Bolzano, / subjective ()

.
(.. ),
() ( ) ,
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concept objective fulfillment.
To assure objective fulfillment, Bolzano introduces objective ideas that are
independent of subjective ideas and each subjective idea corresponds to an
objective idea. . Therefore, a subjective idea may have no reference in the
real world, but still it has a counterpart in the world of objective ideas the
latter being the matter of the former.
Many subjective ideas can have the same matter (objective idea); therefore,
there is a many-to-one mapping from the realm of subjective ideas to the
realm of objective ideas
The definition of ideas in themselves should not refer to the fact that they are
the matter of mental ideas or that they make possible subjective ideas, that
is, that the latter are occurrences of the former, because in this way the
definition of ideas in themselves would be grounded in the subjective ideas
Bolzano makes the existence of ideas in themselves independent of any
subject to the extent that he considers them nonexistent. If they existed, they
would be real, but the whole of reality was created by God, whereby the
objective ideas would also be his creations, which would devoid them of their
objectivity. Objective ideas are thus objective in the highest sense possible,
namely independent even of the mind of God.
We can, at best, say that through subjective ideas we somehow grasp the
objective ideas, that is, a subjective idea grasps (erfasst) its objective
counterpart
Objective ideas are ideas in themselves in the Kantian sense: we have no
direct access to them, as a matter of fact, no access at all. However, Kant did
not deny the things in themselves any existence, which is a characteristic
absent from Bolzanos ideas in themselves. They are, but they are not real;
they are, but they cannot be accessed; they are a guarantor of objectivity of
our cognition, even of erroneous cognition.
Even if we are mistaken in our judgments, even if we pronounce absurd
statements, there is an objective counterpart to these judgments and
pronouncements, an independent sphere of referents although these
referents do not exist (!
). ( subjective ideas,
, ;).

However, there is no way to distinguish illusions from perceptions of real

things. Although ideas in themselves guarantee that illusions are not
vacuous, they are of little help in deciding that they are, in fact, illusions.
Bolzanos theory accounts for the intentionality of our cognitive acts, but it is
not interested in establishing whether these acts bring us in contact with the
real world. /
, ( )

. (
counterpart subjective idea
, objective
ideas, , objective ideas . O Berkley
perceptions
, ,
correspondence theory of truth).
Objective and subjective ideas have the same object; an objective idea
is not an object of the subjective idea (Exner 62, 69); however, as Bolzano
says, each subjective idea grasps an objective one
In todays terminology, it all seems to mean that an objective idea is an
intention of a subjective
idea,4 that is, the former is an intentional content of the latter, whereas the
reference of the subjective idea, its object, is this ideas extension. An idea
in itself is a mediator between mind and object and does not depend on
either of them. It is a condition of the possibility of this connection and of
cognition.