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2AC Berkner

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Policy Framework Good

1. Predictability- Traditional policy debate establishes a clear criteria for

evaluating rounds before the rounds begin, making the debate equally
predictable for each side.
2. Judge Intervention- critical frameworks force judges to intervene based on
personal ideologies and vote on arguments that lack substance and avoid the
actual merits of the plan.
3. Fairness- critical frameworks skew strategy for the affirmative, and thus make
for an inherently unfair debate. The aff should be prepared to debate the merits
of their plan. Criticisms can vary from a single word in the 1AC to something not
even mentioned. The aff cannot possibly prepare to defend against such attacks.
Allowing for this heavily favors the negative before the round even begins.
4. Substance- fiat is the key to an in-depth, substantive debate over the resolution.
Fiat works to contextualize the plan/resolution to the status quo so that each side
of the debate can advance arguments about the merits of the competing options
against one another.
And simulation solves
Deleuze and Guattari's belief in transformation through freedom from dialectical opposition fails
the figures and institutions which could create this freedom are reappropriated by contemporary
oppositional politics, foreclosing exits from the existing political system

Mann, Prof of English at Pomona, 95 (Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)
Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the
order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of
flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them
most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations,
strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were
always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic
outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome
is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately
protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's
recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is
evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part
that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices
of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an
instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy . In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be
mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic
plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering
the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the
model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the
experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always
pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has
long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is
more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself. It is not yet time to abandon work that so deeply challenges our intellectual habits as does that of Deleuze and
Guattari, and yet, before it has even been comprehended, in the very process of its comprehension, its fate seems secure. One pursues it and knows that the pursuit will prove futile; that every application of these new topologies
will only serve to render them more pointless. The stupid optimism of every work that takes up these figures is, by itself, the means of that futility and that immanent obsolescence. One must pursue it still.

Perm do the plan and all non competitive parts of the alt

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First, Even If There Is No Stable, Objective Legal Subject, People Still Act In Response To The
Law, Making It The Best Pragmatic Means Of Social Change
Second, Performative Contradiction Rejecting Normative Legal Throught Prescribes A Non-Nlt
Legal Norm, Which Is Bad Because It Prevents Us From Linking Offense, Destroys
Argumentative Accountability, And Is A Voter For Fairness And Education
Third, Perm Do Both
( ) Theres always value to life Prefer our ev because of Frankls subject position.
Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al,
JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 J-Stor
In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential theory of purpose and meaning in life.
Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated several instances of transcendent states that he
experienced in the midst of that terri- ble sufferin g using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experiences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth . Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence
occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are unchangeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual ; a person can always decide how to face
adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl,
1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain
an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are
ex- periencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through in- trospection, concern about others and
their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture to strengthen one's present life (Reed, 1991b).

Democratic Talk Turn: 2AC (1/2)

TURN: DEMOCRATIC TALK
A. REFUSING TO ACT AS IF WERE THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS
THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL OF DEBATE
Barber, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers, 1984 (Benjamin, Strong Democracy:
Participatory Politics for a New Age)
Agenda-Setting. In liberal democracies, agendas are typically regarded as the province of elites
-- of committees, or executive officers, or (even) pollsters. This is so not simply because
representative systems delegate the agenda-setting function or because they slight citizen participation,
but because they conceive of agendas as fixed and self-evident, almost natural, and in this
sense incidental to such vital democratic processes as deliberation and decision-making. Yet
a people that does not set its own agenda, by means of talk and direct political exchange, not

only relinquishes a vital power of government but also exposes its remaining powers of
deliberation and decision to ongoing subversion. What counts as an "issue" or a "problem"
and how such issues or problems are formulated may to a large extent predetermine what
decisions are reached. For example, the choice between building a small freeway and a twelve-lane
interstate highway in lower Manhattan may seem of little moment to those who prefer to solve the
problems of urban transportation with mass rail transit. Or the right to choose among six mildly right-ofcenter candidates may fail to exercise the civic imagination of socialists. Nor is it sufficient to offer a

wide variety of options, for what constitutes an option-how a question is formulated-is as

controversial as the range of choices offered. Abortion is clearly an issue that arouses intense
public concern at present, but to say that it belongs on the public agenda says too little. The vital
question remains: How is it presented? In this form: "Do you believe there should be an amendment to
the Constitution protecting the life of the unborn child?" Or in this form: "Do you believe there should be
an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting abortions?" When asked the first question by a New York
Times-CBS poll, over one-half responded "yes," whereas when asked the second question only 29
percent said "yes .,,25 He who controls the agenda-if only its wording-controls the outcome. The battle
for the Equal Rights Amendment was probably lost because its enemies managed to place it on the

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public agenda as calling for "the destruction of the family, the legitimization of homosexuality, and the
compulsory use of coed toilets." The ERA's supporters never succeeded in getting Americans to see it
as "the simple extension of the Constitution's guarantees of rights to women"-a goal that most citizens
would probably endorse. The ordering of alternatives can affect the patterns of choice as decisively as
their formulation. A compromise presented after positions have been polarized may fail; a constitutional
amendment presented at the tail end of the period of change that occasioned it may not survive in a
new climate of opinion. A proposal paired with a less attractive alternative may succeed where the
same proposal paired with some third option would fail. What these realities suggest is that in a

genuine democracy agenda-setting cannot precede talk or deliberation, and decision but
must be approached as a permanent function of talk itself. Relegating agenda-setting to
elites or to some putatively "natural" process is an abdication of rights and responsibilities.
Unless the debate about Manhattan's interstate freeway permits people to discuss their fundamental
priorities for mass transportation, energy, and ecology, it is a sham. Unless the debate over abortion
permits people to discuss the social conditions of pregnancy, the practical alternatives available to the
poor, and the moral dilemmas of a woman torn between her obligations to her own body and life and to
an embryo, such debate will treat neither pregnant women nor unborn babies with a reasonable
approximation of justice. For these reasons, strong democratic talk places its agenda at the

center rather than at the beginning of its politics. It subjects every pressing issue to
continuous examination and possible reformulation. Its agenda is, before anything else, its
agenda. It thus scrutinizes what remains unspoken, looking into the crevices of silence for
signs of an unarticulated problem, a speechless victim, or a mute protester. The agenda of a
community tells a community where and what it is. It defines that community's mutualism
and the limits of mutualism and draws up plans for pasts to be institutionalized or overcome
and for futures to be avoided or achieved. Far from being a mere preliminary of democracy,
agenda-setting becomes one of its pervasive, defining functions. 180-182

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Democratic Talk Turn: 2AC (2/2)

B. THE IMPACT IS SLAVERY [THIS EV HAS BEEN GENDER
MODIFIED]
Barber, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers, 1984 (Benjamin, Strong Democracy:
Participatory Politics for a New Age)
Political animals interact socially in ways that abstract morals and metaphysics cannot account for.
Their virtue is of another order, although few theorists who have defended this claim have been called
everything from m realists to immoralists for their trouble. Yet Montaigne caught the very spirit of social
man when he wrote, "the virtue assigned to the affairs of the world is a virtue with many bends, angles,
and elbows, so as to join and adapt itself to human weakness; mixed and artificial, not straight, clean,
constant or purely innocent." If the human essence is social, then men and women have to

choose not between independence or dependence but between citizenship

or slavery. Without citizens, Rousseau warns, there will be neither free natural men
nor satisfied solitaries-there will be "nothing but debased slaves, from the
rulers of the state downwards." To a strong democrat, Rousseau's assertion at the opening
of his Social Contract that [an individual] is born free yet is everywhere in chains
does not mean that [an individual] is free by nature but society enchains
him [or her]. It means rather that natural freedom is an abstraction, whereas
dependency is the concrete human reality, and that the aim of-politics must
therefore be not to rescue natural freedom from politics, but, to invent and
pursue artificial freedom within and through politics. Strong democracy aims
not to disenthrall [individuals] but to legitimate their dependency by means of
citizenship and to establish their political freedom by means of the
democratic community. 216
Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
Allison, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19 90 (Lincoln, The
Utilitarianism Response)
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central

utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral

theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moralthinkingofmanylaymen.Thesimplecoreofthedoctrineliesintheideasthatactionsshouldbejudgedbytheirconsequencesandthat the best actions are
and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it,

those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, isanyidea-abouttheTightnessorwrongnessofactionswhichisnotexplicableintermsoftheconsequencesof

The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for
many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn
towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being .
thoseactions.

Abandoning Normativity Is Impossible. Acknowledging The Limits Of Liberalism While

Vicariously Participating In Litigation Creates Subjective Freedom Through The Laws Repeated
Failure, Coming To Terms With Legal Aporia
Carlson 99
[David Gray, Prof Law @ Cardozo, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908,
November, LN//uwyo-ajl]
of Professor Schlag's points about legal
scholarship are undoubtedly well taken. But it doesn't follow that it should or even could be
abolished. In truth, whether he admits it or not, Professor Schlag himself does legal scholarship. He does not follow
his own advice about not doing it. Nor could he. If legal scholarship stands for participation in the realm of the
Should normative legal scholarship be abolished, as Professor Schlag suggests? Some

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symbolic, then legal scholarship - i.e., culture - is the very medium that perpetuates selfconsciousness.
Schlag is very hard on law professors who give advice to judges. He mocks their work as mere "pretend-law," n313 mere journalism. n314 "One need only pick up a
judicial opinion, a state statute, a federal regulation, or a law review article to experience an overwhelming sense of dread and ennui." n315 Meanwhile, judges are
not even paying attention to legal scholarship n316 - which, experience teaches, is disappointingly true.

Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in

culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent, and
in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics [*1951] could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere
subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but

in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found.
Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice. Work is, in
this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is

Hegel's view,
desire held in check, fleetingness staved off... work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent... This
negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now... acquires an element of
permanence. n317

By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even

academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential," n318 but, more to the point, they make
themselves more resilient, more "existential." n319 Work on law can increase freedom - the
positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety" - fear of disappearance into the Real.
n320 When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out - like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on." n321 But far more important , the self
gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or
"narcissistic loss" n322 - the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support
upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis.
n323 Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge." n324 In this state, we
precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist. n325 In Hegel's inspirational words:
Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish."

Each individual consciousness raises itself out of its allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its work in this particular sphere, but grasps itself as the Notion of
will, grasps all spheres as [*1952] the essence of this will, and therefore can only realize itself in a work which is a work of the whole. n326
I make no special claim that legal academic work is worthy of extra-special respect. It is a craft, like any other. As such, it is at least worthy of its share of respect. If
spirit unfolds and manifests itself in the phenomenal world of culture, n327 why should it not also manifest itself in the law reviews?

Deleuzian Perspectivism Collapses Into Neoconservative Support For The Status Quo Because It
Doesnt Provide A Solid Point Of Criticism Of Oppression
Zerzan no date
[John, primitivist, The catastrophe of postmodernism, the Athenaeum Reading Room, www.evansexperimentalism.freewebspace.com/zerzan01.htm, acc 1-15-05]
The dilemma of postmodernism is this: how can the status and validity of its theoretical approaches be ascertained
if neither truth nor foundations for knowledge are admitted? If we remove the possibility of rational foundations or
standards, on what basis can we operate? How can we understand what the society is that we oppose, let alone
come to share such an understanding? Foucault's insistence on a Nietzschean perspectivism translates into the
irreducible pluralism of interpretation. He relativized knowledge and truth only insofar as these notions attach to
thought-systems other than his own, however. When pressed on this point, Foucault admitted to being incapable of
rationally justifying his own opinions. Thus the liberal Habermas claims that postmodern thinkers like Foucault,
Deleuze, and Lyotard are `neoconservative' for offering no consistent argumentation to move in one social
direction rather than another. The pm embrace of relativism (or `pluralism') also means there is nothing to prevent
the perspective of one social tendency from including a claim for the right to dominate another, in the absence of
the possibility of determining standards.

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More Stuff
There is intrinsic value to the assertion of compassion and ethics on behalf of those suffering---it is
in moments of compassion that we are most human---the alternatives vision of life is an overly
pessimistic and nightmarish world of suffering and pain---vote affirmative for the romantic hope
that we can be redeemed through a fight against suffering
Dr. Mark Hartwig, managing editor for the Foundation for Thought and Ethics and PhD in psychology
from UC Santa Barbara, 2K (http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000386.html)
Nietzsche regarded Judeo-Christian moralitywith its emphasis on compassion, self-denia l and self-sacrificeas a sham,
invented by the weak to tame the powerful ruling classes ("the nobles"). This "slave morality" condemned the "life affirming" values of
boldness, pride, self will, health, beauty and happiness , and replaced them with the enfeebling values of meekness, humility, love of suffering and so
on. The death of Judeo-Christian morality, Nietzsche believed, would open the door for deliberate "self-creation." Without the moral law, people could decide for themselves what they want to
be, and then create themselves in that image: "We, however, would seek to become what we arethe new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves!"

Although this resonates with many people today, Nietzsches brave new world is horrific . Glover notes: The man
Nietzsche admires will overcome bad conscience, which is the mark of slave morality, and will want to
dominate others. He believed that egoism is essential to the noble soul, and he defines "egoism" as the faith
that "other beings have to be subordinate by nature, and sacrifice themselves to us ." This attitude is the sign of a healthy
aristocracy, which "accepts with good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments." In place
of sympathy, Glover says, Nietzsche advocates hardnesshardness toward oneself and hardness toward others: His version of hardness, with its rejection of unmanly compassion, supports
the domination, even the cruel domination of others: "To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more. This is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-

The Nietzschean world, then, is a nightmare. But in the absence of the moral law, is such a
world inevitable? Perhaps not, Glover says . In fact, the major burden of his book is to defend the hope that we can live humanely
without believing in a divinely inspired moral law. Nevertheless, the fading of that law is a towering obstacle to living humanely: "Those of us who
do not believe in a religious moral law should still be troubled by its fading. The evils of religious intolerance, religious persecution and religious wars are well known, but it is striking
how many protests against and acts of resistance to atrocity have also come from principled religious commitment. The decline of
this commitment would be a huge loss." Ground for Hope? Glovers portrayal of humanitys cruel side, though dark, is a welcome contrast to the "evolutionary psychology" now in vogue .
Though he sees this cruelty as rooted in our evolutionary past, he doesnt try to stuff it into a Darwinian
straitjacket and persuade us that it conferred some kind of survival value (as do Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, for example, in their recent
human principle . Without cruelty there is no festival."

book, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion). [continues] Glovers conception is remarkably similar to this only Glover psychologizes it and views it as a collection of "moral resources." He defines

"certain human needs and psychological tendencies which work against narrowly selfish behavior.
These tendencies make it natural for people to display self-restraint and respect and care for others. They
make it unlikely that morality in a broad sense will perish, despite the fading of belief in a moral
law."These moral resources are "distinctive psychological responses to different things people do: Acts of
cruelty may arouse our revulsion; we may respond to some mean swindle with contempt; courage or
generosity may win our respect or admiration. These responses to others are linked to our sense of our own
moral identity. We have a conception of what we are like, and of the kind of person we want to be, which may limit what we are prepared to do to others." Two of the most important moral resources are
what he terms the "human responses." "One is the tendency to respond to people with certain kinds of respect. This may be bound up with ideas about their dignity or
about their having certain status, either as members of our community or just as fellow humans. The other
human response is sympathy: caring about the miseries and the happiness of others , and perhaps feeling a
degree of identification with them. " [continues] That being said, however, Glovers book drives home an important point: No matter what we might think
of an objective moral law, there is something remarkably like it engraved on our hearts . We may dismiss it,
resent it or claim it doesnt exist. But its there all the same. And even in the worst of people, it can provide
at least some small point of contact some faint understanding to which we can appeal.
these resources as

Capitalism doesnt kill everyone there ability to win no value to life is dependent on them winning the capitalist
machine makes life valueless

AND on the off chance this long-dead philosophers is wrong its better to have a more
moderate view that accounts for his wisdom but doesnt cause knee-jerk
annihilation.
Claudia Card, Oxford University Press, 2002 (The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil)

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Often perpetrators cannot repair harm or adequately compensate victims. Yet perpetrators and victims can
communicate how they feel about what was done in ways that matter to those involved. Apologies,

forgiveness or pardon (or the choice not to), and such responses as guilt, shame, gratitude, and resentment indicate
how perpetrators and victims value what was done and what was suffered. These responses reveal how the
parties see themselves in relation to each other and to the deed, showing something of who they are and
thereby something of their worthiness to associate with each other. The shift from a focus on escape,
avoidance, and prevention to a focus on living with and responding to evils is found in Schopenhauer's
masterpiece The World as Will and Representation and his essay On the Basis of Morality as well as in many

of Nietzsche's writings, from The Birth of Tragedy to On the Genealogy of Morality. 9 For Schopenhauer,
salvation comes with a quieting of the will, the stoicism of ceasing to value what inevitably brings suffering. His
solution is an escape after all, not from suffering or harm but from experiencing it as intolerable, an ingenious
escape through a revaluation of suffering. For Schopenhauer, salvation lies not only beyond ethics but beyond the
phenomenal world. Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer's nihilism regarding the world of sense but stole his ideas of
revaluation and moving beyond evil. Like Schopenhauer he abandoned traditional Western religious hopes of an
afterlife with its promised rewards and compensations. Although he also abandoned moral categories, especially
that of evil, he departed from Schopenhauer by embracing finite embodiment, with its vulnerabilities. Retaining
Schopenhauer's pessimism regarding the prevalence of pain and suffering, Nietzsche found that to sustain an
optimistic attitude of affirming life, he had to reconceive and revalue pain and suffering as concomitants of the
will to power and reconceive morality as rooted in a dangerous attempt at domination by those who were lacking
in vitality. 10 But what if life as such is not worthy of affirmation? A more moderate view than either
Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's is that some lives are worthy of affirmation, whereas others truly are not.
Moral concepts may be necessary or at least helpful to ultimately sustainable affirmations of particular
lives. If Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are right about the prevalence of suffering and harm, as compared
with joy and happiness, then in order to find many of our lives worthy of affirmation, we may need or be
greatly helped by moral rectifications. And we may want or need to be able to acknowledge moral
remaindersimbalances, debts, or unexpiated wrongs that remain even after we have done what can be
done to put things right

2AC Berkner Args

1) Fiat Answers (Read Framework it takes him forever)
2) Simulation Solves
3) Human Life Good
4) Enviro Add-on on their dumbass cp
5) Read a Space Add-on and one of seans stupid-ass space = immortality/greater understanding
arguments
6) Read some of the Deluze Answers Below, Read some of the Answers to death Answers Below
7) Capitalism doesnt kill everyone there ability to win no value to life is dependent on them
winning the capitalist machine makes life valueless
8) Read AT: No Value to Life
Value to life cannot be measures externally their framework dehumanizes
Schwartz, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine at the Department of General Practice at the University of Glasgow 02
(Lisa, , Medical Ethic: A case-based approach, Chapter 6: A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?,

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www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for
decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the
value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person
experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that , ideally, ought not to
be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a
comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life
criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for
themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients judgement in this matter is
to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant
information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to
violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.
( ) Theres always value to life Prefer our ev because of Frankls subject position.
Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al,
JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 J-Stor
In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential theory of purpose and meaning in life.
Frankl, a long-time prisoner in a concentration camp, re- lated several instances of transcendent states that he
experienced in the midst of that terri- ble sufferin g using his own experiences and observations. He believed that these experiences allowed him and others to maintain their sense of dignity and self-worth . Frankl (1969) claimed that transcendence
occurs by giving to others, being open to others and the environment, and coming to accept the reality that some situations are unchangeable. He hypothesized that life always has meaning for the individual ; a person can always decide how to face
adversity. Therefore, self-transcendence provides mean- ing and enables the discovery of meaning for a person (Frankl,
1963). Expanding Frankl's work, Reed (1991b) linked self-transcendence with mental health. Through a developmental process individuals gain
an increasing understanding of who they are and are able to move out beyond themselves despite the fact that they are
ex- periencing physical and mental pain. This expansion beyond the self occurs through in- trospection, concern about others and
their well-being, and integration of the past and fu- ture to strengthen one's present life (Reed, 1991b).

There is intrinsic value to the assertion of compassion and ethics on behalf of those suffering---it is
in moments of compassion that we are most human---the alternatives vision of life is an overly
pessimistic and nightmarish world of suffering and pain---vote affirmative for the romantic hope
that we can be redeemed through a fight against suffering
Dr. Mark Hartwig, managing editor for the Foundation for Thought and Ethics and PhD in psychology
from UC Santa Barbara, 2K (http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000386.html)
Nietzsche regarded Judeo-Christian moralitywith its emphasis on compassion, self-denia l and self-sacrificeas a sham,
invented by the weak to tame the powerful ruling classes ("the nobles"). This "slave morality" condemned the "life affirming" values of
boldness, pride, self will, health, beauty and happiness , and replaced them with the enfeebling values of meekness, humility, love of suffering and so
on. The death of Judeo-Christian morality, Nietzsche believed, would open the door for deliberate "self-creation." Without the moral law, people could decide for themselves what they want to
be, and then create themselves in that image: "We, however, would seek to become what we arethe new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves!"

Although this resonates with many people today, Nietzsches brave new world is horrific . Glover notes: The man
Nietzsche admires will overcome bad conscience, which is the mark of slave morality, and will want to
dominate others. He believed that egoism is essential to the noble soul, and he defines "egoism" as the faith
that "other beings have to be subordinate by nature, and sacrifice themselves to us ." This attitude is the sign of a healthy
aristocracy, which "accepts with good conscience the sacrifice of innumerable men who for its sake have to be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments." In place
of sympathy, Glover says, Nietzsche advocates hardnesshardness toward oneself and hardness toward others: His version of hardness, with its rejection of unmanly compassion, supports
the domination, even the cruel domination of others: "To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more. This is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-

The Nietzschean world, then, is a nightmare. But in the absence of the moral law, is such a
world inevitable? Perhaps not, Glover says . In fact, the major burden of his book is to defend the hope that we can live humanely
without believing in a divinely inspired moral law. Nevertheless, the fading of that law is a towering obstacle to living humanely: "Those of us who
do not believe in a religious moral law should still be troubled by its fading. The evils of religious intolerance, religious persecution and religious wars are well known, but it is striking
how many protests against and acts of resistance to atrocity have also come from principled religious commitment. The decline of
this commitment would be a huge loss." Ground for Hope? Glovers portrayal of humanitys cruel side, though dark, is a welcome contrast to the "evolutionary psychology" now in vogue .
Though he sees this cruelty as rooted in our evolutionary past, he doesnt try to stuff it into a Darwinian
human principle . Without cruelty there is no festival."

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straitjacket and persuade us that it conferred some kind of survival value (as do Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, for example, in their recent
book, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion). [continues] Glovers conception is remarkably similar to this only Glover psychologizes it and views it as a collection of "moral resources." He defines

"certain human needs and psychological tendencies which work against narrowly selfish behavior.
These tendencies make it natural for people to display self-restraint and respect and care for others. They
make it unlikely that morality in a broad sense will perish, despite the fading of belief in a moral
law."These moral resources are "distinctive psychological responses to different things people do: Acts of
cruelty may arouse our revulsion; we may respond to some mean swindle with contempt; courage or
generosity may win our respect or admiration. These responses to others are linked to our sense of our own
moral identity. We have a conception of what we are like, and of the kind of person we want to be, which may limit what we are prepared to do to others." Two of the most important moral resources are
what he terms the "human responses." "One is the tendency to respond to people with certain kinds of respect. This may be bound up with ideas about their dignity or
about their having certain status, either as members of our community or just as fellow humans. The other
human response is sympathy: caring about the miseries and the happiness of others , and perhaps feeling a
degree of identification with them. " [continues] That being said, however, Glovers book drives home an important point: No matter what we might think
of an objective moral law, there is something remarkably like it engraved on our hearts . We may dismiss it,
resent it or claim it doesnt exist. But its there all the same. And even in the worst of people, it can provide
these resources as

at least some small point of contact some faint understanding to which we can appeal.

AND on the off chance this long-dead philosophers is wrong its better to have a more
moderate view that accounts for his wisdom but doesnt cause knee-jerk
annihilation.
Claudia Card, Oxford University Press, 2002 (The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil)
Often perpetrators cannot repair harm or adequately compensate victims. Yet perpetrators and victims can
communicate how they feel about what was done in ways that matter to those involved. Apologies,

forgiveness or pardon (or the choice not to), and such responses as guilt, shame, gratitude, and resentment indicate
how perpetrators and victims value what was done and what was suffered. These responses reveal how the
parties see themselves in relation to each other and to the deed, showing something of who they are and
thereby something of their worthiness to associate with each other. The shift from a focus on escape,
avoidance, and prevention to a focus on living with and responding to evils is found in Schopenhauer's
masterpiece The World as Will and Representation and his essay On the Basis of Morality as well as in many

of Nietzsche's writings, from The Birth of Tragedy to On the Genealogy of Morality. 9 For Schopenhauer,
salvation comes with a quieting of the will, the stoicism of ceasing to value what inevitably brings suffering. His
solution is an escape after all, not from suffering or harm but from experiencing it as intolerable, an ingenious
escape through a revaluation of suffering. For Schopenhauer, salvation lies not only beyond ethics but beyond the
phenomenal world. Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer's nihilism regarding the world of sense but stole his ideas of
revaluation and moving beyond evil. Like Schopenhauer he abandoned traditional Western religious hopes of an
afterlife with its promised rewards and compensations. Although he also abandoned moral categories, especially
that of evil, he departed from Schopenhauer by embracing finite embodiment, with its vulnerabilities. Retaining
Schopenhauer's pessimism regarding the prevalence of pain and suffering, Nietzsche found that to sustain an
optimistic attitude of affirming life, he had to reconceive and revalue pain and suffering as concomitants of the
will to power and reconceive morality as rooted in a dangerous attempt at domination by those who were lacking
in vitality. 10 But what if life as such is not worthy of affirmation? A more moderate view than either
Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's is that some lives are worthy of affirmation, whereas others truly are not.
Moral concepts may be necessary or at least helpful to ultimately sustainable affirmations of particular
lives. If Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are right about the prevalence of suffering and harm, as compared
with joy and happiness, then in order to find many of our lives worthy of affirmation, we may need or be
greatly helped by moral rectifications. And we may want or need to be able to acknowledge moral
remaindersimbalances, debts, or unexpiated wrongs that remain even after we have done what can be
done to put things right

The 1AC is a slow experiment; even if it fails to liberate us, it is better than the negatives fast
rejection and overdose, which leads to collapse and death

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Gilles Deleuze, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris; and Felix Guattari,
psychoanalyst, 1987, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 160-161
You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep
small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own
systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force
you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you
to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You dont reach the BwO, and its plane
of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is why we encountered the paradox of those
emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their
organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily
dismantle the organization of the organs we call the organism. There are, in fact, several
ways of botching the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but
nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked. This is because the BwO is
always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you
free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then
instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged
toward catastrophe. Staying stratifiedorganized, signified, subjectedis not the worst that
can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal
collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be
done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an
advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of
flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of
intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a
meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing
conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO.
Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole diagram, as opposed to still signifying and
subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in
us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage
within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the
plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of
desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little
machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines. Castaneda
describes a long process of experimentation (it makes little difference whether it is with
peyote or other things): let us recall for the moment how the Indian forces him first to find a
place, already a difficult operation, then to find allies, and then gradually to give up
interpretation, to construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation,
becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, etc. For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place,
necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants,
animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all of these; for it is not my body without
organs, instead the me (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in
form, crossing thresholds).

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Alternative Increases Oppression

In practice their alternative will further tyrannical control and genocide
Richard Barbrook, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27/19 98,
http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html, accessed 3/3/03
Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the
'deterritorialisation' of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and
revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into 'molecular
rhizomes', direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small
nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the 'end of history': the material
result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression
was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social
movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing
to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool.<21> Yet, as the experience of Frequence Libre proved, this
rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic
fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and
Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an
oppressive regime installed by the Americans . Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and his
organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime
embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam.
Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead,
the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had
led to Pol Pot.

Deleuze and Guattari's belief in transformation through freedom from dialectical opposition fails
the figures and institutions which could create this freedom are reappropriated by contemporary
oppositional politics, foreclosing exits from the existing political system

Mann, Prof of English at Pomona, 95 (Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)
Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the
order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of
flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them
most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations,
strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were
always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic
outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome
is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately
protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's
recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is
evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part
that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices
of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an
instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy . In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be
mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic
plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering
the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the
model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the
experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always
pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has
long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is
more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself. It is not yet time to abandon work that so deeply challenges our intellectual habits as does that of Deleuze and
Guattari, and yet, before it has even been comprehended, in the very process of its comprehension, its fate seems secure. One pursues it and knows that the pursuit will prove futile; that every application of these new topologies
will only serve to render them more pointless. The stupid optimism of every work that takes up these figures is, by itself, the means of that futility and that immanent obsolescence. One must pursue it still.

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Deleuze Bad (General)

Deleuzian Perspectivism Collapses Into Neoconservative Support For The Status Quo Because It
Doesnt Provide A Solid Point Of Criticism Of Oppression
Zerzan no date
[John, primitivist, The catastrophe of postmodernism, the Athenaeum Reading Room, www.evansexperimentalism.freewebspace.com/zerzan01.htm, acc 1-15-05]
The dilemma of postmodernism is this: how can the status and validity of its theoretical approaches be ascertained
if neither truth nor foundations for knowledge are admitted? If we remove the possibility of rational foundations or
standards, on what basis can we operate? How can we understand what the society is that we oppose, let alone
come to share such an understanding? Foucault's insistence on a Nietzschean perspectivism translates into the
irreducible pluralism of interpretation. He relativized knowledge and truth only insofar as these notions attach to
thought-systems other than his own, however. When pressed on this point, Foucault admitted to being incapable of
rationally justifying his own opinions. Thus the liberal Habermas claims that postmodern thinkers like Foucault,
Deleuze, and Lyotard are `neoconservative' for offering no consistent argumentation to move in one social
direction rather than another. The pm embrace of relativism (or `pluralism') also means there is nothing to prevent
the perspective of one social tendency from including a claim for the right to dominate another, in the absence of
the possibility of determining standards.

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D & G Exclude Women

D & G exclude women
Alice Jardine, Professor of Romance Languages and
http://substance.arts.uwo.ca/44/04jard44.html, accessed 2/21/03

Literatures

at

Harvard

University,

19 84,

"sexuality itself" which is

the ultimate, uncontrollable becoming, when it can manage to escape immediate
Oedipalization. ("Sexuality passes through the becoming-woman of /the/ man and the becoming-animal of the human" [MP, p. 341].) But also because,
as "introductory power," "Woman" is both the closest to the category of "Man" as majority, and
yet she remains a distinct minority. D + G explain that the notions of majority and minority here should not be opposed in any purely
Why then do D + G privilege the word woman? First, as they explain through a series of unanalyzed stereotypes, because it is

quantitative way: "Let us suppose that the constant or standard is Manany white-male-adult-city-dweller-speaking a standard language-European-heterosexual (the
Ulysses of Joyce or of Ezra Pound). It is obvious that "the Man" has the majority, even if he is less numerous than the mosquitoes, children, Blacks, peasants,
homosexuals . . . etc." (MP, p. 133). The problem is not to gain, or accede to, the majority, but to become a minority; and this is particularly crucial for women if they
desire to remain radical, creative, without simply becoming (a) Man: The only becoming is a minority one. Women, regardless of their number, are a minority,
definable as a state or sub-set; but they only create by rendering possible a becoming, of which they do not have the ownership, into which they themselves must
enter, a becoming-woman which concerns all of mankind, men and women included. (MP, p. 134) The woman who does not enter into the "becoming woman"
remains a Man, remains "molar," just like men: Woman as a molar entity must become woman, so that man as well may become one or is then able to become one.
It is certainly indispensable that women engage in molar politics, in terms of a conquest which they conduct from their organization, from their own history, from their
own subjectivity: "We as women . . ." then appears as the subject of the enunciation. But it is dangerous to fall back upon such a subject, which cannot function
without drying up a spring or stopping a flood. The Song of life is often struck up by the driest women, animated by resentment, by the desire for power and by cold
mothering.... (MP, p. 339) That is, woman (with her obligatory connotations: "transparent force, innocence, speed," [MP, p. 354] is what Man (both men and women:
"virility, gravity," [MP, p. 354]) must become. There must be no "becoming man" because he is always already a majority. "In a certain way, it's always 'man' who is the

Man is always the

subject of any becoming, even if "he" is a woman. A woman who is not a "woman-become" is
a Manand a subject to that extent and to that extent only. Woman is never a subject but a limita
border of and for Man the "becoming woman" is l'avenir de l'homme tout entierthe future of all Mankind. For D +
G, She is what the entire world must become if Man men and womenis truly to disappear. But to
the extent that women must "become woman" first (in order for men, in D + G's words, to "follow her
example"), might that not mean that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the process of
"becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of women becoming
obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male
configurations. A silent, mutable, head-less, desire-less, spatial surface necessary only for
His metamorphosis? Physicists say: Holes are not the absence of particles, but particles going faster than light. Flying anuses, rapid vaginas, there is
subject of a becoming.... A woman has to become woman, but in a becoming-woman of all of mankind" (MP, p. 357). That is,

no castration. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux Most important theorists have a repertory of exemplary fictions, fictions that they call upon frequently
to interact with their specific theories in creative if predictable ways. Between the scene of Lacanian psychoanalysis and that of Lol V. Stein's ravishing, for example,
the privileged rapport is one of repetition: for Lacan, Marguerite Duras understood and repeated his teachings without him.19 Or, between the invagination of
Derrida's ecriture and that of the narrator in Maurice Blanchot's L'Arret de mort, what is privileged is the process of mime: for Derrida, Blanchot understood his
writings with him, inseparably. 20 D + G's exemplary fiction writers include Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, and Michel Tournierto mention only a few.
What all of these writers' texts share with those of D + G is the surface quality of their figures: the privileged modality of relationship between the configurations of
Deleuzian becoming and those of fiction is allegory. This is made most clear through Deleuze's essay on Tournier's 1967 novel, Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique.
21 There it is no longer a question of whether Duras's Lol, as hysterical body, is or is not a subject of narrative; of whether Blanchot's J. and N., as organs of a
hysterical text, are or are not simply new angles for modernity. For here it is a question of Speranza, a true Body-without-Organs: a woman who is not a woman but a
female figure (an island), a space to be unfolded, molded, into new configurations for the metamorphosis of Man. In t, we first stumble across Robinson just after he
has been shipwrecked on his island. Finding himself completely alone, the Only and perhaps Last Man on this island, he first succumbs to depression, evasion,
infantile panicleaving himself exposed, helpless. For Deleuze, this signals Man's first steps outside of intersubjectivity: "What happens when others are lacking in
the structure of the world? There only reigns the brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, of an insupportable light and an obscure abyss . . ." (LS, p. 355). To avoid
loss of self, however, this twentieth-century Robinson first tries the old solutions. He creates for himself a task: he spends months, perhaps years, perhaps even
decadesthe length of time does not matterbuilding a new boat-structure in which he might escape. But once the vessel is completed, it is too large, too heavy,
and too cumbersome for him to push to the sea towards freedom. Robinson succumbs, once again, to the deepest depressionand, indeed, abjection: He kept
eating, his nose to the ground, unspeakable things. He went underneath himself and rarely missed rolling in the soft warmth of his own excrement.... He moved about
less and less, and his brief movements always brought him back to the wallow. There he kept losing his body and delivering himself of its weight in the hot and humid
surroundings of the mud, while the noxious emanations of the stagnating waters clouded his mind. (VLP, p. 38) Haunted by his lost sister (the one who died young),
his mother (sometimes cold but always self-sacrificing), his wife (left behind in old England), Robinson-the-Man has a brush with what the Man calls insanity. And so,
as a Man, Robinson decides that he must henceforth master both himself and the island if he is to survive. He sets about building a kingdom: he creates a calendar;
he invents a way to write; he builds a house, cultivates the land. He names the island Speranza and realizes that now, in time and mastery, she is his slave. Woman
is, therefore, no longer absent from Man's adventures, even though he remains outside of inter-subjectivity: Besides, it seemed to him, when looking a certain way at
the map of the island which he had sketched approximately, that it could represent the profile of a headless female body, a woman, yes, seated with her legs folded
under her, in a posture within which it would have been impossible to sort out what there was of submission, of fear, or of simple abandonment. This idea crossed his
mind, then it left him. It would come back. (VLP, p. 46)22 In spite of various humiliations, depressions, and disappointments, Robinson continues his mastery over
Speranza. A decisive step is the introduction of time into this one-Man kingdom with a kind of primitive clock. In the "future," Robinson succumbs to his former states
of abjection within the space of Speranza only when that clock of progress stops. Slowly, however, and in spite of his frenzied, productive activity, Robinson realizes
that his relationship with "himself" is changing. His "self," in fact, can no longer exist in a world without the Other. Robinson is ready to lose his Self, his Manhood:
"Who I? The question is far from being pointless. It isn't even insoluble. Because if it's not him, it must be Speranza. There is from here on a flying I which will
sometimes alight on the man, sometimes on the island, and which makes of me, in turn, one or the other" (VLP, pp. 88-89).

A2 Life is Carbon
The Aff Is Wrong The Humn Body Isnt Limited To Carbon, But Is Siliconic In The Machinic
Way It Emerges From Intersubjective Flows Like Communication And Capital, Indicating
Meaning To Life Beyond The Matter That Composes Us
Beddoes no date
[Diane J., Material gadget, Breeding Demons: A critical enquiry into the relationship between Kant and Deleuze with
specific reference to women, Transmat, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Beddoes/BD7s4.htm, acc 1-15-05]
Deleuze notes that biologists have often questioned why life is effected through
carbon, rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that la vie des machines
modernes passe par le silicium (the life of modern machines runs through silicon).

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[377] This is where becoming-women moves, where money released from capital
moves, where life becomes non-organic, nature becomes a thinking machine,
infinities of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated and fluid movement, eroding
the statues of power, the historical . Becoming-woman moves towards becomingimperceptible, but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is
rather than life itself becomes mobile, because it is not longer in the womb nor
arranged in the organisms which emerge from them, but instead becomes a
movement, a cycle that turns on its hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged
class, but the surrogate reproductive machinery of a machinic phylum which is
passing across into a different base, in a movement which effects the conjunction
of teleology and mechanism, and transforming the nature of intelligence.

Human Identity Is More Than Carbon Its Coded By Communication Flows, That Recognition
Is Necessary To Resist Capitalist Alienation
Brassier 2001
[Ray, Doctoral candidate at University of Warwick, Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter,
Doctoral Thesis, April, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Brassier/ALIENTHEORY.pdf, acc 1-14-05//uwyo]
Yet it is a failure which transcendental scepticism may yet help circumvent through the Alien-subjects
unilateralising force-(of)-thought; an intrinsically sceptical force which constitutes an instance of a priori cognitive
resistance to those epistemic norms and informational codes via which a triumphant World-Capitalism maintains
the structural isomorphy between material power and informational force, thereby ensuring its quasitranscendental
dominion over all cognitive experience. A transcendental scepticism agrees with eliminative naturalism: human
beings are simply carbonbased information processing machines. But it also recognises the necessity of crosspollinating that assessment born of evolutionary reductionism with transcendental insight; an insight which
consists in radicalising and generalising Marxs identification of the material infrastructure as the ultimate
determinant for the ideological superstructure 315: World-Capitalism is now the global megamachine determining a
priori the cognitive parameters within which the phenomenological micromachinery of organically individuated
sapience operates. By acknowledging the fact that political intervention can no longer afford to ignore this insight;
by recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing capitals all-encompassing universality as
World- Capitalism, transcendental scepticism constitutes an instance of a priori political resistance.

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A2 Death Doesnt Destroy Being: 2AC (1/2)

First, Even If Death Doesnt Kill Being, It Does Annihilate Consciousnesses That Are Composed
Of Precise Combinations Of Energy And Matter, Meaning That Death Extinguishes Thought
Processes That People Are Attached To, Meaning That Forced Death Is Violent And Undesirable
Second, This Ignores The Role Of Communication In Creating Human Identity. Were More Than
The Matter Of Our Parts, But Create Meaning Through Communicative Processes, Something
Destroyed By Death
Third, Carbon Atoms Arent The Key Component Of Life, Complex Information Processing Is,
Meaning That Death Causes Annihilation Of Consciousness
Tipler 94
[Frank J., Professor of Mathematical Physics at Tulane University, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology,
God and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York: Doubleday, 1994, 124-5//uwyo-ajl]
IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER LIFE can continue to exist forever, I
shall need to define "life" in physics language. I claim that a "living being" is any
entity which codes information (in the physics sense of this word) with the
information coded being preserved by natural selection. Thus "life" is a form of
information processing, and the human mind-and the human soul-is a very
complex computer program. Specifically, a "person" is defined to be a computer
program which can pass the Turing test, which was discussed in Chapter II.
This definition of "life" is quite different from what the average person-and the
average biologist-would think of as "life." In the traditional definition, life is a
complex process based on the chemistry of the carbon atom. However, even
supporters of the traditional definition admit that the key words are "complex
process" and not "carbon atom." Although the entities everyone agrees are
"alive" happen to be based on carbon chemistry, there is no reason to believe that
analogous processes cannot be based on other systems. In fact, the British
biochemist A. G. Cairns-Smith! has suggested that the first living beings--':our
ultim:ate ancestors-were based on metallic crystals, not carbon. If this is true, then
if we insist that living beings must be based on carbon chemistry, we would be
forced to conclude that our ultimate ancestors were not alive. In Cairns-Smith's
theory, our ultimate ancestors were self-replicating patterns of defects in the
metallic crystals. Over time, the pattern persisted, but was transferred to another
substrate: carbon molecules. What is important is not the substrate but the pattern,
and the pattern is another name for information.
But life of course is not a static pattern. Rather, it is a dynamic pattern that persists
overtime. It is thus a process. But not all processes are alive. The key feature of
the "living" patterns is that their persistence is due to a feedback with their
environment: the information coded in the pattern continually varies, but the
variation is constrained to a narrow range by this feedback. Thus life is, as I stated,
information preserved by natural selection.

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GHill 2K10
AT: Non-Del

A2 Death Doesnt Destroy Being: 2AC (2/2)

Fourth, Even If There Are Other Possibilties After Death, The Identities That Were Attached To
Will Be Extinguished Because Consciousness Comes From Information Processsing That Requires
Particular Sequences Of Quantum States To Occur
Tipler 94
[Frank J., Professor of Mathematical Physics at Tulane University, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology,
God and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York: Doubleday, 1994, 221-3//uwyo-ajl]
The Bekenstein Bound follows from the basic postulates of quantum theory
combined with the further assumptions that (1) the system is bounded in energy,
and (2) the system is bounded, or localized, in space. A rigorous proof of the
Bekenstein Bound would require quantum field theory, but it is easy to describe in
outline why quantum mechanics leads to such a bound on the information coded in
a bounded region. In essence, the Bekenstein Bound is a manifestation of the
uncertainty principle. Recall that the uncertainty principle tells us that there is a
limit to the precision with which we can measure the momentum of a particle and
its position. More precisely, the uncertainty principle says that the location of a
point in phase space-a concept I defined in Chapter III-cannot be defined more
closely thal1 Planck's constant h. Since a system's state is defined by where it is
located in phase space, this means that the number of possible states is less than
or equal to the size of the phase space region the system could be in, divided by
the size of the minimum phase space size, Planck's constant. (I've given a
mathematical expression of this argument in the Appendix for Scientists.) This
state counting procedure, based on there being an absolute minimum size h to a
phase space interval, is an absolutely essential method of quantum statistical
mechanics. We have already used it in Chapter III to prove the almost periodicity of
a bounded quantum system. It is confirmed by the thousands of experiments which
have been based on this counting method.9 In high energy particle physics, any
calculation of the "cross section" requires counting the possible number of particle
initial and final states, and the above state counting method is used.lO The cross
section, which is the measure of how many particles scatter in a particular direction
when they collide in particle accelerators, is the basic quantity tested in particle
physics. The Bekenstein Bound on the number of possible states is thus confirmed
by the correctness of the calculated cross sections. In summary, the Bekenstein
Bound on the total information that can be coded in a region is an absolute solid
conclusion of modern physics, a result as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar.
One can also use the Bekenstein Bound to deduce an upper bound to the rate of
information processing. The time for light to cross a sphere of a given diameter is
equal to the diameter of the sphere divided by the speed of light. Since a state
inside the sphere cannot completely change until a signal has time to travel trom
one side to the other, the rate of information processing is bounded above by the
above Bekenstein Bound divided by this time interval. Putting in the numbers
(details in the Appendix for Scientists), we calculate that the rate of state change is
less than or equal to 4 X 1051 bits per second, multiplied by the mass of the
system in kilograms. That is, the rate of information processing possible for a
system depends only on the mass of the system, not on its spatial size or on any
other variable. So a human being of mass 100 kilograms cannot change state
more rapidly than about 4 X 1053 times per second. This number is of course
enormous-and in fact a human will probably change state much, much more slowly
than this-but it's finite.

AT: The Schlaag Stuff

Normativity Answers: 2AC (1/7)
First, Even If There Is No Stable, Objective Legal Subject, People Still Act In Response To The
Law, Making It The Best Pragmatic Means Of Social Change. Cross-Apply Our Specific Tribe
And Katyal Solvency

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GHill 2K10
AT: Non-Del

Second, Performative Contradiction Rejecting Normative Legal Throught Prescribes A Non-Nlt

Legal Norm, Which Is Bad Because It Prevents Us From Linking Offense, Destroys
Argumentative Accountability, And Is A Voter For Fairness And Education
Third, Perm Do Both
Abandoning Normativity Is Impossible. Acknowledging The Limits Of Liberalism While
Vicariously Participating In Litigation Creates Subjective Freedom Through The Laws Repeated
Failure, Coming To Terms With Legal Aporia
Carlson 99
[David Gray, Prof Law @ Cardozo, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908,
November, LN//uwyo-ajl]
of Professor Schlag's points about legal
scholarship are undoubtedly well taken. But it doesn't follow that it should or even could be
abolished. In truth, whether he admits it or not, Professor Schlag himself does legal scholarship. He does not follow
his own advice about not doing it. Nor could he. If legal scholarship stands for participation in the realm of the
symbolic, then legal scholarship - i.e., culture - is the very medium that perpetuates selfconsciousness.
Should normative legal scholarship be abolished, as Professor Schlag suggests? Some

Schlag is very hard on law professors who give advice to judges. He mocks their work as mere "pretend-law," n313 mere journalism. n314 "One need only pick up a
judicial opinion, a state statute, a federal regulation, or a law review article to experience an overwhelming sense of dread and ennui." n315 Meanwhile, judges are
not even paying attention to legal scholarship n316 - which, experience teaches, is disappointingly true.

Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in

culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent, and
in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics [*1951] could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere
subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but

in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found.
Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice. Work is, in
this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is

Hegel's view,
desire held in check, fleetingness staved off... work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent... This
negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now... acquires an element of
permanence. n317

By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even

academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential," n318 but, more to the point, they make
themselves more resilient, more "existential." n319 Work on law can increase freedom - the
positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety" - fear of disappearance into the Real.
n320 When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out - like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on." n321 But far more important , the self
gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or
"narcissistic loss" n322 - the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support
upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis.
n323 Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge." n324 In this state, we
precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist. n325 In Hegel's inspirational words:
Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish."

Each individual consciousness raises itself out of its allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its work in this particular sphere, but grasps itself as the Notion of
will, grasps all spheres as [*1952] the essence of this will, and therefore can only realize itself in a work which is a work of the whole. n326
I make no special claim that legal academic work is worthy of extra-special respect. It is a craft, like any other. As such, it is at least worthy of its share of respect. If
spirit unfolds and manifests itself in the phenomenal world of culture, n327 why should it not also manifest itself in the law reviews?

19