Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
179987
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.
xxx
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues
for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?[13]
more than 30 yearsipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it
under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster
their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section
14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that
the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. [20] Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the
law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced
by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. [23] This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset
of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural
lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified
the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands
of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12,
1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable
prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when
the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered
as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession
on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is
not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein
was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1)
is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable
and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it,
and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the
Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that
this is one of them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration
was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the
dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).
The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where
the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as
1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may
be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary
xxx
xxx
xxx
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under
Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet
this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent.
The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.
Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of
Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known
as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,
including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale
of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military
lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) [40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to
sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. [42] Accordingly, the BCDA
law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing
sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public
service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion
into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no
way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription
and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on
the basis ofpossession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis
of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in
the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith
and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles
526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, [45] provisions that
more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the
person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the
periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under theTorrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not
fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the
Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect
title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June
1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
though it arguably did not preclude such registration. [50] Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over
the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing
original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the
Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
SO ORDERED.