Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
3M
Abbott
Air Products and Chemicals
Alcoa
Amgen Inc.
Anheuser-Busch Companies
Aramco Services Company
BP America
Biogen Idec
CITGO Petroleum Corporation
Cargill
Chevron
Codelco-Chile
ConocoPhillips
The Dow Chemical Company
DuPont
Eastman Chemical Company
ExxonMobil Corporation
Genentech
General Motors Corporation
GlaxoSmithKline
Intel Corporation
International Paper
Kraft Foods
Eli Lilly and Company
Marathon Oil Corporation
Merck
NASA
NOVA Chemicals Corporation
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Ontario Power Generation
Petroleo Brasileiro S/A - Petrobras
Praxair
The Procter & Gamble Company
Progress Energy
Rohm and Haas Company
Sasol Technology
Shell Oil Company
Smithsonian Institution
Solutia
Southern Company
Sunoco
Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S. Architect of the Capitol
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Department of Commerce/NIST/
Building and Fire Research Laboratory
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
U.S. Department of State
U.S. General Services Administration
U.S. Steel
Weyerhaeuser Company
Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Contract Language Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Legal Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
iii
Executive Summary
When allocating construction risks, appropriate allocation is often not achieved due to the
inferior bargaining position held by lower-tier parties. Beyond this dilemma, the most appropriate
and equitable allocation of a particular risk can vary from project to project depending on factors
such as the type of risk, work, and contract. As a result, no single, appropriate allocation exists for
a given construction risk for all projects. Unfortunately, arriving at a conclusive agreement between
contracting parties as to the most appropriate allocation of a given construction risk for a specic
project can be a cumbersome, albeit crucial, task.
Due to the problems associated with determining appropriate risk allocation between contracting
parties, the Construction Industry Institute (CII) formed the Contracting to Appropriately Allocate
Risk Research Team in an effort to encourage risk assessment and allocation in a compromising and
educated manner, recognizing the unique circumstances of each specic project. By involving both
the owner and the contractor in the risk allocation process, which should begin early in the project
life cycle, both parties can avoid the increased costs associated with inappropriate risk allocation.
To aid in this process, the research team developed the Two-Party Risk Assessment and Allocation
Model, which encourages contracting parties to compromise during the risk allocation process.
This publication is meant to accompany the Two-Party Risk Assessment and Allocation Model by
providing useful legal perspective references regarding both contract language and legal research.
This book looks at the top 14 risks, identied as the hot-button risks, which are listed below in order
of the most to the least frequently allocated in an inappropriate manner:
1. No Damages for Delay
2. Consequential Damages
9. Owner-Mandated Subcontractors
3. Indemnity
6. Force Majeure
7. Schedule Acceleration
A contract language table was generated for each of the 14 hot-button risks. Various examples
and/or concepts of contract language were analyzed and categorized according to perceived biases
and compromises to help contracting parties consider the most pertinent risk issues and potentially
identify appropriate compromising clauses.
The research team also developed legal perspective references that provide educational
assistance to contracting parties. Those references are contained in this book. The highlight of
the legal research for each risk is a legal issues and considerations ow chart. These charts help
minimize much of the confusion and ambiguities surrounding the allocation of each risk, as well as
denote which party may actually be carrying the associated risk in the eyes of the court.
Industry participants are encouraged to use this publication in conjunction with the Two-Party
Risk Assessment and Allocation Model (Implementation Resource 210-2) or as an independent
educational resource regarding risk allocation from a legal perspective.
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Purpose of this Implementation Resource
This publication is a result of CII research into risk allocation. It covers contract language and
legal research for the 14 risks that are most often cited as allocated inappropriately. Accordingly,
these risks can be thought of as possessing the most potential for spawning disputes during
contract negotiations. It is intended as a guide for contracting parties so that they can become more
aware of the associated risk issues from a legal perspective. It also will give contracting parties a
better understanding of which party is really carrying a given risk and how the parties may reach
a compromising position. Accordingly, the parties will be in a better position to draft appropriate
contract language and compromising terms and conditions. This is not a legal book, nor does it
purport to be a comprehensive digest of existing statutory or case law. What is ubiquitous is the
common nature of the problems and it is in identifying the nature and implications of the problems
that this study seeks to give the industry a basis for coming to common terms.
Hot-Button Risks
CII formed the Contracting to Appropriately Allocate Risk Research Team to develop a risk
assessment and allocation model that will aid contracting parties in cooperatively identifying,
assessing, and ultimately allocating risk on any specic project. The data collected by the research
team yielded a list of 14 hot-button risks that are frequently allocated in an inappropriate manner.
Table 1 displays the top 14 risks most frequently allocated in an inappropriate manner in ascending
order from the most frequently to the least frequently as determined by various research inputs.
Table 1. Top 14 Risks Most Frequently Allocated in an Inappropriate Manner
Top 14 Risks
1. No Damages for Delay
2. Consequential Damages
9. Owner-Mandated Subcontractors
3. Indemnity
6. Force Majeure
7. Schedule Acceleration
here along with a database of risk allocation principles. These three risk allocation tools are to be
used during and after the contracting parties have completed the risk assessment process developed
by the team (see CII Research Summary 210-1 and CII Implementation Resource 210-2).
Both parties should always consider the ability of the risk-bearing party (including
insurance companies) to survive the materialization of the risk.
Example: Merely successfully shifting a risk to a party does not eliminate the risk that
the assuming party may not be able to remain solvent if the risk should occur. This is
precisely the reason why the private insurance sector refuses to insure ood damages
and instead yields this role to the government. The widespread damage associated
with a ood could easily force a private insurance company out of business.
Owners should realize that shifting risk will often increase the contractors price, and
should determine whether such risks could be more cost-effectively accounted for with
owner retention.
Example: Sophisticated contractors will typically recognize onerous contract terms
and if negotiations are unsuccessful or not attempted, bid prices may signicantly
increase. Examples of such contract terms include no damages for delay clauses,
non-waivers of consequential damages, and high liquidated damages provisions.
The maximum possible loss for each risk should not be overlooked or confused with the
maximum probable loss.
Example: The maximum possible loss for a risk is the worst case scenario. The
maximum probable loss can be interchangeably dened with the expected value
of a risk. Specically, none of the associated project personnel accounted for the
maximum possible loss associated with the collapse of the World Trade Center
towers. Instead, the towers were designed and constructed according to the maximum
probable loss.
Parties should determine the potential for prot that each risk may or may not possess.
Example: Risk/reward schemes encourage amiable contracting relationships while
providing clear incentives and disincentives pertaining to performance. Therefore,
whenever possible parties should identify and utilize opportunities where an
increase in risk assumption is directly correlated to an increase in potential monetary
compensation. When potential for prot is considered for every single risk, the
optimum allocation may not always be the most efcient (lowest bearing cost) or
equitable (most control over risk) allocation, but may instead create the highest
likelihood for project success (on time, on budget completion).
To facilitate a non-controversial contractual relationship, contracting parties should strive
for harmony among all contract clauses.
Example: An owner should not attempt to include a no damages for delay clause in
conjunction with a liquidated damages clause. Essentially, this demonstrates to the
contractor that it will be responsible for its delays to the project, while the owner will
not take responsibility for delays it causes. This breeds a controversial relationship
from the outset.
If the contract is silent regarding damages, the offending party will be held responsible
for the damages reasonably foreseeable as a result of their conduct.
Example: The most well-known example would pertain to consequential damages. If
a contract does not address consequential damages, all contracting parties will be
held responsible for damages that should have reasonably been foreseen as a result
of actions or inactions of the parties. For example, if a vendor delays in delivering a
piece of equipment to a manufacturing facility, the vendor will be held responsible for
the lost prots that would have been averted if the machine would have been xed on
time. The vendor should have reasonably anticipated that its delay would have resulted
in a loss in production and ultimately a loss in prots.
Application of Findings
The contract language tables can be used as a contract language negotiating point between
buyer and seller parties who have identied one of the top 14 risks as a high concern that needs
mutual attention to ensure appropriate allocation. The compromise language is suggested only and
obviously provides no guarantee of success absent such factors as the good faith and ability to
perform of the parties. Internally, an industry participant may nd it useful to compare its companys
existing standardized clauses pertaining to each of the 14 hot-button risks to the contract language
found in the contract language tables developed by the widely represented CII research team to
determine where there are commonalities or disagreements.
Compromises
No interruption, interference,
inefciency, suspension or delay in
the commencement or progress of
the Work under this Contract, from
any clause whatsoever, including
those for which Owner may be
responsible in whole or in part,
shall relieve Contractor of its duty
to perform this Contract in
accordance with the terms of the
Contract Documents, or give rise to
any right to damages of any kind or
nature from Owner. Contractor
expressly acknowledges and
agrees that it shall receive no
damages for delay. Contractors
sole remedy against Owner for
delay shall be the right to seek an
extension in the Contract
Schedule. Granting of any such
time extension shall not be a
condition precedent to this no
damages-for-delay provision. This
no-damages-for-delay provision
shall apply to claims for early
completion, as well as claims
based on late completion. It is
expressly acknowledged and
agreed to by Contractor that a
material inducement to Owner to
enter into this Contract is this nodamage-for-delay provision.
10
Favors Seller
Language that establishes
a xed schedule of
compensation for ownerinduced delays.
For each day that the Contractor
is delayed by the Owner or
Owners agents, the Owner will
pay the Contractor a xed sum of
$XX,XXX per day of delay.
2. Consequential Damages
ISSUES: Owners have more to lose/owners have more to gain, reasonable foreseeability, reasonable
certainty, liquidated damages, home ofce overhead, limits of liability, specic events v. catch-all
phrases, insurance
Favors Buyer
Compromises
Favors Seller
If there is
no language
addressing
consequential
damages, the
contractor is
put at a high
disadvantage. In
some projects (i.e.,
casino, power,
semiconductor)
an owners
consequential
damages can
reach millions of
dollars a day.
Language that
specically
states that the
owner will be
allowed to collect
consequential
damages
(regardless of if
the contractor
is also allowed
to collect its
consequential
damages).
11
3. Indemnity
ISSUES: Workers compensation, broad-form clauses, intermediate clauses, comparative clauses, active
and passive negligence, statutes (Illinois Scaffold Act), public policies, insurance, Owner-Controlled
Insurance Programs, Contractor-Controlled Insurance Programs
Favors Buyer
Compromises
Favors Seller
The best
compromising
language would
specify knockfor-knock for
the people piece,
possibly with
limitations, except
in the case of gross
negligence or willful
misconduct. Also,
the contractors
liability for damage
to the owners
existing property
should be capped
except in the case of
gross negligence or
willful misconduct.
Lastly, the
contractors thirdparty liability should
be capped, except
in the cases of gross
negligence or willful
misconduct.
This type of
clause would be
an intermediate or
broad-form clause
drafted in the favor
of the contractor.
12
An Owner-Controlled
Insurance Program
or ContractorControlled Insurance
Program would
both constitute
as a compromise
accounting for
indemnication
concerns.
3. Indemnity (continued)
Favors Buyer
Compromises
13
Favors Seller
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language that
is looser than
in accordance
with the contract
specications. For
example, when
the contractor
deems the work
acceptable or
complete.
14
Language that
states that after
the contractor
installs its work
its contractual
responsibilities
are complete.
This rarely occurs,
because it is bad
business, and
no owner will
accept this type of
language.
For processoriented work,
language that
omits performance
testing
requirements.
For example, if
a mechanical
contractor puts in
pipes, but is not
required to leak
test them.
Compromises
Favors Seller
15
6. Force Majeure
ISSUES: Time only v. time and money, foreseeability, reasonable efforts/due diligence, burden of proof,
denition of triggering events, impacts of events, relief (suspension, termination), insurance, catch-all
phrases v. specic events, time limits before cost recovery, notice provisions, time-is-of-the-essence
clauses
Favors Buyer
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language
that gives the
contractor time,
money, and
termination rights
without limitations.
16
Language that
gives time and
money relief and
species that
the contractor
must bear the
rst $XXX,XXX
of a Force
Majeure event,
with not more
than $XXX,XXX
expended by
the contractor
for all Force
Majeure events
cumulatively.
If after these
limits the owner
delays in paying
the contractor
for the Force
Majeure impacts,
the contractor
may terminate
the contract
(after X number
of days of nonpayment). Note:
This language
may be viewed as
a compromise if
the project is very
large in scope
and is located
in an area highly
susceptible to
Force Majeure
events.
Compromises
17
Favors Seller
7. Schedule Acceleration
ISSUES: Notice provisions, mandated acceleration, constructive acceleration, recovery acceleration,
control of recovery plans, liquidated damages as direction to accelerate, excusable delays v. nonexcusable delays, ownership of oat, expert testimony/studies, time extension requests, owner response
time for determining if a delay is excusable, burden of proof of lost productivity, causation, liability,
resultant injury
Favors Buyer
Language that species that the contractor should
do whatever it takes to get the job done on time
(regardless of the circumstances) using its own
means and methods. If the required means
and methods happen to include acceleration, the
contractor is responsible for its extra costs.
Language that either gives the contractor no
compensation, or direct costs only for mandated or
constructive acceleration. The example language
below allows direct costs only.
Even if Contractors work is otherwise in compliance
with the Project Schedule, Owner may, at any time,
direct Contractor in writing to accelerate the Work and
to perform additional shifts or overtime and provide
additional equipment. In this event, Owners sole
liability to Contractor shall be to pay Contractors actual
direct costs related to the acceleration. Any adjustment
in the Contract Price for Owners voluntary acceleration
of the Work shall be implemented by Change Order.
Language that forces acceleration by overmanning
(with no means of recovery) if the contractor fails
to meet milestones. The milestone mention is
especially troubling because a contractor may fail to
meet the rst milestone and be forced to accelerate
when it actually may have been on pace to nish
the entire project early or on time. The inability of
the contractor to meet early milestones may not
necessarily mean that the contractor is on pace
to nish late. The milestones may have just been
inaccurately scheduled. Note: Elsewhere in the
contract, overmanning compensation is allowed if it
is necessitated and approved by the owner due to
an increase in the scope of work via a change order.
Should Contractor fail to achieve one or more
milestones by the projected date(s), Contractor
expressly agrees that it will add a sufcient number of
qualied and experienced personnel to its design and/
or construction management staff, as required, to
recover the projected schedule and shall not seek
reimbursement from Owner for such personnel even
though they may be added to Contractors manloader.
18
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language that
allows the
contractor to
recover its prot
and direct and
indirect costs
for mandated
or constructive
acceleration.
In essence,
the contractor
gets Time
& Materials
costs for the
accelerated
work. Although
uncommon,
language that
allows the same
compensation
for recovery
acceleration
would clearly
also favor the
contractor.
Compromising language
should also specically
set out what type of
documentation the
contractor is expected
to keep in order to prove
causation, liability, and
resultant injury of the
mandated or constructive
acceleration. The
recovery plan for
acceleration should
also be agreed upon
by both parties in a
compromising contract.
If the acceleration is
recovery acceleration,
the contractor should
be held responsible for
its extra costs and the
recovery plan should be
agreed upon since the
owner may have to pay
more labor expenses
to increase its safety
inspectors on site.
Compromises
19
Favors Seller
Language that
species a xed
schedule of
compensation
for changes. For
example, the
contractor may try
to draft language
that awards the
contractor a
xed amount of
compensation for
every X number
of changes or
disruptions to its
work to account
for the cumulative
impact.
Language that allows
the contractor to
fully recover its
cumulative impacts
after a certain
amount (%) of
change has occurred
on the project.
Compromises
20
Favors Seller
9. Owner-Mandated Subcontractors
ISSUES: Due diligence, owner-approved lists, contractor nominations, minority and women-owned
businesses
Favors Buyer
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language that
specically mandates
subcontractors and bars
the contractor its due
diligence rights.
Language that
allows the contractor
to contract with
any subcontractor
(absolutely no ownercontrol in selection
of subs). In other
words, the contract
is silent regarding
mandation of specic
subcontractors.
21
Compromises
Favors Seller
22
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language
that
excludes
the
contractors
liability
when
there is
insufcient
time/effort
available to
investigate
site
conditions
sufciently.
Language
will also
exclude
contractor
liability for
any gaps
that may
exist in
existing site
condition
reports.
23
Compromises
24
Favors Seller
Compromises
25
Favors Seller
Compromises
Favors Seller
Language that
is in accordance
with the Spearin
Doctrine. This
language attempts
to remove all liability
for design errors
and omissions from
the contractor, even
if the contractor
happens to know
that there is an error
or omission in the
design documents.
The contractor is
bound to build
according to plans and
specications
prepared by the owner,
and the contractor will
not be responsible for
the consequences of
any defects (patent or
otherwise) in the plans
and specications
under any
circumstances
whatsoever.
With Engineer/Procure/Construct
lump sum work, bid tenders
should be given by the owner
with adequate time for the
contractor to investigate the
design. Oftentimes, not enough
time is allotted to the contractor
to discover deciencies in the
owner-provided design.
26
Compromises
27
Favors Seller
No nal waiver of claims and
no time limits on delay claims
(other than the Statute of
Limitations).
Compromises
28
Favors Seller
Generally accepted
standards.
29
Initially the research teams hypothesis held that any particular risk is always best allocated to
one certain party regardless of project circumstances. After the data collection, the team concluded
that optimum allocation for any particular risk is not always best allocated to the same party in each
instance, but that it is in fact project-specic. Consequently, the team shifted toward legal research
that could aid contracting parties in determining the optimum allocation of the hot-button risks
on each specic project. The team found, however, that only 10 of the hot-button 14 risks yielded
readily available, documented legal information. As a result, the research team chose to limit its legal
research scope to the 10 risks that it: (1) had the most success in obtaining legal information for, and
(2) felt that the industry could benet the most from.
Readers should recognize that each case or legal principle discussed has to be understood
in its totality recognizing that the British and U.S. legal systems are adversarial in nature and not a
Socratic search for the truth. As a result, the specic legal circumstances (i.e., the skills, motivations,
and biases of judges, juries, lawyers, and expert witnesses) may vary greatly from case to case and
thereby result in very different rulings from those discussed herein.
Application of Findings
Through a careful review of the analysis and study of the legal issues and considerations ow
charts, parties should increase their understanding of each of the 10 researched risks. With this
knowledge, along with the information provided by the contract language tables, contracting parties
should then be able to draft more effective risk allocation clauses and more effectively scrutinize
contract clauses that are proposed to them.
No damages for delay clauses may be enforced by courts unless specic exceptions are present
(no-damage-for-delay provisions are valid and enforceable so long as they meet ordinary rules
governing the validity of contracts see United States v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 447
(S.C. 1997)). Figure 1 generically lays out the allocation of owner-caused delays when this type of
clause is present. It should be noted that the gure depicts what the current legal trends indicate.
Jurisdictions may vary in their rulings regarding the enforceability of no damages for delay clauses
and even different courts within the same jurisdiction may not be entirely consistent. The following
gure (and all others in this chapter) should be used only as an educational tool and not relied upon
to predict how a court or arbitrator will rule.
Identify
contract risk:
Delay clearly
foreseeable and/or
specific delay
addressed in clause?
Which party
assumes the risk?
Yes
Contractor
No Damages
for Delay
Yes
Owner
No
Yes
No
Clause is silent
regarding
additional
compensation?
Length of delay
justifies an
abandonment of
the contract?
No
The owner
actively
?*interfered?*
Yes
No
Varies**
Figure 1. No Damages for Delay Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
If an owner-caused delay occurs and was clearly foreseeable and/or specically addressed in
the no damages for delay clause, the contractor will assume the consequences associated with the
owner-caused delay. If the delay was not foreseeable and/or addressed in the clause, the next step
is to determine if the clause specically bars monetary compensation for the owner-caused delay.
Many no damages for delay clauses allow only an extension of time; however, if the clause is silent
or ambiguous regarding monetary compensation, the owner may be held liable for costs incurred by
the contractor. If the clause does state that no additional monetary compensation will be allowed,
the court will then determine if the length of the delay qualies as an abandonment of the contract
by the owner. If the length of delay does not justify abandonment, the next consideration will be to
investigate if the delay was caused by the owners active interference. Active interference includes
willful acts, bad faith acts, and gross negligence. If the owner actively interfered, it will be held liable
for the contractors damages. If the owner-caused delay was not due to active interference, some
jurisdictions will still hold the owner responsible if the owner-caused delay was due to the mere
negligence of the owner.
31
It should also be noted that if the owner refuses to grant a time extension as the sole remedy
when a delay justies such an extension, the contractor may be able to recover for its time and money
impacts if it is constructively accelerated as a result (see schedule acceleration legal issues and
considerations ow chart).
2. Consequential Damages
A consequential damages clause either enables or disallows an owner to be compensated for an
indirect loss caused by the contractor, and likewise, enables or disallows the contractor to receive
compensation should indirect losses stemming from the owners actions occur. Consequential
damages claims differ, however, from owner to contractor. An owner usually les for consequential
damages caused by a contractors breach of contract when the breach causes the owner to lose
use of the nal project and the prots that otherwise would have been realized if the breach had not
occurred. A typical contractor claim for consequential damages occurs when the owners actions/
inactions cause the contractor to lose potential business or destroy the contractors reputation
(sometimes these are referred to as business devastation claims).
Due to the indirect and specialized nature of the losses, the denitions of true consequential
damages are often misunderstood. If a consequential damages clause is not present in a contract,
the common law rule will generally enforce or disallow the damages according to the legal principles
of foreseeability and certainty. The foreseeability principle allows for recovery of consequential
damages if the party in breach of contract could reasonably foresee that a contract breach would
result in the indirect consequential damages to the other party. Certainty requires that damages be
reasonably calculable and not the subject of mere speculation.
Court rulings on consequential damages have been highly variable due to the difculty in proving
losses with reasonable certainty. As a result, consequential damages waivers are increasingly
common and have thus set some standards of enforcement within the legal community. Traditionally,
contracts for construction of power plants and some other large industrial facilities have eschewed
consequential damages clauses in favor of liquidated damages for late completion.
In summary, several considerations should be made when drafting consequential damages
waivers. Foreseeable losses that are known at the time of contract signing should be specically
addressed in the waiver. Waivers may contain language that species that consequential damages
are waived except for those included in a liquidated direct damages provision. This may effectively
disallow the owner from accounting for any consequential damages in its liquidated damages clause,
since there is really no such thing as direct liquidated damages. Unfortunately, it is for consequential
damages that liquidated damages provisions are most needed (Sweet, 2004). By denition liquidated
damages are damages which are indirect or consequential which cannot be directly calculated at the
time a contract is entered into (Wallace, 1998).
Theoretically, by including the limitation to liquidated direct damages alone, the parties
effectively eliminate liquidated damages altogether. However, it is ambiguous as to what indirect
liquidated damages versus direct liquidated damages can actually be dened as. Owners should be
wary of this type of language in consequential damages clauses. It seems more equitable that the
32
owner would be allowed to account for consequential damages within its liquidated damages, but
that a cap would be specied concerning the damages. However, the cap should be high enough as
to provide an incentive for the contractor to perform.
Figure 2 lays out the allocation of consequential damages awards to any party in situations
involving and lacking a consequential damages waiver. It should be noted that the gure depicts
current legal trends. As such, jurisdictions will vary in their rulings regarding the enforceability or
application of consequential damages clauses.
Consequential
damages waived?
No
Identify
contract risk:
Yes
Consequential
Damages
Waiver is
present in
the contract?
No
Specific
damages
addressed
in waiver?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Damages were
reasonably
foreseeable by
injuring party?
Damages can be
proved with
reasonable certainty
by the injured party?
Yes
Yes
No
33
3. Indemnity
Indemnication can be dened as the action by which one contracting party (indemnitor)
holds another party (indemnitee) or parties (indemnitees) harmless for a loss that was caused by
the indemnitor. In other words, if the actions of the indemnitor cause a large loss which may or
may not manifest itself with a lawsuit, the indemnitor will shield the indemnitee from liability for the
loss. Depending on the contract and the legal jurisdiction in question, the indemnitor may also end
up indemnifying the indemnitee even if the loss was caused in whole or in part by the indemnitee.
Indemnity can be provided contractually through express written provisions or non-contractually
through the courts application of the legal concepts of qualitative (common law indemnity) and
quantitative (doctrine of contribution) comparisons of negligence.
Typically, when a severe personal injury or loss occurs on a construction project that yields legal
action, most every project party is named in the lawsuit so that the injured party will have a higher
probability of collecting its damages. If there are no contractual indemnication clauses that prevent
or allow the shifting of guilt for the event, one of the contributing parties may end up bearing all of
the loss even when other parties contributed to the injury or loss. This may happen out of court when
the party with the deepest pockets chooses to absorb the entire loss in order to forgo the costly
legal process, or in the case of litigation, a court may allocate the entire loss to one individual party
through the application of common law indemnity (qualitative comparison of negligence).
When no contractual indemnity provisions exist, the party who pays all of the losses will oftentimes
be interested in recovering some of its losses from the other guilty parties. This reimbursement is
known as contribution. Most U.S. courts do not require contribution among wrongdoers (Sweet,
2004). In Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462 (1882), the court afrmed that, There is
no right of contribution between wrong-doers. However, approximately half of the U.S. states have
implemented some type of contribution statute (Sweet, 2004). These statutes vary from state to state,
but most of the statutes generally specify that a joint tortfeasor (wrongdoer) against whom judgment
is entered is entitled to recover from other joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the
injury. Contribution will only be allowed if the other joint tortfeasors are not protected by workers
compensation statutes (applicable if a joint tortfeasor is the employer of the injured party).
Indemnity can be provided by express written provisions in a contract or by application of
common law indemnity. In this manner, an offending party may nd protection from losses that it
otherwise would have been liable for. The doctrine of contribution among wrongdoers is another
method by which contracting parties can mitigate losses by forcing other wrongdoers to contribute
to the loss. As such, the indemnity legal research efforts focused on differentiating and separately
discussing common law indemnity, contractual indemnity, and contribution among wrongdoers.
Indemnication is a highly complicated contracting issue, and as such, it requires extensive
attention when drafting associated clauses. Each party should investigate their states public policies
and/or statutes that regulate indemnication clauses in construction contracts to ensure that a
particular clause will be enforceable as written.
Rulings on requests for indemnity vary depending on the existence of an indemnity clause and
the laws regarding indemnity within a state. Figure 3 outlines the granting of indemnity based on
34
situations regarding contractual and non-contractual indemnities in states that allow indemnication
clauses in some magnitude. Indemnity is a complex issue and the gure attempts to generalize the
common principles regarding the risk. As such, jurisdictions will vary in their rulings regarding the
granting of indemnity.
Clause expressly
indemnifies
indemnitees sole/
partial negligence?
Contractual
intention of the
parties provides
indemnity to
indemnitee?
Indemnity
provided to
indemnitee?
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Indemnification
clause present?
Yes
Broad /
Intermediateform clause
No
Sole/partial
negligence indemnity
prohibited by Public
Policy/Statute?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Identify
contract risk:
Indemnity
Comparativeform clause
Yes
Active
No clause*
No
Type of
negligence by
indemnitee?
Comparative
contribution
(quantitative)
Passive
Indemnitees
financial
responsibility?
Common law
indemnity
(qualitative)
* Or clause rendered
general or ambiguous,
thus voiding it
No
Yes
35
Where a clause is present, indemnication rights depend on the type of clause found in the
contract. Provided the clause is broad or intermediate, the written indemnication of the indemnitees
sole and partial negligence can only be upheld in states where this type of indemnication is not
against public policy or statute and the indemnication intentions are expressly or clearly and
unequivocally stated in the clause. Public policy restrictions stem from the belief that if the indemnitee
is indemnied in the case of its own sole negligence, it will become careless in its responsibilities.
When expressed indemnication is not present in the clause and the state does not prohibit complete
indemnication, an indemnitee can still receive indemnity where it is proven that the contractual
intentions of both parties were as such; this is often difcult to prove, however.
will be established along with more generic requirements such as, The Work is structurally,
mechanically, electrically and functionally constructed in accordance with the requirements of the
Contract Documents. Ambiguities can surface within any sentence in a contract, but ambiguities
regarding acceptance of the project have the potential to fundamentally alter the entire objective
of the contract as perceived by the contractor versus as perceived by the owner. This conict in
interpretation has the potential to severely delay a project since major completion milestones always
fall on the critical path of a project schedule.
The following discussion of legal principles pertains to any and all ambiguities that may be found
in a contract, not just in the acceptance criteria. A court will view all ambiguities in a similar manner,
so there is no specialized difference in interpreting ambiguous acceptance criteria.
Figure 4 displays the ambiguous acceptance criteria legal issues and considerations ow chart
that generically lays out the allocation of risk when an alleged ambiguity is present.
Prior to bidding,
clarification is sought
from the drafter of the
ambiguity?
Yes
Yes
Identify
contract risk:
Ambiguous
Acceptance
Criteria
Criteria has
more than one
reasonable
interpretation*
and/or does
not have a plain
meaning?
No
Ambiguity is patent
to a reasonable
individual?
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Drafter assumes
costs resulting
from ambiguity?
Established trade
practices or
customs evidence a
competing, alternate
interpretation*?
Yes
Yes
No
No
* Relied upon in preparing bid
(NOT an after-the-fact interpretation)
No
No
Figure 4. Ambiguous Acceptance Criteria Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
If acceptance criteria do not have more than one interpretation or are seemingly plain in their
meaning, the only mode of recovery against the drafter will be when the party performing the contract
relies on an interpretation of the criteria that corresponds with established trade practices or customs.
Also, the interpretation must have been relied on when the contract was entered into.
If the contract terms are ambiguous, the court will determine whether or not the ambiguity is
patent or latent. If the ambiguity is patent, the bidder will be bound to inquire upon the drafter for
clarication. If the bidder does so, it will usually be able to recover its costs from the drafter if the
claried interpretation later results in project difculties.
37
If the ambiguity is latent, the bidders interpretation will be construed over the drafters
interpretation according to the Contra Proferentem rule, so long as the bidders interpretation does
not conict with extrinsic evidence or other portions of the contract when read as a whole (Pari
Materiae).
5. Force Majeure
In any construction project, the fear of the unknown is an ever-present reality. At the time a
construction contract is entered into it is impossible to predict every single event that could occur
and have a devastating impact on the project. These unknown events are commonly referred to
as force majeure events. According to Websters dictionary force majeure can be dened as
a superior or irresistible force or an event or effect that cannot be reasonably anticipated or
controlled. The denition goes on to compare it to an act of God, which is further dened as: an
extraordinary interruption by a natural cause (as a ood or earthquake) of the usual course of events
that experience, prescience, or care cannot reasonably foresee or prevent.
Force majeure (acts of God) clauses, particularly considering the catastrophic hurricane
damage to Louisiana and Mississippi in late 2005, need to eliminate the risk for potential disputes.
Force majeure invoking events should be clearly and unambiguously dened along with the allowable
compensation measures. Oftentimes contracting parties will rely on insurance companies to provide
protection from force majeure events. However, the potential for insurance companies to go insolvent
in the case of a force majeure event makes it even more important that the contract documents
clearly address the risk factors surrounding force majeure events.
In construction law, the contractor is responsible for any damage or loss that occurs to
a structure during its construction (Clough, 1994). However, if a force majeure event causes the
damage, the contractor can nd relief via a force majeure clause. If there is no force majeure clause
several common law principles may provide relief when a force majeure event occurs: impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration.
Impossibility is the common law rule that a court can use to relieve contracting parties if it can be
concluded that performance has become physically impossible. If a contracting party contributes to
the impossibility through its own actions, excuse from the contract will not be granted. Impossibility
doctrine is based on the assumption that both parties will be able to perform as originally contemplated
at the inception of the contract. Impossibility doctrine (along with impracticability and frustration) is
a default and does not apply when contracting parties have agreed to a different allocation of risks
through direct contract language.
The doctrine of impossibility includes physical impossibility as just described as well as extreme
impracticability of performance. Impossibility and impracticability doctrines are closely related
and often indistinguishable in application by courts. The application of impracticability allows for a
broader scope of circumstances that may allow a grant of discharge from a contract, since absolute
physical impossibility will not be a prerequisite for excuse. Instead, continued performance amounts
to an impractical venture instead of a literally impossible situation.
38
Frustration or frustration of purpose is the third and nal common law principle that may allow
discharge from a contract in the absence of a contractual provision addressing force majeure. In the
absence of a force majeure clause, if an event occurs that causes performance of an obligation not to
become impossible or extraordinarily difcult, but to substantially frustrate the principle purpose for
which one of the parties entered into the contract, the doctrine of frustration may apply.
The doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration are similar concepts and thus
are often confused in their applications (some cases speak of a contract as frustrated when
performance has become impossible or impracticable 7200 Scottsdale Rd. Gen. Partners v. Kuhn
Farm Mach., 909 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App.1995)). Although inferred by their denitions, in order for the
application of the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration, the invoking event must
have been unforeseeable at the time the contract was entered upon.
Apart from a direct contract clause addressing force majeure events, an injured partys only
hope is that the court will provide relief through one of the common law doctrines just discussed.
Because it is impossible to predict every event that could occur and have a devastating impact on
a construction project, Force Majeure clauses are usually incorporated in some form into modern
construction contracts.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the force majeure legal issues and considerations ow chart. For
the purposes of the ow charts it was assumed that a typical force majeure clause was being
examined, i.e., a clause constructed to give relief to the contractor in the case of a force majeure
event. Contracting parties should investigate their own legal systems to specically determine what
portions of the ow chart do and do not apply. For example, Indiana law does not allow a buyer to
claim impracticability and does not recognize the defense of frustration (N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, Texas courts have abandoned
the application of the doctrine of impossibility (Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. Prship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.
1990)).
Contractor
relieved?**
See Figure 6
Yes
Identify
contract risk:
Force
Majeure
Yes
Contract
contains a
force
majeure
clause?*
No
Yes
Yes
Impossibility,
impracticability, or
frustration of purpose
apply?
No
No
No
* Even if a force majeure clause does not specifically exist, other clauses may allow or disallow recovery
- Examples: No Damages for Delay clauses, Labor Strike clauses
** Relief limited to the extent that the contractor could not reasonably mitigate against
39
The ow chart generically lays out the ability of a contractor to nd relief in the case of a force
majeure-type event. Again, if the contract does not contain a specic clause addressing force
majeure, relief will be governed by the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration. If
there is a clause, the contractor must comply with the notice provisions or its sole recourse will again
be to seek recovery under one of the three doctrines just mentioned.
Contractor
relieved?**
Yes
Yes*
No
Clause
contains
catch-all
phrase?
No
Cont. from
Figure 5
Clause is
ambiguous?
Yes
No
Clause
contains
list of
force
majeure
events?
Event
is in
the
list?
Yes
No
No
Event is of the
same type as
the listed
event(s)?
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
* If contractor didnt draft the clause, and it is not patently ambiguous
** Relief limited to the extent that the contractor could not reasonably mitigate against
Figure 6. Force Majeure Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart (Continued)
If a contractor complies with notice provisions but the clause is ambiguous, the contractor will
nd relief unless it drafted the clause or the ambiguity was patent. If the clause is not ambiguous
there are three different situations of contract language that will be present: a clause containing a
catch-all phrase, a clause containing a list of specic events, or a clause that contains a catch-all
phrase and a list of specic events. If the clause consists solely of a catch-all, boilerplate provision,
the court will have great liberty in deciding whether or not the event in question triggers relief. If
the clause solely contains a list of specic events, the clause will provide relief only if the event in
question is contained within the list. If the clause contains a catch-all phrase along with a list of
specic events, the event in question will trigger relief if the event is construed to be generally of the
same nature as the events listed per the legal rule of Ejusdem Generis.
It should be noted that if economic conditions are not specically listed, they will not be construed
by a court to constitute a force majeure event. Also, contracting parties have a duty to mitigate their
losses whenever possible. If this is not done, relief will be adjusted to reect the failure to mitigate.
40
6. Schedule Acceleration
Oftentimes a contractor may have to accelerate its work progress during a construction project.
This acceleration is typically accomplished by working overtime, adding more workers to the project
(overmanning), or working multiple shifts (shift-work). Mandated acceleration, recovery acceleration,
and constructive acceleration are the three main types of acceleration possible.
Mandated (or direct) acceleration occurs when the owner directs the contract to accelerate the
schedule merely because it wants an earlier completion (no excusable delays or substantial increases
in scope have occurred).
Recovery acceleration occurs when the contractor falls behind schedule due to its own actions or
inactions that have resulted in schedule delays. The contractor will need to accelerate the schedule in
order to nish by the original completion date. Although rare, the contractor may choose to accelerate
the schedule voluntarily in order to achieve an earlier completion.
Constructive acceleration occurs when the contractor les a justied time extension, the owner
denies it, the contractor is held responsible for the original completion date, and thus the contractor
is forced to accelerate its work. A justied time extension may result when the contractor experiences
an excusable delay, or a large increase in scope requires more time for completion.
Acceleration of work creates labor inefciencies such as fatigue, low morale, loss of job rhythm,
and pacing, which tend to lower labor productivity and thereby increase construction costs. When a
contractor accelerates work because it has fallen behind schedule due to its own actions or inactions,
the contractor must absorb the additional costs associated with lost labor productivity.
An owner needs to recognize that when a contractor makes a request for an extension of time,
the owners failure to act in a timely manner may be interpreted by the court to constitute as a
justication for the contractor to constructively accelerate its work. Therefore, as soon as the owners
agent has decided whether or not the delay is excusable it should notify the contractor, even if the
exact amount of time extension is not known yet. This way the contractor will not accelerate the
schedule prematurely. When possible, the owner should always extend the project completion date
since a simple delay claim is usually much cheaper than a constructive acceleration claim (Interface,
2005). However, if the schedule is so sensitive that an extension in time is simply not possible, the
owner should seek to come to a contractual agreement concerning compensation for acceleration
prior to project commencement.
In summary, if the owner mandates acceleration for its own purposes, it will almost always pay
the additional contractor costs associated with that action. However, if acceleration occurs from no
fault of the contractor, it will be able to collect its extra costs only if it meets the specic constructive
acceleration stipulations outlined herein. Figure 7 (next page) illustrates the schedule acceleration
legal issues and considerations ow chart. Contracting parties should check to see if their local legal
jurisdictions recognize the concept of constructive acceleration.
If the owner mandates acceleration merely to achieve an earlier completion for its own
convenience, the contractor will be able to recover its acceleration costs unless the contract clearly
and unequivocally waives this right. Obviously, if the delay is not excusable, the contractor will not
41
Contractor acceleration
costs recoverable?
Identify
contract risk:
Schedule
Acceleration
Yes
Owner
mandates
acceleration?
No
No
Contractor
experiences
an excusable
delay?
42
Yes
No
Yes
No
Contractor
submits timely
and sufficient
request for time
extension?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Owner
approves
request in a
reasonable
timeframe?
No
Yes
Owner
requires
schedule
adherence?*
If necessary,
contractor
notifies the
owner that it
will accelerate
at the owners
expense?
Yes
Contractor
attempts to
accelerate
the work and
increases its
costs?
No
No
No
No
* This can come in the form of liquidated
damages, direct command, or coercion
recover its costs for acceleration efforts stemming from the delay. If the delay is excusable, the
contractor must submit a timely and sufcient request for an extension of time. Failure to do so
will result in a forfeiture of acceleration costs. If the contractor submits an appropriate request, the
owner must approve the request in a reasonable timeframe. If the owner approves the extension in a
timely fashion, the contractor will not receive any compensation if it accelerates the schedule since
it has ultimately been awarded extra time for the delay. If the owner fails to grant a time extension
in a timely fashion, however, the court will look to see if the owner required the contractor to adhere
to the original completion date. If the owner did require schedule adherence through the threat of
liquidated damages, a direct command, or coercion, the court will then look to see if the contractor
subsequently notied the owner that it was going to accelerate under protest at the owners expense.
In some circumstances this duty of notication is not required: if (1) the acceleration has been directed
by the owner; (2) the owner has communicated that no time extensions will be granted; or, (3) the
owner has waived the need for notice (Wray, 2000). If the contractor meets notication requirements
(if necessary) and it actually attempts to accelerate the work, it must lastly prove that the acceleration
effort resulted in increase costs (even if the acceleration effort is not successful). If the contractor
can meet these nal requirements, in most circumstances it will be able to recover its acceleration
costs.
43
In order to construct a successful cumulative impact claim, the contractor has the burden of proof
to establish liability, causation, and resultant injury. Liability can be established by merely showing that
a substantial amount of owner changes or disruptions occurred. Proof of both liability and causation
are satised within a cardinal change. However, simply showing that a large number of changes and
a cost overrun occurred is not enough to establish causation; rather, the substantial change must
be linked to the cost overrun. Therefore, contractors should make sure that they keep scrupulous
records in order to provide proof of causation via individual impacts of changes or changed working
conditions that led to an overall decrease in labor productivity.
Commonly, the resultant injury is calculated by using the total cost method, the modied total
cost method, or the measured mile approach. In any method, it is imperative that the claimant obtain
an expert witness who will provide an exhaustive analysis and defense of the project documents
associated with the cumulative impact.
Due to the poorly dened nature of cumulative impact, it is not clear how a jurisdiction will rule
concerning compensability. If an impact of a change order on the unchanged work was foreseeable, it
should have been included in the pricing of the change order and therefore is not recoverable. However,
the increased effects of cumulative change orders are often not considered or foreseeable.
Assuming the change orders did not include contingency options that were collected by the
contractor and the contractor did not knowingly waive its right to assert cumulative impact claims, it
will still possess the right to a damages claim due to cumulative change orders. In the past, courts
required that a cardinal change be established in order to allow recovery of cumulative impacts from
change orders; however, in recent years this has shifted to requiring proof of a constructive change
instead.
Figures 8 and 9 display the cumulative impact of change orders legal issues and considerations
ow chart. Each individual industry participant should investigate its own jurisdictional history
concerning cumulative impact in order to more fully comprehend how it might adequately prepare or
avoid a cumulative impact claim.
The ow chart establishes a generic guide for determining when a cumulative impact claim will
be successful or not. First, a large number of owner-caused changes must be issued. Secondly,
the contractor must be able to either: (1) separate owner and contractor caused labor inefciencies
or (2) prove that the owner is the sole source of all inefciencies (no other source is possible). If
the contractor is able to achieve one of these requirements it may be able to pursue a cumulative
impact claim by citing a constructive change, cardinal change, or abandonment of the contract.
If the contractor can establish one of these three recovery doctrines it must then prove liability,
causation, and resultant injury from the cumulative impact of change orders (although some courts
and boards may only require proof of resultant injury after one of the three recovery doctrines has
been established). Typically, the proof of resultant injury will require an experts assistance and
testimony.
No
Cumulative
Impact of
Change
Orders
A significantly
large number
of owner
changes
experienced?
Yes
No
No
Contractor is able
to separate owner
and contractor
caused productivity
losses or prove that
the owner is the
sole source?
45
Yes
No
No
Cardinal
change,
abandonment
of contract, or
constructive
change
established?
Yes
Contractors
productivity is
impacted?
Yes
No
Impact stems
directly from
synergy of # and
scope of changes?
Yes
No
See Figure 9
The cumulative
impact was
previously
foreseeable?
Yes
No
No
Liability, causation,
and resultant
injury* proven
Yes
Yes
* Almost always requires an expert
Figure 8. Cumulative Impact of Change Orders Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
No
No
No
Cont. from
Figure 8
Change
order form
contains
release?
No
No
Yes
Contractor
reserved its
rights to assert
cumulative
impact?
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Figure 9. Cumulative Impact of Change Orders Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
(Continued)
If the contractor is unable to establish one of these three doctrines of recovery it may be able to
continue through a more generic recovery method. First, it must prove that its productivity suffered
from the multiple change orders, the impact stemmed from the number and scope of the changes,
and the impact was previously unforeseeable. Once these elements have been established, a court
or board will typically examine the contract documents to see if there was a release. If a release
was present, the contractor can continue with its claim if it clearly reserved its right to assert a
cumulative impact claim. If the contract did not reserve its right, it may still be able to recover its
losses if the court establishes that the release was ambiguous or general (boilerplate) and the parties
either never discussed the applicability of the release to cumulative impact or they discussed the
concept but never reached a meeting of the minds. If neither of these situations applies the last
opportunity of recovery will hinge on whether or not the release is voided by lack of consideration,
lack of performance, lack of authority, unilateral or mutual mistake, misrepresentation, duress, or
coercion.
46
The goal of many clauses is to shift the responsibility to the owner in an attempt to obtain a fair and
equitable bid price from the contractor. Yet general clauses often attempt to require the contractor to
assume responsibility for verifying the existing site conditions to assure that they do not differ from
what is specied in the design plans and specications. This can become a heated source of debate.
The general clause puts this problem on the contractor, yet the contractor is essentially required
to use the information supplied by the owner in order to remove the contingency cost for unknown
site conditions from its bid price and remain competitive with other contractors. Consequently, the
assignment of responsibility hinges on the reasonableness and results of any existing site conditions
investigation.
Differing site conditions clauses are typically drafted with the intention of allowing a contractor
recovery if it encounters conditions that materially differ from those indicated in the contract
documents or conditions that materially differ from those that could reasonably be expected.
However, a contractor cannot expect to be able to rely on a differing site conditions clause to save
it from increased costs in any and all differing site condition circumstances. On the contrary, there
are several elements that may prevent a contractor from recovery notwithstanding the presence of a
differing site conditions clause: site investigation requirements, exculpatory contractual statements,
notice requirements, and proof of the certainty of resultant damages.
Generally, site investigation contractual requirements will not prevent a contractor from recovery
unless an encountered condition should have reasonably been discovered by a site investigation
conducted by a reasonably prudent contractor. Some investigation clauses also require the
contractor to review pertinent documents concerning site conditions made available by the owner.
If the contractor fails to review the documents, it may not be able to recover its losses if the site
condition causing the loss would have been exposed if the contractor would have reviewed the
required information.
If a contractor has examined and discovered all site information made reasonably available to it
and none of it conicts with the owner-provided information within the contract documents, many
courts will rule that the contractor has reason to rely on the owner-provided information despite any
exculpatory language that appears in the contract in an attempt to disclaim the accuracy of ownerprovided information.
A differing site conditions contractual provision will typically state that a contractor has a certain
time limit in which in must notify the owner or its agents in writing of any conditions encountered
that may qualify as a differing site condition. If the contractor does not adhere to these notice
requirements, it may lose its ability to recover damages under a differing site conditions clause.
Just like any other claim, regardless of if there is a differing site conditions clause in the contract
or not, a claimant must be able to prove its injuries with a reasonable amount of certainty. If it is not
able to reasonably do so, it will not be able to recover said damages.
A contractor does have several means of compensation for costs relating to changed conditions
as a matter of common law when there is no contract clause present that addresses differing site
conditions, or there is a clause but it is rendered void through the contractors failure to adhere
to its requirements (e.g., non-compliance with notice provisions). Most commonly, the contractor
47
must be able to prove one of the following avenues of recovery: duty to disclose, mutual mistake,
misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty, or impossibility.
If the owner possesses site information that would have assisted the contractor in identifying
potentially differing conditions, the owner may be held liable for differing site conditions thereafter
discovered per the owners common law duty to disclose.
Mutual mistake can be claimed by a contractor to recover its losses associated with a differing
site condition if it can show that a condition existed of which both the contractor and owner were
equally unaware.
The concepts of duty to disclose and misrepresentation are closely related. Generally speaking,
the difference is that recovery under the duty to disclose concept can be sought when the owner
did not reveal information that would have allowed the contractor to account for the differing site
conditions, while recovery under the concept of misrepresentation can be claimed when the owner
fraudulently or innocently (unintentionally/negligently) misleads the contractor (orally or through
contract documents).
The Spearin doctrine (see design responsibility risk discussion) establishes that the owner
impliedly warrants to the contractor that the plans and specication will be adequate to achieve an
acceptable product. Pertaining to differing site conditions, if the plans and specications indicate
what type of existing conditions may be encountered, the contractor may be able to make a claim for
breach of contract when conditions are encountered that materially differ from those indicated.
The doctrine of impossibility includes physical impossibility as well as extreme impracticability of
performance. If discovery of differing site conditions render performance impossible or impractical,
the contractor may be excused from the contract.
Differing site conditions clauses can be an effective method for achieving an equitable allocation
of this risk in a construction contract. By an owner accepting responsibility for such a risk, the
contractor will not have to price this risk, which may or may not occur, into the bid price. Regardless
of the allocation, if a differing site condition arises, the contractor should give notice to the owner and
detail its effects on schedule and performance.
The risk responsibility for existing and differing site conditions highly depends on the contract
language, or lack thereof, regarding this matter. Figures 10 and 11 contain the differing site conditions
legal issues and considerations owchart. This owchart represents the general persuasions of the
U.S. judicial system. However, it would be impossible to create a ow chart that would accurately
capture every manner in which a court may rule. The specic circumstances of each case along with
the controlling legal jurisdiction presiding over each case will carry the most weight in predicting how
differing site conditions issues will be resolved by a court.
The ow chart shows that rst a contractor and owner must establish if site information
represented in the contract documents can be relied upon by the contractor. Investigations into
the local legal jurisdictions should be made in an attempt to determine if exculpatory provisions will
be strictly construed. If they are not construed as such, generally contractors will be able to rely
on the site information contained within the four corners of the contract. However, if the contractor
48
Which party
assumes the risk?
No
Yes
Did
encountered
conditions
differ from
those
indicated?
Yes
Identify
contract risk:
49
Differing Site
Conditions
Was there
ownerfurnished site
information
that the
contractor
could review
and
reasonably
rely upon*?
No
Yes
Yes
Was the
contractor
responsible
for further site
investigation?
No
See Figure 11
No
Contractor
Yes
Yes
Was there a
differing site
conditions
(Type I & II)
clause?
Did the
contractor
substantially
comply with
the notice
requirements?
Yes
Owner
Did the
contractor prove
increased costs
with reasonable
certainty?
No
No
No
* Contractors cannot reasonably rely upon owner-provided
information if a court strictly construes an exculpatory
provision, or if there is no such information provided
No
Duty to disclose,
mutual mistake,
misrepresentation,
breach of implied
warranty, or
impossibility
apply?
Yes
Contractor
No
Did the
contractor prove
increased costs
with reasonable
certainty?
Figure 10. Differing Site Conditions Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
Yes
Owner
Which party
assumes the risk?
No
Yes
50
Cont. from
Figure 10
Was there a
differing site
conditions
(Type I & II)
clause?
Type II Recovery:
Did the
encountered
conditions differ
materially from
those reasonably
anticipated***?
Yes
Contractor
Yes
Yes
Did the contractor
substantially comply
with the notice
requirements?
No
No
*** If the contractor was required to investigate the
site conditions it will be held to the expectation that
it should have reasonably anticipated conditions
that it did or should have discovered by conducting
a reasonable investigation
Owner
No
No
Duty to disclose,
mutual mistake,
or impossibility
apply?
Yes
Contractor
No
Did the
contractor prove
increased costs
with reasonable
certainty?
Yes
Owner
Figure 11. Differing Site Conditions Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart (Continued)
is required to investigate the site it will be held responsible if it discovers (or reasonably should
have discovered) site conditions that contradict or clarify what the contract documents indicate. If
a portion of misrepresented site conditions are not claried after a reasonable investigation by the
contractor, it should still be able to recover for damages resulting from the undiscovered portion of
the misleading owner-provided information.
In the case of fraudulent misrepresentations of site conditions, the contractors site investigation
will shift the risk back to the contractor only if it did in fact discover conditions that contradicted
or claried ALL of the fraudulent information. If the contractor discovers site conditions that only
render some of the owner-provided fraudulent information useless, it will still be able to recover for
damages stemming from the portion of the fraudulent misrepresentations that were not rendered
void by the contractors reasonably prudent investigations. If the contractor should have discovered
conditions that would have contradicted or claried fraudulent information but did not discover
such conditions, the law will generally still allow the contractor to pursue a claim stemming from the
fraudulent misrepresentations.
If a contractors required site investigation, or lack thereof, does not shift the risk to the contractor,
it will be able to pursue equitable adjustment under a differing site conditions clause. Common law
mechanisms such as duty to disclose, mutual mistake, misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty,
or impossibility can be used by the contractor to seek recovery if: (1) a differing site conditions
clause does not exist, or (2) a differing site conditions clause is voided due to non-compliance with
notice requirements. Regardless of the mode of recovery sought (contractual or non-contractual), a
contractor will still have to prove its resultant injuries with a reasonable amount of certainty.
If the contractor cannot reasonably rely upon site conditions contained within the contract
(because of a strict enforcement of an exculpatory provision), or no such representations exist, it may
still be able to recover its increased costs stemming from differing site conditions. First, if there is a
differing site conditions clause, the contractor will be able to recover if the encountered conditions
could not have been discovered through a reasonably prudent contractor site investigation, or no
such investigation is contractually required. Furthermore, the contractor will also have to substantially
comply with the notice requirements to be able to seek equitable adjustment under the clause. With a
typical type 1/type 2 clause, recovery will now come under a type 2 condition (conditions materially
different from what can normally be expected), since a type 1 condition (conditions differ from those
indicated in the contract) can not exist due to the strict upholding of an exculpatory provision, or the
fact that no owner-provided site information exists in the contract documents.
If there is no clause or the clause is rendered useless due to non-compliance with notice
provisions, the contractor may still be able to recover under the common law mechanisms of duty to
disclose, mutual mistake, or impossibility. Misrepresentation and breach of implied warranty do not
apply because at this point in the ow chart it has been established that there is no owner-provided
information in the contract documents that the contractor could reasonably rely on in the rst place,
or there is no owner-provided information in the contract at all. Again, if the contractor is going to be
able to successfully recover its damages, it must be able to prove them with reasonably certainty.
51
9. Design Responsibility
The ultimate responsibility for defective plans and specications can often be a source of ambiguity
in the construction industry. Oftentimes the owner will attempt to place the risk associated with
the plans and specications onto the contractor through direct contractual language. Complicating
matters, a contractor may also attempt to include clauses within its subcontracts that attempt to
further shift the design risk down to the subcontractors. For the sake of simplicity, the following
discussions on design responsibility will focus on the ownercontractor relationship.
When an owner inserts a clause attempting to shift the design risk, the contractor will typically
be required to bring any and all errors and omissions in the design to the attention of the owner or
architect. In many cases, the contractor will demand compensation for the changes or delays caused
by undiscovered design inaccuracies, while the owner will claim that the contractor is responsible
for the associated costs since it was contractual responsible for reviewing the design plans and
specications and discovering all inadequacies. These types of disputes often result in a construction
claim. Depending on the defective nature of the design along with the contractual language present,
the courts may or may not reject the notion that the responsibility of design lies with the contractor.
The following pages will provide insight as to the terms and conditions for which both an owner and
contractor can be held responsible for the risks involved in design responsibility.
In every traditional construction contract, the owner impliedly warrants that the plans and
specications are accurate and sufcient enough to build the project. This implied warranty for the
plans and specications on a construction project has been upheld as a result of the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
Although the Spearin doctrine is considered good law on face value, there have been instances
where courts have not relied on a strict application of the doctrine. The following sections will
discuss several elements that may prevent a contractor from recovery under the Spearin doctrine.
These elements are the contractors duty to review the design documents, the presence of an
express warranty in the contract, and the existence of performance specications instead of design
specications.
First, the implied warranty of specication does not relieve the contractor from its duty to conduct
a reasonably prudent review of the plans and specications and bring any noticeable errors and
omissions to the attention of the owner. If the contractor fails to notify the owner of a design error or
omission that the court deems obvious, the implied warranty of the design will not be upheld and the
contractor will be held responsible.
Secondly, oftentimes an owner may claim that a contractor cannot recover losses under the
Spearin doctrine if the contract documents contained either an express disclaimer of the owners
responsibility for the information represented in the plans and specications, or an express warranty
that the contractors work would be free from faults and defects and that any defects in the work
would be reworked at the contractors expense. It is widely known that courts will typically not enforce
boilerplate or broad-form statements within a contract. However, clear and unequivocal language that
adopts express language may be enforced by some courts to shift the responsibility of the design.
52
Lastly, design specications will specify the particular components, dimensions, and types of
materials to be used by the contractor, whereas performance specications will simply specify the
qualities of the end product then leave the contractor to determine the means it will use to achieve the
desired product. Some contracts may contain a mixture of design and performance specications.
In these cases, the Spearin doctrine will apply, but only to the portion of the specications that are
design specications.
The situations discussed herein outline a number of possible scenarios that may arise when
dealing with design responsibility in construction contracts. The Spearin doctrine plays a big role
in determining which entity will ultimately be held responsible for the design. It should be noted
that in a traditional design-bid-build contracting method, the owners implied warranty of the plans
and specications will remain even if the design is completed by a consortium of A/Es which are
separately or conjointly contracted with the owner. Similarly, in a design-build contracting method,
the design-build contractor will impliedly warrant the overall sufciency of its design according to the
Spearin doctrine regardless of how many specialty A/Es and/or consultants retained by the designbuild contractor assisted in the design process.
Figure 12 contains the design responsibility legal issues and considerations ow chart.
Owner retains design
responsibility through
implied warranty?
No
Yes
Identify
contract risk:
Yes
Design
Responsibility
Design
(prescriptive)
specifications
(not performance)?
Contractor
reasonably
reviewed*
and relied upon
the contract
documents?
Yes
Contract contains
an express
disclaimer or
warranty?
Yes
Varies
No
No
No
* Reasonable review = contractor was not aware of design errors or
could not have reasonably discovered them. Also, if patent design
ambiguities existed, contractor must have sought clarification.
Figure 12. Design Responsibility Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
The ow chart shows that if the design in question does not qualify as a design specication, then
the owners implied warranty of the design will not apply. However, when the design does qualify as a
design specication, the contractor must have reasonably reviewed all of the contract documents in
order to be able to claim reasonable reliance. A reasonable review will have occurred if the contractor
was not able to discover any design errors or could not have reasonably discovered them. Also, if
patent design ambiguities existed, the contractor must have sought clarication from the owner or
its agents (i.e., A/E). If a reasonable review and reliance can be established, it can be conrmed that
information represented within the contract documents may have misled the contractor. If the contract
53
contains express disclaimers or express warranties, the end result will vary. Some courts may strictly
construe such provisions, while others will narrowly construe them. Each cases unique characteristics
and circumstances will determine whether or not an express provision will limit the applicability of the
Spearin doctrine. It should be noted that not all legal jurisdictions specically recognize the Spearin
doctrine, but most recognize that the owner does have an implied duty nonetheless to provide plans
and specications that are sufcient to produce a functional constructed product.
54
[A]n action in negligence may be maintained upon the plaintiffs showing that the
defendant owed a duty to him, that the duty was breached, and that the breach
proximately caused an injury which resulted in actual damagesDuty and liability are
only imposed where both the plaintiff and the risk are foreseeable to a reasonable
person (Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984)).
The above language sets forth the parameters by which any contractual party can be held liable
to another for its negligent failure to fulll a duty implied by law.
Standards of care in the construction industry involve several complex applications of contract
and tort law. Notwithstanding the difculties in predicting how a court will accordingly rule, contracting
parties should clearly allocate the expected standards of care within the contract. Furthermore,
to the extent possible, contracting parties should attempt to include provisions which will provide
protection from economic losses caused by third-parties which are connected through the network
of contracts that tend to exist on a construction project.
Under the economic loss rule, a contractor is unable to collect its economic losses from an
engineer for a negligent design. However, if the contractor bargains with the owner to account for
the possibility of economic losses arising from the negligence of the engineer, recovery can be found
under the contractors agreement with the owner. The owner then has the opportunity to bargain with
the engineer to allocate the risk of economic losses caused by the engineers negligence. This type
of contracting strategy is consistent with the attitude of many courts that enforce the economic loss
rule.
Figure 13 (next page) displays the engineering standard of care legal issues and considerations
ow chart. This ow chart attempts to capture the general attitude that the U.S. judicial system has
assumed. Contracting parties should use the ow chart to educate themselves on the major issues
and considerations involving the engineering standard of care as generally perceived by the U.S.
judicial system. The chart adheres to the general or ordinary negligence rules of recovery.
When an engineer allegedly negligently fails to perform its professional design services according
to the standard normally expected, a claimant must rst prove that the actions or inactions of the
engineer proximately caused the claimants injury. Next, the source of the allegedly breached duty
of care must be determined. If the standard of care duty expected was established in a contract, the
claimant will not be able to recover solely economic losses if the court strictly applies the economic
loss rule (applies to one-to-one and third-party contractual relationships). If the damages are physical
in addition to economical, the claimant will be able to pursue a claim under tort law regardless of
what the contract states pertaining to the expected standard of care. If the source of the breached
standard of care arises outside of the contract in the rst place, the claimant will also be able to
pursue its negligence claim.
The next step in pursuing a claim is to determine whether or not the engineer acted reasonably
and competently as other engineers would have acted in similar circumstances. This determination
will typically require expert testimony unless the actions or inactions of the engineer are so obviously
negligent that any common layperson would come to the same conclusion. If the engineer acted
55
No
Identify
contract risk:
Engineering
Standard of
Care
A proximate
causal
relationship
exists
between the
designers
actions or
inactions and
the claimants
injury?
Yes
Yes
No
Breach of
standard of
care duty
arises from
the designers
contract?
56
Yes
No
Breach
results
solely in
economic
damages?
No
No
Yes
An express
disclaimer is
enforced by
the court or
the claimant
deviates
from the
design?
No
Yes
* Typically requires expert testimony speaking as to whether
or not a reasonably prudent design professional should
have foreseen the consequences of the acts or omissions
per the foreseeable harm rule
Designer acted
competently*
and reasonably*
as other
designers
would have
acted in the
same
circumstances?
No
No
Affidavit
of merit
required
by the
state**?
Yes
Court
adopts the
economic
loss rule?
Yes
Yes
Affidavit
of merit
filed?
No
Yes
See
Fig. 14
Designer owed a
duty (e.g., as
construction
manager) to the
claimant outside of
its professional
design capacity
(ordinary negligence
can be claimed)?
No
Yes
Figure 13. Engineering Standard of Care Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
No
reasonably and competently, the claim will not be able to proceed. However, if the engineer failed
to conduct itself accordingly, the court may still bar the claim if an express disclaimer exists in the
contract, or the injury resulted from the contractors deviation from the engineers design. If neither of
these exceptions applies, the claim will proceed.
If required, an afdavit of merit must have been led if a negligence claim based on the professional
standard of care expected is to be successful. If the negligence is so obvious that an expert is not
required, however, an afdavit of merit may not be required. If the afdavit of merit is not required,
or it is required and it is obtained and led, the designer will typically be held responsible for the
damages produced by its negligence in acting according to the engineering standard of care. If the
afdavit is required but not led, a claimant will need to establish a separate independent duty of
care apart from the professional duty of care in order to proceed with a claim. If this type of separate
duty can be established, recovery will be governed by Figure 14.
Figure 14 (next page) displays the construction standard of care legal issues and considerations
ow chart. Similar to Figure 13, this ow chart adheres to the general or ordinary negligence rules of
recovery. Again, this ow chart attempts to capture the general attitude that the U.S. judicial system
has assumed.
When a contractor allegedly negligently fails to perform its services according to the standard
normally expected, a claimant must rst prove that the actions or inactions of the contractor
proximately caused the claimants injury. Next, the source of the allegedly breached duty of care must
be determined. If the standard of care duty expected was established in a contract, the claimant will
not be able to recover solely economic losses if the court strictly applies the economic loss rule. If
the damages are physical in addition to economical, the claimant will be able to pursue a claim under
tort law regardless of what the contract states pertaining to the expected standard of care. If the
source of the breached standard of care arises outside of the contract in the rst place, the claimant
will be able to pursue its negligence claim.
The next step in pursuing a claim is to determine whether or not the contractor acted reasonably
and competently as other contractors would have acted in similar circumstances. This determination
will typically require expert testimony unless the actions or inactions of the contractor are so obviously
negligent that any common layperson would come to the same conclusion. If the contractor acted
reasonably and competently, the claim will not be able to proceed. However, if the contractor
failed to conduct itself accordingly, the court may still bar the claim if the defenses of assumption of
risk or contributory negligence apply. If neither of these defenses applies, the claim will proceed and
the contractor will be liable for the negligent fulllment of its construction standard of care.
57
No
Identify
contract risk:
Cont. from
Figure 13
A proximate
causal
relationship
exists
between the
contractors
actions or
inactions and
the claimants
injury?
Yes
Yes
No
Breach of
standard of
care duty
arises from the
contractors
contract?
58
Yes
No
Breach
results
solely in
economic
damages?
Yes
No
Contractor
acted
competently*
and reasonably*
as other
contractor
would have
acted in the
same
circumstances?
Court
adopts the
economic
loss rule?
No
No
Yes
Defenses of
assumption
of risk or
contributory
negligence*
** apply ?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 14. Construction Standard of Care Legal Issues and Considerations Flow Chart
Chapter 4: Conclusions
Inappropriate allocation of risk can result in nancial consequences and ultimately litigation.
Contracting parties may nd themselves blindsided by a courts interpretation and resultant ruling
concerning a contract clause. This implementation resource provides industry participants with
contract language tables that may assist in drafting agreeable clauses that will keep the parties out
of court in the rst place. Further, the legal research laid out in this publication will educate parties
concerning the legal issues and considerations as they are commonly viewed by the U.S. courts.
By examining the seemingly pervasive opinions of the current courts, contracting parties can obtain
a better understanding of how the hot-button risks will be allocated if the project does end up in
litigation.
When trying to establish risk allocation clauses, especially for parties unfamiliar with dealing with
contracts, the contract language itself can often become a confusing obstacle to incorporating such
clauses. Due to this understanding, the team created its contract language tables for each of the 14
hot-button risks researched. These cooperatively constructed tables provide contract language
seemingly favorable to the buyer (e.g., owner) and seller (e.g., contractor), as well as language that
may provide a compromising position between both sides. It is highly recommended that parties
involved with drafting or approving a risk allocation clause review the appropriate contract language
table before signing any documents.
As part of the research teams task to develop a product to aid the construction industry in
contracting to appropriately allocate risk, the team felt the necessity to establish a base from which
to compare risk allocation. Consequently, the base was chosen to be situations where no contractual
allocation of risk was conducted and the resulting court rulings when that risk came to fruition. For
some of the hot-button risks, this analysis was not entirely possible. For example, a no damages for
delay clause and its associated risks of enforceability become non-existent if the clause is removed
from the contract, since owner-caused delays would subsequently result in equitable adjustment.
Therefore, the legal research for these types of risks focused on observing the exceptions courts
have carved out regarding the enforceability of the related contractual clauses.
Legal issues and considerations ow charts were developed for 10 researched construction
risks, each specifying either the allocation of a risk or the recoverability of damages caused by a risk,
given various circumstances and the existence and/or non-existence of contractual clauses. From
these charts, it becomes rather evident that there is far less ambiguity and chance of no damage
relief when appropriately drafted risk allocation clauses are included in the contract between the
owner and contractor.
The research team developed the Two-Party Risk Assessment and Allocation Model with the
intention of the contract language tables and legal research being used as risk allocation tools after
one of the 14 hot-button risks was cooperatively identied as a high concern by the two-party
risk assessment process. However, the research team realizes that not all industry participants will
embrace the model with the rigor that is intended. As a result, some parties may nd it most useful
to utilize the contract language tables and legal research as legal perspective references on risk
allocation apart from the Two-Party Risk Assessment and Allocation Models full application. At the
59
very least, the research team recommends that contracting parties make this publication available
to its employees, especially the next generation, for the purpose of knowledge-transfer and overall
education on the widely misunderstood legal aspects of risk allocation.
Construction will always have risk associated with it, however, careful drafting of construction
contract clauses can allocate risk where it appropriately belongs and therefore eliminate some of the
uncertainty and legal arguing of common law principles if something does go wrong on the project.
With pre-contract meetings and discussions with the use of these CII materials, inappropriately
allocated and unallocated construction risk claims may be signicantly decreased on a variety of
construction projects.
60
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Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984).
Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865 (Ohio 1902).
Holmes, Oliver Wendell. The Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1881. 1.
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articles/constructive_acceleration.html>.
Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462 (1882).
Merriam-Webster, Inc. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 50th anniversary ed. Springeld,
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N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. Prship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
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593, 685, 688.
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United States v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 447 (S.C. 1997).
Wallace, Brian D. Is the AIAs Mutual Waiver of Consequential Damages Really Mutual?
Faireld and Woods, P.C. (1998). 6/20/05 <www.fwlaw.com/aia.html>.
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