1

Research Project
Philip Manning 12504697
Q) To what extent could issues in British politics have prevented Britain from entering
into World War I?
There can be no doubt that there were several issues in British politics that threatened to
prevent a British entry into war in Europe, however, these arguments were not of sufficient
strength to prevent Britain from declaring war on Germany on 4 August 1914. The British
decision to declare war on Germany is a pivotal moment in international history and is an
area which is often overlooked when examining the historiography of World War I. On 4
August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. However, the declaration of war on Germany
by the British parliament was a decision that had generated some debate and was not a
foregone conclusion. Several issues and groups were attempting to prevent a British entry
into World War I. This essay shall examine the various issues and arguments against British
entry into the war that were prevalent in British politics at the time and outline clearly how
these issues while important were ultimately never going to prevent a British entry into World
War I. The arguments against entry into the war were manifold. Firstly, there were pressing
domestic concerns in the shape of the situation in Ireland. Secondly, there were growing and
prominent groups present in British society that were vehemently opposed to Britain going to
war. This anti-war movement is best exemplified by the rise of the Pacifist movement in
Britain. These elements combined with debate centred on whether Britain should maintain its
isolationist policy and stay removed from conflict in mainland Europe meant that for a time
there was some doubt as to whether Britain would risk getting involved in a war between the
Great Powers in mainland Europe. This essay shall then examine the overriding issues that

allowed for the arguments outlined above to be dismissed and for Britain to eventually
declare war on Germany in August 1914.
Without doubt the Irish Question was a major issue in British politics that could have
prevented a British entry into World War One. The Irish Question refers to an expression used
principally by members of the British ruling classes from the early nineteenth century until
the 1920s. It was used to describe Irish nationalism and the calls for Irish independence.1 The
Irish Question came sharply into focus in British domestic politics in the early years of the
twentieth century particularly after the General Election of 1910 in Britain. In this election
the Liberal Government held power in Britain by virtue of support from John Redmonds
Irish Parliamentary Party. As a result of this it became increasingly clear that the Liberal
government would push a Home Rule Bill onto the Statute book.2 However, the Home Rules
Bill passage into legislation was fraught with protests and controversy with many in British
politics protesting fiercely against the Bill. Many British officials in the foreign office and in
the diplomatic service were gravely concerned with the effect that the proposed Irish Home
Rule Bill might have on Britains position abroad with the instability and indecisiveness
possibly facilitating German aggression abroad and causing the British Entente allies, France
and Russia to doubt the strength of Britain. In addition, granting concessions to a British
colony was viewed as poor practice due to the fear that this might encourage other British
colonies to revolt against Britain.3 Throughout the early part of 1914 there was only one issue
on the agenda of British politicians what to do with the situation in Ireland. The British
1 Stephen Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy,
1914-1918 (New York, 1987), pp. 4-5.
2 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918,
pp. 2-3.
3 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918,
pp. 7-8.

Cabinet had little time for foreign policy; with even the Anglo-Russian negotiations being
pushed to the background.4 By examining the British parliament debates in August 1914 it is
clear to see just how much prominence and time was diverted towards dealing with the Irish
Question. For example, in the month of July alone, the Government of Ireland Bill was
discussed on sixteen different days in British parliament.5 The growing tensions in Europe
were rarely discussed within British parliament despite the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand and the escalating tensions between the major powers in Europe. It is only after the
declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia on 29 July 1914 that the British parliament
begin to discuss the growing tensions in Europe. An Amendment to the Government of
Ireland Bill was then introduced on 30 July 1914 with the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith
declaring to parliament that discussing the Irish Question at such a precious time might
have injurious, and lastingly injurious, effects on the international situation.6 Certainly the
Irish Question was an issue in British domestic politics that threatened to prevent British
entry into World War I. The amount of time spent debating and deliberating on the Irish
Question within the British parliament highlights just how big an issue this was in British
politics. Up until the end of July, the British Government had little time for foreign affairs.
Maurice Hankey stated that Britain was being preoccupied with the Irish crisis and the
danger of Civil War, to the exclusion of almost everything else.7 The British Government
could only begin to fully focus on the growing tensions in Europe at an incredibly late stage,
4 Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge,
1969), p. 153; Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War
(London, 1977), pp. 215-216.
5 British Parliamentary Debates, 01/07/1914 30/07/1914.
6 British Parliamentary Debates, 30/07/1914.
7 Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918: Volume I (London, 1961),
pp. 150-151.

30 July 1914 when the British Government and all parties agreed to postpone the pending
Home Rule legislation till after tensions in Europe had been negated.8

However, while the Irish Question was one that certainly took up the majority of the British
Cabinets time in the weeks and months leading up to World War I, it was never an issue that
was going to prevent a British entry into war. In order to understand why the Irish Question
took such pre-eminence over European affairs in the lead up to war, it is necessary to look at
the atmosphere in Europe during 1914. The European scene in the early months of 1914 was
from the perspective of the British government, unusually peaceful. The British Foreign
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey had a visit to Paris that was deemed a great success. The issues in
the Balkans were no more pressing than usual and Anglo-Russian dialogue had begun. British
relations with Berlin had been better than they had been for over a decade.9 Another factor
that led to the British Cabinet concentrating more of its time on the situation in Ireland was
the fact that after many years of uncertainty and threats, the spectre of war, while always
present, could be ignored. The reasoning behind this was the fact that all the previous crises
in Europe e.g. the Agadir Crisis in 1911, had been successfully resolved without conflict. The
volatility of the Balkans and tension between Russia and Germany and other such tensions
within the international system became seen as just another part of the diplomatic scene.10
Undoubtedly, the Irish Question, while being a prominent issue in British politics throughout
the early stages of 1914 was never an issue that could have prevented British entry into World

8 Hartley, The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918,

pp. 15-17.
9 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, p. 153.
10 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 215-217.

War One. It was because of this seemingly peaceful situation in mainland Europe that the
British Cabinet could afford to focus its attentions on the troublesome situation in Ireland.
Indeed when it became clear that tensions in Europe had boiled over to unprecedented levels
with Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, the British Cabinet was quick
to push the Irish Question to the side with a deal being announced in parliament on 30 July
with Prime Minister Asquith stating that in the hope that by a postponement of the
discussion the patriotism of all parties will contribute what lies in our power, if not to avert, at
least to circumscribe, the calamities which threaten the world.11 All discussions on issues
related to the Government of Ireland Bill were deferred until there was an end to the tensions
that were afflicting Europe.
The issue of whether Britain should stay removed from affairs and conflicts in mainland
Europe was another strong factor that could have prevented British entry into a conflict in
mainland Europe. Between 1865 and 1875 the old order on the European continent was
transformed. The traditional power vacuum that existed in the centre of Europe was replaced
by united and formidable force, a German Empire under Prussian leadership.12 This
transformation on the European continent was highly significant for European politics.
However, Britain during this time maintained a policy of non-intervention. The most obvious
reason for this policy of non-intervention enacted by the British government was the fact that
previous military and diplomatic interventions on the continent had been wholly
unsuccessful. The Crimean War which lasted from 1853 to 1856 and was a conflict in which
Russia lost to a coalition consisting of France, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia for

11 British Parliamentary Debates, 30/07/1914.

12 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on
British External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 74-75.

example, had been ineffective in terms of both its military and naval action.13 Moreover, there
was also the reality that Britain would be unable to intervene in a conflict in mainland Europe
quite simple because they did not possess sufficient military might to contend on the
continent. The British navy could play no role in a conflict in central Europe and the British
army was small by continental standards. In addition to this, British forces were required
elsewhere. Sixty-five thousand British troops were required to quell rebellion in India and
other troops were held in readiness to deal with possible troubles in other colonies such as
Ireland, the Maoris and the Abyssinians.14 Furthermore, there was a belief within Britain that
a strong German nation-state in the centre of Europe would actually strengthen the balance of
power for Britain as a strong Germany would act as a restraint upon the colonial activities of
both France and Russia and thus ease Britains position in the global sphere. Britains
splendid isolation lasted up until 1902 when Britain signed a diplomatic treaty with Japan
pledging mutual aid in the event of the other being engaged in a conflict over China or Korea
with two or more countries and with benevolent neutrality if it was a conflict with only one
country.15 While this diplomatic treaty ended Britains isolation within the international
system, and proved to be a precursor to a Triple Entente alliance with Russia and France,
Britain still possessed a policy of non-intervention in conflicts in mainland Europe that held
up until the British declaration of war on 4 August 1914. There can be no doubt that Britains
policy of isolation was a strong factor that could have prevented a British entry into World
War One as despite the various diplomatic treaties signed by Britain and the formation of the
13 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 74-75.
14 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 75-76.
15 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 116-117.

Triple Entente alliance bloc, Britain still possessed a flexible position within the European
power structure and could remain neutral from any conflict in mainland Europe because
while Britain was associated with France and Russia, Britain was not bound by any legal
treaty to automatically give military assistance to one or any of the alliance blocs and could
still remained isolated and uninvolved in affairs in mainland Europe.16
While the British policy of remaining uninvolved in events and conflicts occurring on the
European continent could have led to Britain remaining uninvolved in a conflict between the
major powers in mainland Europe, a declaration of British neutrality was never likely happen
due to the German violation of Belgian neutrality and due to a fear of what might happen if
Britain was to remain neutral during such a conflict in mainland Europe. Firstly, the German
violation of Belgian neutrality ensured that the British Cabinet would declare war on
Germany. The Liberal Party, headed by Asquith, were divided on the issue of a declaration of
war against Germany. However, a compromise was reached on 2 August 1914. Sir Edward
Grey was authorised to tell Cambon, a French diplomat, that the German fleet would not be
allowed to attack the French northern coast but no further pledge of assistance was given. It
was thus agreed upon in the British Cabinet to make a German violation of Belgian neutrality
a casus belli (a case for war).17 On 4 July 1914, Britain issued an ultimatum to Germany
directing Germany to respect Belgiums neutrality which Germany refused to adhere to in
light of French menaces.18 Germany failed to respect Belgiums neutrality and on 4 August
invaded Belgium. This ensured an entry into the war by Britain. However, Britain was not
16 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136.
17 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, pp. 162-163;
Imanuel Geiss, July 1914 - The Outbreak of the First World War: selected
Documents (London, 1967), pp. 274-275.
18 British Parliamentary Debates, 04/08/1914.

obliged to enter the war to protect Belgian neutrality due to the international treaty signed by
Britain in 1839 as this treaty stated that the ability to uphold the treaty fell on all the
signatories collectively, but not on any single signatory individually.19 It was rather the fact
that a German violation of Belgian neutrality would allow for a near full backing of the
British parliament on the declaration of war. The German invasion of Belgium ensured that a
British declaration of war received the backing of the British Cabinet as Belgian neutrality
had been agreed upon already by those in cabinet as a casus belli. This ensured that it was
much less difficult for Asquith to convince the rest of his Liberal party colleagues and the
country to declare war on Germany. Belgian neutrality proved to be an issue that resonated
loudly with those who were uncertain in Cabinet and indeed, with the public in general.20 The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George summed it up in his memoirs stating that
The invasion of Belgium put an end to all of these possibilities (of non-intervention).21
Secondly, Britain was also likely to enter the war due to a fear of what might happen if
Britain was to stay out. Decades of facing various challenges, anxiously wading through
crisis after crisis had drained much of the confidence and assurance felt by Britons that they
were strong enough to remain aloof and distant from European conflicts, if Britain so
wished.22 There was a realisation that it was becoming increasingly difficult to preserve the
19 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, p. 225.
20 Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, pp. 232-233; Kennedy,
The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External
Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 138-139.
21 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume I (London,
1936), p. 44.
22 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136; G.R. Searle, The Quest for National
Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914 (Oxford,
1971), p. 27.

vast and extensive empire and influence that Britain had gained and maintained in the
preceding one hundred and fifty years. Therefore, to opt out of a European conflict and
potentially see a challenger to the British Empire emerge was not an option for many British
politicians and imperialists.23 A lack of confidence in the strength of the British Empire meant
that to most, remaining on the side-lines of a conflict taking place in Europe was simply not
an option. Many in the Foreign Office and in the upper echelons of British politics were
afraid of what might happen to Britain in the case of a Russian victory, however, most were
afraid that the Germans would emerge victorious from a European conflict and then with
hegemony in Europe secured, resume their naval challenge to Britain with greater vigour,
energy and resources than ever before. Britain in this scenario would be more isolated and
vulnerable than ever before.24 The Conservatives felt that joining the war was a critical aspect
of the self-preservation of the British Empire. Even, the British Foreign Secretary, the Liberal
Party member, Sir Edward Grey, fearing a German victory on the continent was gravely
concerned with being isolated in a Europe that was dominated by one single power.25 Sir Eyre
Crowe, a British diplomat in the Foreign Office went even further in a memorandum on 31
July 1914, when he stated in the opening line that The theory that England cannot engage in
a big war means her abdication as an independent state.26 There can be no doubt that while
23 C.J. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London, 1989),
pp. 1-2; Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, pp. 224-225.
24 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980 (London, 1985), pp. 138-139; Bartlett, British Foreign
Policy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 22-23; Steiner, The Foreign Office and
Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, p. 131.
25 Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British
External Policy, 1865-1980, pp. 135-136.
26 Geiss, July 1914 - The Outbreak of the First World War: selected Documents,
Document No. 164, pp. 330-331

10

Britains isolationist policy can lead to an argument that Britain could have remained neutral
throughout World War I, British neutrality was an event that was never likely to happen due
to the violation of Belgian neutrality on 4 August 1914 which allowed the Cabinet to put
forward and pass a British declaration of war. Furthermore, the fear of what might happen to
Britain and its empire if Britain remained aloof in a European conflict also played a major
role in ensuring that Britain would not remain neutral in a conflict between the great powers
in Europe.
Certainly a strong factor that could have prevented Britain from declaring war on Germany in
August 1914 was the large scale opposition to war that was present in many spheres of
British society. The anti-war movement contained many supporters within the incumbent
party in British politics, the Liberal Party. A Liberal government had been in power in Britain
since 1905 and there were many among its members who were anti-war such as Richard
Cobden and John Bright.27 The strength of the anti-war sentiment in Britain however, is best
exemplified by the growth of the pacifist movement in Britain. There was a growth in the
support for the peace movement throughout Europe in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. The French statesman and lawyer Leon Bourgeois, who was an advocate of
the peace movement remarked in 1909 that the world had been witness for half a century
to a magnificent movement in favour of peace.28 The beginning of the twentieth century the
organised peace movement or pacifist movement in Britain was the largest and best organised
in the world. In 1905, leaders of peace organisations in Britain created a central coordinating
committee to perform as a British National Peace Council. Britain possessed a broader

27 James Joll, The origins of the First World War (London, 1992), pp. 93-94.
28 Leon Bourgeois, The Conditions of Peace, The Advocate of Peace (18941920) Vol. 71, No. 11 (1909), pp. 253.

11

network of affiliated societies that advocated pacifist ideals than anywhere in Europe.29 The
British National Peace Council was composed of twenty-nine branches in the British Isles
and four in Australia. This was in addition to the International Arbitration and Peace
Association which was chaired by Felix Moscheles. Furthermore, there were fifteen other
independent peace societies also present in Britain.30 British activism was also enhanced by
the active and robust anti-militarism and anti-imperialism campaigns that were undertaken by
the radical branch of the Liberal party and the emerging alliance between the Liberal Party
and the Labour Party in the House of Commons. Peace activists also enjoyed the support of
high profile statesmen such as David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
from 1905 to 1908 and as leader of the Liberal Party from 1899 to 1908.31
Certainly while there were many anti-war groups and a strong and vibrant pacifist movement
in Britain prior to the outbreak of war in twentieth century Britain, these groups were not
influential on policy in British parliament and did not hold much influence over public
opinion in Britain. While there were several anti-war movements which are described above
that were prominent in British society there was also many navalist and militarist associations
that attracted reasonable support from the British population. The Navy League, founded in
1895, claimed to have eighteen thousand members by 1900. By 1908, one hundred and
twelve British MPs were members of the Navy League. This can be juxtaposed with the fact
that in the same year, there was only thirty-two British MPs involved in the London
29 William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, 2010), pp.
141-143.
30 Sandi E. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914
(Oxford, 1991), pp. 70- 71.
31 Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914, p. 71.

12

Universal Peace Congress. Following the South African War, the National Service League
which pushed for universal conscription was formed. The League claimed to possess two
hundred thousand members in 1912, of which one hundred thousand were active.32 While the
significance of these numbers is open to dispute as many of these members may have been
influenced by other factors such as social and political influences, this same hypothesis can
also be applied to members of anti-war groups and pacifist movements. For example,
Conservative MPs were prominent in the National Service League, while members of the
Liberal Party were conspicuous in pacifist groups and anti-war movements.33 Furthermore,
even those anti-war figures within government had little power when it came down to foreign
policy. Due to the distraction of domestic issues such as the Irish Question, the conduct of
foreign policy was not left to the government but rather to the Foreign Office and the
professional diplomats and as such the anti-war element within government had little
influence and could not have prevented a British entry into the war.34 Even though the Liberal
anti-war group within government had a vote, by the time the issue of whether to declare war
came around, they were without any real choice as if they rejected the Declaration of War Bill
then the Liberal party would have split and power would have been transferred to the
Conservatives who would certainly have voted for war. In addition to this, the German
violation of Belgian neutrality gave the British government the moral grounds they required
to persuade some of the anti-war group and those Liberal followers who were undecided to
support the war.35 Without doubt, while there were many pacifist groups and anti-war

32 Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, pp. 141-144.

33 Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, p. 143.
34 Joll, The origins of the First World War, p. 95.
35 Joll, The origins of the First World War, pp. 95-96.

13

movements in Britain in 1914 before the outbreak of World War I, these groups had little
influence or power to impact on British policy and could not have prevented Britain from
entering into World War I.
Conclusively, there were several issues in British politics that threatened to prevent a British
entry into war in Europe. However, these arguments were neither strong enough nor popular
enough to prevent Britain from declaring war on Germany in August 1914. On 4 August 1914
Britain declared war on Germany. The declaration of war on Germany by the British
parliament was by no means a straightforward decision for the British Cabinet. There was a
variety of different factors prevalent in British politics that could have potentially prevented
Britain from entering the war. This essay looked at the extent to which these issues could
have in reality prevented British involvement in World War I. This essay examined the
various arguments against British entry into the war that were prevalent in British politics at
the time such as the Irish Question, the large number of people and groups that were opposed
to war and the British isolationist policy. While these issues were important they were
ultimately never likely to prevent a British entry into World War I in August 1914. Firstly,
there was such debate on the Irish Question within British politics due to the seemingly
peaceful nature of affairs in Europe. As soon as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on
28 July, an agreement was reached by all leaders to shelve all discussion of the Irish Question
until after the tensions in Europe had died down. Secondly, while there were growing and
prominent groups present in British society that were vehemently opposed to Britain going to
war they were never likely to have any influence on the British Cabinet. Indeed, the threat of
another rift in the Liberal Party together with the German violation of Belgian neutrality
ensured that the anti-war movement in Britain and within British politics had little chance of
preventing a British entry into World War I. Finally, the debate on whether Britain should
maintain its isolationist policy and stay removed from conflict in mainland Europe was never

14

likely to occur due to the balance of domestic politics swinging towards war after the German
invasion of Belgium and due to the fact that there was a fear in the British psyche of what
might happen to Britain, chiefly of greater isolation and vulnerability, if they did not get
involved in the war.

15

Bibliography
Bartlett, C.J. British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London, 1989.
Bartlett, C.J. Peace, War and the European Powers 1814-1914. London, 1996.
Bourgeois, Leon. The Conditions of Peace. The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) Vol. 71,
No. 11 (1909), pp. 253-255.
British Parliamentary Debates. July 1914.
British Parliamentary Debates. August 1914.
Brock, Peter. Pacifism in Europe to 1914. New Jersey, 1972.
Charmley, John. Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914. London,
1999.
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914. London, 2012.
Cooper, Sandi E. Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914. Oxford,
1991.
Geiss, Imanuel, ed., July 1914 - The Outbreak of the First World War: selected Documents.
London, 1967.
Hankey, Maurice. The Supreme Command 1914-1918: Volume I. London, 1961.
Hartley, Stephen. The Irish Question as a Problem in British Foreign Policy, 1914-1918. New
York, 1987.
Joll, James. The origins of the First World War. London, 1992.

16

Kennedy, Paul. The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External
Policy, 1865-1980. London, 1985.
Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George Volume I. London, 1936.
Mombauer, Annika, ed., The origins of the First World War. Diplomatic and military
documents. Manchester 2013.
Mulligan, William. The origins of the First World War. Cambridge, 2010.
Searle, G.R. The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political
Thought, 1899-1914. Oxford, 1971.
Steiner, Zara. Britain and the Origins of the First World War. London, 1977.
Steiner, Zara. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. Cambridge, 1969.