Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
The Organon
2.
Categories
3.
4.
Kinds of Propositions
5.
Square of Opposition
6.
Laws of Thought
7.
Existential Assumptions
8.
9.
The Syllogism
10.
Inductive Syllogism
11.
12.
Science
13.
Non-Discursive Reasoning
14.
Rhetoric
15.
Fallacies
16.
Moral Reasoning
17.
1.
Primary Sources
2.
Secondary Sources
1. The Organon
To those used to the silver tones of an accomplished writer like Plato,
Aristotles prose will seem, at first glance, a difficult read. What we have are
largely notes, written at various points in his career, for different purposes,
edited and cobbled together by later followers. The style of the resulting
collection is often rambling, repetitious, obscure, and disjointed. There are
many arcane, puzzling, and perhaps contradictory passages. This problem is
compounded by the abstract, technical vocabulary logic sometimes requires
and by the wide-ranging scope and the scattered nature of Aristotles
observations. Some familiarity with Greek terminology is required if one
hopes to capture the nuances in his thought. Classicists and scholars do
argue, of course, about the precise Greek meaning of key words or phrases but
many of these debates involve minor points of interpretation that cannot
concern us here. Aristotles logical vocabulary needs to be understood within
the larger context of his system as a whole. Many good translations of
Aristotle are available. (Parenthetical citations below include the approximate
Bekker number (the scholarly notation for referring to Aristotelian passages
according to page, column, and line number of a standard edition), the
English title of the work, and the name of the translator.)
2. Categories
The world, as Aristotle describes it in his Categories, is composed of
substancesseparate, individual thingsto which various characterizations or
properties can be ascribed. Each substance is a unified whole composed of
interlocking parts. There are two kinds of substances. A primary substance is
(in the simplest instance) an independent (or detachable) object, composed of
matter, characterized by form. Individual living organismsa man, a rainbow
trout, an oak treeprovide the most unambiguous examples of primary
substances. Secondary substances are the larger groups, the species or
genera, to which these individual organisms belong. So man, horse,
mammals, animals (and so on) would be examples of secondary substances.
As we shall see, Aristotles logic is about correctly attributing specific
properties to secondary substances (and therefore, indirectly, about
attributing these properties to primary substances or individual things).
Aristotle elaborates a logic that is designed to describe what exists in the
world. We may well wonder then, how many different ways can we describe
something? In his Categories (4.1b25-2a4), Aristotle enumerates ten different
we now understand it, chiefly has to do with how we evaluate arguments. But
arguments are made of statements, which are, in turn, made of words. In
Aristotelian logic, the most basic statement is a proposition, a complete
sentence that asserts something. (There are other kinds of sentences
prayers, questions, commandsthat do not assert anything true or false about
the world and which, therefore, exist outside the purview of logic.) A
proposition is ideally composed of at least three words: a subject (a word
naming a substance), a predicate (a word naming a property), and a
connecting verb, what logicians call a copula (Latin, for bond or
connection). Consider the simple statement: Socrates is wise. Socrates is
the subject; the property of being wise is the predicate, and the verb is (the
copula) links Socrates and wisdom together in a single affirmation. We can
express all this symbolically as S is P where S stands for the subject
Socrates and P stands for the predicate being wise. The sentence
Socrates is wise (or symbolically, S is P) qualifies as a proposition; it is a
statement that claims that something is true about the world.
Paradigmatically, the subject would be a (secondary) substance (a natural
division of primary substances) and the predicate would be a necessary or
essential property as in: birds are feathered, or triangles have interior
angles equal to two right angles, or fire is upward-moving. But any overly
restrictive metaphysical idea about what terms in a proposition mean seems to
unnecessarily restrict intelligent discourse. Suppose someone were to claim
that anger is unethical. But anger is not a substance; it is a property of a
substance (an organism). Still, it makes perfect sense to predicate properties
of anger. We can say that anger is unethical, hard to control, an excess of
passion, familiar enough, and so on. Aristotle himself exhibits some flexibility
here. Still, there is something to Aristotles view that the closer a proposition
is to the metaphysical structure of the world, the more it counts as knowledge.
Aristotle has an all-embracing view of logic and yet believes that, what we
could call metaphysical correctness produces a more rigorous, scientific
form of logical expression.
Of course, it is not enough to produce propositions; what we are after is true
propositions. Aristotle believes that only propositions are true or false. Truth
4. Kinds of Propositions
Aristotle suggests that all propositions must either affirm or deny something.
Every proposition must be either an affirmation or a negation; it cannot be
both. He also points out that propositions can make claims about what
necessarily is the case, about what possibly is the case, or even about what is
impossible. His modal logic, which deals with these further qualifications
about possibility or necessity, presents difficulties of interpretation. We will
focus on his assertoric (or non-modal) logic here. Still, many of Aristotles
points about necessity and possibility seem highly intuitive. In one famous
example about a hypothetical sea battle, he observes that the necessary truth
of a mere proposition does not trump the uncertainty of future events.
Because it is necessarily true that there will be or will not be a sea battle
tomorrow, we cannot conclude that either alternative is necessarily true. (De
5. Square of Opposition
Figure 1
The Traditional Square of Opposition
As it turns out, we can use a square with crossed interior diagonals (Fig. 1
above) to identify four kinds of relationships that hold between different pairs
of categorical propositions. Consider each relationship in turn.
cheetahs are slow, then it must be the case that at least one member of the
group of cheetahs is not slow; that is, the statement some cheetahs are not
slow must be true.
Note that subalternation does not work in the opposite direction. If Some S
are P, it need not follow that All S are P. And if Some S are not P, it need
not follow that No S are P. We should also point out that if the subaltern is
false, it must follow that the superaltern is false. If it is false to say that Some
S are P, it must be false to say that All S are P. And if it is false to say that
Some S are not P, it must be false to say that No S are P.
4) Subcontrary propositions cannot both be false. The bottom horizontal line
in the square joining the I proposition (Some S are P) to the O proposition
(Some S are not P) represents this kind of subcontrary relationship. Keeping
to the assumptions implicit in Aristotles system, there are only three
possibilities: (1) All S have property P; in which case, it must also be true (by
subalternation) that some S are P. (2) No S have property P; in which case it
must also be true (by subalternation) that some S are not P. (3) Some S
have and some S do not have property P; in which case it will be true that
some S are P and that some S are not P. It follows that at least one of a
pair of subcontrary propositions must be true and that both will be true in
cases where P is partially predicated of S. So, for example, both members of
the subcontrary pair some men have beards and some men do not have
beards are true. They are both true because having a beard is a contingent or
variable male attribute. In contrast, only one member of the subcontrary pair
some snakes are legless and some snakes are not legless is true. As all
snakes are legless, the proposition some snakes are not legless must be false.
Traditional logicians, inspired by Aristotles wide-ranging comments,
identified a series of immediate inferences as a way of deriving new
propositions through a routine rearrangement of terms. Subalternation is an
obvious example of immediate inference. From All S are P we can
immediately inferthat is, without argumentthat some S are P. They also
recognized conversion, obversion, and contraposition as immediate
inferences.
In conversion, one interchanges the S and P terms. If, for example, we know
that No S is P, we can immediately infer that No P is S. (Once we know
that no circles are triangles, we know right away that no triangles are
circles.)
In obversion, one negates the predicate term while replacing it with the
predicate term of opposite quality. If, for example, we know that Some S are
P, we can immediately infer the obverse, Some S are not non-P. (Once we
know that some students are happy, we know right away that some
students are not unhappy.)
Finally, in contraposition, one negates both terms and reverses their order. If,
for example, we know that All S are P, we can infer the contrapositive All
non-P are non-S. (Once we know that all voters are adults, we know right
away that all children are unable to vote.) More specific rules, restrictions,
and details are readily available elsewhere.
6. Laws of Thought
During the 18th, 19th, and early 20th Century, scholars who saw themselves as
carrying on the Aristotelian and Medieval tradition in logic, often pointed to
the laws of thought as the basis of all logic. One still encounters this
approach in textbook accounts of informal logic. The usual list of logical laws
(or logical first principles) includes three axioms: the law of identity, the law of
non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. (Some authors include a
law of sufficient reason, that every event or claim must have a sufficient reason
or explanation, and so forth.) It would be a gross simplification to argue that
these ideas derive exclusively from Aristotle or to suggest (as some authors
seem to imply) that he self-consciously presented a theory uniquely derived
from these three laws. The idea is rather that Aristotles theory presupposes
these principles and/or that he discusses or alludes to them somewhere in his
work. Traditional logicians did not regard them as abstruse or esoteric
doctrines but as manifestly obvious principles that require assent for logical
discourse to be possible.
7. Existential Assumptions
Before we move on to consider Aristotles account of the syllogism, we need to
clear up some widespread misconceptions and explain a few things about
Aristotles project as a whole. Criticisms of Aristotles logic often assume that
what Aristotle was trying to do coincides with the basic project of modern
logic. Begin with the usual criticism brought against the traditional square of
opposition. For reasons we will not explore, modern logicians assume that
universal claims about non-existent objects (or empty sets) are true but that
particular claims about them are false. On this reading, the claim that all
fairy-god mothers are beautiful is true, whereas the claim that some fairygod mothers are beautiful is false. Clearly, this clashes with the traditional
square of opposition. By simple subalternation, the truth of the proposition
all fairy-god mothers are beautiful requires the truth of the proposition
some fairy-god mothers are beautiful. If the first claim is true, the second
claim must also be true. For this and similar reasons, some modern logicians
dismiss the traditional square as inadequate, claiming that Aristotle made a
mistake or overlooked relevant issues. Aristotle, however, is involved in a
specialized project. He elaborates an alternative logic, specifically adapted to
the problems he is trying to solve.
Aristotle devises a companion-logic for science. He relegates fictions like fairy
godmothers and mermaids and unicorns to the realms of poetry and
literature. In his mind, they exist outside the ambit of science. This is why he
leaves no room for such non-existent entities in his logic. This is a thoughtful
choice, not an inadvertent omission. Technically, Aristotelian science is a
search for definitions, where a definition is a phrase signifying a things
essence. (Topics, I.5.102a37, Pickard-Cambridge.) To possess an essenceis
literally to possess a what-it-is-to-be something (to ti n einai). Because
non-existent entities cannot be anything, they do not, in Aristotles mind,
possess an essence. They cannot be defined. Aristotle makes this point
explicitly in the Posterior Analytics. He points out that a definition of a goatstag, a cross between a goat and a deer (the ancient equivalent of a unicorn), is
impossible. He writes, no one knows the nature of what does not exist[we]
can know the meaning of the phrase or name goat-stag but not what the
essential nature of a goat-stag is. (II.7.92b6-8, Mure.) Because we cannot
know what the essential nature of a goat-stag isindeed, it has no essential
naturewe cannot provide a proper definition of a goat-stag. So the study of
goat-stags (or unicorns) is not open to scientific investigation. Aristotle sets
about designing a logic that is intended to display relations between scientific
propositions, where science is understood as a search for essential definitions.
This is why he leaves no place for fictional entities like goat-stags (or
unicorns). Hence, the assumed validity of a logical maneuver like
subalternation.
9. The Syllogism
We are now in a position to consider Aristotles theory of the syllogism.
Although one senses that Aristotle took great pride in these accomplishments,
we could complain that the persistent focus on the mechanics of the valid
syllogism has obscured his larger project. We will only cover the most basic
argument are true, then the conclusion must be true. Modern textbook
authors generally prove the validity of syllogisms in two ways. First, they use a
number of different rules. For example: when major and minor terms are
universal in the conclusion they must be universal in the premises; if one
premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative; the middle term in the
premises must be distributed (include every member of a class) at least once,
and so on. Second, they use Venn diagrams, intersecting circles marked to
indicate the extension (or range) of different terms, to determine if the
information contained in the conclusion is also included in the premises.
Modern logicians, who still hold to traditional conventions, classify syllogisms
according to figure and mood. The four figure classification derives from
Aristotle; the mood classification, from Medieval logicians. One determines
the figure of a syllogism by recording the positions the middle term takes in
the two premises. So, for Barbara above, the figure is MP-SM, generally
referred to as Figure 1. One determines the mood of a syllogism by recording
the precise arrangement of categorical propositions. So, for Barbara, the
mood is AAA. By tabulating figures and moods, we can make an inventory of
valid syllogisms. (Medieval philosophers devised a mnemonic poem for such
purposes that begins with the line Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque
priorisis. Details can be found in many textbooks.) Although traditional
classroom treatments prefer to stick to this time-honoured approach, Fred
Sommers and George Englebretsen have devised a more up-to-date term logic
that uses equations with + and operators and is more attuned to natural
language reasoning than the usual predicate logic. Turn then to a brief
discussion of Aristotles own account of the syllogism.
As already mentioned, we need to distinguish between two kinds of necessity.
Aristotle believes in metaphysical or natural necessity. Birds must have
feathers because that is their nature. So the proposition All birds have
feathers is necessarily true. But Aristotle identifies the syllogistic form with
the logical necessity that obtains when two separate propositions necessitate a
third. He defines a sullogismos as a discourse [logos] in which, certain things
being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from
them. (Prior Analytics, I.1.24b18-20, Jenkinson.) The emphasis here is on
and so forth, we can then rephrase the original argument: All men, horses,
mules, and so forth, are long-lived; all bileless animals are men, horses, mules,
and so forth; therefore, all bileless animals are long-lived. This revised
induction possesses an obviously valid form (Barbara, discussed above). Note
that Aristotle does not view this inversion of terms as a formal gimmick or
trick; he believes that it reflects something metaphysically true about shared
natures in the world. (One could argue that inductive syllogism operates by
means of the quantification of the predicate term as well as the subject term of
a categorical proposition, but we will not investigate that issue here.)
These passages pose multiple problems of interpretation. We can only
advance a general overview of the most important disagreements here. We
might identify four different interpretations of Aristotles account of the
inductive syllogism. (1) The fact that Aristotle seems to view this as a valid
syllogism has led many commentators (such as Ross, McKirahan, Peters) to
assume that he is referring to what is known as perfect induction, a
generalization that is built up from a complete enumeration of particular
cases. The main problem here is that it seems to involve a physical
impossibility. No one could empirically inspect every bileless animal (and/or
species) to ascertain that the connection between bilelessness and longevity
obtains in every case. (2) Some commentators combine this first explanation
with the further suggestion that the bileless example is a rare case and that
Aristotle believes, in line with modern accounts, that most inductions only
produce probable belief. (Cf. Goviers claim that there is a tradition going
back to Aristotle, which maintains that there are . . . only two broad types of
argument: deductive arguments which are conclusive, and inductive
arguments, which are not. (Problems in Argument Analysis, 52.)) One
problem with such claims is that they overlook the clear distinction that
Aristotle makes between rigorous inductions and rhetorical inductions (which
we discuss below). (3) Some commentators claim that Aristotle (and the
ancients generally) overlooked the inherent tenuousness of the inductive
reasoning. On this account, Empiricists such as Locke and Hume discovered
something seriously wrong about induction that escaped the notice of an
ancient author like Aristotle. Philosophers in the modern Anglo-American
The basic idea that induction is valid will raise eyebrows, no doubt. It is
important to stave off some inevitable criticism before continuing. Modern
accounts of induction, deriving, in large part, from Hume and Locke, display a
mania for prediction. (Hence Humes question: how can we know that the
future bread we eat will nourish us based on past experience of eating bread?)
But this is not primarily how Aristotle views the problem. For Aristotle,
induction is about understanding natural kinds. Once we comprehend the
nature of something, we will, of course, be able to make predictions about its
future properties, but understanding its nature is the key. In Aristotles mind,
rigorous induction is valid because it picks out those necessary and essential
traits that make something what it is. To use a very simple example,
understanding that all spiders have eight legsthat is, that all undamaged
spiders have eight legsis a matter of knowing something deep about the
biological nature that constitutes a spider. Something that does not have eight
legs is not a spider. (Fruitful analogies might be drawn here to the notion of
One final point needs clarification. The logical form of the inductive
syllogism, after the convertibility maneuver, is the same as the deductive
syllogism. In this sense, induction and deduction possess the same (final)
logical form. But, of course, in order to successfully perform an induction, one
has to know that convertibility is possible, and this requires an act of
intelligence which is able to discern the metaphysical realities between things
out in the world. We discuss this issue under non-discursive reasoning below.
12. Science
Aristotle wants to construct a logic that provides a working language for
rigorous science as he understands it. Whereas we have been talking of
syllogisms as arguments, Aristotelian science is about explanation.
Admittedly, informal logicians generally distinguish between explanation and
argument. An argument is intended to persuade about a debatable point; an
explanation is not intended to persuade so much as to promote
understanding. Aristotle views science as involving logical inferences that
move beyond what is disputable to a consideration of what is the case. Still,
the explanatory syllogisms used in science possess precisely the same formal
structures as argumentative syllogisms. So we might consider them
arguments in a wider sense. For his part, Aristotle relegates eristic reason to
the broad field of rhetoric. He views science, perhaps naively, as a domain of
established fact. The syllogisms used in science are about establishing an
explanation from specific cases (induction) and then applying or illustrating
this explanation to specific cases (deduction).
The ancient Greek term for science, episteme, is not precisely equivalent to
its modern counterpart. In Aristotles worldview, science, as the most
rigorous sort of discursive knowledge, is opposed to mere opinion (doxa); it is
about what is universal and necessary as opposed to what is particular and
contingent, and it is theoretical as opposed to practical. Aristotle believes that
knowledge, understood as justified true belief, is most perfectly expressed in a
scientific demonstration (apodeixis), also known as an apodeitic or scientific
syllogism. He posits a number of specific requirements for this most rigorous
of all deductions. In order to qualify as a scientific demonstration, a syllogism
must possess premises that are true, primary, immediate, better known than,
prior to, and causative of the conclusion. (Posterior Analytics, I.2.71b20ff,
Tredennick.) It must yield information about a natural kind or a group of
individual things. And it must produce universal knowledge (episteme).
Specialists have disputed the meaning of these individual requirements, but
the main message is clear. Aristotle accepts, as a general rule, that a
conclusion in an argument cannot be more authoritative than the premises
that led to that conclusion. We cannot derive better (or more reliable)
knowledge from worse (or less reliable) knowledge. Given that a scientific
demonstration is the most rigorous form of knowledge possible, we must start
with premises that are utterly basic and as certain as possible, which are
immediately induced from observation, and which confirm to the necessary
structure of the world in a way that is authoritative and absolutely
incontrovertible. This requires a reliance on first principles which we discuss
below.
In the best case scenario, Aristotelian science is about finding definitions of
species that, according to a somewhat bald formula, identify the genus (the
larger natural group) and the differentia (that unique feature that sets the
species apart from the larger group). As Aristotles focus on definitions is a bit
cramped and less than consistent (he himself spends a great deal of time
talking about necessary rather than essential properties), let us broaden his
approach to science to focus on ostensible definitions, where an ostensible
definition is either a rigorous definition or, more broadly, any properlyformulated phrase that identifies the unique properties of something. On this
looser approach, which is more consistent with Aristotles actual practice, to
define an entity is to identify the nature, the essential and necessary
properties, that make it uniquely what it is. Suffice it to say that Aristotles
idealized account of what science entails needs to be expanded to cover a wide
range of activities and that fall under what is now known as scientific practice.
What follows is a general sketch of his overall orientation. (We should point
out that Aristotle himself resorts to whatever informal methods seem
appropriate when reporting on his own biological investigations without too
much concern for any fixed ideal of formal correctness. He makes no attempt
leaved trees. Our deduction will read: All sap-coagulators are deciduous. All
broad-leaved trees are sap-coagulators. Therefore, all broad-leaved trees are
deciduous. We can express all this symbolically. For the induction, where
S=vine, fig, and so forth, P=deciduous, M= being a sap-coagulator, the
argument is: All S is P; all S is M (convertible to all M is S); therefore, all M
are P (converted to Barbara). For the deduction, where S=broad-leafed trees,
M=being a sap-coagulator, P=deciduous, the argument can be represented:
All M are P; all S is M; therefore, all S is P (Barbara). This is then the basic
logic of Aristotelian science.
A simple diagram of how science operates follows (Figure 2).
Figure 2
The Inductive-Deductive Method of Aristotelian Science
it becomes perfectly obvious why these early commentators put the major
premise first: because it constitutes the (ostensible) definition; because it
contains an explanation of the nature of the thing upon which everything else
depends. The major premise in a scientific deduction is the most important
part of the syllogism; it is scientifically prior in that it reveals the cause that
motivates the phenomenon. So it makes sense to place it first. This was not
an irrational prejudice.
G. L. Owen, and Terrence Irwin have argued that Aristotelian first principles
begin in dialectic. On their influential account, we arrive at first principles
through a weaker form of argument that revolves around a consideration of
endoxa, the proverbial opinions of the many and/or the wise. Robin Smith
(and others) severely criticize their account. The idea that mere opinion could
somehow give rise to rigorous scientific knowledge conflicts with Aristotles
settled view that less reliable knowledge cannot provide sufficient logical
support for the more reliable knowledge. As we discuss below, endoxa do
provide a starting point for dialectical (and ethical) arguments in Aristotles
system. They are, in his mind, a potent intellectual resource, a library of
stored wisdom and right opinion. They may include potent expressions of first
principles already discovered by other thinkers and previous generations. But
as Aristotle makes clear at the end of the Posterior Analytics and elsewhere,
the recognition that something is a first principle depends directly on
intuition. As he reaffirms in the Nicomachean Ethics, it is intuitive reason
that grasps the first principles. (VI.6.1141a7, Ross.)
If Irwin and his colleagues seek to limit the role of intuition in Aristotle,
authors such as Lambertus Marie de Rijk and D. W. Hamlyn go to an opposite
extreme, denying the importance of the inductive syllogism and identifying
induction (epagoge) exclusively with intuition. De Rijk claims that
Aristotelian induction is a pre-argumentation procedure consisting in . . . [a]
disclosure [that] does not take place by a formal, discursive inference, but is,
as it were, jumped upon by an intuitive act of knowledge. (Semantics and
Ontology, I.2.53, 141-2.) Although this position seems extreme, it seems
indisputable that inductive syllogism depends on intuition, for without
intuition (understood as intelligent discernment), one could not recognize the
convertibility of subject and middle terms (discussed above). Aristotle also
points out that one needs intuition to recognize the (ostensible) definitions so
crucial to the practice of Aristotelian science. We must be able to discern the
difference between accidental and necessary or essential properties before
coming up with a definition. This can only come about through some kind of
direct (non-discursive) discernment. Aristotle proposes a method for
discovering definitions called divisionwe are to divide things into smaller
14. Rhetoric
Argumentation theorists (less aptly characterized as informal logicians) have
critiqued the ascendancy of formal logic, complaining that the contemporary
penchant for symbolic logic leaves one with an abstract mathematics of empty
signs that cannot be applied in any useful way to larger issues. Proponents of
formal logic counter that their specialized formalism allows for a degree of
precision otherwise not available and that any focus on the substantive
meaning or truth of propositions is a distraction from logical issues per se.
We cannot readily fit Aristotle into one camp or the other. Although he does
provide a formal analysis of the syllogism, he intends logic primarily as a
means of acquiring true statements about the world. He also engages in an
enthusiastic investigation of less rigorous forms of reasoning included in the
study of dialectic and rhetoric.
Understanding precisely what Aristotle means by the term dialectics
(dialektike) is no easy task. He seems to view it as the technical study of
argument in general or perhaps as a more specialized investigation into
argumentative dialogue. He intends his rhetoric (rhetorike), which he
describes as the counterpart to dialectic, as an expansive study of the art of
persuasion, particularly as it is directed towards a non-academic public.
Suffice it to say, for our purposes, that Aristotle reserves a place in his logic for
a general examination of all arguments, for scientific reasoning, for rhetoric,
for debating techniques of various sorts, for jurisprudential pleading, for
cross-examination, for moral reasoning, for analysis, and for non-discursive
intuition.
Aristotle distinguishes between what I will call, for convenience, rigorous logic
and persuasive logic. Rigorous logic aims at epistm, true belief about what
is eternal, necessary, universal, and unchanging. (Aristotle sometimes
qualifies this to include for the most part scientific knowledge.) Persuasive
logic aims at acceptable, probable, or convincing belief (what we might call
opinion instead of knowledge.) It deals with approximate truth, with
endoxa (popular or proverbial opinions), with reasoning that is acceptable to a
particular audience, or with claims about accidental properties and contingent
events. Persuasive syllogisms have the same form as rigorous syllogisms but
are understood as establishing their conclusions in a weaker manner. As we
have already seen, rigorous logic produces deductive and inductive syllogisms;
Aristotle indicates that persuasive logic produces, in a parallel manner,
15. Fallacies
In a short work entitled Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle introduces a theory
of logical fallacies that has been remarkably influential. His treatment is
abbreviated and somewhat obscure, and there is inevitably scholarly
disagreement about precise exegesis. Aristotle thinks of fallacies as instances
of specious reasoning; they are not merely errors but hidden errors. A fallacy
is an incorrect reasoning strategy that gives the illusion of being sound or
somehow conceals the underlying problem. Aristotle divides fallacies into two
broad categories: those which depend on language (sometimes called verbal
fallacies) and those that are independent of language (sometimes called
material fallacies). There is some scholarly disagreement about particular
fallacies, but traditional English names and familiar descriptions follow.
Linguistic fallacies include: homonymy (verbal equivocation), ambiguity
(amphiboly or grammatical equivocation), composition (confusing parts with
a whole), division (confusing a whole with parts), accent (equivocation that
arises out of mispronunciation or misplaced emphasis) and figure of speech
(ambiguity resulting from the form of an expression). Independent fallacies
include accident (overlooking exceptions), converse accident (hasty
generalization or improper qualification), irrelevant conclusion, affirming the
consequent (assuming an effect guarantees the presence of one possible
cause), begging the question (assuming the point), false cause, and complex
question (disguising two or more questions as one). Logicians, influenced by
scholastic logic, often gave these characteristic mistakes Latin names:
compositio for composition, divisio for division, secundum quid et simpliciter
for converse accident, ignoranti enlenchi for nonrelevant conclusion, and
petitio principii for begging the question.
Consider three brief examples of fallacies from Aristotles original text.
Aristotle formulates the following amphiboly (which admittedly sounds
awkward in English): I wish that you the enemy may capture. (Sophistical
Refutations, 4.166a7-8, Pickard-Cambridge.) Clearly, the grammatical
structure of the statement leaves it ambiguous as to whether the speaker is
hoping that the enemy or you be captured. In discussing complex question,
he supplies the following perplexing example: Ought one to obey the wise or
ones father? (Ibid., 12.173a21.) Obviously, from a Greek perspective, one
ought to obey both. The problem is that the question has been worded in such
a way that anyone who answers will be forced to reject one moral duty in order
to embrace the other. In fact, there are two separate questions hereShould
one obey the wise? Should one obey ones father?that have been
Figure 3
The Inductive-Deductive Method of Aristotelian Ethics
We can distinguish then between moral induction and moral deduction. In
moral induction, we induce an idea of courage, honesty, loyalty, and so on.
We do this over time, beginning in our childhood, through habit and
upbringing. Aristotle writes that the successful moral agent must be born
with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly
b. Secondary Sources
This list is intended as a window on a diversity of approaches and problems.
Biondi, Paolo. Aristotle: Posterior Analytics II.19. Quebec, Q.C.: Les Presses de
lUniversite Laval, 2004.
1974.
Parry, William, and Edward Hacker. Aristotelian Logic. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1991.
Peters, F. E., Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon. New York: NYU
Press, 1967.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Boston, M.A.:
Brill, 2002.
Smith, Robin. Aristotle on the Uses of Dialectic, Synthese , Vol. 96, No. 3, 1993,
335-358.
Author Information
Louis
Email:
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Canada
F.
Groarke
lgroarke@stfx.ca
Francis
Xavier
University