the SI a t
t h e st a r t of th e i nv e s ti ga ti o n b u t m e r e l y co n te n d e d
that such charges were not in accordance with law for
the reason that they didnt bear the oaths of the
complaints.
> T h e a u th o r i t y o f a d e p a r t m e n t h e a d t o o r d e r t h e
investigation of a subordinate necessarily carries with
it by implication the authority to take such measures
as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the investigation, including suspending the officer;
plus, the President authorized the suspension.
> Co ur ts of Equ i ty h ave no p o we r to r e str a in p ub li c
officials by injunction from performing any official act,
wh i ch th e y a re re qu i re d b y la w to pe rf or m , o r acts,
which are not in excess of the authority, and discretion
reposed in them.
ISSUES
1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an
investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him,
o f t h e ch a r g e s o f co r r u p t i o n a n d i r r e g u l a r i t y a g a i n s t
Villena.
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena
pending the investigation of the charges.
HELD
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the
inv estigation of the charges against the petitioner,
Vil le na , an d to ap po in t a spe cia l i nv esti ga tor for th a t
purpose.
- Se c. 7 9 o f th e Rev i se d AC sp ea ks of di re ct con tr o l ,
direction and supervision over bureaus and offices under
the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in
relation to sec. 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Dept of Interior executive supervision over the

ad mi n i str a tio n of p rov in ce s, m un i ci pa l i tie s, ch ar te re d

cities and other local political subdivisions.
- Citing Planas v. Gil: Supervision is not a meaningless
thi n g. It is an acti ve po we r. It is ce r tai n l y no t wi tho u t
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into
facts and condi tion s in order to render the power real
and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and
rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation.
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the
secre tar y to suspend a ma yo r of a muni cipali ty wh o is
under investigation.
- N OT E: The re wa s an a r gu me n t r e gar d in g the ve rb al
approval or acquiescence of the President to the
suspension. It was said that if the justices were to accept
that the President had the authority to suspend the
petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the
President approved it, shou ld be sustained . Then thi s
was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts of
the President that could not be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification. There are certain constitutional
p o w e r s a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s o f th e C h i e f E x e cu t i v e t h a t
should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ
of habeas corpu s and proclama tion of mar tial law and
the exercise of pardon.) But there were doubts regarding
the verbal approval by the President of the suspension if
such could be considered as ratification in law (with law
giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.)
Hence, the ratio.
Ratio xxxunder the presidential type of government
w h i ch we h a ve a d o p te d a n d co n s i d e r i n g th e
departmental organization established and continued in
force by par. 1, sec. 12, Art.VII of our (1935)
Constitution,
all
executive
and
administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e l a w t o a c t p e r s o n a l l y, t h e
mul tifariou s executive and admini strative function s of
the Chief Executive are performed by and throu gh the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reproba ted b y the Chief Execu tive, pre sumptivel y the
acts of the Chief Executive.
O b i t e r W ith r e f e r e n ce t o th e Ex e cu ti v e D e p t o f t h e
Govt, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is
readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that it is, the establishment of a single,
not plural, Executive.
- T h e F i r s t Se c t i o n o f Ar t i c l e V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.

- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the

WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the
d i r e c t s u p e r v i s i o n a n d co n t r o l o f t h e LTF R B C e n t r a l
various departments, their personality is reality but the
DOT C Regional Office as an LTFRB Regional Office is
Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional
projection of that of the President.
unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of
Office.
- Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ each head of
legislative power.
a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT
in the matters of that department where the President is
HELD
required by law to exercise authority.
- The Pre siden t ma y, through his/her dul y consti tu ted
OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
- As a matter of executive policy, the y may be granted
political agent and alter ego, legally and validly decree
RESOURCES
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is
the reorganization of the National Government in
FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of
exercise of authority granted by law.
valid legislation in the particular field.
- A public office may be created through any of the
FACTS
- T h e Pr e si d e n t sh o u l d b e a n s w e r a b l e f o r th e a c ts o f
follo wi ng modes: (1) b y the Consti tution (fundamen tal
- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse
administration of the entire Executive Department
law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or
claim against a domestic Mining corporations (Benguet
before his own conscience
(3) by authority of law. The creation and establishment
Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three
Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art.
of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the
mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province.
7 of the 1987 Constitution.
third mode.
- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- T he Pre si de n t, th ro u gh Ad m in i str a tive Or de r N o . 36
- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and
directed the various departments and agencies of
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
Natural Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her
government to immediatel y undertake the creation and
TRANSPORTATION AND
adverse claim
establishment of their regional offices in CAR.
- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a
COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation
second motion for reconsideration and ordered a formal
BUENA; February 27, 2002
and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office,
hearing of the case
when in fact, the D OT C Se creta r y dire ctl y and merel y
- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
sought
to
implement
the
Chief
Executives
FACTS
Administrative Order.
- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
ISSUES
- The Presidents control over all executive departments
Ga r ci a , Jr. i ssu ed M e m o r a n d u m O r d e r N o . 9 6 - 7 3 5
1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands
come from Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
addressed
to
Land
Transportation
Franchising
approved by the Secretar y, upon a question of fact, is
Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin
justiciable
the national government is vested by Presidential
directing him to effect the transfer of regional functions
2. W ON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office
Resour ces can be pre cluded from condu cting his o wn
1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary).
- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for
inquiry
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: without minimizing
c e r t i o r a r i a n d p r o h i b i t i o n w i t h p r a ye r f o r p r e l i m i n a r y
3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed
t h e i m p o r t a n ce o f th e h e a d s of v a r i o u s d e p a r tm e n t s,
injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC
to abide by the requirements of the law
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
Secretary and LTFRB chair, praying among others that
the President. Thus, their acts, performed and
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and
HELD
promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
without effect.
1 . A d e c i si o n r e n d e r e d b y t h e D i r e c t o r o f L a n d s a n d
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce,
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
restraining order enjoining DOTC Secretary from
upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to
Executive.
implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The
be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that
- The designation and subsequent establishment of
l o we r co u r t i s su e d a wr i t o f p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c ti o n o n
su ch deci sion was rendered in conse quen ce of fraud,
DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR
April 8, 1996.
impo si tion or mi sta ke, other than error of ju dgment in
and the concomitant exercise and performance of
- On Ja n u a r y 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 , th e n D OT C Se c r e ta r y Am a d o
estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of
f u n c ti o n s b y th e fo r m e r a s th e LTF R B - C AR R e gi o n a l
Lagdameo issued Department Order No. 97-1025
whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of
Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of
e s t a b l i sh i n g t h e D OT C - C A R R e g i o n a l O ff i ce a s t h e
evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which
the President to effectivel y reorgani ze the DOTC (and
Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the
the finding in question could be made
other departments).
regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR
R e a so n i n g
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated
provided it is pursued in good faith. A reorganization is
declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-735 and 97-1025
in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
null and void and without any legal eff ect as being
or reproba ted b y the Chief Executive, pre sumabl y the
e co no m y o r to ma ke bu re au cra c y m or e effi cie n t. Th e
violative of the provision of the Constitution against
acts of the Chief Executive
reorganization in this case was decreed in the interest
encroachment on the powers of the legislative
2 . The State acting throu gh the legislatu re throu gh its
of service and for purposes of economy and more
department and also of the provision enjoining
power of imperium acting as a sovereign regulating
effective coordination of the DOTC functions in CAR.
appointive officials from holding any other office or
property to come up with rules with which to exercise its
- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections
employment in the Government.
power of dominium as owner of the property cannot act
7 a n d 8 o f Ar t i c l e I X - B o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s i n c e t h e
arbitrarily but in accordance with law
organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely
ISSUE
R e a so n i n g
designated to perform the additional duties and
f un ctio n s of an LTFR B Re gi on al Offi ce sub je ct to the

Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not

a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to
how such title has been acquired

1 . W ON the Court had authori ty to and should inqu ire

into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Con stitu tion for the suspen sion of the privile ge of the

3 . T h e M i n i n g Ac t s p e a k s o f f i n d i n g s o f f a c t s o f t h e
D i r e ct o r o f M i n e s wh e n a ffi r m e d b y th e Se c r e ta r y o f
Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and
conclusive, in which case the aggrieved party may file a

writ
acts of the N PA (its infiltration of several mass-based
2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON
organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters
it complied with ART III Section 1 par 14 34 and ART VII
w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y, e t c ) a n d t h e t h r e a t i t p o s e s t o t h e
Section 10 par 2 35 of the Constitution?
public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP

petition for review with this Court where only questions

of law may be raised
R e a so n i n g No such affirmance by the secretary thats
why he ordered a hearing. It is but a right and proper in
the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits
of this case be conducted
D e ci si on : petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Unanimous

3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889

4 . W ON the Pe ti ti on er s ar e co ve re d b y PN 88 9. W ON
petitioners detained should be released

LANSANG V GARCIA
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971
FACTS:
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.
Other petitions:
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense
L-33973 David vs Garcia
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia
- August 21, 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons
died, several injured
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the
President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution.
His reason was that lawless elements have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety
and the security of the State and that public safety
requires immediate and effective action
- Several people were apprehended and detained
including the petitioners on reasonable belief that they
had participated in the crime of insurrection or
rebellion.
- Au gu st 3 0, 19 71 Pro cla m a tio n 88 9- A a me nd ed
Proclamation 889.
- Sep tember 18 and 25 , October 4, 1971 -Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
i n so m e pr ovi n ce s, su b- p rov in ce s, ci tie s, EXC EPT in
Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao,
I s a b e l a , L a g u n a , L a n a o , N o r t h a n d S o u t h C o ta b a t o ,
Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal,
Tarlac, Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities
including Manila.
ISSUES

HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of

CPP NPA is proof of the existence of a rebellion.
d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the

a n d i t s f r o n t o r ga n i za t i o n s a r e c a p a b l e o f p r e p a r i n g
powerful explosive, and that there was a plan of a series
o f a s sa s s i n a t i o n s , ki d n a p p i n g s , m a s s d e s tr u c t i o n o f
property, etc.
HELD
3 . N O . T h e P r e s i d e n t d i d n o t a c t a r b i t r a r i l y. H e h a d
1 . YE S . U p o n d e l i b e r a ti o n , th e C o u r t a b a n d o n e d th e
p o s s e s s i o n o f i n t e l l i g e n ce r e p o r t s , h e c o n s u l t e d h i s
doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v
advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was
Castaeda (determination by the President of existence
critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the
of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for
e n ti r e P h i l i p p i n e s w a s ju st i f i e d a s h e co u l d n o t h a v e
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be
ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the
conclusive upon the courts. The President, wi th all the
proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension.
intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC
4. Some petitioners were already released and with
to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant
respect to them, the issue is moot and academic . As to
of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no
p e t i t i o n e r s D a v i d , F e l i p e , O l i v a r, d e l o s R e y e s , d e l
unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the
Rosario and Sison, still under detention, they have been
writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so
cha r ged with viola tio n of the An ti- Su bv er sio n Act/
be ca u se i t i s sta te d i n th e n e ga tiv e shall not be
accused of o vert acts co vere d by the PN 889. The PN
except), and like the limitations and restrictions
889 being valid, their release may not be ordered by the
i m p o se d u p o n th e l e gi sl a ti v e d e p a r tm e n t, a d h e r e n ce
SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in
t h e r e to a n d co m p l i a n ce th e r e w i t h m a y, w i t h i n p r o p e r
conducting the preliminary investigation of the charges
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable
- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the
cause is found or otherwise , to order their release.
privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within
De ci sio n Pre siden t did not act arbitra ril y. PN 889 not
its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes
u n co n s ti tu ti o n a l . P e t i t i o n s L 3 3 9 6 4 , L 3 3 9 6 5 , L 3 3 9 8 2 ,
hand in hand with the system of checks and balances.
L34004, L34013 , L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to
The authority to determine whether or not the Executive
con du ct inv esti ga ti on an d i ssue wa r r an ts of ar re st o r
acted wi thin the sphere allotted to him is vested in the
order of release as to petitioners still under detention.
Judiciary.
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.
2. YES.
a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889SEPARATE OPINION
A , d e c l a r e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n u p r i si n g - - l a w l e s s
elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for
the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and
are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and
rebellion xxx
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must
be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent
dan ger the reof and b) publi c safety must re quire the
aforementioned suspension are PRESENT.
st
c. The 1
condi tion can be attested throu gh
jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already
34

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
35 The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law.

FERNANDO [dissent]

- I find i t diffi cult to accept the con clu sion tha t the six
petitioners still under detention should be set free.
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their
liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever
offense the y may be held to answer, to be issued by a
judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to comply
with
the
constitutional
requirement
against
unreasonable search and seizure.
- To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes
of the law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard
of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE

MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974

FACTS
- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
si gn ed Pr o cla ma ti on No . 1 08 1 , pr ocl ai m in g a sta te of
Martial Law in the Philippines
- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed
by the President which provided an order to the
Se cre ta r y of Na ti on al De fe nse to ar re st an d ta ke i n to
custody the individuals named in the list for being
participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state
po wer in the countr y and to ta ke over the governmen t
by force
- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,
immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners
- Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for
habeas corpus
- Respondents filed their Return to Writ and Answer to
the Petition and prayed that the petition be dismissed
- P e n d i n g r e so l u t i o n o f th e se Pe ti ti o n s, p e ti ti o n e r s,
except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose
Diokno), were released from custody on different dates
under a Conditional Release
- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition, imputing dela y in the dispo sition of his ca se,
a n d a s sev e r a ti n g t h a t b e ca u se o f th e d e c i si o n of th e
C o u r t i n th e R a ti f i ca t i o n C a se s a n d th e a c ti o n of th e
Member s of the Cour t in ta kin g an oath to suppor t the
New Constitution, he cannot reasonabl y expect to get
justice in this case
- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds
th a t the re is a p ub li c in ter e st i n the d eci sio n of the se
cases and that the reasons given for the motion to
withdraw are untrue, unfair and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Dioknos motion with a vote of 5 to 7
- Makalinta l, Zaldivar, Fernando, Tee hankee,
M u o z - Pa lm a , Aq u i n o a n d B a rr e d o vo t e d t o g ra n t
D iokn o s mot io n to w ithd raw petition
ISSUES
1 . W ON t h e C o u r t h a s j u r i sd i ct i o n to i n qu i r e i n to t h e
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial
law
2. W ON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the
circumstances required by the Constitution for the
proclamation of a state of martial law
3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them
the relief of habeas corpus
HELD
All pe titions dismi ssed excep t tho se wh ich have been
previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with
the approval of this Court.
M a k a s ia r, Es g u e r ra , F e rn a n d e z , M u o z Pa l ma a n d
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons
for his concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions.
F e rn a n d o , J . , c o n c u r s a n d d i s s e n t s i n a s e p a r a t e
opinion.

Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.

Barredo, J., co n cu r s i n th e d i sm i ssa l s i n a se p a r a te
opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION

WON th e C o u rt ha s ju ris d ic t io n t o in q u ire in to th e

constitutional sufficienc y of the proclamation of
ma rt ia l law ( jus t ic ia b il it y o f t h e m a r t i a l l a w
proclamation)

CASTRO [justiciable]
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the
power to inquire into the existence of the factual bases
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof.
- The judicial department can determine the existence of
conditions for the exercise of the Presidents powers and
i s n o t b o u n d b y th e r e c i ta l s o f h i s p r o cl a m a ti o n . Bu t
wh e th e r i n th e ci r cu m st a n ce s o b ta i n i n g p u b l i c sa f e t y
r e qu i re s th e su sp en sio n of the pr ivi le ge of th e wr i t of
habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is
i ni ti a ll y for the Pre sid en t to de cid e . Th e Pr e sid en ts
findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.

FERNANDO [justiciable]
- The action taken by any or both the political branches
whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive
order could be tested in court. Where private rights are
affected, the judiciary has the duty to look into its
validity. A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be and obstacle to
judi cial inqu ir y. Its improvident exerci se or the abuse
t h e r e o f m a y g i v e r i s e t o a j u s t i c i a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y.
N e ce ssar i l y the n , i t b eco me s th e re spo n si b il i t y of th e
courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
have adhered to the manda te of the fundamenta l law.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
- The range of permi ssible in quir y to be condu cted by
the Court is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of
w h e th e r o r n o t su ch a su sp e n si o n , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e
cr e d i b l e i n f o r m a ti o n f u r n i sh e d b y th e Pr e si d e n t , wa s
arbi trar y. The question before the jud icia r y i s not the
correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken.
- R e f e r r e d t o La nsan g vs. Ga r cia w h e r e t h e C o u r t
sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the
privile ge of the wri t of habeas corpu s as there was no
showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a prerogative
belonging to the executive, the judiciar y merely acting
a s a ch e c k o n t h e e x e r c i s e o f su c h a u t h o r i t y. C h i e f
Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court is merel y to check,
n o t to su p p l a n t th e Ex e cu ti v e , o r to a s ce r ta i n m e r e l y
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of

his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him

or the determine the wisdom of his act.

TEEHANKEE [justiciable]
"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said
factual bases [stated in the proclamation suspending the
p r i v i l e g e o f t h e w r i t o f h a b e a s co r p u s o r p l a c i n g t h e
country under martial law as the case may be, since the
re quire ments for the exerci se of these po wer s are the
same and are provided in the very same clause] in order
to determ ine the con stitutional suffi cien cy thereof."32
T h e C o u r t s tr e sse d th e r e i n t h a t "i n d e e d , t h e gr a n t of
power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred upon by the
Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Execu tive Depar tmen t, is li mited and conditional . The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as
well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates
the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x.' It is only
by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the
privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'or under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger
t h e r e o f - ' w h e n t h e p u b l i c sa f e t y r e q u i r e s i t , i n a n y o f
w h i c h e v e n t s t h e s a m e m a y b e s u sp e n d e d w h e r e v e r
durin g su ch period the necessi ty for su ch su spension
shall exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority
to suspend the privilege of the wr it i s thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not onl y by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existen ce, but also , as regard s the time when and the
place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
d e f i n e th e ex te n t, th e co n f i n e s a n d th e l i m i t s o f sa i d
p o w e r, b e yo n d w h i c h i t d o e s n o t e x i s t . An d , l i k e t h e
limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental
Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto
and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
i n qu i r e d i n to b y th e co u r ts o f j u s ti ce . O th e r w i se , t h e
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
m e a n i n g l e s s . S u r e l y, t h e f r a m e s o f o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n
could no t have intended to en gage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility."

BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]

- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the
determination of the constitutional sufficiency of a
proclamation of martial law by the President should not
go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be
sta te d i n th e p ro cl a ma ti on ,, if the se a re b y the i r ver y
nature capable of unquestionable demonstration.
- W hi l e a d e cl a r a t i o n o f m a r ti a l l a w i s n o t a b so l u te l y
co n clu siv e, th e C ou r ts i n qui r y in to i ts con sti tu tio na l
sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in

Lansang, involve the reception of evidence to be

habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
weighed against those on which the President has acted,
- The right of a government to maintain its existence is
thereof under martial law."
nor may it extend to the investigation of what evidence
the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the
- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested
the President had before him. Such inquiry must be
nation 's continued existen ce, from exte rnal as wel l as
i n t h e Pr e si d e n t. T h e p r o cl a m a ti o n a n d i ts a tte n d a n t
limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what
i n te r n a l t h r e a t s, th e go v e r n m e n t "i s i n v e s te d w i t h a l l
circumstances therefore form a political question.
accords or does not accord with facts of judicial notice.
those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its
adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to
executive and of the legislature is justiciable there can
own
constitutional
prerogatives
vis--vis
the
belong to every government as such, and as being
be no clearer example of a political question than
proclamation and the existing martial law situation,
essential to the exercise of its functions"
Proclamation No. 1081. It is the exercise by the highest
g i v e n th e r e a so n s f o r th e d e c l a r a t i o n a n d i t s av o we d
- These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's
elective official of the land of a supreme political duty
objectives.
protection and security have been lodged by the
exclu si ve l y en tr u sted to h im b y th e Co n sti tu ti on . Our
1 .T h e C o n s ti tu ti o n i s th e su p r e m e l a w o f th e l a n d .
Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on
people have entrusted to the President through a
This means among other things that all the powers
t h e Pr e si d e n t o f th e Ph i l i p p i n e s, wh o i s c l o th e d wi th
specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome
o f th e gov er nm en t an d o f a ll i ts offi cia l s f ro m the
exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which
responsibili ty to wie ld a powe rful we apon. The people
President down to the lowest emanate from it.
the powers shall be called forth.
have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are
2.The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to
- Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the
so ominous and threatening that this ultimate weapon of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all
time of the framing and adoption of the 1935
our duly constituted government must be used.
c o n f l i c t s a s t o w h a t th e C o n s t i t u t i o n o r a n y p a r t
Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated
- The Supre me Court wa s no t given the ju risd iction to
thereof means.
the princip le tha t when the Governor-General wi th the
share the determination of the occasions for its exercise.
3.In the same way the Supreme Court is the
approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5
It is not given the authority by the Constitution to
designated guardian of the Constitution, the
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a
expand or limi t the scope of i ts use depending on the
President is the specifi call y assigned prote ctor of
state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by
allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the
the safety, tranquility and territorial integrity of the
reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension
Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed
na tion. Thi s respon sibil ity of the Presiden t i s his
of the privileges of habeas corpu s, thi s declara tion is
in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much less
alone and may not be shared by any other
held conclusive upon the judicial department of the
does it have the power nor should it even exercise the
Department.
government. And when the Chief Executive has decided
power, assuming its existence, to nullify a proclamation
4.The Constitution expressly provides that in case of
th a t co n d i ti o n s e x i st ju st i f yi n g th e su sp e n si o n of th e
of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will
t h e C o n s ti tu t i o n a n d o n i s su e s so p o l i ti ca l l y a n d
danger thereof, when the public safety requires it,
presume that such conditions continue to exist until the
emotionally charged. The Court's function in such cases
the Executive may place the Philippines or any part
same authority has decided that such conditions no
is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out
thereof under martial law
longer exi st. These doctr ines are roo ted on pragmatic
whether the issues constitute a political question or not.
5.In the same manner that the Executive power
considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The
Its function is to determine whether or not a question is
conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution is
"d o ct r i n e th a t w h e n e v e r th e C o n st i tu ti o n o r a s ta tu t e
indeed justiciable.
complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial
gives a discretionary power to any person, such person
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but
power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior
is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the
justiciable, it is still valid because the president has not
courts, is the very whole of that power, without any
ex i s te n ce o f t h o se f a c ts " h a s b e e n r e co g n i ze d b y a l l
acted arbitrarily in issuing it.
limitation or qualification.
courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable
6.Even the basic guarantee of protection of life,
authority." The political department according to Chief
ESGUERRA [political question]
l i b e r t y, o r p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w
Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the sole judge of the
readil y reveals that the Consti tu tion s concern for
existence of wa r or insur rection , and wh en it declares
- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional,
individual rights and liberties is not entirely above
ei the r of the se e me r gen cie s to exi st, i ts acti on i s n o t
valid and binding; that the veracity or sufficiency of its
that for the national interests, since the deprivation
subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial
factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and
it enjoins is only that which is without due process of
department of the State.
that the question presented by the petitions is political in
l a w a n d l a w s a r e a l w a ys e n a c te d i n th e n a t i o n a l
nature and not justiciable. Whether or not there is
i n te re st or to p ro mo te a nd saf e gu ar d the gen er a l
M AK ASI AR [political question]
constitutional basis for the Presidents action is for him
welfare.
AQUINO [political question]
to decide alone.
7.W hereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution
- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia
e x p l i ci t l y e n j o i n s t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e o f th e w r i t o f
FERNANDEZ [political question]
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
similar injunction whether expressed or implied
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the
against the declaration of martial law.
power to proclaim martial law. It is similarl y explicit in
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon
- Political questions are not per se beyond the Courts
sp e ci f yi n g th e o c ca s i o n s f o r i t s e x e r ci se . " I n ca se of
i t s e l f t h e g r a v e r e s p o n si b i l i t y o f ch e c ki n g e x e c u t i v e
jurisdictionbut that as a matter of policy, implicit in the
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and
Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from
thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the
despotic exercise of the presidential power granted
interfering with the Executives Proclamation.
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
under the Constitution to su spend the privilege of the
the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of
writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; that
ANTONIO [political question]
responsibility and duty of the Court must be preserved

and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as

the last bulwark of democracy in this country.
WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then
the circumstances required b y the Constitution for
the proc la mation of a state of ma rtial law

CASTRO [valid]
- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial
law in cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or
rebellion but also of imminent danger thereof.
- The so called open court theory does not apply to the
Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973
C o n s t i t u t i o n s e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i ze t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f
martial law even where the danger to public safety
arises merely from the imminence of invasion,
in surrection , or rebell ion. Moreover, the theor y is too
simplistic for our day, what with the universally
reco gn i zed in sidiou s nature of Commun ist subversion
and its overt operations

FERNANDO [valid]
W hile i t is beyond que stion tha t the 1973 Constitution
s ti p u l a te s, i n a tr a n si to r y p r o v i si o n , th a t: Al l
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, lega l, binding, and effective even afte r
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly.
TEEH ANKEE [no pronouncement]

BARREDO [valid]
The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a
state of anesthesia, since a major surgery is needed to
save the nations life.

MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
T he extreme measure taken b y the Presiden t to place
the entire country under martial law was necessary. The
President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary.
An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained
exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of
th e acto r, on e wh ich is n ot fou nd ed o n a fa ir or
s u b s t a n t i a l r e a so n , i s w i t h o u t a d e qu a t e d e t e r m i n i n g
principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the

a c t o r ' s w i l l . S u c h i s n o t t h e ca s e w i t h th e a c t o f t h e
President, because the proclamation of martial law was
the result of conditions and events, not of his own
making, which undoubtedly endangered the public
saf e ty a nd le d hi m to con clu de th a t th e si tu a tio n wa s
cr i t i c a l e n o u g h t o w a r r a n t t h e e x e r c i se o f h i s p o we r
under the Constitution to proclaim martial law

This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of those

contributing to the disorder and especially of those
helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the
enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean
anything at all.

WON petitioners were illegall y detained entitling

the m the relief of h a b e a s c o r p u s

- The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality

of arrest and detention of petitioners. Having concluded
that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21,
1972 by the President of the Philippines and its
continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and
detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2
dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended
by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972,
may not now be assailed as unconstitutional and
arbitrary.
- It should be important to note that as a consequence of
the proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended.
Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an
important incident of a declaration of martial law.

CASTRO [legal]
- Given the validi ty of the proclama tion of martial la w,
the arrest and detention of those reasonably believed to
be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh
beyond questioning.
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the
arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of
reasonable belief in their complicity in the rebellion and
insurrection.
E x c e p t D i o k n o a n d Aq u i n o , a l l t h e
petitioners have been released from custody, although
subject to defined restrictions regarding personal
movement and expression of vie ws. As the dan ger to
public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the
c o n t i n u e d d e t e n t i o n o f D i o k n o a n d Aq u i n o a n d t h e
restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other
petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am not prepared to say
that the continued imposition of martial rule is
unjustified.

FERN ANDO [proc lama ti on of martia l law

does
not automaticall y
carry
the
suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus]
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs
could be traced to the wishes of the President himself, it
c a r r i e s w i t h i t a p r e su m p t i o n o f v a l i d i t y. T h e te s t i s
a ga i n a r b i tr a r i n e s s a s d e f i n e d i n L a n sa n g . W hi l e th e
detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered,
as dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it
continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his
release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.

BARREDO [legal]
- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with
it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and
d e te n tio n ca nn o t b e assai l ed a s d ep riv a ti on of li be r ty
without due process.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is
to maintain order and to insure the success of the battle
against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient
means without loss of time and with the minimum effort.

ANTONIO [legal]

FERN ANDEZ [the privilege of the w rit of habeas

corpus
is
ipso
facto
suspended
upon
a
procla mat io n of ma rt ial law ]

MUNOZ-PALMA
[not
legal,
the
proclamation of martial law did not
carry with it the automatic suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus]
- First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus
which as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a
"writ of liberty" and the "most important and most
i m m e d i a t e l y a v a i l a b l e s a f e g u a r d o f th a t l i b e r t y " , th e
privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere
implication. The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution)
categorically states that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended except for causes
therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is
not one of those enumerated.
- Se co n d , th e so - ca l l e d C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f cl a u se ,
either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Constitution, or
Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides specifically
for three different modes of executive action in times of
emergency, and one mode does not necessarily
e n c o m p a s s t h e o t h e r, v i z , ( a ) c a l l i n g o u t t h e a r m e d
f o r c e s t o p r e v e n t o r s u p p r e s s l a w l e s sn e s s , e t c . , ( b )
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
and (c) placing the country or a part thereof under
martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes

for the executive action are the same, still the

exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension
of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of
martial law and vice versa.
- T h i r d , th e r e ca n b e a n a u to m a t i c su sp e n si o n o f th e
privilege of the writ when, with the declaration of martial
law, there is a total collapse of the civil authorities, the
civil courts are closed, and a military government takes
over, in which event the privilege of the writ is
necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there
i s n o co ur t to issue th e wr i t; tha t, h o we ve r, i s n o t the
case with us at present because the martial law
proclaimed by the President upholds the supremacy of
the civil over the mil itar y autho rity,and the courts are
open to issue the writ.

IBP V ZAMORA
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000
FACTS
- In vi e w o f th e al ar m in g i ncre a se in vi ol en t cr i me s in
Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression.
- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary
o f th e I n te r i o r a n d L o ca l G o v e r n m e n t w e r e ta s ke d to
execute and implement the said order.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar
Aglipay, formulated L e t t e r o f I n s t r u c t i o n 0 2 / 2 0 0 0 ,
which contains the ff:
> Pu rp o se : fo r th e su pp r e ssi on of cr i me pr eve nti on
and other serious threats to national security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have
been perpetrated not onl y by ordinar y crim inals but
also by organized syndicates whose members include
active and former police/military personnel. The police
visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the
i n ci d e n ce of cr i m e s sp e ci a l l y t h o se p e r p e tr a te d b y
active or former police/military personnel.
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimi ze or
eradi cate all forms of high-profile crime s especiall y
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
who se members include those that are we ll- trained ,
d i sci p l i n e d a n d we l l - a r m e d a c ti v e o r f o r m e r
PNP/military personnel
> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:
a.Conducted jointly by the National Capital
Region Police Office and the Philippine Marines
to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to
preserve the internal security of the state
against insurgents and other serious threat to
n a ti o n a l se cu r i t y, a l th o u g h th e p r i m a r y
responsibility over Internal Security Operations
still rest upon the AFP.

b .Principle of inte gra tion of efforts: wor k

cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a
focused, effective and holistic approach in
addressing crime prevention.
c.
A provisional Task Force Tulungan
shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
structure and procedures for the integrated
planning,
coordinating,
monitoring
and
assessing the security situation.
d.Area s for deplo yment: Monumento Circle, SM
C i t y N o r t h E d s a , Ar a n e t a S h o p p i n g C e n t e r,
Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial
C en ter, L RT /M RT Sta ti on s a nd the N AIA a nd
Domestic Airport.
- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines,
null and void and unconstitutional because no
emer gen cy situa tion obtain s in Metro Manila as would
justif y the deploymen t of soldier s for law enforcemen t
work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an
insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of
government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment
creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to
p e r f o r m c i v i l i a n f u n c t i o n s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t . I t a l so
m a ke s th e mi l i tar y m or e p o we r fu l tha n wh a t i t sho u ld
really be under the Constitution.
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24
January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief. The President expressed his desire to improve
the peace and order si tuation in Me tro Manila through
more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols. He further stated that to
heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation
f r o m t h e AF P i s n e c e s s a r y. I n v o k i n g h i s p o w e r s a s
Com mander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
a n d P N P C h i e f t o c o o r d i n a t e w i t h e a ch o t h e r f o r th e
p r o p e r d e p l o y m e n t a n d u t i l i za t i o n o f t h e M a r i n e s t o
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only.
ISSUES
1 . W ON t h e P r e s i d e n t s f a c tu a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
a. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP
in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy, over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP
HELD
1. On Judicial Review

Ratio 1: W hen que stions of con stitu tiona l si gnifi cance

are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with,
namel y: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
rai sing the consti tutional question ; (3) the exer cise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount
i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e p u b l i c , t h e C o u r t m a y b r u sh a s i d e
technicalities of procedure.
a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the
requisites of standing in this case.
> Definition of locus standi
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain
dire ct injur y as a resul t of the governmen tal act
that is being challenged
+ interest means a material interest, an interest
in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest
+ gist: whe ther a party alle ge s such a per sonal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of i ssue s upon wh ich the cour t
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions
> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
u n d o u b t e d l y t r u e , i s n o t su ff i c i e n t t o c l o th e i t w i t h
standing in this case
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial
interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown
any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer
by virtue of the questioned government act.
2. T h e P r e s i d e n t d i d n o t c o m m i t g r a v e a b u s e o f
discretion in calling out the Marines
Definition of political question
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed
- ( Tan a d a v. C u e n c o ) q u e s t i o n s w h i c h a r e t o b e
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive department;
if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people
themselves then it is held to be a political question
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case
h e l d t o b e a p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n i s f o u n d a t e x tu a l l y
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts

undertaking
independent
resolution
without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on the one question
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional
or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or
t h e l i m i ta ti o n s r e sp e c te d , i s ju st i c i a b l e th e p r o b l e m
being one of legality or validity.
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the
C on sti tu tio n l im i ts th e d eter m in a tio n a s to wh e th e r or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.
- grave abuse of di scre tion : capr iciou s or whim si cal
ex er ci se o f ju d gm en t tha t is pa te n t a nd gr o ss as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
a l l i n c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f l a w, a s w h e r e t h e p o w e r i s
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility
- There is no evidence to support the asser tion that
there exi st no justif ica tion for call ing out the armed
forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because
the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military.
There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec.
18, par. 1 of the Constitution to bestow on the President
full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power The full discretionar y power of the President to
determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further reinforced
in the rest of the said provision.
- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call
out the armed forces
- Expre ssio unius est exclusio alter ius. W here the
terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters.
- F r. Be r n a s: g r a d u a te d p o we r o f th e P r e s i d e n t a s
Com mander-in- Chief; when he exerci ses this lesser
power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it
i s n e c e s sa r y, h i s j u d g m e n t c a n n o t b e r e v i e w e d b y
anybody
- Beside s the absence of textual standa rds that the
Court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. On the other hand, the

Pr e sid en t ha s a vast i n te l l i gen ce ne two r k to ga th er

- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one
information.
department has no authority to inquire into the acts of
T h e d e p l o ym e n t o f t h e M a r i n e s d o e s n o t v i o l a t e t h e
another, which acts are performed within the discretion
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
of the other department. Whenever a statute gives
character of the police force
discretionar y powe r to an y person, to be exercised b y
Co n sti tu te s p er mi ssi bl e u se o f m i li ta r y a sse ts for
h im up on hi s o wn o pi ni on of ce r ta i n fa cts, th e sta tu te
civilian law enforcement
constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those
- limited participation by the Marines
facts. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon
- real authority belongs to the PNP
the courts. Once a determination is made by the
D e p l o ym e n t o f th e M a r i n e s d o e s n o t u n m a ke th e
ex ecu tiv e an d l e gi sl a tiv e de pa r tme n ts th a t the
civilian character of the police force
conditions justif ying the assailed acts exist, it will
- the real authority in these operations is lodged
p r e s u m e t h a t t h e co n d i t i o n s c o n t i n u e u n t i l t h e s a m e
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive
not with the military
branch, thru its civil and mil itar y branche s, are better
- since none of the Marines was incorporated or
si tu a ted to o b ta in in fo rm a ti on ab ou t p ea ce a nd o rd er
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
f r o m e v e r y co r n e r o f th e n a t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h th e
appointment to a civilian position to speak of
judicial department, with its very limited machinery
- the Marines render nothing more than
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power
a s s i s ta n ce r e q u i r e d i n co n d u c t i n g t h e p a t r o l s ;
of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly
there can be no insidious incursion of the
behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
m em be r f ro m th e exe r ci se of h is offi ce . Th e Su p re me
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Court does not possess the power of coercion to make
Constitution
the Ph i li pp i ne Se na te ta ke an y pa r ti cu la r a ctio n . The
Military assistance to civilian authorities in various
Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction
d i r e ct l y co n tr o l l e d i n th e ex e r ci se o f th e i r l e g i sl a ti v e
- Military assistance in: elections, administration
powers by any judicial process
of the Phil. Red Cross, relief and rescue
- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to
operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary
determine who shall be admitted to its membership
inspections, conduct of census work, etc.
- ( M a b a n a g v. L o p e z V i t o ) A p r o p o s a l t o a m e n d t h e
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
Constitution is a highl y political function performed by
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet,
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
never before questioned
- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a
- M u tu a l su p p o r t a n d co o p e r a ti o n b e tw e e n th e
contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a
military and civilian authorities, not derogation of
necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the
civilian supremacy
legislatures exercise of its discretionary authority is not
D e ci si on Petition dismissed
subject to judicial interference
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo,
- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon)
Congresspower to discipline its members
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction
Panganiban, Quisumbing)
over the controversy in light of the subsequent events
- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo)
justifying intervention among which was the existence of
a quorum
SEPARATE OPINION
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with full
discretionary authority in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power
PUNO
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations, which are
mandatory in nature.
- Political questions are defined as those questions which
- (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not
i n t h e i r so v e r e i gn ca p a ci t y, o r i n r e ga r d t o wh i ch fu l l
come from Congress but from the Constitution
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not
legislative or executive branch of government They have
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised
amendments
to
the
Constitution
violates
the
by the people in their primary political capacity and (2)
Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political
matters which have been specifically delegated to some
issue. The power to amend the Constitution or to
other department or particular office of the government,
propose amendments thereto is not included in the
with discretionary power to act.
ge ne ra l gr a n t of l e gi sl a tiv e po wer s to Co n gre ss. As a
constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive

t h e i r a u th o r i t y f r o m t h e f u n d a m e n ta l l a w a n d th e y d o
not have the final say on whether their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits
- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional
convention called for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the Constitution are at par wi th acts of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly
- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question
d o c tr i n e a n d a s su m e d j u r i sd i ct i o n w h e n e v e r i t f o u n d
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers
conferred upon the Legislature
- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the
exercise of Executive Power
- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature
c o n f e r r e d u p o n t h e G o v e r n o r - Ge n e r a l p o w e r s a n d
duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better
p osi ti on to kno w th e ne ed s of the co un tr y tha n a n y
other member of the executive department, and with
full confidence that he will perform such duties as his
judgment dictates
- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation
of powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the
Constitution that one branch of government could
e n c r o a ch u p o n t h e f i e l d o f d u t y o f t h e o t h e r. E a ch
department has an exclusive field within which it can
perform its part within certain discretionary limits.
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The Presidents inherent power to
deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated
as political, and this power continues to exist for the
preservation of peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress except those
resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of
the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications
to the given appointive office
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, the President has the power to
determine whether war, in the legal sense, still
continues or has terminated. It is within the province
of the political department and not the judicial
department of government to determine when war is
at the end
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring the
suspension of the privilege belongs to the President
and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
- ( La nsan g v. Ga r cia ) T he su spe n sio n of the wr i t of
habeas corpus was not a political question. The power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
nei ther absolute nor unqua lified because the
Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive
discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the
privilege must not be suspended except only in cases
of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety

re quire s i t, in any of whi ch events the same may be

suspended wherever during such period the necessity
for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power,
w h i ch m a y b e i n qu i r e d i n to b y co u r t s i s d e f i n e d b y
these li mitations. The function of the Court is not to
supplant but merely to check the Executive; to
ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power vested in him or to deter mine the wi sdom
of his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of
t h e C o u r t h e l d th a t th e i ssu e o f wh e th e r o r n o t t h e
1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled
that the decisive issue of whether the 1973
Con stitu tion had co me into force and effect, with or
without constitutional ratification, was a political
question
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the
Presidents declaration of martial law. On whether the
validity of the imposition of martial law was a political
or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly
divided.
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order by the President was
n o t s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y. I n t i m e s o f w a r o r
n a t i o n a l e m e r g e n c y, t h e P r e s i d e n t m u s t b e g i v e n
absolute control for the very life of the nation and
government is in peril
- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review,
the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
a persons detention from the moment he was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition
- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court
the power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse
of discretion of both the legislative and executive
branches of government
- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
t h e a r m e d f o r ce s of th e Ph i l i p p i n e s , m a y ca l l o u t th e
armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it
becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
co nd i ti on s l a y do wn th e sin e qua re qui r em en t fo r th e
ex e r c i se o f th e p o we r a n d th e o b je ct i v e so u g h t to b e
attained by the exercise of the power. They define the
constitutional parameters of the calling out power.
Whether or not there is compliance with these
parame ter s is a justi ciable issue and i s not a poli ti cal
question.
- On the use of Bernas opinion: The Constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed it,
but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people.
- W hen private justiciable rights are involved in a suit,
the Court must not refuse to assume juri sdi ction even
tho u gh que sti on s of extre m e po li ti ca l im po r tan ce ar e
necessarily involved.

VITUG
The act of the President in simply calling on the armed
forces of the Phil ippines, an execu tive prero gative, to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis,
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would
n o w wa r ra n t a n exer ci se b y th e Sup re m e Co ur t of i ts
extr ao rd in a r y p o wer a s so env isio ne d b y the
fundamental law.

MENDOZ A [concur and dissent]

- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues
raised by petitioner must await an actual case involving
real parties with injuries to show as a result of the
operation of the challenged executive action
- A ci ti ze n s su i t ch a l l e n g i n g t h e co n s ti tu ti 0 o n a l i t y o f
governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner
m u s t h a ve su ffe r e d a n i n j u r y i n f a c t o f a n a ctu a l o r
imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
( 3 ) t h e i n j u r y i s l i ke l y to b e r e d r e s se d b y a f av o r a b l e
action by this Court
- Only a party injured by the operation of the
governmental action challenged is in the best position to
aid the Cour t in dete rminin g the precise na ture of the
problem presented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and
substantial interest to protect, we do not have evidence
on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of
petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or
controversy

SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TINGA; February 3, 2004
FACTS
- July 27, 2003 Some 300 junior officers and enlisted
men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives,
stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They
demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary
and the PNP Chief.
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the
rebellion.
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after
negotiations.
- August 1, 2003 President lifted the declaration.
- PARTIES
> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a
state of rebellion to call out the armed forces

o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite

period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.
> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens,
taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers
o
Declaration is constitutional anomaly
that confuses because overzealous public officers
acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to
violate the constitutional rights of citizens
o
Circumvention of the report
requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from proclamation of martial law
o
Presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President
> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of
Representatives
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly
affected
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an
exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a
usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6,
Sec 23 par 2
> Sen. Pimentel
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has no
constitutional basis
> Solicitor-General
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of
the declaration
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue
and legal standing of the parties
b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid
HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed
to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article 6.
- Justiciable even if moot
- Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review
- Lacson v. Perez mootness preclude the Court from
addressing its Constitutionality
- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal
standing because when an act of the Executive injures
the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative
but substantial injury, then any member can file suit
(Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)

- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because

they did not obtain any direct injury from the
governmental act that is being challenged. Peoples
organization status would not vest them with the
requisite personality to question the validity of the
presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing
because there was no illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
- Art 7, Sec 18 Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling
out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus,
3.power to declare martial law.
- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or
rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of
such power. These are not required in calling-out power
(IBP v. Zamora)
- It does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but
with first and foremost, Executive powers
- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers
are broad enough as it is and become more so when
taken together with the provision on executive power
and presidential oath of office
- Presidents authority to declare state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and at the same time draws strength from her
commander-in-chief powers
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to
the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it.
- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality
protected rights (Lacson)
- President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity of the
exercise of such power. There is no proof that the
President acted without factual basis.
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to
declaration of martial law.

DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006
FACTS
th
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFOR E, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Phil ippines and
Com mander-in- Chief of the Armed For ces of the
Philipp ines, b y virtue of the powe rs vested upon
m e b y Se ction 18 , Ar ticle 7 of the Ph ilipp ine
Constitution which states that: The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .

.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their

Commander-in-Chief, d o h e r e b y c o m m a n d t h e
Ar me d Fo rce s o f th e Ph il ip p ine s , t o ma int a in
law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
vio lence as w ell as an y act of insu rrection o r
re b e l l io n a n d t o e n f o r c e o b e d ie n c e t o a l l t h e
laws and to all decrees, orders and
re g u la t ion s p ro mu lg at e d b y me p e rs o n a ll y o r
upon m y direction ; and as provided in Section
1 7 , Ar t i c l e 1 2 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d o h e r e b y
dec lare a State of Nationa l Eme rgenc y.
- The declaration is premised military and police
i n te l l i gen ce co n tai n in g co n ce r ted e ffor ts of Lef t a nd
Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo
Government.
- On the same da y, the Pre siden t issued G. O. No. 5
i m p l e m e n t i n g P P 1 0 1 7 ( h e n ce , t h e s a m e p r e m i se a s
PP1017), thus:
N O W, T H E R E F O R E , I G L O R I A M A C A P AG A L ARROYO, b y v i r t u e o f t h e p o w e r s v e s te d i n m e
under the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
d o he re b y ca ll up on the Ar me d Fo r ce s of th e
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of
the AFP and PNP, t o im me d ia t e l y c a rr y o u t t h e
necessary and app ro priate actions and
measures to suppress and pre vent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence .
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these pe titions had been filed , the President lifted PP
1017.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
[4]
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim
to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the
reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
D u r i n g th e o r a l a r g u m e n t s h e l d o n M a r ch 7 ,
2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to
t h e i ssu a n ce o f P P 1 0 1 7 a n d G .O . N o . 5 .
SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO REFUTATION
FROM PETITIONERS COUNSELS.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel
Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of
t h e M a gd a l o G r o u p i n d i c te d i n th e O a k w o o d m u t i n y,

escaped the ir deten tion ce ll in For t Bonifacio , Tagui g

C i t y. I n a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t , t h e y v o w e d t o r e m a i n
defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon
the people to show and proclaim our displeasure at the
sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only
b y goin g to the stree ts in prote st, but also by we arin g
red bands on our left arms. [5]

ch a i n o f c o m m a n d . H e i m m e d i a te l y t o o k cu s t o d y o f
B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of
political and revolutionary work within the military and
the police establishments in order to forge alliances with
its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio

tsun am i , typ ho on , hu rr i ca ne an d si m il a r occur r en ce s,

hence, there is absolutely no emergency that warrants
the issuance of PP 1017.
In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 5 , peti tioner s herein are
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty
one (21) other
members
of
the House
of
Representatives,
including
Representatives
Satur

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold

of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I which detailed
p la n s fo r b om bi n gs an d a tta cks d ur in g the Ph i li pp i ne
Mil ita r y Academ y Alumni Homecom ing in Ba guio City.
The plot was to assassinate selected targets including
some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. [6]

Ka Roger Rosal declared: The Communist Party and

Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look
Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
forward to the possibility in the coming year of
5 co n st i tu te usurpation of legislative powers ;
accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the
violation of freedom of expression and a declaration
Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to
o f m ar ti al la w . T h e y a l l e ge d t h a t Pr e si d e n t Ar r o yo
rule that it will not take much longer to end it.[9]
gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed

U p o n t h e a d v i c e o f h e r s e c u r i t y, P r e s i d e n t A r r o y o
d e c i d e d n o t t o a t t e n d t h e Al u m n i H o m e c o m i n g . T h e
next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was
found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was
recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash
disks containing minutes of the meetings between
members of the Magdalo Group and the National
Peoples Ar m y (N PA), a tape re corder, audio ca sse tte
car tr idges, diske ttes, and copie s of subversive
documents. [7] Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman

for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central
Mindanao, publi cl y announced : Anti-Arroyo groups
w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i c e a r e g r o w i n g r a p i d l y,
h aste ne d b y th e e co no m i c di ffi cu l ti e s su ffer ed b y th e
f a m i l i e s o f AF P o f fi ce r s a n d e n l i s t e d p e r so n n e l w h o
undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.
He claimed that with the forces of the national
democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative
politica l partie s, coali tion s, plus the gr oups that have
been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the
Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the

through DZR H tha t the Magdalos D-Day would be on

February 24, 2006, the 20 Anniversary of Edsa I. th
(a) Section
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo
L om ib ao in ter cep ted in fo rm a tio n tha t me mb er s of th e

first half of 2006.

of tele commun ica tion towers and ce ll si te s in Bu lacan

and Ba taan was also con sidered as additional factual

4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article
III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20]

P N P - S p e c i a l Ac t i o n F o r c e w e r e p l a n n i n g t o d e f e c t .
Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General
Marcelino Franco, Jr. to disavow any defection. The
la tter promptl y obeyed and issued a publi c statement:
A l l S A F u n i t s a r e u n d e r t h e e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o f
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven

basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is

the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the
death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the
Co m mu ni st Par t y of the Ph i li pp i ne s o rd er in g i ts f ro n t
organ i za tion s to join 5,000 Me tro Manila radi cal s and
25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. [10]

of Article XII of the Constitution.

In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 9 , petitioners Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and
unla wful exerci se b y the Pre siden t of her Mar tia l Law
powers. An d a s su m i n g t h a t PP 1 0 1 7 i s n o t r e a l l y a
d ecl ar a tio n of Ma r tia l L a w, p eti ti on er s a r gue d tha t it

integrity and unquestionable loyalty.

O n t h e s a m e d a y, a t t h e h o u s e o f f o r m e r
Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos
brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials
plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration.
Nell y Sindayen of TIME Maga zine reported that Pastor
Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government
o ffi ci a l ab ou t h i s gro up s pl an s i f Pre sid en t Ar r o yo i s
ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta.
Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander
of the Ar m ys elite Scou t Ran ger. Lim said it was all
systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.[8]

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President

convened her security advisers and several cabinet
members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace
and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the
P N P t o a cco u n t f o r a l l t h e i r m e n a n d e n su r e t h a t th e
ch a i n o f co m m a n d r e m a i n s so l i d a n d u n d i v i d e d . To
pr o te ct th e yo u n g stu de n ts f ro m an y po ssib le tro ub le
that might break loose on the streets, the President
su sp en de d cla sse s i n al l lev el s i n the e n ti r e Na ti on al
Capital Region.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 3 9 6 , p e ti ti on er s Ra nd ol f S.

amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency

powers wi thout congressional approval. In addition,
p e t i t i o n e r s a s se r t e d t h a t P P 1 0 1 7 g o e s b e yo n d th e
nature and function of a proclamation as defined under
the Revised Administrative Code.
A n d l a s t l y, i n G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 2 4 , petitioner
Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 are unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom
of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. In

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col.

Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that
a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to
p r o v i d e a cr i t i c a l m a s s a n d a r m e d co m p o n e n t t o t h e
Anti-Arro yo prote sts to be held on Februar y 24, 2005.
Accordin g to the se two (2) officer s, there was no wa y
they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too,
were breaking the chain of command to join the forces
foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has
remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it

this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending
is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
- In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
co n s ti tu ti o n a l gu a r a n te e s of f r e e d o m o f th e p r e s s, o f
General countered that: first, the p e ti ti on s sh ou ld be
speech and of assembly.
dismissed for being
moot; second, petitioners in
In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 0 9 , petitioners Ninez CachoG.R. Nos. 171400 ( ALGI) , 171424 (Lega rda), 171483
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
(KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz
CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear
et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary
c a se o f c e n s o r s h i p o r p r i o r r e s t r a i n t . T h e y a l s o
for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
claimed that the term emergency refers only to
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has con stitu tiona l and

forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the

possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there
is necessity to do so.
In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 3 , petitioners KMU, NAFLUKMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No . 5 are unconsti tutional becau se (1) the y arrogate
u n t o P r e s i d e n t Ar r o y o t h e p o w e r t o e n a c t l a w s a n d
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis;
and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right
of the p eo pl e to pe acea b l y asse mb le to re dr ess th e ir
grievances.
In G.R . N o . 1 71 40 0 , petitioner Alternative Law

Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Respondents further claimed that the bombing
are unconstitutional because they violate

le gal basis; and fifth, P P 1 0 1 7 d o e s n o t v i o l a t e t h e

Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36]

peoples right to
grievances.

H o w e v e r, t h e y f a i l e d t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e C h i e f
Justices very statement that an otherwise moot case
ma y still be decided provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced
or d am a ge d a s a di re ct re su l t of i ts i ssu an ce . T h e

free

expression

and

redress

of

ISSUES
Procedural

Moreov er, i t is in the inte res t of ju stice that tho se

affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Con gre ssmen in bringing to the atten tion of the Cour t
the alleged violations of their basic rights.
- In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 0 0 , (AL GI), thi s Cour t applied the
liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng

1.
W ON the moot and academic principle
precludes the Court from taking cognizance of
the cases
2. WON petitioners in 1 7 1 4 8 5 (Escudero et al.),
G . R . N o s . 1 7 1 4 0 0 (ALGI), 1 7 1 4 8 3 (KMU et

present case falls right within this exception to the

Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,
mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
[61] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the
I n c . v . S e c r e t a r y o f A g r a r i a n R e f o r m ,[62] B a s co v.
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, [63] and
question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is
Taada v. Tuvera,[64] tha t whe n the issue co n ce rn s a

al.), 1 7 1 4 8 9 (Cadiz e t a l .), and 1 7 1 4 2 4

(Legarda) have legal standing
Substantive
3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual

shown that the case is of transcendental importance.

R e a so n i n g
- Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question. [37] In private suits,

public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen

and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
- In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 3 , KMUs assertion that PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly

basis of PP 1017
4. WON PP 1017
unconstitutional

st a n d i n g i s go v e r n e d b y th e r e a l - p a r ti e s- i n i n te r e s t
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every

ma y be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing.

Organizations may be granted standing to assert
t h e r i g h t s o f t h e i r m e m b e r s .[65]
We take judicial

action must be prosecuted or defended in the

n a me of t he re a l p a rt y in in t e re s t . Accordingly, the
real-party-in interest is th e p a rt y w ho s ta nd s t o be
bene fited o r in ju re d b y the judg men t in the suit or
t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t o t h e a v a i l s o f t h e s u i t . [38]

notice of the announcement by the Office of the

President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for
public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
- In G. R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 9 , petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are

and

G.O.

No.

are

a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD
Procedural
1. NO. Courts wil l decide ca ses, o ther wi se moo t and
academic, if: first, t h e r e i s a g r a v e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e
Constitution; [31] second, the exceptional character of the

Su ccin ctl y put, the plain tiff s standin g is based on his

own right to the relief sought.
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled
f r o m th e c a se s d e ci d e d b y t h i s C o u r t . Tax p a ye r s ,

national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any
direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution
or its members may suffer as a consequence of the

situation and the paramount public interest is involved;

[32]
third, w h e n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e r a i s e d r e q u i r e s

voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be

accorded stand ing to sue , provided tha t the followin g

issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated

Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [66] the Court held that

formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,

the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. [34]

requirements are met:

1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpa yers , t h e r e m u s t b e a c l a i m o f i l l e g a l

the mere invoca tion b y the IBP of i ts duty to preserve

the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
tru e , i s n ot su ffi cie n t to clo th e i t wi th sta nd i n g i n thi s

R e a so n i n g
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; [31]
second, the exceptional chara cter of the si tuation and
the paramount public interest is involved; [32] third, when

disbursement of public funds or that the tax

case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
measure is unconstitutional;
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view
3. for voters, t h e r e m u s t b e a sh o w i n g o f o bv i o u s
of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;

declares that petitioner have locus standi.

- In G.R . No . 17 14 24 , Loren Legarda has no personality

constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

con trol ling prin ciple s to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; [33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. [34]

4. or concerned citizens , there must be a showing

as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no
that the issues raised are of transcendental
allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The
importance which must be settled early; and
fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence.
5. or legislators, t h e r e m u s t b e a c l a i m t h a t t h e
She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation

- Al l t h e f o r e g o i n g e x c e p t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t h e r e a n d
justif y th is Cour ts assump tion of ju ri sdiction over the
instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There
i s n o que sti on th a t the issue s be in g ra ised affe ct the
publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic
rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the
press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
b e n ch a n d t h e b a r, a n d i n th e p r e se n t p e ti t i o n s , t h e
mi litar y and the police , on the exten t of the prote ction
g i v e n b y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s . [35]
An d l a st l y,

o ffi ci a l a ct i o n co m p l a i n e d o f i n f r i n ge s u p o n th e i r
that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired
prerogatives as legislators.
by PP 1017 and G.O. No . 5.
Her clai m tha t she i s a
- N o w, th e ap pl i ca ti on of th e a bov e p ri n cip le s to th e
media personality will not likewise aid her because there
present petitions.
was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
- The locus standi of petitioners in G . R . N o . 1 7 1 3 9 6 ,
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her
parti cular l y David and Llamas, i s beyond doubt. The
submission that she has pending electoral protest before
same holds true with petitioners in G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 0 9 ,
t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t o r a l T ri b u n a l i s l i k e w i s e o f n o
Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publ ishin g Co. Inc. They
relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017
alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
wi l l affe ct the pr ocee di n gs or r esu l t of h er ca se . Bu t
unlawful search committed by police operatives
considering once more the transcendental importance of
pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General
the i ssue i nvo lv ed , th i s Co ur t ma y r el ax the sta nd in g
does not question their legal standing.
rules.
- In G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 8 5 , the opposition Congressmen
- It mu st alwa ys be borne in mind tha t the que stion of

respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.

Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In
their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case,
respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans

alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.

They also raised the issue of whether or not the
co n cu r r e n ce o f C o n gr e ss i s n e ce ssa r y wh e n e v e r th e
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.

locus standi i s b u t co ro l la r y to th e bi g ger que sti on o f

proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying
legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing.
It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and

G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount

importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice
Laurel , the who le of Phil ippine so ciety no w wai ts wi th

correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily.

T h u s, th e s ta n d a r d l a i d d o wn i s n o t co r r e c tn e ss , b u t
arbitrariness. [83] It is in c u mbe n t u p on th e pe t it io ne r

and
rebellion
are
considered
harmful
and
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
- Second, facia l invalida tion of la ws is con sidered as

bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical

matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
transce nden tal impo rtance doctrine, a relaxation of

to show tha t the Pre s ide nts de c is ion is tota ll y

beref t of factua l bas is and that if he fails, by way of
proof, to support his assertion, then this Court cannot

man ifest l y st ron g med ic ine , to be used sparingly

and only as a last resort, and
i s generall y
disfavored;[107]
The reason for this is obvious.

the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP

1017 cases.
- T hi s C ou r t h ol ds th a t a ll th e p eti ti on er s h er ei n h ave
locus standi.
- Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT
ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE

un dertake an in depe ndent in vest iga tion be yon d

the pleadings .
- P e t i t i o n e r s f a i l e d t o s h o w t h a t P r e s i d e n t Ar r o y o s
exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor
Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum

Embedded
in
the
traditional
rules
governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person
to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied uncon stitutionall y to o thers, i .e., i n o t h e r
situations not before the Court. [108]

THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE

OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY,
MAY NOT BE SUED IN[67]
challenge to mount

shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the

- And third, a f a c i a l c h a l l e n g e o n t h e g r o u n d o f
ANY
i ssua n ce o f P P 10 17 , wi th su pp or ti n g re po r ts fo rm in g
o v e r b r e a d t h i s t h e m o s t d i f fi c u l t

CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO

PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President,
the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
l i ti ga ti o n s w h i l e se r v i n g a s su ch . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s
important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
t h e p e r f o r m a n ce o f h i s o f fi c i a l d u ti e s a n d f u n c t i o n s .
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one

p ar t o f th e re cor d s. Pe ti ti on e r s pr esen te d no thi n g to

refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary
alle ga tion s, the Cour t is convinced tha t the Pre siden t
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the
constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling
out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire
into the factual basis of such exercise to determine
wh e the r i t wa s wi th in th e con sti tu tio na l l y p er mi ssi bl e

successfull y, since the chal lenger must establi sh tha t

there can be no instance when the assailed law
ma y be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to
show whether this situation exists.
- Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for
vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must
n e c e s s a r i l y g u e s s a t i t s m e a n i n g a n d d if f e r a s t o
its application.[110] It is subject to the same principles

co n st i t u te s th e ex e cu t i v e b r a n ch a n d a n yth i n g wh i ch
i m p a i r s h i s u s e f u l n e s s i n t h e d i s ch a r g e o f t h e m a n y
g r e a t a n d i m p o r t a n t d u ti e s i m p o se d u p o n h i m b y th e
C o n st i tu ti o n n e ce s sa r i l y i m p a i r s th e o p e r a ti o n of th e
G o v e r n m e n t . H o w e v e r, t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other
official, he remains accountable to the people [68] but he

limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its

exercise. (This interpretation was based on Article VIII,
section 1
a. Facial Challenge.
Facial invalidation of laws
(ov er br ea d th do ctri ne ) sha l l n ot be re so r ted to in the
absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the
exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no

governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an

anal yti cal tool for te sting on thei r faces s t a t u t e s in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
va g u e i n a l l i t s p o s s i b l e a p p l i c a t i o n s . Ag a i n ,
p e t i t i o n e r s d i d n o t e ve n a t t e m p t t o s h o w t h a t P P
10 17 is va g u e in all its ap p lica t io n . They also failed

may be removed from office only in the mode provided

by law and that is by impeachment. [69]

instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3)
the Court has no other alternative remedies available.

to e s ta b l i sh t h a t m e n of co m m o n i n te l l i ge n ce ca n n o t
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

Substantive
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be
b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President
3. The Presidents calling-out power is a discretionary
facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must
to ex er ci se h i s ca l l in g ou t p o wer to sup p re ss l a wl e ss
power solely vested in his wisdom. However, this does
n e c e s sa r i l y g u e s s a t i t s m e a n i n g a n d d i ff e r a s t o i t s
vio le n ce sha l l n ot be de em ed to i n cl ud e the po we r to
not prevent an examination of whether such
application.
a u th o r i ze : ( a ) a r r e s t s a n d s e i zu r e s w i t h o u t j u d i ci a l
power
was
exercised
within
permissible
R e a so n i n g
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in
P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e n d t h a t P P 1 0 1 7 i s v o i d o n i t s f a ce
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
a ma nn e r c on s t itu t in g g ra ve ab u se o f d isc ret io n .
because of its overbreadth. They claim that its
issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be
T h is ru li n g is ba se d on Se ctio n 1 , Ar ti cl e VI II of 19 87
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
pr o te cted righ ts un de r Se ction 4, Ar ticle III of th e
where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or
d e te r m i n e i n a n a p p r o p r i a te a c ti o n th e v a l i d i t y o f th e
Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the citizens.
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
acts of the political departments.
Under the new
- A f a ci a l r e v i e w o f P P 1 0 1 7 , u si n g th e o v e r b r e a d th
- The take care power of the President, which includes
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not
doctrine, is uncalled for. F i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t , th e
t h e p o w e r t o e n f o r c e o b e d i e n ce o f l a w s sh a l l n o t b e
only to settle actual controversies involving rights
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
deemed to include calling the military to enforce or
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.
i m p l e m e n t ce r t a i n l a w s , su c h a s cu s t o m s l a w s , l a w s
t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e h a s b e e n a
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
governing family and property relations, laws on
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
obligations and contracts and the like.
excess of juris dic tion on the part of an y b ranch or
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
- The ordinance power of the President shall not include
in s t ru me n ta lit y o f th e g o ve rn me n t . The latter part
forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,
the po wer to make de crees wi th the same for ce and
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
[104] t h e U S S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t w e h a v e n o t
effect as those issued by President Marcos.
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before a forbidden terri tor y,
to wi t, the discretion of
t h e p o l i t i c a l d e p a r tm e n t s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t . [81]
It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power
but also of duty.[82]
- Ho wever, judi cial inqu ir y can go n o f ur th e r than to
sa ti sf y the Court not th a t the Pre sid en ts d eci sio n i s

re c o g n i z e d a n o ve r b r e a d t h d o c t r i n e o u t s i d e t h e
lim ite d c o nt ex t o f th e F irs t Ame n d me nt ( f re e d o m
of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not
in tended for testin g the validity of a law tha t reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
condu ct. Undoubtedl y, lawle ss violence , in surrection

- In the absence of delegated authority from Congress,

the authority of the President to declare a state of
emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privatel y owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
- Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be

deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation

clearly defining said acts and providing specific
punishments therefor.

e x e r c i s e o f a n a w e s o m e p o w e r . O bv i o u sl y, su ch
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

R e a so n i n g
Calling-out Power

- Some of the petitioners vehementl y maintain that PP

1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so.

if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office

as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,[117] including the Philippine National Police [118]
under the Department of Interior and Local Government.
[119]

- The Constitution grants the President, as Commanderin-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. These are:
the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the wri t of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, t h e Pr e si d e n t m a y ca l l t h e a r m e d f o r ce s
to p re ve nt o r supp ress law less vio lence, in vas io n
o r re b e l l i o n . C o n si d e r i n g th e ci r cu m s ta n ce s t h e n
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue
PP 1017.
Owing to her Offices vast intelligence
n e tw o r k , sh e i s i n th e b e st p o si t i o n to d e te r m i n e th e
actual condition of the country.
- Under the call ing-ou t power, the Pre sident ma y
s u m m o n th e a r m e d f o r ce s t o a i d h i m i n s u p p r e s s i n g
l aw le ss vi o l en ce , i n va s i o n an d r eb e l l i o n . This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be

What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings.

It is plain therein that what the President invoked was
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
her calling-out power.
d e cr e e s ?
- I n h i s Sta temen t before the Senate Commi ttee on
- PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to
Justice o n M a rc h 1 3 , 2 0 0 6 , M r. J u s ti c e Vic en t e V.
all the laws and decrees x x x p r o m u l g a t e d b y me
Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President
personall y or upon my direction.
as Co mm an de r - in - Ch ie f , the p o wer to d ecl ar e M ar tia l
- The President is granted an Ordinan ce Po wer under
Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a
C h a p te r 2 , B o o k I I I o f Ex e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . 2 9 2
strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly.
(Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to issue
It ca n n o t b e u se d to st i f l e o r p e r se cu te c r i t i c s o f th e
executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
government. It is placed in the keeping of the President
memorandum orders/circulars, general or special orders.
f o r th e p u r p o se o f e n a b l i n g h i m to se cu r e t h e p e o p l e
P r e s i d e n t Ar r o yo s o r d i n a n ce p o w e r i s l i m i te d t o t h e
from harm and to restore order so tha t the y can en jo y
foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar
their individual freedoms.
to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP
- J u s t i ce M e n d o za a l s o s t a te d t h a t P P 1 0 1 7 i s n o t a
1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by
same ca te gor y and binding force as sta tutes becau se
the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress
they were issued by the President in the exercise of his
lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify
legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law
the 1973 Constitution. [121]

careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke

a greate r power when he wi she s to act under a lesser
po wer. There lie s the wi sdom of our Consti tution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
- It i s pertinent to state, however, that there i s a
distinction between the Presidents authority to declare
a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. While President
Arroyos authority to declare a state of rebellion
emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the
s t a t u t o r y a u th o r i t y ci t e d i n Sanlakas w a s Se ct i o n 4 ,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
publi c momen t or inte rest, upon the existen ce of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation
is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
p r o c l a m a t i o n s w h i ch s h a l l h a v e t h e f o r ce o f a n
executive order.
- President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of
Sanlakas, i s ha rm le ss, wi th ou t le ga l si gni fi can ce , a nd
deemed no t wr itten . In these case s, PP 1017 i s more
than tha t. In declar ing a sta te of nationa l emergency,

can be done.
Its use for any other purpose is a
- T he a ss a ile d P P 10 17 is u nc o ns t it ut io n a l in s of a r
p erv er sio n of i ts n a tu re a nd scop e , a nd an y a ct d on e
a s it g ra n t s P re s id e n t Ar r o yo t h e a u t h o ri t y t o
con trar y to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a)
p ro mu lg at e de c ree s . Legislative power is peculiarly
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
VI ca te go r i ca l l y sta te s tha t [ t ] h e l e g i s l a t i ve p o w e r
a g e n c i e s a n d p r e s s c e n s o r sh i p ; a n d ( d ) i s s u a n ce o f
sh a ll b e ve s t ed in th e C o ng re ss o f t he Ph i lip p in es
Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
by the Pre sident as Commander -in- Chief only where
Representatives . To be sure, neither Martial Law nor
there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension
a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
of the writ of habeas corpus.
P r e s i d e n t Ar r o y o s e x e r c i s e o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r b y
- Based on the above disqui sition, it is clea r tha t PP
issuing decrees.
1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. I t is m e re l y
an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
and laws through the military?
or suppressing lawless violence.
- As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no
authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees
Ta ke C a re Po we r
are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. W ith
- The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power
respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce
o f t h e Pr e si d e n t to e n su r e th a t th e l a w s b e f a i th f u l l y
or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which
governing family and property relations, laws on
reads:
ob li ga ti on s an d con tr a cts a nd the l i ke . Sh e ca n o nl y
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
o r d e r t h e m i l i t a r y, u n d e r P P 1 0 1 7 , t o e n f o r c e l a w s
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence .
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
P o w e r t o Tak e O v e r
- As t h e E x e c u t i v e i n w h o m t h e e x e c u t i v e p o w e r i s
The pertinent provision of PP 1017
vested,[115] th e p r i m a r y f u n c ti o n o f th e P r e s i d e n t i s to
states:

President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article

VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to
p rev en t or sup pr e ss l a wle ss vi ol en ce , i nva sio n o r
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
p r o v i si o n o n t h e S t a t e s e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o w e r t o t a ke
over privately-owned public utility and business affected
w i t h p u b l i c i n te r e s t .
In d e e d , P P 1 0 1 7 ca l l s f o r th e

enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be

embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to
take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President
of the Phi lippine s, he wil l, among other s, execu te i ts
laws.[116] In the exercise of such function, the President,

x x x a n d t o e n f o r ce o b e d i e n ce t o a l l
the laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations
promulgated
by
me
pe rson a ll y or u po n m y d ir e ctio n ; and
a s p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 1 7 , Ar t i c l e
XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare
a
state
of
national

eme rge nc y.
- The import of this provision is that President Arro yo,
during the state of national emergency under PP 1017,
can call the military not only to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act
pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which
reads:
Sec. 17. In ti me s of n a ti on a l
e me r gen c y, whe n the pu bl i c in te re st
so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily

cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to other
na t io na l eme rge n c y. If the intention of the Framers
of our Constitution was to withhold from the President
the authority to declare a state of national emergency
pursuant to Section 18, Ar ti cle VII (ca llin g- out po wer)
and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
e x i s t e n c e o f a s ta t e o f w a r ) , t h e n t h e F r a m e r s c o u l d
h a v e p r o v i d e d so . C l e a r l y, t h e y d i d n o t i n te n d th a t
Congress should first authorize the President before he
can declare a state of national emergency. Therefore,

may exercise such power is dependent on whether

Congress ma y delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
- Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence
of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is
accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the
el em en ts o f in ten si t y, va ri e ty, an d p er ce p tio n .
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in
the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
w i d e r a n ge o f si tu a t i o n s , c l a s si f i a b l e u n d e r t h r e e ( 3 )
principal heads: a) economic, b) nat ura l d isaste r,[129]

take over or direct the operation of any

privately-owned
public
utility
or
business affected with public interest.

President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a

sta te of na tio na l e me r ge n cy ev en in th e ab se n ce of a
Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected wi th public interest, is a different matter. This

and c) national securit y.

- Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of
the same bread th. It may include rebellion , econo mic
crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other
similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
[131]
This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking

the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
- During the existence of the state of national
e me r gen c y, PP 1 01 7 p ur po r ts to gr an t the Pr e sid en t,
wi thou t an y au thority or dele ga tion from Con gre ss, to
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
- This provision was first introduced in the 1973

requires a delegation from Congress.

Commission.
- Consti tu tional provi sions in pari ma teria a r e t o b e
- Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII,
construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses,
inv oked b y Pr e sid en t Ar ro yo i n issu in g PP 1 01 7 , thi s
sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authori ze
the same subject matter will be construed together and
he r du ri n g th e em er ge n cy to te mp or ar i l y ta ke ove r o r
co n sid er ed i n the l i gh t o f e ach o th er. [123] Considering
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility

Con stitu tion . In effect at the time of i ts approval wa s

President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of
N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e t o t a k e o v e r th e m a n a g e m e n t ,
control and operation of the Manila Electric Company,
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the
N a t i o n a l W at e r w o r k s a n d S e w e r a g e Au t h o r i t y, t h e
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air
M a n ila ( a n d ) Filip in a s O r ie n t Air wa ys . . . f o r th e
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to
contain, solve and end the present national emergency.
- Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion
of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment
on the legislatures emergency powers.
- A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents
authority to declare a sta te o f n a ti o n a l e m e r g e n c y
a n d t o exercise e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s . To t h e f i r s t ,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power,
h e n ce , n o l e g i t i m a t e co n s t i t u t i o n a l o b je c t i o n ca n b e
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues
arise.
- Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI

or business affected with public interest without
relate to national emergencies, they must be read
authority from Congress.
to ge ther to determ ine the li mitation of the exercise of
- Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
emergency powers.
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
- Generally, Congress is the repository of
legislation, he has no power to take over privatelye me rg e n c y p o w e rs . T h i s i s e v i d e n t i n t h e t e n o r o f
o w n e d p u b l i c u t i l i t y o r b u s i n e s s a f fe c t e d w i t h p u b l i c
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
in ter e st. T he Pr e sid en t can no t d ecid e whe th er
powers to the President. C e r t a i n l y, a b o d y c a n n o t
e x c e p t i o n a l ci r c u m s t a n ce s e x i s t w a r r a n t i n g th e t a ke
d e l e g a t e a p o w e r n o t r e p o s e d u p o n i t . However,
over of privately-owned public utility or business
kno win g that during gr ave emer gen cies, i t ma y not be
a ffe ct e d wi t h p u b l i c i n te r e st . N o r ca n h e d e te r m i n e
possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
w h e n su c h e x ce p ti o n a l c i r c u m s ta n ce s h a v e c e a s e d .
ex e r c i se i ts p o we r s, th e F r a m e r s of o u r C o n s ti tu ti o n
Likewise, w it h o u t le g is la t io n , t h e Pr e si d e n t h a s n o
deemed it wi se to allo w Con gre ss to gr ant emergency
power to point out the types of businesses affected with
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
thus:
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
(1) There must be a war or ot her emergenc y.
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
(2) The delegation must be for a limited pe riod
absence of an emergency powers act passed by
only.
Congress.
(3) T h e d e l e g a t i o n m u s t b e s u b j e c t t o s u c h
c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe .
as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to
carry out a national policy declared by
implement them.
Congress.[124]
- The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the

S E C . 2 3 . ( 1 ) T he Co n gre ss, b y a vo te of two thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,

voting separatel y, shall have the s o le p o w e r t o
dec lare the existe nce of a state of w ar .
(2) In ti m e s o f wa r o r other national
eme rge nc y, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall

- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect

authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein
of the e me r gen c y p o wer s cl au se . Th e ta kin g ove r of
considered
unconstitutional
are
also
deemed
p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s a ff e c t e d w i t h p u b l i c i n te r e s t i s j u s t
unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of
another facet of the emergency powers generally
necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
against specific abuses committed by authorities.
that the th e St at e ma y, du rin g th e e me rg en c y an d
R e a so n i n g
under reasonable
terms prescribed
by it,
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and
temp ora ril y take o ve r o r d irec t the ope rat io n of
G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general,
any privately owned public utility or business
does the illegal implementation of a law render it
a ff ec te d w ith pu b lic in t e re st , it refers to Congress,
unconstitutional?
no t the President. No w, whe ther or no t the President
- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to

declare statutes invalid although they may be

a b u s e d a n d m i s a b u s e d [135] and m a y a f f o r d a n

Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without

restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate

880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David

was the leader of the rally. [147]

opportunit y
for abuse in the manner of
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
- But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et
application.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is
residen ces, taking over the media enterp rise s,
al. is that not onl y wa s the ir right aga inst warran tle ss
to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, n o t f r o m i t s
effects in a pa rticular case .[137] PP 1017 is merely an

prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and

gatherings unfriend l y to the admin istra tion . All these
can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts

i n v o ca t i o n o f th e P r e si d e n t s ca l l i n g - o u t p o w e r. I t s
general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all
forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President
Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allo wing the police , expre ssl y or implied l y, to conduct
illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional
rights.
- N o w, m a y th i s C ou r t a d jud ge a l a w o r or di na n ce

go fa r be yo nd th e ca l l in g- o u t po we r of the Pre sid en t.

C e r ta i n l y, th e y v i o l a te t h e d u e p r o ce s s cl a u se o f th e
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the acts of
terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably

assemble.
- Assem b l y un de r Ar t. III, Se c. 2 of the Co nsti tu ti on

means a right on the part of the citizens to meet

peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It
is a necessary consequence of our republican institution
and complements the right of speech. This right is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY
a c le a r an d p res e nt da n ge r of a substantive evil that
A U T H O R I T I E S P U R S U A N T T O P P 1 0 1 7 AN D G . O .
C on gr e ss ha s a ri gh t to pr eve n t. In o the r wo r d s, the
NO. 5
right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or
- In the Brief Account [144] submitted by petitioner David,
cen sorsh ip. It ma y not be condi tioned upon the prior

unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor

ce r tai n fa cts a re e stab l i sh ed : first, h e w a s a r r e s t e d
issuance of a permit or authorization from the
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion
without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested
government authorities except, of course, if the
by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be
him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at
a s se m b l y i s i n t e n d e d t o b e h e l d i n a p u b l i c p l a ce , a
measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted,
permit for the use of such place, and not for the
power, and n o t a m e r e i n c i d e n t a l r e s u l t a r i s i n g
photographed and booked like a criminal suspect;
assembly itself, may be validly required.
from its exertion .[138] This is logical.
fourth, h e w a s t r e a t e d b r u s q u e l y b y p o l i c e m e n w h o
- The ringin g truth here is tha t pe titioner David, et al.
- President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect
the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as

held his head and tried to push him inside an

were arrested while the y were exercising their right to
unmarked car; fifth, h e wa s cha r ged wi th Vio la ti on of
p e a ce f u l a s se m b l y.
They were not committing any
Batas Pambansa No. 880[145] and Inciting to
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the

Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours;
present danger that warranted the limitation of that
Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the
and seventh, he was
eventually released for
right.
As ca n b e g l e a n e d f r o m c i r cu m s t a n c e s , t h e
executive offi cer to hi s subordina te s preci sel y for the
insufficiency of evidence.
charges of inc it in g t o s ed it io n and vio lat io n o f B P
proper and efficient a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f la w . Such
- The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no
880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General,
rules and regulations create no relation except between
person shall be arrested without warrant. The
during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting
the official who issues them and the official who receives
recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
officers conduct.
them.[139] They are based on and are the product of, a
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
- On the basis of the above principles, the Court
relationship in which power is their source, and
obedien ce, their ob je ct. [140]
F o r th e se r e a so n s, o n e

Sec. 5. A r r e s t w i t h o u t w a r r a n t ; w h e n l a w f u l . -

like wise considers the dispersal and arrest of the

members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted.

requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must

be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
- G.O. No. 5 manda tes the AF P and the PNP to
immediately
carry
out
the
necessary
and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and law less violence.
- Unlike the term lawless violence, the phrase acts of
t e r r o r i s m i s s t i l l a n a m o r p h o u s a n d v a g u e co n ce p t .
Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing

A peace officer or a private person may, without a

warrant, arrest a person:
(a) W h e n , i n h i s p r e s e n c e , t h e p e r s o n t o b e
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of

Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously
i ssu ed b y l oca l gov er nm en t un i ts. Thi s i s a rb i tra r y.
The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rall y is a
b l a ta n t d i sr e g a r d o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t f r e e d o m o f
a s s e mb l y i s n o t t o b e li m it e d , mu c h le s s d e n ie d ,
except on a showing of a clear and present
d a n g e r o f a s u b s t a n t i ve e vil t h a t t h e St a t e h a s a
r i g h t t o p r e v e n t .[149]
Tol e r a n c e i s t h e r u l e a n d

acts of terrorism.
- The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may
result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police
or military.
- So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our
criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated Januar y 16,
1 98 1 en acted b y Pr e sid en t Ma rco s d ur in g the M ar ti al
Law regime.
- P.D . No . 1835 wa s repealed b y E.O. No . 167 (whi ch

- Neithe r of the two (2) excep tion s mentioned above

justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During
t h e i n q u e s t f o r th e c h a r g e s o f i n c i t i n g t o s e d i t i o n
and v i o l a t i o n o f B P 8 8 0 , a l l t h a t t h e a r r e s t i n g
o ff i ce r s c o u l d i n v o ke w a s t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t
some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Now and the ir erroneou s
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered

limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that

an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens right to exercise
it.W ith the blanket revocation of permits, the
d i stin cti on be twe en p ro te cte d a nd un pr o te cted
assemblies was eliminated.
- M o r e o v e r, u n d e r B P 8 8 0 , t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e gu l a te
assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits

outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted

by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two
( 2 ) l a w s , h o w e v e r, d o n o t d e f i n e a c t s o f t e r r o r i s m .
Since there i s no law defining acts of ter rorism, it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.

his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing
it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with i nciting
t o s e d it i o n . F u r t h e r, h e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e i s
insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP

and to revoke such permits a ft e r d ue n o t i c e a nd

hearing on the determination of the presence of clear
a n d p r e se n t d a n ge r. H e r e , p e ti ti o n e r s w e r e n o t ev e n
no tif ie d a nd he ar d on the r ev oca tio n of the ir pe rm i ts.
The first time the y learned of it wa s at the time of the
d i sp e r sa l . S u ch a b se n ce o f n o ti ce i s a f a ta l d e f e ct .

W hen a persons right is restricted by government

media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff [152] this Court held

In

this

connection,

Chief

Justice

Artemio

V.

action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it

that -Pa n gan ib an s co n cu r ri n g op in io n , a tta ch ed h er e to , i s
that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
procedure.
th e b usi ne ss an d p ri n ti n g o ffice s of the
- G . R . N o . 1 7 1 4 0 9 , (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents
"Metropolitan Mail" a n d t h e " W e Forum
De ci sio n
another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are par tl y gran ted . The
t h e p r e ss . Pe ti ti o n e r s n a r r a ti o n of f a ct s, w h i ch th e
seizure, t h e s e p r e m i s e s w e r e p a d l o c k e d a n d
Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
Solicitor General failed to refute, established the
sealed, with the further result that the
it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched
p r in t i n g a n d p u b li c a t i o n o f s a id n ew s p a p e rs
on the AFP to pre vent or suppress lawless violence .
wi thout warrant; second, the police operatives sei zed
were discontinued .
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP
several materials for publication; third, the search was
Such closure is in the nature of previous
to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
d e cr e e s p r o m u l g a t e d b y th e P r e si d e n t , a r e d e cl a r e d
February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in
freedom of the press guaranteed under the
UNCONSTITUTIONAL . In addition, the provision in PP
the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
1017 declarin g na tional emer gen cy under Section 17,
the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen
denial of petitioners' freedom to express
Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but
stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune
themselves in print. This state of being is
such declaration does not authorize the President to take
offices.
patent l y
an at h e ma t ic
to a democratic
over privately-owned public utility or business affected
- Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government
framework where a free, alert and even
with public interest without prior legislation.
officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was
militant press is essential for the political
- G.O. No. 5 i s CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
quoted as saying that such raid was m e a n t t o s h o w a
enlig hten ment and g row th of the cit izenr y .
s tandard b y wh ich the AF P and the PN P should
strongpresence,totellmediaoutletsnotto
- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not
i mp l em en t PP 1 01 7, i .e . wha te ve r is n ec es sa r y a nd
c on n i ve o r d o an yt h in g t ha t w o uld he lp t he re be ls
padlocked and sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
in bringing dow n this government.
Director
W e Foru m n ewspa pers in the ab ove cas e, yet it
pre ven t acts of law less vio le nce. Considering that
General Lomibao fur ther stated tha t i f t h e y d o n o t
cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded
acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made
follow the standards and the standards are if
their enfor cement dutie s. The sear ch and sei zure of
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
they would contribute to instability in the
materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
go ve rn men t, or if the y do not subsc ribe to what is
the vi cin i ty o f th e The Daily Tribune offices, and the
- The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we
arrogant warning of government officials to media, are
Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU
will
reco mmend
a
takeo ver .
National
plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
a nd N AFL U - KM U me mb e r s du ri n g th ei r r al l ie s, in th e
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
r e p r e s si v e go v e r n m e n t wh o te l l s t h e ci ti ze n th a t h e
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing
television and radio networks to c o o p e r a t e with the
may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no
acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
government for the duration of the state of national
less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
a n d v i o l a ti n g B P 8 8 0 ; th e i m p o si ti o n of s ta n d a r d s o n
emergency.
He warned that his agency will not
p u n i s h m e n t sh o u l d h e b e s o r a s h a s to d i so b e y. [153]
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well
hes itate to rec ommen d the closure of any
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to
a s th e w a r r a n tl e ss se a r ch o f th e Tribune offices and
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
these arbitrary intrusions because of its antiwhimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
me dia co ve ra ge durin g t imes when the nat iona l
government sentiments. This Cour t cannot tole rate
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL .
securit y is threatened .
the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it
- T h e se a r ch i s i l l e g a l . R u l e 1 2 6 , S e c t i o n 4 of The
involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
R evi sed R ul e s o n C r im i na l Pr o ce du re re qui r e s tha t a
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts
PADILLA; April 13, 1989
connection with one specific offence to be determined
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
FACTS
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.
- Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission
produce. S e c t i o n 8 m a n d a te s th a t t h e se a r ch of a
[154]
on Appointments
house, room, or any other premise be made in the
p r e s e n c e o f t h e lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9
states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the da yt ime, unless the property is on the person or in
the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction ma y be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDG operatives.
- Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom
of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic
so cie t y re sts i n th e d e gr ee of fr ee do m en jo ye d b y i ts

- In ciden tall y, during the oral argu ments, the Soli ci tor
- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista
General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices
as Acting Chair of CHR, who took oath of office before CJ
and the seizure of its materials for publication and other
Fernan. She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.
papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible
Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on
for any purpose,
Appointments requesting her to submit info and docs in
- T h e C o u r t h a s p a s se d u p o n t h e co n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y o f
connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.
these issuances. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is
- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her
limited to the calling out by the President of the military
presence at a meeting to deliberate on her appointment.
t o p r e v e n t o r su p p r e s s l a w l e s s v i o l e n c e , i n v a s i o n o r
Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on
rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant
A p p o i n t m e n t s , s a yi n g w h y s h e c o n s i d e r e d C o m m o n
to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts
Ap p o i n tm e n ts a s h a v i n g n o j u r i sd i ct i o n to r e v i e w h e r
which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution,
appointment.
this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and
illegal.

- A s c o n v e y e d i n a l e t t e r t o t h e E x e c S e c r e t a r y,
C om m i ssio n on Ap po i n tme n ts d isap p rov ed Ba u ti sta s
ad interim appointment as Chair.
- Bautistas motion for reconsideration was denied.
- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres
d e s i g n a te d M a l l i l l i n a s Ac t i n g C h a i r o f C H R p e n d i n g
resolution of Bautistas case.
- Bau ti sta filed thi s petition w/ prayer for issuance of
restraining order to enjoin Commission of Appointments
not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment.
- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order
imp leading Malli llin as respondent. She also filed exparte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair
and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers.
- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding
Commission on Appointments, being instrumentality of
coequal branch.
Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent
appointment as Chair on Dec 17, 1988.
This
appointment was for Pres solely to make.
ISSUES
1. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on
Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confirmation of
Commission on Appointments
2 . W ON P r e s c o u l d e x t e n d a n o th e r a p p o i n t m e n t t o
petitioner on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin appointment or
any other kind of appointment to same office of Chair of
CHR that called for confirmation by Commission on
Appointments.
3 . W ON in appoin tments so lel y for Pres to make , the
Pres can voluntarily submit such appointment to
Commission on Appointment for confirmation.
4. WON the petition has become moot and academic.
HELD
1. NO
- CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned
in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore, appointment must
be w/o review of Commission on Appointments.
- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the
position of CHR Chair does not have express provision
that appointment should be with consent of Commission
on Appointments.
- Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c
Pres is authorized by law to appoint.
2. NO
- Bautistas appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was
a completed act on the part of the Pres.
- No new appointment could be made to position
alread y filled b y a previousl y comp leted appointmen t,
accepted by appointee through qualification and
assumption of duties.
Even if Pres could submit to Commission on
Appointments an appointment that belongs solely to her,
still, there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989.
Nor can respondents contend that the new
appointment on Jan 14 was an ad interim appointment
bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to

make. It extends only to those where review of Comm

on Appointments is needed. That is why those types of
appointments remain valid until disapp roval by
Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment
of Congress.
3. NO
- To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can
from time to time move power boundaries in Consti.
- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where
Consti confers none. If Consti made appointment
exclusive for Pres, Pres cant grant power of participation
in Commission on Appointments. Nor can Commission
on Appointments create power to confirm appointments
that Consti has reserved to Pres alone.
4. NO
- R e s p o n d e n t co n te n d s th a t w / o r w / o co n f i r m a t i o n ,
Bautista can be removed fr office anytime at pleasure of
Pres. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination by
Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason
for her removal. Thus, issue is moot and academic. SC
d i sa gr ee s a nd sa ys pe ti tio ne r ca me i n ti me l y m an ne r
and didnt show intention of abandoning her petition.
- EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without
reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office
(at plea sure of Pre s). The diff bet term and tenure is
impt. Consistent w/ CHRs needed independence, tenure
in office cant be later made dependent on pleasure of
Pres.
Obiter
- Sarmiento III V. Mison
- Issue: W hich appointments under 1987 Consti are
to be w/ and w/o review of Commission on
Appointments?
- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1 sentence st
of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commission.
Other appointments by President are to be made w/o
participation of Commission.
- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs
head is valid.
- Marbury V. Madison
- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres power over
the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the
officer is not removable by him.
D e ci si on Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent
aga inst Malli llin ; Petitioner Bau ti sta is la wful Chair of
CHR, she may be removed only for cause.
Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting Opinion
Cruz, Dissenting
Grio-Aquino, Dissenting

SARMIENTO V MISON
PADILLA; December 17, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers,
lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to

enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as

Co m mi ssi on er o f th e Bur ea u of C usto m s. In a dd i tio n ,
the y wo uld want to en join Budget Se cretar y Guil lermo
Carague
from
disbursing
Misons
salary
and
emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that
Misons stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no
co n f i r m a t i o n co m i n g f r o m th e C o m m i s si o n o n
Appointments that is required by the Constitution. The
Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene
in the court proceeding.
- The case was considered justiciable given that there is
g r e a t p u b l i c i n te r e st su ch a s th e n e e d f o r st a b i l i t y i n
public service. This di sposed the que stion of whe ther
this is the proper remedy to question respondents right
to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and also that of the legal standing of the
petitioners.
- The Constitutional Provision under careful examination
is Article VII Section 16, which states that:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be
au thori zed by law to appoint. The Congress ma y, b y
l a w, ve s t th e a p p o i n tm e n t o f o th e r o ffi ce r s l o w e r i n
r a n k i n th e Pr e si d e n t a l o n e , i n th e co u r ts , o r i n th e
heads of the departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
ISSUE
WON Misons stay in Office was Constitutional
HELD
- Yes it is constitutional.
- Reading Article VII Se ction 16 there are 4 groups of
officers who the President is able to appoint. The first
group would be the heads of the executive departments,
a m b a s sa d o r s , o th e r p u b l i c m i n i s te r s a n d co n su l s , o r
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval capta in, and o ther office rs who se appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. The second group
is composed of those officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The
third group are those whom the President may be
authori zed b y la w to appoin t. Lastl y, the four th group,
are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
- To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to
loo k at the previou s consti tu tion s, the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments
is subject to the approval of the Commission on
Appointments while this was removed in the 1973
C o n st i tu ti o n wh e r e i n th e P r e s i d e n t i s a b l e to a p p o i n t

without the need for the approval of the Commission on

Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935
provision became a venue of horse-trading (used for
p o l i ti ca l l e v e r a g e ) w h i l e th e 1 9 7 3 p r ov i si o n g a v e t o o
mu ch power to the Pre siden t. The cou rt held that the
1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground
that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
- Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission they said that the clear and positive intent
of the framer s we re to make tho se officer s in the first
sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval
and confirma tion of the Commi ssion on Appo intments
while those on the second and third sentence need not
seek such confirmation. Given that the position as the
C om m i ssio ne r of the Bu re au of Cu stom s is no t u nd er
t h o se sp e ci f i e d i n t h e f i r st se n t e n ce b u t th e se co n d ,
therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval
of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be
able to exercise full authority and functions and be
entitled to his salary and emoluments.
D e ci si on Petition DISMISSED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmientoconcurring (11)
Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)

SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety.
The focus of the records was merely on the first
sen ten ce of the provi sion and the no t on the follo win g
sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in
question falls under the latter. Also, the records of the
Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and
are at best persuasive only and not necessarily
c o n c l u si v e . I n a d d i ti o n , s t r i c t l y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t h i r d
sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress
the discretion of not creating a law that would give the
President the power to appoint those who are lower in
r a n k . An i r o n y a r i se s w h e n t h o s e i n a l o w e r p o si t i o n
r e qu i r e t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e C o m m i s si o n
on
A p p o i n t m e n t s w h i l e th o se wh o a r e h i g h e r i n p o si ti o n
would not.

PIMENTEL V ERMITA
CARPIO; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session
- 8/25/2004: The Com mission on Appoin tmen ts
(composed of members of Congress) was constituted
+ m e a n w h i l e , GM A i ssu e d a p p o i n t m e n t s
to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments:

Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul

Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz
(DND),
Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor
(DENR)
+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of
office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries
- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen.
Pi m en te l , f il ed th i s pr e se n t p eti ti on f or ce r ti or ar i a nd
prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
declare these appointments by GMA unconstitutional
- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary)
appointments, replacing respondents acting capacity
- Sol Gen argues
+ p e ti ti on is mo o t be ca u se GM A ha d i ssue d the ad
interim a pp oi n tme n ts af ter th e re ce ss of Co n gre ss;
prohibition may not enjoin acts already done.
+ t h e p o w e r t o a p p o i n t i s e x e cu t i v e i n n a t u r e t h e
Commission of Appointments, though it be composed
o f m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s, i s a b o d y i n d e p e n d e n t o f
Congress, and its executive power emanates from the
Consti.
+ o n l y S e n a t o r s E n r i l e , L a c s o n , An g a r a , E j e r c i t o Estrada and Osmena, as members of the Commission,
possess standing in the present petition.
- Petitioners Argument
+ petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such
appointments because no law grants such a power
S1 0 Ch 2 B 4 , EO 29 2 : in case of a vacancy in the
Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who
can be designated as Acting Secretary
+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can
be made w/o the consent of the Commission

- EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President

by lawCongress is not the only source of law
S1 7( 3) of the previous provision states: In no case
shall a temporar y designation exceed one (1) year.
Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a
safeguard against the abuse of such appointments
- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of
the President, that is, it holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the
undersecreta r y au tomatica ll y be appoin tedthe Pres.
must appoint an alter ego of her choice.
J. Bernas, SJ.: acting appointments may be
e x t e n d e d a n y t i m e t h e r e i s a v a c a n c y; ad in terim
a pp oi n tme n ts a re ex te nd ed o nl y d ur in g a re ce ss of
Congress and require submission to the Commission of
Appointments for approval or rejection.
- notwithstanding Bernas textbook definition, the court
finds no abuse of appointments in the present case as
s u c h w e r e i s s u e d immediately u p o n t h e r e c e s s o f
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
De ci sio n Petition DISMISSED

MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
CARPIO; April 2, 2002

FACTS
- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of
prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the
appoin tmen t and the ri gh t of respondents to remain in
office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC
- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was
appointed by the COMELEC en banc as Acting Director
IV o f th e Edu ca tio n an d In fo r ma ti on D ep t. ( EID) , he r
R e s p o n d e n t s Ar g u m e n t :
appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a
-responden ts assert that GM A can i ssue such
Temporary capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15,
appointments for the reason that no law prohibits it
2001 in the same Temporary capacity.
S 1 6 C h 5 T 1 B 3 , E O 2 9 2 : The Pres. shall exercise the
- O n M a r c h 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 P G M A a p p o i n t e d a d i n te r i m ,
power to appoint such officials as provided bythe law
respondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman
S 1 7 C h 5 T 1 B 3 , E O 2 9 2 : the Pr e s. m a y ap po in t an
and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as
officer already in service or any other competent person
COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7
years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths
ISSUE
and assumed their positions with the President
W O N G M As a p p o i n t m e n t o f r e s p o n d e n t s a s a c t i n g
submitting their ad interim appointments to the
secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of
C o m m i s s i o n o n Ap p o i n t m e n t s o n M a y 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 f o r
Appoin tmen ts whi le Con gre ss is in session is
confirmation. The Commission on Appointments,
unconstitutional
however, did not act on their appointments.
- O n J u n e 1 , 2 0 0 1 , P G M A r e n e w e d t h e i r ad i n te ri m
appointments with the term and the expiration
remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2,
HELD
2008). The new appointees took oath a 2 nd time and the
- the court held that the President may make such
sa m e wa s tr a n sm i tt e d t o t h e C o m m i s si o n o n
appointments, as the law expressly provides it
A p p o i n t m e n t s f o r co n f i r m a t i o n o n Ju n e 5 , 2 0 0 1 . T h e
S 1 7 C h 5 T it l e 1 B o o k 3 , E O 2 9 2 : the President
Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on
ma y te mp or a ri l y d esi gn a te an offi cer al re ad y i n th e
th e ap po in tm en ts re su l tin g i n th e r en e wal of th e ir ad
government service or any other competent person to
interim appointments by the President for the 3 rd time on
perform the function of an office in the executive
June 8, 2001.
branch

- Benipa yo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a

Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned
petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r, c i t i n g C i v i l S e r v i c e C o m m i s si o n
Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees
prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001).
Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC
Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the
COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint
with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the
complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She
claims that ad interim appointments violate the
co n st i t u t i o n a l p r o v i si o n s o n th e i n d e p e n d e n ce of th e
COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner
also assails her reassignment to the Law Dept, the
appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements
made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by
way of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents.
- PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
ISSUE
1. WON Benipayos ad interim appointment and
assumption of office as COMELEC chairman is
constitutional
2. WON issue is justiciable
3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed
l a wfu l l y, W ON th e r en e wal of th e ir ap po in tme n ts a nd
subsequent assumption of office was constitutional
4. WON petitioners removal and reassignment is illegal
(done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body)
5 . W ON t h e O f fi c e r - i n - c h a r g e o f C O M E L E C F i n a n c e
Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the
new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD
1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appoin tmen t made b y the Pre s. i n th e m e a n ti m e th a t
Congress is in recess. I t i s n o t a n a p p o i n t m e n t i n a
temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately
and can no longer be wi thdra wn by the Pres. once the
a pp oi n te e h as qu a li fi ed in to offi ce . Th e fact tha t i t i s
sub ject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
R e a so n i n g
- Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the
C o n s t i t u t i o n s a ys , I n n o c a s e s h a l l a n y M e m b e r b e
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity, an ad interim appointment is not a temporary
appointment. A distinction was made between the two in
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was
h e l d t h a t a n a d i n te r i m a p p o i n t m e n t a s d e f i n e d i n
Blacks Law Dictionar y is one that is appointed to fill a
vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during
the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular

i n c u m b e n t . Bu t su c h i s n o t th e m e a n i n g n o r t h e u s e
intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used to
d e n o te t h e m a n n e r i n w h i ch sa i d a p p o i n t m e n t s w e r e
made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime,
while the body, which is originally vested with the power
or appointment, is unable to act.
- Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provi sion
prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court
then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party
v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, It would
be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of
the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent
Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily.
Likewise, In Br i l l a n te s v Yor a c, d e c i d e d u n d e r t h e
present Constitution, this Court struck down as
unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of
Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.
- Art. IX-A 1 should be harmonized with Art. VII 16. for
to hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires
t h e C o m m i ss i o n o n Ap p o i n t m e n t s to f i r st co n f i r m ad
interim appointments before the appointees can assume
o ff i ce w i l l n e g a te th e P r e si d e n t s p o w e r to m a ke ad
interim appointments.
- The original draft of Art. VII 16 did not provide for ad
interim a p p o i n t m e n t s , h o w e v e r, i t w a s r e i n s t a t e d to
avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would
result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad
interim a p p o i n t m e n t h a s s i n c e b e e n p r a c t i c e d b y
Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada.
2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the
ju st i c i a b i l i t y o f th e ca se b y ta ck l i n g th e r e qu i si te s of
ju d i c i a l r e v i e w r a i se d b y th e r e sp o n d e n ts wh i ch th e y
claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not
raised)
> personal and substantial interest of the party
Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the
resolution of the case. If Benipayos appointment is
unlawful, petitioner s reassignment is without legal
basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to
co mplain provided tha t i t wa s done in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal
and material stake in the resolution of the
constitutionality of respondents assumption of
office, she has locus standi to raise it as a
constitutional issue
> exerci se of judi cial revie w mu st be pleaded a t the
earliest opportunity
It is not the date of filing of the petition that
d e te r m i n e s wh e th e r th e co n st i t u t i o n a l i s su e w a s
r a i s e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y. T h e e a r l i e s t
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise
i t i n th e p l e a d i n g s b e f o r e a co m p e t e n t co u r t th a t
can resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in
the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial,
and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
i n te r i m a p p o i n tm e n t s w h e n sh e f i l e d h e r p e ti ti o n

before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity

for pleading the constitutional issue before a
competent body.
> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the
case
The Respondents claim that the legality of
petitioner s reassignment from the EID to the Law
De p t. i s th e i ssu e . Th e Co ur t, ho we ver, h el d th a t
unless
the
constitutionality
of
Benipayos
ap po in tm en t i s de te r mi ne d , the le ga l i ty of
petitioners assignment cannot be determined,
therefore the lis mota o f t h i s ca se i s cl e a r l y th e
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
3. The phrase without reappointment in Art. IX-C 1(2)
applies only to appointments by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
regardless of WoN such person appointed completes the
term of office.
R e a so n i n g The phrase without reappointment does
not appl y to the renewal of appointments to Benipa yo,
T ua s o n a n d B o r r a b e c a u s e t h e r e w e r e n o p r e v i o u s
appointments tha t were confi rmed b y the Commi ssion
on Appointments.
- The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by
the Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon
on the meri ts at the close of the session of Congress.
There was no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. It is
therefore nei ther fixed nor an unexpired term . Ab sent
su ch d e ci s i o n , th e P r e si d e n t i s f r e e t o r e n e w th e ad
interim a p p o i n t m e n t o f a b y - p a s s e d a p p o i n t e e a s
recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for
a f i x e d te r m e x p i r i n g o n F e b . 2 , 2 0 0 8 , c l e a r l y n o t i n
breach of the 7 year term limit.
4 . T h e C O M E L E C C h a i r m a n i s t h e o f fi c i a l e x p r e s s l y
a u t h o r i ze d b y l a w to t r a n sf e r o r r e a s s i g n C O M E L E C
personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure
capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all
the powers of tha t office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC
Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc, approved
th e tra n sf er o r re assi gn me n t o f C OM EL EC p er so nn e l
during the election period.
5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC
chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of
his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.
De ci sio n Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.
Consti Provisions cited:
Art. IX-A 1 The Consti Commissions COMELEC shall
be independent

Art. IX-C 1(2) Nature and term of appointment of

Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o
reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in
a temporary or acting capacity.
Ar t . V II 1 6 power of Pres. to make appointments
during recess of Congress effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.

4 . W ON th e po we r to i ncu r fo re i gn de bts is exp re ssl y

reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President and may not be delegated
5. W ON there has been grave abuse of discretion and
violation of constitutional policies

- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to

the issuer, and the bond repre sents the issue rs
contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal
according to specific terms. The language of the
Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows
the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
HELD
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of
1. The Courts cognizance of this petition will not onl y
loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt
d e te rm i ne th e val id i t y or i nva li di t y of the sub je ct p re instruments are more onerous than others.
termina tion (bu yback) and bond-conversion of foreign
- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside
CONSTANTINO V CUISA
d e b t s b u t a l s o cr e a t e a p r e ce d e n t f o r o th e r d e b t s o r
f r o m th e p r i o r co n cu r r e n ce of th e M o n e ta r y Bo a r d , i s
TINGA; October 13, 2005
debt-related contract executed or to be executed in
that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by
b e h a l f o f th e P r e si d e n t b y t h e Se c r e ta r y o f F i n a n c e .
law. In this regard, it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD
FACTS
Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the
142 entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance
- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
issues herein cannot be doubted.
to Bor ro w to M ee t Pu b li c Ex pe nd i tu r e s Au tho r i ze d b y
assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant
- W here constitutional issues are properly raised in the
Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be
to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for
context of alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a
contracted in the form of bonds thus:
1 99 2 . It se e ks to e n jo i n re sp on de n ts f ro m exe cu ti n g
relatively minor significance. By the very nature of the
the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the
additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto.
power wielded by the President, the effect of using this
President after consultation with the Monetary
- The Financing Program was devised under President
power on the economy, and the well-being in general of
board, is authorized to borrow and to issue therefore
Corazon Aquino to manage the countr ys external debt
the Filipino nation, the Court must set aside the
evidences of indebtedness may be of the following
problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by
procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable
types: Treasury bonds
m e a n s o f t w o d e b t- r e l i e f o p t i o n s : 1 ) ca sh b u yb a c k o f
issues presented by the parties.
- Al so under the fore goin g provision , soverei gn bonds
portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2)
ma y also be provided for the purchase, redemption, or
a l l o w e d cr e d i t o r s t o co n v e r t e x i s t i n g P h i l i p p i n e d e b t
2 . T h e C o u r t h o l d s t h a t s o m e i s su e s a r e n o t r i p e f o r
refunding of nay obligation, either direct or guaranteed,
instruments into bonds/securities.
adjudication.
of the Philippine Government.
- Petitioners challenge the Program as follows:
One such issue raised b y pe titioner s is the allegation
On the Buyback Scheme
1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the
that respondents waived the Philippines right to
- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress
President under Section 20, Article VII of the
repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not
that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing
Constitution:
justiciable.
and spending powers.
However, the law-making
The President may contract or guarantee foreign
- R e c o r d s d o n o t s h o w w h e t h e r t h e so - ca l l e d b e h e s t
authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic
loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
loans were subject of the debt-relief contracts.
appropriations provision for debt servicing. The Court in
That buyback and securitization/bond conversion
- Moreover, asser tin g a ri gh t to repudiate void or
Guingona v. Carague, held:
s ch e m e s a r e n e i th e r l o a n s n o r gu a r a n te e s ,
fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of
Debt service is not included in the General
and hence, beyond the power of the President.
whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently
Appropriation Act, since authorization therefore
2. That assuming the above as constitutionall y
contracted. Petitioners theory depends on a prior
already exists under RA 4860 and 245, as amended,
permissible, it is only the President who may exercise
a nn ul me n t o r de cl a ra ti on o f n ul l i ty of the pr e- exi sti n g
and PD 1967.
In the light of this subsisting
the power to enter into these contract and such power
l oa n s, wh i ch thu s f ar hav e no t b ee n sub m i tted to th i s
authori zation, Congress does not concern itself with
may not be delegated.
Court.
d e ta i l s f o r i m p l e m e n ta ti o n b y th e Ex e cu ti v e . U p o n
3. That the Program was made available for debts
- As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret
su ch approval, Con gre ss has spoken and canno t be
f ra ud ul en tl y con tr a cte d o r voi d. Pe ti tio ne r s r el y o n
over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void
said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive.
1992 Commission on Audit report identifying several
contracts. Respondents unequivocall y assert that the
- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without
behest loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently
Republic did not waive any such right, it having
further action from Congress is established under
d u r i n g t h e M a r c o s r e gi m e . T h a t s i n ce t h e se w e r e
incorporated a no-waiver clause in the agreements.
Section 2 of RA 240 thus:
eligible for buyback or conversion, they would be void
- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should
the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out
for being waivers of the Republics right to repudiate
re ne ge on o bl i ga tio n s th a t ar e con si de re d as
of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise
the void or fraudulently contracted loans.
illegitimate. However, such course of action would
appropriated any interest falling due, or accruing on
- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by
have adverse repercussions. Among the consequences
any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He
petitioners.
They also question the standing of
is that the standard cross-default provisions in Philippine
shall also cause to be paid out the principal amount
petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented.
foreign loans may come into effect, in which case,
o f a n y o b l i g a t i o n s w h i c h h a v e m a t u r e d o r , if
default even in one loan would be ground for other
r e d e e m e d p r i o r t o m a t u r i t y , s u ch p o r t i o n o f t h e
ISSUES
creditors to declare default on other loans.
face value as is prescribed by the terms and
Procedural
- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with
conditions under which such obligations were
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.
the Courts but with the executive.
originally issued.
2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication
- Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the
Substantive
grant of the foreign borrowing power. Ever y statute is
3 . W ON the sco pe o f se ctio n 2 0, Ar ti cle VII in clu de s
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions
bond-conversion and buyback
3. On Bond-Conversion

as may be necessar y to effectuate its object and

purpose.
- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate
let alone enumerate all the acts which the President (or
an y other publi c officer ) ma y no t do, and the fact that
th e Co n sti tu ti on do es n o t exp li ci tl y b ar the Pre sid en t
from exercising a power does not mean that he or she
does not have that power.
4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief con tra cts is made manifest by
the fact that the process of establishing and executing
str a te g y fo r ma na gi n g th e go ve rn me n ts d eb t i s d ee p
wi thin the realm of the experti se of the Depar tmen t of
Finan ce. If the President we re to persona ll y exerci se
every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are
a c co r d e d , a n d w o u l d u n d u l y h a m p e r th e P r e si d e n t s
effectivity in running the government.
- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified
political agency. Though the President is the Executive
of the Government and no other, the heads of the
executive department occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity and should be of the
Presidents bosom confidence and alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority subject to the
direction of the President. And it is upon the Secretary
of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with
matters regarding the sound and efficient management
of the financial resources of Government.
- And although there are powers vested in the President
th a t m a y no t b e d el e ga te d a re on l y tho se tha t ca l l fo r
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
e x e r c i se d b y co - e qu a l b r a n ch e s o f g o v e r n m e n t , e . g .
power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and
p r o c l a i m m a r ti a l l a w ( Pa r. 3 Se c 11, Ar t VI I) a n d th e
benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11, Art VII), the
power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not
fall within the same exceptional class.
- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of
Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is
bound to secure the latters prior consent to or
sub sequent ratifi cation of his acts. A lack of sho wing
t h a t Pr e sid e n t Aq u in o co u n te r m a n d e d th e a c ts of
r e s p o n d e n t s l e a d s u s t o c o n c l u d e th a t t h e sa i d a c t s
carried presidential approval.
5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under
t h e Pr o gr a m a b e st ca se s ce n a r i o wo u l d gi v e a yi e l d
significantly lower than estimated by the Program and a
wo r st ca se sce na r io whe r e wh a t can b e gai ne d i n th e
best case is lesser than what can be lost in this worst
case. In addition, petitioners postulate a more simple
rescheduling agreement in place of the debt-relief
package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program

violates constitutional state policies to promote a social

order that will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty, foster
social justice in all phases of national development, and
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution
a s l i t a n i ze d a r e n o t a p a n a c e a th a t c a n a n n u l e v e r y
governmental act sought to be struck down. Insofar as
the case at bar, the court can make no conclusion other
than that respondents efforts were geared towards
d e b t- r e l i e f w i t h m a r k e d p o si t i v e r e s u l t s a n d to w a r d s
achieving the aforementioned constitutional policies.

SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
- I n d u b i t a b l y, f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t Aq u i n o s d e ci s i o n t o
honor outstanding debts of the Republic was purely an
executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For this
reason, neither can respondents be faulted for
i m p l e m e n t i n g th e Pr o gr a m ex e cu te d p u r su a n t to th a t
constitutional executive policy.
- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several
foreign loans necessitates a review of the assailed
contracts. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate
th e ch a r ge s, th e a r gu m e n t ca n n o t b e a d d r e s se d . A
determination of the validity of such allegations requires
a review of factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a
trier or facts. The proper action for petitioners is to file
their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent
jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better
equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual
evidence in support of their allegations.
This
notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision to
preclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the
Ombudsman from initiating an investigation of the
alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause
must be shown in order that prosecution may be brought
to bear.

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER

FERNANDO; October 30, 1981
- F r e e Tel e p h o n e W or k e r s U n i o n , h e r e i n p e t i t i o n e r ,
a tta ck s th e co n s ti tu t i o n a l i t y o f B a ta s Pa m b a n sa B l g.
13036 ( BP 1 3 0 ) i n so fa r a s i t a m e n d s Ar t . 2 6 4 o f th e
36

"In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely

a ff e ct in g t he n a t i o n al in t e r es t , su ch a s ma y oc c ur i n b ut n ot l i mit e d t o
pu blic ut ilit ies, co mp ani es eng age d in t he ge nerat i on or dist ri but io n of
energy, banks, hospitals, and t hose wit hin export processing zones, t he
M i n i s t e r o f L a b o r a n d E mp l o y m e n t m a y a s s u me j u r i s d i c t i o n ov e r t h e
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitrat ion. Such assumpt ion or cert if ication shall have t he effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one

Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and

Employment the power and discretion to assume
jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission,
and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
b a r g a i n i n g . P e t i t i o n e r co n te n d s th a t [ a ] B P 3 0 i s a n
undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such
co n f e r m e n t o f a u th o r i t y m a y a l so r u n co n tr a r y t o th e
assurance of the State to the workers' right to selforganization and collective bargaining.
- P r o ce d u r e
+ Sep t. 14 , 1 98 1 no ti ce o f str i ke wi th th e Mi ni str y of
L a b o r fo r u n f a i r l a b o r p r a ct i ce s st a t i n g th e f o l l o wi n g
grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a
Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions
of o ffi ce r s a nd me mb er s a s a re su l t of th e
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3)
Au to m a ti c tr e a tm e n t a s of si ck l e av e s a s AW O L w i th
suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining
Agreement
+ Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of
co m p l i a n ce wi t h th e 2 /3 st r i ke vo te a n d o th e r f o r m a l
requirements of the law and Implementing Rules.
Conciliation meetings called by the Minister followed.
+ Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
co m pu l so r y a rb i tra ti on a nd e n jo i ne d an y str i ke a t th e
private respondent's establishment.
+ Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed
petition to SC the next day. Court issued resolution for
respondents to file answer. After parties were duly heard
y SC on Oct. 8, case was ripe for decision.
ISSUES
1. W ON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing
or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the nationa l intere st and thereaf ter decide it or cer tif y
the same to the NLRC is unconstitutional for being
violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
power
2. WON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130
HELD
1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power
to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect
the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC
for arbitration does not constitute undue delegation of
legislative powers.
R e a so n i n g :
First. It lays down the premise. The power which would
be denied the Minister of Labor by virtue of such
h as al r ea d y t ak en p l ac e a t t he t i me of a ss u mpt i o n or c er t i f i c at io n , al l
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employers shall immediately resume operat ions and readmit all work ers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
T he Mi n is t e r ma y se ek t h e as si st a nc e o f l a w e nf or c e me nt a g e nc i es t o
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same."

principle is within the competence of the President, who

in its opinion can best determine national interests, but
o n l y wh e n a str i ke i s i n p r o g r e s s. Su ch a d m i s si o n i s
qualified by the assumption that the President "can
m a k e l a w." B u t w h a t p o s s e s s e s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e
purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who
"shall have control of the ministries." It points that the
adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in
the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character. 37 Then it cites the expanse of the

not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards

- December 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed
t h a t th e l a w p r e s cr i b e s. B P 1 3 0 d i d n o t v i o l a te t h e se
A yt o n a a s a d i n t e r i m G o v e r n o r o f t h e C e n t r a l B a n k .
guidelines.
Aytona took his oath of office on that day.
Fourth. The ponencia stre ssed the rulin g in People v.
- December 30, 1961 President-elect Diosdado
Vera, s a y i n g t h a t t h o u g h s c h o l a r l y a n d e r u d i t e , i t
Macapagal took his oath of office
a r o u se d a p p r e h e n s i o n f o r b e i n g t o r i g i d . T h e l i b e r a l
- December 31, 1961 Macapagal issued Administrative
approach in the ruling in Edu v. Ericta as reinforced in
Order # 2 reca llin g, withdra win g and can cell ing all ad
Agricultural
Credit
and
Cooperative
Financing
in terim appointmen ts made by Ga rcia af ter Dece mber
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n v. C o n f e d e r a t i o n o f U n i o n s i n
13 , 1 96 1 (the da te Ma ca pa ga l wa s pr o cl a im ed as th e
Government Corporations and Offices recognized that:
elected president by Congress)

powers of the President by the provisions in the

Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973. (Note: My reading
here is that the power by the Minister of Labor to
assume juri sdi ction in a labor dispu te is an executive
function)
Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its
argument. Villena v. Secretary of Interior says that "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive. In other words, without minimizing the
i m p o r ta n ce o f t h e h e a d s o f th e v a r i o u s d e p a r tm e n t s,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of
the President. (Note: It used this doctrine in a later case
P h i l . Am e r i c a n M a n a g e m e n t C o . v. P h i l . Am e r i c a n
Management Employees Association)
Third. E v e n o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y
conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of a
legislative character, still no case of an unlawful
delegation of such power may be discerned. It cites Edu
v. Ericta: To determine whether or not there is an undue
d e l e g a t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r, t h e i n q u i r y m u s t b e
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
a nd wh a t i s th e sco pe of hi s a utho r i ty. [a ] Di sti n ctio n
b e twee n d el e ga ti on of po wer to ma ke th e l a ws wh i ch
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
v a l i d o b j e c t i o n c a n b e m a d e ; [ b ] To a v o i d u n l a w f u l
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of' principle and lays down fundamental policy;
[ c] T h e r e a f te r, th e e x e cu t i v e o r a d m i n i st r a t i v e o ffi ce
designated may in pursuan ce of the above guideline s
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In
People v Exconde: regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be

I t w o u ld b e s el f- d e fe a t i n g i n t h e ex t re m e i f th e
legislation intended to cope wi th the grave so cial and
economic problems of the present and foreseeable
future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive
and decidedl y unrealisti c meanin g to be affixed to the
doctrine of non-delegation.
- Also quo tin g Professor Jaffe: The occasions for
d e l e g a t i n g p o w e r to a d m i n i s tr a ti v e o ffi ce s [c o u l d b e ]
co m p a s s e d b y a s i n g l e g e n e r a l i za t i o n . T h u s : Po w e r
sho u ld b e de le ga ted wh e re th er e i s a gre e me n t tha t a
t a s k m u s t b e p e r f o r m e d a n d i t c a n n o t b e e ff e c t i v e l y
performed by the legislature without the assistance of a
delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as
to l e a d t o th e n e gl e ct of e qu a l l y i m p o r t a n t b u si n e s s.
Delegation is most commonly indicated where the
relations to be regulated are highly technical or where
their regulation requires a course of continuous
decision.

37

2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the

Ministr y of Labor and the NLRC), this Court is not in a
po si tio n to ru le on whe th er o r n ot the re i s
unconstitutional application.
D e ci si on
[1 ] N o . BP 1 30 in sof ar a s i t e mp o we r s the M in i ster of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing
or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the na tional in terest and the reafter decide i t or certif y
the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional
since there was no undue delegation of legislative
power.
[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not
BP 130 has been unconstitutionally applied in this case,
for bein g repu gnan t to the re gime of self- organ i za tion
and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged,
disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for
judicial determination
D i sp o s i t i v e Petition Dismissed.
Vot i n g 11 concur, no dissent.

AYTONA V CASTILLO
BENGZON; January 19, 1962

Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "T he President

shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a
p re s i de n t i a l s yst e m t ha t o b t a i ns i n o ur gov er n me nt . T hu s: " Al l p o w er s
vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and
t he laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon
any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless
the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."

FACTS

- January 1, 1962 Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo

as ad interim governor of the Central Bank
- January 2, 1962 Both Aytona and Castillo exercised
the powers of their office but Castillo informed Aytona of
his appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented
from holding office
- Ayt o n a i n s t i t u te d a q u o w a r r a n t o w h i c h ch a l l e n g e d
C a stil l o 's r i gh t to exe rci se the p o wer s of Go ve rn or o f
Central bank. Aytona claims he was:
1.
validly appointed
2.
qualified for the post
3.
and that the subsequent appointment and
qualification of Castillo was void because the
occupation was occupied by him
- C a st i l l o a r gu e d th a t th e a p p o i n tm e n t o f Ayto n a h a d
been revoked by AO 2.
ISSUE
W ON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to
issue the order of the cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by the past President (Garcia) even
after the appointees had already qualified.
HELD
Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.
- December 29, 1961 Garcia sent to the Commission
on Appointments (not yet in session) a communication
submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of
several officials including the Central Bank Governor in
the person of Aytona.
There were three other
co mmuni cations re gardin g the same matter sub mitted
on the same day.
- Al l i n a l l t h e r e w e r e 3 5 0 m i d n i g h t a p p o i n t m e n t s b y
Garcia.
- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based
on the following reasons:
1 ) o u t go i n g Pr e si d e n t sh o u l d h a v e r e f r a i n e d f r o m
f i l l i n g va ca n ci e s to g i v e th e n e w P r e si d e n t t h e
opportunity to consider names in the light of new
plicies
2 ) Sca nd a lo u sl y hu rr ie d ap po in tm en ts in m ass do
not fall within the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision authorizing the issuance
of ad interim appointments
3)Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust
because they were issued only upon the condition
that the appointee would immediately qualify
obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming

President which would result to those deserving

the appointment of the new President to be
declined and by-passed
4)Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment
and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of
the outgoing President to merely subvert the
policies of the incoming administration
- M an y of the pe rson s me n ti on ed in the De ce m be r 29
communication did not qualify.

- Ma y 16, 1962- Qu imsings, as well as other people s

appointments were confirmed
- M a y 17 , 1 96 2- a t the se ssio n of the Co mm i ssio n o n
App oi n tme n ts, a m o tio n fo r re co n si de r a tio n of al l the
confirmed appointments was approved, and the
Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for
its next meeting
- J u n e 11, 1 9 6 2 - P r e s i d e n t M a c a p a g a l d e s i g n a t e d
Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo.

- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a

slight modification of the duration of imprisonment.
- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by
MCU denied by Phil SC.
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil
SC. MCU seeks to elevate the case to US SC.
- November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari.
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCUs petition for
l e a v e t o f i l e a 2 nd a l t e r n a t i v e M F R o r n e w t r i a l ; &

- It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim

- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo
r e m a n d s t h e ca se to C F I M a n i l a fo r e x e cu t i o n o f t h e
appointments
only
when
the
Committee
on
Taj a n g l a n g i t f r o m o c c u p yi n g t h e p o si t i o n o f C h i e f o f
judgment.
Appointments is in session so that only those who have
Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been
- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation
accepted the appoin tmen t and qua lified are submi tted
appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which
under the prov i sions of Ac t No . 4221 of t he Phi l
for confirmation.
he was actually discharging.
Legislature. CFI Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding,
- It is common sense to believe that after the
r e f e r s th e a p p l i ca ti o n t o th e I n su l a r Pr o b a ti o n Offi ce
p ro cla ma ti on of th e e le ctio n of Ma ca pa ga l , Ga r cia 's
ISSUE
(IPO)
a dm in i stra ti on wa s n o mo re tha n a ca r e ta ker
W ON Quim sings appointment was not la wfull y
- 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCUs
administration. He was supposed to prepare for the
confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of
application for probation
orderl y transfer of authori ty to the incom ing Pre siden t
h i s co nf ir m a tio n , wh i ch ha s, to th e pr e se n t, r em a in ed
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila,
a n d h e s h o u l d n o t d o a c t s w h i c h h e o u g h t t o k n o w,
unacted upon
7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC &
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate oppositions
successor.
HELD
to
the
granting
of
probation.
HSBC
attacks
- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief
co n st it u t io n a li t y of Ac t No . 4 2 2 1 o n th e f o llo win g
regarded as abuse of Presidential prerogatives.
of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said
grounds: equal protection
of the laws (its
- W hen the President makes appointments with the
position was not vacant.
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands);
consent of the Commission of Appointments, he has the
- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments
un due de legat io n of legisla tive pow er (section 11 of
benefit of their advice. W hen he makes ad interim
provide:
the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to make said
appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is
SEC. 21: Any motion to reconsider the vote on any
law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces).
bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection
appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a
- 2 8 J u n e 1 9 3 7 : Ju d g e Jo s e O . Ver a o f CF I M n la
either by previous consultation with the members of the
final disposit on such a motion
promulgates resolution with a finding that MCU is
Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the
SEC. 22: Notice of confi rmation or disapproval of an
innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but
reason for such selection.
a pp oi n tme n t sha l l no t b e se n t to the Pre sid en t of the
denying the latter's petition for probation.
- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful
Philippines b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e p e r i o d f o r i t s
- 3 Ju l y 19 37 : cou n se l f or M CU fi le s ex ce p ti on to th e
because:
reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is
resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file

th e Co m mi ssi on th a t wo u ld con si de r the

pending.
MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions
a pp oi n tme n ts i s d iffe re n t fr om th e on e exi stin g
- The Com mission had not disapproved of Qu imsings
for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave
during the time the appointments were made
appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has
to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33

the names are to be submitted by his

been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsings
(34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1
successor who may not fully approve of the
appointment was delivered to Malacanang. This, as well
of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to
appointments
as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the
withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground
- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order
laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does
t h a t th e m o ti o n w a s ci r cu l a te d a t a b a n qu e t g i v e n b y
2 and cancelled the midnight appointments. There are
not have the effect of wi thholding the effectivity of the
co u n se l f o r M C U & th a t h e si gn e d t h e sa m e " w i th o u t
precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it
confirmation, nor is it synon ymous wi th disapproval of
mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.)
ca n n o t b e r e co n si d e r e d . Bu t n o n e o f t h e p r e ce d e n ts
the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the
HSBC files opposition to motion for intervention.
have involved mass ad interim appointments.
appointment was confirmed.
- 6 Au g u s t 1 9 3 7 : t h e F i s c a l o f t h e C i t y o f M n l a f i l e s
motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail
QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT
PEOPLE V VERA
in obedience to said judgment.
BARRERA; February 29, 1964
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
- 1 9 Au g u s t 1 9 3 7 i s t h e d a t e s e t f o r h e a r i n g o n t h e
various motions for CFIs consideration. On this same
FACTS
FACTS
date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an
- Ma y 20, 1960- Qui msin g designated Actin g Chief of
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case People
end to what they alleged was an interminable
Police of Iloilo City
v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al. filed in CFI Manila. In the
proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- D ec. 20 , 1 96 1- Pr e s. Ga r cia ex te nd ed an ad-interim
said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While
appointment to Quimsing to the same position
private prosecutor.
a probation case may look into the circumstances
- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office,
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a
attending the commission of the offense, this does not
continued discharging functions of Chief of Police
judgment
of
conviction
sentencing
MCU
to
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this
imprisonment.
court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom

its own admission reliance was merel y had on the

printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court,
there wo uld be no end to litigation, and jud icia l chaos
would result. < e m p h a s i s o n t h e h i e r a r c h y i n t h e
Philippine judicial s ystem>
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings
2. if YES, WON said Act is constitutional
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning
power of the Executive
b . W O N s e c t i o n 11 o f Ac t N o . 4 2 2 1 c o n s t i t u t e a n
undue delegation of legislative power
c . W O N t h e P r o b a t i o n Ac t v i o l a t e s B i l l o f R i g h t s
provisions on equal protection of the laws
3. WON the entire Act should be avoided
HELD
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case. < l i s m o t a >
T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e co n s t i tu t i o n a l i t y o f a n a c t o f t h e
legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions BUT
r e so r t m a y b e m a d e to e x tr a o r d i n a r y l e ga l r e m e d i e s ,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of
law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action
of quo warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an
a pp li ca tio n fo r in ju n ctio n to re str ai n a ctio n un de r th e
challenged statute, & even on an application for
p re li m in a r y in ju n ctio n wh e re th e de ter m in a tio n of the
constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the
case, or through petitions for prohibition and certiorari.
- Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands,
section 516: Philippine SC is granted concurrent
ju r i sd i cti on i n pr oh ib i ti on wi th co u r ts of f ir st i nsta n ce
over inferior tribunals or persons, and original
jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such
courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the
cr im i na l sta tu te mu st b e ra i se d b y a d ef en da nt in the
trial court and be carried regularly in review to the
Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a new act seriously
affected numerous persons and extensive property
rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions,
the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the
issue of the act's validity promptly before it and decide
in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
- The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to a n in fe ri or cou r t, fo r th e pu rp o se o f p rev en tin g the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it
is not legally vested. General rule: th e me rit of

prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has

jurisdiction
independent
of
the
statute
the
constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the
inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that
statute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court
of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings
is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature. It is unquestionable that the constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this
court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the private prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and
fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes
the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for
the purpose of executing the statute, elements of
consideration which would be otherwise beyond the
scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve
from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained
according to the methods by it provided belongs to the
executive department.
- Coole y on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not
con sider an y attack made on the con stitu tiona lity of a
statute by one who has no interest in defeating it
because his rights are not affected by its operation. The
p o we r t o d e cl a r e a l e gi sl a ti v e e n a ct m e n t vo i d i s o n e
which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human
judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where
he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and
official oath decline the responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where
the ju risd iction of the cou rt depends on the validity of
the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality
will be considered on its being brought to the attention
o f t h e co u r t b y p e r so n s i n te r e s te d i n t h e e ffe ct to b e
given the statute.
- Ge n e ra l r u l e : the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinaril y it may not be raised at the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not
considered on appeal. BUT co ur ts, i n th e ex er ci se of
sounds discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may
be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same
is true in civil cases if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. Also,
a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest

in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,

direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The People of
t h e Ph i l i p p i n e s, i n wh o se n a m e th e p r e se n t a ct i o n i s
b r o u gh t , h a s a su b s ta n t i a l i n te r e st i n h av i n g Ac t N o .
4221 set aside. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of
its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to
i ts behests the courts, the le gi sla ture , and the people
m u s t b o w. T h e s t a t e i s a l w a y s i n t e r e s t e d w h e r e t h e
integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
- A judge should not judicially declare a statute
unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is
tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer
o n w h o m a s ta t u t e i m p o se s t h e d u t y o f e n f o r ci n g i t s
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that
he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if
the statute be unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g.,
the state auditor and state treasurer) should not decline
to perform min isteria l dutie s impo sed upon them b y a
statu te , on the ground tha t the y believe the sta tu te is
unconstitutional.
- The mere fac t t hat the P robat ion Ac t has been
repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila
but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him
as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only
w h e n p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e i t i n b o n a f i d e ca se s f o r
d e te rm i na ti on , an d th e fa ct tha t the qu e stio n h as n o t
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are
ju sti f ie d in r el yin g u po n th e sta tu te a nd tr ea ti n g i t as
valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 is necessary to resolve the instant case? While the
co u r t wi l l m e e t t h e qu e st i o n w i t h f i r m n e ss , w h e r e i ts
decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and
j u s t r e s p e c t f o r t h e l e g i s l a tu r e , r e n d e r s i t p r o p e r, t o
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points.
- G e n e r a l r u l e : the determ ination of a con stitu tiona l
qu e st i o n i s n e ce s sa r y w h e n e v e r i t i s e s se n t i a l t o th e
d e ci si o n o f th e ca se , a s wh e r e th e r i gh t o f a p a r t y i s
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is
attacked. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his
p r i v i l e g e t o p r o b a t i o n s o l e l y f r o m Ac t N o . 4 2 2 1 n o w
being assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a ne w addi tion to our
statute books and its validity has never before been
passed upon by the courts; many persons accused and
convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; some of them are already on probation; more

people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in

the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has
been at large for a period of about four years since his
first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to
p r e v e n t m u l ti p l i c i t y o f su i t s, s tr o n g r e a so n s o f p u b l i c
policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
be now resolved.
- Also, in Phil SCs ruling in an analogous situation in Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the
property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and
inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet
i n te rp r e te d b y the cou r ts, in th e in ter e st o f th e pu bl i c
we l fa re a nd fo r the a dva nce me n t of p ub li c p ol i cy, we
have determined to overrule the defense of want of
jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue.
We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a
relaxation of the general rule." Phil SCs ruling on this
point was sustained by the US SC. A more binding
authority in support of the view we have taken can not
be found.
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty
of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by
clear implication from the provisions of section 2,
sub section 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the
Constitution, may declare an act of the national
legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
h e s i ta te t o gi v e e ffe c t to th e su p r e m e l a w b y se tt i n g
aside a statute in conflict therewith.
- F u n d a me n t a l c r it e ri a : all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is
p r e su m e d to b e w i t h i n co n st i t u t i o n a l l i m i ta ti o n s. T h e
m e m b e r s o f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a n d t h e C h i e f Ex e c u t i v e
h ave ta ke n an o ath to sup po r t th e Co n sti tu ti on an d i t
must be presumed that they have been true to this oath
a n d th a t i n e n a c ti n g a n d sa n ct i o n i n g a p a r t i cu l a r l a w
they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The
courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to
o v e r t u r n t h e so l e m n d e c l a r a t i o n s o f t w o o f t h e th r e e
gr an d d ep ar tme n ts o f th e gov er nm en ts. Th e jud i cia r y
ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
th ro u gh an e le ctiv e Le gi sla tu re a nd a n e le ctiv e Ch ie f
Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed
his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act. In a message dated September 1, 1937, he
recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting
in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the NA repealing the
p r o b a t i o n Ac t , s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e i n
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President
on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In
vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his

constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons

whi ch he ma y deem proper for ta kin g su ch a step, but
his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination
of actual controversies submitted for our determination.
W hatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on
way or another and prevent us from taking what in our
opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. We are independent of the Executive no less than
of the Legislative department of our government
independent in the performance of our functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as
we understand it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on
three prin cipal ground s: (1) That sa id Act encroa ches
upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and
(3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act
No. 4221 vests in the Governor-General of the
Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is
now vested in the President of the Philippines (A7,
s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to
impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions,
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper; and
to gr an t am ne st y wi th the co n cu r re n ce o f th e N A. Bu t
the pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the
C h i e f Ex e cu ti v e . T h e ex e r ci se o f th e p o we r m a y n o t,
therefore, be vested in anyone else. Where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without
express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and
the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor
delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC
ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending
sentenced was void. Under the common law the power
o f th e co ur t wa s l i mi te d to tem po r ar y su spe n si on an d
the right to su spend sen ten ce abso lute l y and
permanently was vested in the executive branch of the
go v e r n m e n t a n d n o t i n t h e ju d i c i a r y. B u t , t h e r i g h t o f
Congress to establish probation by statute was
conceded.
- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his
sentence, that court has no power under the Probation
Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though
th e t e r m a t wh i ch se n te n ce wa s i m p o se d h a d n o t ye t
expired. In this case of Murra y, the constitutionality of
the probation Act was not considered but was assumed.
US SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend
sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for action

b y C o n gr e s s i f th e co u r t s w e r e t o ex e r c i se p r o b a ti o n
powers in the future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth
Circuit held that the constitutionality of Probation Act of
March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the
same was held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President.
- 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to
enact probation laws. A federal probation law was
actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act
has been assumed by the US SC in 1928 and
consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a
number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like
t h e U S C o n g r e s s , m a y l e ga l l y e n a c t a p r o b a ti o n l a w
under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and
all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has
defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated
the desire to vest in the cour ts -- parti cularl y the tria l
courts -- large discretion in imposing the penalties which
the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that
justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
cou r ts, th e y b ei n g i n a p osi ti on to b est de ter m in e the
penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
ci r cu m s ta n ce d , sh o u l d su ffe r. < R e v i se d P e n a l C o d e ,
In d e te r m i n a te S e n t e n ce L a w,
Parole Act, Juvenile
Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation Law, etc show the
intention of the legislature to humanize the penal
laws.>
- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to
vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of
a se n te n ce d , b y p r o b a t i o n o r o t h e r w i s e , a s t o d o s o
would encroach upon the pardoning power of the
executive. Other cases, however, hold contra. Phil SC
e le cts to fol lo w th e lo n g ca ten a of au tho ri ti e s h ol di n g
that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of
a system of probation however characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they
the same. They are actually district and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the
p o wer to su sp en d sen ten ce , wa s al wa ys a p ar t of th e
judicial power. It simply postpones the judgment of the
court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and
liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and
become operative when judgment is rendered. The
pow er to g ra nt re p rie ves an d p a rd o n s , on the other
hand , wa s al wa ys a par t of the ex ecu tiv e power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
o f fe n s e a n d t h e g u i l t o f t h e o f fe n d e r. I t r e l e a se s t h e
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. It removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.

- Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve

matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
actions from which all others under like circumstances
and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs.
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
are exempted.
State: the power to suspend the sentence does not
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of
- True, the legislature may enact la ws for a par ti cular
conflict with the power of the Governor to grant
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
locality different from those applicable to other localities.
r e p r i e v e s . A r e p r i e v e p o stp o n e s th e ex e cu ti o n o f th e
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
But option laws thus sustained treat of sub jects purely
sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for
a d m i n i s tr a t i v e o f fi ce r o r b o a r d m a y b e g u i d e d i n t h e
local in character which should receive different
an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
treatment in different locali tie s placed under different
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various
circumstances. W hile we do not deny the right of local
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
a n a c t o f gr a ce , p r o ce e d i n g f r o m t h e p o w e r i n t r u s te d
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or
with the execution of the laws which exempts the
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
for the people of small co mmuni tie s to pass upon, we
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
believe that in matters of general of general legislation
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a
t h e p r o v i n c i a l b o a r d d o e s n o t w i s h t o h a v e t h e Ac t
l i ke th a t wh i ch tr e a t s o f cr i m i n a l s i n ge n e r a l , a n d a s
remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense.
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the
t o a p p r o p r i a t e th e n e e d e d a m o u n t f o r th e sa l a r y o f a
not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
probation officer. The plain langua ge of the Act is no t
as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not
originally imposed. "Reprieve" or "respite" is the
susceptible of any other interpretation.
tested by what has been done but by what may be done
w i th h o l d i n g o f t h e se n t e n ce f o r a n i n te r v a l o f ti m e , a
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power
under its provisions.
postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
execution.
a s to w h a t i t sh a l l b e , a n d co n f e r r i n g a n a u th o r i t y o r
l e gi sla tur e n ot on l y in the exp re ssi on of wha t ma y b e
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and
power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
to those serving their probationary sentences, remains
latter no valid objection can be made.
become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of
as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never
- It is true tha t la ws ma y be made effective on certain
powers of government is vested in the representatives of
been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
con tin gen cie s, as by procla mation of the execu tive or
the people and that these representatives are no further
proba tioner and thu s place it be yond the po wer of the
the adoption by the people of a parti cular co mmuni ty.
restrained under our system than by the express
court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
T h e l e g i s l a tu r e m a y d e l e ga te a p o w e r n o t l e g i sl a ti v e
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
par ticu lar provision s wh ich by clear intendmen t, have
b. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.
that effect. (Angara case)
3 coordinate and substantially independent organs:
There is nothing essentiall y legislative in ascertaining
- We conc lude tha t se ction 11 of Ac t No . 4221
l e g i s l a t i v e , e x e cu t i v e a n d j u d i c i a l . E a ch d e p a r t m e n t
the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest
t a k i n g i n to e ff e c t o f a l a w. T h a t i s a m e n t a l p r o c e s s
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive
common to all branches of the government.
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction,
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative
supreme within its own sphere.
will must, of course, come from Congress, but the
c. This basic individual right sheltered by the
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is
a sce r tai n me n t of the co n tin ge n cy up on wh i ch the Act
Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec.
shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
departments of our government and on the subordinate
1 2) a nd in a u nica m er a l Na tion al Asse mb ly b y the
designate. The legislature, then may provide that a
instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many
Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and
National Assembly may not escape its duties and
po we r to de ter m in e wh en th e spe cif ie d con ti n gen cie s
eminent domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial
r espo n sib i li ti e s b y de le ga ti n g th a t p o we r to a n y othe r
h as ar isen . In the ca se a t ba r, th e va ri ou s p rov in cia l
of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their
case can be formulated.
delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of
respective provinces.
- Class legislation discriminating against some and
the principle of separation of powers.
- W hi l e t h e l e gi s l a t u r e m a y s u s p e n d a l a w, o r t h e
f a v o r i n g o th e r s i n p r o h i b i t e d . B u t cl a s s i f i ca t i o n o n a
- T h e r u l e , h o w e v e r, w h i c h f o r b i d s t h e d e l e g a t i o n o f
ex e cu t i on o r op er a ti on of a l a w, a l a w m a y no t b e
reasonable basi s, and nor made arbi trar il y or
legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to
to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be
be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as
general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4)
pa r ti cu la r l oca li ti e s. H er e the sov er ei gn an d a bso lu te
purpose s of the la w; i t must not be li mited to existin g
t o th o se wh o m th e C o n st i t u t i o n i t se l f d e l e ga t e s su ch
power resides in the people; and the legislature can only
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before
e x e r c i se w h a t i s d e l e g a t e d t o t h e m a c c o r d i n g to th e
of the class.
us does not fall under any of these exceptions.
constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first
- In the case a t bar, ho wever, the re sultant inequa lity
- Tes t o f U n d u e D e l e g a t i o n : to inquire whether the
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen
legislative power, although perhaps this is not
when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
should enjoy privileges and advantages which are
ne ce ssar i l y the re su l t in ev er y ca se . W hil e in e qu a li t y
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant
may result in the application of the law and in the
delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent
one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or
conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is

not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may

be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed.
- T h e r e i s n o d i ffe r e n ce b e t we e n a l a w wh i ch d e n i e s
equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.
A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.
Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of
their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is
against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will
resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional
p rov i si on is in ter je cte d i n to a sta tu te othe r wi se va li d ,
and is so independent and separable that its removal will
leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the
O rganic Law, wh ile ano ther par t is v alid, the v alid
por tion, if separable from the valid , ma y stand and be
enforced. The void provisions must be eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the
Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. What remains must express the legislative
will, independently of the void part, since the court has
no power to legislate.
- In th e ca se a t b a r, se c ti o n 11 ( wh i ch m a ke s th e
Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries
of probation officer s) is so inseparabl y lin ked wi th the
other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the
se ctio n wh a t wo u ld be le f t i s the b ar e id ea li sm o f th e
system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial result of that system.
- Between is and ou ght there is a far cr y. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We
may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as
has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are
not permitted to read into the law matters and
provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make
the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation
officers in the provinces but to make the provinces
d ef ra y the m sho ul d the y de si r e to hav e th e Pr ob a tio n
Act apply thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been
e n a c te d , h e r e a n d i n o th e r co u n tr i e s , to p e r m i t wh a t
m od er n cri m in o lo gi st ca l l the "in d ivi du al i za tio n of the
punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the
chara cter of the cr iminal and the cir cumstan ces of his

particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to

aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform.
De ci sio n WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement
regarding costs. So ordered.

TORRES V GONZALES
FELICIANO; July 23, 1987
FACTS
- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
- Some ti me before 1979 , Torres wa s convicted b y the
CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs,
(10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day,
and to pa y an indemn ity of P127 ,728.75. These
convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum
sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000.
- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by
t h e Pr e si d e n t o n co n d i ti o n t h a t p e ti ti o n e r w o u l d "n o t
a gain violate any of the penal laws of the Phi lippine s.
Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
a ga i n s t i n th e m a n n e r p r e s c r i b e d b y l a w." P e t i t i o n e r
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
- O n 2 1 M a y 1 9 8 6 , t h e B o a r d o f Pa r d o n s a n d Pa r o l e
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation
o f th e co nd i ti on al pa rd on gr an ted to th e p eti ti on er. In
making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons
and E sp u e l a s u s . P r o v i n ci a l War d e n o f Bo h o l .
The
peti tioner had been char ged wi th 20 coun ts of estafa ,
which were then pending trial before the RTC, and
convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition, which was
then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges
have been brought against the petitioner, although some
have been identified as dismissed.
- On 4 June 1986 , the re spondent Minister of Justi ce
wrote to the President informing her of the Resolution of
the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional
pardon previously granted to petitioner.
- On 8 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 6 , th e P r e si d e n t c a n c e l l e d th e
conditional pardon of the petitioner.
- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest
a n d R e co m m i t m e n t a ga i n st p e ti ti o n e r. T h e p e ti ti o n e r
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
- Pe ti ti o n e r n o w i m p u gn s th e va l i d i t y o f t h e Or d e r of
A r r e s t a n d R e co m m i tm e n t. H e cl a i m s t h a t h e d i d n o t

v i o l a te h i s co n d i ti o n a l p a r d o n si n ce h e h a s n o t b e e n
co nv icte d b y fi na l jud gm e n t. Pe ti ti on er al so co n te nd s
that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and
accordin gl y cla ims he has been deprived of his ri ghts
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence.
HELD
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons . - It wa s h e l d t h a t th e
de termina tion if the parole had been brea ched rested
exclusively in the sound ju dgment of the GovGen and
tha t su ch determ ination wo uld not be revie wed b y the
courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on
parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted
it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon
wh i ch h is re co m mi tm en t wa s o rd er ed ." Tesor o h ad in
effect a greed tha t the GovGen 's deter mination (ra ther
than that of the regular courts of law) that he had
breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at
liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency
i s exten de d u po n th e co nd i ti on s n am ed i n i t, a nd i t i s
accepted upon those conditions. The governor may
wi t h d r a w h i s gr a ce i n a ce r ta i n co n ti n ge n c y, a n d th e
governor shall himself determine when that contingency
has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to
bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed that, whenever the governor should
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his
parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be
conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court
reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is
not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in
court and been afforded the opportunity to defend
himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition with which he was charged, that brought about
or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement
in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned
it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
con stitutional prero gative. The accep tan ce thereof b y
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition
or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To
no other department of the Government [has] such
power been entrusted."

The status of our case law on the matter under

consideration may be summed up in the following
propositions:
1 . The gran t of pardon and the determ ination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of
a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act,
n o t su b je ct to j u d i ci a l s cr u t i n y u n d e r Se c 6 4 o f th e
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of
a condi tiona l pardon under Art 159 R PC . W here the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime
is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final
ju d gm en t of a co ur t, in o rd er th a t a conv i ct m a y be
recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial
due process in his trial and conviction for the offense
for wh ich he was condi tional l y pardoned , Se c 64 (i)
RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner
herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or

- Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People

v. D r a m a y o , 4 2 S C R A 5 9 ) . A p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o n l y
justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but
p r o o f b e yo n d r e a so n a b l e d o u b t i s s ti l l n e ce ssa r y f o r
conviction.
- The executive can only allege the commission of crime
and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable
evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then
a ff i r m t h e a l l e g a t i o n o f c o m m i s s i o n i n a j u d g m e n t o f
conviction.
T he cu rrent doctrine holds that, by virtue of Se c 64(i)
RAC, the President may in his judgment determine
whether the condition of the pardon has been violated.
- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as
the condition does not involve the commission of a crime
b u t , s a y, m e r e l y r e q u i r e s g o o d b e h a v i o r f r o m t h e
pardonee.

cr imes wi th wh ich he was charged before the cr iminal

penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed
upon him . S ince Ar t 159 R PC def ines a dis tin ct ,
s u b s t a n t i v e , f e l o n y, t h e p a r o l e e o r c o n v i c t w h o i s
regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must
be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed
in Art 159.
- In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
b re ache d the co nd i tio n s of h is pa rd on , th e Ex e cu tiv e
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
u n d e r S e c 6 4 ( i ) R A C ; o r ( i i ) to p r o c e e d a g a i n s t h i m
u nd er Ar t 1 59 R PC , u po n a con vi ct wh o "h av in g be en
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC.
D e ci si on Petition dismissed

of Zamboanga without deciding if the y were entitled to

amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has
admitted to the commission of the offense.

SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
- As many as such charges may be, none of them so far
has resulted in a final conviction, without which he
cannot be recommitted under the condition of his
pardon.

BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ
FERIA; January 21, 1949
FACTS
Jim en e z a nd Bar r io qu in to we r e cha r ged wi th m ur de r.
Jimene z was sentenced to life imprisonment, while
Barrioquintos trial was delayed because he was arrested
l a te r tha n Ji me ne z. Bo th su bm i tte d the ir ca se s to the
Guerilla Amnesty Commission pursuant to Proclamation
No. 838 which the said commission remanded to the CFI

ISSUE
WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled
to the benefits of Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty)
HELD
- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the
Amne sty Proclamation of September 7 , 1946, i t is not
nece ssar y tha t he should admit havin g com mitted the
cr i m in al act or o ffen se wi th wh i ch he i s ch a r ged , an d
allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he
admits or confesses having committed the offense with
which he is charged, the Commissions should conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance
t o t h e e n e m y, o r a g a i n s t p e r s o n s a i d i n g i n t h e w a r
38 P rocl amat io n No. 8 (disp osit iv e): I, Man uel Roxas, P resid ent of t he

P hilippines, in accordance wit h t he prov isions of Article V II, sect ion 10,
paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an
amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war effort of t he enemy, and commit ted during t he
period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation.
This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts
committed from purely personal motives.

efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled

to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a
patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to
the nation.
- Since the Amne sty Procla mation is a public act, the
c o u r t s a n d Am n e s t y C o m m i s s i o n s s h o u l d a p p l y t h e
benefits granted to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person
charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
p r e se n t e d sh o ws th a t th e a ccu se d i s e n ti t l e d to sa i d
benefits.
- If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a
case and decide whether the offense committed by the
d e f e n d a n t co m e s wit h in t h e te r m s o f th e Am n e st y
Pro clama tion althou gh the defendant has pleaded no t
guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions
can not do so.
- (This case is under Executive of our outline, and the
following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this
section)
Difference of Amnest y from Pardon
Pardon
Amnesty
-granted by the Chief
-by proclamation of the
Executive, thus a private
president with the
act which must be pleaded
concurrence of the
and proved by the person
Congress, and is a public
pardoned and which the
act of which the courts
courts may not take notice
may take judicial notice.
of.
Granted to one after
Granted to classes of
conviction
persons or communities
who may be guilty,
generally before or after
institution of prosecution
and sometimes after
conviction
-looks forward and relieves
-looks backward and
offender of consequences
abolishes and puts into
of crime; abolishes and
oblivion the offense itself,
forgives punishment, but
as though he had
doesnt abolish civil liability committed no offense
Doesnt restore rights to
Rights not affected as the
hold public office, suffrage,
offender is treated as if he
unless expressly restored
committed no crime at all
by pardon
De ci sio n respondents ordered to hear and decide the
a p p l i ca ti o n s f o r a m n e st y o f p e ti ti o n e r s u n l e ss co u r t s
have already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits
of amnesty.

SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [concur]

To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided

by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following
elements are essential:
1. tha t he is char ged or may be char ged wi th an
o f f e n s e p e n a l i ze d u n d e r t h e R P C , e x c e p t t h o s e
against chastity or for purely personal motives;
2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy;
3. th a t i t wa s co m m i tt e d d u r i n g th e p e r i o d f r o m
December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where
the offense was commi tted was actua ll y liberated
from enemy control and occupation.
If these three elemen ts are present in a case brou ght
b e f o r e a G u e r r i l l a Am n e s t y C o m m i s s i o n , t h e l a t t e r
cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the
p ro cla ma ti on . Th er e i s no thi n g in the pr ocla m a tio n to
even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit
having executed the acts constituting the offense wi th
which he is charged or may be charged.

avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations

against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as,
if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency
for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of
which, according to him, he is not responsible.

MONSANTO V FACTORAN
FERNAN; February 9, 1989

FACTS
In a d e ci si o n r e n d e r e d o n M a r ch 2 5 , 1 9 8 3 , t h e
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and
three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and payment of fine. Petitioner appealed
her conviction to the SC which affirmed the same. She
filed a motion for reconsideration, but while the motion
was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on
TUASON [dissent]
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which she
accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said
- As to the determ ination of the pretended right of the
pardon, petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer
defendants, to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of
requesting that she be reinstated to her former post. The
the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated
final as far as the Commi ssion is con cerned . The fact
to her position without the necessity of a new
that the defendants denied having committed the crime
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground
the abso lute pardon, but she still has to pa y. Seeking
f or its decision to turn down their application. That
reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing
circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act.
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the
T he Com mission has thus ampl y performed the duties
crime which implies that her service in the government
required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the
has never been interrup ted , and therefore the date of
matters of investigating and deciding.
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
The
Amnesty
Commissions
are
executive
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982.
to
instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the
Petitioner contended that:
President. They are not courts; they are not performing
she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of
judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate
her suspension.
jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
she should not be re quired to pa y the
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction.
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
(Guanio vs. Fernandez) - The Court can order the
C om m i ssio n to act bu t i t ca n no t te l l the C om m i ssio n
ISSUES
how to act. How or for whom a case should be decided is
1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an
a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction
absolu te pardon by the Chief Executive, i s enti tled to
to control or review. The writ of mandamus will not issue
reinstatement to her former position wi thout need of a
to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
new appointment.
officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the
2. W ON petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities
right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to
notwithstanding pardon.
any matter in which he is required to act, it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
HELD
court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners)
1. Ratio
Pardon is defined as an act of grace,
- Am n e s t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a c r i m e .
proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
W h e n a n a c c u s e d s a ys t h a t h e h a s n o t c o m m i t t e d a
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is
crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also selfb e s t o w e d , f r o m t h e p u n i sh m e n t th e l a w i n f l i c t s f o r a
evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official
certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to
a ct of th e ex ecu tiv e ma gi str a te xxx a nd no t
prove the existen ce of those conditions. A petition for
communicated officially to the Court. This was
a m n e s t y i s i n th e n a t u r e o f a p l e a o f c o n f e s s i o n a n d
governed by the 1973 Constitution.

R e a so n i n g
- People v. Lising
xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to
hi s former posi tion and entitlement to pa ym ent of
hi s salarie s, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendent elite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public
official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. xxx
- T h e p e n a l t y o f prision mayor carries the accessory
p e n a l t i e s o f t e m p o r a r y a b so l u te d i s q u a l i f i ca t i o n a n d
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffr a ge , e nf or ce ab l e du ri n g th e ter m o f th e pr in ci pa l
pe na l ty. Tem po ra r y a bsol u te di squ al i fi ca tio n ba r s the
convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon
was bestowed, wh ether before or after the conviction ,
for the result would still be the same. Having accepted
the pardon, pet it io ner is de e me d to have
aban done d her appeal and her unreversed
convic tion b y the Sandiganba ya n assumed the
c h a ra c t e r o f f in a li t y. Pa rd o n i mp l ie s g u il t . It does
no t erase the fact of the co mmi ssion of the crime and
t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e o f , a s o p p o s e d t o t h e Ex Parte
Ga rl an d , Pe l ob el l o , a nd Cr i stob al ca se s. It inv olv es
forgiveness, and not forgetfulness.
- W hi le the C ou r t i s p re pa re d to co n ce de th a t p ar do n
may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal
i n d i c tm e n t i f o n l y to g i v e a m e a n i n g t o th e f i a t th a t a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe
the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of
an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. P a r d o n c a n n o t m a s k
the acts constituting the crime.
- Public offices are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safet y and benefit of the
common good. They cannot be compromised to
fa vor private interests. A pardon, albeit full and
p l e n a r y, c a n n o t p r e c l u d e t h e a p p o i n t i n g p o w e r
f r o m r e f u s i n g a p p o i n t m e n t t o a n yo n e d e e m e d t o
be of bad character.
2 . As f or the exem p tio n fr om th e pa ym e n t of the ci vi l
indemnity, the Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability is
governed by RPC, and subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served
by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
D e ci si on
T h e a s sa i l e d r e so l u ti o n o f f o r m e r D e p u t y
Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is
affirmed.
1 . Pe ti tioner is not automa ti call y reinstated, and mu st
apply for appointment to her former position.
2 . Pe ti ti on er is no t e nti tl ed to a n y ba ckp a y, a nd mu st
pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE
FELICIANO; July 39, 1987
FACTS
- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of
various municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del
Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial
T re a s u r e r ' s O f f i c e o f L a n a o d e l S u r, a s w e l l a s t h e
Provincial Auditor and the Assistant Provincial Auditor of
Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged and convicted in
33 ca ses for estafa throu gh falsifica tion of public and
commercial documents (Article 315, in relation to Article
17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a decision of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total
amount of Government funds (treasury warrants)
involved was somewhat over P2.7 million.
- T h e p e ti ti o n e r s s ta te th a t t h e y a p p l i e d fo r a m n e s t y
through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 Februar y
1985, they were granted conditional amnesty by the said
Commission, subject to the approval or final action of the
President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082,
dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty Commission, the
petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications
of the petitioners to the President, recommending
approval thereof or grant of executive clemency to the
pe titioners. The petitioners' amne sty appli cations are
said to have been submitted to the Office of the
P r e s i d e n t b y t h e t h e n P r e s i d e n t i a l As s i s t a n t V i c t o r
Nituda. Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the
petitioners further state, made written representations
d a te d 27 Jan ua r y 19 86 wi th for me r Pr e sid en t Ma rco s
concerning the petitioners' applications during a political
rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 January
1986 . Mr. Marco s apparen tly wrote on the upper
righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter
the followin g: "Approved " and si gned the same wi th a
partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finall y, that
th e or i gin a l co p ie s o f th e am ne st y pa pe rs we re i n the
possession of then Presidential Adviser Joaquin Venus
and were lost or destro yed at Malacaang "durin g the
February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and could
not now be located.
- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty
were never available to the petitioners under P.D. No.
1182 as amended by PD 1429. They further contend that
the applicab le law to them i s PD 1082, whi ch gr anted
amnesty to those resisting the duly constituted
authorities in several parts of Mindanao.
ISSUE
WON President Marcos grant of amnesty to the
petitioners is in accordance with law.
HELD

NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws,

violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and
w h i c h h e h i m s e l f p r o m u l g a te d i n th e e x e r ci s e o f h i s
prays for the issuance of the wri t of prohibi tion to the
concurrent legislative powers, are void and of no effect.
j u d g e a n d t h e ci t y f i s ca l . In v o l v e d i n c a se L - 3 0 5 5 i s
R e a so n i n g
Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports
T h e b e n e f i ts o f a m n e s t y we r e n ev e r a v a i l a b l e to th e
fr om the Phi l ip p in e s. In th i s ca se , L eo n Ma . Gue r re ro
petitioners under PD 1182.
seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator
- U n d e r sa i d l a w, t h e cr i m e s t o b e a m n e st i e d m u s t
of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
h a v e b e e n f o r viola tion s of subver sion la ws o r fo r
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the
cr im e s a gai n st p ub li c or de r un de r th e R PC . Among
p e ti ti o n e r. Bo th o ffi ci a l s r e f u se to i ssu e t h e r e q u i r e d
those disqualified from amnesty under PD 1182 are
e x p o r t l i c e n s e o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e e x p o r ta t i o n o f
t h o se w h o , wh i l e h o l d i n g p u b l i c o ffi ce o r
shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive
emplo ymen t diver ted public funds from the la wful
Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No.
purpose for which they had been appropriated. In the
225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the
instant case, petitioners were charged with and
Government of the Republic uf the Philippines during the
con vi cted o f Ar t. 31 5 viz Ar t 17 1 , R PC . Ar t. 3 15 i s
period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
under Crimes Against Property, while Art. 171 is under
purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodrigue z, Sr., as a
Crimes Against Public Interest. Clearly, petitioners are
tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista
among those expressly disqualified under PD 1182.
P a r t y, a p p l i e s f o r a w r i t o f p r o h i b i ti o n t o r e st r a i n t h e
Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under
T re a s u r e r o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f r o m d i s b u r s i n g m o n e y
PD 1082.
under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056
- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted
is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates
under PD 1082 are acts penalized by existing laws in
P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection wi th,
the furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted
and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to
a u th o r i t i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c b y m e m b e r s a n d
b e h e l d i n N o v e m b e r, 1 9 4 9 . T h e p e t i t i o n e r , An t o n i o
su p p o r te r s o f M N L F, Ba n gs a M o r o Ar m y a n d o th e r
Ba r r e d o , a s a c i t i ze n , ta x - p a ye r a n d vo te r, a sk s th i s
anti-government groups with similar motivations and
Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing,
aims. The resistance referred to is typified by the
spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any
offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or
part of it.
conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all offenses
- Pe ti tioner s rest the ir ca se chiefl y on the proposi tion
with a political character and all of which are
that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total
e m b r a ce d i n th e R PC u n d e r Crimes Against Public
Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines
Order. On the other hand, the acts of which petitioners
and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and
w e r e co n v i cte d we r e ordinar y crimes w i th o u t a n y
R e gu l a ti o n s to M e e t su ch Em e r g e n c y) h a s ce a se d to
political complexion and consisting simply of diversion
have any force and effect, thereby rendering the
of public funds to private profit.
assailed Executive Orders null and void.
- W e do n ot di sco un t the p ossi bi l i ty th a t the for me r
President did in fact act in contravention of PDs 1082
ISSUE
and 1182 by grant ing the amne st y cla imed b y
WON the emergency powers delegated to the President
petitioners, and that by such act, he may indeed have
had ceased when Congress held its regular session
aroused expectations (however unjustified under the
terms of existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If
HELD
su ch be the ca se , the n the a pp ro pr ia te r e co ur se of
YES. Com monweal th Act No . 671 became inopera tive
petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other court,
when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
but rather to the Executive Department.
and that Executive Order s Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
D e ci si on Petition denied.
were issued without authority of law.
- C om mo n we al th Act No . 67 1 d oe s n ot in ter m f ix th e
duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has
ARANETA V DINGLASAN
to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published,
TUASON; August 26, 1949
t h e p u r p o s e t o b e s u b s e r v e d , a n d i t s r e l a ti o n to th e
Constitution.
FACTS
- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders
"I n t i m e o f wa r o r o th e r n a ti o n a l e m e r ge n c y, t h e
of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. Llimited period and subject to such restrictions as it
2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which
may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations
r e gu l a te s r e n ta l s f o r h o u s e s a n d l o t s f o r r e s i d e n t i a l
to carry out a declared national policy."
build ings. The peti tioner, J. Anton io Araneta, is under
- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution
prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
a r e b e yo n d q u e s t i o n i n t e n d e d t o m e a n r e s t r i c t i v e i n

duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of

emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be
s a i d t o b e a n e m e r g e n c y." I t i s t o b e p r e s u m e d t h a t
C o m m o n w e a l t h Ac t N o . 6 7 1 w a s a p p r o v e d w i t h t h i s
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the
principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
- The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal
the act wo uld not be in harmon y wi th the Con stitu tion
e i th e r. I f a n e w a n d d i ff e r e n t l a w w e r e n e ce s s a r y t o
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation
would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain;
that which was intended to meet a temporary
emer gen cy ma y become permanen t la w; for Con gress
m i g h t n o t e n a c t t h e r e p e a l , a n d e v e n i f i t w o u l d , th e
repeal might not meet with the approval of the
President, and the Congress might not be able to
ov er ri de th e ve to . Fu r th e rm o re , th i s wo u ld cr ea te the
anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers
b y simple majority, i t might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to
be, the law.
- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force
a nd e ffect un til th e C on gre ss of th e Ph i li pp i ne s sha l l
otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the
repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
p r o v i si o n f o r t h e r e p e a l o f t h e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s
i ssued in pursuan ce of it, a clear manifestation of the
belief held by the National Assembly that there was no
necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if
having no idea abou t the time the Em ergency Po wers
Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to
m a ke a p r ov i s i o n f o r i t s te r m i n a t i o n i n th e sa m e wa y
that it did for the termination of the effects, and
incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in
repealing or annulling the rules and regulations
promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain
in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the
ones already annulled by the legislature.
- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative
functions by the Executive when Congress is in the
u n o b s tr u cte d ex e r ci se o f i t s a u th o r i t y i s th e f a ct th a t
there would be two legislative bodies operating over the
same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously,
mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emer gen cy po wer s of the Presiden t, as su gge sted, be
suspended while Congress was in session and be revived
after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal
executive order s promul ga ted b y the Pre siden t durin g
con gre ssional rece ss, and the Pre sident in turn could
treat in the same manner, between sessions of
C o n gr e ss , l a ws e n a ct e d b y th e l a t te r. In e n t i r e g o o d

faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the

country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals
a f te r h e h a d v e to e d a b i l l o n th e s u b j e c t e n a c t e d b y
Co n gre ss, an d th e pr e se n t C hi ef Exe cu ti ve i ssu ed a n
ex ecu tiv e o rd er o n expo r t con tr ol af te r Co n gre ss ha d
refused to approve the measure.
- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis
in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of
the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regu lations promu lgated by him under the power s
herein granted."
- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be
only one meeting of Congress at which the President was
to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not
say each meeting, which it could very well have said if
that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did
not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to
be the first and last and did not think that upon the
convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse,
what reason could there be for its failure to provide in
appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to
con tinue makin g la ws in the form of rules, re gula tion s
and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.
- As a contemporar y construction, President Que zon's
sta temen t re gardin g the duration of Act No. 671 is
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering
hi s p ar t i n the p assa ge a nd in th e ca r r yi n g ou t o f th e
law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a
special session, who recommended the enactment of the
Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author,
and who was the very President to be entrusted with its
e x e c u t i o n , s t a t e d i n h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h y, " T h e G o o d
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period"
a nd " wou ld be co me inv al id un le ss r ee na cted ." Th ese
phrases connote automa ti c ex tinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not
t o r e p e a l ) th e l a w a f te r t h e ex p i r a ti o n o f th a t p e r i o d .
They signify that the same law, not a different one, had
to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his
autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he
issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was
most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its
next regu lar session whi ch was to open on Januar y 1,
1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that
the conferring of enormous powers upon the President

wa s decided upon wi th specifi c view to the inabili ty of

the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor
than this inability could have motivated the delegation of
p o w e r s so va s t a s t o a m o u n t to a n a b d i ca ti o n b y th e
National Assembl y of its authority. The enactment and
continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of
democratic institutions could not have been conceived
under any circumstance short of a complete disruption
and dislocation of the normal processes of government.
T h e p er io d tha t be st co mp or ts wi th th e co n sti tu tio na l
requirements and limitations, with the general context of
the law and with what we believe to be the main if not
th e so l e ra i so n d 'e tr e fo r i ts en actm en t, wa s a p er io d
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the convening of that body.
- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead
of the first special session which preceded it as the point
of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the
National Assembly is given effect. In a special session,
the Congress may "consider general legislation or only
such subjects as the President may designate." (Section
9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
- After all the criticisms that have been made against the
efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the
fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
go ve rn me n t, wi th al l i ts d ef ects an d sho r tco mi n gs, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or
group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamen tar y governmen t have given noti ce tha t the y
share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this
s ys te m , w i th a l l i t s f a u l t s, a s th e i d e a l . Th e p o i n t i s,
under this framework of government, legislation is
preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting
p e r i o d s o f c r i s i s n o m a tte r h o w se r i o u s. N ev e r i n t h e
history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department, not even when that
Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was
e n ga ge d i n a l i f e - a n d - d e a th s tr u g gl e to p r e se r v e t h e
Union. The truth is that under our concept of
co n sti tu tio na l gov er nm en t, i n tim e s of ex tr e me p er i l s
more than in normal circumstances the various
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the
ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.
D e ci si on Petitions GRANTED.

QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD

BARRERA; September 30, 1963
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the
p e ti t i o n f o r wr i t o f h a b e a s co r p u s a n d /o r p r o h i b i ti o n ,

certiorari, and mandamus filed by the petitionerappellants

- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation
Board (DB) with having purchased $130,000.00 US
dollars without the necessar y license from the Central
Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the same to
H K; and three of the pe titioner- appellants with having
a t t e m p t e d to b r i b e o f fi ce r s o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e a n d U S
G o v e r n m e n t s i n o r d e r t o e v a d e p r o s e cu t i o n f o r s a i d
unauthorized purchase of US dollars.
- After filing of d e p o r t a t i o n c h a r g e s , presiding member
of the DB issued a warrant of arrest for the said aliens
but upon filing of a surety bond and cash bond, the

C o m mi s s i o n e r, a s s e e n i n S e c 5 2 [which is the
r e p e a l i n g c l a u s e o f t h e I m m i g r a t i o n Ac t , w h i c h
expressly exempted Sec 69 of Act 2711

D e ci si on EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers

the DB to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
p re scri be th e con di ti on s for th e tem po ra r y r el ea se of
Section 69 of the Re vised Ad min is trat ive Co de said aliens, is declared illegal.
( Ac t N o . 2 7 11) : only indicates that the Executive
Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed
or
his
authorized
agent
could
only
cancelled. Decision appealed from affirmed with
deport/expel/exclude
from
RP
aliens
upon
modification.
co n d u c ti n g a p r i o r i nv e s ti ga ti o n of th e gr o u n d o f
such action and the rest of it indicates the
p r o ce d u r e co n ce r n i n g th e p r o te c t i o n o f th e s a i d
ART VIII: JUDICIARY
alien during the deportation proceedings. [indication
of the recognition of the existence of power of the
executive to deport aliens]
DEMETRIA V ALBA
petitioner-appelants were provisionally set free.
Pre s ide n t s p ow er un d e r Sec . 69 , Ac t 2711 ma y be
FERNAN;
February 27, 1987
- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint m o t i o n t o
d i sm i ss the charges on the grounds that (1) deportation
delegated: proofs through history
charges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of
E O N o . 4 9 4 ( f i r s t E O o f G o v - G e n M u r p h y , FACTS
a li en s an d ( 2) th e D B h as n o ju ri sd i ctio n to en ter ta in
1934): c o n s t i t u te a b o a r d t o t a k e a c t i o n s o n
- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer
such charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitionercomplaints
against
foreigners,
conduct
for a writ of preliminary injunction assailed the
a pp el la n ts th en f il ed a p e t i t i o n f o r h a b e a s c o r p u s
investigations and make recommendations
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
a n d / o r p r o h i b i t i o n which was remanded to the CFI of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the
Manila. The CFI issued a w r i t o f p r e l i m i n a r y
E O N o . 3 3 ( Q u e z o n , 1 9 3 6 ) : cre a tio n of D B to Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on the ff. grounds:
i n j u n c t i o n , restraining DB from hearing the deportation
receive complaints against aliens, to conduct
o it infringes upon the fundamental law by
ch a r ge s a ga i n st t h e p e ti t i o n e r s, p e n d i n g f i n a l
investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and make
authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys
t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e habeas corpus and/or prohibition
recommendations authorized by President
o i t i s r e p u g n a n t t o t h e co n s t i tu t i o n a s i t f a i l s t o
proceedings. DB filed its answer to the original petition,
***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO
specify the objectives and purposes for which the
maintaining that the DB, as an agent of the Prexi, has
ORDER ARREST OF THE ALIEN
proposed transfer of funds are to be made
jurisdiction over the charges and the authority to order
E O 6 9 ( R o x a s , 1 9 4 7 ) : o r d e r s r e sp o n d e n ts i n
o it allows the President to override the safeguards,
their arrest. CFI d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n , h en ce th is
deportation proceedings to file a bond with the
form
and
procedure
prescribed
by
the
appeal.
Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their
Constitution in approving appropriations
appearance and facilitate execution of deportation
o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative
ISSUES
order whenever the President decides the case
powers
1. WON the deportation charges constitute legal ground
against the respondent
o t h e t r a n sf e r o f f u n d s b y t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d th e
form deportation of the petitioner-appellants
***TAKE N OT E: Fi l in g of BON D , N OT AU T H OR IZ E
i m p l e m e n ta ti o n t h e r e o f b y th e B u d g e t M i n i s te r
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President
ARREST OF THE RESPONDENT
and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their
can personally order the arrest of the alien complained
authority and jurisdiction
of, such power can be delegated by him to the DB
E O 3 9 8 ( Q u i r i n o , 1 9 5 1 ) : reorganized the DB and - Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
authorized the DB, upn filing of formal charges by
questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further
HELD
the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant
contended that:
1. Yes. The act of profitee ring, hoardin g, or
for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold
o T he provision under conside ration wa s enacted
blackmarketing of US dollars violate Central Bank
him under detention during the investigation unless
p u r su a n t to S e c ti o n 1 6 ( 5 ) , Ar t. V I II o f th e 1 9 7 3
regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC
h e f i l e s a b o n d ( so h e r e , PR ES I D E N T AL R EA D Y
Constitution
SABOTAGE, which is a ground for deportation under RA
AUTHORIZED ARREST OF RESPONDENT ALIENS)
o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the
503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613.
O n r i g h t s o f t h e a c c u s e d : S e c 1 , AR T I I I o f 1 9 3 5
government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of
CONSTI = Sec 2, AR T III, 1987 CONSTI
performance of duties within the latters sphere of
discretion such as the power to arrest cannot be
This provision specifies that the probable cause must
responsibility
delegated to an agent of the President.
be determined b y t h e j u d g e after examination under
- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a
o a th o f t h e co m p l a i n a n t a n d t h e w i t n e s s p r o d u c e d
Reply to the Comment
Obiter
un li ke tha t of the 4 Ame nd m en t, Phi l ip p in e Bi l l , o r th
- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the
2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:
Jones Act which does not determine who exactly would
administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of
determine the probable cause for the order of arrest.
the present case in abeyance
1940):
S e c t i o n 3 7 , C A N o . 6 1 3 ( I m m i g r a t i o n Ac t o f
The Consti is silent on whether a warrant of arrest may
Commissioner of Immigration empowered to
- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to
be issued upon determination of the probable cause
dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of
e ffe c t t h e a r r e s t a n d ex p u l s i o n o f a n a l i e n , a f te r
by other authority besides the Judge.
previous
determination
by
the
Board
of
Section 16(5) , Ar t.VIII of the 1973 Consti tution b y the
*DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT
Freedom Constitution, rendering the petition moot and
Commissioners of the existence of ground or
THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND
gr ou nd s th e re fo re B U T d i d n o t c o n c e n t r a t e
academic
BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE
exercise
power
to
deport
to
the
ALIEN DuriNG THE INVESTIGATION.

ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable
2 . W ON the Para gr aph 1 of Se ction 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES
- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said
that: This Court will not disregard and in effect condone
w r o n g o n th e s i m p l i s t i c a n d to l e r a n t p r e te x t th a t t h e
case has become moot and academic.
- As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not
- W her e th e l e g i sl a tu r e o r t h e ex e cu ti v e b r a n ch a c ts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
b eco me s th e du t y o f th e ju di ci ar y to d ecl ar e wh a t th e
other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred
by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, is null and void.
- Pa ra gr ap h 1 of Se ctio n 44 p rov id e s: T he Pre si de n t
shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
a p p r o p r i a te d f o r th e d i ffe r e n t d e p a r tm e n ts , b u r e a u s,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall
b e pa sse d au tho ri zi n g a n y tra n sf er o f a pp ro pr ia ti on s,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respe ctive offices from savin gs in other item s of
their respective appropriations.
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical
- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway
- T h e p u r p o se a n d c o n d i t i o n f o r w h i c h f u n d s m a y b e
transferred were specified
- P a r a g r a p h 1 o f S e c ti o n 4 4 u n d u l y ov e r - e x te n d s th e
p ri vi le ge gr a n te d u nd er Se ctio n 1 6( 5) , a nd e mp o wer s
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard to W ON the funds to be
transferred are savings, or W ON the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is
to be made
- It completely disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative power

DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

BANK
FERNANDO; April 29, 1971
FACTS
- Francisca De Agba yani obtained a P450.00loan from
P N B d a te d Ju l y 1 9 , 1 9 3 9 m a tu r i n g o n Ju l y 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 ,
secured by real estate mortgage
- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was
P1,294.00
- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of Pangasinan Provincial
Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan balance
- Au gu st 1 0, 19 59 Pla i n tiff fi le d su i t a ga in st PN B an d
Sheriff alle gi ng tha t 15 ye ars havin g elapsed from the
date of maturity the mortgage have prescribed.
- P N B p r a ye d f o r t h e d i s m i s sa l s i n c e t h e d e f e n se o f
prescription would not be available in the period of
March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium
o n d e b t s w a s i ssu e d , t o Ju l y 2 6 , 1 9 4 8 wh e n R A 3 4 2
which extended the period of moratorium was declared
invalid, were to be deducted from the time during which
PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani
ISSUES
1. WON a statute subsequently adjudged as invalid
shou ld be deemed to have force and effect before the
declaration of its nullity.
2. (if yes) W ON prescription ran during the eight year
period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force.
HELD
1 . YES Prio r to the declara tion of nulli ty a cha llenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and
effect.
- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
a n d m a y h a v e c o n s e q u e n ce s w h i c h c a n n o t b e j u s t l y
ignored.
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium
was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferer the SC has made clear its
view in a series of cases that during the eight year
period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription
did no t run. ( case s decided : Da y v. CF I, Republi c vs.
Hernaez.
- Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order
o r a m un i cip al or di na n ce l i ke wi se su ffer i n g f ro m th a t
i n f i r m i t y, ca n n o t b e th e so u r ce o f a n y l e g a l r i gh ts o r
duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
- SC sa id , in Agb a ya ni vs. PN B th a t o r th od ox vi e w i s
unrealistic and that until after the judiciary declares its
invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.

DE LA LLANA V ALBA
FERNANDO; March 12, 1982
FACTS
- The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, en titled "An Act Reorgani zing the Judiciar y,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes".
BP 129 manda tes that Justi ces and Jud ge s of inferior
co ur ts fr om th e Co ur t of Ap pe al s to mu ni cip a l co u r ts,
e x ce p t t h e o c c u p a n t s o f th e S a n d i g a n b a ya n a n d t h e
Cour t of Tax Appeals, unle ss appoin ted to the inferior
co u r ts e st a b l i sh e d b y su ch Ac t, w o u l d b e co n si d e r e d
separated from the Judiciary. The intent of this Act is to
a tta in (1) more efficiency in the di sposal of ca ses, (2)
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed
by the court, (3) democratization of social and economic
opportunities and the substantiation of the true meaning
of
social
justice.
- P r o ce d u r e De La Llana,a judge, together with other
petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
B u d g e t , r e sp o n d e n t C h a i r m a n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n
Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any
action
implementing
BP
129.
ISSUES
1.WON the petitioners have legal standing.
2.On Constitutionality of BP 129
a . W ON t h e r e w a s l a ck of g o o d f a i th o n th e p a r t o f
Legislature in its enactment.
b. WON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is
valid.
c. W ON the provision of BP 129 (re gard ing fixin g of
compensation and allowances of members of Judiciary
by the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
d. W ON BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure
(Art. X Sec 7 of 1973 Constitution) enjoyed by
incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme
Court's power to discipline and remove judges.
HELD
1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and
officers of the court and taxpayers, have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and
evalua tion of the judi cial system in the coun tr y, found
out that institutional reforms is both pressing and
urgent.
b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the
co m p e te n ce o f a l e gi ti m a te b o d y a n d i f d o n e i n g o o d
faith suffers from no infirmity.
R e a so n i n g
0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial

Gov and in Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court also held

in the judiciary calls for its reorganization. He believes
that
the
abolition
of
an
that the Constitution is a living instrument which
No l a w is ir re pe al ab l e . T he po we r to cre a te an offi ce
office is valid)
translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining
i n cl ud e s the po wer to ab ol i sh th em . "Sa lu s po pu li e st
- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2
circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the
suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme
o f 1 9 7 3 C o n st i "v e s ts i n th e N A th e p o we r t o d e f i n e ,
Consti)
law.
prescribe and appor tion the ju risd iction of the various
courts, subject to certain limitation in the case of SC." In
AQUINO [concur in the result]
PLANA [concurs and dissent]
short, the NA has the power to abolish an office that it
created.
For him the sui t is premature , bu t affirmin g expressl y
Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended
c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power
that the abolition was in good faith. CONCEPCION
its enactment. His qualification being that the "President
if the law is complete and provides for a standard.
(concurs in the result)
is under no obligation to consult with the SC and the SC
R e a so n i n g
as su ch i s no t ca ll ed up on to giv e le ga l adv i ce to th e
- In th i s ca se , th e Act p rov id e s a cl ea r sta nd ar d . T he
President."
GUERRERO [concur]
President may be authorized to fix the allo wances and
compensation
but
guided
by
the
Social justification and the functional utility of the law to
PEOPLE V CUARESMA
Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985.
uphold its constitutionality is the ratio decidendi of this
d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination
NARVASA; April 18, 1989
case. For him, inquiring into the wisdom of the law is a
by virtue of the abolition of the office. In case of
political question. Public office is a privilege in the gift of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
FACTS
the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though
thereby lose his position. In the case of abolition, there is
- On t h e b a si s o f a ffid avi ts of Lu z Lu ma cao a nd h er
it
is
harsh.
i n la w n o o ccu pa n t. The re can be no ten u re to a n on wi tne ss, So ledad Tanilon, both da ted August 21 ,1978
existent
office.
which were sworn to before the First Assistant City Fiscal
R e a so n i n g
ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent]
o f D um a gue te C i ty, sa id Assi stan t Fi sca l fi le d on the
- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the
same da y an informa tion wi th the City Cour t Jud ge of
NA to abolish an office on one hand and the security of
Co n cu r s bu t d i sse n te d o n th e gr ou nd th a t the sta tu te
D u m a g u e t e C i t y c h a r g i n g R o si e C u a r e s m a w i t h o r a l
tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and
being free from any constitutional infirmity, the
d ef am a ti on . Th e co mp la i n t wa s do cke ted as C r im i na l
harmoni zed. Recon cilia tion and balan cing is we ll hi gh
"Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power
Case Number 7238.
unavoidable under the fundamental principle of
to fi ll th e n e wl y cr ea te d ju di ci al po si ti on s wi tho u t a n y
- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending
separation of powers.
o b l i g a t i o n to co n su l t w i t h t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a n d t o
that the ca se had been co mmenced by an information
- Political theor y (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more
accord
its
views
the
fullest
consideration.
by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party
truism and actuality of interdependence among different
as required by Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The
branches
of
government
said article provides that criminal action for defamation
than in independence and separation of powers.
DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]
cannot be prosecuted de oficio except at the instance of
D e ci si on : Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP 129
and upon the complaint expressly filed by the offended
has not been shown.
The power of the Legislature to create courts also
party.
i n cl u d e s th e p o we r to a b o l i sh t h e m . W he n th e r e i s a
- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on
SEPARATE OPINION
conflict between public welfare(the duty of the
the basis of the Supreme Cour t rulin g in Fernandez v.
legislature to provide a society with a fair and effective
Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976), which stated that the error
judicial system) and personal benefit (security of
can be corrected by the filing of the sworn statement of
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the
the complainant, assuming it contains all the information
former. The abolition of the cour ts is a matter of
required under the Rules, with the Court to comply with
The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure
legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is proper.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Alternatively, the
o f ju d ge s m u st p rev ai l ove r th e i mp l ie d co n sti tu tio na l
Pe ti ti on i s p re ma tu re . No a ctu a l co n tro ve rs y ye t. No t
fiscal can file with the court a verified complaint of the
a u th o r i t y t o a b o l i s h c o u r t s a n d t o o u s t j u d g e s . S u ch
u n ti l th e ab ol i tio n of cou r ts i s n ot do ne , can th er e b e
o ffen de d pa rt y. In the o rd er de n yin g the qua sha l , th e
subjection of a judge to public "harassment and
p o s s i b l y a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e s e cu r i t y o f t e n u r e . " S a l u s
ju d ge , ho wev er, re qu ir ed th e f iscal to fi le the ver if ie d
h u m i l i a t i o n . . . . c a n d i m i n i s h p u b l i c c o n f i d e n ce i n t h e
populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the
complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with the
courts." The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused
supreme law.
order by filing the needed document on the same day.
by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by
totally destroying their independence. It would be
- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months
ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due
MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
later alleging that the offense had prescribed since the
process cannot count it on themselves.
filing of the original information o August 2, 1978 did not
Tenu re of Jud ge s is different from tenure of Courts. A
interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
l e g i s l a t u r e i s n o t b o u n d t o g i v e s e cu r i t y o f t e n u r e t o
crime ( two months from discovery) and that said
BARREDO [concur]
courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges
prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the
applies only as their Courts exist.
su b m i s s i o n o f t h e co r r e c t i v e co m p l a i n t o n a u g u s t 4 ,
Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the
1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that it was
Legislature) . It follows that it is within the legislature' s
ERICTA
[concur]
the filing of the verified that conferred jurisdiction upon
power to abolish or reorganize them no matter what the
the Court and this was on August 4, 1980.
cost is. He personally believes that the present situation

- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on

Jube 26, 1981 which was denied for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time.
- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court
as filed by the Second Assistant City Fiscal on May 31,
1984 or three years after the dismissal of the motion to
reconsider.
ISSUE
W ON the Supreme Court should give due course to the
application for certiorari
HELD
1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final
order having been disposed of by the Court. The appeal,
if taken in a timely fashion, could have succeeded as the
order of the Cour t was tain ted b y an error of la w. The
f i l i n g of th e co m p l a i n t i n t h e f o r m of a n a ffi d a v i t , th e
investigation by the fiscal, and the subsequent filing of
the information with the Court did indeed toll the period
of prescription.
2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in
several counts:
a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor
General instead of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and
was dismissible on this account [Republic v Partisala ,
118 SCRA 870 (1982)].
b . R e m e d y o f ce r t i o r a r i i s l i m i t e d to a c t s o f a n y
agency or officer exercising judicial functions or
o f a n y j u d g e w h i ch a r e c l a i m e d t o b e w i t h o u t o r i n
excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. In the case at
bar,
the
c o r r e c t p r o ce d u r e i s th e f i l i n g o f a n a p p e a l a s t h e
ju d gm en t re nd er ed i s a n er ro r in l a w an d n o t gr ave
abuse of discretion.
c. The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to issue
extraordinary writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is
not
exclusive and granted to lower courts. There is
also a hierarchy that should be followed in matters of
this nature. Direct action to the Supreme Court will be
a l l o w e d o n l y w h e n t h e r e a r e sp e c i a l a n d i m p o r ta n t
r e a s o n s t h e r e f o r e . An d t h e s e r e a s o n s s h o u l d b e
clearly set out in the petition.
D e ci si on Petition dismissed.

YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE

COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987
FACTS
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing

of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering

the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confi sca tion of the carabaos and , sin ce the y could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. The thrust of his petition is that the executive
order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
tran sported acro ss provincia l boundaries. Hi s cla im is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a
co m p e te n t a n d i m p a r t i a l co u r t a s gu a r a n te e d b y d u e
process. He complains that the measure should not have
b e e n p r e su m e d , a n d so su st a i n e d , a s co n st i tu ti o n a l .
There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of
EO No. 626-A
2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on
constitutionality of statute
3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process
4. W ON EO No . 626-A i s an invalid exerci se of poli ce
power
5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of
legislative power
HELD
1 . NO. W hile al so involvin g the same executive order,
the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the
previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedl y affirm
the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.
2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not
be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safe guard a gain st official arbitrariness. In the instant
ca se, the carabao s were arbi trar il y confiscated by the

police station commander, were returned to the

petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabao s when ordered b y the tr ial cour t.
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted
t h e p e ti ti o n e r a n d i m m e d i a t e l y i m p o se d p u n i sh m e n t ,
which was carried out forthright. The conferment on the
admin istrative authori tie s of the po wer to adjud ge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers.
4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State
in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
mu s t ap pe ar, fi rs t, tha t the i n te r e s ts of the pu bl i c
gen er a ll y, as di stin gu i she d fr om th o se o f a p ar ti cu l ar
class, requi re such interferen ce; and se cond, tha t the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and
so is a l a wfu l sub je ct of EO No . 6 26 - A. Bu t wh il e the
amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement,
that there be a lawful method. To strengthen the original
measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
th e sla u gh te r of the ca ra ba o s b ut on the i r mov em en t,
providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be tran spor ted from one prov in ce to ano ther." The
o b je ct of the pr oh ib i tio n escap e s u s. T he re a so na bl e
connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order
as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
char itab le insti tutions and o ther si milar institutions as
the Chair man of the Na tional Mea t Inspe ction
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industr y ma y see fit, in the case of carabaos.
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
o ffi ce r s me n tio ne d the re i n wh o ar e gra n ted u nl i mi te d
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

BENGZON V DRILON

GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992

FACTS
- Petition to review the consti tutionali ty of the ve to by
the President of certain provisions of the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992
- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA
who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910
as amended by RA No. 1797
- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official
capacities
o f th e Ex e cu t i v e , i n v o lv e d
in the
implementation of the release of funds under the GAA
- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement
p e n s i o n s t o Ju s ti ce s of th e SC a n d th e C A wh o h av e
rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary
or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained
the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until
his death the salary which he has received at the time of
his retirement
- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement
benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP,
u n d e r R A1 5 6 8 , a s a m e n d e d b y R A3 5 9 5 , a n d PD 5 7 8 ,
respectively
- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically
read ju sted the re tiremen t pensions of mili tar y officer s
a n d e n l i s te d m e n . B u t th o se i n t h e j u d i c i a r y a n d t h e
Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic
readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic
r e a d ju st m e n t p r ov i si o n s ( Se ct i o n 3 - a of R A1 7 9 7 a n d
RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti Commissions
- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to
reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on
the matter (HB16297 and SB740)
- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would
erode the foundation of the policy on standardization of
co mp en sa tio n un de r th e Sa la r y Sta nd ar d i za ti on L a w,
RA6758
- On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and
Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their
pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out
t h a t P D 6 4 4 r e p e a l i n g R A 1 7 9 7 d i d n o t t a ke e f fe c t a s
t h e r e w a s n o v a l i d p u b l i c a t i o n p u r su a n t t o Tan a d a v
Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published
only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result
- As a result of the resolu tion by the Cour t, Con gress
i n cl u d e d i n t h e G A A a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r t h e Ju d i c i a r y
intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for
the retired justices
- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and
the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC
and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President
ve to ed th e HB on the m a tter a lr ea d y, a nd su ch
appropriation would erode the policy of salar y
standardization
ISSUE

W ON the veto by the president of certain provisions in

the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992
rela tin g to the pa ym ent of the adju sted pension of the
retired Justices of the SC and the CA

o The purpose retirement laws like such is to

entice competent men and women to enter the
government service and retire with relative
security

HELD
GARCIA V MACARAEG
- The President did not veto items but provisions of the
BARREDO;
May 31, 1971
law in the GAA.
- While veto power is generally all or nothing,
vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not
FACTS
hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or
- Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against
tariff bills.
Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna
o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid
Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former
inexpedient riders being attached to an
capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of
indispensable
appropriation
or
revenue
his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence,
measure; only a particular item or items may be
violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948,
vetoed
as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof.
o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the
- Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of
details, the distinct and severable parts; it is a
Laguna and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on
s p e c i f i c a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f m o n e y, n o t s o m e
June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 ne wl y
general provision of law, which happens to be
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch.
put into an appropriation bill
After consultations with the officials of the province of
o The President did not veto the general fund
La gun a , the mu ni ci pa l i ty of C al am ba a nd th e
adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations
Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer of
WHICH is an ITEM.
the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space
o What she vetoed were provisions methods for the courtroom and offices of the court, to utilize the
financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial
and systems placed by Congress to insure that
government for the purchase of the necessary supplies
obligations would be paid when they fell due
materials and to rely on the national government for
o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations and
the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190
found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is
of the Revised Administrative Code, all these items must
a provision and not an item
be furnished by the provincial government The provincial
o Actually, what she reall y vetoed were RA1797
o f f i c i a l s o f L a g u n a , h o w e v e r, i n f o r m e d h i m t h a t t h e
and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991.
province was not in a position to do so).
WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO.
- As to the space requirements of the court, the
- T he re pe al i n g d ecre e s ( PD6 44 ) o f M ar co s re ta kin g
Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured him that the court
away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never
could be accommodated in the west wing of the
became valid law because it was never published,
Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the
pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was
municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to
never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990
another location. When the projected transfer of the
to restore it so even the presidents veto of the HB does
municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the
n o t e v e n h a v e a n y e ff e c t i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g
treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The
implementation of the law
municipal mayor then requested Macaraig to look over
- T h e Ve t o b y t h e p r e s i d e n t t r e n c h e s u p o n t h e
some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the
commitment that the municipal government will
Judiciary
shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first
o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize
choice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch
their resou rce s wi th the wisdom and dispa tch
in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner
that their needs require
of the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a
o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
month . The nex t sui table spa ce sele cted by Macara ig
o f co mp en sa tio n no t ex ce ed in g h i gh e st r a te s
was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank.
authorized by law
Af t e r a m o n th 's n e go ti a ti o n s, th e m u n i ci p a l i t y f i n a l l y
o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary
signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26,
how its funds should be utilized
1 9 7 0 . An o t h e r m o n t h p a s s e d b e f o r e t h e m u n i c i p a l
- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to
government could release the amount necessary for the
RA1797
i m p r o v e m e n t s t o c o n v e r t th e s p a c e t h a t w a s r e n t e d ,
which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom

a nd o ffice s fo r th e p er so nn e l of the cou r t an d f or the

assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon Macaraig's
representations, the provincial government appropriated
the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies
and materials needed by the court. Early in December,
1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary
e q u i p m e n t w i t h t h e P r o p e r t y O ff i ce r o f t h e D O J b u t ,
unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of the
CF I was released only on December 23, 1970 and the
procurement of the equipment chargeable against this
allotment is still under way.
- W h e n M a ca r a i g r e a l i ze d t h a t i t w o u l d b e so m e t i m e
before he could actually preside over his court, he
applied for an ex tended leave (durin g the 16 ye ars he
had worked in the DOJ, Macaraig had, due to pressure of
du ties, never gone on extended leave, resu lting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond
t h e m a x i m u m t e n m o n t h s a l l o w e d b y t h e l a w ) . The
Secreta r y of Justice , h ow e ve r, p re va ile d upo n him
to forego his leave and instead to assist him,
w it h o u t b e i n g e x t e n d e d a f o rma l d e t a il , w h e n e ve r
he was not busy attending to the needs of his
court.
- Complainant Garcia alleged:
> That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971
inclusive, respondent has not submitted his monthly
reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed
of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases
pending decisions for one month, two months to over
three months, together with the title, number, number
of hours of court session held a day.
> That he has not submitted his certificate of service
(New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to
December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971
inclusive.
> That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has
never performed his official duties or discharged the
duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and
was paid his salaries from July 1970 to February 1971
in flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
> Th a t h i s d e l i b e r a te f a i l u r e to su b m i t th e m o n th l y
reports on the accomplishments of the Court
constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his
oath of office as judge, gross incompetence and violation
of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of
1948 particularly Sections 5, 55 and 58
HELD
- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular
No. 10 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to
a J u d g e n o t a c t u a l l y d i s ch a r g i n g h i s j u d i ci a l d u t i e s .

Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties

impugned. W hat was done by him was likewise in
under
the
circumstances
does
not
constitute
a cco r d a n ce w i t h w h a t p r e v i o u s se cr e ta r i e s of j u s ti ce
incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who
were accustomed to do. T h e r o o t o f t h e e vi l t h e n i s
gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume
the statutory authority of the Department of
his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being
Justice over courts of first instance and other
'a ju dge wi thout a sa la,' bu t forces and ci rcum stance s
in f e r io r c o u rt s . W h i l e a d i s t i n c t i o n c o u l d b e m a d e
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his
between the performance of judicial functions which in
ju dicial duties. Responden t's colle ction of sa laries as
no way could be interfered with by the Department and
judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from
the task of administration which is executive in
the ti me, effort and mone y he spen t in Organi zi ng the
character, still the conferment of such competence to a
CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice.
department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my
- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court
mind, not onl y unwise but of doubtful constitutionality.
looks with favor at the practice of long standing of
For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over
judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary
matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the
even if it were only in connection with his work of
discretion of judges which should be exercised according
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The
to their conscience alone. W hat is more, the influence
line between what a judge may do and what he
that the Secretary has over them is magnified. It is
ma y no t d o in co lla b o ra t in g o r w o rk in g w ith o t he r
alread y unavoidable under our scheme of governmen t
offices or officers under the other great
that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at
departme nts of the go ve rn me nt must alw a ys be
t i m e s d e p e n d o n i t . W i t h t h i s g r a n t o f a u t h o r i t y, t h e
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
assertion of independence becomes even more difficult.
principle of separation of powers on which our
i t i s th u s o b je c ti o n a b l e i n p r i n ci p l e a n d p e r n i ci o u s i n
gove rnment tests b y mandate of the people thru
operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the
th e C on s t itu t io n b e g ra d ua ll y ero d ed b y p rac t ice s
min imum an y parti cipation of the executive in judi cial
purportedly motivated b y good intentions in the
affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even
i n t e r e s t o f t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e . T he fundamen tal
wh en the government as the adverse par ty in crimina l
advanta ge s and the nece ssity of the independence of
case s, tax suits, and other litigations i s in the ri gh t, a
said three departments from each other, limited only by
favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked
the specific constitutional precepts on check and
upon with suspicion. T h e ju d i c ia r y m u s t n o t o n l y b e
balance between and among them, have long been
in depen dent; it must appea r to be so.
ackno wled ged as more paramount than the serving of
- T he pr e se n ce i n the sta tu te bo oks of su ch po we r of
any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
admin istrative oversight then, is, to m y mind,
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the Judiciary
anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power
under our present constitutional scheme of government
granted the department head, respondent Judge in this
that no Judge of even the lowest court in this Republic
case could not have been called upon to assist the
should place himself in a position where his actuations
Secretary
of
Justice.
Considering
that
the
o n m a t t e r s su b m i t t e d t o h i m f o r a c t i o n o r r e s o l u t i o n
Constitutional Con vention is about to meet, it is to
would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst
be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary
still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
is to be totally freed from any supervisory
authori t y other than the Court of Appeal s or the
a u t h o r it y o f a n e x e c u t i ve d e p a rt me n t . ( Take note guys
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say,
t hat t his case was decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural
session of the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And remember that
the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this
the supervision of the CF I and other inferior courts (under the DOJ in the
practice is discontinued.
1935 Consti) was transferred to the SC under the new Consti which
D e ci si on
C om p la in t di sm i sse d . ( 8 vo te s to di sm i ss,
provision was copied in the 1987 Consti. I guess this case was influential in
making that change possible. By the way, Macaraig was a former UP law
Castro & Teehankee took no part.)
prof.)

SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur]
- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any
wise accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached
to his conduct. What he was required to do was in
accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the
Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in force,
under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can
the good fai th of Secretar y of Justi ce Abad San to s be

BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG

ADMINISTRATION
GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991
FACTS
Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of
a parcel of land which he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He
was able to redeem the property but only after 22 years.
On the other hand, petitioner spouses claim the property
wa s so ld to them b y Dra . Valera. Quema filed a ca se
before the Barangay Council but when it failed to settle,

h e f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n th e t r i b a l co u r t o f t h e M a e n g
Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa, Abra)
The tribal court decided in favor of Quema. But as the
spouses did not immediately vacate the land, they
rece ived a warnin g order from the Cordil lera Peop les
L i b e r a t i o n Ar m y ( C P L A ) . P e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n
alleging
that
respondent
Cordillera
Bodong
is,
Administrations decision is void for lack of judicial power
or jurisdiction. Respondent contends the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are
not part of the judicial system.
ISSUE
W ON a triba l cou rt of the Cordil lera Bodong
Administration can render a valid and executory decision
HELD
NO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of
jurisdiction. The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region was rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces and
cities of the Cordillera Region hence the Cordillera
B o d o n g Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e i n d i g e n o u s a n d s p e c i a l
courts for the indigenous cultural communities and the
CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court
not being constituted into an indigenous court, it is but
an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and
traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such
tribal courts are not part of the Philippine Judicial
System which consists of the Supreme Court and
the lower courts which have been established by
l a w. T h e y d o n o t p o s se s s j u d i c i a l p o w e r.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT

OF APPEALS
ROMERO; February 5, 1996
FACTS
- P h i l i p p i n e Po r ts Au th o r i t y ( PPA) e n te r e d i n to t h r e e
contracts regarding various services at the South
Harbor:
> W ith Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OT SI). OT SI
was gran ted exclu sive ri gh t to manage and operate
stevedoring services at the South Harbor
> W ith Marina Port Service s In c. (MPSI) . M PSI wa s
granted exclusive management and operation of
arrastre and container handling services at the South
Harbor
> With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted
warehousing services
- On N ove mb er 28 , 1 99 1, th e con tra ct wi th M PS I wa s
renewed. Part of the contract required the MPSI to cause
integration of storage, arrastre and stevedoring services
a t t h e S o u t h H a r b o r . C o n s e q u e n t l y, O T S I a n d 7 - R
assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing
services to MPSI. In effect MPSI had the duty and

responsibility to manage, operate and render the

with MAFSICOR was noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could
following services:
also operate a floating terminal. Third, injunctive relief
- Arrastre- r e ce i v i n g , h a n d l i n g , c h e c k i n g a s w e l l a s
may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief.
custody and delivery of cargo services. These are
Further, MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR contract
services done on land.
they being not a party thereto.
- Ste vedoring - all work performed on board vessel, that
- M P S I f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r r e co n si d e r a t i o n w h i ch w a s
the process of loading and unloading cargo, stowing
denied by the court on Sept. 15, 1993.
inside hatches, compartments and on deck or open
- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga
cargo spaces on board vessels.
M a n g g a g a w a s a D a u n ga n ( K A M A D A ) th e b a r g a i n i n g
- C o n t a i n e r Ter m i n a l H a n d l i n g - t h e s e r v i c e s o f
agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by MPSI, filed a
handling container discharged or loaded unto vessels.
co mp la i n t a gai n st M PSI , P PA a nd M AF SIC OR f or the
- S t o ra g e - sto r in g of con ta in er s, bu l k an d br ea k bu l k
annulment of PPA-MAFSICOR contract alleging that the
cargoes in all storage areas at the South Harbor.
operation of the floating bulk would duplicate their
- Ap r i l 2 , 1 9 9 2 , P PA e n te r e d in t o a co n t r a c t wi t h
function of stevedoring in the South Harbor. They also
petitioner Manila Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR)
alleged that MAFSICOR had not contacted them on the
whereby the latter was granted right, privilege,
matter regarding the hiring of their services in the
responsibility and authority to provide, operate a floating
s u p p l e m e n t a l c o n t r a c t . Al s o , K A M A D A s a i d t h a t t h e
b ul k te rm i na l fa cil i ti e s fo r bu lk ca r goe s bo un d f or the
requirement of MAFSICOR of trained and qualified
South Harbor with a proviso that use of such facility shall
stevedores (since services in the floating terminal would
not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers.
be done by mach ine), certainl y some of thei r member
Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be on
employees would be deprived.
an interim basis until an actual land based bulk terminal
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay.
plant for the Port of Manila.
Court granted TRO stating great and irreparable injuries
- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a
upon the applicant would result before the matter can be
supplemental agreement stating that manpower needed
heard on notice.
for stevedoring services shall be hired from OTSI.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case and for
- MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR for
the lifting of the TRO ( comple te reason s in p.224- 25).
declara tory relief, fi nal injunction with prayer for
Reasons included Court Circular No. 13-93 which
temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory
prohibits the issuance of injunction against certain
injunction claim ing tha t said contra ct wa s in co mplete
governmen t a gencie s including publi c uti lities. Mo tion
derogation of their rights under their contract with PPA.
was denied.
- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO
- Sept. 10 , 1993, M AF SICOR filed a supplemen t to its
d i r e c t i n g P PA t o m a i n t a i n s t a t u s q u o a n d e n j o i n i n g
motion to dismiss and to lift TRO, raising as an additional
MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating terminal and set
reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that:
a hearing on the issuance of a writ of preliminary
no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
injunction.
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
- PPA fi le d an op po si tio n to the i ssua n ce o f sa id wr i t
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute
stating PPA-MAFSICOR contract actually supports PPAor con tr ov er sy in vo lvi n g a n in fr astr u ctu r e pr o je ct
MPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would be hired
including among others public utilities for the
from MPSI. And that on a 2-day public hearing, most of
transpor t of good s or com modities, stevedoring and
the registran ts agreed to the operation of the floa ting
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons,
terminal.
en ti ty o r gov er nm en t offi ce fro m pr o ce ed in g wi th
- MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion for the lifting of
the operation of such public utility
the TRO and a denial of the the preliminary injunction on
- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility
the ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an
nor is performing a public function and thus non public
action for declaratory relief. They filed another motion to
interest may be affected.
dismiss complaint stating that declaratory relief was not
- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICORs motion.
available to MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in
- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge
the PPA-MPSI contract therefore they were not a partyM a b u n a y i n w h i ch w r i t w a s d e n i e d d u e t o f a i l u r e o f
in-interest.
KAMADA to present clear and convincing evidence of any
- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary
damages it will suffer.
injunction and lifted TRO stating that first, the right to
- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a
op er a te a f lo ati n g te r mi na l wa s no t o n th e PPA- M PSI
ca se for injunction wi th provisional remedy of
contract and there would be no conflict between
preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-MAFSICOR
contracts with MPSI and MAFSICOR since MPSI is not the
c o n t r a c t . T h i s w a s f i l e d b y th e C h a m b e r o f C u s t o m s
sole entity authorized to render stevedoring services in
Brokers Inc., the only accredited association for customs
the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring services for
b r o k e r s i n t h e c o u n t r y, s t a t i n g t h a t t h e y w e r e n e v e r
MAFSICOR shall be provided by OTSI. Second, contract
informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains

t e r m i n a l a n d t h a t o p e r a ti o n o f su c h w o u l d a d v e r s e l y
affect and prejudice its members (reason in p.226-227).
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon.
Court issued a restraining order. In due course, on
October 1, 1993, lower court issued a preliminary
injunction upon the filing of MPSI of an injunction bond.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of
a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded
Jud ge Verd ia no as a p ub li c r espo nd en t. Pe ti ti on a l so
prayed Judges Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively
dealt with for disregarding Circular No. 13-93.
- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to
Court of Appeals.
- October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction finding that MPSI has exclusive stevedoring
ri gh ts at the Sou th Harbor and tha t the operation of a
floating grains terminal by MAFSICOR would overlap on
the rights of MPSI. On the applicability of PD 1818 and
Circular No. 13-93, court stated that what is being
stopped temporarily is private respondents operation of
the floating bulk terminal facility that would lessen
MPSIs stevedoring services as it infringes on the latters
contractual right.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary
injunction is made permanent and that Judge Bayhon be
p e r m a n e n t l y e n j o i n e d f r o m i s su i n g i n j u n c t i v e o r d e r s
during the trial of the case in the court.
- Thus, CA affir med the exclusivity of the stevedoring
con tra ct in favor of M PSI. Tha t being so, it precluded
i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t h e P PA- M P S I c o n t r a c t b y t h e P PAMAFSICOR contract. CA explained that the floating grains
t e r m i n a l i s s i m p l y a m e c h a n i ze d u n l o a d i n g o f g r a i n s
car go fr om the vessel to th e b ar ge or o the r tra n sp o r t
facilities. And also that what is solely done by stevedores
i s sub sti tu ted b y m a ch in e s com p le me n ted b y n ee de d
stevedores. With respect to the supplemental agreement
which states that stevedores would be hired by
MAFSICOR from OT SI, court stated that it was just an
ad ju stment in order not to viola te PPA- MPSI con tract.
And that MAFSICOR can legally excuse themselves from
the contract because OTSI already assigned its
s t e v e d o r i n g s e r v i c e s t o M P S I . As r e g a r d s t o f o r u m
sh o p p i n g a l l e g a t i o n o f M AF SI C O R ( f i l i n g o f se p a r a te
petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber), court said
that there was no forum shopp ing because peti tioner s
had separate and distinct legal personalities. There also
was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On
the applicability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13
ruling.
- P PA a n d M A F S I C O R f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r r e v i e w o n
ce r ti o r a r i a l l e gi n g th a t C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s d e c i si o n : a )
violates PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e o f se p a r a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l a n d
executive powers and prescription against forum
shopping, b) supplants the discretion of the trial court to

pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and

c) is contrary to the evidence on record.

me r e l y e n t a i l s t h e m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f s t e ve d o r i n g ,
it was considered b y the PPA, in the exercise of its
d i s c r e t i o n , a s n e c e s s a r y t o i m p r o ve t h e s e r v i c e s
ISSUE
rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime
WON PD 1818 applicable to the case
that no land-based
bulk terminal
is yet
operational.
HELD
- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not
YES
find application. These are a) where there is clear and
Ratio no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
grave abuse of discretion b) where the effect of the nonto issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or
to stave off implementation of a government project.
con troversy involving an infrastructure project
I n t h i s c a se t h e o p e r a ti o n o f a f l o a ti n g b u l k te r m i n a l
including among others public utilities for the
would augment and improve the over-all operations at
transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring
the port of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded
a n d a r r a s tr e co n tr a ct s, to prohibit any person or
to MPSI.
pe rson s, en ti ty o r gov er nm en t offi ce fr om p ro ce ed i n g
- Another contention against the applicability of PD 1818
with the operation of such public utility
is that MAFSICOR is a private entity. Such contention
- C l e a r l y, th e p r o h i b i t i o n i n P D 1 8 1 8 d o e s n o t co v e r
b e t r a ys a f a i l u r e t o c o m p r e h e n d th e f u n c t i o n s o f th e
in fr astr u ctur e al on e . It in clu de s am on g o the r s
PPA. One of the duties of the PPA is to provide services
stevedoring service s. The law being clear, there i s no
(whether on its own, by contract or otherwise) within the
room for interpre ta tion or con struction . A verbis legis
Port Districts to make or enter contracts of any kind or
non est recendum ( f r o m th e w o r d s o f a s ta tu t e th e r e
nature to enable it to dischar ge i ts function s under i ts
should be no departure).
decree.
- PD 1818 applies in controversies involving facts or the
- Section 1 of PD 1818 clearly states that an injunction
exercise of discretion in technical cases. It is founded
ma y n o t be i ssu ed to pr eve nt an y pe r so n or p er so n s,
on the principle that to allo w courts to determine such
entity or government official from undertaking the
m a t t e r s w o u l d d i s t u r b th e s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e
prote cted activi ties enumera ted. The prohib ition
administrative machinery.
therefore applies regardless of whether or not the entity
- In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as a
or person being enjoined is a public or private person or
p o w e r o r r i g h t co n f e r r e d u p o n t h e m b y l a w o f a c t i n g
en tity, provided that the purpo se of the law to protect
officially under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by
e sse n tia l go ve rn me n t p ro je cts in p ur su i t o f e co no m i c
the judgment or conscience of others.
development is attained.
- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating
- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the
gra ins termina l notwi th standing the existence of othe r
e x c l u s i v i t y o f t h e P PA- M P S I c o n t r a c t ) f o r r e so l u t i o n
stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is
therein which necessitates trial on merits. However court
undoubtedly an exercise of the discretion on the part of
took note of the allegations against two judges
the PPA. No other persons or agencies are in a better
De ci sio n Petition on certiorari granted decision of the
position to gauge the need for the floating terminal than
CA is reversed and set aside.
t h e PPA; ce r t a in l y n o t t h e co u r ts . Co u r ts h av e n o
brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon. Reinerio
IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA
R e ye s e t a l v. H on D or o te o C an eb a et al ) . cou r ts wi l l
intervene only to ascertain whether a branch or
NARVASA; November 9, 1998
instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the
FACTS
President). Under the separation of powers, the courts
- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on
m a y n o t t r e a d i n t o m a t te r s r e q u i r i n g t h e e x e r c i se o f
May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts.
discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and
- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are
legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the
the appointments signed by the President under date of
government official or office abused his or its discretion.
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
In this case there is no showing that the PPA
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court
a bu se d it s d isc re t io n in e nt e rin g in t o th e c on t rac t
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan
with
MAFSICOR.
Judge
Veridiano
correctly
City, respectively.
concluded that there is no provision for the
- received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12,
putting up of a floating grains terminal in the PPA1998
MPS A contract. Al l it co vers are the general
- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
s e r v i c e s o f s t e ve d o r i n g . W h i l e t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a
Consul tan t of the Council, wh o had been a member of
f loat in g gra ins terminal ma y be cons id ere d as part
the Committee of the Executive Department and of the
and parcel of stevedoring as such operation
Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986

Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the

execu tive appoin tmen ts or appoin tmen ts in the
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
C o m m i s si o n 's r e co r d s , t h e e l e c t i o n b a n h a d n o
executive branch of government," the whole article
and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in
application to appointments to the Court of
being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior
respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
research and study on the part of the other Members of
and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees
from the occurrence thereof ."
the JBC, thi s h ypo thesis was accep ted , and wa s then
for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."
Section 9, Article VIII:
sub mitted to the Pre sident for con sidera tion , togethe r
- M a y 8 , 1 9 9 8 : C h i e f Ju st i ce r e p l i e d : - - Se ct i o n 1 5 of
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower
with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in
Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
the Court of Appeals
which is the general rule, the only exception being only
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
- Ap r i l 6 , 1 9 9 8 : Ch ie f Ju s ti ce r e ce iv e d a n o ffic ia l
as re gards "executive positions"( judicial posi tion s are
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
communication
from
the
Executive
Secretary
covered by the general rule)
confirmation.
t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t s o f e i g h t ( 8 ) As s o ci a t e
- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been
V I I, th e d u t y of f i l l i n g th e v a ca n c y i s n o t sp e c i f i ca l l y
appointments within ninety days from the submission of
duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President
imposed on the President
the list."
- In view of the fact that all the appointments had been
- normally, when there are no pres ide ntial elections
signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before
Se ct io n 4 ( 1) , Art ic le VII I s ha ll ap p l y b ut w hen ( as
ISSUE
the commencement of the ban on appointments
now) there are presidential
elections, the
W ON during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution p r o h i b i t i o n i n S e c t i o n 1 5 , Ar t i c l e V I I c o m e s i n t o
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the
which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did
play:
the
President
shall
not
make
any
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
not agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the
appo in tme nts
judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice
- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar
reso lved to defer considera tion of nomina tion s for the
Council to defer action on the matter until further advice
HELD
vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement
by the Court
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on
of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco
- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a
Mar ch 30, 1998 were un questionab l y made durin g the
- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the
resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred
period of the ban. Such appointments come within the
President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission
to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action
operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments
of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later
- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacaang
wh i ch a re co n sid er ed to be fo r th e p ur po se o f b u yi n g
t h a n W e d n e s d a y, M a y 6 , 1 9 9 8 , " i n v i e w o f t h e d u t y
the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial
votes or influencing the election.
imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the
Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the
R e a so n i n g
vacancy . . . wi thin ninety (90) days from Februar y 13,
obligation of transmitting the appointments to the
- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
1998, the date the present vacancy occurred."
appointees so that the y might take their oaths and
undoubtedly in the public interest there is no showing in
- M a y 5, 19 98 : Se cre ta r y of Ju sti ce Si lv estr e Be ll o III
assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
requested the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the
so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner
of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the
expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to
inconsistent with the Constitution)
other hand, there is a strong public policy for the
hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the
- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing
prohibition against appointments made within the period
Court in line with the President's letter . The Chief Justice
p r o ce e d i n gs a n d th e d e l i b e r a ti o n b y th e co u r t o n t h e
of the ban.
advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was
ma tter, and unti l further orders, no action be taken on
- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
drafting
the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
- M a y 6, 19 98 : the Ch ie f Ju sti ce se n t h i s re pl y to th e
which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not
the ti me frames provided therein unless prohibited by
President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled
given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from
Section 15 of Article VII.
for the Council until after the May elections because of
taking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar
- journal of the commission which drew up the present
t h e " n e e d t o u n d e r t a k e f u r t h e r s t u d y o f t h e m a t t e r ,"
Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter
Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the
prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional
of nominations
size of the Court would not be decreased for any
issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned
- Val e n zu e l a to o k h i s o a th o n M a y 1 4 , 1 9 9 8 - - I n h i s
substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion
vacancy"; delivered to Malacaang May 6, 1998, and a
"Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May
in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF
copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello
7, 1998 he "received from Malacaang copy of his
ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO
- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the
appointment . . ." which contained the following
MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed
Council had already taken action on May 6, 1998 they
direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter
- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew
upon the performance of the duties of the office"
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution
- The Relevant Constitutional Pro visions
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers
(omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well
Section 15, Article VII:
to those appointments made within the two months
as to the President's letter of May 4, with an appeal that
"Two mon ths im mediatel y before the next presiden tial
preceding a Presidential election
the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
May 7, 1998
Acti ng Pre siden t shal l not ma ke appointments, excep t
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section
- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the
t e m p o r a r y a p p o i n t m e n t s to ex e cu t i v e p o si t i o n s wh e n
1 5 , Ar t i c l e V I I c o n s i s t s o f t h e s o - c a l l e d " m i d n i g h t "
afternoon of May 7, 1998
continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or
appointments
- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from
endanger public safety."
- the Court recognized that there may well be
Pr e sid en t: "the el ecti on - b an pr ovi sio n a pp li e s on l y to
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
appoin tmen ts to impor tant posi tion s wh ich have to be

made even after the proclamation of the new President.

S u c h a p p o i n t m e n t s , so l o n g a s t h e y a r e " f e w a n d s o
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be
made by the outgoing President
- T h e ex ce p ti o n a l l o w s o n l y th e m a ki n g o f te m p o r a r y
a p p o i n tm e n ts to e xe cu ti v e p o si ti o n s w h e n co n ti n u e d
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of
the ban.
- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames
for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on
the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict,
the former should yield to the latter
- the Constitution must be construed in its enti rety as
one, single instrument; instances ma y be conceived of
the imperative need for an appointment, during the
period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in
the Supreme Court.
- concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for
duty"-Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments
to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President
to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being
addressed to the appoin tees "T hru : the Chief Justi ce,
Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who
t h e r e a f te r a d v i se s th e i n d i v i d u a l a p p o i n t e e s o f t h e i r
appointments and also of the date of commencement of
the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by
the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V

OCURT OF APPEALS
MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998
FACTS
- Oil & Natural Gas Commission (pet it io ner) - a foreign
corporation owned and controlled by the Government of
India
- P a ci f i c C e m e n t C o m p a n y (resp onde nt) -a p ri va te
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines.
- T h e t w o p a r ti e s e n t e r e d i n t o a co n t r a c t o n F e b 2 6 ,
1983, where respondent undertook to supply the
petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oi l w e ll c e me nt ;
petitioner to pay ($477,300.00)
- The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV
SURUTANA NAVA in Surigao City, for delivery at Bombay
and Calcutta, India.
- respondent had already received payment but failed to
deliver the oil well cement due to a dispute between

the ship owner and respondent, the cargo was held up in

Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination
- so th e y ju st a gr e e d th a t t h e p r i v a te r e sp o n d e n t w i l l
replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
wi th C la s s "G " ce me n t c o s t f re e . Ho we v e r, up on
inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the
petitioner's specifications.
- Th e p e ti ti on e r the n in fo rm ed th e pr iv a te r espo nd en t
that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to
Clause 16 of their contract
- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra)
resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor
- Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% interest
- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a
Petition before the Court in India praying that the
decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in
India which the said court granted
- The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant
US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per annum till the last
date of realization
- However, respondent refused to pay
- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao
- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. W ON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under
Clause 16 of the contract; phrased differently, WON the
no n- de li ve r y of the sa id car go is a p ro pe r sub je ct fo r
arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16
2. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable
in this jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be
confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating
to the d esi gn , dr a win g, i nstr u ctio n s, spe ci fi ca tio n s or
quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and
for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
- For the sake of argument, granted that the nondelivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for
a r b i t r a t i o n , t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e r e p l a c e m e n t ce m e n t to
conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter
clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16.
2. YES.
- This Court has held that matters of remedy and
p ro ce du r e ar e gov er ne d b y th e lex fo ri or the in ter na l
law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules
of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment
ma y be rendered by adoptin g the arbi trators findings,
then the same must be accorded respect
- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an
Ord er of th e C ou r t b ecom e s f in al a nd exe cu to r y up on
failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts
i n t h i s j u r i sd i c t i o n c a n n o t i n v a l i d a t e t h e o r d e r o f t h e
foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise

- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a

f o r e i gn j u d g m e n t , h a s th e b u r d e n o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e
p r e su m p ti o n o f i t s v a l i d i t y w h i ch i t f a i l e d to d o i n th e
instant case.
D e ci si on Petition GRANTED

ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CORTES; November 10, 1989
FACTS
- P e t i t i o n e r Ab b a s , a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f o t h e r
taxpa yers in Mindanao, filed this petition to(1)
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary
of Budget and Management from releasing funds
to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional
a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h Ar t i c l e X , s e c t i o n 1 5 w h i c h
provides that "there shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical
areas
sharing
common
and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines."
- To e f f e c t u a t e t h i s m a n d a t e , t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n
further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec.
17.
All
powers,
functions,
and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or b y la w to the autonom ous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act
for each autonomous region with the assistance
an d p ar ti ci pa ti on of t he r eg io na l c on su lt at iv e
commission
composed
of
representatives
appointed b y the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic
act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the
executive and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall like wise
provide for special courts with personal, family,

and property law jurisdiction consistent with the

1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict
t h a n o n e h u n d r e d t w e n t y ( 1 2 0 ) d a ys a f t e r t h e
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
with the Tripoli Agreement.
a p p r o v a l o f t h i s Ac t : Provided, T h a t o n l y t h e
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
2 .W ON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such
effective when approved by majority of the
Constitution.
pl eb is ci te sh al l be i nc lu de d i n th e Au to no m o us
votes cast by the constituent units in a
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
HELD
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas
1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
Agreement.
the existing administrative determination, merge
included in the autonomous region.
SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of
the existing regions.
Sec. 19 The f irst Congress elected under t his
the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,
Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine
the creation of the autonomous region shall take
the t ime of organization of bot h Houses, pass
Government whether under public international or
effec t on l y wh e n a pp ro ve d b y a m aj or it y of t he
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
internal Philippine la w. The Constitution itself
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
provides for the creation of an autonomous region
and only those provinces and cities where a
S e c . 2 0 . W it h i n i t s t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d
in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore
included in the autonomous region. The provinces
n at io na l l a ws , t he o rg an ic ac t of a ut on om o us
be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus,
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
an y conf lict bet ween the provisions of R.A. No.
shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
(1) Administrative organization;
6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement
may be that even if an autonomous region is
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
will not have the effect of enjoining the
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for
nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2)
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is
of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
a binding treaty or international agreement, it
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution
development;
would then constitute part of the law of the land.
and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
(6)
Economic,
social
and
tourism
But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A.
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
development;
No. 6734, an enactm ent of the Congress of the
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
(7) Educational policies;
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in
(8) Preservation and development of the
the latter.
R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
cultural heritage; and
2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized
Constitution.
b. Equal protection of the law Petitioner insists
by law for the promotion of the general
a . P e t i t i o n e r Ab b a s a r g u e s t h a t R . A . N o . 6 7 3 4
th at R .A . No . 6 73 4 is u nc on st it ut io n al be ca us e
welfare of the people of the region.
unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
onl y the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Sec. 21. The preservat ion of peace and order
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions
Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao
within the regions shall be the responsibilit y of
of the Constitution on the autonomous region
and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all
the local police agencies which shall be
which make the creation of such region dependent
of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
included in the Organic Act, possess such
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense
The reference to the constitutional provision
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and
and security of the region shall be the
cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that
other relevant characteristics. By including areas
responsibility of the National Government.
the creation of the autonomous region shall take
which do not strictly share the same characteristic
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No.
place only in accord with the constitutional
as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
6734 was enacted and signed into law on August
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision
e x p a n d e d t h e s c o p e of t h e a u t o n om o u s r e g i o n
1 , 19 89 . T he pr es en t c on t r ov er s y re la t e s t o t he
in the Transitor y Provisions (Article XIX) of the
which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)
Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the
limited.
c it ie s in M in da na o a nd P a la wan , s ch ed ul ed f or
same requirements embodied in the Constitution
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The
November 19, 1989, in implementation of
and fills in the details, thus:
Co ns ti tu ti on la ys d o wn th e s ta nd ar ds b y wh ic h
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region
Congress shall determine which areas should
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
Muslim Mindanao."
approved b y a m ajorit y of the votes cast b y the
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by
constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec.
Congress of the areas that share common
ISSUES
1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall
attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later
legislature's discretion. Any review of this

ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom

o f t h e l a w. S C c a n n o t d o t h i s w i t h o u t d o i n g
violence to the separation of governmental
powers
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable
classification. The guarantee of equal protection is
thus not inf ringed in this case, the classif ication
having been m ade b y Congress on t he basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the
Constitution itself.
c. Free exercise of religion Petitioner questions
the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on free
exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection
centers on a provision in t he O rganic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict
between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the
Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and
the nat ional law on t he other hand, the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic
la w (S hari'ah) is derived f rom t he K oran, which
m ak e s it p ar t of d iv in e l a w. Th us it m a y n ot be
subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enum erat ing possible inst ances of conf lict
b et we en p ro vi si on s of t h e M us lim Co de an d
national la w, wherein an applicat ion of nat ional
law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.
Judicial power includes t he dut y to set tle act ual
controversies involving right s wh ich are legall y
demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As
a condition precedent for the power to be
exercised, an actual controversy between litigants
m u s t f i r s t ex i s t . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , n o a c t u a l
controversy bet ween real litigant s exists. There
are no conflicting claims involving the application
of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. The Court in this case may not
be called upon to resolve what is merely a
perceived
potential
conflict
between
the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

TANO V SOCRATES
DAVIDE; August 21, 1997
FACTS
- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying
to:

1. declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992,
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa
(b) Office Order No . 23, Serie s of 1993, dated 22
January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L.
Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Re solution No . 33, Ordinan ce No. 2, Se ries of
1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan;
2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors
of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the
Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and
hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
- Ordinance No. 15-92
- took effect on January 1, 1993
- entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT
OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF,"
- Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide
and other Obnoxious substance
- unlawful for any person, business enterprise,
company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any
point of destina tion ei ther via aircraf t or seacraft of
any live fish (all alive, breathing not necessarily
moving, used for foor and for aquarium purposes) and
lobster except SEA BASS (apahap), CATFISH (hitohito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND MILKFISH FRIES.
- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00,
imprisonment of not more than 12 mos and/or
cancellation of their permit to do business in the City
of Puerto Princesa
- Offi ce Or d e r N o . 2 3 , Se r i e s of 1 9 9 3
- pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74
( re qu i re me n t o f m a yo r s p er mi t) an d Or di na n ce No .
15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and lobster),
authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish
and lobster to ascertain whether the shipper
possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this
Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
- Resolution No. 33
- prohibi ts catchin g, gatherin g, possessing, buyin g,
se l l i n g , a n d sh i p m e n t o f l i v e m a r i n e co r a l d we l l i n g
aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters
(mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of
pearl , giant clam s, ti ge r prawn, loba/green grouper,
tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years
- WHEREAS
- studies disclose only 5% of the corals of Palawan
remain to be in excellent condition

- cannot be gain said that destru ction and

devastation of the corals of our province were
principally due to illegal fishing activities like
d yn a m i t e f i sh i n g, so d i u m c ya n i d e f i sh i n g, u se o f
other obnoxious substances
- need to protect and preserve the existence of the
remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated
ones to regenerate within 5 years
- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties
e.g. to dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing
- Or d i n a n ce N o . 2
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
a qu a t i c o r ga n i s m s c o m i n g f r o m P a l a w a n w a t e r s
(mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother
of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green
gro up er, tro pi ca l a qu ar i um fi sh e s) for a p er io d of
five years
- Policy Considerations:
- Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
m e a n i n g f u l l o ca l a u to n o m y t o b e s e l f - r e l i a n t
communities, more responsive and accountable
local government structure through a system of
decentralization whereb y local government units
sh a l l b e g i v e n
mo re po we r s, au tho r i ty,
responsibilities and resources.
- S e c . 5 - A ( R A 7 1 6 0 ) : An y f a i r a n d r e a so n a b l e
doubts as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit
concerned
- S e c . 5 - C ( R A 7 1 6 0 ) . T h e gen er a l we lf ar e
provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to L GU in
accelerating
economic
development
and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community.
- Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropria te , or incidenta l f o r i t s e f f i c i e n t a n d
effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
- Policy of the Province of Palawan: to pro tect and
conserve the marine resources of Palawan
- Penalty: f i n e o f n o t m o r e P 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , a n d / o r
imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and confiscation
and forfeiture of paraphernalia
- P e t i t i o n e r s Al l e g e :
- Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no
co n su l ta ti o n ) , t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d ( a l l th e f i sh e r m e n o f
Palawan), and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade (Airline Shippers Association of

Palawan), in violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3)

40

41

39

and Art

XIII Sec 2 , 7 (1987).

- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or
co n d i t i o n u n d e r wh i ch t h e M a yo r 's p e r m i t co u l d b e
granted or denied (Mayor - absolute authority WON to
issue permit)
- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching,
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of
l i v e m a r i n e co r a l d we l l i n g o r ga n i sm s, w i th o u t a n y
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through
lawful fishing method
- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways
- m e m b e r s o f Ai r l i n e S h i p p e r s As so c i a t i o n w e r e
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and
entering contracts essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion
- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases
against Tano et al have to be dismissed
- Interests of petitioners
- Tan o e t a l :
to prevent prosecution, trial and
determination of the criminal cases until constitutionality
or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly violated
shall have been resolved
- Air lin e S h ip p e r s Ass o cia tio n of Pa la wa n a n d 7 7
fishermen:
declaratory relief because Ordinances
adversely affects them
ISSUES
1. WON SC has jurisdiction
2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2
of Resolution 33 are constitutional
HELD
1.NO because there is clear disregard for hierarchy of
courts and petitioners have no cause of action BUT SC
op t to reso lve this case becau se of the life time of the
challenged Ordinances is about to end (1993-1998).
R e a so n i n g
Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action

39

Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its
arch ipe lag ic wat ers, t errit ori al sea, an d exclus iv e eco nomic zon e, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
( 3) T he C o ng r es s ma y, b y l a w, al l o w s ma l l- s ca l e ut i li za t i on of na t u r a l
reso urces b y F ili pin o cit izens, as w ell as co oper at iv e f ish f ar min g, w it h
priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes, bays and
lagoons.
40 A r t X I I I S e c 2 : T h e p r o m o t i o n o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e s h a l l i n c l u d e t h e
commit ment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
41 Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communit ies, t o the pref erent ial use of t he communal
marine and f ishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other
s e r v i c e s . T h e St a t e s h a l l a l s o p r o t e c t , d ev e l o p , a n d c o n s e r v e s u c h
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a
just share form their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

- no cause of action because there is no showing that the

p e ti ti on er s fi le d a M o tio n to Qua sh the i nf or ma ti on in
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c r i m i n a l ca s e s t h a t w o u l d h a v e t h i s
remed y proper therefore the peti tioner s canno t alle ge
the lower courts of having acted in excess of their
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
- If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it
sh o u l d h av e co n t a i n e d th a t t h e f a ct s ch a r ge d d o n o t
constitute an offense because the ordinances in question
are unconstitutional. BUT if their Motion to Quash was
d e n i e d , th e r e m e d y i s n o t ce r t i o r a r i b u t to go t o tr i a l
without prejudice to reiterating special defenses and if
an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal should have
been the proper remedy. And if there is an exceptional
circumstance where special civil action for certiorari may
be filed, the lower court must be accorded a Motion for
Reconsideration to allow itself to correct any errors
Petitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief
- SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of
law are involved being settled that the SC merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions
People v Cuaresma
- There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
o u t i n t h e p e t i t i o n . Th is is estab l i sh ed po li c y str i ct
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be
a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers
to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary
writs directly and immediately by the highest tribunal
of the land...
Santiago v Vasques
- judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
B U T, t h e s e O r d i n a n c e s w e r e u n d o u b t e d l y e n a c t e d
in the exercise of powers under the new LGC
relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and or paramount
importance.
No further delay then may be
allowed.
2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances
of LGUs enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and

> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private

association composed of marine merchants
> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants
> t h e r e s t o f p e t i t i o n e r s : f ishe r me n wi th ou t an y
qualification to their status
- Si n ce co n sti do es no t p rov id e for th e de fi ni ti on o f
subsistence or marginal
Marginal Fisherman
- General l y, an individual en gaged in fishin g who se
m a r g i n o f r e t u r n o r r e w a r d i n h i s h a r v e s t o f f i sh i s
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering fish
- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence
f i sh i n g wh i ch sh a l l b e l i m i te d to th e sa l e , b a r te r o r
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced
by himself and his immediate family
Subsistence Fishermen
- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood
Art XII Sec 2
- aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence
fishermen but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nations marine wealth
- provision merel y recognizes priority to subsistence
fishermen
Sec 149 of LGC
- o nl y p rov i si on of la w wh i ch sp ea ks o f p re fe re n ti a l
right of marginal fishermen
Joint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)
- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential
treatment of small fisherfolk relative to fishery right in
Se c 149 but th is ca se does no t involve such fisher y
right
Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal
Fishermen
Art XIII Sec 7
- s p e a k s n o t o n l y o f c o m m u n a l m a r i n e a n d f i sh i n g
resour ces bu t of their pro tection , development, and
conservation
Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine)
- marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall
be under full control and supervision of the State
Constitutional Commission
- between Rodrigo and Bengzon
- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations
and local laws
Oposa v Factoran

t h e p e ti ti o n e r s d i d n o t p r e se n t cl e a r, co n v i n ci n g a n d
unequivocal evidence to overthrow this assumption.
R e a so n i n g
Peralta v COMELEC
- p r e su m p t i o n o f co n st i t u t i o n a l i t y of l a ws i n cl u d i n g
o r d i n a n ce s o f L GU s a n d to ov e r th r o w th i s
p r e su m p ti o n , i t m u s t b e sh o wn b e yo n d r e a so n a b l e

- even though balanced and healthful ecology is

under Declaration of Principles and State Policies it
does not follow that is less important the civil and
political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights for it
concerns self-preservation and self-perpetuation this
basic right need not be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of

doubt.
Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen
- There is no showing that any of the petitioners

humankind
Sec 16 LGC
- right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology

qualify as subsistence or marginal fishermen

in General Welfare Clause

Realization
of
the
General
Welfare
Clause,
De ci sio n Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO
released to the LGUs subject to the IRR
Decentralization and Exercise of Police Power
lifted
(Implementing Rules and Regulations) prescribed by
Sec 5(c) LGC
Vot i n g 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave
the Oversight Committee
- general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be
Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released
liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGU in
SEPARATE OPINION
directly by the DBM to the LGUs concerned
a cce l er a tin g econ o mi c dev el op me n t a nd up gr ad in g
- OCD Resolutions Oversight Committee allocated
the quality of life
Php5B as follows:
Fishery Laws
MENDOZA [concur]
Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme
- th a t L GU m a y e nf o r ce u n d e r Se c 1 7 i n m u n i ci p a l
prescribed under LGC of 1991
water include
- fully concurs with the decision
P h p 2 B a l l o ca te d w i t h a m o d i f i e d C OD E F sh a r i n g
- PD 704
- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of
scheme
- PD 1015 closed season
the ordinances in view of total absence of evidence that
- PD 12 19 expl or a tio n , ex pl oi ta tio n , u ti li za tio n ,
un de rm in e the ir fa ctua l b asis AND ne ed no t a llo w
Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative
conservation of coral resources
shortcircuiting of the normal process of adjudication on
action projects and other priority initiatives;
- PD 5474 unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during
the mere plea that unless we take cognizance of
proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to the
closed season
peti tion s li ke thi s, by-passin g the tr ial cour ts, alleged
Ove r si gh t Co m mi tte e sub je ct to i ts a pp rov al ( OC
- PD 6451 prohibits and punishes electrofishing
violations of constitutional rights will be left unprotected,
prescribed a Criteria for Eligibility)
Memorandum of Agreement (1994)
when the matter can be very well be looked into by trial
- G A A o f 2 0 0 0 Also contained a proviso earmarking
- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG
courts and in fact it should be brought there
Php5B of the IRA for the LGSEF (similar to GAA of 1999)
- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather
Php3 .5B shared b y the LGUs using a percentagea quarium fishes, gathe r kapi s shell s, ga ther /culture
BELLOSILLO [dissent]
sharing formula agreed upon by the various
shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish
Leagues of LGUs
culture pearls, transports fish and fishery products and
- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to
establishment of closed season
Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because
be endorsed to and approved by the Oversight
RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act
supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility
Committee
comprehensive
framework
for
sustainable
of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704
- G AA o f 2 00 1 GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted
development of Pala wan co mpatible with prote cting
otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF
and OC allocated Php5B LGSEF as follows:
and enhancing the natural resources and endangered
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of
Php3B according to the modified codal formula
environment of the province which shall serve to guide
DNR (Natl Res)
Php1.9B is earmarked for priority projects
the local government of Pala wan nd the government
Php100M for capability building fund subject to OCs
agencies
concerned
in
the
formulation
and
approval
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p l a n s , p r o g r a m s a n d p r o je ct s
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO
- Procedure
affecting Palawan
CALLEJO; May 30, 2004
Province
of Batangas, re pr e se n te d b y
Gov.
Principal Objectives of Ordinances
MANDANAS
filed
a
petition
for
CERTIORARI,
1) establish closed season for the species covered in
FACTS
PROHIBITION,
and
MANDAMUS
to
declare
as
the said ordinances for a period of five years
- EO 4 8 issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled
unconstitutional the assailed provisos in GAA of 99, 00,
2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto
Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and
01 and OCD Resolutions and was issued against Exec.
Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to
Equalization:
Sec . R OMUL O (Chairman of Oversight Commi ttee on
illegal fishing activities
Devolution), Sec . B ON C OD IN ( D e p t . o f B u d g e t a n d
Jurisdiction of BFAR or LGU
D e vo lu t ion Ad ju s t me n t a nd Eq u a liza t io n Fu n d Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG)
- Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod
was created
- Petitioners grounds
of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992
DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be
Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share
because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and
de termined b y the Over sight Commi ttee based on
must be automatically released to the LGUs)
respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources)
appraisal surveys by DILG
Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in
under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975
O versight Committee (which was constituted
d e te rm i ni n g di str ib u tio n an d re le a se o f L GSEF i s
TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of
under Local Govt Code of 1991) has been tasked to
contrary to the principle of local autonomy
DNR (Natl Res)
issue implementing rules and regulations governing
Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified
- Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management,
equitable allocation and distribution of the said fund
sec.285 of LGC) resulting to an illegal amendment
con servation , development, etc not all- encompassin g;
to the LGUs
by the Executive branch of substantive law
excludes municipal waters; BFAR no longer under DNR,
- G AA of 1999 In this General Appropriations Act, the
now under DoA TF incorrect to challenge that ordinances
program was renamed as Local Govt Service
ISSUES
unenforceable because no approval of Sec of DENR but
Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
Procedural
of Sec of DoA instead; BUT this can be dispensed with
Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the
1. WON petitioner has legal standing
b e ca u se o f R e p e a l i n g C l a u s o f L GC i n so f a r a s th o se
IR taxes
2 . W ON p e t i t i o n i n v o l v e s f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n s p r o p e r l y
provisions are inconsistent and power to enact
by lower courts
o r d i n a n ce s t o e n h a n ce r i gh t o f p e o p l e to a b a l a n ce d
Special Provisions included t h a t t h e a m o u n t o f cognizable
3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academic
ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the
Php5B shall be earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be
Substantive
LGC

o Just share shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED

AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS
to the LGUs
THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.)
- As s u c h , t h e L G U s a re N O T r e q u i r e d t o p e rf o r m
- The R A delete s the word independent and
any act to receive the just share accruing to
t r e a t s S a n t i a g o C i t y j u s t a s a c o m p o n e n t c i t y. I t s
t h e m f r o m n a t i o n a l t a x e s (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be
territory and territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged.
HELD
released to them without need of further action.) The
- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a
1. Yes.
provision is IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited.
conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be
- T h e p e t i t i o n e r s e e k s re l ie f in o r d e r t o p r o t e c t o r
- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the
decided by the citys citizens in a plebiscite, of which the
v i n d i c a t e i t s o w n i n t e r e s t s , w h ic h p e rt a i n s t o t h e
LGSEF to implementing rules and regulations, including
RA has no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the
L G U s s h a r e i n t h e n a t i o n a l t a x e s ( I R A ) . The
mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the
other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification.
potential injury it stands to suffer is the diminution of its
provisos in the GAAs of 99, 00, 01 and the OCD
sha re in the IR A, wh i ch i s cl ea rl y a p la in , di re ct an d
Re solutions makes the release NOT au tomatic, whi ch
ISSUES
adequate interest.
violates the Constitution.
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. No.
- OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradicts
2. WON a plebiscite must be provided
- It involves a legal question (on what is the
principle of local autonomy. There is also NO STATUTORY
p ro p e r l e g a l in t e r p re t a t i o n ) w h ic h i s t o b e s e t t le d
BASIS for this power since the OC was created merely to
HELD
by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the issue
formulate
rules
and
regulations
for
efficient
1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the
need not be de termined b y a trial court sin ce the y are
implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc character)
1987 Constitution shall include any material change in
not disputed.
- As ev id e n t f r o m th e Co n - Co m d e lib e r a tio n s, th e
the political and economic rights of the local government
3. No.
Automatic
release
provision
was
intended
to
unit(s) directly affected.
- Even if the LGSEF for 99, 00, and 01 have already
GUARANTEE principle of local autonomy.
- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the
been released, there is still compelling reason for the SC
5. No.
powers of the mayor and the voting exercise of
to resolve substantive issues.
- The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is
residents.
- Even in cases where supervening events,
fixed and may not be reduced except in the
- No t a political que stion. Pe ti tioner s clai m tha t under
whether intended or accidental, had made the
event that the national government incurs an
Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right
c a s e s m o o t , t h e C o u r t d i d n o t h e s it a t e t o r e s o l ve
u n man a ge a b le pu b lic s ec to r de f ic it . (Sec.285 LGC:
to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before
the legal or constitutional issues raised to
Province s 23%, Ci tie s 23%, Municipa lities 34 %,
it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that
fo rmulate controlling principles to guide the
Barangays 20%)
Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making.
bench, bar and public.
- Congress may amend LGC but should do so
2. Ratio The change from independent component city
Obiter
through a separate law, and not just through an
to co mponent city sha ll amoun t to a conversion wh ich
- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of
appropriations law.
therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule
local governments.
De ci sio n Petition granted.
II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules
- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions
Provisions
relating
to
LGSEF
declared
and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
shall enjoy local autonomy.
unconstitutional.
- Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
- Presidents power over LGUs is one of general
Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
supervision, and this excludes power of control. ( Drilon
distribution of LGSEF.
created, or divided, merged, or abolished, or its
v. Lim: The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules
Entire IRA to be released automatically without
b o u n d a r y su b sta n ti a l l y a l te r e d ex ce p t i n a cco r d a n ce
a r e f o l l o w e d , b u t h e h i m se l f d o e s n o t l a y d o w n su c h
further action by LGUs.
wi t h th e cr i te r i a e s ta b l i sh e d i n th e l o ca l g o v e r n m e n t
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
replace them.)
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
Autonomy
is
either
DECENTRALIZATION
of
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
affected.
ADMINISTRATION or decentralization of POWER.
PUNO; September 16, 1999
- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in
- L O C A L AU T ON O M Y m e a n s a m o r e r e sp o n s i v e a n d
the RA is not among those enumerated in the foregoing
accountable local government structure instituted
FACTS
p r o v i s i o n . M o r e o v e r, t h e t e r r i to r y a n d b o u n d a r i e s o f
through a system of decentralization. LGUs are subject
- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition
Santiago City remained unchanged.
to regulation, however limited, for no other purpose than
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
- B u t th e p o n e n te p o i n t s o u t t h a t th e r e i s a co m m o n
to enhance self-government.
- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time
denominator among those enumerated in the provision
- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE
of filing of petition, and residents of Santiago City
al l of the m r esu l t to a ma te ri a l ch an ge in the po li ti cal
(autonomy in the exercise of its functions) and FISCAL
(located in Province of Isabela)
and economic rights of the local government units
AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of revenue, in
- Respondents are executive, local government and
directly affected and the people therein. The same
addition to equitable share in national taxes.)
budget secretaries, and public officials of the province of
applies to the present case.
4. Yes.
Isabela
- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago
- Sec.6 Art .10 mandates that - In te r v e n o r i s wi n n e r o f a d d i ti o n a l se a t i n p r ov i n ci a l
City from independent component city to component city
o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL
board brought about by the reallocation.
will have the following effects:
TAXES
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528
From being directly under the Office of the
o Just share shall be DETERMINED BY LAW
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN
P r e s i d e n t , th e c i t y w i l l b e r e v e r t e d t o t h e
ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO
Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby
4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision
on local autonomy
5. WON the assailed provisos result to a proper
amendment of sharing scheme provided in LGC

increasing its land area and subsequently

increasing its share in the internal revenue
allotment.
Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be
redefined and may be shared with the province.
Allocation of operating funds will now come from
the Province which amounts to a decrease in the
citys funds.
R e gi ster ed vo ter s of Sa n tia go Ci t y wi l l vo te f or
and can be voted as provincial officials
Ci ty officia ls, espe ciall y the mayor, wil l no w be
under the control of the Provincial Governor

Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang

Panlungsod will now be subject to review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade
of Santiago City.
- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is
in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
- (f) Plebi sci te (1) no crea tion , conversion, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in
the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
D e ci si on Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is
declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is
h er eb y i ssu ed co m ma nd in g the re sp on de n ts to d esi st
from implementing said law.
Vo t i n g 10 concur; 4 dissent

TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY
MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987
FACTS
- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba,
a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the same
city contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, creating the
M u n i ci p a l i t y o f S i b a ga t, Pr o v i n ce of Agu sa n d e l Su r,
v i o l a te d Se c. 3 , Ar t. 11 of th e 1 9 7 3 C o n st i tu ti o n : No
province , ci ty, municipa lity, or barrio ma y be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argue
t h a t u n d e r t h e s a i d p r o v i s i o n , t h e L o ca l G o v e r n m e n t
Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria of
the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, municipality,
or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had
as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed,

the statu te cou ld not have possibl y comp lied with an y

criteria when respondent Municipality was created.
Hence, it is null and void.
- The Local Government Code was enacted onl y on 10
F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 3 so th a t wh e n B P 5 6 wa s e n a c te d , th e
C o d e wa s n o t ye t i n ex i s te n ce . A p l e b i sc i te h a d a l so
been conducted among the people of the unit/units
affe cted b y the cr ea ti on o f th e ne w Mu ni ci pa l i ty, wh o
e x p r e s se d a p p r o v a l t h e r e o f ; a n d th a t o ff i ci a l s o f t h e
newly created Municipality had been appointed and had
assumed there respective positions as such.
ISSUE
WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional.
HELD
- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the
time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended
to cr ip pl e l e gi sl a tiv e co mp e ten ce to cre a te mu ni cip a l
c o r p o r a t i o n s . S e c . 3 , Ar t . 11 o f t h e 1 9 7 3 d o e s n o t
prohibit the modification of territorial and political
subdivisions before the enactment of the Local
Government Code. It contains no requirement that the
Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for
creating a new municipality, in much the same way that
creating a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a Local Government Code. W hat the
constitutional provision means is that the once said Code
is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of
l o ca l gov er nm en t un i ts sho ul d con fo rm to th e cri te r ia
thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the
enactment of such code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
- The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat
conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted
and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and
approved the creation of the new local government unit.
Further, it is a long-recognized principle that the power
to create a municipal corporation is essentially
legislative in natu re. Absen t any consti tutional
li mitations, a legislative body ma y create an y
co r p o r a t i o n i t d e e m s e s se n t i a l f o r t h e m o r e e f fi c i e n t
administration of government. The creation of the new
municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of the
legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in
the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986
FACTS
- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided
the province of Negros Occidental into two Negros del
Norte and Negros Occidental.

- The peti tione rs, residents of the province of Negros

Occidental, challenge the constitutionality of the Batas
Pambansa Bl g. 885, the act whi ch crea ted Ne gro s del
Norte. The said law provides that some cities from the
island of Negros would be separated in order to create
the new province, subject to a concurrence of the
majority in a plebiscite.
- The peti tione rs con tend that the act is not in accord
with the Local Government Code as in Article 11, Section
3 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that a
p l e b i sc i te b e h e l d i n t h e u n i t o r u n i t s a ffe ct e d . T h e
petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected
by the creation of the new province, thus, they should be
a ll o we d to vote . Al so , the y co n te nd th a t th e mi n im u m
requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation
of a new province (as provided by the Local Government
Code) has not been complied since the Negros del Norte
is onl y compri sed of 2856.56 square kilome ter s. They
pray that the plebiscite be declared null and void, and
that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct another
plebiscite which includes Negros Occidental.
- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the term unit
or units affected does not include Negros Occidental. As
su c h , t h e y c i te d a P a r e d e s v s . E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y,
where the court ruled that only the members of the
newly created barangay are allowed to vote in the
p l e b i s c i te . Al s o , t h e y co n t e n d t h a t N e g r o s d e l N o r te
a ct u a l l y i s co m p r i se d of 4 ,0 1 9 .9 5 s qu a r e ki l o m e te r s ,
thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they
argue that sin ce the plebi scite has alread y happened,
the case is moot and academic.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the act complied with the constitutional
requirements
HELD
1 . N o . T h e ca s e ca n n o t b e t r u l y v i e w e d a s m o o t a n d
academi c. The le gal ity of the plebi sci te i tse lf is bein g
challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the duty to
r ep ud ia te a cts wh i ch ru n co un te r to the Co nsti tu ti on ,
done by whatever branch of government.
2. No.
Plebiscite
- The province of the Negros Occidental should be
allowed to vote in the plebiscite. It is clear that they are
p ar t o f th e u ni ts affe cted b y the cre a tio n of the ne w
province, it being the parent province.
- The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive
Se cr e t a r y, i s d i ffe r e n t wi th th e ca se a t b a r. It m e r e l y
includes the division of a barangay, the smallest political
unit. This case refers to a division of the largest political
u n i t , a b a r a n g a y, t h u s t h e r e w i l l b e m o r e p r o b l e m s
involved. The Court also looked at the dissent of Justice
Vicen te Aba d San to s i n tha t ca se , wh i ch mi m i cs the y
decision of the Court in this case.

- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein

empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress
3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the
BP Blg. 885 originated, it clearly said that a plebiscite
(see sec. 18, Art. X) and the creation of the autonomous
consti tu tional guaran tee of the loca l autonom y for the
shall be conducted in the areas affected. BP Blg. 885,
region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
provinces
on the other hand, says that a plebiscite shall be
the act through a plebiscite.
conducted in the proposed new province which are the
- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
HELD
areas affected. The Court found no legal basis for the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6
1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional.
change.
of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera
- P e t i t i o n e r s a s se r t i o n s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t h a s p r e - The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes
Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces
e mp ted Co n gr e ss f ro m i ts ma nd a te d ta sk of e na ctin g
vs Executive Secretary is abandoned.
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
said organic act.
- H o w e v e r, t h e a c t b e i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e C o u r t
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
- EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region
c a n n o t d i r e c t th e c o n d u c t o f a n e w p l e b i s c i t e , t h e r e
- It was created to accelerate economic and social
contemplated in the Constitution. It merel y provides
being no legal basis to do so.
gro wth in the region and to prepare for the
for transitory measures in anticipation of the
Minimum area requirement
establishment of the autonomous region in the
e na ctme n t o f a n or gan i c a ct a nd the cr ea ti on o f a n
- Upon examining the certification issued by the
Cordilleras [sec. 3].
au tonomous region . In shor t, it prepares the ground
Provincial Treasurer, the new province, at most, has a
- I t s m a i n f u n c t i o n i s to co o r d i n a te th e p l a n n i n g a n d
for autonomy.
l a n d a r e a o f o n l y 2 7 6 5 .4 s qu a r e ki l o m e t e r s .
implementation of programs and services in the region,
- T h e P r e s i d e n t i s a c t i n g o n a c o n t i n g e n c y. T h e
R e sp o n d e n t s co n t e n t i o n th a t th e te r m l a n d a r e a i s
p a r ti cu l a r l y, to co o r d i n a te wi th th e l o ca l go v e r n m e n t
co mp le x p ro ced ur e in Ar t. X o f th e Co n sti tu ti on wi l l
meant to include not only land, but water also cannot be
uni ts as we ll as wi th the execu tive departments of the
take time.
appreciated. The Court looked at the last sentence of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices
o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which states that
and in identif ying, planning, monitoring, and accepting
powers, as the first Congress had not yet
the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)].
convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures
o r m o r e i s l a n d s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t th e u se o f t h e w o r d
- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing
to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in
territory has reference only to land mass since it speaks
national and local government projects in the region.
t h e m e a n t i m e t h a t t h e o r ga n i c a c t h a d n o t ye t
of territory not needing to be contiguous or adjacent to
- The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
been passed and the autonomous region created.
each other.
policy formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board
- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily
D e ci si on
Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared
as an implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10].
mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition
u ncon sti tu ti on al . Th e p le bi sci te i s vo id a s we l l as th e
- The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall
asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and
exist until such time as the autonomous regional
Cordilleras."
the appointment of its new officials.
government is established and organized [sec. 17].
o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified
- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No.
area , for administra tive purpose s wi th the main
SEPARATE OPINION
220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
objective of coordinating the planning and
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress
implementation of programs and services [secs. 2
and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera
and 5].
TEEHANKEE
a u to no mo u s r e gi on , the re is an ur ge n t n ee d, in the
o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not
interest of national security and public order, for the
supplant
the existin g
local
governmental
- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.
President to reorganize immediately the existing
structure , nor are the y autonomou s government
- Additional facts: Act was approved in deep secrecy
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism
and inordinate haste in
the existing political realities therein and the
for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
t h e l a s t d a y o f se s si o n , D e c 3 , 1 9 8 5 . Th o u gh th e a ct
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas,
local governments, the agencies of the National
p r o v i d e d th a t a p l e b i s ci te b e co n d u c te d 1 2 0 d a ys i t s
without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes,
approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The
of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an
a nd no n- gov er nm en ta l o r ga n i za ti on s in a
pe titioners filed the ca se in Dec 23 , 1985, even as no
autonomous region on a permanent basis.
concerted effort to spur development in the
printed copies of the Act were available, since its has not
- D u r i n g th e p e n d e n c y o f t h i s ca se , R e p u b l i c Ac t N o .
Cordilleras.
b ee n pu bl i sh ed . Sin ce i t wa s Ch ri stm a s b re ak a t th a t
6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act
time, the petition was only acted upon by the Court only
the Cordillera Autonomous Region, " w a s e n a c t e d a n d
No. 6658, which created the Cordillera Regional
on January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has been held.
si gn ed i n to la w. The Act re co gn i ze s th e C AR a nd the
Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The
offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
President then appointed its members.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V
transitory nature.
o T h e co m m i s si o n p r e p a r e d a d r a f t o r g a n i c a c t ,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
whi ch became the basi s for the delibera tion s of
ISSUE
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
CORTES; January 29, 1990
1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutional because it preresult was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress
for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was
FACTS
and the creation of the autonomous region in the
signed into law on October 23, 1989.
- Note R e a d f i r s t s e c . 1 5 - 2 1 , A r t . X o f t h e 1 9 8 7
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the said
o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to
Constitution for this case.
organic act through a plebiscite
be conducted shortly, shall complete the process
- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated
2. WON EO No. 220 created a new territorial and political
outlined in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O.
July 15,1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative
subdivision with CAR
N o . 2 2 0 h a d b e e n i n f o r ce a n d e ff e c t f o r m o r e
R e gio n , i s a ssa i le d o n th e pr im a r y gr ou nd th a t i t p re -

t h a n t w o ye a r s a n d d e s p i t e E . O . N o . 2 2 0 , t h e
The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be
that would prepare the stage for political
created. Events have shown that petitioners' fear
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation
resulting gap in the process of transforming a
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was
group of adja cent terri toria l and political
totally unfounded.
subdivisions
already
enjoying
local
or
2. It did not create a new territorial and political
administrative autonomy into an autonomous
subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
region vested with political autonomy.
subdivision.
De ci sio n
Petition to declare EO No. 220 as
- The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
Vo t i n g All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr.
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
concurring in the result since for him the issue has
o Neither is it vested with the powers that are
become moot and academic because Republic Acts No.
normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the
6658 and No. 6766 superseded the assailed EO already.
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own
ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
sources of revenue, etc.
o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily
GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990
to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
FACTS
- Considering the control and supervision exercised by
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766
the President over the CAR and the offices created under
e n t i t l e d A n Ac t P r o v i d i n g f o r a n O r g a n i c Ac t f o r t h e
E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
Co rd ille ra Au to no m ou s Re gio n , the pe op le of the
participation of the line departments of the National
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
G o v e r n m e n t , t h e C AR m a y b e c o n s i d e r e d m o r e t h a n
an d Ka l in ga - Apa yao an d th e ci ty of Ba gu io ca st th ei r
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the
votes in a plebiscite.
National
Government,
similar
to
the
regional
- R esu l ts of p le bi sci te : a pp rov ed b y ma jo r i ty of 5 ,8 89
development counci ls whi ch the Pre sident ma y create
votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces
under the Constitution (Art. X, see. 14).
and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of
o These
councils
are
"composed
of
local
total population, and as such has the second smallest
government
officials,
regional
heads
of
number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
depar tments and othe r governmen t office s, and
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
representatives
from
non-governmental
2 2 5 9 s ta t i n g th a t t h e Or ga n i c Ac t fo r th e R e g i o n h a s
o r ga n i za ti on s wi thi n the re gi on f or p ur po se s o f
been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also
au tonom y of the units therein and to acce lerate
issued a memorandum for the President reiterating
the economic and social growth and development
COM EL EC resolu tion , stating tha t Ifugao bein g the
of the units in the region."
o n l y p r o v i n c e w h i c h v o t e d f a v o r a b l y t h e n . Al o n e ,
3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
legally and validly constitutes CAR.
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
- Ma r ch 8 , 1 99 0 , Co n gre ss e ba cted R ep ub l i c Act N o .
1 98 7 Co nsti tu ti on , co n te m pl a te s the gr an t of po li ti ca l
6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
of March 1991.
re gion s. Thus, the provision in the Consti tution for an
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary
autonomous regional government with a basic structure
issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting
consisting of an executive department and a legislative
authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
assembl y and special courts with personal, family and
Execu tive Board and Cordi llera Regional Assemb l y
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
created under Executive Order No. 220.
regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order
- The concept of local autonomy:
No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera
It must be clarified that the constitutional
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and
guarantee of lo cal autono m y in the Consti tution
all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
a u to n o m y of l o ca l go v e r n m e n t u n i ts o r, ca s t i n
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera
more technical language, the decentralization of
Autonomous Region in only one province as the
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No.
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 11.]
said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259,

the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds
for the purpose
b .d e cl ar e Exe cu ti ve Ord e r No . 22 0 con sti tu ti n g th e
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assemb l y and othe r office s to be stil l in
f or ce a nd e ffect un til an othe r o r gan i c l a w f or the
A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n sh a l l h a v e b e e n e n a c t e d b y
Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters
in the constituent units.
ISSUE
W ON t h e p r o v i n ce o f If u g a o , b e i n g th e o n l y p r ov i n ce
which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validl y constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a.T he ke ywo rd ins Ar ti cle X, Se ction 15 of the 1987
Constitution provinces, cities, municipalities and
ge o gra ph i cal ar ea s con no te tha t r e gio n i s to be
m a d e u p o f m o r e t h a n o n e co n s t i t u e n t u n i t . T h e
term region used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces.
- r ul e in sta tu tor y co n str u ctio n m ust be a pp li ed
here: the language of the Constitution, as much
as possible should be understood in the sense it
h as in com m on u se an d th a t the wor d s u se d in
constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinar y meaning excep t where techni cal term s
are employed.
b.T he entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with
provi sions wh ich rule again st the so le provin ce of
Ifugao constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended
that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a
set of provincial officials and another set of
re gional official s exercising thei r execu tive and
l e gi sla tiv e po we r s ove r exa ctl y the sa me sm al l
area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in
the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and
2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- A l l o t m e n t o f Ten M i l l i o n P e s o s t o R e g i o n a l
Government
for
its
initial
organizational
r e qu i r e m e n t s ca n n o t b e co n s t r u e d a s f u n d i n g
only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)
(c)]
- C e r ta i n p r o v i si o n s o f th e Ac t ca l l f o r o ffi ci a l s
coming from diff erent provinces and cities in

the Region, as well as tribal courts and the

development of a common regional language. (Art
V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the
COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical and illogical.
D e ci si on Petition (both a and b) granted.

BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT

GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers.
Petitioner Basco is the Chairperson of the Committee on
Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July 1981 PAGCOR
was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government
to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law
- P e t i t i o n e r s a r e a s sa i l i n g th e co n st i t u t i o n a l i t y of P D
1 86 9 an d th e y pr a y for i ts an nu lm en t ba se d on the ff.
grounds:
" A. It con sti tu te s a wa iv er of a ri gh t pr e jud i cia l to a
third person willing right recognized bylaw. It waived
th e Ma ni la Ci t y gov er nm en t's ri gh t to im po se tax es
and license fees, which is recognized by law.
"B. The law has intruded into the local government's
right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted
g a m b l i n g . w h i l e m o s t o th e r f o r m s o f ' g a m b l i n g a r e
outlawed. together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices;
"C. It violate s the avo wed trend of the government
away from monopolistic and crony economy and
toward free enterprise and privatization.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek
the annulment of PD 1869
2. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy
of Manila
3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
HELD
1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek
the annulment of PD 1869.
- Considering the importance to the public of the case at
b a r, a n d i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e C o u r t ' s d u t y, u n d e r th e
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other
b ra nche s of gov er nm en t have kep t th e m se lv es wi th in
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court

has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has

taken cognizance of this petition.
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party
a s a pp li ed i n the ca se s bef or e th e Su pr em e C ou r t, i t
hold s tha t the same is satisfied b y the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in
danger of' sustaining an immediate injury as a result of
t h e a c t s o r m e a s u r e s c o m p l a i n e d o f . " An d e v e n i f ,
strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition,
it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
th e re qu ir e me n t a nd so re mov e th e i mp ed i me n t to i ts
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonom y of
Manila with regard to its exemption clause.
a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
corporation hits no inherent right to impose taxes. Its
"power to tax" must alwa ys yield to a legislative act
wh i ch i s su p e r i o r h av i n g b e e n p a s se d u p o n b y th e
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to
con tr ol b y C on gr e ss. The C i ty of M an il a 's p o we r to
impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 197.5, the power of local
gov er nm en ts to re gu la te ga mb l in g thr u the gra n t o f
"franchise. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D.
No . 771 and wa s vested exclu sively on the Na tional
Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation
o f g a m b l i n g . N e c e s sa r i l y, t h e p o w e r to d e m a n d o r
co l l e ct l i ce n se f e e s w h i ch i s a co n se q u e n ce o f th e
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in
the City of Manila.
3. No , PD 1869 does not viola te the e qual pro tection
clause of the Constitution
- The "equal pro tection clause " does not prohibi t the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall. The mere fact
that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449)
horse racing (R -A. 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended
by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. while
o th er s a re p ro hi b i te d , d oe s n ot re nd er the ap pl i ca bl e
laws, P.D. 1869 for one. unconstitutional.

JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT

CORONA; December 11, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Cour t of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro , was forme rl y
assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court.
- His salary and representation and transportation
a ll o wa n ce ( R ATA) we r e dr a wn f ro m th e b ud ge t of the
Supreme Court. In addition, he received a monthly

a l l o wa n ce f r o m th e l o ca l f u n d s o f t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y of
Naujan starting 1984.
- March 15 , 1993- the Sangguniang Ba yan of Naujan,
through Resolu tion No. 057 , sought the opinion of the
P r o v i n c i a l Au d i t o r a n d t h e P r o v i n c i a l Bu d g e t O f fi c e r
r e ga r d i n g a n y b u d ge t a r y l i m i t a t i o n o n t h e g r a n t o f a
monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner
judge.
- M a y 7 , 1 9 9 3 - th e S a n g g u n i a n g B a ya n u n a n i m o u s l y
approved Resolution 101, increasing petitioner judges
monthly allowance starting May 1993.
- Februar y, 17 , 1994- Provincial Audi tor Salvacion M .
D a l i s a y se n t a l e t te r t o t h e M u n i c i p a l M a yo r a n d t h e
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the
p a ym e n t o f th e m o n th l y a l l o w a n ce a n d t o r e qu i r e th e
immediate refund of the amounts previously paid. Her
directive was based on the following:
1.Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations
Act of 1993
2.National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the
Department of Budget and Management
- Pe ti ti on er Jud ge ap pe al ed to C om m i ssi on on Au d i t,
Regional Director upheld opinion of Provincial Auditor
D a l i sa y a n d a d d e d th a t R e so l u t i o n N o . 1 0 1 S e r i e s o f
1 9 9 3 o f t h e S a n g g u n i a n g B a ya n o f N a u j a n f a i l e d t o
comply with Section 3 of the Local Budge Circular No. 53
outlining the conditions for the grant of the allowances
to jud ge s and other national officials or emplo yee s by
the local government units.
- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of
the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit.
- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its
decision affirming Resolution of the Regional Director.
1.the main issue is whether or not the municipality
can validly provide RATA to its municipal judge
2.Section 36 of RA 7645 states:
- Pa yable from the programmed/appropriated
amount and others from personal services savings
o f th e r e sp e ct i v e o ffi ce s wh e r e th e o ffi ci a l s o r
employees draw their salaries;
- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual
General Appropriations Act;
- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or
assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall
be paid from their parent agencies
- No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source.
2.The municipal government may provide additional
allowances and other benefits to judges and other
national government officials or employees
assigned or stationed in the municipality,
p r o v i d e d , th a t t h e f i n a n c e s o f t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y
allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447,
Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that similar
allo wances/additional compensation are not
granted by the national government to the
official/employee
assigned
to
the
local

government unit as provided under Section 3(e)

of local Budget Circular No. 53.
3.Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and
void. The Honorable Jud ge Toma s C. Leynes,
being a national government official is prohibited
to receive additional RATA from the local
go ve rn me n t fu nd p ur su an t to Se ctio n 36 of the
General
Appropriations
Act
and
National
Compensation Circular No. 67.
- P o s i t i o n o f C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t
> The mu ni ci pa l i ty cou ld no t gr an t R ATA to ju d ge s i n
addition to the RATA already received from the Supreme
Court
1.National Compensation Circular No. 67
- the RATA of national officials and employees shall
be payable from the programmed appropriations
or personal services savings of the agency where
such officials or employees draw their salary and
- no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more
than one source
2.General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645)
- th e R ATA of n ati on al offi cia l s sha l l be p a yab le
from the programmed appropriations of their
respective offices
3.Local Budget Circular No. 53
- p r o h i b i ts l o ca l go v e r n m e n t u n i ts f r o m g r a n t i n g
a l l o w a n ce s to n a ti o n a l g o v e r n m e n t o ffi ci a l s o r
employees stationed in their localities when such
allowances are also granted by the national
government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such
officials or employees
- Position of Petitioner
> M u n i ci p a l i t y i s ex p r e s sl y a n d u n e qu i v o ca l l y
empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of
1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting
allowances and other benefits to judges stationed in its
territory.
> D BM canno t amend or modif y a sub stantive la w like
the Local Government Code 1991 through mere budget
circulars.
ISSUE
W ON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from
municipality
HELD
- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another
national agency, he should get his RATA only from his
parent national agency and not from the other national
agency he is detailed to.
- Re spo nd en t C OA er re d in o pp osi n g th e gr an t of the
monthly allo wance by the Municipality of Naujan to
petitioner Judge Leynes
- R ea so n in g

RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No,

administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate,
modify, or nullify a statute.
The Consti tution guarantees the principle of local
autonomy
- Article 10, Section 2
An ordinance must be presumed valid in the
absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.

impeachment proceedings against such official are

deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
v o te s to o v e r tu r n o r a ffi r m th e f i n d i n g o f th e sa i d
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
reso lution, as the ca se ma y be, is not suffi cien t in
substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a
reso lution of impea chmen t is filed or endorsed, as
the case may be, by at lea st one-third (1/3) of the
Me mb er s of th e H ou se , im pe a ch m en t pr ocee d in gs
are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. W ithin a period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated
against the same official.
- July 2002 House of representatives adopted a
Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct
an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment
complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico,
Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice
dismissed the complain because insufficient in
substance
- Octo be r 2 00 3 R ep . Teo do ro a nd F ue n te be l la f il ed
second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged
resul ts of the le gi slative in quir y; reso lution of
endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of
all the members of the House of Representatives

ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on
Justice, represented by Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon
Datumanong,
The
House
of
Representatives,
represented by Its Speaker, Rep. Jose de Venecia and
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
MINUTE RESOLUTION
- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September
2005: DENIED WITH FINALITY as no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the
questioned resolution
- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September
2005 DENIED for lack of merit
- L e t te r d a te d 2 6 Se p te m b e r 2 0 0 5 N OT ED W IT H OU T
ACTION

FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA
MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.
CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003
FACTS
- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall promulgate
i ts r u l e s o n i m p e a ch m e n t to e ffe c ti v e l y ca r r y o u t th e
purpose of this Section.
- N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 1 - 1 2 C o n g r e s s o f t h e H o u s e o f th
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a d o p te d a n d a p p r o v e d th e R u l e s o f
Procedure
in
Impeachment
Proceedings
(House
Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by
11 Congress th
> Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In ca ses where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,

ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2 . W ON Rule s of Pro cedure for Impea chmen t
Proceedings adopted by 12 Congress is constitutional th
and second impeachment complaint is valid

HELD
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion through power of judicial review.
o Lo cu s sta nd i - C ase i s of tr an scen de n ta l p ub i c
importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had
been filed and the 2001 rules had been
promulgated and enforced.

Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule

V of the H ou se Imp ea ch me n t R ul e s ad op ted b y

th
the 12
Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result
t h e r e o f , t h e se co n d i m p e a ch m e n t co m p l a i n t i s
b a r r e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 3 ( 5 ) o f Ar t i c l e X I o f t h e
Constitution.
o Ju d i ci a l R e s tr a i n t n o t a n o p t i o n b e ca u se th e
Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal
to which the controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeach ment Pro ceedings wh ich were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional.
Consequently,
the
second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix W illiam B. Fuentebella wi th the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Repre senta tives on October 23 , 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the term initiate takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3
of the members of the HR with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of
Art XI becomes clear.
o S e c 3 ( 5 ) o f Ar t i cl e X I o n ce a n i m p e a ch m e n t
complains has been initiated, another complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a
period of one year.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House

Impeach ment Rules, impea chment proceedin gs
a re d ee me d in i tia ted (1 ) if the re is a f in di n g b y
the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint
or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House. These rules clearl y
con travene Se ction 3 (5) of Ar ti cle XI since the
rules give the term initiate a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V

DACOYCOY
PARDO; April 29, 1999
FACTS
- R e s p o n d e n t P e d r o O . D a c o yc o y w a s c h a r g e d w i t h

habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism before

the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro
the Civil Servi ce Com mission . Acco rdingl y, the
Co l le ge o f Ar ts a nd Tra de s. It wa s M r. Ja i me D a cl a g,
Commission conducted a formal investigation, and
Head of the Voca tional Department of the BC AT, who
thereafter, promulgated its resolution finding no
r e c o m m e n d e d t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f R i t o . M r. D a c l a g ' s
substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual
au tho ri t y to re com m en d the a pp oi n tme n t of f ir st l eve l
drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission
posi tion s such as wa tchmen , se curity guard s, driver s,
found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a
utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for
result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped
sh o r t d u r a ti o n s o f t h r e e to si x m o n th s wa s
Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and
reco mmended b y re spondent Daco yco y and approved
their assignment under his immediate supervision and
b y D EC S Re gi on a l Di r e cto r El ad i o C . D io ko , wi th th e
control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro
provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags
C o l l e g e o f Ar ts a n d Tra d e s, a n d i m p o se d o n h i m th e
immediate supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director
penalty of dismissal from the service.
III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito
- The Commission denied respondent's motion for
Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr. Daclag also appointed
reconsideration.
Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special
respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are
civil action for certiorari wi th prelimina r y in jun ction to
available for the proposed appointment of Rito
set aside the Civil Service Commissions resolutions. The
D a c o yc o y a n d e v e n r a te d h i s p e r f o r m a n c e a s v e r y
Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the
satisfactor y. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in
d e c i si o n of th e C iv i l Se r v i ce C o m m i ssi o n , r u l i n g th a t
his position description form that his father was his next
respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons
h i g h e r s u p e r v i s o r . T h e c i r cu m v e n t i o n o f t h e b a n o n
Ri to and Ped , and , hence, wa s no t gu ilty of nepoti sm .
nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionabl y, Mr. Daclag
The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person
wa s a subordina te of responden t Ped ro O. Daco yco y,
who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned,
wh o wa s the scho o l ad mi n i str a tor. H e au tho r i ze d Mr.
as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It likewise
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level
declared null and void the Civil Service Com mission s
employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr.
resolution dismissing him from the service.
Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents
- T h e C o m m i s s i o n t h e n f i l e d a n a p p e a l v i a ceriorari
two sons and placed them under respondents
before the Supreme Court.
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility
worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.
ISSUES
- T o o u r m i n d , t h e u n s e e n b u t o b v i o u s h a n d of
1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism
respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected
recommend ing author ity in the appointmen t of his two
by the decision" of the Court of Appeals who may file an
appeal therefrom
HELD
1. YES
- Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of
Ex e cu t i v e Or d e r 2 9 2 ) , o n e i s g u i l t y o f n e p o ti s m i f a n
a pp oi n tme n t i s i ssu ed in fav or of a re la ti ve wi th in th e
third civil degree of con sanguini ty or affini ty of an y of
the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who
the appointing or recommending authority is. To
c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e l a w, i t s u f f i c e s t h a t a n
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- R espo nd en t i s the Voca ti on a l Scho ol Ad mi n i stra tor,
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern
Samar. He did not appoint or recommend his two sons to

sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.

- Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil
ser vi ce an d th e e ffici en c y o f i ts pe rson ne l . The b asi c
purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism
also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended
to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to
restri ct and li mit the scope of the prohibi tion wh ich i s
tex tua l l y ver y b ro ad a nd co m pr eh en siv e . If no t wi th i n
the exceptions, i t is a form of corruption tha t mu st be
nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it
raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what
we n ee d no w is no t o nl y to p un ish the wro n gdo e r s or
reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug
the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to
insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures
in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention
of the law."
2. YES
- There is no que stion tha t responden t Da co yco y ma y
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Civil Servi ce Commi ssion adverse to him . He was the
responden t offi cial me ted out the penal ty of dism issal
from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
cour t re qui red the pe titioner the rein, here respondent
Daco ycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as

p u b l i c r e sp o n d e n t a s t h e go v e r n m e n t a ge n c y ta ske d
more than thir ty days; or fine in an amount exceeding
with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory
- Although I completely agree with the result and
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
provisions on the civil service.
likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to
r e m o v a l o r d i s m i s sa l f r o m o ffi ce . Th e d e ci si o n o f th e
- S u b s e q u e n t l y, t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s r e v e r s e d t h e
nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do
disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to
decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil
the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal
Service Commission may appeal a judgment of
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
t h e d e ci si o n o f th e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s t o th e S u p r e m e
exoneration in an administrative case involving
f i n e i n a n a m o u n t n o t e x c e e d i n g t h i r t y d a y s s a l a r y.
Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared
n e p o t i s m . An d M r. J u s t i ce P u n o w o u l d g o f u r th e r b y
A p p e a l i n ca s e s a l l o w e d b y l a w m u s t b e f i l e d w i t h i n
not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P.
allowing even a private complainant and by
fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
Su an , who wa s m er el y a wi tne ss f or the go ve rn me n t.
implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision
- It is my submission that the prerogative to now
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become
e x o n e r a ti n g o r a b so l v i n g a c i v i l se r v i ce e m p l o ye e o f
determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in
the party adversely affected by such ruling, which
charges against, or even imposing a penalty upon him.
cases of exoneration should still continue or not,
seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as
This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several
exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and
a n a ggri ev ed p ar t y, i t ma y a pp ea l the d eci sio n of the
cases.
should not arrogate this policy-making power of
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling,
- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy
Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the
we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
of the charge of nepotism. From such adverse
exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under
jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely
d e c i s i o n , t h e C i v i l Se r v i ce C o m m i s s i o n , t h r o u g h i t s
the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to
affected by the decision refers to the government
Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by
remed y inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it
employee against whom the administrative case is filed
wa y of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
f in d an y, e sp e ci a ll y whe n the def in i te in ten ti on of th e
for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and
ex isti n g la w wa s to d i sa l lo w the Sta te to ap pe al f ro m
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer,
jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in
judgments of exoneration. An y attempt by the Court to
removal or dismissal from office" and not included are
the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the
transgress this most basic principle in the separation of
"cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a
powers between these two branches of government
more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
watering down of the settled doctrine.
would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial
exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a
legislation.
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for
s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e a n d m a y b e e x e r ci s e d o n l y i n t h e
- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular
appeal." In other words, w e o ve rru le p rio r d ec is io ns
manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments
holding that the Civil Service Law "does not
- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as The
o r f i n a l o r d e r s o r r e so l u t i o n s o f o r a u th o r i ze d b y a n y
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
Philippine Civil Service Law shows that said law does
quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service
officers
or
emplo yees
from
admin ist rat ive
not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
charges."
officers or employees from administrative charges.
functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
- The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil
- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general,
Service Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced.
- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
appeal by certiorari f r o m a j u d gm e n t o r f i n a l o r d e r o r
The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional
administrative
disciplinary
cases
involving
the
r e so l u t i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s m a y b e f i l e d v i a a
appointment is covered by the prohibition against
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty
verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court
nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
(where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein,
appointments to the civil service, and whether the
demotion in rank or salar y or transfer, removal or
may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or
Commission had gravely abused its discretion in
dismissal from office."
f in a l o r d e r o f t h e Co u r t o f Ap p e a l s e xo n e r a tin g a
recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment
- Said provision must be read together with Section 39
government employee in an administrative case, in
g i v e n to p e t i t i o n e r a f t e r th e C o m m i s si o n h a d e a r l i e r
p a r a g r a p h ( a ) o f P.D . 8 0 5 ( s h o u l d b e 8 0 7 ) w h i c h
p a r t i cu l a r, f a l l s w i t h i n th e a m b i t o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f
approved that appointment. Debulgado never even
contemplates:
Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807.
impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to
"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by
It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential
only the appointing or recommending authority for
the party adversely affected by the decision."
Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of
appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court
- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision"
p r o ce d u r e su ch a s R u l e 4 5 o f t h e R u l e s of C o u r t. N o
emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says
r ef er s to the gov er nm en t e mp lo yee a ga in st wh om th e
appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
- Moreover, it i s reco gni zed in our ju ri sdiction that an
embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
administrative case which could result in the revocation
i m p o r t a n ce , a n d t h e C o u r t h a d n e i th e r a u th o r i t y n o r
i n ra nk or sal a r y, tra n sf er, r em ov al o r di smi ssa l fr om
of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office,
inclination to dilute that important public policy by
office. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a
con stitute s a proceedin g whi ch par take s of a cr iminal
introducing a qualification here or a distinction there."
case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges
nature. Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto
D e ci si on
P e t i t i o n g r a n t e d . T h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s '
against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of
must perforce be con strued strictl y a gainst the Sta te,
d e c i s i o n i s r e v e r s e d a n d t h e r e so l u t i o n s o f t h e C i v i l
said char ge s, as in the case , the re is no occasion for
just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against
Service Commission are revived and affirmed.
appeal.
the State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be
- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil
resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative
SEPARATE OPINION
Service Commission in an administrative case is
case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be
extended to the party adversely affected by the
construed as to include the State in administrative
decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee
charges involving nepotism.
MELO [dissent and concur]
who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for
- To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or

otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my

mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil
servants. It should be noted in this regard that the
g r e a t e r b u l k of o u r g ov e r n m e n t w o r ke r s a r e o r d i n a r y
people, working under supervision and, more often than
not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of
peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding,
t h e y a r e n o t e a s i l y c o w e d a n d i n t i m i d a t e d . M a n y,
though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of
station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of
some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can,
therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence
d i sa l lo w a pp ea l b y th e co m pl a in an t fro m de ci si on s in
administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise.
Verily, an employee ma y be hounded into spending up
t o h i s l a s t r e so u r c e s a n d l o s i n g h i s se l f - r e sp e c t a n d
honor by successive appeals.
- W hat will happen, if for instance, the respondent
government employee is initially exonerated or given a
light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting
that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier
penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter
metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant,
the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals
or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in
the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent
civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of
th e or di na r y e mp lo yee s. Th e b i g sho ts in go ve rn me n t
who co mmi t wrongs may someho w hereb y benefi t, but
then we shall be content in concluding that we decided
i n f a v o r o f t h e m a n y, t h a t t h e g o o d o f t h e m a j o r i t y
prevailed.
- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as
i n t h e ca se of a ju d g m e n t o f e x o n e r a ti o n b y th e C i v i l
Service Comm ission or the now defunct Meri t System
Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse
to the government agency concerned and eventually to
the State as a whole. This is especiall y so when there
had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application
of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding,
the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be
i nvo ke d , m u ch l e ss exe rci sed , whe n the la w do es no t
provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises
its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by
it and has no other recourse except to apply the same.
Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the
l a tter f ai le d to in vo ke th e fo re go in g gen er a l ru le . In a
similar case, we held that the party favored by such law
who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be
deemed to have waived this right.
- Premises considered and with the above observations, I
v o te to gr a n t t h e p e ti ti o n a s st a te d i n th e d i sp o si ti v e
thereof.

PUNO [concur]
-

Appeal

to the

Civil

Service

Commission

in

an

administrative case is extended to the party adversely

in effi ci en c y, if no t cor r up ti on , in go ve rn me n t se r vi ce .
affected by the decision, that is, the person of the
The critical question, therefore, is: who has the standing
respondent employee who has been meted out the
to p rev en t th e vi ol a ti on of th i s l a w an d p ro te ct p ub li c
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in ter e st? I sub m i t th a t a tax pa ye r ha s the sta nd i n g to
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in
bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that
r a n k o r sa l a r y o r tr a n sf e r, r e m o v a l o r d i sm i s sa l f r o m
appointments in the civil service shall be made only
office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even
according to merit and fitness x x x. A taxpayer has a
final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission
right to good government and good government cannot
in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses
exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by
which can be the subject of a complaint by any private
law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the
citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the law allows any private
decision.
citizen to file a complaint against a government official
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a
or emplo yee dire ctl y wi th the Comm ission. Se ction 38
s t a tu t o r y p r i v i l e g e a n d m a y b e e x e r c i se d o n l y i n th e
also recognizes that administrative proceedings may be
manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee
- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may
b y th e h ea d o f th e de pa r tm en t or o ffi ce o f e qu iv al en t
b e a va i l e d of o n l y i n a ca se w h e r e t h e r e sp o n d e n t i s
rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies,
found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when
or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of
the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this
a n y o t h e r p e rs o n s . T h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t o n e
case, there is no occasion for appeal.
w h o h a s a r i g h t t o b e h e a rd h a s s t a n d i n g t o s e e k
- The phrase party adversely affected by the decision
r e v i e w o f a n y r u l i n g a d v e r s e t o h i m . H e n ce , i f a
r ef er s to the gov er nm en t e mp lo yee a ga in st wh om th e
p r i v a te ci t i ze n h a s t h e r i g h t t o f i l e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion
d i sm i ssal of hi s com p la in t, unless t h e l a w c l e a r l y
i n ra nk or sal a r y, tra n sf er, r em ov al o r di smi ssa l fr om
precludes his right of appeal for indubitable polic y
office.
reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the value of the
- W ith h um i li t y, I ma ke th e sub m i ssi on th a t i s ti m e to
right to complain. The cases of P a re d e s , M e n d e z a n d
strike down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil
Mag pale d o n o t g i v e a n y p o l i c y r e a s o n s w h y t h e
S e r v i ce C o m m i s si o n w h e n th e d e ci s i o n ex o n e r a te s a
dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed.
government official or employee from an administrative
They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying
charge. The doctrine is principally based on a constricted
the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes against the
interpretation of Section 39 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
rule that preclusions of judicial review of administrative
Law) which states:
action . . . is not lightly to be inferred.
Sec . 39. (a) Appeals, where allo wable, shall be
- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not
m a d e b y t h e p a r t y a d ve r s e l y a f f e c t e d b y t h e
c at eg o ric a ll y sa nc t io ne d b y th e C i vi l Se r vic e L aw .
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
F o r w h a t th e l a w d e cl a r e s a s "f i n a l " a r e d e ci s i o n s o f
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
he ad s of a gen cie s inv olv in g su spe n sio n fo r no t m or e
se a so n a b l y f i l e d , w h i c h p e t i t i o n s h a l l b e d e c i d e d
than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days
within fifteen days. x x x
salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring
- According to Paredes, Mendez a n d M a g p a l e , the
th e se d e ci si o n s f i n a l . Th e se d e c i si o n s i n v o l v e m i n o r
phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers
offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual
alone to the respondent government official or employee
offenses committed by government officials and
against whom the administrative case is filed. They
e m p l o y e e s . To a l l o w t h e i r m u l t i p l e l e v e l a p p e a l w i l l
excluded from its compass the party complainant whose
doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our
charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent
administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast
government official or employee is exonerated, the
and efficient action from these administrative agencies.
d e c i si o n i s d e e m e d f i n a l a s t h e p a r t y co m p l a i n a n t i s
Nepotism, how e ver, is not a pett y offense. Its
precluded from appealing.
d e le t e ri o u s e f f e c t o n g o ve r n m e n t c a n n o t b e o ve r- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation
e mp ha s ize d . An d it is a s tu b b o rn e vi l. T he
w h i ch i s n o t o n l y to o n a r r o w b u t i s su b v e r s i v e o f th e
objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts,
e s s e n c e o f o u r c i v i l s e r v i c e l a w. I n t h e c a s e a t b a r,
hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism
private respondent is the Vocational Administrator of the
c a n n o t b e g i ve n i mm u n it y f ro m r e vie w, e s p e c i a l l y
Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. His charged with
judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that
the offense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons
since some decisions exonerating public officials from
as driver and utility worker under his immediate control
minor o f f e n s e s c a n n o t b e a p p e a l e d , e r g o , e v e n a
and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotism is
decision acquitting a government official from a major
prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds
offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.

- S i m i l a r l y, t h e d o c t r i n e b a r r i n g a p p e a l c a n n o t b e
justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission to review decisions involving:
(1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in
an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3)
demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or
d i sm i s s a l f r o m o f fi c e . Ag a i n , t h e r e i s n o th i n g i n th i s
provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal from
decisions exonerating a government official or employee
f ro m ne po ti sm . Sta tu tor y p re clu si on o f a pp ea l s i s the
ex ce p tio n ra the r tha n the ru le , for a s stre ssed b y M r.
Justice Douglas, "tolerance of judicial review has been
more and more the rule against the claim of
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i n a l i t y." Yet t h e c a s e s o f Paredes,
M e n d e z a n d M a g p a l e pr eci sel y ba rr ed a ll ap pe al s
despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil
Service Law.
- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party
a d v e r se l y a ffe ct e d to r e so r t to ju d ic ia l re view . This
ca se does no t involve the appella te jur isdi ction of the
Civil Service Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the
po wer to review a decision exonera ting a governmen t
official from a charge of nepotism. The facts show that it
was the Civil Service Commission that at the first
instance found Dacoyco y guilty of nepotism. It was
Dacoycoy who appealed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the Court
of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy
only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission
should also be impleaded as party respondent. The
C ou r t of App ea l s the n r eve rsed th e C om m i ssi on as i t
c l e a r e d D a c o yc o y f r o m t h e c h a r g e o f n e p o ti s m . T h e
question therefore is whether or not this Court is
p re clu de d fr om r evi e wi n g th e de ci si on of th e C ou r t of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again,
I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of
this Court has even been expanded "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
th e pa rt of any branch or instrumentality of
g o ve rn men t ." The question is not our lack of
j u r i s d i c t i o n b u t t h e p r u d e n t i a l e x e r c i s e o f p o w e r. I n
certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion, our
given task is to determine how much is too much of an
abuse.
- To m y mind, it i s also of de minimis importance that
the petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service
Commission. The records will reveal that Suan, the
original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service
Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for
lack of means. But even without Suan, I s u b m i t t h a t
the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its
impact on the effectiveness of government give
the Civil Service Commission the standing to
p u r s u e t h is a p p e a l . T h e i s s u e i n t h e c a se a t b a r i s
basical l y a le gal one , i.e ., the proper interpre ta tion of

who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this

- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel
Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws.
a ge n c y of th e go v e r n m e n t . C o r o l l a r i l y, i t i s e qu i p p e d
Administrative agencies have always conceded that the
with the power and function to hear and decide
final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. And
admini stra tive ca ses in stitu ted b y or brough t before it
the issue has broad implications on the merit and fitness
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments
ph il o so ph y of ou r ci vi l se rv i ce s yste m . U nd er Se c. 3 ,
and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the
Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service
a gencies a tta ched to it. This i s in consonan ce with i ts
Commission that has oversight of our civil service
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the
s u sp e n s i o n o f a l l o f fi ce r s a n d e m p l o ye e s i n th e c i v i l
diverse dimensions of the issue. It is also the most
se r v i ce a n d u p o n a l l m a tte r s r e l a ti n g t o th e co n d u ct ,
affected, for it has the duty not to stand still when
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees
nepotic practices threaten the principle of meritrocacy in
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by
ou r gov er nm en t. It se em s to me sel f evi de n t tha t th i s
law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has
type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by
been constituted as a disciplining authority.
the Commission and not by a private person.
- Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
- There are ot her dist urbing imp licat io n if we do not
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions
provide s the answer as to wh o ma y appear before the
exonerating government officials from charges of
Commission, thus:
nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced
charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review
against a subordinate officer or employee by the
of their conviction, we disallow review of their
following officials and employees:
exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule
(a) Secretary of department;
contravenes our distaste a gain st nepoti sm, a practice
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
w h o se co n ti n u a n ce ca n f a ta l l y e r o d e f a i th i n
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an
(d) Chief of Agency;
evil that should be extirpated wherever found, can never
(e) Regional Director; or
b e t h e i n t e n t o f o u r l e g i s l a t o r s w h o c r a f te d o u r C i v i l
(f) Upon Sworn, Written compla int of An y
Service Law. F o r s t i l l a n o t h e r, c o m p l e t e l y c u t t i n g
other Person."
off access to judicial review goes against the spirit
- C o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e complaint c a n e i t h e r b e t h e
of
the
1987
Constitution
expanding
the
Se cre ta r y of de pa r tme n t, h ea d of offi ce of e qu iv al en t
jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of
rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency,
non-reviewabilit y
w eakens
the
judiciarys
r e g i o n a l d i r e c t o r o r a n y o t h e r p e r s o n o r p a r t y. T h e
checking
power.
Indeed,
shielding
abusive
p hr ase an y o th e r pa r ty ha s b ee n u nd er stoo d to be a
admin ist rat ive actions an d decis io ns from ju dic ia l
complainant other than the head of department or office
o ve r s i g h t w il l u l t i ma t e l y e r o d e t h e r u l e o f la w . As
of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs
Justi ce Brandeis opined, "supre macy of la w demands
of agencies or regional directors.
tha t th er e sha l l be a n o pp or tun i t y to hav e so me cou r t
- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate
decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and
officer or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated
impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules
was conducted regularly."
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as
- I join the majority opinion.
one of the parties, either as complainant or respondent
in an administra tive case . Lo gi call y and by necessar y
ROMERO [dissent]
implication, it cannot considered either a complaint or a
respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal
express men tion of one person , thing or con sequence
personality to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals
implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the
exonerating an employee charged in an administrative
foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil
case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the
Service Commission is not a party to an administrative
Commissions finding that the respondent employee is
proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme
guilty as charged?
Court Administrative Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or
- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807
rulings of the Commission may be brought to the
(other wise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive
S upreme Cour t, now to t he Court of Appeal s, on
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised
certiorari b y t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y. B y i n f e r e n c e , a n
Adm i ni str a tiv e C od e of 19 87 ) as we ll as th e Omn i bu s
aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I
complaint before the Commission or the respondent, the
find no legal basis to support the contention of the
person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as
majority that the Commission has that legal personality.
to who is an aggrieved party has long been settled in a
litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative

case is the government employee against whom an

administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service
Com mission i s definite l y no t a government emplo yee .
Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative
charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense,
the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative
proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is
not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No.
807 or the Civil Service Law.
- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is
n o t a p a r t y, m u c h l e s s a n a g g r i e v e d p a r t y, t h e n
i nd ub i tab l y, i t ha s no l e ga l p er so na l i ty to e le va te th e
c a s e t o t h e a p p e l l a t e a u t h o r i t y. T h e C o m m i s s i o n ,
therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant
petition.
- W h i l e a d m i t t e d l y, t h e C i v i l S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n i s
considered a nominal party when its decision is brought
before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural
formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is

AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will continue with

CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would be forced to
drop him fr rolls of personnel.
- Af te r a l m o st 5 yr s of a b se n ce w /o l e av e , D e Tor r e s
wrote that he was reporting back to duty at UPLB.
C h a n ce l l o r Vi l l a r e a l s a i d h e s h o u l d h a v e c o m e f r a n
a p p r o v e d l e a v e . AC C I D i r e c t o r s a i d D e Tor r e s w a s
co n s i d e r e d AW O L a n d a d v i s e d h i m to r e a p p l y. B u t
C h a n c e l l o r V i l l a r e a l r e v e r se d h i s s ta n d a n d s a i d D e
Torres may report bec records do not show that he had
been officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil
Service Commission.
- CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service.
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA but the
petition was dismissed.

not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based

primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it
issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily, for
purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in
the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like
a judge who should "detach him self from ca ses where
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The
raison detre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an
active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
o pp osi n g p ar tie s to co n te nd th e ir in di vi du al p osi ti on s
and for the appellate court to decide the issues without
his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a
wa y ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial
instead."
- I d i s s e n t f r o m t h e ponencias co n c l u si o n th a t th e
Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in
an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the
foregoing disquisition.

filed a petition quo warranto that questioned her

HELD
replacement to the Supreme Court that was dismissed
NO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.
without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of Appeals.
- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules
Court of Appeals ruled in Bacals favor.
sp ea ks of au to m a ti c se pa ra ti on eve n w /o p ri or n o ti ce
and hearing.
ISSUES
- Q u e z o n v. B o r r o m e o : c h i e f n u r s e o f I l i g a n C i t y
1. W ON the case should be dismissed for its failure to
H o sp i tal re que sted for t wo ex te n si on s of le ave . Bo th
exhaust administra tive remedie s throu gh an appeal to
granted. She sought third extension. It was not acted
the Office of the President
upon. It was ruled that she violated Sec 33. She was
2. WON Bacals removal amounted to a removal without
dropped.
cause (which is illegal)
- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave
3. W ON by the mere fact of being appointed would
ought to have known that he was deemed automatically
enable the individual to acquire security of tenure
separated.
4 . W ON a Career Executive Service personne l can be
- Ramo v. Elefao: Petitioner was dropped fr service for
sh if ted f ro m on e o ffi ce to a no the r wi th ou t vi ol a ti on of
her failure to return to duty after expiration of leave of
their right to security of tenure as their status and
absence.
salaries is based on their ranks and not on their jobs
- Th er e i s su ffi cie n t n o ti ce wh en Ch an ce l lo r a dvi se d
5. WON Demaisip has a security of tenure
petitioner and warned of possibility of being considered
AW OL. But in those three cases, the petitioners were
HELD
actually dropped. Here, De Torres was never actually
1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be
dropped. He remained in the rolls. His salary was even
reviewed is that of the President himself. No appeal need
increased several times during his absence.
His
be taken to the Office of the President from the decision
a p p o i n t m e n t w a s a l so r e cl a s s i f i e d . T h e s e a r e a c t s
of a department head because the latter is in theory the
inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to
alter ego of the former. In addition, exhaustion of
exercise its prerogative to dismiss petitioner.
administrative remedies does not apply when the
- Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to
question raised is purely legal.
de termine who ma y tea ch, wha t ma y be taught, how it
2. No , her appointment to the position of Chief Publ ic
shall be taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has
Atto rn e y r e qu i re s h er to b e ap po in ted to a C ES Ra nk
no author ity to dictate UP the outri gh t dismissal of its
Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an
personnel.
individual is not appropriate to the position her
appointment is deemed to be temporary and she cannot
claim security of tenure. The right to tenure is conferred
CUEVAS V BACAL
upon the individual filling the position based on the
MENDOZA; December 6, 2000
possession of required qualifications. The general rule
would be that those who were qualified would be
FACTS
appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient
- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty.
qualifications may be appointed but merely in an acting
Demaisip v Atty. Bacal
capacity.

ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001
FACTS
- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on
vacation LOA w/o pay, during which he served as official
rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural Devt for Asia and
t h e Pa ci f i c ( C I R D A P) . C IR D A P r e qu e ste d U PL B f o r
extension of LOA but was denied by Director of ACCI of
UPLB. The Director advised De Torres to report for duty.
Also. UPLB Chancellor de Guzman apprised him on rules
of Civil Service and possibility of being considered

ISSUE
WON De Torres automatic separation from civil service
was valid

- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling

o f t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s r e g a r d i n g t h e l e g a l i t y o f th e
appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal to the Office
of the Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office.
Josefina Bacal is a Career Executive Officer III which she
alleges entitled her to the position of Chief Public
Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office.
- Bacal passed the Career Executive Services
Examinations in 1989 and on 1994 was conferred CES
eligibility and was appointed as Regional Director of the
PAO. On January 5, 1995 she was appointed to the rank
of CESO III and on November 5, 1997 the Secretary of
Justice appointed her as Chief Public Attorney that was
co n f i r m e d b y P r e si d e n t R a m o s o n F e b r u a r y 5 , 1 9 9 8 ,
wherein she took her oath and assumed office.
- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief
Public Defender by Pres. Estrada while Bacal was
appointed Regional Director without her consent.
Demaisip took her oath of office on the 7 th of July. Bacal

3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the

rank and not to the position. In addition, the guaranty of
security of tenure is applicable only to those in the first
and second level in the civil service.
4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the
Inte gra ted Reor gan i za tion Plan, the Caree r Executive
Se rv ice p rov id e s tha t re assi gn me n ts o r tra n sf er s a re
allowed provided that it is made in the interest of public
service and involves no reduction in the rank or salary of
t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d th a t th i s sh o u l d n o t b e d o n e m o r e
o f t e n e r th a n t w o ye a r s . If t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e e m s i t a s
un ju stified s/he ma y appeal to the President. The rule
that an employee can claim security of tenure is
applicable only to Election Registrars, Election Officers,
also in the Commission on Elections, and Revenue
Di strict Office rs in thew Bu reau of Inte rnal Revenues.
Bacal was just CESO III therefore, she is meant to qualify
in the position where she was subsequently appointed to
which is Regional Director.
5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not
permanen t follo win g the same logic that wa s used for
Bacal, Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of
CES Rank Level I implies that her stay in the position is
temporary.

CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
FACTS
- PET IT IT ON to declare RA 8851 (R A 8551)
unconstitutional
- th e N a ti o n a l Po l i ce C o m m i ssi o n ( N A PO L C OM ) w a s
originally created under RA 6975 entitled An Act
E s t a b l i s h i n g T h e Ph i l i p p i n e N a t i o n a l P o l i ce U n d e r A
R e o r g a n i z e d D e p a r t m e n t O f T h e I n t e r i o r An d L o c a l
Government, And For other Purposes.
- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar
Torres, Rogelio Pureza, and respondents Jose Adiong and
Dula
Torres
were
appointed
as
NAPOLCOM
commissioners on Jan. 1991 for six year terms
- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the Philippine National Police
R e f o r m a n d R e o r ga n i za t i o n Ac t o f 1 9 9 8 to o k e ffe ct ,
declaring the terms of the current commissioners
expired
- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of
R A 8 5 5 1 w h i ch a m e n d s S1 3 o f R A 6 9 7 5 , a l te r i n g th e
composition of NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes
them from office and allegedly violates their security of
tenure.
- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot
be removed from office except for causes provided by
law, that is, with legal cause and not merely for reasons
deemed fit by the appointing power
- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function; Congress may abolish any office w/o
impairing the officer s right to continue in his position.
This power may be exercised for reasons such as a lack

of funds or the interests of the economy; abolition must

be made in good faith, not personal or political reasons

FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to
ISSUES
annul and set aside two decisions of the Commission
1 . W O N t h e r e w a s a b o n a f i d e reorgani za tion of
on Audit (COA)
NAPOLCOM
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was
2 . W ON the re wa s a val id ab ol i tio n of the p e ti ti on er s
a pp oi n te d a s a d i n te r i m C o m m i s s i o n e r o f t h e C i v i l
offices
Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a
ter m ex pi ri n g F eb . 2 , 19 99 . Sh e assu me d offi ce af te r
HELD
taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by
1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as
Congress.
a collegial body w/in the DILG, and under RA 8551 it
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998,
was defined as an agency attached to the Department
petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the Pres.
for policy and program coordination. This increase in
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the
the agencys autonomy does not result in the creation of
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice)
an entirely new office. S4 of RA 8551amends the
Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioner s term would
NAPOLCOMs composition by adding the PNP Chief as an
ex pi re o n Fe b . 2 , 20 00 n ot on Fe b . 2 , 1 99 9. She th u s
ex -o ffi ci o m em be r, re qu ir i n g th e me mb er s h ip o f 3
r em ai ne d i n offi ce af te r F eb . 0 2 , 19 99 , r el yi n g o n th e
civilian commissioners, a fourth commissioner from the
said advisory opinion.
law enforcement sector and at least one female
- O n F e b . 0 4 , 1 9 9 9 , C S C C h a i r m a n Al m a D e L e o n ,
commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect
requested opinion from the COA on whether petitioner
the nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and
and her co- term inous staff shou ld continue to be paid
duties of NAPOLCOM remain unchanged. Reorganization
their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their
only takes place when there is an alteration of the
appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel
existing structure of the office including lines of control
issued an opinion that the petitioner s appointment had
and authority and may involve a reduction of personnel
indeed expired.
o r ab ol i tio n of offi ce s if d on e i n goo d fa i th (e co no m i c
- CSC Residen t Audi tor issued a no tice disallo wing in
purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new
audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to
law, NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the
petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner
same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory
a p p e a l e d t o t h e C O A en banc. T h e a p p e a l w a s
and adjudicatory functions.
dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that
2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses
the issue of petitioners term of office may be addressed
le gi sla tive inten t to abolish N APOLCOM pursuan t to a
by mere reference to her appointment paper which had
bona fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents
Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that
v. Rasul, the removal of an incumbent is not justified if
the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
the functions of the old and new positions are the same,
extension of her term, not even with the implied
that is, if there is no true reorganization. The court finds
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner
that RA 8551 does not expressly abolish the petitioners
moved for reconsideration, she was again denied; hence
positions upon examination of the changes introduced
this petition.
by the new law. In the event of a reorganization done in
go o d fa i th , n o d i sm i ssa l a ct u a l l y o ccu r s b e ca u se th e
ISSUE
office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely seeks
W O N p e t i t i o n e r A t t y. G a m i n d e s t e r m o f o f f i c e , a s
to enact a change of nomenclature or attempt to
CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2,
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
2000
service personnel, then the abolition is void a b initio. In
the case at bar, no bona fide reorganization had been
HELD
mandated by congress; hence, petitioners were removed
It expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year
from office with no legal cause, making S8 of RA 8551
term) the count is:
unconstitutional, and entitling them to immediate
Feb.02,
1987---Feb.02,
1992---Feb.02,
1999--reinstatement.
Feb.02, 2006
De ci sio n -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of
Ratio T he ap pr op r ia te star ti n g po in t o f th e ter m s o f
declaring S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for violating the
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
petitioners rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are
Com mission s under the 1987 Consti tution must be on
entitled to reinstatement.
Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of
vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous
G AMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
appointment intervals.

PARDO; December 13, 2000

R e a so n i n g
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the
Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973
C o n s t i t u t i o n i n tr o d u ce d t h e f i r s t s ys t e m o f a r e gu l a r
rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII
Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the
Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935
Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment
o f th e C h a i r m a n a n d m e m b e r s of th e C o m m i ssi o n o n
Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that the operation of
the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the
terms of the first (3) Commissioners should star t on a
common date , and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of
the term.
- C o n se q u e n t l y, t h e t e r m s o f t h e f i r s t C h a i r m a n a n d
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under
the 1987 Constitution must s t a r t o n a c o m m o n d a te ,
irre spective of the varia tions in the dates of
appoin tmen ts and qualifi cations of the appointee s , in
order that the expirations of the firs terms of 7, 5 and 3
years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year
interval between the expiration of the terms.
- In the law of public officers, term of office is
distinguished from tenure of the incumbent. The term
m ea n s the ti m e du ri n g wh i ch the offi ce r m a y cla i m to
hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not
a ffecte d b y th e h ol d- ove r. The ten u re m a y be sho r ter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of
the incumbent.
- Al thou gh Ar t. XVIII Se c. 15 provides that incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall
con tinue in office for one yea r after the ratifi cation of
this Constitution, unless the y are soone r removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office or appoin ted to a ne w te rm, what it
con temp late s is tenure not te rm. The term unless
i mp or ts an ex ce p tio n to the ge ne ra l r ul e . C le a rl y, the
transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members
of the Con sti Commi ssions sha ll con tinue for 1 year
after ratification of the Consti under their existing
appointments at the discretion of the appointing power
who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons
stated therein. However, they do not affect the term of
office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational
st
interval for the 1 appointees.
D e ci si on
Ter m o f o f f i c e e x p i r e d o n F e b . 2 , 1 9 9 9 .
However, petitioner served as de facto officer in good
faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her
salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments
is reversed.

Vot i n g 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of

p r o d u c t i v i t y i n c e n t i v e b o n u s f o r c a l e n d a r ye a r 1 9 9 2
the parties, Puno, concur (In the resul t) , De Leon, Jr.,
pursuant to RA 6971, other wi se kno wn as the
Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was,
Mendoza, Joins De Leons dissent
h o w ev e r, d i sa l l o w e d b y th e C o r p o r a te Au d i t o r o n th e
ground that it was prohibited under AO 29. The
SEPARATE OPINION
disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought
o n a p p e a l t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t ( C O A ) w h i c h
denied the appeal.

DE LEON [concur and dissent]

Dissents:
-the term of peti tione r expired on Feb . 2, 2000 not on
Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed
under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2,
1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the sala ries and emolu ments whi ch peti tione r as
CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not
be disallowed by COA.

BLAQUERA V ALCALA
PURISIMA; September 11, 1998
FACTS
- G.R . No s. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are
ca ses for certiorari a n d p r o h i b i ti o n , ch a l l e n g i n g th e
constitutionality and validity of AO 29 and 268
- P e t i t i o n e r s a r e o f f i c i a l s a n d e m p l o ye e s o f s e v e r a l
government departmen ts and agen cies who were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292
o the r wi se kn o wn a s the Ad m in i stra ti ve Co de o f 1 98 7 ,
and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.
- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized
the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year
1 9 9 2 i n t h e m a x i m u m a m o u n t o f P1 ,00 0 .00 a nd
r ei te ra ti n g th e pr oh ib i ti on u nd er Se cti on 7 of AO 2 68
( i ssu e d b y Pr e si d e n t Aq u i n o ) , e n j o i n i n g sa i d gr a n ts
without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO
29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which
au thori zed payment of C Y 1992 Produ ctivity In centive
Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section
1 hereof to immediatel y cause the return/refund of the
e x ce s s . I n co m p l i a n c e t h e r e w i t h , t h e h e a d s o f th e
departments or agencies of the government concerned,
who are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction
from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts
needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
- To p r e v e n t t h e R e s p o n d e n t s f r o m m a k i n g f u r t h e r
deductions from their salaries or allowances, the
Petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
- I n G . R . N o . 119 5 9 7 , t h e f a c t s a r e d i ff e r e n t b u t t h e
petition poses a common issue with the other
consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of
Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(ADEPT), is an association of employees of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) who were granted

ISSUES
1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under
RA 6971 are applicable to ADEPT employees
2. W ON AO 29 a nd 26 8 (b ei n g Pr e si de n tia l
pronouncements) are violative of the provisions of EO
292 (being a law passed by the legislature), and hence
null and void, and WON AO 29 and 268 unlawfully usurp
the Consti tutional au thority gran ted sole l y to the Civil
Service Commission
3. W ON the forced refund of incentive pay is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation
4. WON assuming arguendo that the grant of incentives
was invalid, the same should be the personal liability of
officials directly responsible therefore in accordance with
section 9 of AO 268
HELD
1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:
1. Those
incorporated
under
the
general
corporation law. Employees of this type have
the r i gh t to b ar ga in ( col l e ctive l y) , str i ke , an d
o th e r s u ch r e m e d i e s a v a i l a b l e t o w o r ke r s o f
private corporations. Functions are mainly
proprietary.
2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original
charter), which are subject to Civil Service
La ws, h ave no ri gh t to ba r gai n ( co l le cti ve l y) .
Incorporated in pursuance of a State Policy.
- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general
corporation law, and thus performing proprietary
functions, are included under the coverage of RA 6791.
GOCCs created in pursuance of a policy of the state and
those whose officers and employees are covered by the
Civil Service are expressly excluded.
- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing
proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is
also gleanable from the other provisions of the law
making reference to remedies available only to laborers
akin to the private sector.
- Also, pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, which provides for the establishment of
D e p a r tm e n t o r Ag e n c y Em p l o ye e S u g g e s ti o n s a n d
I n c e n t i v e s Aw a r d S y s t e m s f o r G O C C s w i t h o r i g i n a l
charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is already within
the scope of an incentives award system.
2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil
Ser vi ce Co mm i ssio n h ave be en de ce n tra l i ze d to the
offices and agencies where such functions can be
effectively performed; specifically, the implementation

o f t h e E m p l o y e e S u g g e s t i o n s a n d I n c e n t i v e Aw a r d
System ahs been decentralized to the President or to the
h e a d o f e a ch d e p a r t m e n t o r a ge n c y ( a s h i s / h e r a l t e r
ego).
- T h e P r e s i d e n t i s t h e h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t . H i s /h e r
p o w e r i n cl u d e s c o n t r o l o v e r e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s .
Con trol mean s the powe r to al ter what a subordina te
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
s u b s t i t u t e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e f o r m e r f o r t h a t o f th e
latter. In issuing AO 29 limiting the amount of benefits,
enjoining heads of departments from granting benefits
wi thou t prior approval from him/her, and directin g the
refund of an y exce ss over the prescribed amoun t, the
President was just exercising his power of control over
ex ecu tiv e d ep ar tme n ts. Sp e ci fi ca ll y, se e in g tha t th e
incentives program was producing demoralization
instead of the original goal of encouragement, owing to
the fact that employees not receiving the incentives felt
s l i g h t e d a n d u n d e r a p p r e ci a te d , th e P r e s i d e n t m e r e l y
exercised his power of control by modifying the acts of
the respondents who granted incentive benefits without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President.
- Nei ther can it be said that the President encroached
upon the authori ty of the Civil Servi ce Commi ssion to
gr an t be ne fi ts to go ve rn me n t e mp lo yee s. AO 2 9 an d
268 did not revoke, but rather only regulated, the grant
and amount of incentives.
3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
b e m a d e b e t w e e n i t s so v e r e i g n a n d p r o p r i e t a r y a ct s.
The acts involved in this case are governmental.
Besides, incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which
is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting form the
performance of official duties.
D e ci si on In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268
and 29, the Court reiterates the doctrine that in
in terpre tin g sta tutes, tha t whi ch wil l avoid a findin g of
unconstitutionality is to be preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in
good faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund of
the incentives which amount the petitioners have
already received, as a corollary, further deductions from
salaries are thus enjoined.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PADILLA; May 5, 1994

- 18 Ap r il 19 94 : Pe ti ti on er L i ga N g M ga Ba ra n ga y, a n
o r ga n i za ti o n o f b a r a n g a ys , r e p r e se n t e d b y p e t i t i o n e r
Alex David (as taxpayer and as president and secretarygeneral of the organization) filed this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order.
- 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues
were filed.
- Petitioners question what they perceive as the
t h r e a te n e d i l l e g a l t r a n sf e r, d i sb u r se m e n t , a n d u se of
p ub li c fun ds in a ma nn er con tr a r y to the C on sti tu tio n
and the law relative to the conduct of the forthcoming
barangay elections. They claim that in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, only P137,878,000.00
were appropriated by the Congress for the holding of the
said elections. The petitioners claim that by early 1994,
Congress itself has made the assessment that the
money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the
e le cti on s. Pe ti ti on e r s al le ge th a t i n or de r to au gm en t
said amount, respondents have threatened and are
about to transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be
sourced from the executive and legislative branches of
government to COMELEC, which in turn will use it to fund
the ele ctions: [a ] P180M from the appropr iation of the
D I L G , [b ] P 1 6 0 M f r o m t h e C o u n t r ys i d e D e v e l o p m e n t
Fund; P70M from the Senate; P30M from the HReps; and
[c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of
Provinces, Cities and Municipalities ( Note: T h is is th e
scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case)
- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to
submit comment on the petition within the nonexistentiable period of 5 days
- 2 6 Ap r i l 1 9 9 4 : R e s p o n d e n t s t h r o u g h t h e S o l i c i t o r
General filed their comment. They claim that petitioners
acted solely on the basis of reports made in the
newspaper ( Baran ga y Po ll Funds Found article from
the M an il a Bu l le ti n) a nd d id n ot bo th e r to co nf i rm th e
veracity of article. They also claim that said reports were
mere unofficial proposal s/su gge stions made in the
process of searching for funds. COMELEC further alleges
that that it intends to fund the barangay elections from
the money allotted by Congress for the purpose and
from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The
Solicitor General supports the stand of the respondents,
a s i t is a c co r d in g t o Se c. 2 5 ( 5 ) , Ar ti cle V I of th e
Constitution and Sectoons 17 (Use of Savings) and 19
(Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the GAA for
Fiscal Year 1994.
- Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may
also be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming
barangay elections. They cite Opinion No. 51 of the
Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, which says that
under Sec. 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are
required to appropriate funds for barangay elections

FACTS
- N a t u r e Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened
illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in

ISSUE
WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the

a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law

impleaded

public

respondents

are

attempting,

or

intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be

i n d i r e c t c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f Ar t . V I S e c . 2 5 ( 5 ) o f t h e
42

Constitution

HELD
Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds
scheme that exists only in newspaper reports is not
suffi ci en t fa ctu a l ba si s to re nd er su ch sch em e b y the
COMELEC unconstitutional.
R e a so n i n g
1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was
one, existed only in newspaper reports which could have
misled the general public, including the petitioners, into
believing that the same emanated from impeccable
sources. [b] Court acknowledges petitioners have
displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions,
but they should have first obtained an official statement
or at least confirmation from respondents as to the
veracity of the report instead of relying on the
newspaper article.
2. T h e c o u r t w e n t f u r t h e r i n s a y i n g a c t u a l l y, i n
affirming the arguments of the respondents that
consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the
following may be availed by the COMELEC to defray the
cost of the forthcoming barangay elections:
[a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that
LGUs should appropriate funds for the barangay
elections. COMELEC may make arranges with local
governments to comply with this article pursuant to its
co n st i t u t i o n a l a u th o r i t y to e nf o r ce a n d a d m i n i s te r a l l
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
COMELEC may also issue an appropriate directive for the
p r o v i n c e c i t y, o r m u n i c i p a l i t y t o a d v a n c e e l e c t i o n
expenses that are chargeable to it. Since the President
exercises general supervision of all local governments,
the COMELEC may course its directives to local
governments through the Office of the President and to
be imple mented by DIL G. ( Note: This is based on the
Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of Sec. of Justice which was cited
as authority)
[b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAA for FY 1994 where it was
s ta te d th a t t h e H e a d s o f C o n s ti tu t i o n a l C o m m i s si o n s
under Article IX of the Constitutionare hereby
a u t h o r i ze d t o a u g m e n t a n y i t e m i n t h i s Ac t f o r t h e i r
respe ctive offices from savin gs in other item s of their
respective appropriations.
De ci sio n Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Vo t i n g 14 concur, no dissent.

LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PUNO; April 14, 1999
42N o l a w s h a l l b e p a s s e d a u t h o r i z i n g a n y t r a n s f e r o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ;

however, the President, the President of the Senat e, t he S peak er of t he

House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
h e a d s o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o m m i s s i o n s m a y, b y l a w, b e a u t h o r i z e d t o
augment any it em in the general appropriations law for t heir respect ive
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

FACTS
- RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated
election system
> Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in
the ARMM which includes Sulu
> Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC
Task Force in Sulu
- Sulu voting readil y peaceful except that there wa s a
problem with the automated counting of votes
> Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998)
b e twee n the el ecti on re tu r n s an d th e vo te s ca st for
mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed
when checked by Atty. Tolentino)
> The automated counting of ballots in Pata were
suspended and the problem was immediately
communicated to the COMELEC technical experts
> The problem was caused by the misalignment of the
ovals opposi te the names of candida tes in the loca l
ballots but nothing was wrong with the machines.
- Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino
participated in by military police officials and local
ca n d i d a te s . Pe ti ti o n e r L o o n g wa s a m o n g th o se w h o
attended along with private respondent Tan.
> Discussed how ballots should be counted.
> Shift to manual coun t recommended by Brig. Gen.
Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino,
gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and
congressinal candidate Tulawie
> Au to ma ted cou n t insisted by gubernatorial
candidates Loong and Jikiri. Written position papers
were required to be submitted.
> Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by
automated machines (Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul
a n d J o l o ) . B a l l o t s r e j e c t e d b e ca u se o f t h e w r o n g
sequence code.
> COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 98-1747
orderin g manual recoun t in Pa ta . By 12 midnight of
May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report to
th e C OM EL EC re om me nd i n g m an ua l r ecou n t i n th e
whole province of Sulu because it is possible that the
same problem would extend to other provinces in
Sulu.
> The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentino's
r e co m m e n d a t i o n w i t h th e fo l l o w i n g i m p l e m e n ta ti o n
procedures:
+ Counting machines from Jolo be transported to
Manila in the PICC to keep COMELEC away from
bloodshed between AFP and MNLF
+ Au t h o r i z e t h e o f f i c i a l t r a v e l o f t h e b o a r d o f
canvassers concerned for the conduct of the
automated and manual operations of the counting
of votes at PICC
+ To a u t h o r i z e t h e p r e s e n c e o f o n l y t h e d u l y
authorized representative of the political parties
concerned and the candidate watchers both
outside and inside the perimeters of the PICC
> May 15, 1998 COMELEC laid down rules for manual

count through Minute Resoln 98-1796

> May 18, 1998 Loong filed objection to Minute
Resolution 98-1796
+ Vi o l a te s p r ov i s i o n s o f R A 8 4 3 6 p r o v i d i n g f o r
au tom a ted co un ti n g of ba ll o ts in AR MM .
Automated count is mandatory and could not be
substituted by manual counting.
+ Ballots were rejected because ballots were
ta m p e r e d wi th a n d /o r t h e te x tu r e wa s d i ffe r e n t
from the official ballot
+ Counting machines designed in such a way as
only genuine official ballots could be read by the
machine
+ Other counting machines in other municipalities
were in order.
> COMELEC still began with the manual count on May
18.
> Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme
Court:
+ C OMELEC issued Minu te Reso lutions wi thou t
prior notice and hearing to him
+ Order for manual counting violated RA 8346
+ M an ua l co un ti n g gav e o pp or tun i t y to el ecti on
cheating:
< Counting by human hands of fake,
tampered and counterfeit ballots which
machines were programmed to reject
< Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC
< 22 Boa rd of Election Inspe ctors for 1,194
precincts gives sufficient time to change and
tamper ballots
< O p p o r tu n i t y to d e l a y th e p r o cl a m a ti o n of
winning candidates through dilatory moves in
p r e - p r o cl a m a ti o n co n tr o v e r s y b e ca u se th e
returns and certificates are already made by
man
> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3 rd

to the conduct of an election.

- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and
in tervenor so there are enough con sidera tion s for the
certiorari jurisdiction.
2 . No grave abuse of discrection amountin g to lack of
jurisdiction because the post election realities show that
t h e o r d e r f o r t h e m a n u a l c o u n t w a s n o t a r b i t r a r y,
capricious or whimsical.
a. There was legal basis for the manual count.
- RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the
machines rejected the local ballots in five
municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine
related by were because of the ballots.
- C on gr e ss fa il ed to p rov id e fo r re me d y wh en th e
error in counting is not machine-related. The
vacuu m i n th e l a w can no t pr ev en t the C OM EL EC
from levitating the problem. Article 9, Section 2(1)
of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power to enforce and administer all laws and
regu lations rela tive to the condu ct of an election ,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
b. There was reasonable factual basis.
- Au to m a te d m a c h i n e s f a i l e d t o r e a d th e b a l l o t s
correctly in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal,
Indanan and Talipao were rejected.
> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC
experts and found nothing wrong with the
machines but with the ballots.
> To continue with the automated count would
result in a grossly erroneous result.
- COMELEC had to act derisively in order to restore
p e a c e a n d o r d e r, e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e p a s t e l e c t i o n
tensions have been created by failures in automated
co un ti n g. M il i ta r y an d au th o ri ti e s r ecom m en de d
manual counting to preserve peace and order.

highest votes.

ordered the manual count.

- They were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of local ballots in Sulu.
> Orally heard
> Written position papers
> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots
and automated machines to Manila
> Watchers observed manual count
- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded
when they were transferred from Sulu to Manila and
when they were manually counted.
- Manual count is reliable because when the
COMELEC ordered manual count, it issued
corresponding rules and regulations to govern the
counting and the ballots were not difficult to
understand.
3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper.
- A special election only governs exceptional
circumstances. The plea can only be grounded on a
failure of election.
> A failure of election applies when on account

ISSUES
1. WON petition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to
invalidate COMELEC resolutions
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdisction in order manual count
a. Is there legal basis for manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC
ordered manual count?
3 . W on i t i s p r o p e r to ca l l f o r sp e ci a l e l e c ti o n f o r th e
position of Sulu governor assuming the manual count is
illegal and result is unreliable.
HELD
1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9,
Sec. 7 of the Constitution
- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the
C O M E L E C ' s b r o a d p o w e r i n Ar t . 9 , S e c t i o n 2 ( 1 ) t o
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative

c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC

of force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other

analogous causes, the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the dosin g of the votin g, or after the voting and
d u r i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n a n d th e t r a n sm i s si o n o f
the election returns or in the custody of canvass
thereof.
> A plea for special election must also be
addressed to the COMELEC not to the SC (Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in
relation to RA 7166).
> Grounds for failure of election involve questins
after the fact. The y can onl y be dete rmined b y
the COMELEC en banc after due notice and
hearin g to the par tie s. Loon g did not do this in
the present case. His plea for special election was
an afterthought.
- To h o l d a sp e ca l e l e ct i o n w o u l d b e
discriminatory.
> Al l e l e c te d o ff i c i a l s i n S u l u n o w d i s ch a r g i n g
functions.;
> Tan's election cannot be singled out as invalid
for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
In addition
- C O M E L E C w a s o r g a n i e d u n d e r C o m m . Ac t 6 0 7 i n
August 1940. The power to enforce election laws was
originally vested in the President and exercised through
the Dept. of Interior.
- 1 94 0 a me nd me n ts to 1 93 5 Co nsti tu ti on tr an sfo r me d
the COMELEC to a constitutional body. COMELEC was
granted power to have exclusive charge of the
enforcemen t and admini stration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections.
- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC
by making it the sole judge of all election contests
rela tin g to the ele ctions, re turns and qualifi cations of
members of the national legislature and elective
provincial and city officials. It was given judicial power
asde from the traditional administrative and executive
functions.
- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELEC by
allowing it to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
p le bi sci te s, i ni ti a tiv e, re fe re nd a an d r eca ll s. It a lso
includes contets involving elective municipal and
barangay officals.

SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran
for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner

- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null

and void the local elections due to alleged large scale
terrorism
- Ultimatel y, the COMELEC found that after the voting
was over in the local elections, terrorism and
irregularities were committed- counters were threatened
b y a r m e d go o n s a n d p o l i ce m e n i n to m a ki n g sp u r i o u s
election returns in favor of Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the
setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang
2. To certif y to the President/Prime Minister and the
Ba ta san g Pa mb an sa the f ai lu re of el ecti on , so th a t
r e m e d i a l l e g i s l a t i o n m a y b e e n a c te d , a n d p e n d i n g
such enactment, the President/PM may appoint
municipal officials in San Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC
Resolution certifying the failure of election, and praying
i n ste a d th a t C OM EL EC ca l l a sp e ci a l e l e ct i o n i n Sa n
Fernando
- COMELEC denied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC,
which were consolidated into the following issues:
ISSUES
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire
municipal election on the ground of post-election
terrorism
2 . W ON t h e C O M EL EC h a s th e a u th o r i t y to ca l l f o r a
special election
HELD
1. Bili wang asse rts tha t C OMELEC lacks the po wer to
a n n u l e l e c ti o n s o f m u n i ci p a l o ffi ci a l s b e ca u se , u n d e r
Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try
election contests relative to elective municipal officials is
vested in the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting
COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the
1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not
have this power, and that instead the power lay with the
Senate Ele cto ral Tribunal and the House Elec toral
T r i b u n a l . N o w, h o w e v e r , i t i s t h e s o l e j u d g e o f a l l
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials. The COMELEC
must be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with
i ts pl en i tu de of po wer s an d i ts fun ctio n to p ro te ct the
integrity of elections.
2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the
holding of a new or special election, because the actual
e le c ti on i ts e lf too k pl ac e , a nd i n a p ro pe r, or de rl y
fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or
special election only in a failure of election, but in this
case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine
will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election

(tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted

counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election
contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because
elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In
pr acti ca l effe ct, no el e ctio n ha s b ee n h el d ; the r e ha s
been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This
i n te r p r e ta t i o n o n l y h a m p e r s t h e e f fe c t i v e n e s s o f t h e
COM EL EC and dela ys the opportun ity to the voters to
cast their votes.
D e ci si on The SC upholds the power and prerogative of
the COMELEC to annul an election and to call for a
special election.

UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

BARREDO; April 3, 1981
FACTS
- Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org
campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to the
1973
Consti
proposed
by the
Batasang
P a m b a n s a ) , f r om t h e r e s o l u t i o n s of C O M E L E C
dated March 18 and March 22, 1981.
- 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions
providing for Rules and Regulations concerning
the plebiscite campaign:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal
opportunity on free public discussions and
debates;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time
on the use of the broadcast media (radio & TV)
<equal as to duration and qualityat the same
rates or given free of charge>; &
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal
space on the use of the print media; but
COMELEC recognizes the principle of selfregulation & shall practice only minimal
supervision.
- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re:
news that Pres. Marcos will lead the campaign for
"Yes" votes in his 2-hr nationwide "Pulong-Pulong
sa Pangulo" radio-TV program on March 12, which
will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio
stations throughout the countr y. Citing the said
COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the
same number of TV and radio stations all over the
country to campaign for 'No' votes.
- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter
to COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they will
hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda,
Quiapo, Manila, & requesting that it covered b y
radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They

expect COMELEC to direct the radio & TV facilities

to comply with their request.
- 1 8 Ma rc h 1 98 1: C O M E L E C is su ed R es ol ut io n
saying UNIDOs request "cannot be granted and is
hereby denied" & that
(1) 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political
or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of
participatory democracy where the President as
leader of the nation enunciat es cert ain
programs or policies. Its format is intended to
result in effective multi-wa y consultation
between the leader of the nation and the
people; and that
(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime
Minister, has no right to 'demand' equal
coverage by media accorded President Marcos
but is f ree t o ent er int o appropriat e cont racts
with the TV or radio stations concerned.
COMEMEC cannot direct these media to grant
free use of their facilities.
- 20 March 1981: UNIDO writes another letter as
MFR. Denied by COMELEC for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal before SC. Petitioner raises the

join in the instant petition indispensable

parties, thereby depriving the Court of
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a c t , and for these alone am ong
other reasons which there is hardly time to state
herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be
granted.
- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep
and transcendental importance and the more the
people are adequately informed about the
proposed amendments, their exact meaning,
implications and nuances, the better.
- Denial of due process is considered generally as
th e f irs t an d t he m o st v al ue d r ig ht of ev er yo ne
under the Bill of Rights. UNIDO should have made
the television and radio stations ( who will be
directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec
upon SCs orders) parties to this case. Said parties
are indispensable without which the Court cannot
proceed properly.
- In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently
they have not done so, that they have requested
any TV or radio station to give them the same
tim e and st yle of " pulong-pulong" as that which
they afforded the President. Also, there are other

following grounds:
(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are
c o n t r a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e l a w, f o r
being unjust, unf air & inequitable. They violate
the basic principles of equalit y, good faith and
f ai r p l a y, & a r e n o t c o n d u c i v e t o i n s u r e f re e ,
orderly and honest elections;
(2) UNIDOs request/demand for equal broadcast
media of its public meeting/rally at Plaza
Miranda was arbitraril y denied. The cam paign
for NO votes should be granted the same right &
equal use of facilities granted Marcos campaign
for YES.

groups and aggrupations not to speak of

individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner
who would also want to be heard.
- The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of
the Constitution is applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly
one
relative
to
constitutional
amendments. It is indispensable that they be
properly characterized to be fair submission: the
voters must of necessity have had adequate
opportunit y, in the light of conventional wisdom,
to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of
what they are voting on.
- Nothing can be of more transcendental
importance than to vote in a constitutional

ISSUE
WON COMELEC
discretion

HELD
for being be yo nd wh at t he chart e r, t he la ws
and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate,

plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it

that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations
insures that time equal as to duration and quality
is available to all contending views.
- Curtailm ent of the f reedom of speech and the
press of television and radio stations is
permissible for election purposes.

f or being more t han wh at t he opposit ion is dul y

entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or
privilege inherent in the head of state to directly
dialogue with the sovereign people when the
o cc as io n d em a nd s, f or b ei ng im pr ac t i ca l u nd er
prevailing circumstances, and f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o

- The head of state of every country in the world

must from the very nature of his position, be
accorded certain privileges not equally available
to those who are opposed to him. When the head
of state wants to communicate on matters of
public concern, no government office or entity is

acted

with

grave

abuse

of

obliged to give the opposition the same facilities.

They have to avail themselves of their own
resources.
- In instances wh ere the head of state is at the
same time the president of the political party that
is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he
speak s wit h t wo voices wh en he dialogues wi th
the governed. When the President spoke in
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he spoke as PresidentPrim e Minister and not as head of the KBL, the
political party now in power.
- Th e p et it io ne r h ad n ot ad eq ua te l y sh o wn th at
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise
and regulate the mass media with respect to the
equal opportunity provisions, but such authorit y
arises onl y when there is a showing that an y
sector or member of the media has denied to any
party or person the right to which it or he is
entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the
media.
- There are other political parties similarl y situated as
petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must
necessarily follow that such other parties should also be
g r a n t e d . T h a t w o u l d b e to o m u c h t o e x p e c t f r o m t h e
m e d i a th a t h a s a l so i t s o w n r i g h t to w h i ch i t o r h e i s
entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the
media.
D e ci si on Appeal dismissed.

CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

BIDIN; July 3, 1992
FACTS
- Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC
from proclaiming the 24 highest senatorial candidate. th
- May 5, 1992 - Cour t issued a Resolu tion of the case
" F r a n ci s c o C h a v e z v. C o m e l e c , e t a l . , " d i s q u a l i f yi n g
Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11,
1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent
motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate
to all i ts a gents and the general public the resolu tion ;
and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of
candidates, tally sheets, election returns and "to count
a ll votes cast for the dis qua lifie d Melc ho r, Cha vez
in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
- May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which
resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the
list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order
the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner
as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in
the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor
Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified

candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over

t h e r a d i o a n d T V o r d e r i n g th a t a l l C h a v e z v o te s b e
credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts
- Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its
mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states
that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the
duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the
deletion of the name of said candidate.
- C o n f u si o n a r o se a s t h e "C h av e z" vo te s w e r e e i th e r
declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election
Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not
credited in favor of petitioner.
- M a y 1 2 , 1 9 9 2 - C o m e l e c i s su e d a n o th e r R e so l u t i o n
directing all municipal and city election registrars
throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting
s u b m i t t e d b y t h e B E I s a n d to cr e d i t a l l t h e " C h a v e z "
votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by
the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.
- Pe ti ti on er m ai n tai n s tha t the sa id r e so lu ti on pr ove d
futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs
throughout the countr y on time for implementation and
that the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of
"Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated.
- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before
the respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1)
i m p l e m e n t i t s M a y 1 2 , 1 9 9 2 r e s o l u t i o n w i t h co s t s d e
offi cio; (2) to re- open the ballot boxes to scan for the
"Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his
favor ; (3) make the appropria te en tries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the
proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to
act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the
24 th hi ghe st sena torial candida te , wi thou t first
implementing Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and
acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14,
1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner
alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and
whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.
- J u n e 8 , 1 9 9 2 , S e n Ag a p i t o Aq u i n o p r a y e d f o r t h e
dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the
law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy
involving the election of members of the Senate.
ISSUE
1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD
1. Jurisdiction
- The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the
deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified
candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's
function of judicial review. T h e C o u r t c a n r e vi e w t h e
decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of
g r a ve a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n c o m m i t t e d b y i t i n t h e

discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not

j u r i sd i c t i o n t o e n te r t a i n t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n . I t i s t h e
those
arising
from
the
exercise
of
its
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction
administrative functions.
to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does,
- Comelec can administratively undo what it has
contest relating to the election of a member of the
administrativel y left undone. Comelec has ordered the
Senate. Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular
deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the
e le cti on p ro te st b efo re th e Sen a te Ele cto ra l Tri bu na l
official list of candidates, but also on the election
after the winning senatorial candidates have been
return s, tal l y shee t and cer tifi cate of canvass. Hence,
proclaimed.
petitioner's allegation that respondent Comelec failed to
- P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t a r e co u n t b e f o r e th e S e n a t e
implement the resolutions does not hold water.
Ele ct oral Tribunal wou ld f orce him t o shell out the
- Petitioner has n o c a u s e o f a c t i o n , the controversy
expenses imposes not only a property requirement for
b e i n g i n t h e n a tu r e o f a p r e - p r o c l a m a t i o n . W h i l e t h e
the enjo ymen t of the ri gh t to be voted upon but also a
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over prep r i ce o n th e r i g h t o f s u f fr a g e w h i c h w o u l d u l ti m a te l y
proclamation controversies involving local elective
stifle the sovereign will.
officials, such are not allowed in elections for President,
- The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right
Vice - Pre sid en t, Sen a tor an d M em be r of the Ho use of
for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled
Representatives.
jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the
- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in
mandator y procedures laid down by the existing law in
El e ctio n s fo r Pre si de n t, Vice - Pr e si de n t, Se na to r, an d
cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed. The
Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but
of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: " (1) Errors in
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating
the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are
to the preparation, tran smi ssion , rece ipt, cu stod y and
proper subject for election protest and not for recount or
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of
reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots
ca nv ass, as th e ca se m a y be . H o wev er, thi s do es n o t
is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers.
p r e cl u d e t h e a u th o r i t y o f th e a p p r o p r i a te ca n v a s si n g
The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The
interested person to correct manifest errors in the
scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete
xxx
xxx
xxx
ele ction return s whose authenticity is not in question ,
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or
must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of
municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
canvassin g the same and pro clama tion of the winn ing
certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of
candidates.
canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro
"The g ro und fo r recou nt re lied up on b y Sanche z is
Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of
clea rl y not among the iss ues that ma y be raised in
their respective proceedings."
p r e - p r o c l a m a t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y. H i s a l l e g a t i o n o f
W hat is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in
i n va l i d a t i o n o f " Sa n c h e z " v o t e s i n t e n d e d f o r h i m
th e ce r ti f i ca t e o f ca n v a s s o r e l e c ti o n r e tu r n s. " To b e
bear no relation
to the correctness
and
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
authenticit y of the election returns canvassed.
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted
c o r r e c te d a n d /o r o b j e c t i o n s t h e r e t o m u s t h a v e b e e n
the Co melec or the board of can vasse rs the p ow er
made before the board of canvassers and spe cifi call y
in t h e c a n va s s o f e le c t i o n re t u r n s t o l o o k b e yo n d
noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
the face the reof ,
once satisfied
of their
- The petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction
aut hent icit y (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
o f " m a n i f e s t e r r o r ' s i n t h e ce r t i f i c a te s o f ca n v a s s o r
- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in
election returns" before the Comelec but for the rethe certificates of canvass or election returns before the
opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the
Comelec which would warrant their correction.
b al lo ts co n tai ne d the re i n . H e ha s no t ev en p oi n te d to
Decision Pre mises cons ide red , the C ourt Reso lve d
a n y "m a n i f e st e r r o r " i n th e ce r t i f i ca te s of ca n v a ss o r
to D ISMISS the insta nt petition for lack of me rit.
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being
Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cru z, Paras, Feliciano,
no ne , th e pr op er r e co ur se i s to fi le a r e gu l ar el ecti on
Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Electoral Tribunal.
Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any
- T h e w o r d " s o l e " u n d e r s co r e s t h e e x c l u si v i t y o f t h e
qu e stio n p er ta i ni n g to or a ffecti n g th e pr o ce ed in gs of
Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to
t h e b o a r d of ca n v a s se r s wh i ch m a y b e r a i se d b y a n y
their respective Members is therefore the Court has no
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition

of political parties before the board or directly with the

Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transm ission, receip t, cu stod y and apprecia tion of the
election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND CAYETANO
PUNO; January 26, 2004
FACTS
- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus to compel the COMELEC to take cognizance
of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the
annulment of its result.
- In Apr il 19 88 , a p le biscite wa s h eld to ra tif y th e
c i t y h o o d o f Tag u i g ( c o n v e r t i n g Tag i u g i n t o a h i g h l y
u r b a n i ze d c i t y) . T h e P l e b i s ci t e B o a r d o f C a n v a s s e r s
( PBOC ) , wi th ou t co mp l e tin g the can va ss of six ty- f ou r
(64) other election returns, declared that the No votes
won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion
o f Tag u i g i n t o a c i t y. H o w e v e r , u p o n o r d e r o f t h e
C OM EL EC , th e PBOC re co nv en ed a nd co m pl e ted th e
canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming
that the negative votes still prevailed.
- Al l e g i n g th a t f r a u d a n d i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a t te n d e d th e
casting and counting of votes, Buac and Bautista filed
with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of
the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for
revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC
treated the petition as an election protest.
- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion to
d i s m i s s o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e C O M E L E C h a s no
jurisdiction over an action involving the condu ct of a
plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the
subject of an election protest, and such must be within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, but this was
overturned completely upon the MFR of Cayetano.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases
regarding plebiscite contests.
HELD
YES
Ratio COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite contest
contests as power to decide such cases is part of the
power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC
43

under Art. IX(C) Sec. 2(1) .

R e a so n i n g : there are 7 reasons given.
43

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and functions:
(1) E n f o r c e an d a d m i n i s t er al l l aw s a n d r e g u l at i o n s relativ e to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

1.Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting

ri gh ts as conferred b y law. Under the present case ,
there is no involvement of the violation of any legally
demandable right, for it merel y involves the
ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig.
2.Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Plebiscite
is NOT a civil action but a determination of public will.

3.

To g r a n t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o R T C w o u l d r e s u l t t o
jumbled justice. There would be confusion if plebiscite
con te st case s we re given to the RTC for what if the
plebiscite was a national one. Every RTC in the
Ph i li pp i ne s wo u ld hav e ju r i sd i cti on ov er n a ti on wid e
p le bi sci te , wh i ch r un s co n tra r y to th e pr in cip l e tha t
jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region.
4.The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only
election of officers to the courts (part of judicial
f u n c ti o n ) o r t o a d m i n i st r a t iv e t r i b u n a l s ( ex e r ci s i n g
quasi-judicial power). As such, jurisdiction over
plebiscite contests is not vested on the courts.
5.T he Constitutional mandate to COMELEC to enforce
and administer laws and regulations relative to
co n d u ct o f p l e b i sc i te s ( a m o n g o th e r s) i n cl u d e s th e
power to ascertain the true results of such plebiscite.
I t i n cl u d e s th e p o we r t o d o a l l th a t i s n e ce s sa r y to
achieve honest and credible plebiscites.
*T he provision gran tin g C OM ELEC juri sdi ction over
contests re: elected officials is not limiting in the sense
that it only limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to
su ch ca se s . T h e p o we r to a s ce r ta i n t r u e r e su l ts i s
implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite.
6.COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such
cases because of their indisputable expertise in
election and related laws.
7.MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not
th e pr escr ib ed 5 d a ys, af te r r ece ip t of th e Or de r o r
Resolution of COMELEC).
D e ci si on COMELEC directed to reinstate the petition to
annul the results and decide it without delay.

SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]
- Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to
contests involving election of regional, provincial, and
city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti
said). As such, jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC,
since no other court or agency has jurisdiction over it.
- Presen t con test i s based on allegations of fraud and
i r r e gu l a r i ti e s, wh i ch i n v o l v e s a l e ga l qu e st i o n th a t i s
determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
- There is also the involvement of a demandable ri gh t
(right to a canvass free from fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities) which arose from their right to to vote in a
plebiscite.

- Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is

involvement of a judicial controversy or a purely
administrative function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V
MINISTER OF LABOR
GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW ) is a
re gi ste red labor federation wh ile the other pe titioner s
a re i ts a ffil i a te un io ns wi th m em be r s f ro m am on g th e
employees of the following offices, schools, or
g o v e r n m e n t - o wn e d o r co n t r o l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s : P N B ,
MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The workers in the
respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the
heads of their respective offices or their representatives
in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted through a
labor federa tion and its affilia ted union s. The wor kers
a nd e mp lo yee s a re ta kin g co l le cti ve a ctio n thr ou gh a
l a b o r f e d e r a ti o n w h i ch u se s th e b a r g a i n i n g p o we r o f
organized labor to secure increased compensation for its
members.
- The petitioners contend that they should be included as
recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas bonus which states:
SECTION 1.
All emplo yer s are hereby re quired to
pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than P 1000 a
month, regardless of the nature of
th
their employment, a 13 -month pay
n o t l a te r th a n D e ce m b e r 2 4 o f e v e r y
year.
SECTION 2.
Employers
already
paying
their
th
employees a 13 -month pay or its
equivalent are not covered by this
Decree.
- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
PD 851 provides:
Section 3. Employees covered. The Decree shall apply
to all employers except to:
b) The Government and any of its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except those corporations
operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the
Government;
- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. A legislative act cannot
be amended by a rule and an administrative officer
(Minister of Labor) cannot change the law.
ISSUE
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case;

2 . W ON bran ches, agen cies, subdivisions, and

instrumentalities of the Government included among the
employers under PD 851 are required to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000
th
13 -month pay;
3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government are allowed to
collectively bargain for wages and benefits.
HELD
1. The Court does not ha ve jurisdiction over the
petition.
R e a so n i n g The petitioners are faced with a procedural
b a r r i e r. T h e p e t i t i o n i s o n e f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f , a n
a ctio n n ot em br aced wi th in th e or i gi na l ju r i sd i cti on o f
the Supreme Court. There i s no sta tu tor y or
jurisprudential basis for petitioners statement that the
SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are
concerned.
HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved.
2. G o ve r n m e n t e m p l o ye e s a re n o t e n t i t l e d t o 1 3 th-

embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B).

was dismissed from NASECO in 1983. In the same year
T hi s wa s to co r re ct th e si tua ti on wh e re m or e fav or ed
Credo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was
employees of the government could enjoy the benefits of
eventually decided by the NLRC in 1984 in her favor.
two worlds. S a l a r i e s a n d f r i n g e b e n e f i t s o f t h o s e
44
- NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC
has
e m b ra c e d b y t h e c i vi l s e r vi c e a re f ix e d b y la w. As
no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO
such petitioners have no standing to bargain collectively
claims that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a
(or to bargain at all) for wages.
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB, which in
SEPARATE OPINION
turn is a GOCC], the terms and conditions of

FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]

- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of
statutory construction that unless so specified, the
government does not fall within the terms of any
legislation or decree.
- ART. XIII Sec. 1: Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility xxx
> Under the Constitution there can be no right to
strike by them nor to take a mass leave which is a way
of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable.
- Gov er nm en t wo r ke r s can no t use the sa me we a po n s
e m p l o ye d b y w o r k e r s i n t h e p r i v a t e se c t o r t o s e cu r e
concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law).

mont h pa y as pro vid ed in PD 851.

Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall
within the terms of any legislation or decree (STATCON).
R e a so n i n g
The Republic of the Philippines, as
so v e r e i gn , ca n n o t b e co v e r e d b y a ge n e r a l te r m l i ke
MAKASIAR [dissent]
employer unless the language used in the law is clear
and specific to that effect.
- Al l th e wh e r e a se s a r e th e p r e m i se s of th e d e cr e e
In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the
requiring all emplo yers to pay all their employees
Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 that
receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a
Governmen t subd ivision s, etc. are not covered by the
month. All working masses, without exception whether
De cree. The benefi t is extended onl y to emplo yees of
private sector or public, are also suffering from ravages
private companies/ corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of
of inflation, and are entitled to properly celebrate
PD 851 bars the peti tioner s from rece ivin g the bonus,
Christmas every year.
since government offices have instituted an across the
- Both the employees of the respondents and the
board wage increase.
e mp lo yee s of th e p riv a te se ctor ar e si m il a rl y si tu a te d
3. P u b l i c o f f i c e r s a n d e m p l o y e e s m a y n o t j o i n
an d have col l e ctiv e b ar ga in i n g a gre e me n ts wi th th e ir
associations which impose the obligation to
respective employers.
engage in concerted activities in order to get
salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments
NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC
h ig h e r th a n o r d if fe re nt fro m th at p ro vid e d b y law
PADILLA; November 29, 1988
and regulation.
Reasoning
Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law government
FACTS
w o r k e r s ca n n o t u se t h e sa m e w e a p o n s e m p l o ye d b y
- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
decision of the NLRC.
their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
- Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
service under the 1987 Const does not cover employees
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between
from GOCCs organized as subsidiaries under the general
private employers and their employees rest on an
corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs
essentially voluntary basis. In government employment,
are under NLRCs jurisdiction. By further implication, the
it is the legislature and the administrative heads (when
auditing power of COA does not apply over said GOCCs.
properl y delegated the power) of government which fix
- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a
the terms and conditions of employment.
corporation that provides manpower services to PNB and
- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or
its agencies. Because of certain administrative charges
con tr ol l ed co rp or a tio n s a re sp e cif i ca l l y me n tio ne d as
against her such as discourtesy and insubordination, she

employment of its employees are governed by the Civil

Ser vi ce La w, r ul e s a nd re gu la ti on s. In su pp or t of thi s
argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation
vs. Juco [ 1 3 4 SC R A 1 7 2 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ] , wh e r e SC h e l d th a t
"employees of GOCCs are governed by the civil service
law.
ISSUE
For the purpose of de termin ing wh ethe r the ca se falls
under the NLRC or CSC, WON NASECO (without original
charter) covered b y the civil servi ce as defined in the
1987 Constitution
HELD
- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed
to be embraced by the term civil service under the
Constitution. By implication, labor disputes in said
GOCCs shall fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. By
further implication, the auditing power of COA shall not
apply to them.
R e a so n i n g
In the matter of coverage by the civil
service of GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies
from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC is based.
Under the 1973 Const, it was provided that
"[t]he civil service embra ces every
instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or
controlled corporation."
- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art.
IX-B, Sec. 2(1)]
[t]he civil service embraces all
instrumentalities of the Government,
including
government
owned
or
co n tro l le d co r po ra ti on s wi th o ri gi na l
charters."
- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973
C o n st i tu ti o n a n d t h e NHC ca se re gardin g sub sidia r y
corporations created under the Corporation Code, whose
"officials and employees would be free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and
t h e r e gu l a t i o n s o f th e C o m m i s si o n o n Au d i t, a p p e a r
rele ga ted to relative in signifi cance b y the above 1987
Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IXB, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil Service does not include GOCCs
44

BRYAN_S J: NLRC does not h ave ju risdicti on o ver th ose co vered

by the CSC. It had jurisdiction on labor issues of private
corporations or broadl y speaking, private businesses.

which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the

45

general corporation law.

- On th e p r e m i se th a t i t i s th e 1 9 8 7 C o n s ti tu t i o n th a t
governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in
p l a c e a t t h e t i m e o f [ SCs] decision thereof, the NLRC
h a s ju r i sd i ct i o n to a cco r d r e l i e f to t h e p a r ti e s. As a n
admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of
the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC without original
charter.

46

NLRC decision affirmed.

CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR
MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977
FACTS
- Jo se C r i sto b a l wa s f o r m e r l y e m p l o ye d a s a p r i v a te
secretary in the President's Private Office in Malacaan,
having been appointed to that position on Jul y 1, 1961
wi th a salar y of P4 ,188.00 per annum. On the se cond
we e k o f Jan ua r y, 1 96 2 , the th en Exe cu tiv e Se cre ta r y
Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter, informed the plaintiff that
his services as private secretary in the President's
Private Office were terminated effective January 1, 1962.
A simila r letter was addressed by Se c. Mutu c to some
other employees in the Office of the President (OP). The
dismissed employees appealed to the President by
means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26,
1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the
service. In a letter dated February 21, 1962, their
r e qu e s t f o r r e co n si d e r a ti o n w a s d e n i e d b y S e cr e ta r y
Mutuc, acting 'by authority of the President'.
- On March 24 , 1962, five of the emplo yees who we re
separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action before
the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash
Disbursing Officer of the OP praying for reinstatement
and the payment of their salaries effective as of January
1 , 1 96 2 . Fr o m a jud gm e n t d ism i ssin g the ir co mp l ai n t,
the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court
wh i ch r en de re d a d eci sio n p ro mu l ga ted o n Nov em be r
29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint and
declaring their removal from office as illegal and
con tr ar y to la w, an d o rd er in g the i r r ei n sta te me n t a nd
the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to
the date of their actual reinstatement.
- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by
Raul Ingles, et al was still pending in the CFI of Manila,
t h e d i s m i s se d e m p l o ye e s w h o f i l e d s a i d a c t i o n w e r e
recalled to their positions in the OP, without prejudice to
45

BRYAN _S J: A co rp o rati on can b e cre ated g en e ral l y in tw o w ays:

by i n c o r p o r a t i o n u n d e r t h e C o r p o r a t i o n C o d e , o r b y s p e c i a l l a w .
C o r p o r a t i o n s c r e a t e d b y s p e c i a l l aw a r e a l s o c a l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s
w ith special/original charters.
46

BRYAN _S J: Wh at th e Co u rt se ems to mean i s th at al th ou g h PN B

h a s a n o r i g i n a l c h a r t e r, a n d h e n c e c o v e r e d b y c i v i l s e r v i c e l aw ,
N AS E CO ( as P NBs sub -subsidi ar y) w as org an iz ed under th e
Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRCs jurisdiction.

the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the

person actually holding the office although illegally, and
o th er e mp lo yee s who we re n o t re in sta ted C ri sto ba l
another for one not actually rendering service although
included, efforts were exerted by Sec. Mutuc to look for
entitled to do so. The fact that the petitioner sought to
pla cements ou tside of Malacaan so tha t the y ma y be
pursue administrative
remedies
to
secure his
r ee mp lo yed . Cr i stob a l wa i ted f or Se c. M u tu c to ma ke
r e i n s t a t e m e n t d o e s n o t e x cu s e t h e f a i l u r e t o f i l e t h e
g o o d h i s a s su r a n ce t h a t h e w o u l d b e r e c a l l e d t o t h e
action within the one year period.
service, until the latter was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of
ISSUE
assistance to be reemployed at the opportune time.
WON Cristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial
- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November
relief for not having filed his complaint wi thin the one29, 1968, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the OP dated
ye ar period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the
January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former
Rules of Court
position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962
u p to th e ti me of actua l r ei n sta te me n t, su pp o se dl y in
HELD
accordance with said decision. This request was denied
N O. The Co ur t a gre e s tha t in a ctio n s of quo war r an to
repeatedly by the OP in successive letters addressed to
involving right to an office, the action must be instituted
the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970,
within the period of one year from the time the cause of
April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last
a ctio n a ro se ; Per son s cl ai m in g a ri gh t to an o ffice of
of which declared the matter 'definitely closed',
which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately
- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with
take steps to recover said office and that if they do not
the CFI of Manila a complaint against then Exec. Sec.
do so within a period of one year, they shall be
Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursing
considered as having lost their right thereto by
O f f i c e r o f t h e O P, a n d p r a y i n g f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g : 1 .
abandonment. However, this doctrine of laches (laches
Declaring his dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2.
is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify his name in the payroll
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
of the OP, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the
e x e r ci si n g d u e d i l i ge n ce , co u l d o r sh o u l d h a v e b e e n
effective da te tha t he wa s il legall y dism issed from the
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
servi ce; 3. Ordering Ar cala to pay all the emoluments
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow him to
declined to assert it) wh ich i s invoked to defeat
continue with the performance of his duties in the
Cristobal's suit, is not applicable in this case. There are
S e cr e ta r y Offi ce S ta ff , O ffi ce of th e Pr e si d e n t o f t h e
certain exceptional circumstances attending which take
Philippines.
this case out of the rule.
- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General
R e a so n i n g
alleged that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is
1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part
deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to
of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right
institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within
to reinstatement in office.
one ye ar from the da te of sepa ration pursuant to Sec.
> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising
1 6 , Ru le 66 of the R ul e s of C ou r t, h e h avi n g co me to
him of his separation from the se rvi ce, Cristobal , wi th
court only after the lapse of more than nine years,
the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration
t h e r e b y i n e ff e c t a c q u i e s ci n g to h i s s e p a r a t i o n , a n d
in a letter dated Januar y 3, 1962, calling inter alia the
therefore he is not entitled to any salary from
attention of then Sec. Mutuc that he was a civil eligible
termination of his employment.
employee with eight years of service in the government
- On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the
dismissing the complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of
Constitution. This was followed by another letter of
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an
January 26, 1962. Reconsideration having been denied, a
action a gainst a publi c office or emplo yee ma y no t be
complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI of
filed for the plaintiffs ouster from office unless the same
Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for
i s co m m e n ce d wi th i n o n e ye a r a f te r t h e ca u se of th e
reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1,
ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold much office or
1962, wherein the SC held that the removal of the
p osi ti on a ro se . Th i s pe ri od of on e ye a r i s a co nd i ti on
plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and
precedent for the existen ce of the cau se of action for
that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of
quo warranto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the
Government must be immediately informed or advised if
any person claims to be entitled to an office or position
in the civil service, as against another actually holdingi t, so tha t the Gov er nm en t ma y n o t be fa ce d wi th th e
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the

their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their

actual reinstatement.
> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case,
i t i s tr u e , b u t h i s n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s n o t f a t a l t o h i s
cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case,
Cristobal

continued

to

press

his

request

for

r ei n sta te me n t to ge the r wi th the o the r e mp lo yee s wh o

had filed the complaint and was in fact promised
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More
i m p o r t a n t l y, C r i s t o b a l c o u l d b e e x p e c t e d - w i t h o u t
necessarily spending time and money by going to court to r el i c u po n th e ou tcom e of the ca se fi le d b y hi s coemployees to protect his interests considering the
similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein
and the identifical relief being sought.
2. It was an act of the government through its
responsible officials more particularly then Sec. Mutuc
a n d h i s su c c e s so r s w h i ch co n t r i b u t e d t o t h e a l l e g e d
d el a y in th e fi li n g of Cr i sto ba l 's pr esen t co m pl a in t for
reinstatement.
> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed
employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek
reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec.
Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to
th e co n tin ua ti on of th e civ il a ctio n , h e wou l d wo r k fo r
their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed
employees were recalled to their respective positions in
the OP among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case
and several othe rs who were no t parties therein . Se c.
Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the
M a l a ca a n O ff i ce . I n t h e m e a n t i m e , h o w e v e r, S e c .
Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries to whom
Cristobal over and over again presented his request for
rein sta temen t and who gave the same assuran ce tha t
C r i s t o b a l w o u l d b e r e ca l l e d a n d r e - e m p l o ye d a t " t h e
opportune time".
> It was this continued promise of the government
officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time
and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its
commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the
decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which
h e b e l i e v e d sh o u l d b e a p p l i e d i n h i s fa v o r. Bu t w h e n
Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the
letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President
d e n yi n g h i s r e i n s t a t e m e n t a n d d e c l a r i n g t h e m a t t e r
"definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action
in court within one year from his separation, it was only
then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from
the courts.
> S u r e l y, i t w o u l d n o w b e t h e h e i g h t o f i n e q u i t y a n d
injustice, if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith
and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who
preceded the herein respondent Sec. Melchor, that the
court hold that he lost his right to seek relief because of
lapse of time.
3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to
law on the strength of the Supreme Court's decision in
Ingles vs. Mutuc.
> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal
i s s u e i n t h e c a se w a s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e e m p l o ye e s
were occupying positions primarily confidential in nature
and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power, and that this issue was to be resolved

in the affirmative. The Court held: that one ho ld in g in

the government a primarily confidential position is
"in the Civil Service" and that "officers or
emplo yees in the unclassified" as well as "those in
the classified service" are p rotecte d b y the
provision in the organic law that "no officer or
emp lo ye e in t he C ivil Se rvic e sh a ll b e re mo ve d o r
suspended except for cause as provided b y law"
(Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that while the
incumbent of a primarily confidential position
ho ld s office at the p leasu re on ly of the appo int in g
power and such pleasure turns into displeasure,
the incu mbe nt is not " remo ve d" or "dismissed "
b u t t h a t h i s t e r m m e r e l y " e x p i r e s " ; tha t there wa s
no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of
the dismissed employees were "primarily confidential" in
nature and on the contrar y the compensation attached
and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or
at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and
consequently, considering that the dismissed employees
were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years
of service in the Government, their removal from office
was "illegal and contrary to law".
> No evidence was adduced by the government to show
that Cristobal's position was "primarily confidential". On
the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc,
the compensation attached to his item and the
desi gna tion of the position indica te the purel y cleri cal
nature of his functions. In fact, none of the letters sent to
him from the OP ever indicated that he was holding his
position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that
his services were terminated because his term of office
had "expired". The only reason given - and this appears
in the letter of September 1, 1969 from the OP - was that
he failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert his
right, if any, to the position within the period of one year
from the date of termination and under settled
jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned his right
to said office or acquiesced in his removal.
> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back
salarie s, however, there i s no proof to sho w that from
January 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision,
Cristobal at no ti me wo rked or wa s emplo yed at so me
other office. The court cannot ignore the probability of
Cristobal's having sought employment elsewhere during
that period to support himself and his family.
C on sid er i n g th e la p se o f a lm o st n in e ye a r s be fo re h e
filed this suit, the resolved to grant back salaries at the
r a te l a st r e ce i v e d b y h i m o n l y f o r a p e r i o d o f f iv e ( 5 )
years without qualification and deduction.
> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate
Jose Cristobal, either in the OP or in some other
government office, to any position for which he is
qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject
to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and
to pay him back salaries for a period of 5 years at the
ra te of P4,188.00 per annum wi thou t qualifi cation and
deduction.

De ci sio n Decision set aside.

ACOLOLA V TANTUICO
SANTOS; June 27, 1978
FACTS
- N a t u r e ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus
with preliminary injunction.
- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial
Au d i to r of C a p i z o n Ap r i l 1 6 , 1 9 7 2 . S o m e t i m e b e f o r e
De cem be r 1 2, 19 72 , a n a dm in i str a tiv e co mp la i n t wa s
f i l e d a ga i n s t h i m ch a r gi n g h i m w i t h
various
irregularities in connection with the discharge of
h i s d u t i e s . The complaint was subsequently dismissed.
- On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively
c ha r ged wi t h o ff en se s r an gi n g f r om " misconduct,
neglect
of duty to i n c o m p e t e n c e
in the
p e r f o r m a n c e o f o f f i c i a l d u t i e s ," which charges were
likewise dismissed.
- On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as
Ac t i n g H i g hw a y E n g i n ee r i n g D is t r i ct Au d i t o r o f
Romblon, private respondent Ho ra c io A. M a rt in e z , a
co n tr a cto r o f P u b l i c W or ks P r o je ct i n th e p r o v i n ce o f
Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner
charging him, this time, with
(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.
(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of
accomplished work:
(3 ) Re fu sa l to a ssi gn an a ud i to r 's r ep re sen ta tiv e to
check deliveries of materials at job sites at the time of
deliveries;
(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:
(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on
inspection
of
materials
delivered
or
work
accomplished, and
(6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin
daughter's trip to the United States.
- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of
the Commi ssion on Aud it, an entrapment sche me wa s
devised and executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner
was apprehended by the PC Provincial Command in the
act of receiving from complainant Horacio A. Martinez,
the amount of P2 ,000 .00 in mar ked P20 bil ls as bribe
m o n e y, w h i l e h e w a s a b o u t t o e n t e r h i s r o o m a t t h e
Seaside Hotel.
- On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative
c h a r g e was preferred against him. At the same time the
p r e v e n t i v e s u s p e n s i o n of peti tioner wa s ordered b y
the respondent pursuant to S e c t i o n 4 1 , P r e s i d e n t i a l
D e cr e e N o . 8 0 7 . Respondent, now petitioner, answered
the charge.
- On May 12, 1977, petitioner was s u m m a r i l y
d i sm i s s e d
from
the
se rv i ce ,
pursuant
to
P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e N o . 8 0 7 , dated October 6, 1975.
P e t i t i o n e r ' s m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n p r a yi n g f o r a
formal investigation denied, appeals to Court, seeking:
(1) the review and reversal of the order of May 27, 1977

o f t h e Ac t i n g C h a i r m a n C o r m n i s s i o n o n Au d i t , ( H o n .
Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) summarily dismissing him from
the service, on the grounds that respondent acted
wi thou t or in exce ss of his jur isdi ction and wi th gr ave
abuse of discretion and the said order is violative of his
con sti tu ti on al ri gh ts; an d ( 2) hi s r ei nsta te me n t to h is
former position. Petition was given due course,
respondents required to file their comments, TRO issued.
- On M ar ch 18 , 1 97 8 , the So l i ci to r Gen er a l fo r an d i n
behalf of respondent Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed
th e re qu ir ed co m me n t a nd pr a ye d tha t th e p eti ti on b e
dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder
(should be reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978.
ISSUE
W ON the re spondent Chairman of the Com mission on
Au di t, cou ld su m ma r il y di smi ss pe ti tio ne r pu r su an t to
Presidential Decree No. 807.
HELD
Ratio Yes , t h e r e s p o n d e n t C h a i r m a n o f C O A c o u l d
summarily dismiss petitioner Pursuant to PD 807.
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specificall y
provides:
"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation
i s n ece ssa r y a nd the r e sp on de n t m a y be im m ed ia te l y
removed or dismissed if any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) W hen the charge is se rious and the eviden ce of
guilt is strong.
(b) W hen the respondent is a recid ivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining
authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
i mp ar ti a li t y to the e nd tha t no i n ju sti ce i s co mm i tte d :
Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the
President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed
to the Commission."
- P e t i t i o n e r wa s ca u gh t r e d - h a n d e d b y a ge n ts o f t h e
Philippine Constabulary in the entrapment operations,
and the evidence against him was over whelming which
warranted his summary dismissal from the service under
PD 80 7. Th e ser i ou sne ss o f th e offe nse cha r ged , the
circumstances surrounding its commission and the
evidence of gui lt, bein g overwhelm ing and indubitab l y
strong, the interest of the public service demanded the
drastic remedy of summary dismissal, which respondent
Chairman of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took
against petitioner.
D e ci si on
Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Vo t i n g
4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo,
Antonio, and Aquino
1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.

SANDIGANBAYAN
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO; January 30, 1982
FACTS
- Petitioner Rufino Nuez was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public
a n d co m m e r ci a l d o cu m e n t s co m m i t te d i n co n n i v a n ce
with his other co-accused, all public officials
- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26,
1979
- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and jurisdictional grounds
- R espo nd en t co u r t d en ie d th e m o ti on , as we ll as th e
MFR
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the SC, assailing the validity of PD 1486, as
amended by PD 1606, creating the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE
W ON P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e N o . 1 4 8 6 , a s a m e n d e d , i s
viola tive of the due process, equa l prote ction, and ex
post facto clauses of the Constitution
HELD
Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a
case calling for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1606.
Ratio
On the equal protection clause of the Constitution
- Petitioners premise is that the Sandiganbayan
proceedin gs viola tes peti tione r s righ t to equa l
protection because:
> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into
a matter of discretion
> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a
review of facts and trial evidence
> There is onl y one chan ce to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
chances
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering questions of law and of
facts, and to two appellate courts (CA and SC)
- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court
in People v. Vera
> Must be based on substantial distinction
> Must be germane to the purposes of the law
> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and
must apply equally to each member of the class
- T h e C o n st i tu ti o n sp e ci f i ca l l y m a ke s m e n ti o n o f th e
creation of a special court, in response to problem,
namely, the dishonesty in the public service.
- Petitioners, should therefore have an ticipated that a
d i ffe r e n t p r o ce d u r e th a t w o u l d b e p r e s cr i b e d f o r th a t

tribuna l wo uld not be viola tive of the equal protection

clause
- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give
wa y to spe ci fi c p rov i si on s of th e C on sti tu tio n , fo r the
promotion of the general welfare, which is the end of the
law
On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution
- Petitioners contention that the challenged Presidential
Decree is contrary to the ex post facto law is premised
on the allegation that petitioners right of appeal is
being diluted or eroded efficacy wise.
- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision,
defined an ex post facto law as one which:
> makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act
> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was
when committed
> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed
> al ters the le gal rule s on eviden ce, and au thori ze s
conviction upon less or different te stimon y than the
law required at the time of the commission of the
offense
> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty
- the lawful protection to which an accused has
become entitled is qualified, not given a broad scope
- th e m od e of pr oced u re p rov id ed f or i n th e sta tu to r y
r i gh t to a p p e a l ca n h a r d l y b e a r gu e d t o b e e m b r a ce d
therein
- the test to whether the ex post facto law is
disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in
Thompson v. Utah, is taking from an accused any right
th a t w a s r e ga r d e d , a t th e t i m e o f th e a d o p ti o n o f th e
constitution as vital f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f l i f e a n d
liberty, a n d w h i c h h e e n j o y e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
commission of the offense charged against him
- the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does
not deprive the petitioner of a right vital to the
protection of his liberty
- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge
court, where a unanimous vote is required
- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any
error of law was committed
- the SC in determin ing wh ethe r to give due course to
the petition for review must be convinced that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has been
overcome
- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of
evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied

- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that

the omission of the CA as a reviewing authority results in
the loss of vital protection of liberty.
On the due process clause of the Constitution
- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness
- In Arnault v. Pe cson , the court declared that wh at is
required for compliance with the due process mandate in
cr i m i n a l p r o ce e d i n gs i s a f a i r a n d i m p a r ti a l tr i a l a n d
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense
- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if
t h e a c c u se d i s i n f o r m e d a s t o w h y h e i s p r o ce e d e d
against and what charge he has to meet, with his
con vi ctio n b ei n g m ad e to re st o n evi de nce tha t i s no t
tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut
it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a
valid law.
- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent
ju r i sd i cti on , an d p ro cee de d a ga i n st u nd er the or de rl y
p r o c e s s o f l a w, a n d o n l y p u n i s h e d a f t e r i n q u i r y a n d
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to
be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority
of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of
law.

ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988
FACTS
GR Nos. 79690-707
- P e t i t i o n e r E n r i q u e A. Z a l d i v a r ( A n t i q u e G o v e r n o r )
sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and
hearing of Criminal cases Nos. 12159 12161 and
12163-12177
- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by
Tanodba yan without legal and consti tu tional authori ty
since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the
Ombudsman (not the present Tanodbayan) the authority
to file cases with the Sandiganbayan
GR No. 80578
- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same
grounds as first petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan
Gonzales from conducting preliminary investigations and
filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1, W ON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution,
have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan
HELD
N O . T h e i n c u m b e n t Tan o d b a y a n , u n d e r t h e 1 9 8 7
Constitution is without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan

- T h e Tan o d b a ya n , u n d e r t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n st i t u t i o n , h a s
been transformed into the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise
its powers provided by law, EXCEPT those conferred on
t h e Offi ce o f th e O m b u d sm a n cr e a te d u n d e r th e sa m
Constitution (1987).
- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombu dsma n
a s d is t in g u is h e d f ro m t h e in c u mb e n t Tan o d b a ya n
has the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
- T h e S p e c i a l P r o s e c u t o r ( R a u l G o n za l e s ) i s t h u s a
subordina te of the Tanodba yan( Ombud sman) and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter s
authority or orders.
O b i t e r Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman
in as much as he has not been replaced because he has
never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Omb ud sm an i s a n e w cre a tio n un de r Ar ti cl e XI of th e
1987 constitution different from the Office of the
Tanodbayan created under PD 1607.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992
FACTS
- Nature
S p e c i a l C i v i l Ac t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i a n d
prohibition to revie w the orders of the Commi ssion on
Human Rights
- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain
parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as
the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). The area
w a s d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r f o u r Ph a se s a n d P h a se I V w a s
bought by Filoil and was later sold to EPZA.
- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several
individuals, had entered the premises and planted
a gr i cul tu ra l p ro du cts th er e in wi tho u t p er mi ssi on f ro m
E P Z A o r F i l o i l . To c o n v i n c e t h e i n t r u d e r s t o d e p a r t
peaceful l y, EPZ A paid a P10 K- financial assi stan ce to
th o se wh o a cce p ted th e sa m e an d si gn ed qui tcl a im s.
Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, the
father of the respondent Loreto Aledia.
- Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a
joint complaint praying for justice and other reliefs and
remedies. The CHR conducted an investigation.
- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP,
bulldo zed and level the area, despite the fact tha t the
occupants presented a letter from the Office of the
President of the Phil ordering postponement of
bulldozing.
- Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
to desist from committing further acts of demolition,

terrorism and harassment until further orders from the

CHR and to appear before the Commission for a
dialogue.
- However, the same group again bulldozed the area and
allegedly handcuffed private respondent Valles, pointed
their firearms at others and fired a shot in the air.
- The CHR issued another injunction Order reiterating the
same order.
- P r o ce d u r e
1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of
injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs
and temporary restraining orders but this was denied.
2 . EPZ A f il ed a spe cia l ci vi l acti on of ce r tio ra r i a nd
prohibition with a pra yer for issuance of restra ining
order and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted by
the Court.
3. CHR filed a Motion to lift the restraining order
contending that CHR has the power not only to
investigate but also to provide for preventive
mea sures and le gal aid servi ces to the under
privileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti)
ISSUE
WON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction or restraining order against supposed violators
o f h u m a n r i gh ts , t o co m p e l th e m t o ce a se a n d d e s i s t
from continuing the acts complained of
HELD
NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminar y injunction, for it ma y onl y be issued by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending (within
his district), or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court or by the judge of the Regional Trial
Court.
R e a so n i n g
1. adherence to precedent
- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the
CH R is no t a court of justi ce nor even a quasi- ju dicial
body. Fact-finding function is different from adjudication
and cannot be likened to a judicial function.
2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning
- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the under privileged whose human rights have been
vi o l a te d o r n e e d p r o te ct i o n m a y n o t b e co n s tr u e d to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
la. It is never derived by implication.
- preventive measures and legal aid services refer ti
extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR ma y
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims.
D e ci si on The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR are ANNULLED

and SET ASIDE. TRO wh ich the Court issued is made

PERMANENT.

ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY

AND PATRIMONY
KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MORAN; November 15, 1947
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS
BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997
FACTS
- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization
program
of
the
Philippine
Government
under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC which owns the
h i sto r i c M a n i l a H o te l . In a cl o se d b i d d i n g h e l d o n 1 8
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
p e ti ti on er Ma ni la Pri n ce Ho tel Co rp or a tio n , a F il i pi no
corpo ration, wh ich offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or
1 5 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 sh a r e s a t P4 1 .5 8 p e r sh a r e , a n d R e n o n g
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its hotel
o pe ra tor, wh i ch b id fo r the sa me n um be r of sh a re s a t
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
- P e n d i n g t h e d e cl a r a t i o n o f R e n o n g B e r h a r d a s t h e
winning bidder and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated
28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
s h a r e te n d e r e d b y R e n o n g B e r h a d . In a s u b s e q u e n t
letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
m a n a ge r 's ch e c k i s su e d b y P h i l tr u s t B a n k fo r T h i r t ythree Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
C o u r t i s su e d a te m p o r a r y r e st r a i n i n g o r d e r e n jo i n i n g
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant
ca se wa s a cce p te d b y the C ou r t En Ba n c af te r i t wa s
referred to it by the First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of
t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d su b m i t s th a t t h e M a n i l a
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and

has practicall y become a historical monument which

p e ti ti o n e r sh o u l d h a v e q u e s ti o n e d i t r i gh t f r o m th e
reflects the vibrancy of Philippines heritage and
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
cu lture . To all inten ts and purpose , i t has beco me a
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of
part of the national patrimony.
the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason,
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares
the H i ghe st Bid de r can no t be a war de d the Blo ck of
of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
S h a r e s , G S IS m a y o ffe r th i s to t h e o th e r Qu a l i f i e d
business of the hotel wh ich i s owned by responden t
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
GSIS, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
a matching bid has not ye t arisen since it only takes
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
awarded the Block of Shares.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse
Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
also unquestionably part of the national economy
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was
bid offer of the Mala ysian firm. For the bidding rules
not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
m a n d a te th a t i f fo r a n y r e a so n , th e H i gh e st Bi d d e r
a posi tive duty or a vir tual refusal to perform a duty
can no t be a war de d the Blo ck of Sh a re s, GSIS ma y
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
sh o u l d f a i l a s p e t i t i o n e r h a s n o cl e a r l e ga l r i g h t to
validl y submi tted bids provided tha t these Qualified
what it demands and respondents do not have an
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
i mp er a tiv e du ty to p er fo rm the act re qu ir ed of th e m
price per share.
by petitioner.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
ISSUES
C o n st i tu ti o n i s m e r e l y a sta te m e n t o f p r i n c i p l e a n d
1. W ON Se c. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987
p ol i cy sin ce i t i s n o t a se lf - exe cu ti n g p rov i si on an d
Constitution is non-self-executing
requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said
2 . W ON the Manila Ho tel fall s under the term national
provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to
patrimony
l a y d o w n c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i ch b u s i n e s s m a y b e
3. W ON 51% of the e qui ty of MHC can be con sidered
done."
part of national patrimony
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the
Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
highest bid
which only refers to lands of the public domain,
5. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion
waters, mine rals, coa l, petroleu m and other minera l
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
HELD
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth
1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and
i n i t s te r r i t o r i a l se a , a n d e x cl u s i v e m a r i n e zo n e a s
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art.
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of the
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
or whether, they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par.,
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
of Ar t. X II i s cou che d in su ch a wa y as no t to m ake i t
o wn separa te and distin ct from the Philipp ines as a
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
State.
purposes of style. The argument of respondents that the
3 . G r a n t i n g th a t th e M a n i l a H o te l f o r m s p a r t o f th e
non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art.
national patrimony, the constitutional provision
XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not self-executing is flawed. If the first and third
n o t t h e h o te l b u i l d i n g n o r t h e l a n d u p o n w h i c h t h e
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is
bu il d in g stan d s. C er tai n l y, 5 1% of th e e qui t y of the
still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
MHC cannot be considered part of the national
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
to regulate and exercise authority over foreign

i n v e st m e n t s w i th i n i t s n a ti o n a l ju r i sd i c ti o n , a s i n th e
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same lo gi c, the
second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
no t by i ts lan gua ge re quire any legislation in order to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may
be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
a n o t h e r. S e c . 1 0 , s e c o n d p a r., Ar t . X I I o f t h e 1 9 8 7
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any
l e gi sla ti on to p u t i t i n op er ati on . It i s p er se ju d i ci a ll y
enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
pa trimon y perta ins to heritage. W hen the Constitution
spe a ks of n ati on al pa tr i mo n y, i t re fe rs no t o nl y to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
cou ld have ver y we ll used the ter m natura l resour ces,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Ho tel has become a landmark - a livin g testimon ial of
Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Veril y,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
mana gemen t of the ho tel. In this instance , 51% of the
M H C ca n n o t b e d i sa s so ci a te d f r o m t h e h o te l a n d t h e
l a n d o n w h i ch th e h o te l e d i f i ce sta n d s. R e sp o n d e n ts
further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by
itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private
a c to r a s to m a ke th e g o v e r n m e n t r e sp o n si b l e f o r h i s
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of "state action." Therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
t r a n s a c t i o n o f t h e S t a te a n d t h e r e f o r e su b j e c t to th e
constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Mala ysian
firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
b i d d e r. T h e b i d d i n g r u l e s e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e t h a t th e
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows

preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the

highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award ye t, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
kno wn to al l the bi dd er s a nd o th er in ter e sted p ar tie s.
Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for
any reason the Highest Bidder canno t be a warded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidde rs that have validl y subm itted bid s provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block
o f sh a r e s i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e f o r e i g n b i d d e r
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
hi ghe st, bid . W here a forei gn firm submi ts the hi ghest
bi d in a p ub li c b id di n g co n ce rn in g the gra n t o f r i gh ts,
privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedl y, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
forei gner s ma y be a warded the sale onl y if no Fi lipino
qu a li fi e s, o r if the qu a li fi ed Fi l ip i no f ai l s to ma tch the
highest bid tendered by the forei gn en tity. In the ca se
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
in cep ti on o f th e bi dd in g b ecau se of the con sti tu ti on al
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Only after it had matched the bid of
the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
r e sp o n d e n t G SI S o f p e ti t i o n e r 's m a t ch i n g b i d d i d th e
latter have a cause of action.
5 . YE S. Sin ce p eti ti on er ha s al re ad y ma tche d the b id
price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
bu t to a wa rd to p e ti ti on e r the b lo ck o f sha r e s of MH C
and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Vot i n g
R e g a l a d o , D a v i d e , J r., R o m e r o , K a p u n a n ,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main
opinion.

Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
- U n d e r t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n st i t u t i o n , "n a ti o n a l p a tr i m o n y"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty
God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of
land, sea, and air. The concept of national patrimony has
b e e n v i e we d a s r e f e r r i n g n o t o n l y to o u r r i ch n a tu r a l
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.
T h e M a n i l a H o te l i s v e r y m u ch a p a r t o f o u r n a ti o n a l
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional
p ro te ctio n as to who sh al l o wn i t an d b en ef i t fr om i ts
operation. This institution has played an important role
in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as
the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of
state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful,
must refer not only to things that are peripheral,
co l l a t e r a l , o r ta n ge n ti a l . I t m u st to u ch a n d a ffe ct th e
very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public
b id di n g in the acqu i si tio n of thi n gs th a t p er tai n to the
national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must
allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid
of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only
when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the nonFilipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The
Constitutional preference should give the qualified
Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid
of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
VITUG [separate]
- The provision in our fundamental law which provides
that "(i)n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is selfexecutory. The provision does not need, although it can
obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law
or a set of rules.
- The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the
country's natural resources but also to its cultural
heritage. A "historical landmark, Manila Hotel has now
indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives
its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in
MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to
the Constitutional mandate.
- On the piv o ta l i ssu e of the de gre e of "p re fe re n ce to
qualified Filipinos," the only meaningful preference
wo uld reall y be to allo w the qualified F ilipino to ma tch

the foreign bid. The magnitude of the bids is such that it

becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand
exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view,
could trigger the right of preference.

MENDOZA
j udgme nt]

[se para te

opinion

in

the

- T he on l y wa y to e nf or ce th e con sti tu tio na l m an da te

that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
c o v e r i n g t h e n a ti o n a l p a t r i m o n y th e S t a t e s h a l l g i v e
preference to qualified Fi lipino s" is to allo w pe titioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian
firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.
- We are dealing here not with common trades or
common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in
o u r m i d s t , b u t w i t h t h e s a l e o f g o v e r n m e n t p r o p e r t y,
which is like the grant of government largess or benefits.
Therefore no one should begrudge us if we give
preferential treatment to our citizens.
- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a
Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would
then do would be not to make a bid or make only a
token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has
submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that
of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules
on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is
a m i n i m u m b i d r e q u i r e d . I f t h e F i l i p i n o e n t i t y, a f t e r
passing the prequalification process, does not submit a
bid , he wi ll not be allo wed to match the highe st bid of
the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only
to those who have "validly submitted bids."

TORRES [separate]
- H i s t o r y, c u l t u r e , h e r i t a g e , a n d t r a d i t i o n a r e n o t
legislated and is the product of events, customs, usages
and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance b y the col lective mores of a race. It is the
spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our
history, culture and heritage. The Manila Hotel is witness
to historic events which shaped our history for almost 84
ye a r s . T h e h i s t o r y o f t h e M a n i l a H o te l s h o u l d n o t b e
placed in the auction block of a purely business
transaction, where profit subverts the cherished
historical values of our people.

PUNO [dissent]
- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
1. W h e t h e r S e c . 1 0 , P a r . 2 o f A r t . X I I o f t h e
Con stitu tion is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry
it into effect;

2.

A s s u m i n g S e c . 1 0 , P a r. 2 o f Ar t . X I I i s s e l f
- The third issue is whether the constitutional command
executing, whether the controlling shares of the
to the State includes the respondent GSIS. The GSIS is
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
patrimony as a nation;
corporation created by Congress and granted an original
3. W hether GSIS is included in the term "State,"
charter to serve a public purpose. As a state-owned and
hence, mandated to implement Sec. 10, Par. 2
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the
of Art. XII of the Constitution;
policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it
designed to promote the general welfare of the people.
failed to give preference to petitioner, a
One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the
qualified Filipino corporation, over and above
people elevated as a constitutional command.
R en on g Ber ha d , a fo re i gn co r po ra ti on , in th e
- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must
Hotel Corporation;
turn to the rules and regulations of respondents
5. Whether
petitioner
is
estopped
from
Committee on Privati zation and GSIS to determine the
question ing the sa le of the shares to Renon g
degree of preference that peti tioner is entitled to as a
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at the rules
st
- 1 issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the
a n d r e g u l a t i o n s w i l l s h o w t h a t t h e y a r e si l e n t o n t h e
Constitution as self executing, rather than as requiring
degree of preferen tial ri gh t to be accorded a qualified
future legisla tion for their enforcemen t. If the y are no t
Filipino bidder. However, the y cannot be read to mean
treated as self- executing, the manda te of the
that they do not grant any degree of preference to
fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
petitioner for Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is
easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Case law also
deemed part of said rules and regulations. I submit that
lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not
the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied
self-executing where it merely announces a policy and
th e bi d of Re no n g Be rh ad . In tha t in stan ce , a ll th in gs
its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder
mean s by whi ch the poli cy shall be carr ied into effect.
should be preferred. Under the rules, the right to match
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing.
the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest
By its express text, there is a categorical command for
bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason
Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in
has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad.
certain areas of investments in the country and to
It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of
encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
b i d d i n g . I t wa s d e cl a r e d a s th e h i gh e st b i d d e r b y th e
Filipino enterprises. The second and third paragraphs of
GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves
Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State
the a ward as a ma tter of right for the rules clearl y did
and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three
not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the
great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the
broader for they cover "the national economy and
rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the]
- Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
n a ti on a l ju ri sd i ctio n " a nd n ot me re l y "ce r ta i n ar ea s o f
Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules and regulations do
investments." Their language does not suggest that any
not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the
of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege
winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that
to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners
wh a tso ev er. Th ei r du t y to i mp l em en t i s un co nd i ti on al
qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot
and it is now.
be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard
- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of
them when it loses.
the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the
disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records
PANG ANIBAN [dissent]
of the Constitutional Commission show that the
Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
- The majority contends the Constitution should be
meaning.
According
to
Commissioner
Nolledo,
interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
"patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The unique
right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. No
value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his
canno t be viewed wi th a m yopic eye. The value of the
bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the
hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may
absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural
interpretation,
I
respectfully
submit,
constitutes
treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does
unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a
not exclude it from our national patrimony.

ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no

foreigner can win.
- Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such
judicial legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly,
gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It
e n c o u r a g e s o t h e r c o u n t r i e s - i n th e g u i se o f r e v e r se
comity or worse, unabashed retaliation - to discriminate
against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their
o wn na tional s to similar l y e qual and defeat the higher
b i d s o f F i l i p i n o e n te r p r i se s so l e l y, w h i l e o n th e o th e r
hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals.
- In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent
of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the
constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may
be allowed only where all the bids are equal. The
Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino
only when the scores are tied. But not when the
b al l ga me i s ov er a nd the f or ei gn er cl ea r l y po sted th e
highest score.

Consti into production-sharing agreements except smallscale mining leases and those pertaining to sand, gravel
and quarr y resour ces cover an area of 20 hectare s or
less. The latter laid down the Procedural Guidelines on
t h e Awa r d o f M i n e r a l P r o d u c t i o n S h a r i n g Ag r e e m e n t
Through Negotiation (MPSA).
- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition
- The y contend that:
o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rulemaking power under EO279
o The AOs violate the non-impa irmen t of contra ct
provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti
as

AO57 unduly pre-terminates

existing mining leases and other mining
agreements and converts it into productionsharing agreements within a year of its
effectivity and

AO82 declares that failure to

su b m i t L e t t e r o f In t e n t a n d M P S A w i t h i n 2
years of effecitivity of guidelines shall cause
the abandonment of their mining, quarry and
gravel permits
o AOs h ave the e ffect of re pe al in g o r ab ro ga tin g
existin g mining la ws wh ich are not incon si sten t
with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos merely
reiterated the acceptance and registration of
declarations of location and all other kinds of
mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and
Geo- Science s under PD 463, as amended, un til
Congress opts to modify the same
- A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the
AOs. The Continental Marble Corp. also intervened as its
DENR refused to renew its mining permit

only to carrying into effect what is provided in the

legislative enactment
o
By such regulations, the law cannot be
extended. So long as the relate solely to carrying
into effect the provision of law, they are valid
o
The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceed ing to ca rr y into effect the law as i t has
been enacted
o
I n c a se o f d i s cr e p a n c y b e t w e e n t h e
basic law and a rule issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails as rule or regulation cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law
o
Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized
the
said
official
to
promulgate
such
supplemen tar y rules and re gula tion s as ma y be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions
o f t h e l a w. M o r e s o , t h e s u b j e c t s o u g h t t o b e
governed and regulated is germane to the objects
a n d p u r p o s e s o f E O 2 7 9 , sp e ci f i c a l l y i s s u e d t o
MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE
carry out the mandate of the 1987 Consti
- PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it
PHILIPPINES V SECRETARY
pertained to the old system of exploration, development
ROMERO; January 16, 1995
a n d u t i l i za t i o n o f n a t u r a l r e so u r ce s t h r o u g h l i c e n s e ,
concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article
FACTS
XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti., except those provision in
- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII,
PD463 tha t are no t incon sisten t with the provisions of
S e c t i o n 2 o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i tu t i o n o n t h e s ys t e m o f
EO279
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
o To co n tin ue th e li cen se s, con ce ssio n s or l ea se
n a tu r a l r e s o u r c e s . U t i l i za t i o n o f i n a l i e n a b l e l a n d s o f
would be inconsistent witht raison detre of
public domain through license, concession or lease is no
EO279 and contravening the express mandate of
longer allowed in the present Consti.
the Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti.
- W ith the state in full control and supervision, the only
o T h e C o n st i o n l y o r d e r s th a t t h e St a t e h av e f u l l
options for mineral exploration development and
control and supervision of the mineral resources
u t i l i za t i o n i s o n l y t h r o u g h d i r e c t u n d e r t a k i n g o r b y
ISSUES
and the only mode for its exploration, utili zation
entering into co-production, joint venture, or production1. WON DENR Sec committed grave abuse of discretion
and development is through a direct act, or may
sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with
in promulgating AOs 57 and 82
enter into co-production, joint venture, production
foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
2. WON PD 463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows
shar ing agree ments or in to agree ment wi th
development and utilization.
l i ce n se s, co n ce ssi on s a nd l ea se s for the exp lo ra tio n ,
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
- The President may enter into agreements with foreignutilization and development of mineral resources
financial assistan ce for lar ge -scale explora tion ,
owned corporations involving either technical or financial
3. WON AO 57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate
development
and
utilization
of
minerals,
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
the non-impairment of contract
doctrine
as
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti
ge n e r a l te r m s a n d co n d i ti o n s p r o v i d e d b y l a w,
oils
4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion
based on real contributions to the economic
- In view of these provisions, the President issued
of mining leases and agreements granted after the
growth and general welfare of the country.
Exe cu ti ve Or de r No . 211 a nd N o . 27 9 . Th e for me r
e ffecti vi t y o f th e 19 87 C on sti i n to p ro du cti on sha r in g
- The AOs do no t undul y pre term inate existin g min ing
p r e s cr i b e s i n te r i m p r o ce d u r e s i n th e p r o ce ss i n g a n d
agreements
lea ses in general as it does not appl y retroa ctively to
approval
of
applications
for
the
exploration,
l i ce n se , co n ce s s i o n o f l e a s e g r a n t e d b y g o v e r n m e n t
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the
HELD
under the 1973 Consti or before the effectivi ty of the
1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DENR secretary to
- There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has
1987 Consti but to those granted after the effectivity of
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or
transcended the bounds demarcated by EO279 for the
the 1 98 7 Co nsti an d sha l l b e sub je ct to m od if i ca ti on s
production-sharing
agreements,
and
prescribed
exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave
and alterations which Congress may adopt
guidelines for these agreements and those with foreignabuse of discretion
o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly
owned corporations
o
The power of administrative officials to
modified or altered the privileges granted as well
- To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secretary
p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s i n th e
as the terms and conditions of mining leases
promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The former converts all
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited
under EO211
existing mining leases or agreements prior to the 1987

o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or

a greemen ts gran ted b y the Sta te su ch as tho se
gr an te d b y EO211, th e se a re sti l l su b je ct to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State and even the court
r eco gn i ze s th e su pe r io r i ty o f p ol i ce po wer ove r
the sanctity of the contract especially when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the
state and the means adopted are reasonably
adap ted to the acco mpli shment of that end and
are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
o The State may not be precluded by the
co n st i t u t i o n a l r e s tr i ct i o n o n n o n - i m p a i r m e n t of
con tra ct from alter ing, modifyin g and amendin g
the minin g lea ses or a greemen ts gran ted under
PD 463 or EO211
o The object of this police power is clear the
exploration, development and utilization of
mineral resources are matters vital to the public
interest and the general welfare of the people
- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the
conclusion of an authorization of automatic conversion of
mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivi ty of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO211, in to
production-sharing agreements
o T h e u se of th e te r m p r o d u c ti o n - sh a r i n g
agreement implies negotiation and cannot be
presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part
of government
o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the
par ties af ter ne gotiations are arrived at in good
faith and in accordance with procedure as laid out
in AO 82
D e ci si on AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional

REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND

DELA ROSA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
FACTS
- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon,
B e n g u e t P r o v i n c e o n F e b r u a r y 11, 1 9 6 5 o n h i s o w n
behalf and on behalf of his ch ildren. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose dela Rosa and
Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime
A l b e r t o , r e s p e c t i v e l y i n 1 9 6 4 . B a l b a l i o a n d Al b e r t o
testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription.
- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots
1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation as to portions of Lots 15 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic throu gh the
Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet
o p p o s e d o n t h e g r o u n d th a t J u n e B u g m i n e r a l c l a i m
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934
by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly who located

the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October

14, 1909. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
m i n e r a l cl a i m s l o ca te d b y H a r r i so n a n d R e yn o l d s o n
December 25, 1930 and recorded on January 2, 1931 in
the Office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The
locations of the mineral claims were made in accordance
with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the
land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935
and 1973.
ISSUE
W ON t h e B e n g u e t a n d At o k M i n i n g C o m p a n i e s h a v e
exclusive rights to the property in question.
HELD
YES. Though the property was considered forest land
and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve,
this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
a n d At o k a t t h a t t i m e . T h e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e m i n i n g
claim converted the property into mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain . By su ch act, the loca tor s acquired exclu sive
rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land
be ca m e the p ri va te pr op er t y o f th e lo ca to r s, th e y h ad
the right to transfer the same , as the y did , to Benguet
and Atok.
- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous,
adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the
a p p l i ca n t s t o su p p o r t th e i r cl a i m o f o wn e r sh i p . T h e y
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its
registration in 1965.
- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private
persons. The rule reserves to the State all minerals that
may be found in public and even private land. Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral
is discovered, his ownership of such land does not give
him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property
in question by vir tue of their respective minin g claim s
wh ich the y validl y acquired before the Consti tution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was
not and could not have been transferred to the private
r espo nd en ts b y vir tue of acqu i si tive p re scri p tio n , n or
cou ld its use cou ld be shared simu ltaneou sl y by the m
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.

Vo t i n g Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and GrioAquino, concur.

ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF

APPEALS
PARAS; January 18, 1991
FACTS
- Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by
A . I . R e yn o l d s i n 1 9 3 0 . T h e m i n e r a l cl a i m w a s d u l y
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931,
the mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner.
Since then petitioner has been in continuous and
exclusive ownership and possession of said claim.
- In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house
in the land where the claim was located. It was only in
1984 when he wa s told tha t sa id lot belonged to Atok.
Respondent contends that he had been paying taxes on
sa i d l a n d w h i c h h i s f a th e r h a d o c cu p i e d b e f o r e h i m .
A t o k f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t f o r f o r c i b l e e n t r y. T h e M T C
dismissed the case. The RTC decided in favor of Atok.
Up on a pp ea l b y Co nsi , th e C A di sm i sse d the f or cib le
entry action ruling that both Consi and Atok are holders
of possessory titles, the former through long term
occupancy, and the latter by virtue of its being the claim
locator.
ISSUE
WON an individuals long term occupation of land of the
public domain vests him with such rights over the same
as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim
HELD
NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land and under the laws then in
f or ce r em ov ed i t f ro m th e p ub li c d om ai n . As the l an d
had become private property of the locators (A.I.) they
had the right to sell it to Atok. W h e r e t h e r e i s a v a l i d
location of mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public and the property of
t h e l o c a t o r . (Note however that the sale in the case
took place in 1931) Atok then have exclusive rights to
th e p r o p e r t y i n qu e st i o n b y v i r tu e o f th e i r r e sp e ct iv e
m i n i n g c l a i m s wh i ch th e y va l i d l y a cq u i r e d b ef o r e t h e
1935 Constitution prohibited alienation of all lands of the
public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
- Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His
possession was not in the concept of owner of the
m i n i n g cl a i m b u t o f th e p r o p e r t y a s a g r i cu l tu r a l l a n d .
Since the subject lot is a mineral land, private
respondents possession did not confer upon him
possessory rights,

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI

INVESTMENTS

MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989

FACTS
- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved
for an advanced hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca
Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahis title was
to be registered under the provisions of Act 496.
- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of
mountain ranges covering an area no less than
886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the alleged
123 mineral claims of Kalahi. It was also found out that
the said lot was labeled as timber land under RA 3092. in
the land classification of the province of Pampanga and
Zambales, these lands were also considered part of the
Project No. 11, Timber Land.
- The Bureau of Forestrys opposition on the registration
of the lo t is based on the ground tha t the se lands are
part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER LAND.
These lots are not yet released as alienable agricultural
land s and were even declared by the President of the
Philippines under Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt.
Dorst Forest Reserve.
- Kalahi thus abandoned i ts former claim over Lot No .
1851-B. it limited its claim to two land which when
co mbined, cover an area of 1,730 hectare s. This land
contained the 123 mining claims of Kalahi and where the
alleged 500,000 coffee plants were planted. Kalahi
claimed and presen ted evidence tha t i t had loca ted in
1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in
F l o r i d a b l a n ca M o u n ta i n s; m a d e a n n u a l a sse ss m e n t s
w o r k t h e r e t o ; m a d e d e cl a r a t i o n o f l o ca t i o n a n d p a i d
annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed
r oa ds tra ve rsin g the mo un tai n s a nd hi l l s an d pl an ted
500,00 coffee trees. These however were not considered
by the court as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the
registration of title under act 496.
- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were
now segregated from government lands and its mining
claims thereon deemed property rights. These were
based on an opinion of the Secre tar y of Ju stice dated
August 31, 1956 which stated that the legal effect of a
valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate
the area from the public domain, but to grant the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
p a te n t the re fo re up on co m pl i an ce wi th th e ter m s a nd
cond itions prescribed by law the area is segregated
and becomes the property of the locator.
- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine
Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a
r i gh t o r ri gh ts acqu ir ed b y a h ol de r of un pa ten ted bu t
valid and existing claim located and registered under its
p r o v i si o n s b e co m e s th e p r o p e r t y o f t h e l o ca to r th e
right of the locator to enjoy the surface ground and the
minerals within the limits of his claim becomes exclusive
as against the whole world, limited only by extralateral
rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to
purchase the claim or secure a patent and as long as he

could comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights

of ownership are as good as though secured by patent.
- It also claims registration of title based on its actual,
open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession
i n the con cep t of an o wne r fo r mo re th an 30 ye ar s or
confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141
as amended by RA No. 1942.
- In i ts d eci sio n , th e co u r t a quo de ni ed the cl a im for
r e g i s t r a t i o n r u l i n g t h a t a ) t h e 1 2 3 m i n i n g cl a i m s a r e
governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Mines which is the proper agency to
e nf or ce th e cla i m s an d to ad jud i ca te th e r i gh ts of the
claimants, which in fact Kalahi recognized when it filed
an application for lease with said Bureau, and b) that the
c l a i m f o r co n f i r m a ti o n of i m p e r f e ct ti tl e b a se d o n t h e
evidence of Public Land Law provisions:
- T he la nd s i n the p ub li c do ma in a re cl a ssi fi ed un de r
three main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural
land s in the publi c domain that ti tle cou ld be issued
the Public Law never governs private lands.
- The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands
nor to mineral lands. The confirmation of imperfect land
title can not be basis for registration of titles over forest
and/or mineral lands.
- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following:
1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for
th e re gi str a tio n of la nd i n que sti on su ffi cie n t i n la w
and in fact.
2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine
of the Supreme Court and the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice never contemplate of a procedure that will
entitle the claimants to the registration of the lands in
question.
3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for
registration of the claimants title over the land in
question at last a portion thereof covered by the
mining claims and their gaps.
- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended:
Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining
property consisting of mining claims located and
r e g i s te r e d u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Ac t o f t h e U S
Congress of July 1, 1902. and as such, said Act requires
K a l a h i a s h o l d e r o f m i n i n g c l a i m s t o d o n o o th e r a c t
except to proceed with the acquisition of mining patent
in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an explicit
and definite procedure b y wh ich min ing paten ts are to
be secured administratively
- CA thus certified the following questions (issues) for SC
resolution:
ISSUES
1 . W ON mi n in g cla i m s acqu i re d , r e gi ster ed p er fe cted
a n d p a te n ta b l e u n d e r t h e Ol d M i n i n g L a w m a tu r e d to
p ri va te o wn e r sh ip wou l d en ti tle cl a im an t- a pp el la n t to
the ownership thereof
2. who has the authority to examine process and find out
W ON the requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902

have been complied by applicant- the Court or the

Bureau of Mines
HELD
1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v
H on M in i ster of Na tur a l Re sou r ce s Jo se Le id o jr. a nd
Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that
while it recognized that the right of a locator of a mining
claim is a property right, th is rig ht is not abs olute. It
is merely a possessory right more so when
p e t i t i o n e r s c l a i m s a r e s t i l l u n p a t e n t e d . Mere
l o ca ti o n d o e s n o t m e a n a b so l u te o wn e r sh i p o v e r th e
located claim. It merely segregates the located land or
area from the public domain by barring other would-be
loca tors from locating the same and appropriating for
themselves the minerals found therein the intention of
th e la wm a ker i s th a t the lo ca to r sho ul d fa i th fu l l y an d
co n si ste n tl y com p l y wi th th e re qu ir e me n ts fo r an nu al
wo rk and improvemen ts in the loca ted min ing clai ms.
T h i s ca se m o d i f i e s th e Sa n M a u r i ci o d o c tr i n e i n th a t
w h i l e a p e r f e c t e d l o ca t i o n o f a m i n i n g c l a i m h a s t h e
effect of segregating said land from the body of public
domain, the area covered does not thereby become the
private property of the locator.
- C o n cu r r i n g o p i n i o n o f Ju s ti ce L a u r e l i n Go l d C r e e k
Mining Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadilla: my opinion is
that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures
t h e b e n e f i c i a l o w n e r s h i p o r t h e d o m i n u m u ti l e , t h e
government retains the bare ownership or the
dominium directum, until the locator s claim ripens into
full ownership upon full compliance with all requirements
of the law for the issuance of a patent.
- Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold
Creek Min ing Corp. case : To give a broader meanin g
a n d g i v e a g r e a t e r e f fe c t t o t h e l o ca t i o n o f a m i n i n g
claim is to contend that location is all that is necessary
to a c qu i r e a b so l u te o wn e r sh i p o v e r a l o ca te d m i n i n g
claim. This is not the law. Location without more,confers
only the right of possession I maintain that in
prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any
existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right
of loca tion or the inherent right of possession, or any
i n ch o a te o r co n t i n g e n t r i g h t wh i ch a r e o n l y m e a n s to
brin g abou t another right; i t refers onl y to the right to
obtain a patent.
- It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the
requirements of Act of Congress of 1902. this is a factual
issue which is beyond the issue of the Court.
Nonetheless, even assuming claimant to be a holder of a
subsisting and valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold
that it can no lon ger pro ceed wi th the acqu isi tion of a
mining patent in view of PD No. 1214 issued in October
14, 1977, directing holders of subsisting an valid
patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
t h e Ac t o f C o n g r e s s o f 1 9 0 2 t o f i l e a m i n i n g l e a s e
application within one year of the approval of the
Decree non-filing of the application within the period

prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his rights to

the claim.
- Records show that claimant has already filed a mining
lease application.
2 . Hav in g fi le d a m in i n g l ea se ap pl i ca ti on , i ts m in in g
claims therefore, are deemed covered by PD 1214 and
the Bureau of Mines may accordingly process the same
as a lease application, in accordance with PD 463,
pursuant to PD 1214. As to whether or not the Bureau of
Mines is qualified to rule on whether there has been full
and faithful compl iance with the requ iremen ts of
Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that the Bureau is
empowered as a corollary function in the processing of
mining lease applications.
D e ci si on
The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is
affirmed, with the modification that Kalahis mining
claims may be processed as a mining lease application
by the Bureau of Mines.

TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

MAKASIAR; October 27,1983
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat.
Resources (DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director of Bureau of
Forestry (BOF) Apolonio Rivera
- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao
Happick, Atanacio Mallari
- Apr i l 19 61 the Bu re au of Fo re str y i ssue d a no ti ce
advertising for public bidding a tract of public forest land
(6,420 hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It was located
within the former US Naval Reservation.
- May 5, 1962 petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his
application plus nine other applicants
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having
the are declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to
be awarded to the most qualified bidder
- June 7, 1961 then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a
directive to the Dir. Of Bureau of Forestry to prepare a
d ra ft pr ocl ai m in g the sa id la nd a s a wa ter she d fo re st
rese rve for Olon gapo and to reject the bids the y have
received
Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the
recommendations of the director of BOF who concluded
that it would be beneficial to the publi c intere st of the
are is made available for exploitation. The Director said
t h a t to th e d e cl a r e th e fo r e st a r e a s a fo r e s t r e se r v e
rather than to open it for timber exploitation under
license and regulation would do more harm than good to
th e pu bl i c i n te re st si n ce i t mi gh t ju st be co me a F re e
Zone and Logging Paradise to the problem loggers of
Dinalupihan, Bataan an open target for timber
smugglers and kaingineros; also, rejecting the received
bids would cause the department huge embarrassment

- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the

BOF against the other bidders, Rovago Commercial
Company and Jorge :Lao Happick
- May 30, 1963 D ANR Sec. Gozon (who succeeded
th e n Sec . Fo rt ic h) issued a memorandum authorizing
the grant of ne w ordina r y timber li cense for area s not
m o r e t h a n 3 ,0 0 0 h e c ta r e s e a ch a n d th e ex te n si o n o f
ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5000
hectares
- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec.
Jose Feliciano , w h o u p o n a s s u m p t i o n o f o f f i c e h e
revoked the memorandum.
- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was
signed by acting Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal,
without the approval of the Secretary of DANR
- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick
then wrote a letter to the Sec. of DANR praying that the
license issued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it
was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing
forestry laws, rules and regulations
- The license was declared void ab initio
- P e t i t i o n e r Tan c l a i m s t h a t r e sp o n d e n t s u n l a wf u l l y,
illegally, whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted
w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse
o f d i s cr e t i o n b y r e v o k i n g a v a l i d a n d e x i s t i n g t i m b e r
license without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of
the equal protection of the laws and by depriving him of
his con stitutional ri ght to proper ty w/o due proce ss of
law by impairing the obligation of contracts
- His petition was dismissed because it did not
state a sufficient cause of action
ISSUE
W ON t h e f a c t s i n t h e p e t i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t
cause of action
HELD
cause of action 3 essential elements
1. legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendants
3. t h e a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i n
violation of that right
NO.
- the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the
timber license relied upon by the petitioner was void ab
initio
- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been
declared a forest reserve on April 39, 1964
- what is important for the validity of a timber license is
the date of release of the license and n the sate of
signing. Before the release, not tight is acquired by the
licensee. Tans license was signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was
re le a se d Ja n . 6 , 1 96 4 b y Jan ua r y 6 , the Di re cto r of
Forestry no longer had any authority to release the
license

- the peti tioner had no t acquired any legal ri ght under

such void license
- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative
r em ed ie s. H e sh ou ld hav e a pp ea le d the o rd er o f th e
DANR Secretary to the President, who has the power to
review on appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary
where admin istra tive appeal is available, special civil
action of certiorari cannot be availed
- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his
administrative remedies, he also failed to note that his
action is a suit against the state which under the
doctrine of immuni ty from suit, cannot prosper unless
the state gives it consent to be dued
- N e x t , g r a n t i n g t h a t t h e l i c e n s e g r a n t e d to h i m w a s
valid, still the respondents can validly revoke this license

REPUBLIC V QUASHA
REYES; August 17, 1972
FACTS
- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope
and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens
an d co rp or a tio n s con tr ol l ed b y the m u nd er the Par i ty
Am en d me n t a pp en de d to th e Co n sti tu ti on as o f Se p t.
18, 1946
- William Quasha is an American citizen who
pu rcha sed a l an d in F or be s Par k o n Nov.26 ,19 54 . He
filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the
acqu i si tio n of the sa id la nd ; th a t the R P cl ai m ed th a t
upon expiration of the Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3,
1974, rights acquired by US citizens shall cease; that this
claim affects his right and interest and that the
uncertainty as to the status of his property after the PA
e nd s r ed uce s the p ro pe r tys val ue an d pr ecl ud e s hi m
f r o m h a v i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s m a d e o n i t ; a n d s o he
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e o w n e rs h ip o f p r o p e r t ie s d u r in g
the effectivit y of the PA continues despite its
terminat ion
- Sol.Gen. An tonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha
i s p r i v a te a gr i . l a n d a n d t h a t th e a c qu i si ti o n v i o l a te d
Sec .5 Ar t . XII I of the Constitution which prohibits the
t r a n s f e r o f p r i v a t e a g r i cu l t u r a l l a n d t o n o n - F i l i p i n o s
except by hereditary succession ; and assuming validity
of acqu i si tio n , h i s ri gh ts acqu i re d thr ou gh th e PA wi l l
expire on July 3, 1974
- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that
acquisition was valid and he has a right to continue in
ownership of property even beyond July 1974.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. W ON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine
Constitution Quasha could validly acquire ownership of
the private residential land which is concededly
classified private agricultural land

2 . On t h e a ssu m p t i o n th a t Qu a sh a s p u r ch a se o f th e
private agricultural land is valid and constitutional, WON
his rights will expire on July 3, 1974

> Th e can t co mp l ai n of d ep ri va tio n of du e pr oce ss

the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
becau se PA is part of Consti, the hi ghe st law of the
Executive Agreement entered into...on July 4, 1946...but
land
in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974, the
> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its
disposition,
exploitation,
de ve lo pment ,
or
HELD
alienab le public agri cul tural lands be yond that date
ut il izat io n ...b e o p en to c it izen s o f th e U S and to all
1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right
under PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified
forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
to validly acquire ownership of private agricultural land
b y PA, o n l y a u t h o r i z e s e i t h e r o f t w o t h i n g s : a )
directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same manner
in the Philippines.
alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or
a s to , a n d u n d e r th e sa m e co n d i ti o n s i m p o se d u p o n ,
-examination of the PA reveals that it only establishes
b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not
citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations
an express exception to 2 provisionsSection 1 Article
later than the specified period.
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
XIII (disposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and
D i scu ssi on
L a u r el L a n g l e y A g r e e m e n t (revision of PA enacted
Section 8 Article XIV (operation of public utilities)
Historical Background
in June 1955): establishes some sort of reciprocity rights
> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 &
Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural
between US and Phils.
5 of Art.XIII
Resources
- - n o d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e c a s e a t b a r, s i n c e t h e
-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US
Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
p u r ch a se b y Q u a sh a o f th e p r o p e r t y i n qu e st i o n w a s
ci ti zen s/en ti ti e s to a cqui re a gr i cul tu ra l l an d s of the
public domain ...be long to the Sta te , and thei r
made in 1954, prior to the effectivity of this agreement
p u b l i c d o m a i n , th e n su c h c i t i ze n s /e n t i t i e s b e ca m e
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corps. At
LAUREL V GARCIA
Phils., even without hereditary succession
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
> this argument does not rest upon the text of
citizens...
GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990
t he PA b ut up o n a me re in f e re n ce ; if it w as e ve r
Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or
intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it
hold public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
FACTS
would ha ve bee mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8
hectares...
- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of
w e re men t io n ed
Sec.5
Sa ve in ca se s of he re di tar y su cce ssi on , no
the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
- w h e t h e r f r o m t h e P h i l . O r t h e Am e r i c a n s i d e , t h e
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
intention was to secure parity for US citizens
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
e n te re d in to wi th Ja pa n in 1 95 6 , the o the r l o ts be in g:
only
in:
1)exploitation ,
de ve lo pment
and
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
Nampeidai Proper ty , Kobe Commer cial Proper ty, and
utilization of public lands and other natural
the Philippines.
Kobe Residential Property. The properties are part of the
resources, and 2) the operation of public
Article XIV General Provisions
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in
utilities
Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility
life and property and their suffering during World War II.
-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
was adopted in 1935, US citizens were already
to corpora tion s organ i zed under the laws of the
valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20)
qualified to acquire public agri land, so even without
P h i l i p p i n e s , 6 0 % of th e ca p i t a l o f wh i ch i s o w n e d b y
years in accordance with annual schedules of
hereditary succession transfer of private agri lands to
citizens of the Philippines...
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
Americans is permitted
nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions
governments. Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law,
> such capacity could exist only during the
1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and
prescribes the national policy on procurement and
A m e r i c a n s o ve r e i g n t y o v e r t h e I s l a n d s ( b e f o r e
Insular Affairs: when the Philippines do become
utilization of reparations and development loans. The
the RP is established)
i n d e p e n d e n t n e x t J u l y, t h e y w i l l s t a r t o n t h e r o a d t o
Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
2 . His r igh ts will ex pire . All the excep tio na l r igh ts
i nd ep en de n ce wi th a co un tr y wh o se co m me r ce , tra de
government under the Second Year Schedule.
conferred upon US citizens and business entities owned
and political institutions have been very damaged;
- On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee
or controlled by them, under the Parity Amendment, are
internal revenue have been greatly diminished by war.
to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
to last durin g the effectivity of the agreement entered
in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
into on July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July
the President of the US to enter into an Exec. Agreement
- On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No.
3, 1974.
with the President of the Philippines, which should
296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
- t e x t o f PA: i n n o c a s e t o e x t e n d b e y o n d J u l y 3 ,
contain a provision thatthe disposition, exploitation,
reparations' capital goods and services in the event of
1 97 4 in con fo r mi t y wi th Ar ti cle X , Se cti on 2 th i s
development, or utili zation...be open to citizens of the
sale, lease or disposition.
agreement shall have no effect after Jul y 3, 1974. It
US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has
may be terminated be either the US or the Phils at any
controlled , dire ctl y or indire ctl y, b y US citi zen s.; and
been pushing its decision to sell the reparations
time...
that the govt of the Phil . W ill take such step s as are
p r o p e r ti e s st a r t i n g w i t h th e R o p p o n g i l o t . P e t i t i o n e r s
-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not
necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution
have filed two petitions to stop the sale of the Roppongi
be applicable because under Art.428 of the Civil Code,
so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of
property.
the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
such part of the provisions
thing, without other limitations than those established
Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President
ISSUES
by law
of the Phils. To enter into the Executive Agreement
1. WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can
> this limi tation alread y existed when he purcha sed
proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite
be alienated by the Philippine Government
the land
and was ratified in Nov. 1946
2 . W ON Exe cutive Order No . 296, whi ch entitles non P a r i t y A m e n d m e n t : Notwithstanding the provision
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital
of section 1, Art icle 13, and section 8, Article 14 , of

g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s , i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . W ON E O 2 9 6
violate the following constitutional provisions:
a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the
national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987
Constitution
b . r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e o w n e r sh i p a n d a c q u i si t i o n o f
alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens
c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant
o f r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s a n d c o n c e s s i o n s co v e r i n g t h e
national economy and patrimony
d. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises
against unfair competition and trade practices
e. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to
information on all matters of public concern
f. W ON there is declaration of the state policy of full
publi c disclo sure of all tran saction s involvin g publi c
interest
HELD
1 . NO, the Roponggi proper ty is public domain. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.
2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions unless these questions are properly raised in
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for
the determination of the case. The Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a
statute or general law.
D e ci si on Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is
issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with
the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.

RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ

ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982
FACTS
- APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
- widow
- French who lives in Paris
- received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over
1/3 of the free portion
R o b e r to a n d Jo r ge R a m i r e z
- two grandnephews
- lives in Malate
- received the (free portion)
W an d a d e W r o b l e s k i
- companion
- Austrian who lives in Spain
- received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion

- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski

and Horacio Ramirez
- Maria Luisa Palacios - administratix
- Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID
because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because
first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien,
Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the
Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants
violates testators express will to give this property to
them
- LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is
47

the widow and over which he could impose no burden,

encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
48

whatsoever
- the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of
the testator s wido w of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free
portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it
will run counter to the testators express will. The Court
erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate en
pleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than
what she is given under the will is not entitled to have
a n y a d d i ti o n a l sh a r e i n th e e sta te . To gi v e M a r ce l l e
more than her legitime will run counter to the testator s
intention for as stated above his disposition even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before
the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC,
cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept
inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideico mmi ssar y substi tu tion s are VOID becau se
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related
to W ande an d accor d in g to Ar t 86 3 CC , i t val id a te s a
f id ei com m i ssa r y su b sti tu ti on p rov id ed tha t su ch
substitution d o e s n o t g o b e y o n d o n e d e g r e e from the
47

Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall
be entitled to of the hereditary estate
48

Art 904 (2) CC

h e i r o r i g i n a l l y i n st i tu te d . An o th e r i s t h a t th e r e i s n o
a b so lu te d u t y im p o se d o n W an d a to t r a n sm it th e
usufru ctua r y to the sub stitute s and in fact the apellee
agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of
the f id ei com m i ssa r y sub sti tu tio n wh en he pe rm i ts th e
properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual
agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
49

- Art XIII
Se c 5 (1935): Save in ca ses of heredi tar y
succession, no private agricultural land shall be
t r a n sf e r r e d o r a s si gn e d ex ce p t to i n d i v i d u a l s ,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
50

land of the public domain in the Philippines.

T h e l o w e r co u r t u p h e l d th e u su f r u c t t h i n k i n g th a t th e
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of
law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the
opinion tha t thi s provision does not appl y to
te sta mentar y su cce ssion for o ther wi se the prohibition
wi l l b e f or na u gh t an d me an in gl e ss. An y a li en wou l d
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY
RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore , the usufru ct in favor of Wanda, althou gh a
real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of
title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
De ci sio n : Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution
in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez

CRUZ V NCIP
PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND
IMPERIUM)
LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V
WESTERN MINING CORPORATION
PHILIPPINES
CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus
and Prohibition.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise
known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along
49

Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources

50 Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

[removed agricultural] l a n d s s h a l l b e t r a n s f e r r e d o r c o n v e y e d [ 1 9 3 5 :
assigned] except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines].

w i th t h e Im p l e m e n t i n g R u l e s a n d R e gu l a t i o n s i ssu e d
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40,
and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic
of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation
(Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws.
- July 25, 1987 President Aquino issued EO 279
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving
ei ther te chni cal or financia l assistance for lar ge- sca le
ex pl or a tio n , d evel op me n t, an d u ti li za tio n of m in er a l s,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the
Secre tar y, the Presiden t ma y execu te wi th the foreign
proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President
sh a l l co n si d e r th e r e a l co n t r i b u ti o n s to t h e e co n o m i c
gro wth and gene ral welfare of the coun tr y tha t wil l be
reali zed, as well as the development and use of lo cal
scientific and technical resources that will be promoted
by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress
shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for
purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for
con tra cts or a greemen ts for minera l re source s
e x p l o r a t i o n , d ev e l o p m e n t , a n d u ti l i za t i o n i n v o l v i n g a
co mm i tte d ca p i ta l i n a si n gl e mi n in g un i t p ro je ct o f a t
least Fifty Million Dollars in United States currency (US
$50,000,000.00).
- M ar ch 3 , 19 95 Pre sid en t Ra mo s ap pr ove d 7 94 2 to
g o v e r n t h e e x p l o r a t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t , u t i l i za t i o n a n d
p ro ce ssi n g o f a ll mi ne ra l r e so ur ce s. R A 7 94 2 d ef in es
m o d e s o f m i n e r a l a g r e e m e n t s f o r m i n i n g o p e r a ti o n s,
outlines the procedure for filing and approval,
a s s i g n m e n t / t r a n sf e r, a n d w i t h d r a w a l , a n d f i x e s th e i r
terms. These also apply to FTAAs.
- The law also prescribes the contractors qualifications,
grants ce rta in rights su ch as timber, wa ter, easemen t
rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or
occupants are forbidden from preventing holders of
mining rights from entering private lands and concession
a r e a s . A p r o ce d u r e fo r se tt l e m e n t o f co n f l i ct s i s a l so
provided for.
- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and
other permits. It regulates the transport, sale and
processing of minerals, and promotes the development
of mining communities, science and mining technology,
and safety and environmental protection.
- The governments share in the agreements is spelled
out and allocated, taxes and fees are imposed,
incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts,
the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation,
revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
- April 9, 1995 RA 7942 took effect.
- March 30, 1995 Shortl y before RA 7942 took effect,
the President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering
99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

- August 15, 1995 DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR

Admini strative Order (D AO) 95-23 , s. 1995, o ther wi se
known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
79 42 . Thi s wa s la ter re pe al ed b y D AO 96 -4 0 , s. 1 99 6
which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
- January 10, 1997 Counsels for petitioners sent letter to
DENR Secretary demanding that they stop the
implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them
1 5 da ys fr om r ece ip t to act th e re on . D EN R h as ye t to
respond or act on petitioners letter.
- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
- Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in
excess of jurisdiction:
1)In signing and promul ga tin g D AO 9640 implementing RA 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that:

It al lo ws fu ll y for ei gn o wn ed
co r p o r a ti o n s to e x p l o r e , d ev e l o p , u ti l i ze a n d
exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary
to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution

It allows the taking of private

property without the determination of public
use and for just compensation

It violates Art. III, sec. 1

It allows enjoyment by foreign

citizens as well as fully foreign owned
corporations of the nations marine wealth
contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2

It allows priority to foreign

and fully foreign owned corporations in the
e x p l o r a t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t a n d u t i l i za t i o n o f
mineral resources contrary to Art. XII
2 ) In r e co m m e n d i n g a p p r o v a l o f a n d
i m p l e m e n ti n g th e F TAA b e t we e n t h e Pr e si d e n t
and WMCP because the same is illegal and
constitutional
- They pra y that the Court issue an order permanentl y
enjoining the respondents from acting on any application
for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other
similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and
null and void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP
as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
- Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners
contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry
h ave no t b ee n me t, th e p eti ti on d oe s n ot co mp l y wi th
the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has
been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
- W MCP sub sequentl y filed a Manife sta tion da ted
September 25, 2002 alleging that on Januar y 23, 2001
WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by
Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about
40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian
company.

- B e c a u s e o f t h i s , t h e D E N R S e c r e t a r y, b y O r d e r o f
December 18, 2001, approved the transfer and
registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to
S a g i t t a r i u s . S a i d O r d e r , h o w e v e r, w a s a p p e a l e d b y
Lepanto Con solida ted Minin g Co . (Lepan to). Be cause
there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be
considered moot.
ISSUES
1. WON case is justiciable
2. WON EO 279 took effect
3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional
4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional
HELD
1. Case is justiciable.
Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the
Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real
p a r ti e s i n i n t e r e s t , b u t w i t h w h e t h e r th e y h a v e l e g a l
standing.
- Petitioners traverse a wi de ran ge of sector s. Among
t h e m a r e L a Bu ga l B L a a n Tri b a l Ass o ci a ti o n , I n c ., a
farmers and indigenous peoples cooperative organized
under Philippine laws representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of
said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also
affected by the mining activities of W MCP. Even if they
are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that
they will suffer irremediable displacement as a result
of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities
in their area of residence.
- And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force
when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as
to their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942
explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any
t e r m a n d c o n d i t i o n f a v o r a b l e t o F T AA c o n t r a c t o r s
resul tin g from a la w or re gula tion sha ll be considered
part of the agreement.
- The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the
appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the
Government, have obligations to fulfill under said
contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling
such obligations on the theory that the contract is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
- The contention tha t the filing of the peti tion viola tes
the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The
repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine
mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as
the novel ty thereof , consti tute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in
the first instance. Indeed, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure.
2. YES.
Ratio
When the issues raised are of paramount
i m p o r t a n ce t o t h e p u b l i c , t h e C o u r t m a y b r u s h a s i d e
technicalities of procedure.

- P e t i t i o n e r s co n te n d t h a t EO 2 7 9 d i d n o t t a ke e ffe c t
because its supposed date of effectivity came after
President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained
that the convening of the first Congress merely
precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the
President it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she
had previously enacted.
3. NO.
Ratio
The convening of the first Congress merely
precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the
President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws she
had previously enacted.
In accordan ce with Ar t. XII, sec. 2 of the con stitu tion ,
F T AA s s h o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o t e c h n i c a l o r f i n a n c i a l
assistance only. However, contrary to the language of
the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully
foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than
mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of
the mining activity.
- W MCP nevertheless submits that the word technical
encompasses a broad number of possible services,
perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus
posits that it may well include the area of management
a n d o p e r a t i o n s . T h e C o u r t i s n o t p e r s u a d e d . Casus
omisus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management
or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors,
whi ch is the primar y feature of service contracts, was
precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to eradicate.
- Respondents insist that agreements involving
technical or financial assistance is just another term for
s e r v i c e co n t r a c t s . T h e p r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e C O N C O M
indicate
that
the
members
used
the
terms
interchangeabl y. The Court is like wise not persuaded.
W hile ce rta in comm issioner s ma y have men tioned the
term service contracts, they may have been using the
term loosely and not in the context of the 1973
Con stitu tion . Al so, the phra se service contra cts has
b ee n de le ted in the 1 98 7 Co nstitu tion s Ar ticle on
N a t i o n a l E c o n o m y a n d P a t r i m o n y. I f t h e C O N C O M
intended to retain the concept of service contracts under
the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adapted the
old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar
terms (agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance).
- The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the
same terminologies. And the UP Law draft proponents
viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as
grants of beneficial ownership of the countr ys natural
resources to foreign owned corporations. W hile, in
t h e o r y, th e St a t e o w n s t h e se n a tu r a l r e so u r ce s a n d
Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service contracts
actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose,
explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This

arrangement
is
clearly
incompatible
with
the
which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a
constitutional ideal of nationali zation of natural
qualified Filipino company.
resources.
But
the
proponents
nevertheless
- The word involving signifies the possibility of
acknowledged the need for capital and technical knowinclusion of other activities. If the intention of the
ho w in th e la r ge- sca le ex pl oi ta tio n , d eve lo pm en t an d
drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporations to
utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their
compromise technical or financial agreements.
language would have been unmistakably restrictive and
4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
stringent.
Ratio
Finan cial or techn ical a greements as
- The pre sent Constitution still recogni ze s and allo ws
con temp lated in Art. XII, se c. 2 sha ll refer to financial
service con tra cts (and has no t rendered the m taboo) ,
agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to
albeit sub ject to several restrictions and modifications
service contracts.
aimed at avoiding pitfalls of the past.
- Although the statute employs the phrase financial and
- I n t h e m i n d s o f t h e co m m i s si o n e r s , t h e co n ce p t o f
te ch ni ca l a gre e me n ts , i t a ctua l l y tr ea ts th e se
te chnica l and financial assi stan ce a greements did no t
a gre e me n ts a s se r vi ce co n tr a cts th a t gr an t be ne fi cia l
exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts
ownership
to
foreign
contractors
contrary
to
duly modified to prevent abuses technical and
fundamental law.
financial agreements were understood by the delegates
De ci sio n
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
to i n cl u d e se r v i ce co n t r a c ts d u l y m o d i f i e d t o p r ev e n t
Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
abuses.
1)The following provision of RA 7942
- C u r r e n t b u si n e ss p r a c ti ce s of te n r e q u i r e b o r r o we r s
a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)
seeking huge loans to allow creditors access to financial
b) Section 23,
records and other data, and probably a seat or two on
c) Section 33 to 41,
the formers board of directors, or at least some
d) Section 56,
participation in certain management decisions that may
e) The second and third paragraphs
have an impact on the financial health or the long-term
of Section 81, and
viability of the debtor, which of course will directly affect
f)
Section 90.
the latters capacity to repay its loans.
2 ) All pr ovi sio n s of D AO 9 6- 4 0, s. 1 99 6
- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international
wh i ch a r e n o t i n co n f o r m i t y wi t h th i s D e c i si o n ,
r e a l i t i e s a n d u n i l a te r a l l y se t s u p i t s o wn co n ce p t s o f
and
s tr i ct te ch n i ca l a n d f i n a n ci a l a s si sta n ce , th e n i t m a y
3)The FTAA between the Government of
unwittingly make the country a virtual hermit an
the Republic of the Philippines and WMC
economic isolationist in the real world of finance.
Philippines, Inc.
- The commissioners fully realized that their work would
Vot i n g 8 concur including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took
h a v e t o w i t h s t a n d t h e te s t o f t i m e , th a t t h e C h a r t e r,
no part
though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences
and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living
SEPARATE OPINION
d o cu m e n t th a t w o u l d a n sw e r th e n e e d s o f t h e n a ti o n
well into the future.

VITUG
- It could not have been the object of the framers of the
Charter to limit the contracts which the President may
enter into, to mere agreements for financial and
technical assistance; The Constitution has not prohibited
the State from itself exploring, developing, or utili zing
the countrys natural resources, and, for this purpose, it
may, enter into the necessary agreements with
individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible
operation.

PANGANIBAN
- T h e p e t i t i o n s h o u l d b e d i sm i s s e d o n th e g r o u n d o f
mootness. The dispute claiming the right to purchase the
foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino
companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus
and Prohibition
- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: major dissenter in
part1)
- All mine ral resour ces are owned by the Sta te . Their
ex p l o r a ti o n , d e ve l o p m e n t a n d u t i l i za t i o n ( E D U ) m u st
always be subject to the full control and supervision of
th e S ta te . M o r e sp e ci f i ca l l y, g i v e n th e i n a d e qu a c y o f
Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU
activities, the State may secure the help of foreign
companies in all relevant matters especially financial
and technical assistance provided that, at all times, the
State maintains its right of full control. The foreign

assi stor or contractor assumes all financial , techni cal

and entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence it
may be given reasonable management, operational,
m ar ke tin g, a ud i t an d othe r p re ro ga ti ve s to pr o te ct i ts
investments and enable the business to succeed.
- The Consti tution should be read in broad , life-giving
strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic
growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it
should be construed to grant the President and Congress
sufficien t di scre tion and reasonab le leewa y to enable
th em to attr a ct fo re i gn i nve stme n ts a nd exp er ti se , a s
wel l as to secure for our people and our poste rity the
blessings of prosperity and peace.
- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds
t h e co n s ti tu ti o n a l i t y o f th e Ph i l i p p i n e M i n i n g L a w, i ts
Implemen tin g Rules and Re gula tion s insofar as the y
relate to financial and technical agreements as well as
the sub ject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).
ISSUES
1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the
WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and by the
subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from
WMCP to Sagittarius
2 . As s u m i n g t h a t t h e ca s e h a s b e e n r e n d e r e d m o o t ,
W ON i t wou ld sti ll be proper to resolve the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining
Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase
A g r e e m e n t s I n v o l v i n g E i t h e r Tec h n i c a l o r F i n a n c i a l
A s s i s t a n ce c o n t a i n e d i n p a r a gr a p h 4 o f S e c t i o n 2 o f
Article XII of the Constitution?
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
- The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign
shares in W MCP is between two Filipino companies
(Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side
wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified
Filipino company. The plea to nullify the Mining Law has
b e c o m e a v i r tu a l p e t i t i o n f o r d e cl a r a t o r y r e l i e f , o v e r
which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of
the FTAA is invalid. Government cannot enter into FTAA
with Filipinos.
- It do es no t ta ke de ep kn o wl ed ge of la w an d lo gi c to
understand that what the Constitution grants to
foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.
2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those
o f t h e 1 9 7 3 v a r i e t y, t h e g r a n t t h e r e o f i s s u b j e c t t o
several safeguards.
- Petitioners stre ss the follo win g points. First, while a
case becomes moot and academic when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no

useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits,

what is at issue is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA
but also the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of
private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its
alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its
ju risd iction to decide . Third , the Constitution impose s
upon the Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any
law that offends the Constitution.
- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of
uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is
even now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident
th a t s tr o n g r e a so n s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y d e m a n d th a t th e
constitutionality issue be resolved now. And citing Acop
v. Guingona, the courts will decide a question otherwise
moo t and academi c if it is capable of repe tition, ye t
evading review.
3 . C i t i n g F r a n ci s co v. H o u se o f R e p r e se n ta ti v e s , th e
ponencia reiterated the well settled principles of
constitutional construction:
Verba legis, that is, wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given
th e i r o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g ex ce p t w h e r e t e ch n i ca l
terms are employed.

several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as

signatory, reporting to Congress)
- W ith u t ma gi s val ea t qu a m pe re a t, we ma y n oti ce a
contradiction between the States full control and
supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with
foreign contractors. It must be pointed out that the full
control and supervision cannot be taken literally to mean
that the State controls and supervises everything
inv ol ve d, do wn to the mi nu te st d e ta i l s, a nd ma ke s al l
decisions required in the mining operations. Control by
State ma y be on the macro level establishment of
policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.
- To further disabuse the notion of these ne w service
contracts, the governments share in these operations
will not be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be
im po sed . Th ose on l y co n si st of the ba si c gov er nm en t
share. The law provide s for an addi tional governmen t
share to be determined using formulas presented in DAO
96-40, either of which results to at least 50% of the net
benefits from the mining.
De ci sio n WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and
to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL
W here the re is ambi gu ity, ratio legis
1) RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules
est anima. The words of the Constitution should
and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
relate to financial and technical assistance agreements
framers.
re fe rr ed to i n pa r. 4 of Se c ti on 2 of Ar t. X II o f th e

Ut magis valeat quam pereat . The

C o n s ti tu t i o n ; a n d 3 ) t h e F TAA d a te d M a r ch 3 0 , 1 9 9 5
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
executed by the government and WMCP, except
- Petitioners claim that the phrase agreements
S e c t i o n s 7 . 8 a n d 7 . 9 o f t h e su b j e c t F TAA w h i ch a r e
involving either technical or financial assistance simply
hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy
means technical assistance or financial assistance
and for bein g gro ssl y disadvanta geou s to the
agreements, nothing more and nothing else.
government.
- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of
Vo t i n g 10 concur including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took
requiring that they be based on real contributions to the
no part
economic growth and general welfare of the country?
- It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to
SEPARATE OPINION
th e co n cl u si o n th a t th e m a n a g e m e n t o r o p e r a t i o n o f
m i n i n g a c ti v i ti e s b y f o r e i g n co n t r a c to r s, wh i ch i s th e
primar y feature of service contracts, was precisely the
CARPIO
evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
eradicate. If the framers had intended to put an end to
- Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the States
se rv i ce con tr a cts, th e y wo u ld h ave a t le a st l ef t som e
constitutional duty to control and supervise fully the
transitory guidelines.
exploitation of mineral resources.
- The drafters will have to be credited with enough
- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear
pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign
r e je ctio n of the o ld s yste m of li cen se , con ce ssio n or
enti tie s wil l not en ter into such a gree ments involvin g
lease.
assistance without requiring arrangements for the
- The State as owner of the natural resources must
protection of their investments, gains and benefits.
re ce i ve in com e f ro m i ts exp lo i ta ti on tax es, fee s a nd
- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the
charges cannot substitute.
C O N C O M d e l i b e r a ti o n s. It m a y b e o b se r v e d th a t th e
- State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in
members use the terms financial and technical
FTAAs, which share is equivalent to the Filipino equity
assi stan ce a gr ee me n ts an d se rv ice co n tra cts
requirement.
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y. F r o m t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s , i t m a y b e
concluded that FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike
those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to

- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is

en titled to wha t the entire mining industr y is wi llin g to
pay the State.

CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]

-

The phrase natural resources are owned by the State

simultaneously vests the legal title to the nations
natural resources to the Government, and the beneficial
ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filipino
people.
- In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as
trustee. So it cannot, without violating its sacred trust,
enter into any agreement or arrangement which
effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial
ownership of these resources.
- Ar t. X I I, sec . 2 in men tionin g based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general
we l fa re o f th e co un tr y ar ti cu l a te s th e va lu e wh i ch the
Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes
their potential benefits.
- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because
the motherlands natural resources are the birthright not
only of the present generation of Filipinos but of future
generations as well.
- Involving as the majority construes it runs counter to
the restrictive spirit of the provision.
- Either refers to one of two items and any is
required when more than two items are involved.
- Either is not merely descriptive but restrictive.
- C a su s o m i su s p r o o m i sso h a b e n d u s e st a person,
o b je ct o r t h i n g o m i tt e d f r o m a n e n u m e r a t i o n m u s t b e
held to have been omitted intentionally.
- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a
government, strapped for cash and in the midst of a self
proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind
eye to the consequences of unconstitutional legislation
i n t h e h o p e , h o w e v e r f a l s e o r e m p t y, o f o b t a i n i n g
fabulous amounts of hard currency; As always, the one
overriding the consideration of this Court should be will
o f th e so ve re i gn Fi l ip i no p eo pl e as em bo di ed i n the i r
Constitution.
- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine
natural resources now belongs to another generation.

FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC

AND MERALCO
TINGA; January 15, 2004
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Tem p o r a r y R e st r a i n i n g Or d e r o r a S ta tu s Qu o O r d e r
a ssa i l in g the Order d a t e d N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 2 0 0 3 o f
respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric

Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average

ISSUE
amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom from
1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate
Debt Coalition (FDC) argues that the said Order of the
adjustments under RA No. 9136, otherwise known as the
ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4
2 . As su m i n g t h a t th e E R C h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t
of the Implementing Rules of the Electric Power
pr ovi sio na l o rd er s, W ON th e gr an t b y th e ER C of the
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) is unconstitutional
provisional rate adjustment in question constitutes grave
for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
further asser ts that the Order i s vo id fo r hav in g be en
i ssued b y the ERC with grave abuse of discre tion and
HELD
manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of
1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to
injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by
approve provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of
MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in
Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
ir re pa r ab le pr e ju d i ce to th e F DC an d o the r s sim i la r l y
Sec. 44. Transfer of Po wers and Functions. The
situated unless the court restrains such implementation.
powers and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board
- On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent
n o t i n co n si s te n t w i t h th e p r ov i s i o n s o f th i s Ac t a r e
Motion to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan.
hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer
9 , 20 04 , th e ER C i ssu ed a n Order clarif yin g that the
of powers and functions shall in clude all appli cable
provisional rate increase granted to MERALCO in its Nov.
funds and appropriations, records, equipment,
27, 2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004.
property and personnel as may be necessary.
The Court En Banc issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause The
ordering ERC and MERALCO to file their respective
applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERC
as amended, otherwise known as the Public Services
a n d M ER A L C O t o o b s e r v e t h e sta tu s quo prevailing
Act, R e p u b l i c Ac t 6 3 9 5 , a s a m e n d e d , r ev i s i n g th e
before the filing of the Petition and set the case for oral
charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended,
a r gu m en ts on Ja n . 2 7 , 20 04 . On Jan . 26 , 2 00 4 , ER C ,
r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i f i ca t i o n D e cr e e ;
MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
Republ ic Act 7638, other wi se kno wn as the
filed their respective Comments on the Petition.
Department of Energy Act; Executive Order 172, as
- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments
amended , crea tin g the ERB; Republic Act 7832
o f t h e O S G a n d i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s a u t h o r i ze d t o i s s u e
otherwise kno wn as the Anti-Electricity and Electric
provisional orders under the law. ERC argues that it must
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004;
not have been the intention of Congress to expand the
s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o h a v e f u l l f o r c e a n d e f fe c t e x ce p t
fu ncti on s o f th e ER C , a s the su cce sso r of the En er g y
i n so f a r a s t h e y a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s Ac t . T h e
Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip its powers at the same
provi sions wi th respect to electri c power of Section
time. The ERC also asserts that it is authorized to issue
11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section
provisional rate increases ex parte, and that it may base
5 ( f ) o f R e p u b l i c Ac t 7 2 7 7 a r e h e r e b y r e p e a l e d o r
its provisional order on the verified application and
modified accordingly.
supporting documents submitted by the application, and
- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules
it is not required to wait for the comments of consumers
and regula tion s, or portions thereof, in consi stent wi th
or local government units (LGUs) concerned before
th i s Act a re h er eb y r ep ea le d or m od if ie d a cco rd in gl y.
issuing a provisional order. The ERC also denies that the
(Emphasis supplied)
Nov. 27, 2003 Order wa s i ssu ed wi th gra ve a bu se o f
T he prin cipal powe rs of the ERB relative to electri c
di scre tion . On the con trar y, it claim s tha t the Order is
public utilities transferred to the ERC are the following:
supported by substantial evidence. Finally, ERC contends
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged
t h a t t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n s t a n t Petition i s p r e m a tu r e
by electric companies;
b e c a u s e i t w a s d e n i e d t h e o p p o r tu n i t y t o h a v e a f u l l
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the
determination of the Application after trial on the merits,
operation of electric power utilities;
and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
- For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid,
- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of
because it was issued by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of
the power to gran t provisional rate ad ju stments is not
the EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not
inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers
inconsistent with the EPIR A) of the old ERB to ERC. It
of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are
also denies that the assailed Order was issued by the
in addition to the new powers conferred upon the ERC
ERC with grave abuse of discretion, asserting that on the
under Section 43.
c o n t r a r y, t h e i s s u a n c e t h e r e o f wa s b a s e d o n t h e
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it
Application, affidavits and other supporting documents
m a n d a t e s t h e co n t i n u e d e f fi c a c y o f t h e applicable
which it submitted earlier.
provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material
provisions of the Public Service Act which continue to

b e i n f u l l f o r ce a n d e ffe ct a r e co n t a i n e d i n Se ct i o n
force and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with
operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or
16(c), which states thus:
this order. (Words in parenthesis supplied).
p le ad in gs of the cu sto me r s an d LGU con ce rn ed i n i ts
Section 16. Proceedings of the C om m i ssio n , u po n
- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws
action on the application or motion for provisional rate
notice and hearing.
were expressly repealed or modified. Sec. 8 of EO No.
adjustmen t. Sin ce the IRR wa s issued pursuan t to the
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice
172 and Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant
EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the IRR has the force
and hearing in accordance with the rules and
the regulatory body concerned the authority to approve
and effect of law and thus should have been complied
provision s of thi s Act, sub je ct to the limi tations and
provisional rate increases are not among the provisions
with.
ex ce p tio n s me n tio ne d an d sa vi n g p rov isi on s to th e
expressly repealed or modified. This clearly indicates the
- In view of the infirmities which attended the November
contrary:
laws intent to transfer the power to ERC.
27, 2003 Order, particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCO
xxx xxx xxx
- Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our
to publish its Application or at least a summary thereof;
c) To fix and de termine individual or jo int rate s, toll
jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have
2 ) t h e f a i l u r e o f E R C t o r e s o l v e t h e Mo tio n s fo r
charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well
been impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent
Production of Docu ments f i l e d b y t h e o p p o s i t o r s t o
as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other
thereto unless there is a showing that a plain,
MERALCOs Application before acting on the motion for
special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and
unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy exists
provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of the ERC
follo wed thereafte r by an y publi c service : Provided,
between the two.
to consider the ar gumen ts raised by the oppositor s in
That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve
- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the
their respective pleadin gs prior to the issuance of the
ra tes propo sed by publi c service s provisional l y and
power to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter
assailed Order, the Cour t decla res void the November
w i th o u t n e ce ssi t y o f a n y h e a r i n g ; b u t i t sh a l l ca l l a
to the statutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of
27, 2003 Order of the ERC for having been issued with
h e a r i n g t h e r e o n w i t h i n t h i r t y d a ys t h e r e a f te r, u p o n
the l a w. Thi s se ctio n or da in s th a t th e EPIR A sh al l b e
grave abuse of discretion.
publication and notice to the concerned parties
co n s tr u e d i n f a v o r of m a r ke t co m p e t i t i o n a n d p e o p l e
operating in the territor y affected: Provided, further,
power empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V
That in case public service equipment of an operator is
par ticipation of the people. To the Cour t, the goals of
used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a
m ar ke t com pe ti ti on an d p eo pl e em po we r me n t a re n o t
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
private business, the net profits of said private
negated by the ERCs exercise of authority to approve
CORPORATION
business shall be considered in relation with the public
pr ovi sio na l r a te ad ju stme n ts. The con cer n s a re ta ke n
PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004
service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the
care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for
rates.
one, even if the re is a ground to gran t the provi sional
FACTS
- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or the ERB
rate increase, the ERC may do so only after the
- The petitioners, after having been granted permission
Charter continue to be in full force by virtue of Sections
publication requirement is met and the consumers
to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak4 4 a n d 8 0 o f th e E P I R A . Sa i d p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e E R B
affected are given the opportunity to present their side.
na-Ba to , su cceeded in di scovering marble deposits in
Charter read:
For another, the rate increase is provisional in character
Mount Mabio, which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The
and therefore may be modified or even recalled anytime.
range. The petitioners then applied with the Bureau of
Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition
Finally, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting
Mines for the issuance of the corresponding license to
o r co mp l ai n t o r a t an y sta ge the r ea f te r an d wi tho u t
m e th o d o l o g y i n t h e p u b l i c i n te r e st a n d to p r o m o te
exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was granted
prior hearing, on the basi s of the supporting papers
e f f i c i e n c y. F o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h e r e i s a p l e t h o r a o f
to them. Shortl y after respondent Ernesto Maceda was
duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief
provisions in Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to
a p p o i n t e d M i n i s t e r o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f E n e r g y, h e
on motion of a party in the case or on its own
promote public interest, market competition, and
cance lled the peti tione r s licen se throu gh his le tte r to
i ni ti a tiv e, wi tho u t p re ju d i ce to a f in al d eci sio n af te r
consumer protection.
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated
h e a r i n g , sh o u l d th e B o a r d f i n d t h a t t h e p l e a d i n g s ,
- All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that
Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the cancellation, the
to ge the r wi th su ch affi da vi ts, do cu me n ts a nd o th e r
the ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA,
original petition was filed on August 21, 1991.
ev id en ce wh i ch m a y be sub m i tted i n su pp o r t of the
in relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Publ ic Service Act and
- The tr ial cour t granted the pe tition and said that the
motion, substantially support of the provisional order;
Se c. 8 of EO. No . 17 2, po sse sse s the p o wer to gra n t
privilege granted under the license had already ripened
Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule
provi sional ra te ad justmen ts sub je ct to the procedure
into a property right, thus the cancellation of the license
and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
laid down in these laws as well as in the IRR.
without notice or hearing was against the Constitutional
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected
2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion
right of the petitioners against deprivation of their
parties.
when an act is done
property rights. It was unjustified because that could be
SEC. 14. App l i ca bi l i ty C la u se The applicability
contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or
covered by four separate applica tion i s 400 hecta res.
(applicable) provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
when executed whimsicall y, capriciously, or arbitraril y
F i n a l l y, t h e y r u l e d t h a t P r o c l a m a t i o n N o . 8 4 , w h i c h
as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service
out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. W hat makes the
confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post
Act; Republic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise
challenged Order pa r ti cu la r l y r ep u gn an t i s th a t i t
f a c t o l a w. T h u s , t h e y w e r e a l l o w e d to co n t i n u e t h e i r
known as the Oil Industry Commission Act; Republic
involves a bla tant and inexcusab le breach of the very
operations until the expiration of their license.
Act No. 6395, as amended, revising the charter of the
rule which the ERC is mandated to observe and
- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license
National Power Corporation under CA 120; Presidential
i mp l em en t. Th e vio la ted pr ovi sio n wh i ch is Se c. 4 (e ) ,
c o v e r i n g 3 3 0 .3 0 6 2 h e c t a r e s t o t h e r e sp o n d e n t s w a s
Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred to as the
Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise
valid because it was covered by four separate
National Electrification Administration Decree, and
its power to issue provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44
applications, each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover,
Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended, creating
in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the application
it held that the limitation under PD 463 - that any quarry
the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full
for rate increase must be published in a newspaper of
license should not cover not more than 100 hectares in
ge ne ra l ci r cu l a tio n in th e lo cal i t y whe r e the a pp li can t

any given province was supplanted by RA 7942, which

increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463,
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the license is valid
3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid

- Pr o c N o . 8 4 i s a l so n o t a b i l l o f a tt a i n d e r s i n ce t h e
declaration of the license as a nullity is not a declaration
of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a punishment within
th e pu rvi e w of th e con sti tu tio na l p ro scri p tio n a gai n st
bills of attainder.
- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It
does not fall under the six recognized instances when a
law is considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is
limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
D e ci si on Petition granted

HELD
1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec
2) toward full control and supervision of the State over
natural resources the Court in Miners Association of the
DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V
Philippines vs Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463
as contrary to the Constitution.
SECRETARY
- RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies
CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006
the new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent
FACTS
wi th an y of i ts p rov i si on s. Ho we ve r, i t do es n o t ap pl y
- N a t u r e Prohibition and mandamus
r e tr o a c ti v e l y to a l i ce n se g r a n t e d b y th e go v e r n m e n t
- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942
under the 1973 Constitution. The Court therefore needs
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
to determine W ON the license of the respondents falls
together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
within the type of licenses wherein the new law cannot
i s su e d p u r su a n t th e r e to , D e p a r tm e n t o f En v i r o n m e n t
be applied.
and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to
96-40, s. 1996.
the terms and conditions of PD 463. Proclamation No.
- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No.
2202, which awarded the license to Rosemoor, expressly
27 9 wh i ch a u th or i ze d the D ENR Se cr e ta r y to a cce p t,
states that the grant is subject to existing policies, laws,
co n si d e r a n d e v a l u a te p r o p o sa l s fr o m f o r e i gn - o w n e d
r ul e s an d re gu la ti on s . The li cen se i s thu s su b je ct to
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
Section 69 of PD 463, which states that a license cannot
agreements involving either technical or financial
cover more than 100 hectares in any one province. The
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
l a w d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a n y e x ce p ti o n to th e n u m b e r o f
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
a pp li ca tio n s fo r a l i ce n se . Mo re ov er, the l i ce n se wa s
r e co m m e n d a ti o n of th e Se cr e ta r y, th e Pr e si d e n t m a y
i s s u e d so l e l y i n t h e n a m e o f R o s e m o o r e M i n i n g a n d
execute with the foreign proponent.
Development Corporation, rather than the four individual
- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into law Rep.
stockholders.
Act No. 7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New System
3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development,
Corporation vs. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, Tan vs.
Utili zation and Conservation, other wise known as the
Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary,
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
the Court ruled that licenses may be revoked by
- 15 Au gu st 19 95 ~ D EN R Se cr e tar y Victo r O. Ra mo s
e x e c u t i v e a c t i o n w h e n n a t i o n a l i n te r e s t so r e q u i r e s ,
issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series
because it is not a contract, property or a property right
of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep.
protected by the due process clause. The license merely
Act No. 7942.
evidences the privile ge granted by the sta te and does
- 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took
not vest any permanent or irrevocable right. The license
effect on after due publication superseded DAO No. 23,
likewise contains a provision which says that the license
s.1995.
m a y b e re v o ke d o r c a n c e l l e d a t a n y t i m e b y t h e
- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994,
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when in his opinion,
Pre si de n t R am o s exe cu ted an FTAA wi th AM C ove r a
public interest so require. As to the exercise of
total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the
p r e r o g a t i v e b y M a ce d a , su ff i ce to sa y t h a t w h i l e th e
provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this
cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the
area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
s a i d d i r e c to r, t h e l a t t e r i s su b j e c t to th e d e p a r t m e n t
- Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
head.
Limited to form a single company that now goes under
- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also
the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
by revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are
The exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is
Australian nationals.
clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the
- 7 Se p tem be r 2 00 1 ~ cou n se l s f or p eti ti on er s fi le d a
State ownership of all natural resources.
demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary
Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA

for the pri mar y reason tha t Rep . Act No . 7942 and its
Im p l e m e n t i n g R u l e s a n d R e gu l a t i o n s D AO 9 6 - 4 0 a r e
unconstitutional.
- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also
furnished a copy of the said letter.
- There being no response to both letters, another letter
o f t h e sa m e co n te n t d a te d 1 7 Ju n e 2 0 0 2 w a s se n t to
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
- This le tte r wa s indor sed to the DENR Secre tar y and
ev e n tu a l l y r e f e r r e d to th e Pa n e l of Ar b i tr a to r s o f t h e
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office
No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received
a letter from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB
requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of the
Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.
- Yet a g a i n , c o u n s e l s f o r p e t i t i o n e r s s e n t P r e s i d e n t
Arroyo another demand letter dated 8 November 2002.
Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary
who referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.
- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected
the demand of counsels for petitioners for the
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.
- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for
prohibition and ma ndamus, with a pra ye r for a
t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r. T h e y p r a y t h a t t h e
Court issue an order:
1.
enjoining public respondents
from acting on any application for FTAA;
2.
declaring unconstitutional the
P h i l i p p i n e M i n i n g Ac t o f 1 9 9 5 a n d i t s
Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3.
canceling the FTAA issued to
CAMC.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. W ON the pe titioners' eminent domain claim is a
justiciable issue.
Substantive
2 . W O N R A 7 9 4 2 a n d t h e CAMC FTAA a r e v o i d
b e c a u s e t h e y a l l o w t h e u n j u s t a n d u n l a w f u l ta k i n g o f
property without payment of just compensation, in
violation of Art III Sec 9 of the Constitution
3. W ON the mining act and its implementing rules and
regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning
an
unconstitutional
administrative
process
of
determining just compensation
4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA,
ab di ca te d i ts p ri ma r y r e sp on sib i l i ty to the ful l con tro l
and supervision over natural resources
5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the
wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their
involvement in mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2
(4) of the Constitution
6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts
HELD

1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following

considerations:
a.
Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a
c l a sh o f l e g a l r i gh t s a s R e p . Act N o . 7 9 4 2 h a s
been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and
a n F TAA s h a v e b e e n e n t e r e d i n t o . P e t i t i o n e r s
e m b r a c e v a r i o u s s e g m e n t s o f t h e so c i e t y, l i ke
DESAMA representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well
as other residents of areas affected by the mining
activi ties of C AMC . These petitioners have the
standing to raise the constitutionality of the
questioned FTAA as the y alle ge a per sonal and
substantial injury. They are under imminent threat
o f b ei n g d i sp la ced fro m the i r la nd ho ld i n gs a s a
r e su l t of th e i m p l e m e n ta t i o n o f th e q u e s ti o n e d
FTAA.

b.

Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the

questioned law or the approval of the challenged
a c t , th e d i s p u t e i s s a i d t o h a v e r i p e n e d i n to a
judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.

c.

T h e tra n sce nd en ta l im po r tan ce o f th e

i s s u e s r a i s e d a n d t h e m a g n i tu d e o f th e p u b l i c
interest involved will have a bearing on the
coun tr ys econom y, wh ich is to a grea ter extent
d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e m i n i n g i n d u s t r y.
Also
a ff e c t e d b y th e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s ca s e a r e t h e
p ro pr ie ta r y r i gh ts of nu me ro u s r esi de n ts i n th e
mining contract areas as well as the social
existence of indigenous peoples, which are
threatened.
2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
DAO 96-40
- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and
Sec. 107 of D AO 96-40 allo w the "un lawful and unjust
" TAK I N G " o f p r i v a te p r o p e r t y f o r private purpose in
contradiction with Sec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken
except for public use and the corresponding payment of
just compensation."
- They assert that public respondent DENR, through the
Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property
and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.
- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to
illustrate the concept of taking of property for purposes
of eminent domain to wit:
> "taking under the concept of eminent domain as
entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of
l e g a l a u t h o r i t y, d e v o t i n g i t t o a p u b l i c u s e , o r

otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously

affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the
o w n e r a n d d e p r i v e h i m o f a l l b e n e f i c i a l e n jo ym e n t
thereof."
- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo
th a t the re is no ab so l u te , ph ysi ca l ta kin g, a t the ver y
least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the
su r f a ce o w n e r s , o c cu p a n t s a n d co n ce s si o n a i r e s o f a
mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of
enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden
imposed by the legal easement falls within the purview
of eminent domain.
(NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege
or advantage, which one man may have in the lands of
another, without profit; it may arise by deed or
prescription)
- PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A
TAKING provision but a VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POW ER and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people.
T h is gov er nm en t re gu la ti on inv ol ve s the
ad ju stm en t of ri gh ts f or the pu bl i c goo d a nd tha t th i s
adjustment curtails some potential for the use or
economic exploitation of private property.
- Public respondents concluded that to require
compensation in all such circumstances would compel
the government to regulate by purchase.
- Public respondents are inclined to believe that by
e n t e r i n g p r i v a t e l a n d s a n d c o n c e s s i o n a r e a s , F TAA
holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them
of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said
entry merely establishes a legal easement upon surface
owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining
contract area.
- Hence the distinctions below:
1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from
Regulation in Police Power

The power of eminent domain is the

inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
w h i ch th e p o we r h a s b e e n l a wf u l l y d e l e ga te d ) to
condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.

On the other hand, police power is the

power of the state to promote public welfare by
r e s t r a i n i n g a n d r e g u l a t i n g th e u se o f l i b e r t y a n d
property.

A l t h o u g h b o t h p o l i c e p o w e r a n d t h e p o w e r o f
eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two
wi th the l a tter b ei n g u se d a s an i mp le m en t of th e
former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence,

no com pe n sa ti on sh al l b e pa id . ( N OT E: nox io us=

harmful)

Jurisprudence
shows:
WHERE
A
PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY RESTRICTED
BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD BE
INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC WELFARE, OR WHERE
PROPERTY IS DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED
EXISTENCE WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC
INTEREST, THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE TAKING.
However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS
APPROPRIATED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC
PURPOSE, THERE IS COMPENSABLE TAKING.
In the exerci se of i ts police po wer re gula tion , the
state restricts the use of private property, but none
o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n te r e s t s i n t h e b u n d l e o f r i g h t s ,
which constitute ownership, is appropriated for use
by or for the benefit of the public. (-Bernas)

TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS

WITHOUT ACTUAL EVICTION OF THE OWNER,
MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF THE ORDINARY USES
FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH
AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.

In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had

the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in
eminent domain, to wit:
1.the expropriator must enter a private property;
2.the entry must be for more than a momentary
period.
3 . th e e n tr y m u s t b e u n d e r w a r r a n t o r co l o r o f l e ga l
authority;
4 .t h e p rop e rt y mus t be de vo te d t o p u b lic us e o r
otherw ise
informally
app ro priate d
or
injuriously affected;

5.the utilization of the property for public use must be

in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
p o s se s si o n o f , th e e xp r o p r i a te d p r o p e r t y; b u t n o
cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner
of the condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property
m a y, t h r o u g h e x p r o p r i a t i o n , b e s u b j e c t e d t o a n
easement right of way.
THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A
SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WAY WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE. Here, the
holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes
of conducting mining activities such as exploration,
e x tr a ct i o n a n d p r o ce s si n g o f m i n e r a l s. M i n i n g r i gh t
holders build mine infrastru cture , di g mine shafts and
connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas
and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment

and sewer systems. On top of this, under Section 75,

easement rights are accorded to them where they may
build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission,
railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining
operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or
occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership
of their lands. W ITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS
ONCE MINING OPERATIONS COMMENCE.
1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision
Brief History of Mining Laws:

Fir st found in Se ction 27 of Com monweal th

Act No. 137

A similar one was found in a provision of

Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known as
The Mineral Resources Development Decree of
1974

H a m p e r e d b y t h e d i ffi cu l t i e s a n d d e l a ys i n
securing surface rights for the entry into private
land s for purpo ses of minin g operations,
Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 Jul y 1974
was passed into law in order to achieve full and
accelerated mineral resources development.
Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a
new system of surface rights acquisition by
mining prospectors and claimants.

W hereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and

Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain may
only be exercised in order that the mining
c l a i m a n ts ca n b u i l d , co n s tr u ct o r i n st a l l r o a d s,
railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities,
this time, the power of eminent domain may now
b e i n v o k e d b y m i n i n g o p e r a t o r s f o r t h e e n t r y,
acquisition and use of private lands.
Con siderin g that Se ction 1 of Presiden tia l Decree No .
512 granted the qualified mining operators the authority
to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of
authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep.
A ct N o . 7 9 4 2 , t h e i n e s ca p a b l e co n cl u s i o n i s t h a t th e
latter provision is a taking provision.
o
The taking to be valid
must be for public use.
o
Public
use
as
a
requirement for the valid exercise of the power of
eminen t domain is no w synon ymou s with publi c
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience.
o
It includes the broader
n o ti o n o f i n d i r e c t p u b l i c b e n e f i t o r a d v a n t a g e .
Public use as traditionally understood as actual
use by the public has already been abandoned.
D e ci si on THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC
FTAA are not void because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942
and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of
just compensation based on the agreement entered into

b y th e h ol de r of mi ni n g ri gh ts an d th e su r fa ce o wn er,
occupant or concessionaire in accordance to PD 512.
Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:
3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just
Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just
co m p e n sa ti o n h a s b e e n se tt l e d i n t h e ca se of Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court
declared that the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as the
executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the
courts findings. (NOTE: I think this is the ratio already.)

T here is noth ing in the

p r o v i si o n s o f th e a s s a i l e d l a w a n d i t s
implementing rules and regulations that exclude
the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation
in expropriation
proceedings
involving mining operations.

T h e r e i s n o th i n g w r o n g wi th
the grant of pri mar y jur isdi ction b y the Pane l of
A r b i tr a t o r s o r th e M i n e s Ad j u d i ca t i o n Bo a r d to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable
co m p e n sa t i o n d u e t h e a f fe c te d l a n d o w n e r s o r
occupants.

The
jurisdiction
of
the
Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and
exclusive becau se the que stion is fir st passed
upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are
n o t a co n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e a d m i n i s tr a t i v e
determination.
4 . On th e Suffi ci en t Co n tr o l b y th e Sta te Ove r Mi ni n g
Operations

Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc.

v. Ramos: The Court held that RA 7942 provides
for the states control and supervision over mining
operations.
o
T h e g a m u t of r e qu i r e m e n ts ,
regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed
u p o n t h e F T AA c o n t r a c t o r b y t h e s t a t u t e a n d
regulations
easily
overturns
petitioners
contention that the setup under RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 relegates the State to the role of a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and
reports.

On the con trar y, the

government agencies concerned are empowered
to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence,
dire ct and chan ge -- the various wor k pro gram s
and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.
- Considering the provisions of the statute and the
regulations just discussed, the Court believes that the

Sta te de fi ni te l y po sse sse s the me an s b y wh i ch i t ca n

have the ultimate word in the operation of the
e n te r p r i se , se t d i r e ct i o n s a n d o b je c ti v e s , a n d d e te ct
deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and
to impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.

In o th e r wo r d s , t h e F TAA co n tr a ct o r i s n o t
free to do whatever it pleases and get away with
i t ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y, i t w i l l h a v e t o f o l l o w t h e
government line if it wants to stay in the
enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO
96-40 vest in the government more than a
sufficient degree of control and supervision over
the conduct of mining operations.
5 . On th e Pr op er In te rp re ta ti on o f th e Co n sti tu ti on a l
Phrase "Agreements Involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance"

Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal

Association, Inc. v. Ramos:

Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t m a t te r s , o t h e r t h a n th o se
expli citl y mentioned , cou ld be made part of the
agreement.

The use of the word

involving implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere
financial or technical assistance. The difference in
sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose
agreements for technical or financial assistance
against agreements including technical or
financial assi stance . This mu ch is unal terabl y
clear in a verba legis approach.

o
The word involving as
used in this context has three connotations that
c a n b e d i ff e r e n t i a te d t h u s : one, t h e s e n s e o f
concerning, having to do with, or affecting;
two, en tai l in g , r e qu i r in g, im p l yi n g or
necessitating;
and
three,
including,
containing or comprising.

If the real intention of the

d r a f te r s w a s to co n f i n e fo r e i gn co r p o r a t i o n s to
financial or technical assistance and nothing
more , the ir lan guage would have certa inl y been
so u n m i s ta ka b l y r e s tr i c ti v e a n d str i n g e n t a s to
leave no doubt in anyones mind about their true
intent.
o
For example, they would
have used the sentence foreign corporations are
absolutely prohibited from involvement in the
m a n a g e m e n t o r o p e r a t i o n o f m i n i n g o r si m i l a r
ventures or words of similar import. A search for
such stringent wording yields negative results.

- The meaning of the phrase agreements involving

e i th e r te c h n i c a l o r f i n a n ci a l a s s i s t a n c e m u s t n o t b e
construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner since
th er e wa s a con scio u s a nd de li be r a te de ci si on b y the
drafters to avoid the use of restrictive wording.
6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized

The 1987 Constitution allows

the continued use of service contracts with
f o r e i gn co r p o r a t i o n s a s co n tr a ct o r s wh o wo u l d
invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and
superv i sion of the Sta te; thi s time, howev er,
safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.

Citing Philippine Veterans

Bank v. Court of Appeals:
a. " T h e p h r a s e a g r e e m e n t s i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r
te chn i ca l o r fi na ncia l a ssi sta n ce , re fe rr ed to i n
p ar a gra ph 4 , a re i n fa ct ser vi ce co n tra cts. Bu t
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between
foreign
corporations
acting
as
con tr a cto r s o n th e o ne ha nd ; a nd o n th e o th er,
the government as principal or owner of the
works."
b. "xxx..From the foregoing, we are impelled to
con cl ud e tha t th e p hr ase a gre em en ts in vo lvi n g
either technical or financial assistance, referred to
in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between
foreign
corporations
acting
as
con tr a cto r s o n th e o ne ha nd ; a nd o n th e o th er,
the government as principal or owner of the
works. "
- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by
the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of
service contracts with foreign corporations -- as
contractors who would invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control
and supervision of the State -- sans the abuses of the
past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and utilize
our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large
scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the
Filipino people." (id.)
D e ci si on The petition for prohibition and mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of
DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar
as they relate to financial and technical assistance
a greemen ts referred to in para graph 4 of Section 2 of
Article
XII
of
the
Constitution
are
NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V

BALITE PORTAL MINING

YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002

- M e a n w h i l e , J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 9 7 , t h e R PA r e s o l v e d t h e
Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus
FACTS
Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated
- Diwalwal Gold Rush Area rich tract of mineral land
and all adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It
dismissed.
is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo
- June 24, 1997 the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
and Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been
Order No. 97-03 which provided among others, that:
embroiled in controversy since mid-80s due to the
a. DENR shall studythe option of direct state
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal
- M ar ch 10 , 1 98 8 , Ma r co pp er Mi ni n g C or po r a tio n wa s
Gold-Rush Area
granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over
b . S t u d y sh a l l i n c l u d e s t u d yi n g a n d w e i g h i n g t h e
4 , 4 9 1 h e c t a r e s o f l a n d , w h i ch i n cl u d e d th e D i w a l w a l
feasibility of entering into management agreements
area.
or operating agreements
- June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076
c.Such agreements shall include provisions for profitor the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act which established
sharing including profit-sharing arrangements with
a People s Small- Scale Mining Pro gra m to be
small-scale miners, as well as the payment of
implemented by the secretary of the DENR and created
royalties to indigenous cultural communities
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the
- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action
DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. It also
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA
authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale
for the nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on
mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary
the ground that the di rect state uti li za tion espoused
and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under
therein would effectivel y impair its vested rights under
certain conditions.
EP No. 133, among others
- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretar y Fulgencio
- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO)
Consolidated Mines cases, setting aside the judgment of
No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as
the RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme
no n- fo re st l an d op en to sma l l - sca le mi ni n g. Th is wa s
Court by way of consolidated petition.
made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR
- M a r c h 1 9 , 1 9 9 8 , t h e C A d i s m i s se d p e t i t i o n o f S E M
Secretary by Proclamation No. 369 which established the
ruling that:
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
a.DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in
- P e t i t i o n f o r t h e ca n ce l l a t i o n o f E P N o . 1 3 3 a n d th e
issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since it was
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
merely a directive to conduct studies on the various
( M P S A ) p r o p o sa l o v e r D i w a l w a l w a s f i l e d b e f o r e t h e
options available to the government for solving the
DENR Regional Executive Director (RED Mines Case)
Diwalwal conflict.
- February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending,
b .T h e a s s a i l e d m e m o r a n d u m d i d n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southeast
adopt
direct
state
utilization
as
official
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn
government policy on the matter, but was simply a
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by
manifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as
the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional
one of i ts op tions, after determ ining i ts feasib ili ty
Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and
through studies.
registered SEMs integrated MPSA application. Several
c.Petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are not
small-scale miners filed their opposition (MAC cases).
inviolable , sa crosan ct or immu table and , being in
- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the
Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this, the MAC cases
permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the
were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA)
Chief Executive when the national interest so
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining
requires.
ri gh ts. R PA too k co gn i za n ce of th e R ED M in e s ca se s
- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this
which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
petition.
- Ap ri l 1 , 1 99 7 Pro vi nci al Mi ni n g Re gu la tor y Boa rd o f
Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997
ISSUES
authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs)
1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the
to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.
DENR Secretar y which petitioner allege as violative of
- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for
mining laws and in derogation of vested rights of
d am a ge s a ga i n st D EN R Se cr e tar y an d PM R B- D ava o,
petitioner over the area as covered by EP No. 133.
alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the
2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity
extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per
of ore transport permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional
truckload from SEMs mining claim.
Panel of Arbitrators (RPA).

HELD
1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did
n o t co n c l u s i v e l y a d o p t d i r e c t s t a t e u t i l i za t i o n a s a
policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the
m e m o r a n d u m cl e a r l y i n d i ca t e th a t w h a t wa s d i r e ct e d
was merely a study of this option and nothing else. It did
no t gran t an y manage ment/opera tin g or profi t- sharin g
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.
- Petition wa s prema ture . The MO did no t impose any
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation
whatsoever between and among the parties to the
dispute. Petitioner can show no more than a mere
apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would
directly take over the mines, and until the DENR actually
does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid
objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on
grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.
2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right
over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and
unse ttled ma tter, as the EPs validi ty is s ti ll bein g
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases.
- W he th e r o r n o t r e sp o n d e n t B a l i te C o m m u n a l Po r ta l
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC) and the other mining
entities it represents are conducting illegal mining
a ctiv i ti e s i s a fa ctu a l ma tte r tha t ha s ye t to b e f in al l y
determined in the Consolidated Mines Cases.
- SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may
petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total
and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a
privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so
re quire s. This i s necessaril y so since the explora tion ,
development and utilization of the countrys natural
mineral resources are matters impresses with great
public interest.
- L oo ki n g in t o Ar t i c l e X I I , S e c t i on 2 of t he 19 87
Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine
M i n i n g Ac t o f 1 9 9 5 , t h e S C s a i d t h a t t h e S t a t e m a y
pursue the constitutional policy of full control and
supervision of the exploration, development and
utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by
either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
a greemen ts wi th qual ified enti tie s. The State need be
guided only by the demands of public interest.
- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR
Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, he is
p r e su m e d to h a v e r e gu l a r l y i ssu e d th e m e m o r a n d u m
with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions.
- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule
on it as the grounds invoked by petitioner for
invalidating the OTPs are inextricably linked to the
issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.
D e ci si on Petition was denied; CA ruling affirmed.

CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

AND AMARI COASTAL BAY
CARPIO; July 9, 2002
FACTS

- N a tu r e original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for

wri t of prelim inar y in jun ction and a tempora r y
r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r. P e t i t i o n a l s o s e e k s t o c o m p e l t h e
Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
PEAs then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from
s i g n i n g a n e w a gr e e m e n t wi th AM A R I i nv o l v i n g su ch
recalamtion.
- 1973-The government through the Commission of
Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay
- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating the PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas and to
develop, improve, acquire x x x lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos
issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Ba y under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP)
- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA
to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP
sha l l tra n sf er in fav or of PEA the a re a s re cla i me d b y
CDCP in the MCCRRP
- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting
a n d tr a n sf e r r i n g to P EA p a r ce l s o f l a n d so r e cl a i m e d
under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the
name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the
Freedom Islands
- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
w i t h AM A R I , a p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n , t o d e v e l o p t h e
Freedom Islands and this was done without public
bidding
- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres approved the JVA
- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged
sp e e ch i n th e Se n a t e a n d d e n o u n ce d th e J VA a s th e
grandmother of all scams. As a result, investigations
were conducted by the Senate. Among the conclusions
were: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AM AR I un de r the JVA ar e la nd s of the pu bl i c do ma in
wh i ch the gove rn me n t h as no t cla ssi fi ed a s a li en ab le
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal
- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the

Senate Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily

Inquirer publi shed repor ts on on-goin g rene go tia tion s
between PEA and AMARI
- PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman Arsenio
Yulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members
of the negotiating panel
- Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that
the government stand s to lose bill ions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations
of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of
Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of
the public domain to private corporations and Article 2
Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the
right to information on matters of public concern
- 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres.
Estrada approved
ISSUES
1. W ON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition
are moot and academic because subsequent events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to
observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts
3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion
of administrative-remedies
4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
5. W ON the constitutional right to information includes
o ffi ci a l in fo rm a tio n on o n- go in g ne go tia ti on s bef or e a
final agreement
6. W ON the stipula tion s in the amended jo int ventu re
a gr e e m e n t fo r t h e tr a n sf e r to a m a r i o f ce r ta i n l a n d s ,
r e c l a i m e d a n d s t i l l t o b e r e c l a i m e d , v i o l a te th e 1 9 8 7
consitution; and
7 . W ON t h e co u r t i s t h e p r o p e r f o r u m f o r r a i si n g th e
issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement
is grossly disadvantageuos to the government.
o threshold issue: whether amari, a private
corporation, can acquire and own under the
amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
froeshore and submer ged area in mani la bay in
view of se ctions 2 and 3, arti cle 12 of the 1987
constitution
HELD
(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA
on
constitutional
grounds
necessarily
includes
pr eve n ti n g i ts im p le me n ta tio n if i n th e m ea n ti m e PEA
and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Co n sti tu ti on an d i f al re ad y i mp le m en ted , to an nu l the
effects of an unconstitutional contract
(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally
to cases involving factual questions
R e a so n i n g the instant case raises constitutional issues
of transcendental importance to the public
(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedie s does no t appl y when the issue involved is a
purely legal or constitutional question

(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental

Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to
p ub li c im po r ta n ce an d a s su ch , th e re i s th e ri gh t of a
t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f n a tu r a l r e so u r c e s o th e r th a n
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then
c i t i ze n t o b r i n g a ta x p a ye r s su i t o n t h e se m a tt e r s of
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
placing the land in the name of a corporation would be
transcendental public importance
reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands.
(5) The constitutional right to information includes
governmen t can classif y the recla imed lands as
If the farmland is registered in the name of a
official information on on-going negotiations before a
alienable or disposable, and further declare them
c o r p o r a t i o n , u p o n t h e d e a t h o f t h e o w n e r, h i s h e i r s
f i n a l c o n t r a c t a n d m u s t th e r e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e d e f i n i t e
n o l o n ge r n e e d e d f o r p u b l i c se r v i ce s. St i l l , th e
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
p ro po si tio n s b y th e go ve rn me n t a nd sh ou l d no t cov er
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
recognized exceptions like privileged information,
p u b l i c d o m a i n t o AM A R I wi l l b e v o i d i n vi e w o f
the continuin g break-up of farmland s in to smal ler and
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
S e c t i o n 3 , Ar t i c l e 1 2 w h i c h p r o h i b i t s p r i v a t e
smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual
affecting national security and public order
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation
R e a so n i n g The State policy of full transparency in all
land of the public domain.
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
R e a so n i n g C o m m o n we a l th Act 1 4 1 of th e Ph i l i p p i n e
of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban,
peoples right to information on matters of public
National Assembly empowers the president to classify
individuals who alread y acquired the maximum area of
con cer n . P EA m ust pr ep ar e a ll th e da ta an d di sclo se
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
sec. 6 . T h e P r e s i d e n t , u p o n r e co m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
long before the consummation of the contract. While the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
individual could own as many corporations as his means
evaluation or revie w i s on-going, there are no offi cial
to time classify the lands of the public domain into(a)
would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a
acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals
A l i e n a b l e o f d i s p o s a b l e , ( b ) t i m b e r, a n d ( c ) m i n e r a l
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of
but
once
the
committee
makes
its
official
lands.-The President must first officiall y classify these
the corporation.
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on
lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them
the part of the government
open to disposition or concession.
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF
(6) In a form of a summary:
-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the
APPEALS
o
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
G ov e r n m e n t b y d r e d g i n g , f i l l i n g , o r o th e r m e a n s; ( b )
PUNO;
September
24, 2003
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
FACTS
any of the foregoing classes . -Sec. 61 states that the
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
- January 27, 1977 The National Investment and
lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59
lease these lands to private corporations but may
Developmen t Corpora tion (NIDC) , a governmen t
shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and
n o t se l l o r tr an sfe r o wne r sh i p of the se la nd s to
corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
not otherwise
p r i v a te co r p o r a t i o n s . P E A m a y o n l y se l l t h e s e
Ka wa sa ki He av y Ind u str y, L td o f Ko be , Ja pa n fo r th e
-After the effectivi ty of the 1935 Consti tu tion ,
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership
construction, operation, management of the Subic
government reclaimed and marsh y disposable lands of
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
National Shipyard, which became the Philippine Shipyard
the public domain continued to be onl y leased and not
laws.
and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO) with 60-40%
s o l d t o p r i v a t e p a r t i e s . T h e s e l a n d s r e m a i n e d suis
o
T h e 5 9 2 .1 5 h e c t a r e s o f s u b m e r g e d
capitalization.
generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the
a re as of Ma ni la Ba y re ma in in al ie na b le n a tu ra l
- One of the feature s of the a greemen t is the grant to
public domain the government could not sell to private
r esou r ce s of the p ub li c do ma in a nd o utsi de th e
the parties the right of first refusal should either of them
par ties. The onl y wa y tha t the governmen t can se ll to
commerce of man until classified as alienable or
decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint
p ri va te p ar tie s gov er nm en t re cla i me d a nd m ar sh y
disposable lands open to disposition and declared
venture.
disposable lands of the public domain is for the
no longer needed for public service. The
- November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights,
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.
government can make such classification and
title and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National
-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public
declaration onl y afte r PEA has recla imed the se
Bank (PNB). And subsequently transferred to the Natl
domain, a public bidding is required
submerged areas. Only then can these lands
Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14
-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation
o wned b y the Sta te. W ith the exception of a gri cultural
which are the only natural resources the
No. 50 establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP)
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
government can alienate.
and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take
Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public
o
Sin ce th e Am e n d e d JVA se e ks to
possession of, manage and dispose of non*performing
d o m a i n sh a l l b e l i m i te d to a gr i cu l tu r a l l a n d s . P r i v a te
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
assets of the National Government.
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
- APT was named trustee in the National Govt share in
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
PHILSECO.
S e c t i o n 3 , Ar t i c l e 1 2 o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
- COP and APT decided to sell the govt shares to private
wh i ch pr oh ib i ts pr iv ate co rp or a tio n s fr om
hectares in area.
entities (87.67% equity share).
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
-ration behind the ban on corpora tion s from acquir ing
- APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKIs
domain
except through lease is not well understood. If the
right of first refusal for the right to top by 5% the highest
o
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the
bid, and be entitled to name the compan y wh ich could
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares
Consti cou ld have simp l y li mited the si ze of alienable
top. KAWASAKI named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
o f s t i l l s u b m e r g e d a r e a s o f M a n i l a B a y, s u c h
lands of the public domain that corporations could
- JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of
tr an sfe r i s voi d fo r b ei n g con tr a r y to Se ctio n 2 ,
acquire. If the intent was to encourage owner2,030,000,000.00php with an ackno wledgment of

KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top. JGSHI was declared the

highest bidder.
- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP
a p p r o v e d . AP T a n d P H I e x e c u t e d a S t o c k P u r c h a s e
Agreement.
- JGSHI filed a peti tion for mandamu s to question the
legality of the right to first refusal and right to top
exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI.
- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper
remedy, and that JGSHI was estopped from questioning
the validity because it participated in the public bidding
with the full knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top.
- SC h e l d t h a t a) t h e r i g h t t o t o p g r a n t e d t o
KAWASAKI/PH I was ille gal . Becau se it allows forei gn
corporations to own more than 40% equity in PHILSECO,
which is a public utility whose capitali zation should be
60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of
competitive bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped from
questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable
provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00
bid of JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return
to PHI the amount of 2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel
the stock certificates issued to PHI.
- Respondents filed MFR with the ff. issues
ISSUES
1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility.
2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI
can exercise its right of first refusal o n l y u p t o 4 0 % of
the total capitalization of PHILSECO
3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates
the principles of competitive bidding.
HELD
1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not
a public utility by nature, and there is no law declaring it
to be.

a)

P u b l i c u t i l i t y = a business or service
engaged in regularly supplying the public with some
commodity or service of public consequence such as
electricity, water, transportation. The facility must
be necessary for the maintenance of life and
occupation of residents.
b)Public utility implies public use and service to the
public. Determinative characteristic: service or
readiness to serve an indefinite public (not a
p r i v i l e g e d f e w ) , w h i ch h a s r i g h t s t o d e m a n d a n d
receive the services and commodities.
c)Public use is not synon ymous wi th public interest.
The fact that a business offers services and goods
that promote public good and serve the interest of
the public does not make it a public utility.
d ) T ru e c r i te r i o n t o j u d g e t h e ch a r a c t e r o f t h e u s e :
whether the public may enjoy it by RIGHT or only by
PERMISSION
e)
S h i p ya r d = a p l a c e o r e n c l o s u r e
wh e re sh ip s a re b ui l t o r re pa ir ed . It ha s a li m i te d

clientele whom it may choose to serve as its

discretion. It is not legally obliged to render its
services to the public. Though the industry may be
imbued with public interest, its public service is
only incidental.
f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public
u ti l i t i e s ( b y Ac t N o 2 3 0 7 , C o m m o n w e a l th Ac t N o
146). Then Marcos PD No. 666 removed it from the
li st of publi c utili tie s to free the indu str y from the
60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution
(he wanted to accelerate the growth of the
industr y). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No. 666 ,
r e v e r t i n g b a c k t h e s ta t u s o f s h i p ya r d s a s p u b l i c
utilities.
g)Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226.
But this did not revive PD No 666 or the other
repealed laws. The status of shipyards reverts back
to non-public utility prior to the Public Service Law.

h i ghe st bi d sh ou ld KAWASAK I/PH I d ecid e to

exercise its right to top.
f)
If the parties did not swap right to first
refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI would still
have the right to buy the shares (for the original
amount, which was lesser), so there is no basis
in the submission that the right to top unfairl y
favored KAWASAKI.
D e ci si on : M F R g r a n t e d . D e c i s i o n & r e so l u t i o n o f C A
affirmed.
Vot i n g Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga
(w/ sep op)

SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA

Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of

No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI
C A N o . 4 5 4 s h i p ya r d s h a v e never been considered
to acquire more then 40% of PHILSECOs total
public utilities. PD 666 merely removed any doubt as to
capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement.
their non-public utility status.
(o r Y E S , i t c a n o w n m o r e t h a n 4 0 % ) . Th e y
agreed that in the event that one party sells its
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON
sh a r e s, th e n o n - se l l i n g p a r t y h av e a p r e f e r e n ti a l
right to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership
PRIVITIZATION
is based on delectus personae. No one can become
QUAISON; July 14, 1995
a m e m b e r o f th e p a r tn e r sh i p a s so ci a ti o n w /o t h e
consent of all other associates.
FACTS
3) No. The right to top d id n o t vio la te the rules - this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the
of competitive bidding.
sale of a block of shares of Petron Corporation and the
a)
bidding = making an offer or an
a war d ma de to Ara m co Ov er sea s Co mp an y a s the
invita tion to prospe ctive contra ctors whe reb y
highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of
the govt manifests its intention to make
shares to Aramco
proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials
- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities
an d e qu ip m en t for o ffici al bu si ne ss or p ub li c
and Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate
use. Public bidding is the accepted method in
name Esso Philippines, Inc.
arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and
- In 1 9 7 3 , th e P h i l i p p i n e go v e r n m e n t a c qu i r e d ES S O
through the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company
ensures that overpricing, favoritism, and other
of the government under the corporate name PET RON
anomalous
practices
are
eliminated
or
and as a subsidiary of PNOC.
minimized.
- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated
b)
Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the
Proclamation No. 50 entitled Proclaiming and Launching
publi c; 2) an oppor tuni ty for co mpetition; 3) a
a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and
b a s i s f o r co m p a r i so n o f b i d s . As l o n g a s th e
Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or
t h r e e a r e co m p l i e d wi t h , th e b i d d i n g i s va l i d
th e Asse ts th e re of a nd cr ea tin g th e Com m ittee o n
and legal.
Pr iva ti za ti on an d th e Asse t Pr iva ti za ti on Trust i n the
c)
The highest bid may not be
e x e r ci se o f h e r l e gi sl a t i v e p o we r u n d e r th e F r e e d o m
automatically accepted. Bidding rules may
Constitution.
specify other conditions or reservations.
- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise
d)
In th e ca se , 1 ) al l in te re sted bi dd er s
revenue for the government and the ideal of leaving
w e r e w e l co m e d ; 2 ) b a si s f o r co m p a r i n g b i d s
business to the private sector.
were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted
- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the
sealed and were opened and read in the
privatization program to be successful and beneficial.
presen ce of the C OAs official represen ta tive
- September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors
and before all other bidders.
approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the
e)
The bidders were placed in equal
footing. And they were made aware of the rules
attention of the administration to the need to privatize
tha t th e gov t r ese rve d th e r i gh t to r e je ct the
Petron.

2)

- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the

Committee on Privatization, endorsed to President
Ramos the proposal of PNOC.
- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by
Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos.
- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of
Energy endorsed for approval
- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the
p r i v a t i za t i o n o f P e t r o n a s p a r t o f t h e E n e r g y S e c t o r
Action Plan.
- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring
and Coordinating Committee recommended a 100%
privatization of Petron.
- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a
r e so l u t i o n a u th o r i zi n g th e co m p a n y to n e go ti a te a n d
c o n c l u d e a co n tr a c t w i t h t h e c o n s o r t i u m o f S a l o m o n
Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital
Corporation for financial advisory services to be
rendered to Petron.
- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the
p ri va ti za ti on o f Pe tr on u p to a m axi mu m o f 6 5 % of i ts
capital stock.
- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%40%-20% privatization strategy of Petron.
- Invitation to bid was published.
- The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at
US$400 million.
- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS),
ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were submitted while the floor
price was being dicussed.
- ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502
million
- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief
Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of
ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same
day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint
questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.
- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock
Purchase Agreement
- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the
Shareholders Agreement
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioner have locus standi
2. W ON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization
program contravened the declared policy of the State
3. WON the bidding procedure was valid
4. WON Petron was a public utility
HELD
1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into
b y th e n a t i o n a l g ov e r n m e n t o r g o v e r n m e n t - o wn e d o r
controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of
the law.
2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the
approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in
accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be
reviewed b y the Court. Such acts are exer cise s of the

executive function as to whi ch the Cour t wil l not pass

judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom.
3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules
should be given more weight than the interpretation by
that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
4 . NO. A public u tili ty under the Con stitu tion and the
Public Service Law is one organized for hire or
co m p e n sa ti o n t o se r v e th e p u b l i c, wh i ch i s gi v e n t h e
right to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil
refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of
other parties.
D e ci si on Petitions dismissed

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT

OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001
FACTS
- Pe ti ti on f or re vi e w o n ce r tio ra r i of a de ci si on of th e
Court of Appeals
- Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged
in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same
and selling various petroleum products through a
network of service stations throughout the country
- Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC)
owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner
of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City
- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of
Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to
relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to
Im e l d a M a r co s Ave , Pa r a n a qu e . T h e a p p l i ca ti o n wa s
initially rejected because the old site had been closed for
five years such that relocation of the same to a new site
would amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet,
which construction was then the subject of a
moratorium. Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and
gave due course to the application.
- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are
a d e qu a t e se r v i ce s ta ti o n s a t te n d i n g t o th e m o to r i st s
requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous competition
will result, and (3) there is a decline not an increase in
the volume of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also
opposed on the ground that Shell failed to comply with
the jurisdictional requirements.
- March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on
ju r i sd i cti on al gro un d s a nd fo r la ck of f ul l ti tl e of th e
lessor over the proposed site
- May 7, 1984: BEU reinstated application and conducted
a hearing thereon
- June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a decision denying
application because there was no necessity for an
addi tional petroleum products re tail outle t on the site .
Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA)
- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the
regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU

- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shells appeal. Shell moved

for reconsideration and prayed for new hearing or
remand of the case for further proceedings. Shell
submitted a new feasibility study to justify application.
- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the
updated survey conducted by Shell
- September 17, 1991: ERB allowed Shell to establish the
service station
- PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the ERB. It thus elevated the case to the CA.
- November 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment
- CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB
thus elevated matters to the Supreme Court
- While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar
application in the same area. PDSC opposed on the same
grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again
filed a peti tion wi th the CA. Petition wa s di smi ssed in
May 14, 1993.
- ERB arguments: evidence used as basis for ERBs
decision is neither stale nor irrelevant and justifies
establishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle
volume and fuel demand supports construction of outlet,
new outlet will not lead to ruinous competition
- Shel l argu ments: ER B findings based on sub stan tia l
ev id en ce , fe asib i l i ty stud y ha s no t b eco me i r re le va nt
even if presented two years after preparation, CA erred
in passing judgment and making pronouncement of
purely economic and policy issues on petroleum
business, proposed outlet will not result to ruinous
competition, CA should have referred the new evidence
to ERB under the doctrine of prior resort to primary
jurisdiction
ISSUES
1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decision
2. W ON there is substantial evidence to support ERBs
finding of public necessity to warrant approval of Shells
application
3. WON the Feasibility study has become stale because
it was submitted in evidence two years after it was
prepared in 1988
4. W ON the establishment of the outlet would result to
ruinous competition
HELD
Ratio The cour ts wi ll no t inte rfere wi th actions of an
administrative agency, except if there is an error of law,
abuse of power, lack of jur isdi ction or grave abuse of
discretion.
G e n e r a l R u l e : The courts will not interfere in matters,
which are addressed to the sound discretion of
go ve rn me n t a gen cie s en tru sted wi th the re gul a tio n of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized
themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the
meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an

independent, conscientious and competent expert

opinion
- Ex ce p t i o n
An action by an administra tive agen cy
m a y be se t a si de if the re i s a n er ro r of la w, ab use of
power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
- W hen an administrative agency renders an opinion or
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law and the administrative interpretation is at
best advisor y for it i s the cour ts tha t finall y deter mine
what the law means.
1.

2.

No cogent reason to depart from general rule since

ERB findings conform to the governing statutes and
controlling case law on the matter
R e gu l a to r y b o a r d s w e r e e m p o w e r e d to e n te r t a i n
a n d a c t o n a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r th e e s ta b l i s h m e n t o f
gasoline stations in the Philippines.

There is a worldwide trend towards

economic deregulation. This trend is reflected
in our policy considerations, statutes and
jurisprudence.
RA 8479 was enacted to implement Art XII,
Sec. 19 of the Constitution
Government believes deregulation will
eventually prevent monopoly
Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and
sp irit. It espouse s competition. The
objective is based upon the belief that
through competition producers will satisfy
co n su m e r w a n ts a t th e l o w e s t p r i ce wi t h
the sacrifice of the fewest resources.
Compe ti tion amon g producers allo ws
con su me r s to bi d fo r goo d s an d se rv ice s
and thus, matches their desires with
societys opportunity costs.

Re cen t d evel op me n ts in the oi l

industry as well as legislative enactments and
jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken
and rendered stale the view espoused b y the
appellate court in denying Shells petition
ERB Decision was based on hard economic data

Data includes: developmental projects,

residential subdivision listings, population
count,
public
conveyances,
commercial
establishments, traffic count, fuel demand,
g r o wt h o f p r i v a te ca r s, p u b l i c u ti l i t y ve h i cl e s
and commercial vehicles increased market
potential which will benefit community and
transient motorists

ER B i s in a better posi tion to reso lve

Shells application being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter

Substantial evidence is all that is

needed to support an administrative finding of
fact. It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept to support a

conclusion
3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals Sixteenth
Division affirming ERB Decision approving a similar
a pp li ca tio n b y Ca l tex is mo re i n ke ep i n g wi th the
policy of the State and the rationale of the statutes
enacted to govern the industry

CA: no gasoline station along the

e n ti r e st r e t ch ; n e e d n o t n e ce ssa r i l y r e su l t i n
ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to
that effect; unless petitioner is able to prove by
co mp e te n t ev id en ce th a t si gn if i ca n t cha n ge s
have occurred sufficiently to invalidate that
afore-stated study, the presumption is that said
study remains valid
4. The mere possibil ity of reduction of earnings of a
business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition

In determining the allowance or

d i sa l lo wa n ce of an a pp li ca tio n for th e
construction of a service station, the CA
confined the factors thereof within the rigid
sta nd ar d s gov er ni n g pu bl i c u ti l i ty r e gu l a tio n ,
where exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain
requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity
i s m o r e th e e x ce p t i o n r a th e r th a n t h e r u l e i n
the gasoline service station business

PDSC failed to show that its business

would not have suffi cien t profi t to have a fair
return on investment

Caltex , PD SC s principal, never filed

any opposition to Shells application

A climate of fear and pessimism

generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous
competition already rejected in the past should
not be made to retard free competition,
consistently
with
legislative
policy
of
deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to
ensure a truly competitive market under a
regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous
supply, environmentally clean and high quality
petroleum products
D e ci si on
(1) C h a l l e n g e d d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s i s
reversed and set aside
(2) E R B O r d e r g r a n t i n g th e a m e n d e d a p p l i c a t i o n o f
Pi lipina s Shel l Corpora tion to reloca te i ts se rvice
sta ti on to Be ni gn o Aqu in o Jr., Ave ., P que , Me tro
Manila reinstated
Vo t i n g 3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave

FACTS
- Two s e p a r a t e m o t i o n s f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e e k i n g
reversal of the SCs decision nullifying the win-win
resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office
of the President (OP)
- Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in
reopening the case in OP Case No. 96-C 6424 through
the i ssuan ce of November 7, 1997 win -win Re solution
which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 OP
Decision that had long become final and executory
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the
same office as final and executory after the DARs
motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period
- Movants:
o
T h e w i n - w i n r e so l u t i o n i s v a l i d a s i t
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o
Proper remedy for petitioner is a
petition for review and not certiorari
o
Filing of motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before petition for
certiorari may be filed
o
Petitioners
are guilty of forum
shopping
- Intervenors:
o
They have right to intervene
o
The win-win resolution is valid as it
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o
Win-win resolution properly addresses
the substantial issues of the case
- Bo th m ova nts ask th a t the i r m o ti on s be re sol ve d e n
banc since the issues are novel and of transcendental
significance Issue here according to them is WON the
power of the local government units (LGUs) to reclassify
lands is subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian
Reform (DAR)
- Other issues raised by movants described as
substantial (1) whether the subject land is considered
a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2)
whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsor y Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is
tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for
intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries
t h e r e o f ; a n d ( 4 ) w h e t h e r t h e S a n g g u n i a n g B a ya n o f
Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into
industrial/institutional use

ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM

ISSUE
WON the SCs decision nullifying the win-win resolution
d a te d N o v e m b e r 7 , 1 9 9 7 i s s u e d b y th e O ff i c e o f t h e
President (OP) must be reversed.

FORTRICH V CORONA
MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998

HELD
- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary
import to merit the attention of the Court en banc

o The issue is no longer novel as having been

decided in Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. CA
wh e re in i t wa s h el d tha t LGU s ne ed no t o b ta in
the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non agricultural use.
o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at
b y a un an im ou s vote of al l f ive me mb e r s of the
nd
2 Division.
- The order which denied the DARs motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was
not an erroneous ruling and it does not have to be
corrected by the November 7, 1997 win-win resolution
o In a cco rd an ce wi th Ad m in i stra ti ve or de r No . 18
which
mandates
that
decisions,
orders,
resolutions of the OP shall become final after the
l ap se of 15 d a ys f ro m re ce i p t of cop y th er eo f
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within
such period.
o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR
must not disregard the reglementary period fixed
b y la w in referrin g the deci sion to the
departments concerned for the preparation of the
motion of consideration
o Pr o ce du ra l r ul e s sho ul d b e tr ea te d wi th u tmo st
respect and due regard as the y are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
wor sening problem of dela y in the reso lution of
rival claims in the administration of justice
- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
second motion for reconsideration and on the basis
t h e r e o f i s s u e d t h e w i n - w i n r e so l u t i o n w a s a f l a g r a n t
infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave
breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are
clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
o
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision
was declared final and executor y, vested ri gh ts
were acquired by the petitioners
- W hen th e D AR s o r d e r d e n yi n g t h e p e ti ti o n e r s f i r st
application for conversion was first brought by petitioner
to the OP, the appropriate administrative rules were not
co mp l ie d wi th . Bu t m ova n ts ca nn o t n o w qu e stio n the
supposed procedural lapse for the first time before the
S C . I t sh o u l d h a v e b e e n r a i se d a n d r e so l v e d a t t h e
administrative level.
- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in
the subject matter.
o Being merel y sea sonal farmwor kers wi thou t the
right to own, application for intervention must fail
a s the y have n o l e gal or a ctu a l an d su b sta n tia l
interest over the subject land
o ev en "wi n - wi n R e so lu ti on of Nov em be r 7 , 19 97
did no t recogni ze the la tter as proper par tie s to
intervene in the case simply because the qualified
farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously
determined as ordered in the said resolution.

- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and

l a n d o w n e r s a n d t e n a n t fa r m e r s co n ce r n e d
properl y dispo sed of the aforementioned sub stan tia l
heretofore authorized.
issues
Payment of lease rentals to landowners
o Factual findings of administrative agencies which
covered by OLT shall terminate on the date
have acquired expertise in their field are binding
the value of the land is established.
and conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is
Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their
the m o st com pe te n t i n ma tter s fal l in g wi th in i ts
lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its
domain
authorized agents: provided that in case
- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
w h e r e t h e va l u e o f th e l a n d i s e st a b l i sh e d
Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of
during the month the crop is to be harvested,
the impoverised members of society will be benefited by
the cut-off period shall take effect on the next
t h e a gr o - e co n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e d i sp u te d l a n d
harvest season. With respect to cases where
which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of
lease ren tals paid may exceed the value of
Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake.
the land , the tenant-farmer s ma y no lon ger
be bound to pa y such ren tal, but i t shal l be
o T he OP De cision of Mar ch 29, 1996 was for the
his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR
eventual benefit of the man y, no just of the few.
Tea m L e a d e r c o n c e r n e d o f s u c h f a c t w h o
This is clearly shown from the development plan
sh a l l a sce r ta i n i m m e d i a t e l y th e v e r a ci t y of
on the subject land as conceived by the
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t h e r e a f te r r e s o l v e t h e
petitioners
matter expeditiously as possible. If the
- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration
landowner
shall
insist
after
positive
of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the
a s ce r t a i n m e n t t h a t t h e t e n a n t - f a r m e r i s t o
r e s p o n d e n t s a n d th e a p p l i c a n t s f o r i n te r v e n t i o n , a r e
pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
the rental insisted to be paid shall de
deposited by the tenant-farmer with the LBP

SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002

FACTS
- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as coadministratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with
the Cour t of Appeals a pe tition for prohibition and
mandamus s e e k i n g t o p r o h i b i t t h e L a n d B a n k o f t h e
Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals
from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando
Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the
rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre.
- Ernesto Sigre was private responden ts tenant in an
irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan,
Ilo i lo . He wa s pr evi ou sl y p a yin g p riv a te r e sp on de n t a
l e a se r e n t a l o f 1 6 ca v a n s p e r cr o p o r 3 2 c a v a n s p e r
agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992,
Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent
and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the
Department of Agrarian Reforms Memorandum Circular
N o . 6 , Se ri e s of 1 97 8, wh i ch se t th e gu id el i ne s i n the
payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmerbeneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No.
27.
- The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6 reads:
"A. W here the value of the land has already
been established.
T he val ue o f th e la nd i s e stab l i sh ed o n th e
da te the Secre tar y or his author i zed
representative has finally approved the
average gross production data established by
the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by

or its authorized agent in his name and for his

a cco u n t t o b e wi th d r a w n o n l y u p o n p r o p e r
written authorization of the DAR District
Officer based on the result of ascertainment
or investigation."
- According to private respondent, she had no notice that
the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to
O c t o b e r 1 9 7 2 a t a n a v e r a g e o f 1 19 . 3 2 c a v a n s p e r
hectare, and the value of the land was pegged at
P13,405.67. Thus, the petition filed before the Court of
Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of MC No. 6, but
also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.
- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition
and declared MC No. 6 null and void. The LBP was
directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals
paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals
directly to private respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as
n u l l a n d v o i d , t h e a p p e l l a t e co u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e r e i s
n o t h i n g i n P.D . 2 7 w h i c h s a n c t i o n s t h e c o n t e s t e d
provision of the circular; that said circular is in conflict
wi t h P.D . 8 1 6 wh i ch p r o v i d e s t h a t p a ym e n t s o f l e a se
rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter,
being a statute, must prevail over the circular; that P.D.
2 7 i s u n co n s t i tu t i o n a l i n l a yi n g d o w n t h e f o r m u l a f o r
determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on
the
judicial
prerogative
of
determining
just
compensation; and that it is no longer applicable, with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
1. WON MC No. 6 is valid
2. WON MC No. 6 can be reconciled with PD 816

3. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional

tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease

rentals to the landowner until the value of the property
HELD
has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner
1. YES.
a n d th e D A R . O n t h e o th e r h a n d , D A R M e m o r a n d u m
- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres.
Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a
tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the
land reform area and decreed the emancipation of
value of the land has been determined.
t e n a n t s f r o m t h e b o n d a ge o f th e s o i l , t r a n sf e r r i n g to
- In C u r s o v. C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s , i n v o l v i n g t h e s a m e
them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its
Ci r cu l ar an d P.D . 81 6 , i t wa s ca te go ri ca ll y ru le d th a t
purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase
there is no incompatibility between these two.
by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of
- In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guidelines in
the economy, of the lands the y were tilling. Owners of
t h e p a ym e n t o f l e a se r e n ta l s /a m o r ti za t i o n s i n
rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum
implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and MC
retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified
No. 6, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the
farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was
date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the
pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued MC No. 6,
tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank.
series of 1978.
The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial
- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not
payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.
sanction said Circular, particularly, the provision stating
- P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t , h o w e v e r, sp l i t s h a i r s , so to
that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall
speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on
terminate on the date the value of the land is
the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816,
established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their
whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was
lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized
issued in implementation of P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and
agents.
P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation
- W e d i s a g r e e . T h e p o w e r o f s u b o r d i n a te l e g i s l a t i o n
o f P.D . 2 7 . T h e s e m u s t n o t b e r e a d i n i s o l a t i o n , b u t
a l l o w s a d m i n i s tr a t i v e b o d i e s to i m p l e m e n t th e b r o a d
rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816,
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details.
rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After
All that is required is that the regulation should be
the value of the land has been determined/established,
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to
r e gu l a tio n be n ot in con tr ad i ctio n to b ut in con fo rm i t y
the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly, there
w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d s p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e l a w. O n e s u c h
is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular
and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as
No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel,
it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals
emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from
on the agricultural property.
th e bo nd a ge of th e soi l b y tra n sf er r in g to the te na n t3. NO.
f a r m e r s t h e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e l a n d t h e y r e t i l l i n g . As
- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is
noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular,
a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by
p r o b l e m s h a v e b e e n e n co u n t e r e d i n t h e e x p e d i ti o u s
this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De
implementation of the land reform program, thus
Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be
necessitating its promulgation.
constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law
- The rationale for the Cir cular was, in fact, expli ci tl y
of the land, viz.:
r eco gn i ze d b y th e a pp el la te cou r t wh e n i t sta ted th a t
"There is no doubt then, as set forth
(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain
expressly
therein,
that
the
goal
is
that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are
e m a n ci p a t i o n . W ha t i s m o r e , th e d e cr e e i s
applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
n o w p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f t h e l a w o f th e l a n d
land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the
accord ing to the revised Consti tu tion i tse lf.
situation where the tenant-farmer s lease rentals to
Ejectmen t therefore of pe titioner s is simpl y
l a n d o wn e r we r e n o t c r e d i t e d i n h i s f a vo r a ga i n st th e
ou t of the que stion. That would be to set at
determined purchase price of the land, thus making him
naught an express mandate of the
a perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since the
Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is
assailed Circular essentiall y sought to accomplish the
clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not
noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being
only so because of the cardinal postulate of
the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the
respect.
fundamental law. It is also because any other
2. YES.
approach would run the risk of setting at
- The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict
naught this basic aspiration to do away with
between P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular
all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with
No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the
the promise and the hope associated with an

o pe n so cie t y. To d ep ri ve pe ti tio ne r s o f th e
small landholdin gs in the face of a
presidential decree considered ratified by the
new Constitution and precisely in accordance
w i t h i t s a v o w e d o b j e c t i v e co u l d i n d e e d b e
contributor y to perpetuating the misery that
tenancy had spawned in the past as well as
the grave socia l problem s thereb y crea ted.
T h e r e ca n b e n o ju st i f i ca t i o n f o r a n y o th e r
decision then whether predicated on a
juridical norm or on the traditional role
assigned to the judiciary of implementing and
not thwarting fundamental policy goals."
- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally
involves private respondent and counsel in the case at
bench,
the
Court
emphatically
declared
that
" P r e si d e n ti a l D e cr e e N o . 2 7 h a s su rv i v e d th e t e s t o f
constitutionality."
- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with
judicial imprimatur in A s s o c i a t i o n o f R i c e & C o r n
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land
Reform Council.
- Fu r th er, in Asso ci a tio n of Sm al l L an do wn er s in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity
o f P.D . 2 7 w a s u l t i m a t e l y f o r e c l o s e d w h e n i t w a s
declared therein that R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
a ga i n s t a l l t h e co n s ti tu ti o n a l o b je ct i o n s r a i se d i n th e
herein petition.
- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets
limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just
compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:
"For the purpose of deter minin g the cost of
the land to be transferred to the tenantfarmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of
the land shall be e quivalent to two and one
half (2 ) times the average harvest of three
normal crop years immediately preceding the
promulgation of this Decree;"
- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:
"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and
corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based
on the average gross production determined
by the Baranga y Committee on Land
Pro du cti on in a cco rd an ce wi th D ep ar tm en t
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973
and related issuances and regulation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The average
gross production per hectare shall be
multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product
of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five
Pesos (P35.00), the government support price
for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October
21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50
ki lo s of co rn o n Octob er 21 , 1 97 2, an d th e

a mo un t ar ri ve d a t sha l l b e th e val ue of the

T h r e e h a c i e n d a s ( P a l i c o , B a n i l a d , C a yl a w a y) i n
2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid
ri ce and corn land , as the case ma y be, for
Nasugbu, Bats is owned by Roxas and Co., a domestic
3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas
the purpose of determining its cost to the
corp.
farmer and compensation to the landowner."
- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO
HELD
- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No.
229 for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
1. Yes.
27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is
- Congress passed RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But
not final or conclusive. This is evident from the
Reform Law or CARL). This was signed by Pres. Aquino.
judicial action can be resorted to immediately when
succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:
- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntar y offer to sell
- question is purely legal
"x x x In the event of dispute with the
Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
- the administrative body is in estoppel
landowner regarding the amount of lease
l a te r p l a ce d u n d e r co m p u l so r y a cq u i s i t i o n b y D AR i n
- act is patently illegal
r e n t a l p a i d b y t h e f a r m e r b e n e f i c i a r y, t h e
accordance w/ CARL.
- theres urgent need for judicial intervention
Department of Agrarian Reform and the
PALICO AND BANILAD
- respondent disregarded due process
Barangay Committee on Land Production
- F o r H a ci e n d a s P a l i c o a n d Ba n i l a d , t h e M u n i c i p a l
- the respondent is a department secretary
co n ce r n e d sh a l l r e so l v e th e d i sp u t e wi t h i n
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent notices Invitation
- irreparable damage will be suffered
thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant
to Parties to Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime Pimentel,
- theres no other speedy remedy
to
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
Hacienda Administrator. This was to discuss the results
- strong public interest is involved
Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973,
of DAR investigation of Haciendas.
The reports
- subject of controversy is private land
and other pertinent issuances. In the event a
recommended that the haciendas be subject to
- in quo warranto proceedings
party questions in court the resolution of the
compulsory acquisition. DAR, through its Secretary, sent
- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law
dispute, the landowners compensation shall
Notices of Acquisition.
provides that deposit must be made only in cash or
still be processed for payment and the
- W he th er th e y a cce p t o r r e je ct th i s o ffer, the y m u st
L a n d b a n k b o n d s . D A R s i n i t i a l a c t i o n to o p e n t r u s t
proceed s shal l be held in tru st by the Trust
inform Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. In
account deposits does not constitute payment.
Department of the Land Bank in accordance
c a s e o f r e j e c t i o n o r f a i l u r e t o r e p l y, D A R c o n d u c t s
2. No.
with the provisions of Section 5 hereof,
administrative
proceedings
to
determine
just
- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory
pending the resolution of the dispute before
compensation of the land. In case of acceptance or if
and voluntary.
the court."
compensation has already been deposited, DAR takes
- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and
- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the
immediate possession of the land.
the lando wner s must fir st be iden tified . However, the
te na n t- f ar me r a cce p t the val ua tio n of the p ro pe r ty b y
- B e c p e t i t i o n e r r e j e c te d , D A R s e n t t o L a n d b a n k a
la w i s si le n t o n h o w i de n tif i ca ti on m u st b e m ad e . To
the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR,
Request to Open Trust Account in favor of petitioner for
address thi s, DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989 . This
t h e p a r ti e s m a y b r i n g th e d i sp u te to co u r t i n o r d e r t o
its compensation.
was amended by DAR AO 9-1990 and DAR AO 1-1993.
de termine the appropria te amoun t of co mpensa tion , a
- Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and
In these amendments, Notice of Coverage and letter of
task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.
Bani lad fr agri cul tural to non-a gri land s. De spite thi s
invitation to conference meeting were expanded.
- Finall y, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A.
application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisition of the
- Th e No ti ce of Cov er a ge no tif ie s l an do wn e r tha t hi s
6657 or the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27.
haciendas.
property is placed under CARP, informs him that a public
R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land
- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were
hearing will be conducted and a field investigation of the
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
replaced by DAR with cash and Landbank bonds.
land will be conducted.
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and
- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award
- Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the
Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and
(CLOAs) and distributed them to farmer beneficiaries.
P r e s i d e n t , M a n a g e r, S e c r e t a r y, C a s h i e r o r a g e n t o r
corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for
CAYLAWAY
directors. This is to ensure prompt and proper notice.
the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the
Jaime Pimentel is not one of these parties.
Program, specifically states: (P)residential Decree No.
govt. DAR accepted the petitioners voluntary offer and
- Petitioner s principal place of business is in Makati.
27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect
sent Notice of Acquisition.
Pimentel is based in Nasugbu.
t o r i ce a n d c o r n l a n d s , co v e r e d th e r e u n d e r. x x x I t
- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DAR
- As s u m i n g th a t P i m e n t e l w a s a n a ge n t o f t h e co r p ,
can no t be ga in sa id , th er ef or e , th a t R .A. 66 57 d id n ot
withdrawing voluntary offer for sale (VOS) bec
there is no showing that he was duly authorized to
repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr
attend the conference meeting.
provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A.
agri to non-agri land.
- As s u m i n g p e t i t i o n e r w a s d u l y n o t i f i e d , t h e a r e a s
6 6 5 7 sh a l l b e su p p l e t o r y t o t h e l a t t e r, a n d a l l r i g h t s
- DAR said reclassification would not exempt the land fr
subject to CARP were not properly identified before they
a c q u i r e d b y t h e t e n a n t - f a r m e r u n d e r P.D . 2 7 a r e
agrarian reform. It denied the withdrawal of the VOS.
were taken over by D AR. The acqu isi tion cover s onl y
retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board
portions, not the entire haciendas. The haciendas are
D e ci si on
Petitions GRANT ED . The Decision of
(DARAB) for cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a
n o t e n ti r e l y a g r i l a n d s . Pe ti ti o n e r h a d n o i d e a w h i ch
the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
tourist zone and not suitable for agri production. This
portion was subject to compulsory acquisition. This is
petition for conversion was denied by the MARO.
important bec petitioner can exercise right to retention
- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition.
ch o o se to r e ta i n n o t m o r e th a n 5 h e ct a r e s o u t o f th e
ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
Hence, the recourse to SC.
total area subject to CARP.
PUNO; December 17, 1999
- W ith respect to Caylawa y, notices were not deemed
ISSUES
received by the petitioner.
FACTS
1 . W ON S C ca n t a ke co g n i za n ce d e sp i t e f a i l u r e o f
3. No.
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies

- DARs failure to observe due process in acqui sition

does not ipso facto give SC power to adjudicate on
application for conversion from agri to non-agri land. Its
DARs job.
- Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve
prime agri lands for food production while recogni zing
need of other sectors for land. CARL promotes social
justice, industrialization, and optimum use of land.
- Land use manner of utilization of land incl. allocation,
devt and mgmt.
- Land use conversion requires field investigation.
- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SC to
a r r o ga te a u th o r i t y t o r e so l v e co n t r o v e r s y ju r i sd i c ti o n
ov er w /c i s i ni ti a ll y lo d ge d w / a n ad mi ni str a tiv e b od y.
Here, DAR must be given chance to correct its
procedural lapses.
D e ci si on P e t i t i o n i s r e m a n d e d t o D A R f o r p r o p e r
acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioners
application for conversion.

SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [concur and dissent]
- PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone,
has force and effect of law unless repealed. It cannot be
disregarded by DAR.

YNARES-SANTIAGO
dissent]

[concurr

and

- If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party

are violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be
reversed and set aside.
- C L O A s d o n o t h a v e n a t u r e o f Tor r e n s T i t l e a n d
administrative cancellation of title is sufficient to
invalidate them.

ART XIV: EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD
OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND
ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET
CELINE
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
FACTS
- Ar o k i a s w a m y W i l l i a m M a r ga r e t C e l i n e i s a n I n d i a n
citi zen taking her doctoral program in Anthropology at
t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . To c o m p l e t e t h e
doctoral program she was required to pass a dissertation

a n d s h e c r e a t e d o n e e n t i t l e d , Tam i l i n f l u e n c e s i n
filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. She defended
while Court of Appeals rev ersed and ordered the
h er d isse r ta ti on al tho u gh pr io r to i t D r. Me di na no te d
restoration of the degree.
so me lifted materia l in the di sser ta tion wi thou t proper
acknowledgment. She got the nod of four of the five
ISSUES
panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the
1. W ON the writ of Mandamu s is applicable in this
letter coming from Dean Paz that wanted her to be
situation
temporarily struck off the list of candidates for
2. W ON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be
graduation to clear the problems regarding her
done by the University
dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time.
3. WON there was a denial of due process
- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a
letter that she would not be granted academic clearance
HELD
w i t h o u t C e l i n e su b s ta n t i a t i n g h e r a c cu s a t i o n o f D r s .
1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an
Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the
i n st i tu ti o n of h i gh e r l e a r n i n g f r o m th e e xe r ci se of i ts
disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by
academic freedom that is a constitutional right
sa yi n g tha t th e u nfav or ab le a tti tud e wa s du e to so me
2 . Yes , b e c a u s e M a n d a m u s i s a w r i t c o m m a n d i n g a
failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel members
tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act
and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr.
required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglects
Medina answered back and wrote that Celines
t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n a c t w h i c h t h e l a w sp e ci f i c a l l y
dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
doctorate be withdrawn.
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
- An ad -h oc co m mi tte e wa s for me d to i nve sti ga te the
e n j o ym e n t o f a r i gh t o r o ff i ce t o w h i c h s u ch o t h e r i s
char ge s and tha t the reque st for the withdra wal of the
e n ti t l e d , th e r e b e i n g n o p l a i n , sp e e d y, a n d a d e qu a t e
doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In
remedy in the ordinar y course of a law. It could not be
the investigation it was found out that in at least 90
invoked against the academic freedom of the school as
instances the dissertation included lifted materials
academic freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV
wi t h o u t p r o p e r o r d u e a c kn o wl e d gm e n t . Th e C o l l e ge
Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of authority over the
Assembly
therefore
unanimously
approved
and
choice of students. This entails as well that it can also
r eco mm en de d the wi thd r a wa l of the d octo ra te d e gr ee
d e te r m i n e wh o wo u l d h a v e t h e d i s ti n ct i o n o f b e i n g a
and forwarded it to the University Council. The University
graduate of the school. If the University discovers that
Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the
the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it
withdrawal to the Board of Regents. UP Diliman
has the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The
Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and
actions of the University through the Board of Regents is
th a t she sho u ld sub m i t h er wr i tte n exp la na ti on to th e
to protect academic integrity by withdrawing her
charges against her. The Chancellor informed Celine of
academic degree that she obtained through fraud.
th e ch ar ge s an d sho wed a cop y o f th e fi nd in gs of the
3 . N o , D u e p r o c e s s w a s d o n e a s t h e r e w e r e se v e r a l
investigating committee. A second meeting was done as
investigations done by the school starting from the
we ll as a third one, however Cel ine did not a ttend the
college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in
third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that
t h e i nv e s ti ga ti o n to cl e a r u p h e r n a m e . H o we v e r, t h e
time already had decided her case before she was fully
actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her sources
heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the
proved that indeed she committed the offense. Her
jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary
demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is
tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the
untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for
withdrawal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized
the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in the
penalty.
ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore.
- A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman
that investi ga ted the case and the y came out with the
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT
findings through all the documents and an interview of
Celine. It was established that at least 22 counts of
OF APPEALS
d o c u m e n te d l i f t i n g w e r e i d e n t i f i e d t h a t f o r m s t h e 9 0
KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000
instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That
Celine admits of being guilt of the allegation of
FACTS
plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to withdraw
-PET ITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience with
Court of Appeals
the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was
-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of
denied.
Miriam Colleges school paper Chi-Rho entitled Libog
- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer
at Iba Pang Tula was odiously received by the MCHS
for a writ of mandatory injunction and damages was

community, calling it obscene, indecent and devoid

TRO. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of
- I n se v e r a l ca se s , th e C o u r t h a s u p h e l d th e r i gh ts of
of all moral values among other things.
a pr ocee di n g pr io r to the jud gm e n t of a fi na l or de r to
students to free speech in school premises.
- an ex ce rp t wr i tten b y M r. Go m e z, wh o wr o te the
preserve the status quo of things until the merits of the
- A s h e l d i n T in k e r v. D e s M o i n e s S c h o o l D i s t r i c t :
foreword (Foreplay) reads:
case can be heard and persists until issuance of a final
petitioners have the right to peacable assembly and free
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang
injunction.
speechthey do not shed these constitutional rights at
mga putang bikay na sa gitna
A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until
the schoolhouse gate. A students rights extend beyond
di na puwedeng paglabhan
the hearing of the application of the preliminary
class hours, and he/she may express even controversial
di na maaring pagbabaran
injunction. In the instant case, no such preliminary
subjects on school grounds
-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the
i n j u n c t i o n w a s i s su e d , h e n c e t h e T R O a u t o m a t i c a l l y
-however, free speech is not absolute and students lose
theme sekswalidad at ibat ibang karanasan nito
expired (BP 224, TRO expires after 20 days if judge takes
immunity when conduct by the studentdisrupts class
-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the
no action on application of preliminary injunction). The
work or involvesinvasion of the rights of others.
MC Discipline Committee wrote a letter to the editorial
CA erred in assuming its order was complied w/ by
-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside
b oa rd , i nf or m in g the m of the co mp l ai n ts f il ed a ga in st
Miriam; it cant be said that the students had graduated
the provisions of the Constitution. Consistent w/
their publi cation by the Miriam Communi ty, alon g wi th
w/in that short span of time. Miriam also allegedly
ju risp rudence , S7 of R A 7079 shou ld be read to mean
the alleged school regulations violated, and requiring the
refused the students readmission, and so actual
that the scho o l ca n t su sp en d /e xp el a stud en t on the
b o a r d to su b m i t a wr i t t e n st a te m e n t i n a n sw e r t o th e
controversy still existed. Since the RTC had set aside all
sole basis of articles he/she has written, except when
charges.
previous orders, it allowed the dismissals and
such articles materially disrupt class work orinvades
-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS,
suspensions to remain in force.
the rights of others.
w/c under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94, has jurisdiction
2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states that
- From the fore goin g, i t is eviden t tha t Miria m Colle ge
-the students atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for
t h e e d i t o r i a l b o a r d o f a s c h o o l p u b l i ca t i o n i s f r e e t o
has jurisdiction over the complaints against the
actions committed w/in their capacity as campus
determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same act
students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct of its
journalists, what applies is RA 7079 (The Campus
provides that a ..a student shall not be expelled or
po wer to suspend or expel students. It is a nece ssa r y
Journalism Act) and not committee regulations
su sp e n d e d so l e l y o n th e b a si s o f a r ti cl e s h e /sh e h a s
corollary to its enforcement of rules and regulations, w/c
-the committee proceeded w/ its investigation ex parte,
written orperformance of his/her duties. S9
is inherently granted by the Constitution. The court
su sp en d in g 5 stu de n ts, expe ll i n g 3 , d i sm i ssin g 2 an d
mandate s DEC S to promul ga te the rules and
th er ef or e ru le s th a t M C ha s the au th o ri t y to he ar a nd
withholding graduation privileges of 1 student
regulations for the act, as embodied by DECS Order No.
decide the cases filed against respondent students.
-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and
94 , ser i e s of 19 92 wh i ch un de r Ru le 12 pr ovi de s th a t
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
DECS regional offi ce shall have original jurisdiction
CAMACHO V CORESIS
order before the RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline
o v e r c a se s a s a r e s u l t o f t h e d e c i s i o n s , a c t i o n s a n d
Boards jurisdiction
policies of the editorial board of a school w/in its area of
QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002
- t h e R T C d e n i e d t h e p r a ye r f o r a T R O a n d h e l d t h a t
administrative responsibility.
nothing in the DECS Order No. 94 excludes school Admin
When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the
FACTS
from exercising jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the
students, they filed a petition for certiorari and
- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the
jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases
prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline
graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty.
- the stu de n ts the n f il ed a Su pp l em en ta l Pe ti ti on a nd
Board had no jurisdiction over the case (2) the Board did
Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and
Motion for Reconsideration after w/c the RTC granted
not have the qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter,
criminal complaints against private respondents.
the writ for preliminary injunction (against expulsion and
w/c would deny the students their right to due process.
- In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of
dismissal) so as not to render the issues moot
The issues thus raised were purel y legal in nature and
the College of Education of the University of
- bo th pa r tie s m ov ed fo r r e co n si de r a tio n af te r w /c th e
well wi thin the jurisdiction of the TC to determine. The
Southeastern Philippines (USP) received complaints from
RTC recalled the issues and dismissed the case
TC had the duty to render a decision for a case w/in its
several doctoral students regarding a class held by
-the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c
ju risd iction and should have settl ed the i ssue s before
respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY 1994i ssued a resolu tion requ irin g the respondents to sho w
dismissing the case.
1995. The complaints were that there were ghost
cause wh y no preliminar y injunction should be issued,
3 . YE S. A1 4 S5 (2 ) of the Co nsti tu ti on gu a ra n te e s a ll
students in Dr. Daleons class, namely respondents Aida
and issued a TRO (against the dismissals/suspensions)
institution of higher learning academic freedom w/c
Agu lo , De sid e ri o Ala ba a nd N or ma Tecso n , wh o we r e
-the CA granted the students petition, declaring the RTC
includes the right of the school to decide for itself how
given grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite
order and the dismissals/suspensions as void
best to attain it:
their failure to attend regular classes.
-hence this present petition by Miriam College
( 1 ) w h o m a y te a ch ( 2 ) wh a t m a y b e ta u gh t ( 3 ) h o w i t
- June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon
shall be taught (4) who may be admitted to study
to furnish copies of exams, term papers, records of
ISSUES
-how it shall be taught certainly encompasses the right
attendance, which respondent ignored. The matter was
1.WON the case has been rendered moot
o f th e sch oo l to d i sci p li ne i ts stud en ts. wha t ma y b e
raised in a university council meeting and a committee
2.WON the TC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition
taught embodies the Constitutional obligation to instill
wa s cr e a te d t o i n v e st i g a te th e co m p l a i n t . D r. D a l e o n
for certiorari by the students
discipline in students, stated in A14 S3(2)
admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo,
3 .W ON Mi r ia m h ad ju ri sd i ctio n ove r the co mp la i n ts
- who ma y b e a dm i tted to stu d y cle ar l y p rov id e s the
Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without
against the students
school w/ the right to determine whom to expel
petitioners approval.
A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the States power to
- Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University
HELD
regulate and supervise educational institutions, not
P r e s ) t h a t Ag u l o , Al a b a , a n d Tec s o n b e r e q u i r e d t o
1 . N O. Pe ti tio ne r a sse r ts th a t the ca se i s mo o t sin ce
deprive them of their rights
attend regular classes and comply with the course
more than 1 year had passed since the court issued the
requirements.
Dr.
Prantilla
approved
the

reco mmendation; howev er, he also enter tained an

appeal b y Agu lo to validate the grades given to them .
The BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner
filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as
well as criminal complaints against Dr. Daleon, Agulo,
Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including
Dr. Pran til la for viola tin g R .A. 3019 and /or su ch other
penal laws to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Said office ordered respondents to desi st from fur ther
proceedings to consolidate the administrative complaint
with the criminal complaint.
- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito
Core sis, Jr., the graf t investi ga tor of the Offi ce of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao , and approved b y Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon
finding insufficient evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for
the administrative charges as well as finding no prima
facie violation for the criminal complaint. Petitioner
m ove d for r e co n si de ra ti on an d wa s de ni ed f or l ack of
merit. Hence, the case was brought before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
W ON p u b l i c r e s p o n d e n t s c o m m i t t e d g r a v e a b u s e o f
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (in
exoneratin g Dr. Daleon from admini strative as we ll as
criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to
A g u l o , Tec s o n , a n d Al a b a w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g t h e m t o
attend classes).
HELD
- Ab sent a sho wing of lack or excess of jur isdi ction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the Courts power of judicial review under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked.
R e a so n i n g
1. From the records, there is no valid ground nor
co gen t reason to hold responden t Office of grave
abuse of discretion because the conclusions in its
assailed Resolution are based on substantial
evidence easi l y verifiable . W ell estab lished is the
principle that factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect and even
f i n a l i t y b y th i s C o u r t, p r o v i d e d su ch f i n d i n gs a r e
supported by substantial evidence.
2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art.
140 of the University Code which provides that the
rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in
all classes subject to the modification by the Dean
in the case of graduate students and other courses.
It is undispu ted that Dr. Daleon had alread y been
designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate
School by the President of USP and was even
entitled to emoluments inherent to the Dean of the
Grad. School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the
func tion s of the Dean of the Grad . School , Dr.

Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on

attendance without seeking permission of petitioner.
3. Dr. Daleons teaching style had support of the
members of the Board of Regents (BoR), the body
wi th the authori ty to formula te universi ty policies,
full y kno wing the policy on attendance of students
i n th e g r a d u a t e sch o o l . In p a s si n g i ts r e so l u t i o n ,
they not only validated the grades given by Daleon,
t h e y a l s o g a v e a n i m p r i m a t u r o n t h e p r o p r i e t y,
regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons
instructional approach.
4. Dr. D al eo n s tea ch in g styl e , val id a ted b y the

n a m e l y: t h a t "h e r f r e qu e n t q u e s t i o n s a n d d i f fi c u l t i e s
were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class," is not valid ground for
expulsion
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that
p e ti ti on er wa s a dm i tted , no t to a de gr ee p ro gr am bu t
merely to take some courses for credit, since admission
to a degree requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean
of the Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University
(as opposed to, the Loyola School of Theology), and no
such acceptance was given.
- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher
learning" has the "academic freedom" to discretion
USP BoR, is bolstered by the constitutional
wh e th er to ad mi t or con ti nu e ad mi tti n g an y p ar ti cu l ar
guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom
stu de n t con sid er i n g n o t on l y acad e mi c or i n te l le ctua l
is two-tiered - that of the academic institution and
standards but also other factors.
the teachers. As was held in Miriam College v. CA,
- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner
Institutional freedom includes the right of the
since the School of Theology is a seminary for the
school or col lege to decide for itself, its aims and
priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not
ob je ctives and the method s on how best to a tta in
studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a
t h e m , f r e e f r o m i n te r f e r e n ce o r o u ts i d e co e r ci o n
woman.
except when overriding public welfare calls for some
restra int. It include s the freedom to determ ine for
ISSUES
itself: who may teach, what may be taught, how it
Procedural
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
1. WON a mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at
5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University bar
Foundation that, Academic freedom also accords a
Substantive
faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his
2. W ON respondent is deemed possessed of a right to
p a r t i cu l a r sp e ci a l t y. Ap p l i e d to th e c a se a t b a r,
continued admission to the Loyola School of Theology.
acade mic freedom c lothe s Dr. Daleon wi th the
3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds
wide st latitude to innovate and experimen t on the
(therefore, not aribtrary).
method of teaching which is most fitting to his
students, sub je ct only to the rules and poli cie s of
HELD
the university. Consider that the BoR, whose task is
1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is
to lay down school rules and policies, has validated
a clear legal right on her part and a clear duty on
his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner
respondent's part to so admit her.
to complain before the Court simply because he
- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a
holds a contrary opinion on the matter.
right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime an
De ci sio n P e t i t i o n i s d i s m i s s e d f o r l a c k o f m e r i t .
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
R e so l u ti o n of Off i ce o f th e O m b u d s m a n - M i n d a n a o i s
2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All
affirmed.
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
Vot i n g Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and
freedom."
Corona
- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified
with the right of a faculty member to publish his findings
GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL
and thoughts wi thou t fear of re tribu tion , the referen ce
given by the constitution of "institutions of higher
SCHOOL
learning," show that the school or college itself is

FERNANDO; November 28, 1975

FACTS
- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology
to allow petitioner to continue studying there.
- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent
in the Summer of 1975 to pursue graduate studies
l e a d i n g t o a n M A i n T h e o l o g y, b u t w a s d e n i e d r e a dm i ssio n in th e fo ll o wi n g se me ster. She con te nd ed
t h a t th e r e a so n g i v e n b y r e sp o n d e n t f o r su ch d e n i a l ,

possessed of such a right.

- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for
i tse lf who may tea ch, wh at may tau gh t, ho w, and who
may be admitted to study
- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as
to whom to admit or reject.
3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in view
of the character of the particular educational institution
involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood. Therefore,
at most, she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being
cast on respondent school.

- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best

considering the interest of the school as well as of the
other students and her own welfare. There was nothing
arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant.

SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [concur]
- Same points as Ponencia, plus:
- A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has
admi ttedl y failed to exhaust her admini strative
remedies.
- Que sti on s of ad mi ssio n to the sch oo l a re m a tte r s o f
technical and academic judgment that the courts will not
ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion of
administrative remedies and when there is marked
arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty.

MAKASIAR [dissent]
- 1 9 3 5 C o n s ti tu t i o n : "U n i v e r si ti e s e st a b l i sh e d b y th e
State shall enjoy academic freedom." VS. 1973
Constitution which broadened the scope into "All
institutions of higher learning." Thus guaranteed, it is
not limited to the members of the faculty nor to
administrative authorities of the educational institution.
It must also be deemed granted in favor of the student
body because all three constitute the educational
i n st i tu ti o n , w i th o u t a n y o n e o f wh i ch t h e e d u ca t i o n a l
institution can neither exist nor operate.
- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn
and develop his faculties. The Constitution provides for
this in various provisions. The happiness and full
development of the curious intellect of the student are
protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom
a n d m o r e so b y th e b r o a d e r r i gh t o f f r e e e x p r e ss i o n ,
wh i ch i ncl ud e s fr ee sp ee ch a nd pr e ss, a nd acad e mi c
freedom.
- No private person has the inherent right to establi sh
a nd o pe ra te a scho o l . Ed u ca ti on i s a sove re i gn sta te
f u n c ti o n ; th e r e f o r e , n o t d i ffe r e n t i n th i s r e sp e ct f r o m
commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to
o p e r a te d e p e n d s u p o n st a te a u th o r i t y. C o n st i t u t i o n a l
rights must be respected by the State and by enterprises
authorized by the state to operate.

REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP

MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991
FACTS

- N a t u r e Pe ti tio n s fo r ce r tio ra r i a nd pr oh ib i tio n wi th

p re li m in a r y in ju n ctio n a nd re stra i ni n g or de r to rev ie w
the decision of the CA
- Re sp on de n t- stud en ts (stu de n ts h er ei na fte r) as th en
applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent
in the National Medica l Admi ssion Test (NMAT) wh ich
was the cut-off score prescribed for academic year 19861987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17,
1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April
8,1986.
- However, their scores were lower than the 90
percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty
in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic
year 1987-88.
- Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the
Boa rd of Re gen ts ( BOR) in i ts 9 96 th re sol u tio n d ated
February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of
70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in
its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1987.
- subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant
to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an
investigation on the studen t's ca se and recom mended
i n te r a l i a t h e a d m i s s i o n o f a l l a p p l i c a n t s o b ta i n i n g a
percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of
right".
- The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
promp ted the studen ts to file a petition for mandamus
with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
- Students filed wi th the RTC a motion to dismiss and
51

attached thereto their letter

to the UPCM Faculty. In an
Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case
wi th prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM
Fa culty held an emer gen cy mee tin g on June 22 , 1990
where it denied the appeal of the students on the ground
that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM.
As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to
reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the
RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to
the college. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the
ex-parte mandatory order.
- Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June
28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter
of the University over matters affecting university
affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the
students in the interest of justice and equity and to order
the petitioners to admit them.

51 Students manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's

right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the
question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission
requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue
the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of
humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending
the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the
college

- Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge

of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an
Or de r f or the i r Pr ev en tiv e Su spe n sio n . So , he re in
p e ti t i o n e r s a p p e a l e d t o t h e C A b u t t h e i r a p p e a l w a s
dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON the BOR violated the petitioners academic
freedom, and thus could validly direct the petitioners to
admit the students to the college of medicine.
HELD
There is no violation of academic freedom when an order
of BOR in upholding the admission requirement
approved by the University Council (in 1986) is
su p p o r ti v e o f r i g h t of th e U n iv e r si t y C o u n ci l t o f ix o r
a p p r o v e a d m i s s i o n r e qu i r e m e n t s , a ga i n s t t h e U P C M
Faculty and Dean who changed the admission
requirements approved by the University Council without
f o l l o w i n g t h e p r e sc r i b e d r u l e s a n d p r o ce d u r e s of th e
University.
R e a so n i n g The method deployed was simpl y referring
to the U P Charter or to the University Code , and then
applying the relevant provisions or rules to the case at
bar. The ponencia cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty
52

Admission Committee , L o y o l a S c h o o l o f T h e o l o g y ,
citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy
53

v. Ne w Ha mp sh ir e , t h o u g h a s o b i t e r d i c t a o n l y, t o
strengthen the arguments in support of the ratio
decidendi.
First. U n d e r t h e U P C h a r t e r , t h e p o w e r t o f i x t h e
requirements for admission to any college of the
university is vested in the University Council (See. 9).
The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in
t h e U n i v e r si t y C o u n ci l su b j e c t t o th e a p p r o v a l o f t h e
B o a r d o f R e ge n ts ( Se c. 9 ) . Th e p o we r t o a p p o i n t th e
academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service
and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents
[Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the
d i ff e r e n t ca t e g o r i e s o f e x p e n d i t u r e s i s v e s t e d i n t h e
Board of Regents
54

Second. Academic freedom

m a y b e a s se r te d b y th e
University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in
so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them
52 The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in

his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result
of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments
53 In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study
54

Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

b y l a w w h i c h a r e e s s e n t i a l t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l a ca d e m i c
freedom
T he acade mic freedom claimed by the facul ty to have
been violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the
questioned order is related to the right of the University
to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix
admission requirements is clearl y vested by law in the
University Council. The College Faculty was merely
empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of
the University Code to initially determine the admission
requirements, subject to the approval of the University
Council and the President of the University.
Third. W hen the Board of Regen ts reta ined the cu t off
s c o r e i n th e N M AT a t 7 0 th p e r c e n t i l e ( p , 1 6 1 , R o l l o )
which was the cut off score approved by the University
Council on 8 April 1986, it did not exercise the power to
prescribe the entrance re quire ments. It merel y upheld
the power of the University Council under the law to fix
the requirements for admission to the UPCM and
r en de re d in effe cti ve the a ctio n of the U PC M F a cu l ty,
which attempted to exercise that power to increase the
c u t o f f s c o r e i n N M AT t o 9 0 p e r c e n t i l e w i t h o u t t h e
approval of the University Council and the President of
the University in violation of Section 324 of the
U ni ve rsi t y Co de ( su pr a ) wh i ch is ver y exp li ci t on thi s
matter.]
Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of governance
and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide wi th
the law, university rules and regulations.
Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right
to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be
t h e U C co u l d r a ti f y th e a c ts of th e C o l l e g e r e ga r d i n g
admission requirements, the same should be done within
a reasonable time. It is to be recalled that the
controversy regarding the students' admission started in
1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners' insistence
on the UC's juri sdiction over admi ssion requi rements,
they did not seek recourse to it immediatel y. From the
records, there appears to be no physical or legal
hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the
students' case. To validate these resolutions at this point
in time would not be fair and equitable to the students.
In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle
by passing the academic requirements of the college
Therefore
No. There was no violation of the
petitioners academic freedom by the BOR since the BOR
onl y exercised its power of governance and its duty in
see ing to it tha t all the units abide with the law,
university rules and regulations.
D e ci si on Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Vo t i n g 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.

MORALES V UP
CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004

FACTS
- According to Art. 410 of the U P Code, studen ts who
complete their courses with the following minimum
weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa cum laude 1.20
Magna cum laude 1.45
Cum laude 1.75
- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in
the curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as
el e ctive s, sha l l b e i n cl ud ed in the co mp u ta tio n of the
weighted average grade; provided further that in cases
where the electives taken are more than those required
in the program, the following procedure will be used in
selecting the electives to be included in the computation
of the weighted average grade:
1)
For students who did not shift
programs, consider the required number of
electives in chronological order.
2)
For students who shifted from one
program to another, the electives to be
considered shall be selected according to the
following order of priority:
a.Electives taken in the program where the
student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
b.Electives taken in the previous program and
acceptable as electives in the second
program will be selected in chronological
order.
c.Prescribed courses taken in the previous
program, but qualify as electives in the
se co n d p r o gr a m wi l l b e se l e c te d i n
chronological order.
- Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in
Spe e ch Pa tho l o gy) to U P Di l i ma n an d en ro ll ed in the
European Languages undergraduate program in SY
1997-98. She was enrolled under the Plan A curriculum
and chose French as her major and German as her
minor.
- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with
27 being electives.
st
- 1 s e m e s t e r o f AY 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 M o r a l e s e n r o l l e d i n
German 10 and German 11 where she obtained a grade
of 1.0 in both subjects.
nd
- 2 semester of AY 1997-98 Morales changed minor to
Spanish but maintained French as her major.
st
- End of 1 semester of SY 1990-2000 Morales included
in list of candidates for graduation with probable honors
based on the computation made by the College of Arts
and Letters of Morales GWA inclusive of her grades of
1.0 in German 10 and 11. Her GWA then was 1.725.
- 2nd seme ster of S Y 1999-2000 Morales GW A wa s
1 .7 29 a fter ob ta i ni n g an ave ra ge o f 1 .70 8 in h er f in al
s e m e s t e r i n U P, m a k i n g h e r e l i g i b l e f o r c u m l a u d e
honors.
- D u r i n g th e a s se s sm e n t f o r gr a d u a ti o n , sh e w a s n o t
granted cum laude honors because her grades in

German 10 and 11 we re excluded in the co mputa tion ,

bringing her GWA to 1.760.
- According to Prof . Bau ti sta of the Dept. of European
Lan guages, a Plan A studen t i s requ ired to major in a
European language other than Spanish and minor in any
other discipline allowed in the curriculum.
o
In Morales case, her major is French
and her minor is Spanish so German does not fit
into her curriculum.
o
Plan A curriculum also does not allow
for free electives.

Ele cti ve s mu st be ma jo r
language electives taken from French courses
in either literature or translation.

German 10 and 11 are basic

language courses and do not fall under
electives as contemplated in the Plan A
curriculum.
- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades
be included in the computation of her GWA.
o
Her letter was taken up on a no-name
basis during the University Council meeting upon
the endorse ment of the Registrar. By a vote of
20 7- 4 , the C ou n ci l a ffir m ed th e de ci si on of th e
CAL in not awarding honors to Morales.
o
Issue was then elevated by Morales to
the UP Board of Regents and it was resolved that
the appeal be returned to the University Council
f o r f u r th e r co n si d e r a ti o n wi th fu l l d i sc l o su r e of
petitioners identity.
o
By a vote of 99 in favor-12 a gainst- 6
abstaining, the Council denied the award of cum
laude honors to Morales.
o
A subsequent appeal was made to the
Board of Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2.
- Morale s filed a peti tion for cer tio rari and mandamus
before the RTC and assailed the decision of the UP Board
of Regents as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by
saying that the UP Board of Regents greatly abused its
d i scr e tio n in th e im p ro pe r a pp li ca tio n of i ts a ca de m i c
discretion in interpreting Art. 410 of the UP Code. The
RTC o rd er ed th a t U P r eco mp u te d M or al e s gra de s b y
in cludin g German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cum
laude honors.
- In the Court of Appeals:
o
In resolving the issue, the CA initially
de termined whe ther onl y que stions of la w were
involved and eventually decided that an analysis
of the facts of the cases was indispensable.
o
The CA ruled that the lower court
viola ted U Ps con stitutionall y prote cted right to
a ca d e m i c f r e e d o m w h e n i t su b s t i tu t e d i t s o w n
interpretation of the internal rules and regulations
of the University for that of the UP Board of
Regents and applied the same to the case at bar.
ISSUES

1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the

RTC Or de r b ecau se the essen ti al facts we re n eve r in
dispute, the case involving only questions of law
2 . W ON the RTCs in terpre tation of Art. 410 of the U P
Code violated the academic freedom granted to UP as an
institution of higher learning
HELD
1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law.
- A question of law arises when the issue does not call
for an examina tion of the proba tive value of evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted
and the doubt con cerns the corre ct applica tion of la w
and jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question of
fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute
as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.
- B o th p a r ti e s a d m i t te d to th e fa c ts . An y co n cl u s i o n
based on these facts would not involve a calibration of
the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but
wo u ld be li m i ted to a n in qu ir y o f wh e the r th e la w wa s
p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d g i v e n th e s ta te o f fa c ts o f t h e ca se .
Since the appeal raises only questions of law, the proper
mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA did not
have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.
2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted
to UP.
Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of
arbitrary and capricious exercise of judgment,
courts may not interfere with the Universitys
exclusive right to decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them (in this
case, to whom among its graduates it shall confer
academic recognition based on its established
standards).
- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was
said that the discretion of schools of learning to
f o r m u l a te th e r u l e s a n d g u i d e l i n e s i n th e gr a n ti n g of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part of the
a ca de m i c fr ee do m .
Such discretion may not be
d i s tu r b e d m u ch l e s s c o n t r o l l e d b y t h e co u r t s u n l e s s
there is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
- G r a v e a b u se o f d i s cr e t i o n i n v o l v e s c a p r i ci o u s a n d
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
o f ju r i sd i c ti o n . T h e p o we r sh o u l d b e e xe r ci se d i n a n
a rb i tra r y o r d espo ti c ma nn er b y r ea so n of p assio n o r
personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as
t o a m o u n t to a n e v a si o n o f p o si t i v e d u t y o r a v i r t u a l
r ef usal to pe rf or m the d u ty en jo in ed or to act a t al l i n
contemplation of law.
- UP proceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of
Morales and gave her and her parents ample opportunity
to present their side on different occasions. There is no
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness.
o
De l ib er a tio n s we r e do ne i n th e
University Council.

A m e m b e r a s ke d w h e t h e r Ge r m a n 1 0 a n d 11
could be counted as electives for Morales and
the Registrar responded the student was
enrolled in Foreign Languages with a major in
French and a minor in Spanish and German 10
and 11 are not required in the checklist. These
can neither be considered as electives because
e l e c t i v e s sh o u l d b e n o n - l a n g u a g e e l e c t i v e s .
German 10 and 11 are excess subjects.
E v e n i f M o r a l e s c o m p l e t e d a l l t h e r e q u i r e d
sub jects under the curriculum so that German
10 and 11 should be included, the Dean of the
CAL said that the same rule had applied in the
past to previous students. Applying the rules to
Morales would be unfair to the other students.
o
Since the rule provides for an order of
p ri or i t y in the el ecti ve s, th er e i s an i mp l i ca ti on
that not all electives may be included in the GWA.
o
The
Advising
Committee
allows
studen ts to chan ge their ma jor s and minor s but
these shifts are not counted as part of the course
with credit in the curriculum.
- The word program in Art. 410 must be interpreted in
the context of a particular curriculum. In computing the
GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum
and the grades of subjects that qualify as electives in the
curriculum are included.
- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable
electives in the curriculum should be taken in the
context of the entire courses. Morales decision to shift
cau sed the exclu sion of her grade s in Ger man 10 and
11. Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects,
h e r to t a l u n i t s t a k e n u p i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y b e i n g 1 4 7 ,
instead of the required 141.
- Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative
a gen ci e s ove r ma tte r s fa ll in g u nd er the i r ju r i sd i ctio n ,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon;
th u s the ir fi nd in gs of fact in th a t r e ga r d ar e gen er a ll y
accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts.
Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institution