Case Digest of Kasilag vs.

Rodriguez
KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] - F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and
heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner
the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana
Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the
parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event
the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land
and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the
land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner
of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled
and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the
parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs,
she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner,
for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that
in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan,
the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in
all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay
the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she
and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would
introduce improvements thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as
integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such
contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the
contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land
bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated.
Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the
question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable
ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the
petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition
regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its
fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by
Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and

may be the basis of GF.

The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by
the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy
and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value
to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

Noveras vs Noveras
SHORT FACTS: David and Leticia are (former Filipino) US citizens who own
properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce
from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
ISSUE(S): Whether facts in the case give ground to grant a decree of judicial separation of property of
the spouses.
HELD: YES. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one
year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
RATIO:
1. As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and
refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18 Leticia
anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of
Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of

administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition,
the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
2. The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause
and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three
months from such abandonment.
3. In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown
in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until
the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and
the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California
court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered
as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19 Separation in fact for one year as a
ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.
4. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the
name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
5. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted. The grant of
the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute
community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus: Art. 99. The
absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal
separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.

6. Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver
of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to
liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as
well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall
only be limited to the Philippine properties. We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the
payment of their childrens presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where

their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus,
Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit
of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in
going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of P300,000.00
when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by
the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal
driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount ofP120,000.00 or in the respective amounts
of P1,040,000.00. x x x x Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the
absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to
their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should
each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Quiaov.Quiao,G.R.No.183622,July4,2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977.
They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage,
they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation
for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of
legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court.
By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and
debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of
martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry.
The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Panav.HeirsofJuanite,G.R.No.164201,Dec.10,2012
FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder.
Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the
penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil
indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the
dominant lots.

FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15
meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the
south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to
Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the
Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to
AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to
Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as
La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a
Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the
Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMUs 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way
around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola
Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.

ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the

road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using
6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of
the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn
filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that
Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU
has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by
the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I dont
think I can find the details regarding it in the case I just saw the one regarding
acknowledgement between admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a
compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same
cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude
or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-ininterest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement
yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one
(there no such thing as a judicial easement)

Fabie v. David
G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945
Ozaeta, J.
FACTS:
Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at
372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the
ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo
Cristo property is the respondent Juan Grey. Litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as
plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the Ongpin property as

intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned in clause 9 of the

will referred to above.
In June 1945 Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against
Ngo Boo Soo (who says that his correct name is Ngo Soo), alleging that the
defendant is occupying the premises located at 372-376 Santo Cristo on a month-to
month rental payable in advance not later than the 5th of each month; that she is
the administratrix and usufructuary of said premises; that the defendant offered to
pay P300 monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month,
beginning the month of April 1945, for the said of premises including the one door
which said defendant, without plaintiffs consent and contrary to their agreement,
had subleased to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based on the fact that the
plaintiff very badly needs the said house to live in, as her house was burned by the
Japanese on the occasion of the entry of the American liberators in the City; that
defendant was duly notified to leave the said premises, but he refused; and she
prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid rentals.
The defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a
tenant of the premises in question, which he was using and had always used
principally as a store and secondarily for living quarters; that he was renting it from
its owner and administrator Juan Grey; that plaintiff is merely the usufructuary of
the income therefrom, and by agreement between her and said owner, her only
right as usufructuary of the income is to receive the whole of such income; that she
has no right or authority to eject tenants, such right being in the owner and
administrator of the house, Juan Grey; that plaintiff has never had possession of
said property; that defendants lease contract with the owner of the house is for 5year period, with renewal option at the end of each period, and that his present
lease due to expire on December 31, 1945; that on June 1, 1945, defendant made a
written offer to plaintiff to compromise and settle the question of the amount of rent
to be paid by defendant but said plaintiff rejected the same for no valid reason
whatever and instituted the present action; that the reason plaintiff desires to eject
defendant from the property is that she wishes to lease the same to other persons
for a higher rent, ignoring the fact that as usufructuary of the income of the
property she has no right to lease the property.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to administer the property subject matter of this case and
who should be the tenant?
HELD:
The usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the
acts of administration to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the
property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums thereon were by court judgment vested in
the usufructuary. The pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he is the
administrator of the property with the right to choose the tenants and to dictate the
conditions of the lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause
of the will, the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot

manage or administer the property after all the acts of management and
administration have been vested by the court, with his consent, in the usufructuary.
He admitted that before said judgment he had been collecting the rents as agent of
the usufructuary under an agreement with the latter. As long as the property is
properly conserved and insured he can have no cause for complaint, and his right in
that regard is fully protected by the terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the
court above mentioned. To permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose
the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to
comply therewith, would be to place the usufructuary entirely at his mercy. It would
place her in the absurd situation of having a certain indisputable right without the
power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.
TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because
under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.
One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within
the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Kalaw v. Relova

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition
for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name,
designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not
initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This
alteration was initialed by the testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir.
The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as
there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another.
To rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this
change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814,
or by affixing her full signature.
BARTOLOME VS SSS
G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014
Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over the death of her son John
Colcol (John), who she gave up for adoption, and alleged that she was the sole remaining
beneficiary. Previously, John was employed as electrician by Defendant Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. He was covered by the governments
Employees Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the
vessel wherein steel plates fell on him resulting in his death.
When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it stating that she was no longer the parent of
John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioner herself. On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
affirmed the SSS ruling through a decision dated 17 March 17 2010 citing Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1)
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
HELD: Petitioner was entitled to receive the claim for death benefits. Based on Cornelios
death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less
than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As
such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away.
The ECC Rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. Rule XV,
Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear
language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended Hence, it was held that Rule XV of

the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a

substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase
dependent parents to refer to legitimate parents.'
As the law does not define dependent parents, it should be understood to have a general and
inclusive scope. Thus, the term parents in the phrase dependent parents in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot
be unduly limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent parents
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or
by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent
parents are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in
need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to
limit the phrase dependent parents to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive,
Article 167 provides that in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
secondary beneficiaries. Had the lawmakers contemplated dependent parents to mean
legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not legitimate descendants.
The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
dependent parents was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
nature or adoption.
The law is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
As a result, it was held that Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority resulted in the
restoration of petitioners parental authority over the adopted child.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his
benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. While RA 8282 does not
cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act
of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner
as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death
during Johns minority, the restoration of petitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
In sum, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelios
adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during
Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, Johns sole
remaining beneficiary

Edroso vs. Sablan

1. The reservistas right over the reserved property is one of ownership.
2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of reservatarios at the
time of the reservistas death.
3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.
4. The reservistas right of ownership is registrable.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal
title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express
provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to
alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a
word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives.
After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who
must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and
only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy
Constancio SIENES, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
Fidel ESPARCIA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12597, March 24, 1961
FACTS:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he
had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by
Saturnino upon his death were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando,
Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco.
As a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it
in her name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died at the age of 20,
single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument and sold
the property in question to appellants in consideration of the sum of P800.00. Andrea Gutang died on
December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13,
1952. Said vendees demanded from Paulina and her husband, the surrender of the OCT which was in their
possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral,
which was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso.
RULING:
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. This Court
has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property;
that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable
and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without
being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang
died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by
the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject
to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property
came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of,
albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership
to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve.
In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when
Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the
absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be
true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective
because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position
to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property
in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees did not appeal
therefrom
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO
FATS: In 1980 Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children and his
widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in partition of the subject property. When the latter died, the said
property were inherited by his mother severina, who latter died leaving a will instituting her daughter as

her universal heir. The appellants demands from the daughter to deliver their corresponding share in the
reservable property but the daughter refused.
HELD: Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own property to her only daughter,
nevertheless, this property had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the
common ancestor of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted by
operation of law to his mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property while there
are living with the 3rd degree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or fiduciary of the
reservable property received. But if afterwards all of such relative die, the said property become free
property by operation of law, and is hereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can
transmit it at his death to his legal succession.
Del Carmen v Spouses Sabordo
FACTS: Sometime in 1961, the spouses Toribio and Eufrocina Suico (Suico spouses),
along with several business partners, entered into a business venture by
establishing a rice and corn mill at Mandaue City, Cebu. As part of their capital,
they obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and to
secure the said loan, four parcels of land owned by the Suico spouses, denominated
as Lots 506, 512, 513 and 514, and another lot owned by their business partner,
Juliana Del Rosario, were mortgaged. Subsequently, the Suico spouses and their
business partners failed to pay their loan obligations forcing DBP to foreclose the
mortgage. After the Suico spouses and their partners failed to redeem the
foreclosed properties, DBP consolidated its ownership over the same. Nonetheless,
DBP later allowed the Suico spouses and Reginald and Beatriz Flores (Flores
spouses), as substitutes for Juliana Del Rosario, to repurchase the subject lots by
way of a conditional sale for the sum of P240,571.00. The Suico and Flores spouses
were able to pay the downpayment and the first monthly amortization, but no
monthly installments were made thereafter. Threatened with the cancellation of the
conditional sale, the Suico and Flores spouses sold their rights over the said
properties to herein respondents Restituto and Mima Sabordo, subject to the
condition that the latter shall pay the balance of the sale price. On September 3,
1974, respondents and the Suico and Flores spouses executed a supplemental
agreement whereby they affirmed that what was actually sold to respondents were
Lots 512 and 513, while Lots 506 and 514 were given to them as usufructuaries.
DBP approved the sale of rights of the Suico and Flores spouses in favor of herein
respondents. Subsequently, respondents were able to repurchase the foreclosed
properties of the Suico and Flores spouses.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial deposit complied with the provisions of Art 1256 and 1257
HELD: Petitioner's main contention is that the consignation which she and her coheirs made was a judicial deposit based on a final judgment and, as such, does not
require compliance with the requirements of Articles 1256 11 and 125712 of the Civil
Code.
The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court quotes with approval the discussion of the CA regarding the
definition and nature of consignation, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
consignation [is] the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial
authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and
itgenerally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be distinguished
from tender of payment which is the manifestation by the debtor to the
creditor of his desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of
immediate performance. Tender is the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act
preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived
the immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of
payment may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the
priority of the first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to
the solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made,
produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the obligation. 13
In the case of Arzaga v. Rumbaoa,14 which was cited by petitioner in support of his
contention, this Court ruled that the deposit made with the court by the plaintiffappellee in the said case is considered a valid payment of the amount adjudged,
even without a prior tender of payment thereof to the defendants-appellants,
because the plaintiff-appellee, upon making such deposit, expressly petitioned the
court that the defendants-appellees be notified to receive the tender of payment.
This Court held that while [t]he deposit, by itself alone, may not have been
sufficient, but with the express terms of the petition, there was full and complete
offer of payment made directly to defendants-appellants.15 In the instant case,
however, petitioner and her co-heirs, upon making the deposit with the RTC, did not
ask the trial court that respondents be notified to receive the amount that they
have deposited. In fact, there was no tender of payment. Instead, what petitioner
and her co-heirs prayed for is that respondents and RPB be directed to interplead
with one another to determine their alleged respective rights over the consigned
amount; that respondents be likewise directed to substitute the subject lots with
other real properties as collateral for their loan with RPB and that RPB be also
directed to accept the substitute real properties as collateral for the said loan.
Nonetheless, the trial court correctly ruled that interpleader is not the proper
remedy because RPB did not make any claim whatsoever over the amount
consigned by petitioner and her co-heirs with the court.
In the cases of Del Rosario v. Sandico16 and Salvante v. Cruz,17 likewise cited as
authority by petitioner, this Court held that, for a consignation or deposit with the
court of an amount due on a judgment to be considered as payment, there must be
prior tender to the judgment creditor who refuses to accept it. The same principle
was reiterated in the later case of Pabugais v. Sahijwani.[18 As stated above, tender
of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal
tender currency as payment to the obligee for the formers obligation and
demanding that the latter accept the same.19 In the instant case, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the RTC that petitioner and
her co-heirs failed to make a prior valid tender of payment to respondents.

It is settled that compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is

mandatory.20 Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will render the
consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid prior tender of
payment.21cralawred
Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior tender of payment is excused
are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of
payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time
it is due; (3) when, without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a receipt; (4)
when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when the title of
the obligation has been lost. None of these instances are present in the instant
case. Hence, the fact that the subject lots are in danger of being foreclosed does
not excuse petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to respondents, as
directed by the court.