Scott Smith

History 306
Dr. Matthew Waters
8 December, 2014
Pharsalus: a reevaluation of Pompey Magnus
The Battle of Pharsalus was the decisive battle between the forces led by Julius Caesar
and those led by Pompey Magnus. Pharsalus is notable in a way that few other battles are, in
that arguably the two greatest generals of the era faced off against each other in one decisive
battle. This clash of great generals has been written about in great detail since 48BCE when the
battle occurred. The traditional narrative has tended to portray this as a fight that Pompey should
have won, had he not been plagued by command and control issues from all of the senators that
were with him. This rests upon the belief that Pompey was a truly great general on the level of
Caesar. However, the traditional narrative is incorrect because it was primarily Pompeys
generalship that was his downfall at Pharsalus. This can be seen by analyzing Pompeys record
in Spain against Sertorius and comparing what is found to the traditional narrative of the Battle
of Pharsalus.
Pompey in Spain:
Pompeys campaign in Spain was against a rogue Roman general, Sertorius. Sertorius
had been one of Marius lieutenants and had fled to Spain to continue the war against Sulla
following Marius defeat.1 Sertorius fought what would today be considered a guerilla war,
1*See Works Cited for explanation of how ancient sources are cited. Goldsworthy, Adrian.
In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire. London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 2003, 158-159.

refusing to give battle and conducting quick raids against the forces of Metellus Pius. Pompey
had standing legions near the city of Rome and at his request, the Senate ordered him to move
his legions to Spain to support Metellus.2
Pompeys first encounter with Sertorius was at the siege of Lauron. Sertorius was besieging the
city and Pompey moved to trap him between Pompeys forces and the city.3 However, when
Pompey thought him safe enclosed, and had boasted somewhat largely of raising the siege, he
found himself all of a sudden encompassed.4 Sertorius had divided his forces before being
completely cut off and had placed them in locations around Pompeys forces. Sertorius moves
cut Pompeys troops off from almost all areas in which they could forage for food. Sertorius
allowed Pompeys troops to forage unhindered as the siege progressed. Eventually Pompeys
forces did not take proper security measures while foraging and light troops from Sertorius army
were able to ambush and maul an entire legion of Pompeys troops. This engagement led
Pompey to withdraw his forces and leave the town of Lauron to its fate.5 This engagement is
briefly mentioned in Plutarch and is mentioned by modern scholars in terms of where it fits
within the narrative of Sertorius and Pompeys carriers. However, there has been a failure to
recognize this battle as evidence that would point to Pompey not being the great general he is
portrayed to be. Pompey initial plan was sound. However, when Sertorius was able to isolate

2 Plutarch. The Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans. trans John Dryden.
Encyclopaedia Brtanica, 1952. Pompey. 54,1-22, Pompey. 55,1-9.
3 Ibid. Pompey. 57,1-3.
4 Ibid, Pompey. 57,4-8.
5 Goldsworthy. In the Name of Rome. 163-164.

Pompey and force him to forage in one area, Pompey should have immediately withdrawn. Even
if Pompey had not seen the potential trap that Sertorius was setting, Pompey should have
recognized that his forage situation created a serious weakness that would be easy to exploit.
Pompey was in an untenable position and either didnt recognize it or was unwilling to admit that
the situation was that serious.
The second major engagement between Sertorius and Pompey in Spain is critical to
understanding how Pompeys generalship failed at Pharsalus. Following Laruon, Pompey
campaigned against and defeated two of Sertorius subordinates. He then began a pursuit of
Sertorius.6 According to Plutarch, Pompeys forces met Sertorius near the Sucro River. Pompey
sought to engage Sertorius quickly because Metellus was quickly approaching and Pompey
feared sharing glory with him. Thus Pompey launched a hasty assault against Sertorius,
attempting to turn his flank. During the course of the battle, both armies were able to push back
one of the flanks of the other army. Ultimately as night closed in, the battle came to an end as a
draw.7 The narrative that Plutarch presents does not reflect well upon Pompey as a general.
Pompey clearly placed the political aspects of the campaign above the strategic and tactical
considerations. As a result of this desire for glory, Pompey failed to develop and execute a plan
that offered a legitimate chance for victory if Sertorius didnt cooperate. Although the details are
sparse in Plutarchs writing, it is clear that Sertorius was able to drive back the flank that Pompey
must have left weaker in order to batter Sertorius other flank. Sertorius was able to exploit
Pompeys poor planning to ensure that his own army would survive to fight another day.

6 Ibid. 165.
7 Plutarch. Noble Lives. Pompey. 58-59.

After the Battle of Sucro, Metellus linked up with Pompey and the two launched a
methodical campaign aimed at depriving Sertorius of his base of support. This campaign
continued for three years after Sucro until one of Sertorius lieutenants assassinated him.8
Pompey and Metellus joint counterinsurgency campaign was strategically an excellent plan.
However, at the tactical level Pompey failed as a general against Sertorius. At both Lauron and
Sucro, Sertorius was able to quickly identify and exploit weaknesses that were created by
Pompeys tactical maneuvers. Sertorius was clearly an excellent general and Pompey did have
success in Spain. However, it was not Pompeys generalship on the battlefield that brought about
Sertorius downfall.
The Pharsalus Narrative:
The course of the Battle of Pharsalus is agreed upon by ancient and modern sources. Caesar and
Pompeys armies were facing each other across a plain, bordered by a river in Thessaly.
Plutarch9, Dio10, and Caesar11 all concur on at least some of the details as to the location, and
have the same general account as to the course of the battle. Modern sources have composed the
ancient sources into one cohesive picture of how the battle occurred. Both generals anchored
one of their flanks on the nearby river. Caesar was outnumbered by Pompey, especially in

8 Goldsworthy. In the Name of Rome. 168-169

9 Plutarch. Noble Lives. Pompey. 213,3-6.
10 Dio, Cassius. Historia Romana. trans Earnest Cary. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1914-1927. 41.53,8-9
11 Caesar, C. Julius. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars: with the
Supplementary Books attributed to Hirtius; Including the Alexandrian, African and
Spanish Wars.. trans W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1869. Volume 2 .3.88.

cavalry therefore Pompey decided to smash Caesars free flank with his cavalry.12 However, as
the armies formed up, Caesar was able to quickly appraise Pompeys deployment and recognize
that the preponderance of the cavalry being aligned against his own exposed flank was Pompey
tipping his hand. Caesar moved his reserves to the threatened flank behind his light troops.
When both commanders gave the order to advance, Pompeys cavalry launched a head long
charge at the flank and were met with fierce resistance from legionaries instead of skirmishers.
The cavalry broke and fled. Instead of attempting to rally his troops, Pompey watched in despair
as his own troops had their flank turned and were trapped against the river by Caesars forces.13
The traditional narrative that has been told by ancient and modern historians attributes Pompeys
defeat to command and control issues that originated from not being fully in charge of his own
army. As the campaign leading up to Pharsalus had been long and slow, Plutarch states that
Pompey was exposed on all sides to outcries and imputations of using his generalship to defeat,
not Caesar, but his country and the senate14. Plutarch continues on to describe Pompey being
unable to handle these reproaches and abandoning his normally prudence in order to bring
Caesar to battle.15 While other ancient sources do not bear out the same story, they provide
evidence that supports this line of thought. In his work Historia Romana, Cassius Dio begins
discussing Pharsalus by describing the status of both camps prior to the battle. However, before
he moves on to his discussion of the state of both armies, he interrupts this narrative to interject a
12 Holland, Tom. Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic. London: Anchor
Books, 2003, 311.
13 Goldsworthy, Adrian. Caesar: Life of a Colossus. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2006, 429-431.
14 Pompey. 217,2-5
15 Ibid. 218,1-6

few sentences about the overall ambitions of Caesar and Pompey. He reports that [Pompey]
was anxious to be honoured by a willing people and to preside over and be loved by men who
fully consent.16 This interjection seems to indirectly indicate support for the theory that Pompey
was operating under pressure to please the senators that were accompanying him. The timing of
this interjection in the battle narrative means that Pompeys desire to be loved must have played
some role in the lead up to the battle. In his commentaries, Caesar also provides indirect
evidence that could indicate support for what Plutarch presented. In the commentaries, Pompey
announces that he will engage and defeat Caesar days before the actual engagement at Pharsalus.
Caesar notes that most of the men present at the meeting expressed surprise at this.17 It is safe to
assume that given Pompeys previous record of military success, it was not his statement that he
would defeat Caesar that surprised many of them. That then leaves the Pompey offering battle as
the reason for their surprise. This means that these advisors willing to express their opinions in
Pompeys presence and that their opinion was that he was unwilling to engage Caesar. In
modern sources, this narrative is also born out as the explanation for why Pompey moved his
forces onto the plain of Pharsalus to engage Caesar.18 This commonly accepted theory as to why
Pompey lost lacks explanatory power. The simple fact that Pompey chose to engage in order to
please the senators with him, does not explain why Caesar was able to win even though Pompey
outnumbered him heavily and both armies were on equal footing in terms of terrain.
Applying the Spanish lessons:

16 Dio. Historia. 41.53, 41.54,1-2.

17 Caesar. Commentaries. volume 2, 3.86,1-2
18 Goldsworty. Caesar. 423-424, Holland. Rubicon. 310-311.

In order to more fully explain why Pompey lost at Pharsalus it is important to compare what the
sources have said about Pompeys prior experience to what occurred at Pharsalus. The first
lesson that must be considered is that from Lauron. Pompey was outmaneuvered by an enemy
and defeated because he was too predictable in the actions that he took. According to Caesars
account of the lead up to the battle, Pompey declared his intention to engage Caesar by allowing
Caesar to anchor a flank on the nearby river. Pompey would then use his overwhelming cavalry
superiority to smash Caesars flank. Labienus, a former subordinate of Caesars in Gaul, backed
up Pompeys proposal by providing testimony that the army that Caesar had with him was not
remotely close to being as strong and veteran a force as Caesars army in Gaul had been.19 Given
the terrain at Pharsalus, this may have seemed like a good battle plan, against an army that they
believed was beatable. This is similar to what has been shown to have contributed to Pompeys
defeats and Lauron and Sucro. In both of those cases, like Pharsalus, he used a simplistic plan.
At Sucro it wasnt enough to overcome Sertorius and at Lauron Sertorius was able to take
advantage of the predictability of the plan. Caesar was able to do much the same thing. He
observed the terrain and Pompeys deployment and created a reserve infantry force that would be
able to counter a flanking attack.20 By creating the reserve in the rear instead of deploying it out
to the flank to prevent the flank collapse, Caesar was setting a trap. When his outnumbered
skirmishers and cavalry would be driven back by Pompeys cavalry, his own reserve would be
able to catch Pompeys cavalry by surprise.
Pompey failed to avoid the potential trap, just as he had failed at Lauron. It merits
consideration that Pompey would have been aware that his battle plan would have been apparent
19 Caesar. Commentaries. Volume 2. 3.86, 3.87.
20 Ibid. Volume 2. 3.89,3-5.

to Caesar, simply by his own mass deployment of cavalry. Caesar, the conqueror of Gaul, left his
flank mostly uncovered in response. If Pompey was truly the great general that is often
portrayed, it seems odd that he would miss something so obvious. However, when his campaign
experience in Spain is taken into consideration, it is far less shocking that Pompey fell into the
trap. Pharsalus was not the first time. The failure to develop an effective battle plan and
recognize the potential trap set by Caesar, clearly show issues of generalship contributing heavily
to Pompeys defeat. These were not one time issues brought on solely by Pompeys decision to
give battle at the behest of the other senators. He made the same mistakes in Spain.
The second lesson that should be applied is Pompeys prioritization of politics at Sucro.
However, this prioritization of politics was not the desire to please the senators. It is in fact, the
organization and command structure implemented by Pompey for his cavalry. Pompeys cavalry
was commanded by the aforementioned Labienus. Most of his subordinates were young
aristocrats, seeking glory. When the charge occurred, these aristocrats did not keep the charge in
order which allowed Caesars infantry to cut the charge to pieces.21 Labienus was a wise choice
to lead the charge given his experience fighting alongside Caesar in Gaul for many years.
However, many of the subordinate commands within the cavalry contingent were given to much
younger aristocrats that were seeking self aggrandizement. The senators that were speaking of
Pompey trying to conquer them would not have earned themselves any favor in Pompeys eyes.
The men that would have been more loyal to him personally over the other senators would have
been younger men seeking to earn fame serving Pompey. The easiest way to maintain their
loyalty would have been to give them positions of honor leading the cavalry charge that would
finish Caesar.
21 Goldsworthy. Caesar. 429-430.

This decision to put political considerations over realities of the battle is similar to what
occurred at Sucro. Pompeys younger commanders were not able to hold a cohesive charge
together or regroup the cavalry after the first charge failed. Experienced battlefield commanders,
which the older senators would have been, would have been more likely to be able to control the
charge and keep it well ordered. Instead of over-pursuit and piecemeal destruction, Pompeys
cavalry may very well have overwhelmed Caesars reserve and arrived in Caesars rear,
surrounding him and allowing Pompey to destroy his army. At both Sucro and Pharsalus, it is
entirely possible that had Pompey given victory a higher priority than politics, he would have
been victorious at both battles.
The traditional narrative of Pharsalus has placed emphasis on issues of command and
control based on bickering that created command and control issues. However, Pompeys
campaign in Spain illuminates flaws within his generalship. Simplistic, predictable battle plans,
and prioritization of politics over victory were present at Pharsalus just as they were in Spain.
Although the issues brought on by having the senators present did have an impact on the
outcome of the battle, it was not the decisive factor. Pompeys generalship decided the battle.

Works Cited:
*Caesar cited as: Volume. Book. Chapter, Line(s)
*Dio cited as: Book. Chapter, Line(s).
*Plutarch cited as: Subject of chapter. Paragraph, Line(s)

Caesar, C. Julius. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars: with the Supplementary
Books attributed to Hirtius; Including the Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars.. trans
W. A. McDevitte and W. S. Bohn. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1869.
Dio, Cassius. Historia Romana. trans Earnest Cary. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19141927.
Goldsworthy, Adrian. Caesar: Life of a Colossus. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
Goldsworthy, Adrian. In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003.
Holland, Tom. Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic. London: Anchor Books, 2003.

Plutarch. The Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans. trans John Dryden. Encyclopaedia Brtanica,
1952.