INTRODUCTION

A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

BARRIENTOS vs. DAAROL

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court

on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria
C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a
member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p.
12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor
General and for the convenience of the
parties and their witnesses who were
residing in the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province
was authorized to conduct the investigation
and to submit a report, together with
transcripts of stenographic notes and
exhibits submitted by the parties, if any
(Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the
Solicitor General submitted its Report and
Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was
single and a resident of Bonifacio St.,
Dipolog City; that when she was still a
teenager and first year in college she came

to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol

in 1969 as he used to go to their house
being a friend of her sister Norma; that
they also became friends, and she knew
the respondent as being single and living
alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was
the General Manager of Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO)
and subsequently transferred his residence
to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd.
at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111,
tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to
their house and asked her to be one of the
usherettes in the Mason's convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30,
1973 and, she told respondent to ask the
permission
of
her
parents,
which
respondent did, and her father consented;
that for three whole days she served as
usherette in the convention and respondent
picked her up from her residence every
morning and took her home from the
convention site at the end of each day (pp.
112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973,
respondent came to complainant's house
and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former
classmate of respondent; that respondent
took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then
they strolled along the beach, and in the
course of which respondent proposed his
love to her; that respondent told her that if
she would accept him, he would marry her
within six (6) months from her acceptance;
complainant told respondent that she

would think it over first; that from then on

respondent used to visit her in their house
almost every night, and he kept on courting
her and pressed her to make her decision
on respondent's proposal; that on July 7,
1973, she finally accepted respondent's
offer of love and respondent continued his
usual visitations almost every night
thereafter; they agreed to get married in
December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited her, with the consent of
her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom;
that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent
fetched her from her house and went to the
Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that
at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they
left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but
before taking her home respondent invited
her for a joy ride and took her to the airport
at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked
the jeep by the beach where there were no
houses around; that in the course of their
conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and
then started caressing her downward and
his hand kept on moving to her panty and
down to her private parts (pp. 121-122,
tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this
Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be
afraid of me. I will marry you" and
reminded her also that "anyway, December
is very near, the month we have been
waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he
pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not
be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his
promise and assurances, at the same time
pulling down her panty; that she told him
that she was afraid because they were not
yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse
with him at the back seat of the jeep; that
after the intercourse she wept and

respondent again
and assurances
anyway he would
12:00 midnight
122-124, tsn, id.).

reiterated his promises

not to worry because
marry her; and at about
they went home (pp.

After
August
20,
1973,
respondent
continued to invite her to eat outside
usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in
Dipolog City about twice or three times a
week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual
intercourse; that they had this sexual
intercourse from August to October 1973 at
the frequency of two or three times a week,
and she consented to all these things
because she loved him and believed in all
his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September,
1973 complainant noticed that her
menstruation which usually occurred during
the second week of each month did not
come; she waited until the end of the
month and still there was no menstruation;
she submitted to a pregnancy test and the
result
was
positive;
she
informed
respondent and respondent suggested to
have the fetus aborted but she objected
and respondent did not insist; respondent
then told her not to worry because they
would get married within one month and he
would talk to her parents about their
marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn,id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and talked to her
parents about their marriage; it was agreed
that the marriage would be celebrated in
Manila so as not to create a scandal as
complainant
was
already
pregnant;
complainant and her mother left for Manila
by boat on October 22, 1973 while
respondent would follow by plane; and they

agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the

house of complainant's sister Delia who is
married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135,
tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent
came to see complainant and her mother
at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them
that he could not marry complainant
because he was already married (p. 137,
tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad
and said: "Trans, so you fooled my
daughter and why did you let us come here
in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on,
however,
respondent
reassured
complainant
not
to
worry
because
respondent had been separated from his
wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment
of
his
marriage
and,
subsequently marry complainant (p. 139,
tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to
deliver their child in Manila and assured her
of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140,
tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog
City and actually sent the promised
support; he came back to Manila in January
1974 and went to see complainant; when
asked about the annulment of his previous
marriage, he told complainant that it would
soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.);
he came back in February and in March
1974 and told complainant the same thing
(p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her
mother to come to Manila when she
delivers the child, but her mother answered
her that she cannot come as nobody would
be left in their house in Dipolog and instead
suggested that complainant go to Cebu
City which is nearer; complainant went to
Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister
Norma took her to the Good Shepherd
Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a
baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual
Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child

was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp.

143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant
came to Dipolog City and tried to contact
respondent by phone and, thru her brother,
but to no avail; as she was ashamed she
just stayed in their house; she got sick and
her father sent her to Zamboanga City for
medical treatment; she came back after
two weeks but still respondent did not
come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she
consulted
a
lawyer
and
filed
an
administrative case against respondent
with
the
National
Electrification
Administration; the case was referred to
the
Zamboanga
del
Norte
Electric
Cooperative
(ZANECO)
and
it
was
dismissed and thus she filed the present
administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of
his sole testimony and one exhibit, the
birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1).
Respondent declared substantially as
follows: that he was born on August 6,
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that
he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in
1955; that he had a son who is now 20
years old; that because of incompatibility
he had been estranged from his wife for 16
years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a
moslem and thereby embraced the Islam
Religion
(pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came
to know complainant's father since 1952
because he was his teacher; likewise he
knew complainant's mother because they
were former classmates in high school; that
he became acquainted with complainant
when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in
their house; they gradually became friends

and often talked with each other, and even

talked about their personal problems; that
he mentioned to her his being estranged
from his wife; that with the consent of her
parents he invited her to be one of the
usherettes in the Masonic Convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30,
1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the
arrangement was for him to fetch her from
her residence and take her home from the
convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each
other and after the convention, he
proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973;
that (sic) a week of courtship, she accepted
his proposal and since then he used to
invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited complainant to be his
partner during the Chamber of Commerce
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair,
complainant complained to him of a
headache, so he decided to take her home
but once inside the jeep, she wanted to
have a joy ride, so he drove around the city
and proceeded to the airport; that when
they were at the airport, only two of them,
they started the usual kisses and they were
carried by their passion; they forgot
themselves and they made love; that
before midnight he took her home; that
thereafter
they
indulged
in
sexual
intercourse many times whenever they
went on joy riding in the evening and
ended up in the airport which was the only
place
they
could
be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of
October 1973 that complainant told him of
her pregnancy; that they agreed that the
child be delivered in Manila to avoid

scandal and respondent would take care of

expenses; that during respondent's talk
with the parents of complainant regarding
the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was
married but estranged from his wife; that
when complainant was already in Manila,
she asked him if he was willing to marry
her, he answered he could not marry again,
otherwise, he would be charged with
bigamy but he promised to file an
annulment of his marriage as he had been
separated from his wife for 16 years; that
complainant consented to have sexual
intercourse with him because of her love to
him and he did not resort to force, trickery,
deceit or cajolery; and that the present
case was filed against him by complainant
because of his failure to give the money to
support complainant while in Cebu waiting
for the delivery of the child and, also to
meet complainant's medical expenses
when she went to Zamboanga City for
medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).

FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties,
the following facts are not disputed:
1.
That
the
complainant,
Victoria
Barrientos, is single, a college student, and
was about 20 years and 7 months old
during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been
born on December 23, 1952; while
respondent
Transfiguracion
Daarol
is
married, General Manager of Zamboanga
del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41
years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6,
1932;

2. That respondent is married to Romualda

A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that
the marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr.
Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and
that said respondent had been separated
from his wife for about 16 years at the time
of his relationship with complainant;

preliminaries, they consummated the

sexual act and at about midnight they went
home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the
airport where they used to make love twice
or three times a week; that as a result of
her intimate relations, complainant became
pregnant;

3. That respondent had been known by the

Barrientos family for quite sometime,
having been a former student of
complainant's father in 1952 and, a former
classmate of complainant's mother at the
Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City;
that
he
became
acquainted
with
complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and
Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to
visit Norma at her residence; that he also
befriended complainant and who became a
close friend when he invited her, with her
parents' consent, to be one of the
usherettes during the Masonic Convention
in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30,
1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her
home from the convention site after each
day's activities;

5. That after a conference among

respondent, complainant and complainant's
parents, it was agreed that complainant
would deliver her child in Manila, where she
went with her mother on October 22, 1973
by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and,
stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto
Serrano
in
Singalong,
Manila;
that
respondent visited her there on the 26th,
27th and 28th of October 1973, and again
in February and March 1974; that later on
complainant decided to deliver the child in
Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog
City, and she went there in April 1974 and
her sister took her to the Good Shepherd
Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on
June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at
the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City
and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went
home to Dipolog City; that during her stay
here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent
defrayed
some
of
her
expenses; that she filed an administrative
case against respondent with the National
Electrification
Administration;
which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and
then she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.

4. That respondent courted complainant,

and after a week of courtship, complainant
accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973;
that in the evening of August 20, 1973,
complainant with her parents' permission
was respondent's partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez
Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about
10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the
place but before going home, they went to
the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and
parked the jeep at the beach, where there
were no houses around; that after the usual

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommend that after hearing,

respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be

disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the
Court finds itself in full accord with the
findings and recommendation of the
Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable
that complainant was never informed by
respondent attorney of his real status as a
married individual. The fact of his previous
marriage was disclosed by respondent only
after the complainant became pregnant.
Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16
years and dangled a marriage proposal on
the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a
deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said
marriage. More importantly, respondent
knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for
annulment of marriage and does not vest
him legal capacity to contract another
marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived
alone in Dipolog City though his son, who
was also studying in Dipolog City, lived
separately from him. He never introduced
his son and went around with friends as
though he was never married much less
had a child in the same locality. This
circumstance alone belies respondent's
claim that complainant and her family were
aware of his previous marriage at the very
start of his courtship. The Court is therefore
inclined to believe that respondent resorted
to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual
desires at the expense of the gullible
complainant. It is not in accordance with

the nature of the educated, cultured and

respectable, which complainant's family is,
her father being the Assistant Principal of
the local public high school, to allow a
daughter to have an affair with a married
man.
But what surprises this Court even more is
the perverted sense of respondent's moral
values when he said that: "I see nothing
wrong with this relationship despite my
being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13,
1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even
suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's
moral sense is so seriously impaired that
we cannot maintain his membership in the
Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1
[1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another
woman while his first wife is still alive and
their marriage still valid and existing is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. Respondent made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity
to allege that he is a Moslem convert and
as such, could enter into multiple
marriages and has inquired into the
possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo,
p. 15). As records indicate, however, his
claim of having embraced the Islam religion
is not supported by any evidence save that
of his self-serving testimony. In this regard,
we need only to quote the finding of the
Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry
complainant he said he could not because
he was already married and would open
him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn,
January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem

convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is

now claiming, why did he not marry
complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a
moslem, but, having been married in a civil
ceremony, he could no longer validly enter
into another civil ceremony without
committing
bigamy
because
the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn,
January 13, 1977). Consequently, if
respondent knew, that notwithstanding his
being a moslem convert, he cannot marry
complainant, then it was grossly immoral
for him to have sexual intercourse with
complainant
because
he
knew
the
existence
of
a
legal
impediment.
Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he
has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral
tendencies to appease his sexual desires,
respondent
Daarol
has
amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency.
Hence,
his
removal
for
conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar on the
grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
is in order. Good moral character is a
condition which precedes admission to the
Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is
not dispensed with upon admission thereto.
It is a continuing qualification which all
lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda,
181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v.
Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a
lawyer may either be suspended or
disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil.
350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206
SCRA 395 [1992]):

It cannot be overemphasized that the

requirement of good character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As
aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm:
"As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is
unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the court retains the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only
recently,
another
disbarment
proceeding was resolved by this Court
against a lawyer who convinced a woman
that her prior marriage to another man was
null and void ab initio and she was still
legally single and free to marry him (the
lawyer), married her, was supported by her
in his studies, begot a child with her,
abandoned her and the child, and married
another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case
No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man
and about 41 years old, proposed love and
marriage to complainant, then still a 20year-old minor, knowing that he did not
have
the
required
legal
capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having
carnal relations with complainant by
deception, made her pregnant, suggested
abortion, breached his promise to marry
her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded
only to those who measure up to the

exacting standards of mental and moral

fitness. Respondent having exhibited
debased morality, the Court is constrained
to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law
exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality. The members are, in
fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar
against the admission of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient either moral
character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA
439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA
1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral
character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral
standards
of
the
community.
More
specifically, a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral
standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21,
26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA
757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA
859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally
delinquent and as such, should not be
allowed continued membership in the
ancient and learned profession of law
(Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY,
We
find
respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly
immoral conduct unworthy of being a
member of the Bar and is hereby ordered

DISBARRED and his name stricken off from

the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished to all courts of the
land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread
on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.
SO ORDERED.

ALAWI vs. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,

Shari'a
District
Court,
Marawi
City, respondent.

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still

is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency,
a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by
the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely
on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing

from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered
into between me and your company, as
represented
by
your
Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent
was
vitiated
by
gross
misrepresentation,
deceit,
fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent
acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal
and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent
** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa
& Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of
our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract **. I hope I do not
have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the
Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps.
Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995,

Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of
the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and
asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable
from salary deductions at the rate
of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent
was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit,
dishonesty,
and
abuse
of
confidence; and that there was no meeting
of the minds between me and the swindling
sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he
narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr.
Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in
all of which, for the same reasons already
cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account

thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996

to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again
asserting the anomalous manner by which
he was allegedly duped into entering into
the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the
NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began
negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the
buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and **
the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to
Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to
which she appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free
Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she
accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous
charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing
her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege
of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney,"
which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her

as
"unscrupulous,
swindler,
forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with
the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations
as
irresponsible,
"all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled
with manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with
the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from
the service, or be appropriately disciplined
(sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to
comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of
resolutions
emanate
from
the
corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was
signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary
Comment"[3] in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div.
Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District
Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's
office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of
him for being not only "the Executive Clerk
of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and
District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty.
Marasigan, but this time in much less

aggressive,
even
obsequious
tones,
[5]
Alauya requested the former to give him
a copy of the complaint in order that he
might comment thereon.[6] He stated that
his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law;
and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a
housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And
in
his
comment
thereafter
submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that
in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had
been deducted from his salary. [7] He
declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa
& Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate whom
he entrusted with the mailing of certain
letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD
26," were typewritten on the envelope by
some
other
person,
an
averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn
to before respondent himself, and attached
to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as
he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters
with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court,
this had occurred inadvertently and
because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title,
"attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-

at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers

have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor"
is
often
mistaken
for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not
consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion,
alleging that what he did "is expected of
any
man
unduly
prejudiced
and
[10]
injured."
He claims he was manipulated
into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a
blank contract on Alawi's assurance that
she would show the completed document
to him later for correction, but she had
since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property -- subject of his
supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12]He says
Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his
wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa
& Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw. [13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question
were done without malice, Alauya prays for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious
and baseless allegations," and complainant
Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the
fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to

his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all
of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996,
he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is
that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,"
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the
contracts
in
question
"by
gross
misrepresentation,
deceit,
fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated
** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and
"swindling") sales agent" who had fooled
him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without ** (his) authority
and against ** (his) will," and "concealed
the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in

making these statements, he was merely
acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental
anguish,
sleepless
nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards
for
Public
Officials
and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights
of others, and ** refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest." [17] More than
once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding
judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn
and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court
consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively
intemperate.
insulting
or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action

against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that

he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise
stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright namecalling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man
of the law, he may not use language which
is
abusive,
offensive,
scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a
judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the person and the
rights of others at all times, and that his
every act and word should be characterized
by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity.
His radical deviation from these salutary
norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of
"Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts.
[21]
While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be

considered "counsellors," in the sense that

they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use
the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged
unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M.
Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use
of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent
language,
i.e.,
language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

PRACTICE OF LAW

OFFICE
OF
THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287
January 26, 2001

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998,

respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court
Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo,
for authority to appear as pro bono counsel
of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People
vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification
of Public Document pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.[1] While respondents letterrequest was pending action, Lisa Payoyo
Andres, the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court

Administrator, dated September 2, 1998,

requesting for a certification with regard to
respondents authority to appear as counsel
for the accused in the said criminal case.
[2]
On September 7, 1998, the Office of the
Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14,
1998, respondent admitted that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885
without prior authorization. He reasoned
out
that
the
factual
circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled
him to handle the defense of his cousin
who did not have enough resources to hire
the services of a counsel de parte; while,
on the other hand, private complainant was
a member of a powerful family who was out
to get even with his cousin. Furthermore,
he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office
nor the interest of the public since he did
not take advantage of his position. In any

case, his appearances in court were

covered by leave application approved by
the presiding judge.

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999,

we required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued

a resolution denying respondents request
for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing
the
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator to file formal charges against
him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court. [5] On
January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator
filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)
(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards
for
Public
Officials
and
Employees, which provides:

In his Comment, respondent explained

that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood
cousins who belong to a powerless family
from the impoverished town of Bacauag,
Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had
always supported and guided him while he
looked up to her as a mentor and an
adviser. Because of their close relationship,
Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and
advice when she was charged in Criminal
Case No. 84885 for falsification by the
private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
whose only purpose in filing the said
criminal case was to seek vengeance on
her cousin. He explained that his cousins
discord with Ms. Andres started when the
latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left
the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot
three (3) children. The birth certificate of
their eldest child is the subject of the
falsification
charge
against
Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is
the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to
be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to
be her counsel since she did not have
enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in
his
seven
(7)
years
of
untainted
government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with
the judiciary, he had performed his duties
with honesty and integrity and that it was
only in this particular case that he had
been
administratively
charged
for
extending a helping hand to a close relative
by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In

addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other
activities related thereto.- Public officials
and employees during their incumbency
shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions;

advantage of his position as branch clerk of

court since the questioned appearances
were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City and not in Makati where he
is holding office. He stressed that during
the hearings of the criminal case, he was
on leave as shown by his approved leave
applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999,
we noted respondents comment and
referred the administrative matter to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga,
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29,
1999, Judge Salonga made the following
findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael
Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No.
84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents
before the METC of Quezon City. It is also
denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that
during the occasions that the respondent
appeared as such counsel before the METC
of Quezon City, he was on official leave of
absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge,
Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the
case he was handling. That the respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel likewise
cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo
from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the

family, he agreed to represent her out of

his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the
first time that respondent ever handled a
case for a member of his family who is like
a big sister to him. He appeared for free
and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge
was aware of his appearance as counsel for
his cousin. On top of this, during all the
years that he has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing
that the respondent appeared as counsel
for his cousin without first securing
permission from the court, and considering
that this is his first time to do it coupled
with the fact that said appearance was not
for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED
with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.
[6]

We agree with the recommendation of

the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards
for
Public
Officials
and
Employees which prohibits civil servants
from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The
said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.No judge or other official or employee of
the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advise to clients.

himself to be in the active and continued

practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.

However, it should be clarified that

private practice of a profession, specifically
the law profession in this case, which is
prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated
court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self
to the public as a lawyer.

For one thing, it has never been refuted

that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,

we explained the meaning of the term
private practice prohibited by the said
section, to wit:
[7]

We believe that the isolated appearance of

City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice,
within
the
meaning
and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding ones self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation
of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented

Based on the foregoing, it is evident

that
the
isolated
instances
when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel
of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885
does not constitute the private practice of
the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless,
while
respondents
isolated court appearances did not amount
to a private practice of law, he failed to
obtain a written permission therefor from
the head of the Department, which is this
Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the
Department: Provided,
That
this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire
time
be
at
the
disposal
of
the
Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage
in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by

the agency to the end that it will not impair

in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties,
and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors. [9]
Respondent entered his appearance
and attended court proceedings on
numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998,
June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5,
1998, as borne out by his own admission. It
is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission
from
the
head
of
the
Department. The presiding judge of the
court to which respondent is assigned is
not
the
head
of
the
Department
contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning
that any repetition of such act would be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

We are faced here with a controversy of farreaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably
have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1
(1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately
preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned
after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members
of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 100113

September 3, 1991

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no

jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions
and
special
proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing
himself
as
an
attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in
the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body,
committee,
or
commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies
and
there,
in
such
representative capacity performs any act or

acts for the purpose of obtaining or

defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected
with
the
law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation
and
drafting
of
legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions
consists in no small part of work performed

outside of any court and having no

immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill,
a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law
Center in conducting orientation briefing
for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even
broader terms as advocacy, counselling
and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in

following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr
v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot
to do during our review of the provisions on
the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed
to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with
qualifications of the members of
Commission on Audit. Among others,
qualifications provided for by Section
that "They must be Members of
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from

the
the
the
I is
the
the

provision "who have been engaged in

the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which
would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee
on
Constitutional
Commissions
and
Agencies and we deem it important to take
it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to
just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that
service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on
the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that
the work of COA, although it is auditing,
will necessarily involve legal work; it will

involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers

who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under
our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction
given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, provides, among others, that
the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should
either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice,
or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private
practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority
of
lawyers
are
private
practitioners.
(Gary
Munneke, Opportunities
in
Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
[1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to
define private practice. The term, as
commonly
understood,
means
"an
individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are

often called "sole practitioners." Groups of

lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be
organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there
are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by
looking to traditional areas of law practice
is
essentially
tautologous,
unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which
lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal
Ethics [West
Publishing
Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. (State
Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in
behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as
an uncommon role for the average lawyer.
Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend
their entire practice without litigating a
case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many
lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of

litigation in the public mind reflects history,
not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this
wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the
bench and bar and the informed laymen
such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices
than
in
the
courtrooms.
General
practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician
and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average
general practitioner wig engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other
interested
parties.
Even
the
increasing
numbers
of
lawyers
in
specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will
shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different
one such as representing a client before an

administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.

687).
By no means will most of this work involve
litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling,
advice-giving,
document
drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation
legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized into a
social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a
business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice,
a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may
be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legalpolicy decisional contexts, are finding that

understanding the major emerging trends

in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding
of
the
nature
and
implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved
corporate
legal
policy
formulation,
particularly
"model-making"
and
"contingency planning," has impressed
upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of
information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences
of given courses of action, and the need for
fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession
are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject
of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a

cross-disciplinary
approach
to
legal
research has become a vital necessity.

staff large enough to handle most legal

problems in-house.

Certainly, the general orientation for

productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems.
Lawyers, particularly with either a master's
or
doctorate
degree
in
business
administration or management, functioning
at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and

purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.

Truth to tell, many situations involving

corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because
of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may

assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters
as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate

lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "bigtime" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and
magnates of business and industry.

In a big company, for example, one may

have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's
work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of
his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to
be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Despite the growing number of corporate

lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by
a single corporation will vary with the size
and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services

may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities
available
to
corporate
lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as

glamorous, tills is an area coveted by

corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law
libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the
role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one
who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice
direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional
law
teaching
method
of
confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues
deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2)
an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion
to
the
organization
and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought

of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and
policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews
the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels.
The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often
with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also,
the
nature
of
the
lawyer's
participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and
operations
of
governance
through
participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as
well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology.
New
collaborative
arrangements
for
promoting
specific
technologies
or

competitiveness more generally require

approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are
lessons to be learned from other countries.
In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following
the
concept
of
boundary
spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both longterm
and
temporary
groups
within
organizations has been found to be related
to indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively
revising
their
knowledge
of
the
environment
coordinating
work
with
outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-avis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways
both
to
anticipate
effective
managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and
insurance
considerations.
(Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply
corporate
counsel,
three
are apropos:

by the
factors

First System Dynamics. The field of

systems dynamics has been found an

effective tool for new managerial thinking

regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate
all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic,
managerial,
social,
and
psychological. New
programming
techniques
now
make
the
system
dynamics principles more accessible to
managers including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables
users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation,
aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third
Modeling
for
Negotiation
Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including
hands-on
on
instruction
in
these
techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers
requires special skills that comprise a major
part
of
the
general
counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights

for such legal entities at that time when

transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in
trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the
Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its
global operations, managing improved
relationships
with
an
increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new
and
varied
interactions
with
public
decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis
that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate
counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the
legal
system
shapes
corporate
activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the

modem corporation. "Business Star", "The

Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar
and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast
tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance
and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding
and
risk
exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent
Christian
Monsod
was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On
the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the

Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 8655%. He has been a dues paying member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law
(U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's
work
involved
being
knowledgeable
in
election
law.
He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity
and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for
the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of

the Davide Commission, a quast judicial

body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987),
and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which
he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma
for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of
Representative.
(pp.
128-129
Rollo)
( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating
team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a
negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during
a negotiation. Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance
manager,
and
an operations
officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise
the members of the team. (Guillermo V.
Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper
No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a
country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned.
Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2)
borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of
default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an

important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development
policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from
the
work
paper,
entitled
"Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan
concessions
and
compromises,
perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model
loan
agreement.
Debt
restructuring
contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical
support
personnel.
(See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External
Debts,
an
unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of
the contract. A good agreement must not

only define the responsibilities of both

parties, but must also state the recourse
open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat
debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis
issine qua non for foreign loan agreementsan adherence to the rule of law in domestic
and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where
they are, men learn that bustle and bush
are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The
Role
of
Lawyers
in
Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's
past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that
the
appointee
should
possess
the

qualifications required by law. If he does,

then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better
qualified
who
should
have
been
preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case
of
(Central
Bank
v.
Civil
Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment
of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that
the
appointee
should
possess
the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular
appointment as in the case at bar, consists
of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments;
(3)
issuance
of
a
commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments
of
its
certificate
of
confirmation, the President issues the
permanent
appointment;
and
(4)

acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of

bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by
Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall
be appointed by the President with the
consent
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate
opinion, suffice it to say that his definition
of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover,
Justice
Padilla's
definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised
two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this
is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion

of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition
of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily
mean by the practice of law." True I cited
the definition but only by way of sarcasm
as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional
areas
of
law
practice
is
essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance
that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use
of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law.
In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of
persons
practising
law, without
first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme
Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified,
how can the action be entertained since he
is the incumbent President?

determined
that
he
possessed
the
necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission
in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec.
1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has
been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1)
If
the
Commission
on
Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse
the
Commission,
and
thus
in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly,
the answer is in the negative.
(2)
In
the
same
vein,
may
the
Court reject the
nominee,
whom
the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

We now proceed:
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
The Commission on the basis of evidence
submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's
confirmation,
implicitly

We must interpret not by the letter that

killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and

Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved)
for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that

persons
or
entities
from
making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those
allowed by law."

No blade shall touch his skin;

The advertisements complained

herein petitioner are as follows:

No blood shall flow from his veins.

Annex A

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah)

was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the
letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

ULEP vs.THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.,

Bar Matter No. 553
June 17, 1993

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the

respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B"
(of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit

of

by

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,

5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS
on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office
hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL
Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the

advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and
that, as a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent
admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and
Van
O'Steen
vs.
State
Bar
of
2
Arizona, reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the
legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
(IBP),
(2)
Philippine
Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations
readily
responded
and
extended their valuable services and
cooperation of which this Court takes note
with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before

the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice
of law and, in either case, whether the
same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis
of the merits of this case, we deem it
proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective
position
papers
adopted
by
the
aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the
issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by
which
respondent
endeavored
to
distinguish the two terms,i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that
the
same
are
essentially
without
substantial distinction. For who could deny
that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or
non-government
agencies
like
birth,
marriage,
property,
or
business
registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes

the view espoused by respondent (to the

effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain
terms
its
opposition
to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative
supervision
of
this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent
from
undertaking
highly
unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies
that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The
impression
created
by
the
advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such
a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term

"Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the

term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it
offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt
may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether
respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make
a distinction between "legal services" and
"legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the
minds of the reading public that legal
services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are
meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent
claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of
the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to
Guam divorce, and any law student ought
to know that under the Family Code, there

is only one instance when a foreign divorce

is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the
Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and
woman entered into accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to
stipulation,
except
that
marriage
settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By
simply
reading
the
questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This
is
not
only
misleading,
but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation
of Philippine law. At the very least, this can
be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine
laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or

abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point
out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which
contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and
seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special
contract
of
permanent
union,"
the
inviolable social institution," which is how
the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability.
Worse,
this
particular
advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to
be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are
accurate.
The
Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what
the advertisements suggest. Here it can be
seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged
or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las
Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the
"legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements
in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated

by lawyers and that it offers legal services,

as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of
the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and
the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent
should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the
public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there
can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved
in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively
to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the

legal profession will deny the profession of

the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however,
should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not
only for the protection of members of the
Bar but also, and more importantly, for the
protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar
may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that
some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action

may be illegal under Philippine law, that it

is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise,
advertising should be directed exclusively
at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by
paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation,
and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to
be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may
be considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged
in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to

the public under the trade name "The Legal

Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for
its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch
credulity.
Respondent's
own
commercial
advertisement
which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds,
incorporation,
rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural
persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing
competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is
the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to
the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public
cannot
ventilate
any
grievance
for malpractice against
the
business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice
of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of
the Supreme Court. Although respondent
uses its business name, the persons and
the lawyers who act for it are subject to

court discipline. The practice of law is not a

profession open to all who wish to engage
in it nor can it be assigned to another (See
5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited
to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's
position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are
not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the
power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical,
misleading
and
immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in

the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services"
to
answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause
of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages
2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public
its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations
Law,
particularly
regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and
such other related laws.
Its
advertised
services
unmistakably
require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon
and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in
the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term
as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one

to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass
the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned
in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public
as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses
of study and/or standards, the fact remains
that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines.
In
the
meantime,
this
Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public
from being exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public
should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising
of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements
of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of

marriage, immigration, visa extensions,

declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence,
legal matters , will be given to them if they
avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not
help matters. It gives the impression again
that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied
by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are
clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for
under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal
in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a
secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it
is certainly fooling the public for valid

marriages in the Philippines are solemnized

only by officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA,
Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services
for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit
the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We
submit
further
that
these
advertisements that seem to project that
secret marriages and divorce are possible
in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this
clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it
cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this
country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37,

the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in
the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law.
In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service
unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice
of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most
men have considerable acquaintance with
broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law accurate or
inaccurate moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess

rather precise knowledge of the laws

touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his
client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision
of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for
the legal advice or information, and the
legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of
custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to
the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed
attorneys.
Likewise,
if
the
industrial relations field had been preempted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case.
The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and
few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their

practical knowledge and skill in such

matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that
the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is
growing into a recognized profession for
which appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court should
be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing
law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I
can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining
his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the
path charted by law. This, of course, would
be the practice of the law. But such is not
the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just
as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing

law. For instance, if as part of a welfare

program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This
is not per se the practice of law. Anyone
may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated
by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same opinion, then it
may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation
is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of
the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may
regulate the representation of parties
before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with
such
determination
or
to
forbid
representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the

National Labor Relations Board give to a

party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules
and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky,
Introduction
to
Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a
person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided
that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not
customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to
the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer
and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in
another
profession
or
occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic

appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage
license,
and
making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may
not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard
Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer,
such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information
on
divorce,
absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute
of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that
aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of
a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact
that the principles or rules stated in the
text may be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how

the forms should be filled out, constitutes

the unlawful practice of law. But that is the
situation
with
many
approved
and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment
under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce,
separation,
annulment
or
separation agreement any printed material
or writings relating to matrimonial law or
the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems

which might arise in the preparation and

presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation,
annulment
of
separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal
advice
or
counselling,"
such
would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par.
6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that
a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With
all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et
seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to
the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of

the phrase "practice of law" becomes
exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this
score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed
attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal
advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty,
and property according to law, in order to
assist
in
proper
interpretation
and
14
enforcement of law.

When a person participates in the a trial

and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney
and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving
advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions
and
special
proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129
Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in

the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their
right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies
and
there,
in
such
representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.
W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines
Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil.
173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters
connected
with
the
law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters

or estate and guardianship have been held

to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation
and
drafting
of
legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions
consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects
and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill,
a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass],

194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar

Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a
wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings
and
observations
of
the
aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely
offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been
offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of
giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the
gathering,
processing,
storage,
transmission
and
reproduction
of
information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search;
evidence
gathering;
locating
parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies,
like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment
records
or
certifications,
obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or

adoption laws that they can avail of

preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such
as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of
law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as
if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for
the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely
within
the
jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact

that respondent corporation does not

represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is
not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The
aforesaid
conclusion
is
further
strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an
insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation
was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is
transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as
the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation,
Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors are "specialists" in various
fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal
law,
medico-legal
problems,
labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist
are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in
1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in
clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors
do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the

symptoms and so on. That's how we

operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one
of our specialists.

statutory
prohibitions
against
the
advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.

There are cases which do not, in medical

terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.

Further, as correctly and appropriately

pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the
main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of
legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. 22

Those cases which requires more extensive

"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and
named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we
would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by
the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction

the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

That fact that the corporation employs

paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the

Public policy requires that the practice of

law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and
the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american

jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would
wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice
of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of
law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons
are allowed to practice law who, by reason
of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized
by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them
to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from
the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the
bar from competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised and
represented
in
legal
matters
by
incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in
the United States of paralegals as an
occupation
separate
from
the
law
profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it
has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent,

there are schools and universities there

which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none
in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in
the United States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines
was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted
concept and limited acceptance of what
may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly,
we
have
adopted
the
American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice
law for the proper administration of justice
cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of
encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek
legal assistance only from persons licensed
to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the

questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the
code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also
warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a profession.
Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious
Affairs.
vs.
Estanislao
R.
38
Bayot an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the
present
proceeding,39 was
held
to

constitute
solicitation.

improper

advertising

or

The pertinent part of the decision therein

reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell
us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective

service which is right and proper. A good

and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or
solicitation are prohibited. The canons of
the profession enumerate exceptions to the
rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the
publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such
data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it

cannot be a mere supplemental feature of

a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity
or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional
card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of
the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may
likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature
and contents of the advertisements for
which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that
the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs.
State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification
relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is

the fact that the disciplinary rule involved

in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even
the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions
stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when
the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted
by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public
about
lawyers
after
viewing
television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy
from
71%
Professional
from
71%
Honest
from
65%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

to
to
to

14%
14%
14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the

present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate
what is already a deteriorating public

opinion of the legal profession whose

integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community
in general. At this point in time, it is of
utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain
the high esteem formerly accorded to the
legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on
the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in
this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the
question as to the legality or illegality of
the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic,
Inc. was created should be passed upon
and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that
aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative
in nature. It is, of course, imperative that
this matter be promptly determined, albeit
in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of
law in this country. This interdiction, just
like the rule against unethical advertising,

cannot be subverted by employing some

so-called paralegals supposedly rendering
the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern
and province of the Solicitor General who
can
institute
the
corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment
of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to

RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed
by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this
resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General
for
appropriate
action
in
accordance herewith.