Bayan Muna v.

Alberto Romulo (in his capacity as executive secretary), Supreme Court of the Philippines,
1 February 2011
SUMMARY
On 1 February 2011, the Supreme Court of the Philippines dismissed a claim by Bayan Muna (the petitioner), a
duly registered party-list group set up to represent the marginalized sectors of society, which sought to nullify the
Non-Surrender Agreement (the Agreement) concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America.
According to the petitioner, the Agreement contravened the obligations of the Philippines under the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which had been signed (but not ratified) by the Philippines. The
petitioner also argued that the Agreement was void ab initio because it created obligations that were immoral or
that were contrary to universally recognized principals of international law.
Regarding the petitioners first argument, the Supreme Court concluded that the Agreement did not undermine or
contravene the Rome Statute. On the contrary, the Court held that the Agreement and the Rome Statute
complemented each other and thus conformed to the ICCs principle of complementarity. The Court added that:
it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the
RP [Republic of the Philippines], over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute. (p. 27)
Regarding the petitioners second argument, namely that the Agreement was immoral because it leaves criminals
immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity (p. 32), the
Court also disagreed. It stated that the Agreement is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish
crimes under its national law and that it is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary
to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously (p. 33). The Court did not
concur with the petitioners opinion that the Agreement would allow Americans and Filipinos to commit grave
international crimes with impunity. The Court explained that people who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of
the RP [Republic of the Philippines] or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to
bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.
It also stated:
With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the
Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the Non-Surrender Agreement over an offense
considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute. (p. 34).
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby
abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the
Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the
Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National
criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to
prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus,
the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our
national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over
US persons committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC
over them. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to persons
of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international
agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this
partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting
party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur
Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February
1, 2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,
as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity
than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the
authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes

precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement
between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it
must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy
and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while
those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements. According to
petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in
the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular
relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject
matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone.
There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive
agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of
agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further
their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect
of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each
labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v.
Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary represented by Hon. Alberto
Romulo, Department of Foreign Affairs represented by Hon. Blas Ople
G. R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005
FACTS:
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for signature at its headquarter in New York. On December 28,
2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines through its Charge d Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo
signed the Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be ratified by the accepting states.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon.
Blas Ople (Department of Foreign Affairs) respondents in this case to transmit the signed document to the
Senate for ratification.
Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the Executive
Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE:
Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?
HELD:
The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
Thus, this petition is DISMISSED. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.

NICOLAS vs. ROMULO

FACTS:
Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was
charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial
court every time his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his
sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States pursuant to the
VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new
agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This
agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine
Corps, be returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they would allow such transfer of
custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal
protection clause of the Constitution is also violated.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units
around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their
bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of
the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including
rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed
forces.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to
detention as against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties,
but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy,
are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States
towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, is UPHELD
as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape in the RTC of Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail until further orders.
On December 19 and 22, 2006, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and US Ambassador Kristie
Kenney executed agreements that pursuant to the VFA, Smith be returned to the US military custody and be
detained at the first floor, Rowe Building, US Embassy Compound.
Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said agreements contending that the Philippines
should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Art. XVlll,
Sec. 25 of the constitution.
Is the VFA constitutional? Granting that it is constitutional, Are the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in accordance
with the provisions of the VFA itself?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19
and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
VFA is Constitutional
The SC ruled that the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty
by the United States, and the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The issue, the Court said, is whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant
to the VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State. It is, the Court ruled. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint
RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the
Court held. visit fellester.blogspot.com The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was signed and
duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
Romulo-Kenney Agreements not in accord with the VFA itself
The Court however ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself
because such detention is not by Philippine authorities. Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides that the
confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto
Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)
DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissent, Chief Justice Puno maintained his view in the earlier case of Bayan v. Zamora that the VFA falls
short of the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution, which provides that the agreement allowing
the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state. For the Chief Justice, the majority of the Court in Bayan v. Zamora gave undue deference to the statement
of former US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard that US Senate advice and consent was not needed to consider a
treaty binding on the US, then jumped to the conclusion that the US recognized the VFA as a treaty, and that the
constitutional requirements had been satisfied. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon Vs. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No.
175888, February 11, 2009)

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III

Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk
Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom
Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be
implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and
WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local
legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most
of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS
whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions
(specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely
prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our
country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions
may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft
law is not part of intl law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising,
promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to 24
months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said
provisions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international
law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can

be applied to domestic conflicts. (Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phil. v. Health Secretary Duque,
et al., G.R. No. 173034, October 19, 2007).
State the concept of the term generally accepted principles of international law and give examples.
ANS: Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of
sovereign immunity, a persons right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The
concept of generally accepted principles of law has also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges upon certain general principles of law as a primary source of international law
because they have the character of jus rationale and are valid through all kinds of human societies. (Judge
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966, I.C.J. 296). OConell holds that certain
principles are part of international law because they are basic to legal systems generally and hence part of the
jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common
identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and
determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution. (Pharmaceutical & Health
Care Assn. of the Phil. v. Sec. of Health Duque, et al., G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007).
Q

What is customary international law? Explain.

ANS: Custom or customary international law means a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris). This statement contains the two basic elements of custom:
the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave
the way they do.
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several
elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long.
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the
practice.
Once the existence of state practice has been established it becomes necessary to determine why states behave
the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they
do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what
makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law. (Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the
Phil. v. Health Secretary Duque, et al., G. R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007).
Q

What is a soft law? Is it an international law? Explain.

ANS: Soft law is an expression of non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.
(David Fidler, Development Involving SARS, International Law & Infections Disease Control at the Fifty-Six
Meeting of the World Health Assembly, June 2003, ASIL; Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phils. v.
Health Secretary Duque, et al., G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007). It does not fall under the international law set
forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts:
On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of Persons who have
committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The Doctrine of Incorporation under the
Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of U. S. a request
for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the
following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false statement or entry, election contributions in the name of another.
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1, 1999, requested
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall received copies of the
requested papers.
Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:
1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;
2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present
evidence is support of the opposition;
The Depart of Justice Denied the request.
On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition
documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec
of Justice from considering the extradition request).
On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:
The Secretary of Justice et al ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of.
Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:
1. by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained of (i.e to desist from
refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and documents.)
2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under the extradition treaty and
the Philippine Extradition Law.
Issue:
Would Mark Jimenez entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute
a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
Held:
Petition Dismissed.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of

the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in
their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the nonestablishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"),
rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration
to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to
which we adhere.