VARGAS V RILLORAZA

80 PHIL. 297
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act,
Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could
designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional
RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any
composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided.
And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of
the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by judges
of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to
this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act
No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but
positively violative of the organic law.
Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members
of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the
consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the
composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.
However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge
designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he
would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the
appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any
regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be
a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution,
where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate
Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING VS CA

261 SCRA 464

Facts: On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker
was given formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per
square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants concurred this
arrangement. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner
company who agreed to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally
informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July
11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went
to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. VicePresident Aromin entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot
would be sold at P1,000.00 per square meter to be paid in cash. The
authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive
basis; there is no dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and
the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was possible to
pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in
trying to ask for payment on terms because in previous transactions,
the same had been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that
should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid
in cash. Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay
on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988
and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The
payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell
that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his
unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona
who also refused to receive payment. An action for specific
performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by
petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial
court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14,
1989.
Issue: Whether or not such contract is covered by the statute of
frauds.
Held: In the case at bench, the allegation that there was no
concurrence of the offer and the acceptance upon the cause of the
contract is belied by the testimony of the very BPI official with whom
the contract was perfected. Aromin and Albano concluded the sale for
BPI. The fact that the deed of sale still had to be signed and notarized
does not mean that no contract had already been perfected. A sale of
land is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into. The
requisite form under Article 1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater
efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply does not affect the
validity and binding effect of the act between parties. Therefore, such
contract that was made constituted fraud and is covered by the statute
of frauds. BPI should be held liable and can be sued for damages.

PERFECTO VS. MEER 85 PHIL 522

Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required
plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this
Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this
action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary
in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature
approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that
salaries of judges thereafter appointed", salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two
paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First,
when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913,
taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these
are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in
the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted
here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention
approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on
judicial salaries really impairs them.

ENDENCIA VS DAVID
93 PHIL 696
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered
Judges Endencio and Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon
construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that
judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus
considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a
violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of
income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions
given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation

shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service.

Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public
officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This
specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has
provided.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
112 SCRA 294
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of
justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the
validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount
to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.
It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
BRILLANTES VS COMELEC
432 SCRA 269

Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System
including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for
the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and
usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the
authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the
"unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the
exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that
the issue is beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was
justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely
fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436,
vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially
canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President.
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No.
8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely
authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the
unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The
quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only
be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would
also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the
assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional
provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any
disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.

G.R. No.191618: June 7, 2011

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.

FACTS:
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty.
Romulo B. Macalintal of our Decision in G.R. No. 191618 dated
November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring the
establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as
constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged
unconstitutional creation of the PET:
1.He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a concerned
citizen.
2.He is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply
by virtue of his appearance as counsel of former president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent tribunal.
3.Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the PET.
4.The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes
our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be
created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively
with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of
the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court,
likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that:
1.Petitioner is without standing to file the petition.
2.Petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET.
3.The constitution of the PET is "on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the PET is unconstitutional
HELD: No
POLITICAL LAW: Presidential Electoral Tribunal
We reiterate that the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction
in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is

sound and tenable.

Petitioner is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the
text of the provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain
the PETs constitutionality.
We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of
the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the
present Constitution.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to
constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted by
the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to
create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot
contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to
accept the constitutionality of the PET.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution
is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect.
MACEDA VS VASQUEZ 221 SCRA 464
TANAWA SA DESKTOP
ARUELO VS CA 227 SCRA 475
Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt
of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule
35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian
filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and
motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings
did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a
new five-day period to file his answer.
Issue:

whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent
Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not
applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly
mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule
1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall
apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts
of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars
are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending
before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting
the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5
[5]).
PEOPLE VS MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004 [Judicial Power]
FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the
complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA.
Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the
Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on

automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life

imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The
practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not
preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court,
there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of
guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept
the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the
ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the
determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the
Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it
is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate
to review factual issues.

NITAFAN VS COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the
RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or

compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution

of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to
the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from
income taxes.
HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was
somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional
Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial
officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has
been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to
income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees.