Johns Hopkins University Press

The Monstrosity of Translation

Author(s): Carol Jacobs
Source: MLN, Vol. 90, No. 6, Comparative Literature: Translation: Theory and Practice (Dec., 1975
), pp. 755-766
Published by: Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2907018
Accessed: 08-10-2015 15:19 UTC

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755

TI7HE
O MONSTROSITY

TION

OF TRANSLABY CAROL JACOBS O

Darin bestehtdas eigentliche

Kunstgeheimnisdes Meisters,dass
er den Stoffdurch die Form vertilgt.
Schiller,cited by Benjamin in
"Zwei Gedichte von Friedrich
Hblderlin"
In 1923, when Walter Benjamin published his translationsof
Baudelaire's "Tableaux parisiens,"he prefaced them witha short
essay entitled"Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers."1Was thisintended to
unfold for us the nature of the difficulttask thatclaimed so many
yearsof Benjamin's life?Does it signifyan unprecedentedconsideration forthe understandingof his readers-for those to whom the
reading of lyricpoetrywould present difficulties?No less than the
introductorypoem of Baudelaire's "The Flowers of Evil," ("Au
lecteur"),the opening lines of Benjamin's essay close the gates abruptlyon such illusions of brotherlyconcern. "The poem to the
reader closes with the apostrophe: 'Hypocritical reader,-my
likeness,-my brother!'The situationturnsout to be more productiveif one re-formulatesit and says: [Benjamin] . .. has writtenan
[essay] . ..that, from the beginning, had littleexpectation of an
immediate public success" (from "Uber einige Motive bei
Baudelaire," 1.2:6072). "Nowhere does consideration for the perceiverwithrespectto a workof art or an art formprove fruitfulfor
their understanding .... For no poem is intended (gilt) for the
1 Translated as "The Task of the Translator," in Walter Benjamin,
Illuminations
(New York: Schocken, 1969). Harry Zohn's lucid translationshave made a decidely
meaningfulcontributionto the understandingof Benjamin by an English-speaking
audience. The criticismthatappears here and therein mytextshould be recognized
more as a play between possible versionsthan as a claim to establisha more "correct"
translation.
2 All citations,
unless otherwisenoted,are fromWalterBenjamin,Gesammelte
Schriften (Frankfurta.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 197-2).Referencesare made withthe volume
number(in roman numerals)followedby the part of thatvolume (in arabic numerals),
a colon, and the page number. The translations,such as they are, are my own.

MLN 90 755-766 (1975)

Copyright? 1975 by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress
All rightsof reproductionin any formreserved.

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M L N

reader, no image forthe beholder, no symphonyforthe audience"

(IV. 1:9).
What Benjamin's essay performs (and in this it is exemplary
among his works) is an act of translation. It is to begin with a
translationof "translation,"whichthen rapidlydemands an equally
violenttranslationof everytermpromisingthe keyto itsdefinition.
"Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers" dislocates definitionsrather than
establishingthembecause, itselfan uncannytranslationof sorts,its
concern is not the readers' comprehension nor is its essence communication.
Is a translationintended (gilt)forthe readers who do not understand the original?.... What does a piece of writing"say"?What
does it communicate?Very littleto him who understandsit. The
essentialis not communication,not assertion.... If it [thetranslation] were.aimed at the reader, the original would have to be
also. If the originaldoes not existforhim,how could the translation be understood in this respect.
(IV.1:9)
If one by one once familiar words become incomprehensibly
foreign, if they relentlesslyturn on their traditional ("althergebrachte,""herkdmmliche")
meanings,if the essay systematically
roots
itselfin thattraditiononlyto shiftthe veryground it standson, this,
afterall, is the way in which translationfunctions.For Benjamin,
translationdoes not transforma foreignlanguage into one we may
call our own, but ratherrenders radicallyforeignthatlanguage we
believe to be ours. Benjamin cites Rudolf Pannwitz:
Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a false
grounding: they wish to germanize Hindi, Greek, and English
instead of hindicizing,grecizingand anglicizingGerman. They
have a much more significantrespect for their own linguistic
usage than forthe spiritof the foreignwork... the fundamental
errorof thetranslatoris thathe holds fastto theincidentalstateof
his own language instead of lettingit be violentlymoved by the
foreign.
(IV. 1:20)
This invasion of the foreign is perhaps merely prescriptivefor
othertranslations,forthe initialattackon his audience immediately
gives way to a more amicable rhetoricof life, kinship,harmony,
fidelity,religion,and nature. As in Baudelaire, where the wounds
inflictedby "Au lecteur" are soon to be soothed by the balm of

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"Correspondances,"' so in Benjamin's essay,it would seem we find

ourselves again on native soil.
In the metaphoricalclimatethatnow sets in, translationsseem to
blossom forthfrom the original as a continuationof that former
"life"4-as a "transplant,"a "ripening,"a germinationof theoriginal
"seed." But forall thisapparentlyabundant flourishing,at no point
does translationrelateorganicallyto thetextthatprecedes it.On this
point Benjamin is as ironical as he is deceptive. The "Entfaltung"
(unfolding5IV. 1:1 1) thatthe lifeof the originalachieves in translation never quite brings its seeds to flower.Translation denies the
linear law of nature in order to practicethe rule of textuality.If the
rootand
original"cannotreach . .. [therealmof linguisticfulfillment]
branch"(mitStumpfand Stiel, italics mine, IV. 1:15), this figure of
speech, metaphoricalforcompletionin both German and English,
must also be taken in its "fullyunmetaphorical reality"(IV. 1:11).
Nowhere in the essay does translationdevelop beyond the germ
("keimhaft"IV. 1:12), the kernel ("Kern" IV. 1:15), the seed ("Samen" IV.1:17).
More precisely,thisessentialkernelis definableas thatin translation which, in its turn is untranslatable.... Unlike the poetic
word of the original,itis not translatablebecause the relationship
of contentto language is completelydifferentin the originaland
the translation.If language and contentconstitutea certainunity
in the original, like fruitand rind, the language of translation
envelops itscontentsin vastfoldslikean emperor'srobes. For this
language signifiesa loftierlanguage than its own and therefore
3 Benjamin's essay could well be read as an ironicalcommentaryon the traditional
reading of "Correspondances" (see "Ober einige Motive bei Baudelaire," 1.2:63848, where Benjamin reinterpretsthe "correspondances"as a temporaldisplacement
bound to the "essentiallydistant,"the "inapproachability"of the cult image. For a
general discussion of the concept of symboliclanguage which the Baudelaire piece
poses, see Paul de Man, "The Rhetoricof Temporality,"in Interpretation:
Theoryand
Practice(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969) as well as Walter Benjamin,
Ursprungdes deutschen
Trauerspiels1.1:336-7 and 342.
4 The connectionbetween original and translation"may be called a natural one,"
Benjamin writes,"more preciselya connection of life," ("ein Zusammenhang des
Lebens,"IV. :10). To make his meaningdear, he repeatsthe syllables"Leben" sixteen
timesin the course of the paragraph, and midwaythroughclears it of its traditional
meaning. The "life" to which translationsare bound is itselfwoven into textual
history."The sphere of life must ultimatelybe fixed in history,not in nature ....
Thus the task arises for the philosopherto understandall natural life throughthe
more encompassinglifeof history"(IV. 1:11).
5 Harry Zohn translates"Entfaltung"as "flowering"-and understandablyso, for
thisextensionof the metaphoricalweb is a naturalone. It is not,however,Benjamin's.

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remainsnon-adequate, violentand foreignwithrespectto itsown

content.
(IV. 1: 15)
The natural metaphors for translation produce the opposite of
organic fruition.The "Nachreife" (IV. 1:12 and 13) hardly completes the maturingprocess of the original,but ratherwithersthe
fruitof meaning. The "unfolding" of the original paradoxically
resultsin a proliferationof abundant foldsthatviolentlycamouflage
the content while maintainingit as non-adequate otherness. No
furthergermination is possible: "This brokenness prevents any
[further]translation,and at the same time makes it superfluous"
(IV. 1: 15).
The Ver-pflanzung(transplant,IV. 1: 15) of the originalbespeaks
far less the continued life of the plant than a displacement of its
ground.
This problemof ripeningtheseed of pure language in translation
seems neverto be solvable,to be definablein no solution.For isn't
the ground pulled out fromunder such a language ifthe restitution of meaning [Sinnes] ceases to be decisive? And indeed nothingelse-to turn the phrase negatively-is the significanceof
all the foregoing.
(IV. 1:17)
Withthisnegativeturnof the phrase, Benjamin definestranslation
as undefinable. The unfixable task of translationis to purifythe
original of meaning: only poor translations seek to restore it
(IV. 1:9). This is why translationsare themselves untranslatable.
"Translations on the other hand show themselves to be untranslatable-not because of the heaviness, but because of the all
too fleeting manner in which meaning [Sinn] attaches to them"
(IV. 1:20).
The relation between translationand original then, although
"seeminglytangible,"is alwayson the verge of eluding understanding (IV. 1: I 1). And eluding of understanding(Erkenntnis)
is precisely
what translationperforms(darstellt).Benjamin insistson the verb
"darstellen,"as opposed to "herstellen"or "offenbaren"(IV. 1:12),
fortranslationneitherpresentsnor revealsa contents.6It toucheson
6Translation is then ultimatelyexpedient for the expression of the innermostrelation of
languages to one another. It cannot possibly reveal [offenbaren]this hidden realtionship
itself,cannot possiblyestablishit [herstellen],but can performit [darstellen]bya germinating
or intensiverealization.
(IV.1:12)

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the meaning of the original only by way of markingits independence, its freedom-literally-to go off on a tangent: the point it
chooses remains irrelevant.
What meaning [Sinn] remains of significancein the relationbetweentranslationand originalcan be grasped in a simile.Justas a
tangenttouches the circle fleetinglyand only at one point, and
just as it is the touchingand not the particularpoint thatdictates
the law according to which it takes off on its straighttrajectory
furtherinto infinity,
so translationtouches the originalfleetingly
and only at an infinitelysmall point of meaning in order to ...
followits own trajectory.
(IV.1:19-20)
Certainly,it is its own trajectorythat "Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers" followswhen touchingon such termsas fidelity,literality,
and
kinship.These it translatesfroma familiarGerman to another that
hardlyseems germane. But that,afterall, is the point. Nowhere is
thisunfamiliarity
more intenselysensed thanwhen theessayturnsto
the familialrelationsbetween languages. The "kinship" Benjamin
setsout to describegathersmuch of itsstrangenessfromthe discrepancy between his mode of defining and his ultimateintentionof
definition.If we are made at all familiarwiththenotionof kinship,it
is by learningwhat kinshipis not. Kinship between languages is not
similarity
(IV. 1: 12 and 13) nor can it guarantee the preservation,in
translation,of the original's form and sense. Benjamin touches
fleetinglyhere on a point of epistemologicalconcern.
In order to grasp the genuine relation between original and
translation,we must set up a deliberationwhose design is completelyanalogous to the train of thoughtin which a critique of
cognition demonstrates the impossibilityof a mimetictheory.
If it is
[And tangentially
theimpossibility
of traditionalepistemology.]
shown here thattherecould be no objectivityin knowledge-not
even a claim to it-if itconsistedin duplicationof the real, then it
can be proven here that no translationwould be possible if it
strovewithits total being for similaritywith the original.
(IV. 1: 12)
This explains why kinship may only be defined negatively.The
on what basis
kinshipbetween languages generatestheirdifference:
could translationclaim to duplicate the original if no language,
however original, in turn guarantees the objective realityof that
which it names?

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For all this insistenceon kinship as differentiation,

kinship sets
fortha certainsameness as well. The elusive nature of thissameness
presentsparticulardifficultiesto the English translator.In the long
passage that speaks of this sameness, Harry Zohn remains far less
"true" to the original,farless "literal"than the textdemands. This is
because he maintains a significantrespect for his own linguistic
usage, and, traditionally,thatis to his credit.Understandablythen,
his translationresultsin phrases such as "the same thing,""the same
object," where the German speaks neitherof objects nor things.In
an admittedlygermanized English, the passage would read as follows:
[A]ll suprahistoricalkinshipof languages restsin the factthatin
every one of them as a whole .. . one and the same is meant
[gemeint],which,however,is not reachable by any one of them,
but only by the totality of their mutually supplementing
intentions-pure language. While, namely, all individual elements of foreign languages-the words, sentences, contextsexclude one another,theselanguages supplementone anotherin
theirintentions.To grasp thislaw, one of the fundamentallaws of
what is meant [das
the philosophyof language, is to differentiate
fromthe mannerof meaning[dieArtdesMeinens]in the
Gemeinte]
intention.In "Brot" and "pain" whatis meant is indeed the same,
the manner of meaning it,on the otherhand, is not..... While in
thiswaythe mannerof meaningin thesetwowordsis in conflict,it
supplements itselfin both languages from which they are derived. The manner of meaning in them supplements itselfinto
what is meant. In the individual, unsupplemented languages,
what is meant is never found in relative independence, as in
individual words or sentences; ratherit is grasped in a constant
stateof change untilitis able to step forwardfromtheharmonyof
all those manners of meaning as pure language.
(IV. 1: 13-14)
What is meantin "Brot" and "pain" is "the same," but thisis not to
say thattheymean the same thing.The same thatis meant is "pure
language." Benjamin statesthisquite literallyat the beginningand
end of the passage, but a hunger forsubstancecould wellallow us to
forget it. What is meant by "pure language"? Certainly not the
materializationof truthin the formof a supreme language. Benjaminsetsthistemptationaside witha passage fromthe"Crise de vers"
(IV. 1:17). He displaces his own text with the foreignnessof Mal-

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larme's in which the latterinsistson the insurmountabledisparity

between languages. The "pure languge" of the lengthycitation
above does not signifythe apotheosis of an ultimatelanguage but
signifiesrather that which is purely language-nothing but language. "What is meant" is never somethingto be found independentlyof language nor even independentlyin language, in a single
word or phrase,but arises ratherfromthe mutual differentiation
of
the various manners of meaning. There isn'tquite so much difference as one mightsuspect then,between"kinship"as sameness and
"kinship"definedas differentiation,
foreach generatestheother,in
language, indefinitely.
In a sense, one could argue, the kinship of language as here
defined saysnothingafterall. If so, the translationof Benjamin has
been rendered with the great fidelitythe essay requires. For the
translator'stask of "fidelity"(Treue) calls foran emancipation from
all sense of communication(IV. 1: 19), a regainingof pure language.
The "one and the same" which is meant in pure language means
nothing.
[T]o winback pure language formedin the fluxof language is the
violent and single power of translation.In this pure language,
which no longer means anythingand no longer expresses anything,which,as expressionlessand productiveword,is thatwhich
is meant in all languages, all communication,all meaning and all
intentionultimatelymeet with a stratumin which they are destined to extinction.
(IV. 1: 19)
This productive word which renders meaning extinctis that of
literality(Wortlichkeit).
In the textof translation,the word replaces
sentenceand propositionas the fundamentalelement (IV. 1:18). A
teratogenesisinsteadof conventional,natural,re-productionresults
in which the limbs of the progeny are dismembered, all syntax
dismantled.
Literalitythoroughlyoverthrowsall reproduction of meaning
withregard to the syntaxand threatensdirectlyto lead to incomprehensibility.In the eyes of the nineteenthcentury,Hdlderlin's
translationsof Sophocles were monstrousexamples of such literality.... [T]he demand forliteralityis no offspringof an interst
in maintainingmeaning.
(IV. 1: 17-18)

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The demand is Benjamin's, forit is thismonstrosity

thathe praises
above all as the most perfectof all translations.7
This exaction of literality,the passage continues, must not be
understood as an interestin meaning, but "aus triftigerenZusammenhangen" (IV. 1:18). Must it be understood then "in a more
meaningfulcontext"as Zohn's translationinsists(p. 78, op. cit.)?Or
is the con-textuality
of originaland translationsuch thatthisphrase
too must be taken literally.The linkingtogetherof the two would
then be "triftig"in itsetymologicalsense-from treffen-asstriking,
fragmentary.This is certainlythe point if not the tone of the simile
that follows.
Justas fragmentsof a vessel,in order to be articulatedtogether,
must followone another in the smallestdetail but need not resemble one another, so, instead of making itselfsimilar to the
meaning [Sinn] of the original,the translationmust rather,lovinglyand in detail, in its own language, formitselfaccording to
the manner of meaning[ArtdesMeinens]of the original,to make
bothrecognizableas thebrokenpartof a greaterlanguage,just as
fragmentsare the broken part of a vessel.
(IV. 1: 18)
In this,itsliteraltranslation,8the passage leaves thingsincomplete.
With thejoining togetherof translationand original,language remains a Bruchstick.Such is the mode of Benjamin's articulation
despite itsapparent referenceto organic growth,kinship,sameness,
fidelity.And it is afterall also the vision of the "angel of history"in
7 Hblderlin's translationsare touched upon at three other pointsin the essay-and
always spoken of as exemplary.
Here as in everyother essential regard, Holderlin's translations,especiallythose of the two
Sophoclean tragedies,presentthemselvesas a confirmation.
The harmonyof the languages
is so deep in them,thatthe meaning [Sinn] is touched by thelanguage onlyas an aeolian harp
is touched by the wind. Holderlin'stranslations
are originaryimages [Urbilder]of theirform:
they relate themselveseven to the most perfecttranslationsof their textsas the originaryimage to the example

....

(IV.1:20-21)

Zohn's translationis perhaps more logical, certainlymore optimistic,but doesn't

quite form itselfin detail according to the strange mode of Benjamin's meaning.
8

In thesame waya translation,insteadof resemblingthemeaningoftheoriginal,mustlovingly

and in detail incorporatethe original'smode of signification,thus makingboth the original
and the translationrecognizableas fragmentsof a greaterlanguagejust as fragmentsare part
of a vessel. (Zohn, op. cit, p. 78)

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the "Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen" (part IX)9 and that -of

Baroque allegory in Ursprungdes deutschen
Trauerspiels("Allegorie
und Trauerspiel").
Perhaps this helps account for the involuted formulationtranslationmustawaken fromits own language the original'secho,
This is not to say that translationechoes the original. Translation
relatesto theoriginalas to pure language-in a waythattheoriginal,
so laden withits apparent content,is rarelydeemed to function.
In this lies a characteristicof translationtotallydifferentfrom
that of poetic works, since the intentionof the latter is never
towards language as such, its totality,but rather solely and directlytowardsdefinitivelinguisticcoherences of content.Translation,however,does not viewitselfas does poetryas in the inner
forest of language, but rather as outside it, opposite it, and,
withoutentering,it calls into the original,into that single place
where,in each case, theecho is able to givein itsown language the
resonance of a work in a foreigntongue.
(IV.1:16)
To locate the source of these reverberationsis not an easy matter.
Though, logically,the originalshould originatethe call, Benjamin's
formulationleaves this task to translation.
9 Gershom Scholem, in writingabout this text,relates the figureof the angel of
historyto the Tikkunof the Lurianic Kabbalah.
Yetatthesametime,Benjaminhasinmindthekabbalistic
conceptoftheTikkun,
themessianic
restoration
and mendingwhichpatchestogether
and restorestheoginalBeingof things,
shattered
andcorrupted
inthe"Breaking
ofVessels,"
andalso[theoriginal
Beingof]history.
("Walter
BenjaminundseinEngel,"inZurAktualitat
WalterBenjamins
[Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,
1972],pp. 132-33.)
If Scholem recognizesthe failureof the angel of historyto carryout this task,he
neverthelesssees evidence of this redemption elsewhere in Benjamin (ibid, pp.
133-34).
Scholem mighthave turnedto "Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers,"where the image of
the broken vessel plays a more direct role. Harry Zohn's (mis)translationof this
passage (cited in footnote8) along withBenjamin's carefullyarticulatedmessianic
rhetoricseem to speak here of the successfulrealizationof the Tikkun.Yet whereas
Zohn suggeststhata totalityof fragmentsare broughttogether,Benjamin insiststhat
the finaloutcome of translationis still"a brokenpart."In the Lurianic doctrine,then,
translationwould never progressbeyond the stage of the Shevirath
Ha-Kelim.(For a
descriptionof this"Breaking of Vessels" as Benjamin knewit,see GershomScholem,
Major TrendsinJewishMysticism
[New York: Schocken, 1973].) In the closingpassage
of "Die Aufgabe des Tbersetzers,"the messianicvalorizationof the holy scriptures
ironicallyservesto usher in the fundamentalfragmentationwhichinterlineartranslation performs.

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There is an unmistakableecho here of a German sayingthatboth

amplifies and clarifiesthe predicament: "Wie man in den Wald
hineinruft,so schallt'sheraus."'" Translation'scall into the forestof
language is not a repetitionof the originalbut the awakeningof an
echo of itself.This signifiesits disregard for coherence of content,
forthe sound thatreturnsis itsown tongue become foreign.Justas
thevase of translationbuiltunlikefragmenton unlikefragmentonly
to achieve a final fragmentation,so the echo of translationelicits
onlyfragmentsof language, distortedintoa disquietingforeignness.
But who pieces thevase together?Who sounds the echo? Whichis
to say,who writesthe textof translation?Or are thesequestionsthat
necessarilylose theirmeaningin thecontextof the essay.By now itis
evident that when Benjamin speaks of "translation,"he does not
mean translation,for it has never ceased to aquire other, foreign,
meanings. One is tempted to read "translation"as a metaphor for
to offerthe answer that the criticwritestranslations.How
criticism,
else to explain the following:
Translation transplantsthereforethe originalinto a more-in so
far as ironically-conclusive language realm, since it cannot be
displaced from it through furthertranslation .... The word
"ironically"does not recall thoughtsof the romanticsin vain.
They above others possessed insight into the life of works of
whichtranslationis thehighesttestimony.To be sure theydid not
recognize translationas such,but turned theirentireattentionto
criticism ....

(IV. 1: 15)

Translation may indeed be metaphoricalforcriticism,but the critical textis inexorablybound to a certainirony.That ironydislocates
the syntaxof Benjamin's phrase as well as the tentativesolution to
thequestion "who writes,"in whichour own criticaldistancewas not
ironical enough.
"Translatability,"whichwe mightalso call the criticaltextwithin,
is a potentialof the work itself.
Translatabilitybelongs to certainworksessentially-which is not
to say thattheirtranslationis essentialto them,but ratherthata
certain significancedwellingwithinthe originalsexpresses itself
in theirtranslatability.
(IV.1:1O)
10"As one calls into the forest,so it willresound."

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This, then, is the text-nessof the text or a criticismwithoutcritic.

From the very beginning, the essay dismisses the necessityof a
translatorfor translation.
[C]ertain relational concepts maintain their good, perhaps best
sense, when theyare not a prioriexclusivelyreferredto man. In
thiswayone mightspeak of an unforgettable
lifeor momenteven
if all men had forgottenit. When, namely,its essence demands
not to be forgotten,then thatpredicate would not correspond to
somethingfalse,but ratherto a demand which does not correspond to man, and would at the same timeinclude a referenceto a
realm to which it does correspond-to a remembrance of God.
(IV.1:1o)
The translatability
of the textexcludes the realm of man and with
him the translator,the figureto whichBenjamin's essay is devoted.
The "Aufgabe"of thetranslatoris less his taskthanhissurrender:he
is "aufgegeben," given up, abandoned. This is its initialirony.
Yet no sooner is the figure of man abandoned, than another
appears to offeritself.At the beginningand the end Benjamin turns
to therealmof religionwhichseems to redeem thismonstrousloss (if
also, in a sense, to cause it). This is the way, in the essay's closing
paragraph, he writesof Holderlin's translations-the most perfect
of their kind. The overwhelmingdanger theycreate may only be
contained by the holy script.
[B]ecause of this there lives in them [Holderlin's translations]
above all the monstrousand originarydanger of all translationthatthe gates of a language so expanded and controlledmay fall
shut and enclose the translatorin silence .... In [these translations] ... meaning plunges fromabyss to abyss untilit threatens
to lose itselfin the bottomlessdepths of language. But thereis a
halt [Halten]. However, no text guarantees it but the holy text
(IV.1:21)
What is itexactlythatthe holyscripturevouchsafes?Is itreallya halt
to the precipitous loss of meaning or must we translate"Halten"
ratheras a holding and retainingof thatloss. For in the holy scriptures meaning no longer separates language and revelation.The
holytextis totallyliteral,in Benjamin's sense of theword,whichis to
say, because no meaning stands behind its language, because language and revelationcoincide absolutely,itis as absolutelymeaningless as an original may be.

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However, no textguarantees it but the holytext,in whichmeaning has ceased to be a watershedforthe flowof language and the
flow of revelation.Where a text belongs to a truthor doctrine
immediately,withoutthe mediation ofmeaning,in its literalness
of true language-that text is absolutelytranslatable.... Such
boundless trustwithrespect to it is demanded fromthe translation thatjust as in this [holy text] language and revelation are
united withouttension,so in the translation,literalityand freedom mustjoin in the formof the interlinearversion.For to some
degree, all great writings,but above all the holy scriptures,contain theirvirtualtranslationbetween the lines.
(IV.1:21)
And what of Benjamin's "between the lines,"for fromthe beginning,we recognized thisessay as a translationof sorts.Between the
lines of German, he has slipped in a phrase fromthe originalof the
) yog(IV. 1: 18). These are the opening words
holywrit:Eva&Q~Xjr6v
of The GospelaccordingtoJohn,and the text to which Benjamin's
clearlyreferswhenitspeaks of the holyscriptures."Die Aufgabe des
Obersetzers"servesas a translationforthe followinglines whichare
given below in an interlinear,literal,translationfromLuther's version of the text.
1. Im
Anfang war das Wort, und das Wort war bei Gott
1. In the beginning was the word, and the word was withGod
und Gott war das Wort.
and God was the word.
bei Gott.
war im Anfgang
2. Dasselbige
2. The same (the word) was in the beginning withGod.
3. Alle Dinge sind durch dasselbige gemacht und ohne
and without
3. All thingsare through the same made
gemacht ist.
dasselbige ist nichts gemacht,was
is.
which made
the same is nothing made
This is the final irony.
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity

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