CORDILLERA CAREERDEVELOPMENT COLLEGE

College of Law
Poblacion, Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet

POSITION PAPER FOR EJECTMENT

(FORCIBLE ENTRY) AND DAMAGES

Submitted by:
HECTOR M. PALAO-AY

Submitted to:
ATTY. JOLANIE ANN C. LUSPIAN SACYAT

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL REGION
BAGUIO CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Plaintiff,
CIVIL

CASE

No.

_____
-versus-

For: CARNAPPING

Joey Rickets y Kabkab

Defendant
x ------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF, by counsel most respectfully submits this
POSITION PAPER and avers:
TIMELINESS
The Plaintiff thru counsel received an order from said Court
dated _____________ requiring the Undersigned Counsel to file
position paper within ten (10) days from receipt thereof or on or
before _____________ hence said position paper is filed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for Carnapping commenced by the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES against the Defendant Joey Rickets y Kabkab

before the Honorable Court. The subject matter of this action is a

Toyota Revo taxi owned by Alexander Kano Y Mapagbigay which
was carnapped along M. Roxan Street Trancoville, Baguio City.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Alexander Kano Y Mapagbigay is the lawful owner of a Toyota
Revo taxi with plate number AYJ 397 and with trade name
MARLYN.
a Deed of Sale executed between him and the original owner Mr.
Antonio H. Ambog. The parcel of land is situated at Wangal, La
Trinidad Benguet covered by TCT No. 2354 with an area of 1,000
square meters. Attached is a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
the land executed by the plaintiff and the seller as annex A and
made an integral part hereof. Copy of the TCT No. 1434 is
likewise attached as Annex B and made integral part of this
position paper.
2. The plaintiff built a house on and developed one-half of the
property, leaving the other half idle with the intention of having it
rented out at Twenty Pesos per square meter, the running rate of
lease for undeveloped land at the place.
3. On 01 April 2011, the plaintiff went on a month long vacation.
4. Taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiff, herein
defendant, surreptitiously occupied the remaining undeveloped
half of the property and even built a two story house on said lot.
Pictures of said structure is attached as Annex C.
5. Upon his return from his month long vacation on 02 May 2011,
plaintiff was surprised to see the new house within his property
built and occupied by the defendant. On the same day, plaintiff
filed a complaint of forcible entry with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and damages against herein defendant before the
Municipal Trial Court.
6. In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, defendant
raised the following defense:
a. That there is no basis for a Complaint for Forcible Entry
because he did not apply FORCE when he entered the
subject property;
b. That the Plaintiff did not suffer actual or moral damages;

c. That since the Plaintiff forced him to hire a lawyer to

present him in court, Plaintiff should be made to pay him
attorneys fees; and
d. That the Complaint of Arvin should be dismissed for
failure to refer the case to Barangay Conciliation before filing
in court.
ISSUES
I. Is Plaintiff in prior possession of the land in dispute?
II. Is FORCE necessary in action of Forcible Entry?
III.Did the Plaintiff suffer actual or moral damage?
IV.Is non-compliance with the Barangay Conciliation Proceedings a
jurisdictional defect that warrants dismissal of this case?
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS
I. Is Plaintiff in prior possession of the land in dispute?
The main issue in forcible entry cases is the physical
possession of real property possession de facto and not
possession de jure (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67 SCRA 262). The
subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or
possession de facto over the real property. The questions to be
resolved simply are these: First, who had actual possession
over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor
ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint
by force, threat, strategy, or stealth? And lastly, does he ask for
the restoration of his possession? Any controversy over
ownership rights should be settled after the party who had the
prior, peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property
(Dizon vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897). As incidents of the main
issue of possession de facto, the inferior court can decide the
questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between the
parties is one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is
a lease contract between the parties, the period of such lease
contract and whether or not the lease contract has already
expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the
date when it will take effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep
the premises against the will of the landlord; and (e) if the
defendant has built on the land a substantial and valuable
building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the
ownership of the land and the building, their rights according to
the Civil Code.

In the instant case, the plaintiff took possession of the

subject premises upon the execution of a Deed of Sale and has
been in occupancy thereof since then up to the present. Under
the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. (Ong
Ching Po, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341). Article
531 of the statute is explicit, thus: Possession is acquired by
the material possession of a thing or the exercise of a right, or
by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will or by the
proper acts or legal formalities established for acquiring such
right.
The plaintiff, after having bought the land from the original
owner has in fact developed, built a house and occupied the
property. All these clearly show that even before the
defendants intrusion of the vacant portion of the lot, plaintiff
was already residing and is in actual possession of the
property. In De la Rosa vs. Carlos (GR No. 147549, October
23, 2003), the Supreme Court held that possession in the eyes
of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of the ground before he is deemed to be in
possession. It is sufficient that the Plaintiff was able to subject
the property to the action of his will. Moreover, the defendant
did not raise the question of lawful possession since in his mind
he knows who the lawful owner of the land is.
II. Is FORCE necessary in actions for Forcible Entry?
The provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
are clear. Where a person unlawfully deprives another of his
property, an ejectment for forcible entry case may be filed
against the usurper who deprives another of possession of
land or building by force, intimidation, or stealth or threats or
strategy. Where the defendants possession of the property is
illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) is
the remedy to recover possession (Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R.
No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565).

In Banez vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines (475 SCRA

13), the Supreme Court held that the words- by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, include every situation
or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon
real property to exclude another, who was in prior possession.
In Mediran vs Villanueva (37 Phil 752, 756), it was held that the
act
of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
property,
and this is all that is necessary. The employment of force, in this
case, can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent
took full control and possession of the subject property without
his
consent and authority.
Stealth on the other hand, was defined as any secret, sly, or
clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or
remain within residence of another without permission, while
strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices
to
gain possession of the subject property (Sumulong v. Court of
Appeals , 232 SCRA 372).
In Valdez vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 132424, May 2,
2006), it further explained that if the possession of the
defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated
because the defendant started to occupy the subject lot and
then built a house thereon without the permission and consent
of the owner or rightful possessor, the defendants entry into
the land was effected clandestinely without the knowledge of
the owners. It is therefore possession by stealth which is
forcible entry.
It is clear that there are other forms of committing Forcible Entry
other than using FORCE, but also by STEALTH and
STRATEGY. In the instant case, the defendant, without the
consent and permission of the plaintiff, clandestinely usurped
portions of the latters property through stealth and strategy,
entering and building a house on the vacant portion of the
subject property, with clear intention of permanency.
III. Is the Plaintiff entitled for actual or moral damage?

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court states that a person

deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, may at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs.
Section 17 of the Rule 70 further provides that if after trial the
court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall
render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not
true,
it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If
a
counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for
the
sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires.
Article 20 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same. As a result of the clandestine intrusion of the
defendant, depriving the plaintiff of his property hence the
plaintiff suffered damages. He was constrained to engage the
services of a lawyer to protect his rights and interest, hence
defendant should be ordered to pay the amount of P20,000 to
the plaintiff by way of attorneys fees.
Moreover, the provisions of Article 2200 of the Rules of
Court clearly state that, indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also
that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. Prior to his
vacation, plaintiff intended to rent out the 500 square meter
portion of his lot at Twenty Pesos (Php 20.00) per square
meter, however, the same did not materialize due to the
unlawful intrusion of the defendant to the subject property.

Hence, plaintiff suffered actual damage of Php 10,000.00.

By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the
defendant when he clandestinely usurped a portion of the
plaintiffs property and deliberately refused to vacate the
aforesaid premises and by way of example or correction for the
public good, plaintiff herein is duly entitled for the payment of
exemplary damages in the amount of Php 20,000.00.
IV. Is non-compliance with the Barangay Conciliation
Proceedings a jurisdictional defect that warrants dismissal of
this case?
Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
provides:
Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman
or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or the
pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or
pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
Section12, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further states that
cases should be referred for conciliation, where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement; they shall be
dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that,
requirement shall have been complied with( Also Section 2,
Rule18, Rules of Court).
However, there are instances where the parties may go
directly to court as provided by Section 412 (b) of the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law as follows:
1) Where the accused is under detention;
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and
4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the

statute of limitations.
At the instant case, the complaint for ejectment filed by the
plaintiff contained an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33
of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall under the
exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
Under Section 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary
procedure, and that all actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid
rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the
summary procedure hereunder provided. Additionally, it is also
a firmly settled principle that the municipal court has jurisdiction
over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases (Heirs of Jacobo
Bolus, et. al. vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Ricardo
and Gliceria Jimenez, G. R. No. 107036, February 9, 1993).
The rationale is that forcible entry cases are summary
proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved (Republic vs. Guarin, 81 SCRA 269). It has
been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of
public order by those who would take the law in their hands
purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession" (Vda
de Legaspi vs Avendao, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977).
It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is
time procedure designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs.
Madela, Jr. 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore
obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property
should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice
(Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that
judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of
the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from
loss of possession (Salinas vs. Navarro 126 SCRA 167).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of the Honorable Court that the instant ejectment suit be
decided in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendant to:
1. Permanently vacate the premises in question and give the
immediate right of possession to the plaintiff;

Pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of Php 20,000;

Pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of Php 10,000.00;
4. Attorneys Fees in the amount of P20,000; and
5. Pay the cost of this suit.
Other such reliefs that are just and equitable under the
premises are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
La Trinidad, Benguet
January 7, 2013
ATTY. RICHARD P. DUMAPIS
Commission No. 124 - 2013
Notary Public for Benguet Province
Until December 31, 2013
Dumapis and Associates, Room 204 RPD Building,
Km. 4 La Trinidad Benguet
PTR No. 134342; 1/4/2013; La Trinidad, Benguet
Bar Roll No. A-564235; 8/15/2010
IBP Lifetime No. 68799; 8/24/2010; Baguio-Benguet
MCLE Compliance No. I 47786 series of 2012; 8/22/2012
Copy furnished
Atty. Brusco N. Talunan
Counsel for the Defendant
Talunan Law Office, 309 Lakay Building
Km. 5 La Trinidad, Benguet
By: Personal Delivery
Republic of the Philippines)
Province of Benguet ) S.S.
Municipality of La Trinidad )
VERIFICATION
I, ARVIN D. MAUNAHAN , Filipino, of legal age and resident of
Wangal, La Trinidad, Benguet, after having been duly sworn in
accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:
I am the petitioner of the above titled case; that I have caused
the preparation of the above brief and understood the contents
thereof, and I hereby declare that all the allegations contained
herein
are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and the
authentic
records of the case.
2.
3.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th

day of January 2013, at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.
ARVIN D. MAUNAHAN
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of
January 2013, at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines, affiant is
known
to me personally and exhibiting to me his Drivers License with
number 788999, issued at Baguio City, Philippines on January 3,
2011.
ATTY. RICHARD P. DUMAPIS
Commission No. 124 - 2013
Notary Public for Benguet Province
Until December 31, 2013
Dumapis and Associates, Room 204 RPD Building,
Km. 4 La Trinidad Benguet
PTR No. 134342; 1/4/2013; La Trinidad, Benguet
Bar Roll No. A-564235; 8/15/2010
IBP Lifetime No. 68799; 8/24/2010; Baguio-Benguet
MCLE Compliance No. I 47786 series of 2012; 8/22/2012
Doc No. 34;
Page No. 28;
Book No. 20;
Series of 2012.