Luke K - Michigan7 2014

**luke kritik**
Emma Ha
Tony Hackett
Jessica Jiang
Sanat Mohapatra
Spencer Roetlin
1nc
The affirmative generates systems of geo-power through its
tendencies of control and regulation that reduces populations and
environments to bare life
King 6 Ynestra King has been an activist, teacher and writer since the 1970s. She is an ecofeminist theorist, and a founder of
Women and Life on Earth and the feminist anti-militarist movement, as well as the Committee on Women, Population and
Environment. She is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Barnard Center for Research on Women. (7/22/2006, Ynestra, Committee
on Women, Population, and the Environment, Managerial Environmentalism, Population Control and the New National Insecurity:
Towards a Feminist Critique, http://www.cwpe.org/node/135 // SM)
Tim Luke, writing in
Cultural Critique (Fall 1995) goes even further to suggest that a new meta-managerial perspective
and policy elite are emerging under the banner of environmentalism. He argues that: an environmental act , in turn, is
already a disciplining move, aimed at constructing some expanse of space -- a locale, a biome, a
planet as a biospherical or on the other hand, some city, any region, the global economy in technospherical
territory-- in a discursive envelope. Within these enclosures, environmental expertise can arm
environmentalists who stand watch over these surroundings, guarding the rings that include or
exclude forces, agents, and ideas. (p.65) Living worlds, or ecosystems and their human inhabitants
become: ...sites of supervision, where environmentalists see from above and from without through
the enveloping designs of administratively delimited systems. Encircled by enclosures of alarm,
environments can be disassembled, recombined, and subjected to the disciplinary designs of
expert management. Enveloped in these interpretive frames, environments can be redirected to
fulfill the ends of other economic scripts, managerial directives, and administrative writs.
Environing, then, engenders "environmentality", which embeds instrumental rationalities in the
policing of ecological spaces. (p.65) By focusing on the leading think-tank of environmentality, the
US based Worldwatch Institute, Luke suggests that "discourses of nature, ecology, or the
environment, as disciplinary articulations of "eco-knowledge", might be interpreted as efforts to
generate systems of "geo-power" over, but also within and through, nature for the governance of
modern economies and societies. 1 Here the "facts of life" as delivered and mediated by the
Worldwatch Institute pass into "fields of control for eco-knowledge and spheres of intervention
for "geo-power"." (p.67). He develops his analysis of environmentality as an extension of governmentality, which applies
techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management. "As ecological limits to growth are
discovered or defined, states are forced to guarantee their populations' fecundity and
productivity in the total setting of the global political economy by becoming "environmental
protection agencies." (p. 69). Governmentality reemerges as environmentality, re-establishing and
enforcing "the right disposition of things." Resource managerialism is the eco-knowledge of
modern governmentality, in which national security and national interests are "greened" in
which the natural bounty of the planet is continually monitored and watched over by the new
technologies of oversight. To construct the managerial problem in the fashion of environmentalism, nature must be
redefined by the eco-knowledge of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for the use
and exploitation of particular human beings. Being "an environmentalist" provides the grounds
for draping a bioeconomic spreadsheet over Nature while "hovering over the world in a
scientifically centered surveillance machine"-- a green panopticom. International
environmentalism is watching everything and everyone, measuring and evaluating among other
things, the fertility of women, who can be reduced to "populations" for the purpose of analysis. The
disciplining of nature, misrepresented as maintaining national security, involves
the subdivision of nature into environs, the reduction of human beings to
populations, and the construction of a geo-global political structure to manage it
all.
Ecogovernance turns exploitation into the organizing principle of

social life that ends in genocide of both populations and
environments
Olivier 99 (Lawrence, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Quebec, The Construction of Environmental Awareness, Discourses of the Environment, pp.
71-72, arh)
Thus, we see that the environmentalist discourse was born with the blossoming of legislation in
a wide range of fields that have a direct or indirect effect on the life of individuals. This discourse
is rooted in the aspiration for a better quality of life, better health, better control over the
immediate environment - in short, over any phenomena that influence on our-well being . On the
other hand, the aspiration for quasitotal control over matter, pushed to an extreme, leads
individuals to create the death culture so justly condemned by environmentalists. The death culture
represents a discourse that was strongly criticized-by a number of groups and scientific disciplines. It appears in the
imperialist political will, where oppression and exploitation, assimilation and cultural genocide,
of subjected people, constitute the golden rule of the powerful colonizing ruler. But more than
control over a territory, its subsoil of its wealth, it is a form of cannibalism of
values and works of art that devours a culture with all its original creations (Moscovici
1993: 19). The death culture can therefore be understood in terms of what some environmentalists
call genocide and, transported to the environmental scale, ecocide (ibid. 20), as a mode of
governmentality in which exploitation is the organizing principle of social life. Ecocide, decried
by environmentalists, is reflected in an absence of respect for the environment, through the
pollution of air and water and the destruction of entire forests stemming form a fetishization of
concrete. Ecocide is the mutation of the environment by genetic manipulation and
cloning, by the nuclear experiment and its production of radioactive waste. Many
environmentalists claim that it is the rule of market aesthetics (of ugliness), of
waste and of stench.
Neither corporate managerialism nor traditional environmental

activism has any hope of securing lasting change in contemporary
environmental debates literally the ONLY hope for change is a
representational strategy like ours.
Luke 3 (Timothy W. Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, June-July 2003, Alternatives, p. 413-14, arh)
These new modes of existence present us with an opportunity. A world where one
asks, What are world politics? and then funda mentally doubts all the answers
about what the political world is taken to be gives both individuals and groups the
opportunity to transform their spaces for effective action. Those who dominate the
world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is
known. Unless they also face resistance, question ing, and challenge from those
who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces . Looked at by itself,
the neat division of the world into the realms of international relations and
environmental affairs remains somewhat colorless. Such terms continuously
remediate our most common modes of interpretation , as they now prevail in the world. Indeed,
this language spins particular wordsglobalization, sustainability, development
into either important choke points or major rights-of-way in the flows of political
discourse. The connections between international relations and the environment assume considerable importance in the
2000s because much of the worlds ecology has deteriorated so rapidly during the past ten, thirty, or fifty years. This
omnipolitanizing deterioration, in fact, has spread so quickly that neither green

fundamentalist preservationism nor corporate capitalist conservationism can do
much to solve the pressing ecological problems of the present . Now, after the industrial
revolution, nowhere in the world holds out against machines; high technology is
everywhere. After two world wars, few places anywhere in the world hold onto traditional formulas of authority; liberal
democracy is spreading everywhere. After the Cold War, nowhere seriously holds forth as a real alternative to the market; corporate
capitalism is everywhere. So only
a truly critical approach to international relations and the

environment can unravel why these forces interact, and maybe correct how they
create ecological destruction. Improving the understanding of international
relations as a scholarly discipline is one possible response to this new context. Strangely enough, the
dysfunction of markets and states is a key constituent component of the contemporary world systems environmental crisis.
links
link aesthetics
Their focus on aesthetic representations becomes a regulatory
discourse that determines how nature should be constructed and
experienced
Luke 97 (Timothy W. Luke Ph.D., Washington University, St. Louis, Political Science, University Distinguished Professor
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized
Consumerism?, presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association (3/18/1997-3/22/1997),
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.htm // JJ)
Here, one finds what is the essence of the Sierra Club as a environmental organization today. While the World Wildlife Fund or
Nature Conservancy have devoted many of their energies to the cultivation of "charismatic megafauna," like tigers, whales, or rhinos,
to preserve Nature, the
Sierra Club has identified special environmental sites, like the Grand Canyon,
Yosemite, California Redwood forests, as "mediagenic ecotopes" to be projected as endangered
nature to the nation's consumers and voters. Despite its newfound engagements at protecting wilderness across the
United States, the most enduring commitment of the Sierra Club seems to be this unending devotion
to protecting Nature from being reduced to "agro-industrial resources" by transforming it
through vivid image-riven projections into "scenic resources," which, in turn, need to be
explored and enjoyed in those special ways that the Sierra Club renders accessible. "Of all
modes of representation," as Shapiro asserts, photography clearly is the one "most easily
assimilated into the discourses of knowledge and truth, for it is thought to be an
unmediated simulacrum, a copy of what we consider 'real' ."106 Few ideological formations have
exploited this property in photography as expertly as the green gaze of the contemporary Sierra Club in its coffeetable books, wildlife
calendars, magazine photolayouts, or direct mail. Indeed, the
Sierra Club's own celebration of Nature through

spectacular nature photography is particularly problematic. On one level, there is no denying many
of these images are striking evocations or breathtaking clarity. Hoping to see such sights in
person and up close moves many to aid in the protection of Nature. Yet, on another level,
nothing in Nature is ever is this perfect, and many of these images are highly manufactured . That
is, the Sierra Club's "spectacular nature photography" is more accurately a system of
fabricating "photographic nature spectacles." Finding "mediagenic ecotopes," in some
ways, requires the Sierra Club to continually engage in "ecotopian mediagenesis." Nature is
continually reinvented through light and shadow manipulations, or color and contrast
machinations; it is how and where a Sierra Club vision of the good life and paradise brings into
life a perfected set of images, symbols, and signs to stir up interest, devotion and loyalty. The
modern Sierra Club, as it forced its way onto the national stage, has generated a popular sense of greater Nature accessibility
through mass-run photography-and-prose print products. This strategy began in 1960 with This is the American Earth by Ansel
Adams and Nancy Newcall, which were followed quickly by Cedric Wright's Words of the Earth, Ansel Adams These We Inherit: The
Parklands of America, Eliot Porter's "In Wildness Is the Preservation of the World" (a match of Thoreau with Nature photography),
and Richard Kauffman's Gentle Wildness: The Sierra Nevada (a mix of Muir's writings with color shots of the Sierras). Brower saw
how effective these media were as mechanisms for propagating the green gaze of the Sierra Club among the powerful and/or
influential: When you have photographers like Ansel Adams and Eliot Porter, and writers like Wallace Stegner, Loren Eiseley,
Nancy Newhill, and Rachel Carson appearing an organization's magazine and publishing books under the environmental banner, the
high ground is easily captured. Those special books won many of our battles for us, sitting there on the coffee tables until people of
great power looked into them and began to understand.107 Without such supreme visions of Nature, its benefits often are
overlooked; yet, with the green gaze of Sierra Club photography, and in spite of its many problems, this new way of seeing Nature
through ecotopian mediagenesis became popularized as a potent power/knowledge formation. The
photographic
reimagination of Nature, in fact, is one of the Sierra Club's most potent consummational
weapons. Since the 1950s and 1960s, when its first photographic books were used to show why conservation now is so vital by
presenting perfect images of what might be lost to hydroelectric dam building, clearcutting loggers, or ski resort developers, the
Sierra Club uses high-quality photography for many purposes: constructing pristine images of Nature, mobilizing political support,
affirming organizational values, guiding outdoorsmanistic practices, popularizing outing destinations, defending environmental
sites. One of the well-meaning Sierra Club member's prime directives is centered on the fusion of nature outing with nature
photography: "leave nothing but footprints, take nothing but pictures." The
Sierra Club green gaze looks through
camera viewfinders, which finds views of Nature as "great pictures." Getting outside by foot,
horseback or canoe to be somewhere worthy in the green gaze of being photographed
constitutes, in many ways, the essence of Sierra Club membership as members work to preserve
places that can still be recognized as being as natural, wild or pristine as various Sierra
photographers have composed them. Photography also permits Nature's often very unscenic raw
stuff to be represented with the right lighting and camera angles as "scenic resources." The
Sierra Club's real ideological task , therefore, has been reconstructing the manifold
appearances of real Nature as very unscenic stuff to conform to its particular
fetishization of green signs and symbols as hyperreal "scenic resources." Nature
cannot simply exist as such; it must be constructed, distributed, and stabilized to fit
those categories of pristine spectacularity which Sierra Club has chosen to assign to the
great outdoors. The Sierra Club has resisted the raw consumptive industrialization of Nature in
order to advance its more sophisticated informationalization of Nature as scenic
consummational images. Instead of being a storehouse of materials, it becomes a terminal
destination with aesthetic values and symbolic worth, because its "renewing resources" provide
an entertainment site, a communications resource, an informational utility. These applications can
unfold alongside the industrial economy; indeed, an informational sector needs material inputs and outputs from its engines of
growth to function. Nonetheless, this organization does not stand for appropriating and processing Nature as atoms; instead, it
works to transform it into images, signs, ideologies that can serve many profit agendas in other ways. Thus, "the Sierra Club"/"wise
use movement" contradiction perhaps is more of an odd internal capitalist contradiction between "tertiary" informational and
"secondary" industrial sectors of the same overdeveloped advanced economy rather than a real face-off between pre-industrial forces
of "the environment" versus hyper-industrial partisans of "the economy."
link apocalypticism
Climate Apocalypsism only paves the way for human expansionism
and symptom-oriented problem solving blocks solvency
Swyngedouw 13 (Erik, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester in its
School of Environment and Development, Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,
Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2013, arh)
A flood of literature on the relationship between apocalyptic imaginaries, popular culture, and politics has excavated the uses and
abuses of revelatory visions (Skrimshire 2010; Calder Williams 2011). Despite the important differences between the transcendental
biblical use of the apocalypse and the thoroughly material and socio- physical
ecological catastrophes-to-come, the

latter, too, depoliticize matters. As Alain Badiou contends: [T]he rise of the rights of Nature is
a contemporary form of the opium for the people. It is an only slightly camouflaged religion: the
millenarian terror, concern for everything save the properly political destiny of peoples, new
instruments for control of everyday life, the obsession with hygiene, the fear of death and
catastrophes . . . It is a gigantic operation in the depoliticization of subjects. (Badiou 2008, 139)
Environmental problems are indeed commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival
of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999)
aptly called ecologies of fear. Much of the discursive matrix through which the presentation of the environmental condition we are
in is quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the specter of ecological annihilation, or at least
seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. The nurturing of fear, in turn, is sustained in part
by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginations that serve to reinforce the seriousness of the situation (Katz 1995). The
apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water or at least with endemic water shortages;
ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land
as global warming shifts the geo-pluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and
floods; icebergs that disintegrate; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are
threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of nuclear wastelands; the threat of peak-oil;
the devastations raked by wildfires, tsunamis, spreading diseases like SARS, Avian Flu, Ebola, or
HIV*all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening, and out of control
are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping
CO2 into the atmosphere, recombining DNA, deforesting the earth, etc . . . In sum, our
ecological predicament is sutured by millennialism fears sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric
and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an
overwhelming, mind-boggling danger*one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of
our everyday lives and routines and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for
granted. Of course, apocalyptic imaginaries have been around for a long time as an integral part of Western thought, first of
Christianity and later emerging as the underbelly of fast-forwarding technological modernization and its associated doomsday
thinkers. However, present day millennialism preaches an apocalypse without the promise of redemption. Saint Johns biblical
apocalypse, for example, found its redemption in Gods infinite love, while relegating the outcasts to an afterlife of permanent
suffering. The proliferation of modern apocalyptic imaginaries also held up the promise of redemption: the horsemen of the
apocalypse, whether riding under the name of the proletarian, technology, or capitalism, could be tamed with appropriate political
and social revolutions. The environmental apocalypse, in contrast, takes different forms. It is not immediate and total (but slow and
painful), not revelatory (it does not announce the dawn of a new rose-tinted era); no redemption is promised (for the righteous
ones), and there are no outcasts. Indeed, if the boat goes done, the first-class passengers will also drown. As Martin Jay argued,
while traditional apocalyptic versions still held out the hope for redemption, for a second coming, for the promise of a new
dawn, environmental
apocalyptic imaginaries are leaving behind any hope of rebirth or

renewal . . . in favor of an unquenchable fascination with being on the verge of an end that never
comes (Jay 1994, 33). The emergence of new forms of millennialism around the environmental
nexus is indeed of a particular kind that promises neither redemption nor realization. As Klaus
Scherpe insists, this is not simply apocalypse now, but apocalypse forever . It is a vision that does not
suggest, prefigure, or expect the necessity of an event that will alter the course of history (Scherpe 1987). Derrida (referring to the
nuclear threat in the 1980s) sums this up most succinctly: here, precisely, is announced*as promise or as threat*an apocalypse
without apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revelation . . . without message and without destination,
without sender and without decidable addressee . . . an apocalypse beyond good and evil (Derrida 1982). The environmentally
apocalyptic future, forever postponed, neither promises redemption nor does it possess a name, a positive designation. The
attractions of such an apocalyptic imaginary are related to a series of characteristics. In contrast to standard left arguments about
the apocalyptic dynamics of unbridled capitalism, I would argue that sustaining
and nurturing apocalyptic

imageries are an integral and vital part of the new cultural politics of capitalism for which the
management of fear is a central leitmotiv (Badiou 2007) and provides part of the cultural
support for a process of post-politicization (Swyngedouw 2010a). At the symbolic level,
apocalyptic imaginaries are extraordinarily powerful in disavowing or displacing social conflict
and antagonisms. Apocalyptic imaginations are decidedly populist and foreclose a proper political framing. Or in other words,
the presentation of climate change as a global humanitarian cause produces a thoroughly depoliticized imaginary, one that does not
revolve around choosing one trajectory rather than another, or identifies clear adversaries in a political process; it is one that is not
articulated with specific political programs or socio-ecological projects or transformations .
It insists that we have to

make sure that radical technomanagerial and socio-cultural transformations, organized within
the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute, are initiated that retrofit the climate
(Swyngedouw 2007). In other words, we have to change radically, but within the contours of the
existing state of the situation*the partition of the sensible in Rancie`res (1998) words, so that
nothing really has to change.
link aquaculture
Aquaculture industries subjugate fish experience and biology to the
needs of capital this ensures violence
Bavington 11 (Dean Bavington Ph.D. in Geography and Environmental Studies, Michigan Society of Fellows post-doc
and assistant professor in the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, Canada Research Chair
in Environmental History at Nipissing University, Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of the Newfoundland Cod
Collapse, UBC Press (1/1/2011) // JJ)
Cod aquaculture emphasizes individual ownership and management responsibility for marine
resources once under the exclusive purview of the state. The federal government's Aquaculture Development
Strategy is explicit about individual and corporate ownership in aquaculture. Aq culture, the strategy observes,
implies two different meanings of culture. One meaning implies intervention in the life history
of farmed organisms to enhance production, but "culture also implies individual or corporate
ownership of the stock being cultivated. "n Cod farming extends and intensifies the marketoriented management approach to marine fisheries that was discussed in Chapter 5. Rather than
ownership and property rights being tied to a quota for a portion of the biomass of wild cod
populations, ownership and property rights in aquaculture apply to the entire life
cycle of cod and even to patented brood stocks and the genetic code of fish. The
ability to control cod from egg to plate subsumes cod biology under the logic and
needs of capital. International agreements and institutions, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
World Trade Organization, and the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, enshrine property rights that enable the
privatization and commodification of cultured organisms on the enclosed coastal spaces of fish farms. Once coastal spaces have
been privatized, the international trade regime creates the potential for corporations to sue governments to recuperate lost profits
should a national or provincia government decide to reclaim coasta zones or coastal genomes as state-owned common property'
In addition to the loss of collective state-managed property, the
expanded logic of privatization,

commodification, and enclosure that underlies industrial cod farming fundamental y
transforms the identity and social relations of fishermen. In the earlier efforts to develop the Newfoundland
fishing industry from a small-scale-dominated inshore fishery to an intensive offshore dragger fishery, governments and
market institutions told fishermen that they had to abandon their small boats, outport
communities, and detailed local knowledge and embrace the industrial efficiency of big-boat
techno (V, frozen fish plants, urban growth centres, and sci- entifc fisherles management. With aquaculture, fishermen are
asked to cease being hunters altogether and evolve into professionalized industrial farmers.
This perspective is bluntly stated in an article in The Economist: L The ocean is a resource that must be preserved
and harvested. To enhance its uses, the water must become ever more like the land, with
owners, laws and limits. Fishermen must behave more like ranchers than hunters. Cod aquaculture
leads to the commodification of the coastal zone and requires intensive corporate-led management, a smaller, more efficient, and
more flexible workforce, higher levels of capitalization, and more complete integration into global seafood markets than does the
Through egg-to-plate farming, cod become increasingly conceptualized

as a pure commodity with exchange value rather than a food source with use value
for local food sovereignty or a living fish with intrinsic existence value. To compete with
wild cod fishery.
low-cost global producers and other whitefish products, farmed cod must be branded as a high-end prod uct. The needs and
demands of the global seafood market come to influence everything that occurs on fish farms, since "there is very ittle point in
growing seafood if you can't sell it. "2
link biodiversity
Biodiversity discourse is used to construe ecosystems as resources to
be managed for the needs of economic growth
Takeshita 1 (Chikako Takeshita Ph.D. in Science and Technology Studies at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Associate Professor at the Department of Womens Studies at the University of California, Riverside, Bioprospecting
and Its Discontents: Indigenous Resistances as Legitimate Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (July-September 2001), vol.
26 no. 3, pp. 259-282 // JJ)
This section focuses on the construct of the rhetoric of bioprospecting and the effects of its discursive powers over indigenous
peoples and their affairs, starting
from the analysis of the notion of biodiversity. Although

biodiversity has concrete biophysical constructs, it should also be "seen as a discursive
invention of recent origin."12 A popular view of "biodiversity" has been produced by dominant institutions such as the
World Bank and the environmental NGOs and supported by G-7 countries, where "biodiversity" represents the
"threatened" habitats of diverse, rare, and useful microorganisms, plants, and animals. Based
on the recognition that these threatened habitats require protection, the discourse of
biodiversity conservation also "offers a set of prescriptions for the conservation and sustainable
use of resources at the international, national, and local levels" and "suggests appropriate
mechanisms for biodiversity management."13 The prevailing idea behind this notion of
"biodiversity" is that nature should be preserved and managed sustainably as if it
were resource for capital. To use political economist Martin O'Connor's terminology, capital has
entered a new "ecological phase."14 The supply-side crisis of environmental resources
caused by overexploitation and the rise of social movements against environmental
destruction have led to the modification of the dynamic of capitalism. Because it has
become costly to treat nature as "an external and exploitable domain," nature is now
"redefined as itself a stock of capital," and the biological milieu is codified as tradeable
goods.15 The potential profitability of rain-forest biodiversity, where genes and chemical compounds residing in the rare
species of the rain forest wait to be discovered and converted into valuable commercial products using biotechnology,
reinforces this capitalization of nature. Jack Kloppenburg quotes tropical ecologist Daniel Janzen, who bluntly frames
biodiversity in commercial terms: "Now, how do you get hard dollars out of biodiversity information? ... I look at my assets and
I've got 12,000 square kilometers of green- houses [Costa Rican national parks] with a half a million species and organisms
and I know what they are and where they are, and when I sit down at the bargaining table with some company they are going to
pay me for those assets. ... I give you something, you give me something, and we both come out with a happy business
relationship."16 Profiting
from biodiversity and conserving it are two sides of the same coin for
this new form of ecological capital that relies on sustainably managing natural resources. The
notion of sustainable development plays a central role in the construction of the discourse of
biodiversity conservation. In a word, sustainable development defines environmental management as compatible with
economic growth, as opposed to considering environmental conservation and economic development mutually exclusive.
One of the underlying assumptions is that "poor" countries will stop overexploiting their natural resources if they became
more economically developed. Typically, bioprospecting projects operate under the assumption that while the underlying
causes of biodiversity loss are many and complex, it is clear that "poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities
are significant contributing factors."17 They appeal to the image of developing countries struggling to meet the most basic
human needs and declare that "efforts to protect biological diversity will succeed only if implemented in the context of
promoting sustainable economic growth.
link bioprospecting
The concept of bioprospecting reframes nature and indigenous
people as sources of capital that must be managed and regulated
Takeshita 1 (Chikako Takeshita Ph.D. in Science and Technology Studies at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Associate Professor at the Department of Womens Studies at the University of California, Riverside, Bioprospecting
and Its Discontents: Indigenous Resistances as Legitimate Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (July-September 2001), vol.
26 no. 3, pp. 259-282 // JJ)
This article seeks to analyze the
discursive control exercised over indigenous people and knowledge

through the rhetoric of bioprospecting and to conceptualize indigenous peoples' protests
against bioprospecting as legitimate politics. On the one hand, bioprospecting, the exploration
of biological resources in search of active compounds for pharmaceutical development, has
been promoted as a "win-win-win" project that fosters the discovery of new drugs,
economic development in countries that are rich in natural resources, and conservation of
biodiversity. On the other hand, such attempts to find useful genetic and biological material in bio- diverse regions of
the Third World by Western researchers and industries have been accused of "biopiracy" - that is, the plunder of natural
resources and related knowledge of the developing world by powerful industrial countries.1 Indigenous groups that reside in
the tropical forests where some of these explorations take place have openly condemned bioprospecting activities and the
application of traditional knowledge of medicinal plants to scientific research and commercial use. These protests have
drawn sympathetic supporters from some quar- ters, but have also been dismissed as aberrations or deemed irrational by
bioprospectors, with whom legitimacy automatically rests. Given this imbalance of power relations between indigenous peo-
ples and bioprospectors, I take it as a worthy challenge to attempt to negotiate greater political legitimacy for the former. The
first step toward realizing this challenge is to comprehend bioprospecting as a "discourse"

- a set of narrated knowledges and representations of constructed realities, which determines
what modes of being and thinking are permissible or disqualified. Dis- courses channel
power and control by defining the ways in which reality is conceptualized and by making
contending or alternative accounts invisible or irrelevant.2 In the case of explicitly globalized discourses,
such as bioprospecting, meanings can be, and often are, imposed upon indigenous communities with relatively little eco-
nomic and political power and used to legitimize certain interventions in indigenous peoples' affairs. The
discourse of
bioprospecting perforce weaves indigenous peoples into networks of forces and interests
regulated and controlled by a narrow cross-section of the global scientific and political elite.
This global elite has been, by and large, successful in setting the agenda and framework for addressing a range of issues
involving indigenous knowledge and peoples in ways that are primarily beneficial to itself but that are adver- tised to be
beneficial to all. In sum, as it constructs and mobilizes imposed images of indigenous people, hierarchizes their knowledge, and
disempowers them by discounting their viewpoints, bioprospecting is both rhetorically and practically hegemonic.
Paralleling advances in bioprospecting, however, is the enhanced visibility of local peoples in accordance with the increasing
economic and ecological interests in their habitats. Heightened visibility has created spaces in which indigenous people can
attempt to have their voices heard. Indigenous peoples' opposition to bioprospecting includes denying of access to their
territories and de- manding that patents on traditional knowledges be revoked. Vari- ous movements have also mounted
semiotic forms of resistance against the meanings and identities imposed upon the indigenous peoples by the external forces
of bioprospecting industry. These movements should not be regarded as sporadic local uprising, but as nodes in a broader
network of attempts to resist the dominant discourses by upholding the notion that appealing to cultural differences is
legitimately political. In the main section of this article, following a brief overview of bioprospecting and biopiracy, I
critically analyze bioprospecting as a hegemonic discourse that appropriates nature,

indigenous people, and their knowledge. In order for capitalist economy to continue to
extract natural resources - genetic and chemical material, in particular - nature must be
sustained as their reservoir, not destroyed and lost. The rhetoric of bioprospecting has
been instrumental in opening up biodiversity to consumption, exploration, and
conservation by framing nature and its resources selectively in terms of their
market value and as commodities . I contend that the codification of nature as reservoir
of capital values is completed when meanings are assigned to the local inhabitants
and their knowledges that agree with the specific role nature plays for capi-
talist economy. Put another way, bioprospecting accomplishes the "semiotic conquest of
nature, people, and knowledge,"3 using its discursive powers to articulate indigenous people
and knowledge as managers and generators of economic value.
link borders
The striation of nature through borders is inherently managerial
environmental policy becomes disciplinary
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Ecocritique in Context: Technology, Democracy and Capitalism as
Environment, presented at ASLE (6/4/1999-6/6/1999), http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim653.htm // JJ)
Perhaps the
early origins of "the environment" as a term, or its historical emergence as

concept/word/idea, might prove suggestive here. This archeological move does not uncover a stable nominal
essence; it simply reilluminates semiotic qualities carried in the expression today that, first, accompany the term from its earliest
origins, and, second, throw light upon its discursive applications. In this original sense, which is brought into English from Old
environing
as a verb is, in fact, a type of military, policing or strategic action. To environ is to encircle,
encompass, envelop or enclose. It is the physical activity of surrounding, circumscribing, or
ringing around something. Its use even suggests stationing guards around, thronging with
hostile intent, or standing watch over some person or place. To environ a site or a subject is to
beset, beleaguer or besiege that place or person. An environment, as either the means of such
activity or the product of these actions, now might be read in a more suggestive manner,
especially in light of how most environmental knowledge is produced and consumed. It can be
the encirclement, a circumscription, or the beleaguerment of places and persons in a strategic
disciplinary policing of space. An environmental policy, in turn, is already a
disciplining move, aimed at (re)constructing some expanse of space--a locale, a
biome, a planet as biospheric space or some city, any region, the global economy
as technospheric territory--within a discursive envelope of policing regulation.
French, an environment is the result of an action from, or the state of being produced by a verb: "to environ." And,
Within such enclosures, many flavors of environmental expertise can arm environmental activists, policy-makers or regulators, who
stand watch in these surroundings, surveying from their bureaucratic battlements those zones of encircled space that include or
exclude forces, agents, and ideas. Even
if we understand environment in these terms, there are many

different ways to track down the various interrelationships of all living creatures to all of their
natural and artificial environments. Earth, the solar system, this galaxy antedate humanity by billions of years, and
nothing that humanity has done up to this point has altered significantly many basic astrophysical, geological, or meteorological
processes. Chaos theory, of course, says everything can be changed by anything, but right now we do not have the abilities to make
many reliable forecasts. Nonetheless, we could heed the caution signs of chaotic linkages, and recognize how our
industrial/social/cultural metabolisms as collectives of causation are beginning to leave more enduring traces upon the planet,
particularly in the oceans and atmosphere. First formulated in 1866 by Ernst Haeckel, the term "ecology" pertains to "the science of
the relations of living organisms to the external world, their habitat, customs, energies, parasites, etc." (cited in Worster, 1979: 192).
Allegedly, ecology
can be operationalized as "a subversive science" (Shepard and McKinley, 1969: 9), but
many others see it being misused as the subversion of science (Bramwell, 1994; Lewis, 1992; Ray, 1990;
Rubin, 1994). In both forms, however, the scientists acting in the name of this science rarely examine the totality of all relations
between living organisms and the external world: in part, this is because there is no consensus about where, why, and how the
external world can be redacted from living organisms; and, in part, it is due to a privileging of operational research programs that
assume a biocentric understanding of organisms or a geocentric reading of the external world that deflects many sciences away from
more systemic artificial aspects of the external world.
link democracy
Democracy promotion efforts are tied up in environmental
stewardship rhetoric that seeks to enforce ecogovernmentality in
other countries
These geo-economic readings also have sparked new discourses of social responsibility into life, such as the green geo-politics of the
Clinton administration with its intriguing codes of ecological reflexivity. The
presidential pledge to deploy American

power as an environmental protection agency has waxed and waned over the past quarter
century, but in 1995 President Clinton made this green geo-politics an integral part
of his global doctrine of "engagement." "To reassert America's leadership in the post-Cold War world," and
in moving "from the industrial to the information age, from the Cold War world to the global village," President Clinton asserted
"we
know that abroad we have the responsibility to advance freedom and democracy -to advance prosperity and the preservation of our planet....in a world where the dividing line
between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly blurred....Our personal, family, and national
future is affected by our policies on the environment at home and abroad. The common good at
home is simply not separate from our efforts to advance the common good around the world.
They must be one in the same if we are to be truly secure in the world of the 21st century. "11 By
becoming an agency of environmental protection on a global level, the U nited States sees itself
reasserting its world leadership after the Cold War. As the world's leader, in turn, America
stipulates that it cannot advance economic prosperity and ecological preservation without
erasing the dividing lines between domestic and foreign policy. In the blur of the coming Information Age
and its global villages, the United States cannot separate America's common good from the common goods of the larger world. To be
truly secure in the 21st century, each American's personal, family, and national stake in their collective future must be served
through the nation's environmental policies. Secretary of State Christopher confirmed President Clinton's engagement with the
environment through domestic statecraft and diplomatic action: "protecting our fragile environment also has profound long-range
importance for our country, and in 1996 we will strive to fully integrate our environmental goals into our diplomacy--something that
has never been done before."12 These
efforts to connect economic growth with ecological responsibility,

however, are stated most systematically in Vice President Al Gore's environmental musings. To
ground his green geo-politics, Gore argues that "the task of restoring the natural balance of the Earth's
ecological system" could reaffirm America's longstanding "interest in social justice, democratic
government, and free market economics."13 The geo-powers unlocked by this official ecology might even be seen as
bringing "a renewed dedication to what Jefferson believed were not merely American but universal inalienable rights: life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."14 At another level, however, Gore argues that America's global strategies after the Cold War must
reestablish "a natural and healthy relationship between human beings and the earth," replacing the brutal exploitation of Nature
with an "environmentalism of the spirit."15 Gore's
program for earth stewardship takes a unique

geo-economic turn when he calls for a Global Marshall Plan to embed sustainable
development at the heart of his green geo-politics. In that historic post-WWII program, as Gore notes,
several nations joined together "to reorganize an entire region of the world and change its way of life."16 Like the Marshall Plan, his
new Global Marshall Plan would "focus on strategic goals and emphasize actions and programs that are likely to remove the
bottlenecks presently inhibiting the healthy functioning of the global economy...to serve human needs and promote sustained
economic progress."17 In other words, the
green geo-politics of this Global Marshall Plan provides a

justification for advancing Strategic Environmental Initiatives. That is, the U.S. should be "embarking on an
all-out effort to use every policy and program, every law and institution, every treaty and alliance, every tactic and strategy, every
plan and course of action--to
use, in short, every means to halt the destruction of the environment and
to preserve and nurture our ecological system."18 At the end of the Cold War, we cannot simply show
interventionist state bureaucracies to the door nor can we allow them to remobilize society
around dangerous geo-economic programs of mindless material development. On the contrary,
we must bring the state back in to manage production and consumption by being mindful of
"the e-factor," or "ecology" as efficiency and economy. 19
link development
Ocean development policy seeks to control and distribute the
environment as capital
Randeria 7 (Shalini Randeria Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology at the Graduate Institute in Geneva,
visiting professor at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin, President of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, Max
Weber Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich, Global Designs and Local Lifeworlds: Colonial Legacies of Conservation,
Disenfranchisement and Environmental Governance in Postcolonial India, Interventions (2007), vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 12-30 // JJ)
Both varieties of cosmopolitan oppose the modernizing vision of the nation state with its
developmentalist agenda that envisages the use of natural resources for economic growth. But
whereas the environmental experts do so in order to advance a global design to protect the rights of nature, grassroots activists are
concerned about the protection of customary rights to common property resources. Both
invoke international norms

derived from sources other than the regulatory framework of the state which they seek
to broaden and transform. Experts remain ambivalent about the states claims to sovereignty over natural
resources within its territory as they would prefer nature to be subjected to the rule of experts rather than to national interest.
Grassroots activists are as critical of state-led developmentalist policies and projects as of market-driven ones. They contend that
state- led interventions on behalf of market forces increasingly erode the rights of local communities and endanger the commons
(pastures and grazing lands, inland and coastal fishing grounds, woodlands, grasslands, forests, rivers, village tanks and ponds).
From their point of view, both involve top-down interventions in favour of an intensification of
the exploitation of natural resource use, with little concern for the impact of privatization and
commercialization on fragile eco-systems and on the livelihoods of the poor who depend on
them. For them, both the state and the market, as well as the new nexus between the two in
neoliberal environmental governmentality worldwide, threaten the conservation of common
property resources based on traditional patterns of access and use, as well as communitarian
arrangements embedded in local knowledge of nature.
link environmentalism
Discourse of environmentalism locks-in a Western managerial ethic
towards nature
The choice of language and terminology, "ecology" or "environmentalism", is very significant. These
are not interchangeable terms. Environmentalism leaves intact a western (and capitalist) view of
nature as resources for human exploitation, and as external to human beings. Nature/culture
dualism and naturalized systems of human oppression are not immanent concerns of
environmentalists. Rather, they are concerned with managing a particular environment toward
particular human ends and purposes, which may include the long-term stability of systems
which oppress human beings. In one way or another, each of the three main branches of contemporary radical green
theory-- social ecology, deep ecology, and eco-feminism-- begin with a critique of the limits of environmentalism.
Modern environmentalism denies nature its own agency and seeks to

serve human purposes our attempts to constantly control the earth
rather than live in harmony with it prevent it from having its own
existence independent of our own
Luke 96 (Timothy, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of
Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International
Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University in Blacksburg, Virginia, PhD in Political Science from Washington University,
Generating Green Governmentality: A Cultural Critique of Environmental Studies as a
Power/Knowledge Formation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, pp. 15-17, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
The "three Rs" of environmental studies now implicitly acknowledge how thoroughly most
human ecologies on Earth

are "a sociotechnical order." As Law suggests, the networks of humans and machines, animals and
plants, economies and ecologies, which now constitute our environment, are mixed media of
power and knowledge: "what appears to be social is partly technical. What we usually call
technical is partly social. In practice nothing is purely 54 technical. Neither is anything purely social ."
Approaching the environment as terrestrial infrastructure , at the same time, admits that
the professional- technical graduates of environmental studies programs are in
many ways trained to operate as "heterogeneous engineers." That is, he/she must work "not
only on inanimate physical materials, but on and through people, texts, devices, city councils, architectures, economics, and all the
rest," such that if his/her designs are to work as a system, then he/she always must travel effectively "between these different
domains, weaving an emergent web which 55 constituted and reconstituted bits and pieces that it brought together." Too few
articulations of environmental studies acknowledge these basic operational conditions, but they form the sociotechnical terrains
upon which environmental studies experts must negotiate their professional worklives through in order to heterogeneously
engineer Earth's ecologies as the infrastructures of anthropogenic environments. Transforming the raw stuff of Nature into natural
resources, while minimizing the associated risks of such processing and maximizing the aggregate access of recreationists to yet-tobe or never-to-be transformed Nature, is a constant challenge for heterogeneous engineers from the environmental science
disciplines to pull off with any aplomb. The green fixations of so many conventional environmentalists makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for environmental studies to recognize all of the natural/artificial networks that its practitioners must
tend as essential parts with a complex system for their projects of heterogeneous engineering. Owning up to full immensity of these
reshaping the Earth

so completely that it obviously becomes an essentially sociotechnical planetary
order. The Earth, then, no longer is allowed to exist or evolve as such; instead it is
tasks, however, leads those who would be the tenders of Nature to the project of "terraforming," or
consigned to the hands of terraforming professionals with graduate training in the

environmental sciences. Duke University asserts "the mission of the School of the Environment is
education, research and service to understand basic environmental processes and to protect and
enhance the 56 environment and its natural resources for future generations." This engagement
at "protecting" and "enhancing" the environment to transmit its natural resources to future
generations is seconded by California-Berkeley, whose Ecosystem Sciences mission statement virtually writes the job
description of terraforming technicians: "Ecosystem Sciences are concerned with quantitative understanding of ecosystem
properties and processes, and the controls on these features. Central to this mission is a full partnership between physical and
biological scientists, leading to an integrated understanding of ecosystem structure and function, and the extension of these findings
in modeling and implementation activities." The labor of environmental studies professionals must be dedicated to protecting and
enhancing the performativity of our environments. Whatever surrounds our increasing performative global economy must also
become as operationally adaptable, flexible, and productive, as Colorado State labels them, through the problem-solving knowledges
of riparian management, land rehabilitation, habitat evaluation, range economics, biotelemetric surveillance, wood engineering,
resource interpretation, or visitor strategies. While students may enter schools of environmental studies and colleges of natural
resources in search of wisdom from Aldo Leopold or John Muir, they mostly leave as adept practitioners of ecosystem
management/analysis, ecological risk analysis, and recreation resource 16 58 administration. Forests, range lands, waters, game
animals, and soils all are integral components in terrestrial infrastructures for the vast machineries of commodity production,
circulation, consumption, and accumulation, which are, in turn, terraforming the unruly ecologies of Earth to suit their mainly
commercial requirements. Because, as the Dean of Yale's School argues, " there
is hardly a place on Earth

where human activity does not influence the environment's current condition or
its prospects for the future ," environmental studies and colleges of natural resources produce technoscientific
experts, or those new "cadres of educated professionals," or who truly believe "that the best hope for developing sound knowledge
and workable management solution for environmental problems is to bring science 59 and policy together." Truths about ecology
are not objective timeless verities, but rather are the operationalized findings of continuously evolving practices for heterogeneous
engineering as they have been constructed by major research universities. These institutions are sites where "truth," or "a system of
order procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, 60 and operation of statements," arises from knowledge
formations, like the disciplines of environmental science, to help steer power formations, like the decision-making bureaux of liberal
democratic states and capitalist firms. As Foucault asserts, "there
are manifold relations of power which

permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production,
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of
power without a certain economy of discourses 61 of truth which operates through and on the
basis of this association." Environmental science, then, should reveal multiple traces of this vital
cycle of cogeneration by which power charges truthful knowledges even as truthful knowledges
mediate power in the scope and substance of its discursive construction at schools of
environmental studies and colleges of natural resources.
The affirmative reentrenches traditional modes of ecology the

notion that state action is necessarily key to environmental
pragmatism is flawed, and only serves to reinvigorate the static
notion of the environment as in need of repair policies are
destined to fail
Kuehls 96 (Thom, Asst. Professor at Weber State and PhD in Political Science from Johns
Hopkins University, Beyond Sovereign Territory, pp. 15-16, 1996, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
The science of ecology has, over the last few decades, engaged the concepts of contingency, complexity,
and chaos- concepts that, moreover, problematize the founding principles of ecology. Until the past
few years, suggests Daniel Borkin, the predominant theories in ecology either presumed or
had as a necessary consequence a very strict concept of a highly structured,
ordered, and regulated, steady-state ecological systemChange now appears to be
intrinsic and natural at many scales of time and space in the biosphere. The belief
in a nature that, if left alone, will maintain permanence of form, outline, and proportion is being
seriously challenged by the results of ecological research. The view that dominated the
science of ecology during its first hundred years In Discordant Harmonies, Botkin points to several
examples of failed policies in environmental management that were based upon beliefs in the
timeless constancy of nature, beliefs that nature left untouched by human hands would remain
in a static state of balance forever. The notion of a static landscape [existing] like a
single musical chord sounded foreve r, Botkin insists, must be abandoned. Change
occurs with or without human interference.
link expertism
Their focus on expert knowledge reflects the desire to regulate
environmental discourse for purposes of management or control
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Generating Green Governmentality: A Cultural Critique of
Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation, (June 1996), http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim514a.htm // JJ)
In and of itself, Nature
is meaningless unless or until particular human beings assign significance to

it by interpreting some of its many ambivalent signs as meaningful to them. The outcomes of
this activity, however, are inescapably indeterminate, or at least, they are a culturally contingent function of who
decodes which signs when and how they find decisive meaning there. Because human beings will observe
natural patterns differently, choose to accentuate some, while deciding to ignore others, Nature's meanings always will
be multiple and unfixed.1 Such interpretive acts only construct contestable textual fields, which are read on various levels of
expression for their manifest and latent meanings. Before scientific disciplines or industrial technologies turn its matter and energy
once Nature is
rendered intelligible through these discursive processes, it can be used to legitimize many
political projects. One vital site for generating, accumulating and then circulating such
discursive knowledge about Nature, as well as determining which particular human beings will
be empowered to interpret Nature to society, is the modern research university. As the primary
structure for credentialling individual learners and legitimating collective teachings, graduate
programs at such universities do much to construct our understanding of the natural world. Over
the past generation, graduate programs in environmental science on many American university
campuses have become the main source of new representations of "the environment" as well as
the home base for those scientific disciplines that study Nature's meanings. Indeed, a new
into products, Nature already is being transformed by discursive interpretation into "natural resources." And,
environmental episteme has evolved over the past three decades, allowing new schools of environmental studies either to be
established de novo or to be reorganized out of existing bits and pieces of agriculture, forestry, science or policy studies programs.
In turn, these
educational operations now routinely produce professional-technical workers with

the specific knowledge--as it has been scientifically validated--and the operational power--as it
is institutionally constructed--to cope with "the environmental crisis" on what are believed to be
sound scientific and technical grounds. Still, graduate teaching in schools of the
environment has little room for other social objectives beyond the rationalizing
performativity norms embedded at the core of the current economic regime. To
understand the norms used by this regulatory regime, as Lyotard asserts, "the State and/or company must abandon the idealist and
humanist narratives of legitimation in order to justify the new goals: in the discourse of today's financial backers of research, the
Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to

find truth, but to augment power. "2 This chapter asks how specialized discourses about Nature,
or "the environment," are constructed by American university programs in graduate-level
teaching and research by professional-technical experts as disciplinary articulations of "ecoknowledge" to generate performative disciplinary systems of "geo-power" over, but also within
and through, Nature in the managerial structures of modern economies and societies. The critical
project of Michel Foucault--particularly his account of how discursively formed disciplines operate inside
regimes of truth as systems of governmentality--provides a basis for advancing this critical reinterpretation.
These continuously institutionalized attempts to capture and contain the forces of Nature by
operationally deploying advanced technologies, and thereby linking many of Nature's apparently
intrinsic structures and processes to strategies of highly rationalized environmental
management as geo-power, develops out of university-level "environmental studies" as a
strategic supplement to various modes of bio-power defined by existing academic "human
studies" in promoting the growth of modern urban-industrial populations. 3 Moreover, the rules of
only credible goal is power.
economic performativity now count far more materially in these interventions than do those of ecological preservation.
Environmental expertism renders nature a tool for experimentation

and militarisation
Luke, writing in Cultural Critique (Fall 1995) goes even further to suggest that a new meta-managerial
perspective and policy elite are emerging under the banner of environmentalism. He argues that: an
environmental act, in turn, is already a disciplining move, aimed at constructing some expanse of space -a locale, a biome, a planet as a biospherical or on the other hand, some city, any region, the global
economy in technospherical territory-- in a discursive envelope. Within these enclosures, environmental
expertise can arm environmentalists who stand watch over these surroundings ,
guarding the rings that include or exclude forces, agents, and ideas. (p.65) Living worlds, or ecosystems and their
Tim
human inhabitants become: ...sites of supervision, where environmentalists see from above and from without through the enveloping designs of administratively delimited
Encircled by enclosures of alarm, environments can be disassembled, recombined,

and subjected to the disciplinary designs of expert management . Enveloped in these interpretive
frames, environments can be redirected to fulfill the ends of other economic scripts, managerial
directives, and administrative writs. Environing, then, engenders "environmentality" , which
embeds instrumental rationalities in the policing of ecological spaces. (p.65) By
focusing on the leading think-tank of environmentality, the US based Worldwatch Institute, Luke
suggests that "discourses of nature, ecology, or the environment, as disciplinary
articulations of "eco-knowledge", might be interpreted as efforts to generate systems of
"geo-power" over, but also within and through, nature for the governance of modern economies and societies.
1 Here the "facts of life" as delivered and mediated by the Worldwatch Institute pass into "fields of
control for eco-knowledge and spheres of intervention for "geo-power" ." (p.67). He develops his analysis of
systems.
environmentality as an extension of governmentality, which applies techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management. "As ecological limits to growth
are discovered or defined, states are forced to guarantee their populations' fecundity and productivity in the total setting of the global political economy by becoming
"environmental protection agencies." (p. 69).
link exploration
Exploration lays the groundwork for domination in its attempt to
control and define
Youatt 8 (Rafi Youatt Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago, assistant professor at The New School,
Counting Species: Biopower and the Global Biodiversity Census, Environmental Values (2008), vol. 17 no. 3, pp. 393-417,
http://www.environmentandsociety.org/sites/default/files/key_docs/ev_17no.3_youatt_r.pdf // JJ)
One critical role that information technology plays in organising the global biodiversity census
is in its ability to suggest a panoptic biological future. 23 Imagine an electronic page for each species of
organism on Earth, Wilson asks us, available everywhere by single access on command. 24 Genealogically related to
projects like Diderots Encylopedie, the modern Encyclopedia of Life is the endpoint and
ultimate goal of the censusing project, organised in a technology that claims to outrun space and
time. The rhetoric of achieving a global biodiversity census also taps into complex Western
narratives of discovery and conquest of nature (ironically, since the conservation agenda of the
census is aimed in part at preserving the wildness of nature). This rhetoric also draws on the
position of social power held by the modern sciences to reveal the unknown to human publics.
Wilson exhorts supporters of the census to have faith in the sprint to the finish of the global census, promising that unknown
microorganisms ... will be revealed and that never again, with fuller knowledge of such extent, need we overlook so many golden
opportunities in the living world around us. 25 Similarly, the All-Species Foundation tells us that the
global biodiversity
census offers an unsurpassable adventure: the exploration of a little-known planet .
26 Finally, the discursive power of the census is connected to economic life, in the way that it
renders nonhuman agents ready for postmodern capitalism as semiotic constructions (as in
genetic codes for bioprospectors or images in nature videos). 27 As Arturo Escobar argues, whereas
nature marked modern capitalisms attitude towards the nonhuman, biodiversity is a term of
postmodern capitalism, in the way that it readies nonhuman nature for semiotic use rather than
material use. 28 Indeed, postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the
case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials. 29 Yet, as Escobar argues , once the semiotic
conquest of nature is completed, the sustainable and rational use of the environment becomes
imperative. 30 That is, once biodiversity discourses help conserve an area as a biodiversity
reserve which is made valuable in terms of code-commodity, it also becomes part of a political
system of global environmental governance that continues to manage it for capitalism.
link food security

The desire to securitize world food supply enables biopolitical control
of environments and people
Alcock 9 (Rupert Alcock BA in Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, ESRC-funded Ph.D. candidate at the University
of Bristol, Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security, School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies
(2009), http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/research/workingpapers/wpspaisfiles/alcock0709.pdf // JJ)
The establishment of world food security as an international and developmental concern at the
World Food Conference in 1974 represents the emergence of biopolitical techniques which monitor and
manage how food is produced and consumed at the level of global populations. At this embryonic
stage the monitoring techniques available were relatively crude; as my analysis of the International Undertaking (IUWFS) has
shown, indicators of world food security were limited to national levels of food supply. The
resolution adopted at the

Conference to establish a system of international grain reserves represents a rudimentary
attempt to manage the risks of an unpredictable global market, devoid of American surpluses, by means of
an insurance level of buffer stocks. The other main emphasis was on the need for more data and
information, to enable more comprehensive monitoring of the world food situation. This resulted
in the establishment of the Global Information and Early Warning System for Food and Agriculture (GIEWS), which marks the
first stage of process of techno-scientific informationalization regarding food and the patterns of
its global production. Biopolitics, writes Michael Dillon, change according to changes in the
technologies through which life processes are made transparent to knowledge (2008: 310). The
biopolitical securitisation of peoples food consumption thus becomes possible as new
technologies enable more comprehensive global monitoring of these life processes. From its early
focus on national production aggregates, the GIEWS now incorporates a view from space using satellite technology
to analyse the very constitution of the earths crust. The juxtaposition of the poor Indian farmer
working his land with plough and ox while surveyed from beyond the ionosphere by the latest in
satellite technology as a means to ensure his food security exposes the absurdity that
characterises what Baudrillard conceives as the precession of simulacra: Simulation is no
longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it
survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory precession of simulacra that
engenders the territory (Baudrillard, 1994: 1, emphasis in original). Just as new technologies enable new models of the
hyperreal, I suggest that new forms of knowledge simultaneously enable the development
of new technologies of monitoring and surveillance. The food security discourse which emerged in
the 1980s regarding access to food, adapting Sens work on entitlements and famine, led to the establishment of more complex
mapping systems which construct the risk of hunger via an economic grid of intelligibility. Critically enabled by what Duffield calls
the zenith of the non-governmental trajectory of the NGO movement in the 1980s (Duffield, 2007: 25), in which the
economic dynamics of non-insured and food insecure peoples became increasingly exposed to
international surveillance, the world was accordingly remapped to incorporate the new
conflation of risks articulated at the World Food Summit. The Food Insecurity Vulnerability Information and Mapping
System (FIVIMS) is the culmination of this re-rendering of reality; just as GIEWS produced the poor and hungry
as victims of risk inherent in nature, FIVIMS produces a new category of people as victims of
risk inherent in a global economy and social (dis)order. As the logics of biopolitics evolve, so do
its calculative techniques:
link free market

The affirmative enforces ecogovernmentality through their regulation
and distribution of nature via free market mechanisms
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Generating Green Governmentality: A Cultural Critique of
Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation, (June 1996), http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim514a.htm // JJ)
Resource managerialism can be read as a geo-power/eco-knowledge of modern governmentality. While voices in favor of
conservation can be found in Europe early in the nineteenth century, the real establishment of this stance comes in the United States
with the Second Industrial Revolution from the 1880s through the 1920s and the closing of the Western Frontier in the 1890s.17
an awareness of
modern industry's power to deplete natural resources, and hence the need for systems of
conserving their exploitation, is well-established by the early 1900s. Over the past nine decades,
the fundamental premises of resource managerialism have not changed significantly. At best, this
code of eco-knowledge only has become more formalized in bureaucratic applications and legal interpretations. Keying off of
the managerial logic of the Second Industrial Revolution, which empowered technical experts,
or engineers and scientists, on the shop floor and professional managers, or corporate
executives and financial officers, in the main office, resource managerialism imposes
corporate administrative frameworks upon Nature in order to supply the economy
and provision society through centralized state guidance. These frameworks assume
that the national economy, like the interacting capitalist firm and household, must avoid both
overproduction (excessive resource use coupled with inadequate demand) and underproduction
(inefficient resource use coming with excessive demand) on the supply-side as well as
overconsumption (excessive resource exploitation coming with excessive demand) and
underconsumption (inefficient resource exploitation coupled with inadequate demand) on the
demand side. To even construct the managerial problem in this fashion, Nature is reducedthrough the
encirclement of space and matter by national as well as global economiesto a
system of geo-power systems that can be dismantled, redesigned, and assembled
anew on demand to produce "resources" efficiently and when and where needed
in the modern marketplace . As a cybernetic system of biophysical systems, Nature's
energies, materials, and sites are redefined by the eco-knowledges of resource managerialism as
manageable resources for human beings to realize great material "goods" for sizeable numbers
of some people, even though greater material and immaterial "bads" also might be inflicted
upon even larger numbers of other people, who do not reside in or benefit from the advanced
national economies that basically monopolize the use of world resources at a comparative
handful of highly developed regional and municipal sites. Echoing California-Berkeley's declaration that
Whether one looks at John Muir's preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchot's conservationist codes,
environmental studies boil down to mobilizing the biological, physical and social sciences to address the major social and political
effects of current and future anthropogenic environmental problems, Yale's Dean Cohon tells would-be environmental studies
enrollees that their professional power/knowledge will be crucially significant in the coming years: "Your role in helping to protect
and manage the integrity and survival of natural systems and human health globally could not be more important. Since so much is
now in human hands, people are needed, more than ever, who are focused, informed, and dedicated to learning."18 Here,
environmental sciences infrastructuralize the Earth's ecologies. The Earth becomes, if only in
terms of technoscience's operational assumptions, an immense terrestrial infrastructure. As the
human race's "ecological life-support system," it has "with only occasional localized failures" provided
"services upon which human society depends consistently and without charge."19 As the
environmentalized infrastructure of technoscientific production, the Earth generates "ecosystem
services," or those derivative products and functions of natural systems that human societies
perceive as valuable.20 This complex system of systems is what must survive; human life will continue only if such survivalsustaining services continue. And, as Colorado State's, Yale's, Berkeley's or Duke's various graduate programs all record, these
infrastructural outputs include: the generation of soils, the regeneration of plant nutrients, capture of solar energy, conversion of
solar energy into biomass, accumulation/purification/distribution of water, control of pests, provision of a genetic library,
maintenance of breathable air, control of micro and macro climates, pollination of plants, diversification of animal species,
development of buffering mechanisms in catastrophes, and aesthetic enrichment.21 Because
it is the terrestrial
infrastructure of transnational enterprise, the planet's ecology requires highly disciplined
reengineering to guide its sustainable use. In turn, the academic systems of green
governmentality will monitor, massage, and manage those systems which produce all of these
robust services. Just as the sustained use of any technology "requires that it be maintained, updated and changed periodically,"
so too does the "sustainable use of the planet require that we not destroy our ecological capital , such
as old-growth forests, streams and rivers (with their associated biota), and other natural amenities."22
link geoengineering
Invasive geoengineering techniques presume that we can manipulate
every variable in an environment they become the justification for
further expanding ecogovernance
Behringer 10 (Wolfgang Behringer German historian specialising in the witchcraft beliefs of Early Modern Europe, A
Cultural History of Climate, Polity (2010), pp. 205-206 // JJ)
Even more extravagant seem proposals to delay global warming by strengthening the albedo
effect in the stratosphere; wafeerhin, light-reflecting particles of sulphur would beam sunlight back
into space at a height of fifteen kilometres above the earth. Since Nobel prizewinner Paul Crutzen endorsed
the idea, there has been serious discussion of how to introduce sulfate powder into the stratosphere with the help of balloons,
rockets or cannons, as a way of reducing the greenhouse effect. According to Crutzen's calculations, sufficient artificial pollution
of the stratosphere would require no more than five million tonnes of sulfate powder a year, less than a tenth of worldwide sulfate
emissions, at a cost Of $50 per head Of the popu a- tion in the Industrial countries. Nor would the veil Of sulphur significantly
impair our experience Of nature: gloriously coloured sunsets would continue, only a ittle paler than we are used to not a high
price to pay for keeping Our fami iar ambient temperature and familiar climate. As
one might have expected, this

technocratic venture did not win much support among those who largely blamed global
warming on human influences. The same is true of other flights of fancy, such as the iron
fertilization of ocean plankton to remove C02 from the planet's carbon cycle, or large-scale
reforestation and the production of genetically modified plants to increase carbon binding, or
the installation of giant mirrors in space, or the irrigation of deserts to reduce the albedo.
Schellnhuber and Rahmstorf describe these technofixes as an attempt to manipulate the earth
system. 8 The idea of allowing a Dr Frankenstein to experiment with the world's climate has
aroused widespread concern, since a mistake here would have far-reaching consequences." We
should remember the fixes for supposed global cooling in the 1970s, and consider how absurd
they sound today at a distance of just one generation.
link green policy

Green statism is a smokescreen to keep things business-as-usual
necessitates a state of exception
Luke 14 - Timothy W. Luke is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and
Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International
Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (4/23/2014, Timothy W., Routledge,After Sustainable Cities?, Page
36, http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=UK9wAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA24&dq=tw+luke&ots=qdhMM_7Xmq&sig=_Xa5WkAJ0VKYNzcaGPSMLPi0_Zo
#v=onepage&q=luke&f=false // SM)
regulatory requirements, Washington quickly has
organized a coalition of environmentalists, labour

unions, scientists, car makers and legislators to endorse an average 5 per cent improvement in
fuel efficiency from 2010 through 2016. Once these vehicles become available, and enter service, the overall fuel
savings should amount to nearly 2 billion barrels of imported oil during those vehicles* road lives, and those savings in fuel use also
should reduce greenhouse gas emissions by the equivalent of taking 58 million current automobiles out of the nation's car fleet for a
year. By 2016, new passenger cars would need to meet an average 39 mpg fuel economy standard compared to 27.5 mpg in 2009,
while light trucks would need to hit 30 mpg on average versus 23 mpg in 2009. President Bush and Congress agreed to meet a 35
mpg target by 2020, which was the first such increase passed since 1975, but the Obama administration rammed the date for full
implementation forward to 2016 (Broder, 2009: A3), and then pushed the EPA to mandate 54.5 mpg by 2025. Although
it is
comforting for some on the Left to consider these shifts as some sort of a Green New Deal, such
changes are not necessarily transformational, socially progressive or even
innovative. In fact, the Green Party's 2012 Green New Deal four-point programme had four pillars, which were actually quite
conventional, namely, i) the Economic Bill of Rights; ii) a Green Transition; iii) real financial reform; and iv) a functional
democracy.22 Essentially, this
rhetorical strategy has been little more than hitting the 'reset* button on
contemporary industrial society by digging up a nearly 80-year-old episode in hit-or-miss
economic experimentation as a metaphor for moving ahead in the twenty-first century. Coming
amid a deep recession, the Green New Deal touts the promise of green collar jobs, green hard hat ideas
and green industrial efficiencies. When positioned within today's quite transnational and neoliberal
world-wide market economy, however, this plea often seems anachronistic at best and antiprogressive at worst.
Explicitly or implicitly, the New Deal is a code word for a normalized state of emergency, an
embrace of the exception or the submission to seemingly dictatorial authority
(Shales, 2008). That democracies always carry this potential was made more than apparent during
2008 as the BernackePaulsonBush triumvirate imposed their own draconian fiscal policies
cooked up on-the-fly down the throats of big business. In a sense, there already had been a 'Green New Deal' as
billions of greenbacks were expended to prop up the nation's banking and insurance system.
Turning to the Earth itself as a reason to save the economy today is politically palatable in a way
that the more avowedly corporatist, bureaucratic and even dictatorial moves of 1933, 1937 or
1939 never would have been. After Vietnam, Reaganism and the collapse of communism, turning to a rigid dirigisme
definitely is not coming back into fashion for the USA. Even so, the need to fight global warming is real, so the
willingness to allow a flexible 'greening' of statism is everywhere in favour, especially when it sustains the
developments of industrialism. Yet, this seems questionable and contestable, if not downright dangerous (Luke,
2009). Who wants it, who benefits from it and who stands to lose with it? Arguably, this rhetoric is
yet another vision of citizen apathy matched with expert activism to keep things
'business-as-usual' .
Environmental policy guarantees a biopolitical state the impact is

bare life
Here the "facts of life" as delivered and mediated by the Worldwatch Institute pass into "fields of control for eco-knowledge and
spheres of intervention for "geo-power"." (p.67). He develops his analysis of environmentality as an extension of governmentality,
which applies techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management. " As
ecological limits to growth

are discovered or defined, states are forced to guarantee their populations' fecundity and
productivity in the total setting of the global political economy by becoming "environmental
protection agencies." (p. 69). Governmentality reemerges as environmentality, reestablishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things." Resource managerialism is the eco-knowledge of
modern governmentality, in which national security and national interests are "greened" in which
the natural bounty of the planet is continually monitored and watched over by the new
technologies of oversight. To construct the managerial problem in the fashion of environmentalism, nature must be
redefined by the eco-knowledge of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for the use and exploitation of particular human
beings. Being
"an environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a bioeconomic spreadsheet

over Nature while "hovering over the world in a scientifically centered surveillance machine"-- a
green panopticom. International environmentalism is watching everything and
everyone, measuring and evaluating among other things, the fertility of women, who can
be reduced to "populations" for the purpose of analysis. The disciplining of nature,
misrepresented as maintaining national security, involves the subdivision of nature into environs, the
reduction of human beings to populations, and the construction of a geo-global political structure to manage it all.
link hegemony
The pursuit of national security masks eco-managerialism the
impact is bare life
Governmentality reemerges as environmentality, re-establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of

things." Resource managerialism is the eco-knowledge of modern governmentality, in which national security and
national interests are "greened" in which the natural bounty of the planet is continually monitored and watched over by the
new technologies of oversight. To construct the managerial problem in the fashion of environmentalism, nature must be redefined by the eco-
Being "an
environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a bioeconomic spreadsheet over Nature
while "hovering over the world in a scientifically centered surveillance machine"-- a green
panopticom. International environmentalism is watching everything and everyone , measuring and
evaluating among other things, the fertility of women, who can be reduced to "populations" for the purpose of analysis. The disciplining of
nature, misrepresented as maintaining national security , involves the subdivision of
nature into environs, the reduction of human beings to populations, and the construction of a
geo-global political structure to manage it all.
knowledge of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for the use and exploitation of particular human beings.
link keystone species

Focus on specific keystone species creates a form of biocelebrity
that transforms ecology into commodity for control and consumption
On one level, the American WWF frets over biodiversity, but many of its high Madison Avenue activities actually aim at developing
systems of "biocelebrity." From
the adoption of the panda bear as its official logo to its ceaseless
fascination with high-profile, heavily symbolic animals, or those which are most commonly on
display in zoos or hunter's trophy rooms, the WWF-US has turned a small handful of
mediagenic mammals, sea creatures, and birds into zoological celebrities as part and parcel of
defending Nature. Whether it is giraffes, elephants, rhinos or kangaroos, ostriches, koalas or dolphins, humpbacks, seals,
only a select cross-section of wild animals with potent mediagenic properties
anchor its defense of Nature. Special campaigns are always aimed at saving the whales,
rhinos or elephants, and not more obscure, but equally endangered fish, rodents, or insects. This
mobilization of biodiversity, then, all too often comes off like a stalking horse for its more entrenched
vocations of defining, supplying, and defending biocelebrity. On a second level, however, the WWF is
increasingly devoted to defending biodiversity, because it is, as Edward O. Wilson asserts, "a priceless product of millions of years of
evolution, and it should be cherished and protected for its own sake."98 Even though it should be saved for its own safe, it is not.
Wilson provides the key additional justification, indicating implicitly how the World Wildlife Fund actually presumes to be the longterm worldwide fund of Nature as the
unassayed stock of biodiversity is saved "for other reasons,"

including "we need the genetic diversity of wild plants to make our crops grow better and to
provide new foods for the future. We also need biodiversity to develop new medicines....a newly
discovered insect or plant might hold the cure for cancer or AIDS." 99 Wilson argues, "you can think of
biodiversity as a safety net that keeps ecosystems functioning and maintaining life on Earth."100 But, as the organization operating
as the green bank with the biggest deposits from a worldwide fund of Nature, the WWF aspires to hold many of these bioplasmic
assets in ecological banks as an enduring trust for all mankind. Fuller, is quite explicit on this critical side of the association's
mission. Because "the biological riches of the planet are part of a seamless web of life in which a threat to any part weakens the
whole," the WWF must ensure the integrity and well-being of the Earth's "web of life," giving it a most vital mission: Because so
much of the current biodiversity crisis is rooted in human need and desire for economic advancement, it is essential that we work to
bring human enterprise into greater harmony with nature. Short-sighted efforts at economic development that come at the expense
of biodiversity will impoverish everyone in the long run. That is why, in addition to establishing protected areas and preserving
critical wildlife populations, WWF uses field and policy work to promote more rational, efficient use of the world's precious natural
the WWFUS mobilizes the assets of biocelebrity to leverage its limited guardianship over the planet's
biodiversity, because we may see as much as one quarter of the Earth's biodiversity going extinct in twenty or thirty years.
Even so, the WWF fails to realize how closely its defense of the rational, efficient use of precious
natural resources as third wave environmentalism may contribute to the extinction of
biodiversity. And, the conspicuous consternation of the WWF permits a focused fixation upon biocelebrities
to occlude this fact for those who truly care about Nature--as long as it is equated with rhinos,
tigers, and elephants. WWF ecotourism remanufactures Nature into
consummational reserves, transforming habitat into assets, flora and fauna into
operating plant, and indigenous communities into entrepreneurial stakeholders
or, even worse, underpaid site managers, for global ecoconsummation. Nature
conservation becomes a game, and everyone involved becomes a player for the WWF. In fact, the
resources."101 Faced by an extinction wave of greater pervasiveness than any confronted during recorded history,
WWF's worldwide banking powers over Nature's biological riches as interdependent mutual funds collateralizes the ecotourism
bargain. As the WWF declares, the deal is dangerous, but potentially very rewarding, inasmuch as "for many rural communities and
local and national governments, the booming travel industry is a rich resource for cash-starved economies and an important
development tool that can foster conservation by giving communities an economic stake in the nonconsumptive use of their natural
resources."102
link law of the sea

Law of the Sea serves as a function by which the government can
expand its control over the environment
Environmentality as Green Governmentality, Discourse of the Environment, pp. 127, arh)
Repudiating the end of history thesis, Secretary of State Christopher
announced at a major address hosted by the

the United States must cope instead with
history in fast-forward, since it now faces threats from which no border can shield us
terrorism, proliferation, crime, and damage to the environment . Such new transnational
security threats endanger all of us in the international world, so that United States will step
forward in the post-Cold War era to combat these threats as an integral part of its anti-isolationist policies . As it runs headlong ahead on fast-forward, the United States now pledges through its secretary of state to
reduce Greenhouse gages, ratify biodiversity conventions, and approve Law of the Sea. Even
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University that
so, President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and Secretary Christopher also recognize how we can make greater use of
environmental intitiatives to promote larger strategic and economic goals helping our environmental industrial sector capture a
larger share of a $400-billion global market.
link legal reform

Ecology and environmental movements crystallize control and
manipulation of populations and environment
As it is discursively constructed by contemporary technoscience ,
the art of government now find the principles of

its rationality and the specific reality of the state, like the policy programmes of sustainable
development, balanced growth or ecological harmony for its many constituent populations of
human and non-human beings, in the systemic requirements of ecology. Government comes
into its own when it has the welfare of a population, the improvement of its condition, the
increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on, as its object. And ecology gives rational
governments all of lifes biodiversity to reformat as endangered populations, needing various
state ministrations as objects of managerial control ignorant of what is being done to them as
part and parcel of a range of absolute new tactics and techniques. Ecology simply
crystallizes the latest phase of the three movements: government, population,
political economy, which constitutea solif series, one which even today has
assuredly not been dissolved in the formations of green governmentality.
Environmental Regulations are a mechanism by which the

government can expand its control over the environment
Repudiating the end of history thesis, Secretary of State Christopher
announced at a major address hosted by the

John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University that the United States must cope instead with
history in fast-forward, since it now faces threats from which no border can shield us
terrorism, proliferation, crime, and damage to the environment . Such new transnational
security threats endanger all of us in the international world, so that United States will step
forward in the post-Cold War era to combat these threats as an integral part of its anti-isolationist policies . As it runs headlong ahead on fast-forward, the United States now pledges through its secretary of state to
reduce Greenhouse gages, ratify biodiversity conventions, and approve Law of the Sea. Even
so, President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and Secretary Christopher also recognize how we can make greater use of
environmental intitiatives to promote larger strategic and economic goals helping our environmental industrial sector capture a
larger share of a $400-billion global market.
Legal reforms to environmental policy serve to expand the reach of

ecogovernance
Goldman 1 (Michael Goldman University of Ilinois at Urbana-Champaign and Yale University, Constructing an
Environmental State: Eco-governmentality and other Transnational Practices of a Green World Bank, Social Problems (November
2001), vol. 48 no. 4, pp. 499-523 // JJ)
Under the rubric of state restructuring, there are three types of interventions in which the
World Bank is engaging; rewriting laws (particularly related to the regulation of natural
resources. the environment, and property rights); restructuring state agencies that regulate
environments (broadly defined to include many state ministries); and funding large-scale
"green" infrastructural projects. All three interventions are inextricably linked: the
development of fixed capital infrastructure (in this case, a joint-ventured hydro-electric facility) requires
laws that establish certain property rights, which can only occur through the restructuring of
state institutions. The environmental projects are the legitimizing vehicle for the dam: Without such a strong public
commitment to environmentally Sustainable development, the World Bank and Counterparts would nor be able to proceed
without incurring robust resistance from the highly effective campaigns to Stop "traditional" Bank-style developmentalism. In
effect, the
Banks pro-active response to transnational environmental organizations,

networks, and movements are new strategies of global environmentalism that
have become institutionalized (with greater and lesser effectiveness) throughout the
world. Before 1975, the colonial French created the Lao legal, juridical, and administrative systems to maximize social control,
resource taxation, and forced labor for their empire. Upon taking power, the socialist Pathet Lao abolished the French system and
replaced it with a general declaration that ail land and resources would belong to the people and held in a public trust (Evans
1995). By the late 1980s, as its main source of foreign aid from the USSR dried up and its foreign debt out of control, the Pathet
Lao introduced a marketoriented set of economic reforms chat were in part in response to pressure from its main creditors, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as to dramatic shifts already Occurring in Vietnam and China. Foreign fiscal
advisors, natural resource planners, and lawyers soon moved into the capital city, Vientiane, to facilitate the policy shift.
Subsequently, the Prime Minister's office passed a
number of important decrees relating to property rights

and natural resource use, especially forest, water, and land. Each was motivated and largely
written by foreign consultants to international finance institutions (IHS), donor "trust funds," or
international NGOs. Each was followed up with Northern loans, aid, and foreign direct investments,
leading to larger and more permanent offices and staff in Vientiane for Northern aid and development agencies, With each legal
in distinction from the colonial era,

the greening and neoliberalization of the state , as the following sections show.
change came institutional restructuring Of the Lao government, and
link limited growth

The discovery and definition of ecological limits to growth transforms
the state into a biopolitical entity
Here the "facts of life" as delivered and mediated by the Worldwatch Institute pass into "fields of control for eco-knowledge and
spheres of intervention for "geo-power"." (p.67). He develops his analysis of environmentality as an extension of governmentality,
which applies techniques of instrumental rationality to the arts of everyday management. " As
ecological limits to
growth are discovered or defined, states are forced to guarantee their populations'
fecundity and productivity in the total setting of the global political economy by
becoming "environmental protection agencies ." (p. 69). Governmentality reemerges as
environmentality, re-establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things." Resource
managerialism is the eco-knowledge of modern governmentality, in which national security and national interests
are "greened" in which the natural bounty of the planet is continually monitored and watched over
by the new technologies of oversight. To construct the managerial problem in the fashion of environmentalism, nature
must be redefined by the eco-knowledge of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for the use and exploitation of particular
human beings. Being
"an environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a bioeconomic

spreadsheet over Nature while "hovering over the world in a scientifically centered surveillance
machine"-- a green panopticom. International environmentalism is watching everything and
everyone, measuring and evaluating among other things, the fertility of women, who can be
reduced to "populations" for the purpose of analysis. The disciplining of nature, misrepresented
as maintaining national security, involves the subdivision of nature into environs, the reduction of human
beings to populations, and the construction of a geo-global political structure to manage it all.
link models
Their calculated risk models sanitize violence by justifying the
destruction that happens on the periphery of ecogovernance
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Ecocritique in Context: Technology, Democracy and Capitalism as
Environment, presented at ASLE (6/4/1999-6/6/1999), http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim653.htm // JJ)
In this subpolis, ordinary processes of democratic legitimation fail. Modern chemical revolutions with all of their toxic by-products
are highly technified economic actions. Each always "remains shielded from the demands of democratic legitimation by its own
character" inasmuch as "it is neither politics nor non-politics, but a third entity: economically guided action in pursuit of interests"
(Beck, 1992: 222). Still, the inhabitants of this planetary subpolis have yet to realize fully how " the
structuring of the
future takes place indirectly and unrecognizably in research laboratories and executive suites,
not in parliament or in political parties. Everyone else --even the most responsible and best
informed people in politics and science--more or less lives off the crumbs of information
that fall from the tables of technological sub-politics " (Beck, 1992: 223). Such informational
crumbs become passages in the textuality of toxicity , which toxicological analysis uses
to confirm the human costs of chemical revolution, environmental transformation, technological
innovation (Smith, 1995). The subpolis evolves in the machinations of many industrial ecologies,
whose machinic metabolism, in turn, entails the planned and unintended destruction of many
nonhuman and human lives. Despite what technoscientific conservatives claim only a few perils in technical
modernization are imagined; many more, which are grounded upon how we construct, inhabit and enjoy the subpolis, are quite
real. When put into practice, then, most environmental
risk analysis unfortunately serves dark purposes as an

applied science of mortality management in the polis. To coexist with the technics of wealth production, all implicitly
consent to coevolve with the tools and techniques that generate hazardous by-products as part and parcel of their useful products. So
many might live more fully with those manufactured goods and services that insinuate their way into our lives, a few must die
and/or live less fully as a function of the many inherent bads and disservices intrinsic to the ordinary routine output of the subpolis.
This operational necessity is called risk. Just as the polis often must conscript its members to wage war and die for its survival, the
To
enjoy the production of wealth by advanced technologies, everyone must endure the systemic
by-production of richer risks, recognizing that for every A, B or C benefit of this chemical or that
material X people per 10,000, Y people per 100,000, or Z people per 1,000,000 will be harmed
by disease, genetic mutation, and/or death. Statistics can forecast in general how many
people, plants, and animals will be struck by this anonymous violence, but no
estimation technique or modelling trick can name which particular individuals
will be taken by this brutal regimen of inexorable random decimation. As Beck ironically
observes, this is accepted glumly as "progress," or "a substitute for questions, a type of consent in
advance for goals and consequences that go unnamed and unknown" (1992: 184).
subpolis requires a random arrangement for an anonymous decimation of its members in order for it to continue developing.
link resource extraction

The corporate-administrative frameworks the aff imposes upon
resource extraction serves to control and regulate nature
and Chair at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the
Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism, Cultural Critique (Autumn 1995), no. 31, The Politics of Systems and
Environments, Part II // JJ)
The script of environmentality embedded in new notions like "the environment" is rarely made articulate in scientific and tech-
nical discourses. Yet, there are politics in these scripts. The
advocates of deep ecology and social ecology

dimly perceive this in their frustrations with "reform environmentalism," which weaves its log-
ics of geo-power in and out of the resource managerialism that has defined the mainstream of
contemporary environmental protection thinking and traditional natural resource
conservationism (Luke, "Green Consumerism"). Resource managerialism can be read as the
eco-knowledge of modern governmentality. While voices in favor of conservation can be found in Europe
early in the nineteenth century, the real establishment of this stance comes in the United States with the Second Industrial
Revolution from the 1880s through the 1920s and the closing of the Western Frontier in the 1890s (Noble). Whether one looks at
John Muir's preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchot's conservationist codes, an awareness of modern industry's power to
deplete natural resources, and hence the need for systems of conservation, is well established by the early 1900s (Nash,
Wilderness). President Theo- dore Roosevelt, for example, organized the Governor's Confer- ence in 1907 to address this concern,
inviting the participants to recognize that the natural endowments upon which "the welfare of this nation rests are becoming
depleted, and in not a few cases, are already exhausted" (Jarrett 51). Over the past nine decades, the
fundamental
premises of resource managerialism have not changed significantly. In fact, this code of ecoknowledge has only become more formalized in bureaucratic applications and legal
interpretations. Paralleling the managerial logic of the Second Industrial Revolution, which em-
powered technical experts on the shop floor and professional managers in the main office,
resource managerialism imposes corporate administrative frameworks upon
Nature in order to supply the economy and provision society through centralized
state guidance. These frameworks assume that the national economy, like the interacting capitalist firm and household,
must avoid both overproduction (excessive resource use coupled with inadequate demand) and underproduction (inefficient
resource use in the face of excessive demand) on the supply side as well as overconsumption (excessive resource exploitation with
excessive demand) and underconsumption (inefficient resource exploitation coupled with inadequate demand) on the demand
side. To
even construct the managerial problem in this fashion, Na- ture must be reducedthrough the encirclement of space and matter by national as well as global economies-to a
cybernetic system of biophysical systems that can be dismantled, redesigned, and assembled
anew to produce "resources" efficiently and in adequate amounts when and where needed in
the modern marketplace. In turn, Nature's energies, materials, and sites are redefined
by the eco-knowledges of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for
sizable numbers of some people, even though greater material and immaterial
"bads" also might be inflicted upon even larger numbers of other people who do
not reside in or benefit from the advanced national economies that basically
monopolize the use of world resources at a comparative handful of highly
developed regional and municipal sites. Many of these eco- knowledge assumptions and geo-power
commitments can be seen at work in the discourses of the Worldwatch Institute as it develops its own unique vision of
environmentality for a global resource managerialism.
Resource managerialism privileges corporate, scientific, and

nationalistic approaches to environmental management
Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Timothy W., Greening the Academy: Ecopedagogy Through the Liberal
Arts, Greening the Political pg. 54-55, Sense Publishers, ISBN: 978-94-6209-101-6 // SM)
A sixth significant permutation of political discourses about the environment can be found in the long-standing practices for a green
politics embedded in resource managerialism. Political science as policy science, administrative science or decision science is more
this approach to green politics has ridden

along with the expansion of American state power since the era of Reconstruction
(Croway, 1953; Vogt, 1947; Diamond, 2005). The formation of bureaus to conduct national geological
surveys, map out national forests, delineate public from private lands, reclaim deserts with
dams, and police Native American lands, territorial lands, and far-flung overseas
commonwealths or colonies to maximize their resource productivity speak directly to the
significance of resource managerialism as green politics in the U.S.A . (Gottlieb, 1993; Luke, 1997; Luke
than comfortable with resource managerialism. Indeed,
1999b). Resource managerialism often is dismissed as not being authentic green politics, because it appears to stand for a business
as usual approach to existing economic and political problems. In fact, this interpretation usually is quite far from the truth.
Beginning with panics in the nineteenth century about the loss of animal species, erosion of farmlands, depletion of forests, and
exhaustion of mineral deposits, resource
managerialism has sought to rethink many existing values and

practices of industrial production, commercial circulation, and capital accumulation in order to
meet the demands of mass consumption which was transformed into the narrow promise of industrial democracy
(Benton, 1994). The politics of more drive the programs of endless economic growth launched in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries; hence, the institutional means of getting, keeping, and expanding
access to fresh stocks of natural resources in order to manufacture more goods and services keeps
the core precepts of industrial democracy alive (Commoner, 1971). Thus, the conceptual articulation of resource
environmentalism are an ideology that is, in fact, quite powerful. Resource managerialism allied with the popular and venerable
beliefs of conservation during the Progressive Era, but it also validates deeper, more potent fundamentalistic environmental
nationalism throughout the twentieth century (Vogt, 1947; Osborn, 1948; Croway, 1953; Carson, 1961; Ophuls, 1977; Brown, 1981;
Dowie, 1995). Resource
managerialism expresses a clear agenda for adapting to the political world. At the same time, it
prescribes certain beliefs about the nations economic condition, and propounds a strict
program for political action to meet those conditions, while regarding them as
institutionally vital truths (Gottlieb, 1993; Barry, 1999; Luke, 1999). Resource managerialism has
always had an institutional propensity to affirm scientific expertise and technological
acumen, and this tenor in its practices clearly does continue even today. Indeed, its backers highlight the changing
face of green politics in this global age by privileging its corporate, scientific and
nationalistic approaches to managing the Earth in an era of expansive
globalization (Friedman, 2008; Beck, 2000; ONeill, 2008).
Resource managerialism locks-in eco-governmentality the impact is

bare life
Resource
managerialism is the eco-knowledge of modern governmentality, in which national security and
national interests are "greened" in which the natural bounty of the planet is continually
monitored and watched over by the new technologies of oversight. To construct the
managerial problem in the fashion of environmentalism, nature must be redefined by the ecoknowledge of resource managerialism as the source of "goods" for the use and
exploitation of particular human beings . Being "an environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a
Governmentality reemerges as environmentality, re-establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things."
bioeconomic spreadsheet over Nature while "hovering over the world in a scientifically centered surveillance machine"-- a green
panopticom. International environmentalism is watching everything and everyone, measuring and evaluating among other things,
the fertility of women, who can be reduced to "populations" for the purpose of analysis. The
disciplining of nature,
misrepresented as maintaining national security, involves the subdivision of nature into
environs, the reduction of human beings to populations, and the construction of a geo-global
political structure to manage it all.
Management of natural resources is the crux of power for the state

Hopkins University, Beyond Sovereign Territory, pp. XIII, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, government'
is about providing for needs, while

sovereignty is about authority." The problem of government, according to Michel
Foucault encompasses concerns that had been (and still are) mere variables to
perhaps the majority of modern political theorists: resources, means of
subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, Irrigation, "fer tility,
etc."; and people with their specific qualities, customs, habits, ways of acting and
thinking, etc. These issues are not independent of the exercise of sovereignty over
a territory but arc inextricably linked to it. far from being given entities, sovereign
territories (including their populations) are created entities And the creation of
sovereign territory carries with it profound ideological consequences.
The expansion of natural resources only serves as a mechanism by

which the state can expand its power
This chapter has explored only one path through the order of things embedded in contemporary mainstream environmentalism.
Ultimately, it suggests
that we cannot adequately understand governmentality in present-day

regimes, like the United States of America, without seeing how many of its tactics, calculi or
institutions assume environmentalized modes of operation as part and parcel of ordinary
practices of governance. Strategic Environmental. Initiatives are how standard operating procedures. To preserve the
political economy of high-technology production, many offices of the American state must
function as environmental protection Agencies, inasmuch as they continue to fuse a politics of
national security with an economics of continual growth, to sustain exist ing industrial ecologies
of mass consumption with the wise use of nature through private property rights.Conservationist ethics, resource managerialism and green rhetorics, then congeal as an
Unusually cohesive power/knowledge formation, whose actions are an integral element of this
orders regime of normalization.
Resource Managerialism is only a tool of the state to control us and

project their biopolitical concerns on the environment
Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation, acc. 7/29/14,
arh)
Resource managerialism can be read as the essence of today's enviro-mentality. While voices in favour
of conservation can be found in Europe early in the 19th century, there is a self-reflexive establishment of this stance in the United
whether one
looks at John Muir's preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchot's conservationist code, there is
a spreading awareness of modern industry's power to deplete nature's stock of raw materials,
which sparks wide-spread worries about the need to find systems for conserving their supply
from such unchecked exploitation. Consequently, nature's stocks of materials are rendered down to
resources, and the presumptions of resourcification become conceptually and operationally well
entrenched in conservationist philosophies. The fundamental premises of resource
managerialism in many ways have not changed over the past century. At best, this
code of practice has only become more formalized in many governments'
applications and legal interpretations. Working with the managerial vision of the second industrial
States in the late 19th century. From the 1880's to the 1920's, one saw the closing of the western frontier. And
revolution, which tended to empower technical experts like engineers or scientists, who had gotten their degrees from agricultural
schools, mining schools, technology schools like the one I work at, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, which prides itself as they say on
producing the worker bees of industry. Or, on the shop floor and professional managers, one
found corporate executives

and financial officers in the main office, who are of course trained in business schools. Put
together, resource managerialism casts corporate administrative frameworks over nature in
order to find the supplies needed to feed the economy and provision society through national
and international markets. As scientific forestry, range management, and mineral extraction took hold in the U.S. during
this era, an ethos of battling scarcity guided professional training, corporate profit making, and government policy. As a result, t he
operational agendas of what was called sustained yield were what directed the resource
managerialism of the 20th century. In reviewing the enabling legislation of key federal agencies,
one quickly discovers that the values and practices of resourcification anchor their institutional
missions in a sustained yield philosophy. As Cortner and Moote observe, the statutory mandates
for both the Forest Service, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, and the National Forest
Management Act, and the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, for example, specifically direct these agencies to employ a multiple use
sustained yield approach to resource management. More often than not, however, these agencies adjusted their
multiple use concept to correspond to their primary production objective -- timber in the case of the Forest Service, grazing in terms
of the Bureau of Land Management. Although
sustained help is not specifically mentioned in the legislated

mandate of agencies such as the National Parks Service or the Bureau of Reclamation, they too
have traditionally managed for maximum sustained yield of a single resource - visitor use in the
case of the parks, water supply in the case of water resources. So the ethos of resourcification
imagined nature as a vast input/output system. The mission statements of sustained yield pushed natural resource
management towards realizing the maximum maintainable output up to or past even the point where one reached ecological
collapse, which in turn of course caused wide-spread ecological degradation, which leads to the project of rehabilitation
managerialism.
link sanctuaries
The affirmatives designation of certain lands as protected sanctuary
necessarily designates others as less ecologically significant and
therefore subject to ecogovernmental violence
Some lands of Nature

are more "ecologically significant," some regions are much more "natural areas," but some
grounds are far less "protectable" than others. The methods of the Conservancy show how it
implicitly sees Nature as real estate properties inasmuch as its chapters must constantly grade the acreages they
receive--labelling some as truly ecologically significant, some as plainly natural areas, some as
merely "trade lands."85 The latter are sold, like old horses for glue or worn-out cattle for dogfood, and the proceeds can used
elsewhere to promote conservation. In seeking to preserve Nature, the Nature Conservancy strangely
oversees its final transformation into pure real estate, allowing even hitherto unsalable or
undeveloped lands to become transubstantiated into "natural areas" to green belt human
settlements and recharge their scenic visits with ecological significance. When it asks for land to protect
In the Nature Conservancy's operational codes of land consumption, a triage system comes into play.
wildlife and create sanctuary for ecosystems. However, the Nature Conservancy tends not to detail the ultimate cause of its concern.
Protect it from what? Create sanctuary from what? The
answer is, of course, the same consumeristic economy

that is allowing its members to accumulate stock, mail in donations, buy and sell land. In many
ways, the Conservancy is disingenuous in its designation of only some of its lands as trade lands. Actually, all of its protected
lands are trade lands, trading sanctuary and protection here (where it is commercially possible or aesthetically
imperative) to forsake sanctuary and protection there (where it is commercially unviable or aesthetically
dispensable). It extracts a title for partial permanence from a constant turnover of economic destruction anchored in total
a perpetually losing battle, protecting rare

species from what makes them rare and building sanctuary from what devastates
everything on the land elsewhere with the proceeds of its members' successful
capitalist rarification and despoliation. The Nature Conservancy necessarily embraces the key
counter-intuitive quality of all markets, namely, a dynamic in which the pursuit of private vices can
advance public virtues. This appears contradictory, but it has nonetheless a very valid basis. It agrees to sacrifice almost all
impermanence.86 The Conservancy ironically fights
land in general to development, because it knows that all land will not, in fact, be developed. On the one hand, excessive
environmental regulations might destroy this delicate balance in land use patterns. In accepting the universal premise of
development, on the other hand, it constantly can undercut economic development's specific enactments at sites where it is no
longer or not yet profitable. Some land will be saved and can be saved, in fact, by allowing, in principle, all land to be liable to
development. Hence, it needs trade lands to do land trades to isolate some land from any more trading. In allowing all to pursue
their individual vices and desires in the market, one permits a differently motivated actor, like the Nature Conservancy, to trade for
land, like any other speculator, and develop it to suit its selfish individual taste, which is in this case is "unselfish nondevelopment."
This perversely anti-market outcome satisfies the Conservancy's desires and ends, while perhaps also advancing the collective good
through market mechanisms. Over the past two decades, The Nature Conservancy has grown by leaps and bounds by sticking to the
operational objectives of "preserving biodiversity."87 As
powerful anthropogenic actions have recontoured the

Earth to suit the basic material needs of corporate modes of production, these artificial contours
now define new ecologies for all life forms caught within their "economy" and "environment."
The "economy" becomes a world political economy's interior spaces defined by
technoscience processes devoted to production and consumption, while "the
environment," in this sense, becomes a planetary political economy's exterior
spaces oriented to resource-creation, scenery-provision, and waste-reception.
link satellites
Constant satellite surveillance lays the groundwork for
ecogovernance the astropanopticon is the emblem of the
managerial gaze
No longer Nature, not merely ecosystem, the
terraforming of our world under this kind of watch truly

reduces it to strategic spaces. As "an environment," ringed by many ecological knowledge
centers dedicated to the rational management of its assets, the global ecosystem is to be
understood through the disciplinary codes of green operational planning. The health of
global populations as well as the survival of the planet itself allegedly necessitate
that a bioeconomic spreadsheet be draped over consummativity on Earth,
generating an elaborate set of accounts for a terraforming economy of global
reach and local scope. Hovering over the world in their scientifically-centered
astropanopticon of green surveillance, the disciplinary grids of efficiency and waste, health and
disease, poverty and wealth as well as employment and unemployment. Fusing geo-economics with geopolitics, Brown, Flavin and Postel declare "the once separate issues of environment and development are now inextricably linked."80
Indeed, they are, at least, in the discourses of Worldwatch Institute as its experts survey Nature-in-crisis by auditing levels of topsoil
depletion, air pollution, acid rain, global warming, ozone destruction, water pollution, forest reduction, and species extinction
brought on by excessive mass consumption. Worldwatch
terraforming would govern through things, and

the ends things serve, by restructuring today's ecologically unsound system of objects through
elaborate managerial designs to realize tomorrow's environmentally sustainable economy in the
ecologically perfected objects of that environmentalized system. The shape of an environmental
economy would emerge from a reengineered economy of environmentalizing practices vetted by
worldwatching codes. The individual human subject of today, and all of his or her things with their unsustainable practices,
would be reshaped through a consummational environmentality, redirected by practices, discourses, and
ensembles of administration that more efficiently synchronize the bio-powers of populations
with the geo-powers of environments. To police global carrying capacity, in turn, this
environmentalizing logic would direct each human subject to assume the much less capacious
carriage of disciplinary frugality instead of affluent suburban abundance. All of the world must come
under this watch, and the global watch would police its human charges to dispose of their things and arrange their ends--in
reengineered spaces using new energies at new jobs and leisures--around these post-consumptive agendas. Sustainability, like
sexuality, would become another expert discourse about exerting power over life. 81 What the biopower
strategies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped fabricate in terms of human sexuality now must be reimagined for
How development might

"invest life through and through" becomes a new sustainability challenge, once biopolitical
relations are established, in making these investments permanently profitable as
consummational systems of objects.82 Thus, the Worldwatch Institute issues pamphlet after monograph after book on
humanity in worsening global conditions of survival as a perfected consummative survivalism.
the supreme virtues of bicycles, solar power, windmills, urban planning, or organic agriculture to reveal the higher forms of
consumer goods perfection attainable by the system of objects. Moreover, sustainability more or less presumes that some level of
material and cultural existence has been attained that is indeed worth sustaining. This formation, then, constitutes "a new
distribution of pleasures, discourses, truths, and powers; it has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the
enslavement of another: a defense, a protection, a strengthening, and an exaltation...as a means of social control and political
subjugation."83 Sustainable development means developing new consummative powers through defining a new model of green
subjectivity organized around sustaining both new object worlds in a more survivable second nature and new consummational
systems for their surviving subjects.
link scientific rationality

The affirmatives reliance on scientific rationality sanctions select
forms of knowledge as more acceptable than others, symptomatic of
regulatory ecomanagerial discourse
Goldman 1 (Michael Goldman University of Ilinois at Urbana-Champaign and Yale University, Constructing an
Environmental State: Eco-governmentality and other Transnational Practices of a Green World Bank, Social Problems (November
2001), vol. 48 no. 4, pp. 499-523 // JJ)
The emphasis in this article is not only on these changes, but also on the
regimes of power, truths, and rights on

which these institutional practices are based. These knowledge/power relations run through the
scientific and legal practices of the World Banks new green work and become concretized
through loan conditionalities, environmental assessments, scientific reporting, methodologies,
classifications, policy papers, decrees, legislation, and large-scale foreign investments. Newly
transnationalized state agencies, staffed with new hybrid actors, emerge with the strengthened mandate to oversee the reterritorialization (Brenner 1999) and re- evaluation of borrowing country landscapes, resulting in a radical alteration in the ways in
which people interact with people and nature. In analyzing this process, I stress the making of hegemonic
forms of
rationality that translate into effects of government: constructing the environmental science and art
of targeting populations, production practices, and behaviors vis--vis nature that are judged as
guilty or innocent of ecological degradation. In this way, the modern eco-rational subject and
the environmental state are being mutually constituted . Different from the prevailing debates on
governmentality, however, I have emphasized that national territory is not just an unchanging stage on which new political
rationalities are exercised (Burchell, et al. 1991; Darier 1999); in fact, the problems of government hinges on the contest over de?
ning natures intelligibility (Braun 2000; Moore 2001). In
the case of resource-rich and capital-poor

borrowing countries such as Laos, natural wealth and natural- social relations are being
transformed through proliferating scientific and political processes under the mantle of
environmentally sustainable development. Based on actual practices, however, it should be renamed
green neoliberalism, a political rationality that has fostered the scientization,
governmentalization, and capitalization of some very hotly contested eco-zones (e.g., the Mekong, the
Amazon).
link sustainability
The affirmatives rhetoric of sustainable development serves as
justification for expanding the control and regulation of the
environment
Parker 8 (David Parker interested mainly in ecological politics, green politics, political economy, and social change, An
ecosocialist critique of sustainable development: maintaining growth through sustainable degradation, well sharp (1/23/2008),
http://wellsharp.wordpress.com/2008/01/23/an-ecosocialist-critique-of-sustainable-development-maintaining-growth-throughsustainable-degradation // JJ)
One important flaw in this conception of ecological crisis, from a green perspective, is that it
reduces the environment to its economic value only [2]. However, it appears that the fear of this type of
crisis drives much government policy, because many business and most state agencies
themselves only recognise the economic value of the environment . As a crisis of underproduction would
indeed severely damage prospects for economic growth, the response of governments, international institutions, NGOs and business
it is always insisted that growth will not

and must not be impaired by the new policy instruments of sustainable
development. From the capitalist point of view of business and the state, this is only logical:
nothing is permitted to rein in growth. What we have in sustainable development, then, is the
latest creative restructuring of capitalism in the face of an imminent crisis. What will this mean for
has been the idea of sustainable development. At the same time
capitalism? And what will it mean for the natural world? In the ecosocialist journal Capitalism Nature Socialism, Timothy Luke
presents an analysis of sustainable development that extends the insights gained from OConnors theory [3]. In his article, Luke
describes how the crisis-induced reorientation of capitalism to sustainable development is being manifest as ecomanagerialism,
ecocommercialism and ecojudicialism. Ecomanagerialism Luke uses the term ecomanagerialism to
describe the
shift of corporate thinking about environmental issues into more positive environmentally
friendly channels. This shift has occurred with the gradual acceptance of the natural world as
one of the necessary pre-conditions of any profitable business enterprise . For example,
environmentalists have worked hard over many years to move the business approach to resource
exploitation away from sustained maximum yield and towards sustainability ; successes have
been achieved through a combination of activism, resource management legislation, tradeable
quotas, global competition, and bench-marking and eco-labelling. Extensive monitoring is also
part of the picture, as it is a necessary part of maintaining keeping sustainable business practices
on track. Overall, the shifts in attitudes and practices embodied by ecomanagerialism
have effectively blunted calls for more radical green economic alternatives and at
the same time have allowed society to maintain its aspirations for continuing
growth and expanding consumption.
Sustainable development is a smokescreen for sustaining

development bureaucracy co-opts the plan
Luke 13 Timothy W. Luke is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and
Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (October 2013, Timothy W., The Platypus Affiliated Society, Platypus
Review 60, The Anthropocene and Freedom: Terrestrial time as political mystification,
http://platypus1917.org/2013/10/01/anthropocene-and-freedom/ // SM)
the most common normative advice for living better in the Anthropocene resorts to the
demand to embrace sustainable development. Despite their green pretensions, sustainable
development practices focus on sustaining development rather developing
sustainability and, in any case, they have decisively failed to do either . Our Common Future propounded directives
Stuck at this impasse,
to enjoy the benefits of development up to the point that it will not compromise the ability of future generations to have that same opportunity.[18] Nevertheless, todays
opportunities are grim. The best science on greenhouse gases, for example, suggests that 350 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere is the tipping point for halting global warming
trends. Regrettably, this threshold was identified in 19871988, and then exceeded during 1990 by 4.35 ppm with regard to global greenhouse gas emissions. 350 ppm still is
scientists are
still quarreling with policy makers, who dispute their findings or reject their recommendations in
toto. What once was a sincere appeal to radically restructure industrial civilization
by developing sustainably has , in turn, morphed into a corporate chamber of
commerce homily for lean and clean growth . Yet, atmospheric CO2 levels measured at Hawaiis Mauna Loa Observatory stood
considered the safest limit, as James Hansen testified before Congress in 1988. Rather than abiding by the WCEDs 25-year-old moral injunctions,
at 395.5 ppm during January 2013 and will exceed 400 ppm by 2014.[19]
link warming
Global Warming only serves to further the domination of populations
and the environment by the government
Luke 8 (Timothy, , University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of
The Politics of True Convenience or Inconvenient Truth: Struggles Over How to Sustain
Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology in the 21st Century, Environment and Planning, Vol. 40,
pp. 1811, 1824, arh)
4 Conclusions: Ì [we] need to wake-up' The
project of global climate crisis management, as outlined by

one of the greatest efforts to expand, as Michel De Certeau claims, ``the empire of
the evident in functionalist technocracy'' (1988, page 203). Indeed, as this overview of the struggle for
capitalism, democracy, and ecology in the 21st century has sought to demonstrate, Al Gore's telling of ìnconvenient
truths' is being done in a manner that aspires to exert greater control over most
planetary places, processes, and practices in the state of emergency threatened by
worldwide climate changes. More draconian complexities, however, also could await those
Gore, marks
who follow Gore. Since only 1% of all cars and trucks registered in the USA are hybrids, only 5% of current light bulb sales are
compact fluorescents, and only 2.3% of electricity generation comes from renewable sources of energy, voluntary changes motivated
by ethical consumption thus far have not been, and in the future probably will not be, sufficient. The institutional problems of
responding efficaciously to climate change, then, are immense. To cite one example, Joseph Romm,
head of the
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the US Department of Energy
under President Clinton, argues that ``global warming will change American life forever and end politics as we know it'' in our
lifetimes (2007, page 230). That is a rather big bite to swallow in suburbia, and few will want to have their helping of it. In his view,
it is now imperative that ``the nation and the world embrace an aggressive
multidecade, government-led effort to use existing and near-term clean- energy
technologies'' (Romm, 2007, page 230). This program would entail planning out a fifty-year-long energy-generation and
energy-conservation campaign, which stresses radical action immediately. During the mobilization, the USA and other major
industrial countries must act so that: ``1. We replicate, nationally and globally, California's performance-based efficiency
program and codes for homes and commercial buildings. From 1976 to 2005, electricity consumption per capita stayed flat in
California, while it grew 60 percent in the rest of the nation. 2. We
greatly increase the efficiency of

industry and power generation and more than double the use of cogeneration (combined heat and power). The
energy now lost as waste heat from U.S. power generation exceeds the energy used by Japan for all purposes. 3. We
build 1 million
turbines (fifty times the current capacity) or the equivalent in other renewables, such
as solar power. 4. We capture the carbon dioxide associated with 800 proposed large coal plants (four-fifths of all coal plants in
large wind
the year 2000) and permanently store that CO2 underground. This is a flow of CO2 into the ground equal to the current flow of oil
out of the ground. 5. We build 700 large nuclear power plants (double the current capacity) whilemaintaining the
use of all existing nuclear plants. 6. As the number of cars and light trucks on the road more than triples to 2 billion, we
increase their average fuel economy to 60 miles per gallon (triple the current U.S. average) with no increase in
miles traveled per car. 7. We give these 2 billion cars advanced hybrid vehicle technology, so that they are
capable of running on electricity for short distances before they revert to running on biofuels. We take one-twelfth of the world's
cropland and use it to grow high- yield energy crops for biofuels. We build another half-million large wind
turbines dedicated to providing the electricity for these advanced hybrids. 8. We stop all tropical deforestation, while doubling the
rate of new tree planting'' (Romm, 2007, pages 22 ^ 23). Such foundational changes are not impossible, particularly if the world is
truly facing the greatest emergency in human history, but they now surely seem improbable. Stratagems numbers (3) and (7) versus
number (5), for example, have often been seen, at least in the USA, as politically antithetical, because windmills and nuclear plants
have had different political supporters. It is not clear that stratagem number (1) is the best standard in the USA, much less the world,
since standards other than those from California might be superior. Stratagem number (6) for cars and trucks is business as usual in
current, sprawl-driven urbanization patterns; and, stratagem numbers (1) and (2) have been routinely dismissed for decades as cost
ineffective in the USA and elsewhere, because many business groups oppose serious conservation. Finally, no one knows what will
happen if stratagem number (4) is implemented, since this project must capture and sequester in gas and/or liquid forms massive
quantities of CO2, or about 82 million barrels per day in 2004. This will require a massive new infrastructure, as elaborate and
expensive as today's oil industry, to implement successfully, but without the same widely distributed demand for the product being
processed as one finds for gasoline. Even so, Romm's truly radical plan also might be too little, too late. It openly aims at keeping
global CO2 emissions higher than 2005 levels at 400 ppm, or the figures predicted for 2010, while anticipating they could very well
increase to about 550 ppm. If the plan worked perfectly, global warming will continue steadily, and the Earth's overall degradation
will become more evident to everyone. Therefore, while this vast economic and engineering effort unfolds, it also could very easily
lose political support. Temperatures would rise 1 8C (1.88F) by 2015, they could rise another 1.5 8C (or 2.78F) by 2100, and much of
Greenland's ice sheet would melt, increasing sea levels maybe by 20 ft (Romm, 2007, pages 22 ^ 24). At the same time, as Gore
(2006a; 2006b) would affirm, even greater disasters could be avoided, and CO2 levels eventually might be brought back to 1990
levels of 356 ppm (Kolbert, 2006, page 202) early in the 22nd century with these interventions. However, this
reindustrialization campaign would require a sustained systemic policing of world

greenhouse gassing, energy conservation, and land use for almost ninety years, three human
generations, or more than twice as long as the Cold War, to name a recent global struggle on a lesser scale. As the GROCC
Romm's plan is
just one representative blueprint for administering sustainable degradation: it just
needs a good solid business model. Who will build more efficient power plants,
consortium of transnational capital, environmental NGOs, and academic mandarins are anticipating,
manufacture hybrid vehicles, construct more nuclear generating capacity, sequester captured, stored, and piped CO2, stop
deforestation, and
build wind turbines? It is no surprise that ninety major global firms

want to, as the CEO of Alcoa asserts, `àll grow and prosper in a greenhouse gas-constrained world.'' Romm's design requires
only a more comprehensive consensus among business and government leaders about selling the goods and services needed by a
world where CO2 concentrations increase, temperatures rise dramatically, much of the world's existing ice fields melt, sea levels rise
at least 20 ft, thousands of square miles of settled ground is flooded, and this chaos goes on for decades, if not centuries. Whether it
is called èthical consumption', `corporate social purpose', `green stewardship', or `cradle-to-cradle design', this is the reality of
`sustainable degradation', namely, how to profit from ecological crisis. Like Romm, Gore and his Alliance for Climate Protection are
hoping to develop, with the GROCC, as Alcoa's Belda states, `à global plan of action on climate change in ways that create more
economic opportunities than risks'' or the type of plan ``needed to extend the climate change issue from one of talk to one of
action''. More critical
analyses, such as this one, must question the reduction of an

entire planet to these national or, perhaps even, transnational policeable spaces. Oddly enough,
many of those who accept such efforts at global policing pushed by authorities like Gore and the IPCC
are the same people as those who reject outright other efforts at global policing by figures
like President Bush (43) or Robert Kagan. There is far too much presumption of a power
and knowledge not yet attained implied by Gore's na| ve belief in àn Earth in Balance', reprocessed GIS images,
and ecological moralizing PowerPoints as An Inconvenient Truth implies. Pictures alone do not make the Earth's ecologies fully
legible, but they embolden those backing Gore's green ideology to lay down the basis of a new regulatory regime that ironically few, if
any, democratic publics have elected to endure. Authority
is clearly being asserted here in the global warming

debates, but it is not very clear that it is being affirmed by voters, the public, or people in general. After all, we must remember
that Live Earth was mostly a rock extravaganza, not a global plebiscite, and the Nobel Peace Prize is an honorary recognition, not a
writ of sovereignty. Whose
space gets policed transnationally when, how, and by whom

remain important open questions.
Sustainable development to solve warming is co-opted by bureaucracy

were already past the tipping point
Stuck at this impasse, the
most common normative advice for living better in the Anthropocene resorts to
the demand to embrace sustainable development. Despite their green pretensions, sustainable
development practices focus on sustaining development rather developing sustainability and, in any
case, they have decisively failed to do either . Our Common Future propounded directives to enjoy the benefits of
development up to the point that it will not compromise the ability of future generations to have that same opportunity.[18]
Nevertheless, todays
opportunities are grim. The best science on greenhouse gases, for example,
suggests that 350 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere is the tipping point for halting
global warming trends. Regrettably, this threshold was identified in 19871988, and then
exceeded during 1990 by 4.35 ppm with regard to global greenhouse gas emissions. 350 ppm still is
considered the safest limit, as James Hansen testified before Congress in 1988. Rather than abiding by the WCEDs 25year-old moral injunctions, scientists are still quarreling with policy makers, who dispute their findings
or reject their recommendations in toto. What once was a sincere appeal to radically restructure
industrial civilization by developing sustainably has , in turn, morphed into a corporate chamber of
commerce homily for lean and clean growth . Yet, atmospheric CO2 levels measured at
Hawaiis Mauna Loa Observatory stood at 395.5 ppm during January 2013 and will
exceed 400 ppm by 2014 .[19]
Increasingly invasive strategies to curb warming become the

justification for expansion of government control
Hallstrom 8 (Niclas Hallstrom director at the What Next Forum, exploring a broad range of issues and areas, including
new technologies, climate change and climate justice, development and globalisation, economics, and knowledge, science and
complexity, What Next? Climate change, technology and development, Society for International Development (2008), vol. 51, pp.
375-381, http://www.whatnext.org/resources/Publications/What-Next-article_Development-journal-issue-51-3.pdf // JJ)
Although there are reasons to scrutinize each of these technologies in their own right, there is
also a pressing need to understand what is happening in the broader picture. A few years ago, the Dag
Hammarskjld Foun- dation in collaboration with a number of scholars and activists set in motion the What Next project to
reflect back on 30 years of work on alternative development ^ and to look ahead. 3 In its 30-year business-as-usual scenario of the
future, What Next weaves a complex web of trends and interlin- kages between climate, new technologies and corporate
concentration. In
the gloomy story of the future, geo-engineering is pursued as a major strategy to

curb global warming, leading to esca- lating health and environmental problems, and also
providing the rationale for new levels of corporate mergers and collusion between
governments and big geo-engineering consortia. The technologies are considered too risky to be
made available to everyone, and are too costly insurance-wise for the corporations; thus, governments must step in
and guarantee liability. While the struggle against climate change unfolds through increasingly
centralized and large-scale efforts, society is also becoming more closed and authoritarian ^
again considerably triggered by technological development. As synthetic biology and other new technologies
are providing the means for easily producing massively destructive bioweapons, society must protect itself and democracy from
terrorists and lunatics through pre- vention by surveillance. Surveillance,
massively enhanced by new

information technology, ro- botics and satellites, becomes the parad- oxical imperative to
protect democracy and freedom. As a way to adapt to a rapidly changing environment and succeed in an increasingly
competitive society, more and more people see themselves obliged to enhance themselves in a range of ways, both physically and
mentally, through new human performance enhancement drugs and therapy ^ if theycanafford them.
impacts
impact biopolitics
Biopower imposes an obligation on the state which will use this
obligation to justify expanding to global biopower. Ecocide and
genocides are the end result.
Olivier 99 (Lawrence, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Quebec, The Construction of Environmental Awareness, Discourses of the Environment, pp.
71-72, arh)
Thus, we see that the environmentalist discourse was born with the blossoming of legislation in
a wide range of fields that have a direct or indirect effect on the life of individuals. This discourse
is rooted in the aspiration for a better quality of life, better health, better control over the
immediate environment - in short, over any phenomena that influence on our-well being . On the
other hand, the aspiration for quasitotal control over matter, pushed to an extreme, leads
individuals to create the death culture so justly condemned by environmentalists. The death culture
represents a discourse that was strongly criticized-by a number of groups and scientific disciplines. It appears in the
imperialist political will, where oppression and exploitation, assimilation and cultural genocide,
of subjected people, constitute the golden rule of the powerful colonizing ruler. But more than
control over a territory, its subsoil of its wealth, it is a form of cannibalism of
values and works of art that devours a culture with all its original creations (Moscovici
1993: 19). The death culture can therefore be understood in terms of what some environmentalists
call genocide and, transported to the environmental scale, ecocide (ibid. 20), as a mode of
governmentality in which exploitation is the organizing principle of social life. Ecocide, decried
by environmentalists, is reflected in an absence of respect for the environment, through the
pollution of air and water and the destruction of entire forests stemming form a fetishization of
concrete. Ecocide is the mutation of the environment by genetic manipulation and
cloning, by the nuclear experiment and its production of radioactive waste. Many
environmentalists claim that it is the rule of market aesthetics (of ugliness), of
waste and of stench.
Biopolitical thought leads to mass destruction and inevitable

extinction.
Kouros 97 (George, Yale Law Graduate, And Holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Emory. Become
What You Are, 1997, arh)
Although the consequences are grave, the administrative practices of biopower go largely
unchallenged precisely because they promise the opportunity of vastly improving the quality of
life. But a system primarily concerned with technological exigencies of ensuring survival
paradoxically is no longer able to assign meaning to the value of life. Life is something to be
secured at all costs, and by any means, as the American military motto of "you have to kill to
save" during the Vietnam War demonstrates. For Foucault, this technological imperative to
secure survival is what brings us closest to the possibility of our own extinction: [T]his formidable power
of death ... now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply
it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars ... are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone ;
entire
populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity:
massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that
so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And
through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend
increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that
terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic
situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to
death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's existence . . . If genocide is
indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to
kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race. (HS
137) In the interest of optimizing life we find ourselves possessing the capabilities to wipe out all
of humanity as we know it. Heidegger, much like Foucault, understands "the atomic situation"
as the product of a technological process that seeks to create "a happier human life."8 But he also emphasizes that "precisely if the
hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved" that we face the greatest danger (DT 52). Responding to a chemist's
proclamation that "The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will
be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will," Heidegger writes: "We do not stop to consider that an
attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little" (DT 52).
In other words, in the absence of a nuclear holocaust we assume that we have managed to keep technology in hand. Without the sound of an explosion to alert us,
we become complacent to the deadliness of our own technological achievements. For example, the chemist's ability to manipulate DNA and genetically screen out
undesirable traits, while promising the possibility of a "happier human being," maintains the conditions for a eugenic nightmare.-JC
The notion of an anthropocentric dualism is only possible because of

the political distinctions made by humans themselves biopolitics
strengthens human control and exploitation of the environment
Oliver 07 (Kelly, Professor at Vanderbilt University Stopping the Antrhopoligical Machine:
Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty PhaenEx2, no. 2, Fall/Winter
amr.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/phaenex/article/download/236/396 2007, arh)
2007
To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the
Agamben
diagnoses the history of both science and philosophy as part of what he calls the anthropological
machine through which the human is created with and against the animal. On his analysis, early forms
suspension of suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man. (Agamben, The Open 92) In The Open, Giorgio
of this machine operated by humanizing animals such that some people were considered animals in human form, for example
barbarians and slaves. Modern
versions of the machine operate by animalizing humans such that some

people were/are considered less than human, for example Jews during the Holocaust and more
recently perhaps Iraqi detainees. Agamben describes both sides of the anthropological machine:
If, in the machine of the moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside
and the inhuman produced by animalizing the human, here [the machine of earlier times] the
inside is obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced by the
humanization of an animal: the man-ape, the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also and above all the slave, the
barbarian, and the foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form. (37) The human-animal divide, then, is not
only political but also sets up the very possibility of politics. Who is included in human society
and who is not is a consequence of the politics of humanity, which engenders the polis itself.
In this regard, politics itself is the product of the anthropological machine, which is inherently
lethal to some forms of (human) life. Although Agambens analysis could be extended to include
a diagnosis of the dangers to animal life, in The Open, he is primarily concerned with the
dangers to human life.1 Agamben argues that the dichotomy between man and animal is a
division within the category of the human itself. In both the earlier and the modern versions,
humanity is divided into more and less human types, which in turn becomes justification for
slavery and genocide. The question, then, for Agamben is not one of human rights, but rather
how the category of the human is produced and maintained against the category of the animal,
which functions as both constitutive outside and inside such that some people are rendered
non- or sub-human.
impact environment
Expansion of state power is the root cause of environmental
degradation
Darier 99 (Eric, PhD, research associate for Lancaster Universitys Center for the Study of
Environmental Change, Discourses of the Environment, pp. 23-24, acc. 7/29/14, arh)
Foucaults approach to space is the third concept which might also be extremely relevant to an
environmental critique. Foucault explored the problematization of space within a historical
context (Foucault, 1984e; 1989d: 99-106). According to the framework of governmentality, the security
of the state is guaranteed not so much directly by the control of territory (space), but rather
through the increasing control of the population living in that territory . In fact, Foucault
suggests that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the government of France started to think of its territory on the model of
the city. According to Foucault, The
city was no longer perceived as a place of privilege, as an exception

to the territory of fields, forests, and roadsInstead, the cities, with the problems that they
raised, and the particular forms that they took, served as the models for the governmental
rationality that was to apply to the whole of the territory. A state will be well organized when a system of
policing as tight and efficient as that of the cities extends over the entire territory. Consequently , one historical rupture
which became a condition for the environmental crisis was the attempt to extend the system of
social control in place in the cities to the countryside. The historical analysis of the increasing
control of the non-urban space (the more natural environment) is similar to the critique of
social ecologists who might agree with Foucault that the domestication of nature was part of a
system of (urban) power relations among humans which had for its objective the maintenance of
the given social order (Bookchin 1982). As the environmental crisis was one of the results
of specific power relations such as the social inequalities and political hierarchyit would presumably have to have to be addressed before or at least at the same
time as the environmental crisis. Obviously, deep ecologists, like George Sessions, would interpret this
focus on human issues as the continuation of anthropocentrism which created the environment crisis in the first place (Sessions
1995b). Locating Foucault with other social ecologists against deep ecologists is not accurate either. Foucaults
studies of
emergence and rise of human sciences in the context of governmentality- as a specific reason
of state based on security- could also be the basis for a critique of anthropocentrism. However,
unlike deep ecologists, Foucault would not suggest replacing anthropocentrism by ecocentrism, which also presents its own set of
traps. For example, Foucault would probably agree with Timothy Lukes critique of Ecocentrism (i.e. anti / non-anthropocentrism)
as being also, ultimately, a humanly constructed category which is policed by all-too-human ecocentrists. Justifying
human
actions in the name of nature leaves the unresolved problem of whose (human) voice can
legitimately speak for nature and the inherent dangers of such an approach.
impact individual freedom

Environmental experts fail to solve crises their authority devastates
individual freedoms
The Anthropocene as Past/Present/Future THE RECENT COINAGE OF THE ANTHROPOCENE as a technical term of art
presents an intriguing intellectual and political puzzle.[1] Arguments for accepting the Anthropocene as a fundamental change in all
hitherto experienced human history appear driven less by the hopes to chronicle accurately natural history, than by designs for
redirecting how human beings ought to act now. On the one hand, its proponents
present themselves as vigilant

scientific sentries of individual freedom, declaring alarm as experts on current
ecological crises prompt nation-states to do something about the destruction that
mankind has wrought in the environment for 250 years. At the same time, how individual
freedoms will be protected under their watch is less clear. With power and wealth at
stake, various networks of scientific and technical experts maneuver with their latest analyses of the
Anthropocene to gain authority to manage from above and afar, once again, individual choices and
collective efforts to mitigate, or adapt to, rapid climate change. On the other hand, the notion of the
Anthropocene remains an on-going theoretical debate in the geophysical and stratigraphical scientific communities.[2] This aspect
of the debate poses the question of whether the unchecked growth of civilizations products and by-products is, or is not, a worldhistorical episode of ecological degradation. Do negative human environmental impacts yet exist on a geological time scale and, if
they do, what must be done? Corporate
interests, government agencies, and mass publics are concerned

about the environment, but their agendas can be at odds. Crutzen, as Kolbert notes, wants to focus our
attention on the consequences of our collective actionson their scale and permanence. What I hope, he says, is that the term
Anthropocene will be a warning to the world.[3] Crutzen is, however, not the first to sound this alarm.
The world has been
repeatedly warned about anthropogenic destruction, practically to no avail. In Man and Nature (1864),
George Perkins Marsh made comparable claims about humanity which fully anticipated this anthropocenic turn. Little serious notice
was given to his or other warnings. In the meantime, many
degrees of freedom have been lost in these decades
of neglect. It is unclear how much environmental damage we would be able to rectify even if political will were not so divided.
The question of the Anthropocene and freedom is, in fact, quite disjointed.
Green statism empowers experts rather than creating a responsible

community
Arts, Greening the Political pg. 53, Sense Publishers, ISBN: 978-94-6209-101-6 // SM)
Eckeresleys notion of green statism is rooted in a green public sphere of humans and nonhumans; and, for her, the project of building the green state
can never be finalized: inasmuch as it will lead to a dynamic and ongoing process of extending citizenship rights and securing an inclusive form of
political community (Eckersley, 2004, p. 16) to many of a global scale. Indeed, the brief for a green state would be to far more effectively and
comprehensively protect ecosystems and environmental victims (Eckersley, 2004, p. 16). Even though it is aware of the contributions of
environmental science, ecomodernization or green business, the green state becomes critically important to enact, and then enforce more ecologically
responsible modes of state governance (Eckersley, 2004, p. 15). Nonetheless, green
statism ultimately means to empower

experts rather than citizens. Even though it speaks about a public sphere and its democratizing
possibilities, it is less clear that Eckersley and other green statists see, as Bookchin (1995, p. 232) advocates, an
ecological politics able to inculcate the values of humanism, co-operation, community, and public
service in the everyday practice of civic life.
impact inequality
Environmental management re-entrenches elitism and inequality
How and why the idea of the Anthropocene is being touted now by other policy-centered scientific communities, like atmospheric chemistry,
conservation biology, soil science, physical geography, applied climatology, or public administration, is a much more directly political question about
Earth
management. To the extent that this idea of the Anthropocene becomes a writ of empowerment to
preside over the declaration, and then implementation of, an ecological state of
emergency , its significance is hardly limited to specialists within the academy. Letting go of
1960s-era ecological catastrophism has many political dimensions. Most significantly, the deciders in
charge of adapting to rapid climate change would be empowered to right-size carbon-intensity,
growth prospects, and participation in global cosmopolitan society for the few , while the same
ecomanagerialist schemes will engineer decarbonization, degrowth, and deglobalization in
everyday life for the many. [15]
Human modification of nature potentially leads to a new emerging

hierarchy of domination, reducing the environment into the humans
work. Altering the environment means destruction of our two
spheres.
Luke 95 Timothy W. Luke University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the
College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and
International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia (Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of
Nature, Economy, and Culture, http:// books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=kayX_vHwwpoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=timothy+luke&ots=_XQQpd_7m1&sig=
PuyrPDJ_u-eTGEylXyikSbvuW8A#v=onepage&q=timothy%20luke&f=false) ENH
Humanitys increasing control over the environments of Nature through technological means
necessarily results in a greatly increased ability to dominate human nature . The two spheres are
intimately connected inasmuch as the complex technical controls implicit in advanced technology
demand that everyone exercise greater discipline over his or her own labor and patterns of
consumption. By preconditioning the behavior of individuals, Marcuse sees technological reason introjecting its
technical demands into each persons somatic-psychic constitution, which becomes the psychological basis of a
threefold domination: First, domination over ones self, over ones nature, over the sensual drives that want only
pleasure and gratification; second, domination of the labor achieved by such disciplined and
controlled individuals; and third, domination of outward nature, science, and technology.
Science and technology become an antienvironmental system of domination with its own
subpolitics of instrumental control. This recognition is critical: Science, by virtue of its own method and concepts, has
projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained links to
domination of mana link which tends to be fatal to this universe as a whole. Nature, scientifically comprehended and
mastered, reappears in the technical apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and
improves the life of individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus. Consequently, a
rationalizing technical hierarchy based on humans dominating Nature merges with a disciplinary
social hierarchy of humans dominating other humans in the abstract machinery of onedimensional society. Marcuse also sees a possibility for changing the negative trends in the scientific project. The
reconciliation of science and technology as a global system, or Logos, within a new metaphysics of liberation, or Eros, might assist
science in developing essentially different concepts of nature, facts, and experimental context. Beyond the reification
of
technology, which reduces humans and Nature to fungible objects of organization, neither the world
of Nature nor the systems of society would be the stuff of total administration. Marcuse believes that this
break would be possible if a new idea of Reason attuned to a new sensibility of capable of guiding its theoretical and practical
workings could be developed. This moment, which would reverse the relationship between existing science and a metaphysics of
domination, would come with the completion of technological rationalization, or the mechanization of all socially necessary but
individually repressive labor. This moment of technological
liberation also would make possible the

pacification of existence between humans as well as between humans and natureif such newly freed
individuals would work effectively to finally realize this emancipatory moment. The New Sensibility and Pacifying Nature
Marcuses ecological engagement is intertwined with his search for a new science and a new sensibility as paths for society to
take itself out of its current environmental crises. If the old
science of instrumental operationalism is behind

the domination of Nature and humanity in the abstract machines of industrial environments,
then new scientific practices, linked not to a metaphysics of domination but rather to a metaphysics of domination but
rather to a metaphysics of liberation, might well alter everything. Here, a new sensibilityaesthetic, life-affirming, and
liberatory in characterwould play a vital role. Most important, a new sensibility, based on aesthetic dimensions and a regard for
beauty as a check against aggression and destruction, would mark the ascent of Eros over Thanatos in the pacification of existence.
Marcuse sees the powers of the imagination, unifying the faculties of sensibility and reason, becoming productive and practical. A
new sensibility of emancipatory freedom would work as a guiding force in the reconstruction of
realityreconstruction with the help of a gaya scienza, a science and technology released from their service to destruction and
exploitation, and thus free for the liberating exigencies of the imagination. The new science, when combined with the
sensuous aesthetic awareness of the new sensibility, could reintegrate labor and leisure, science and art, work and play
so thoroughly that humanity and nature would also become one: such a world could (in a literal sense) embody,
incorporate, the human faculties and desires to such an extent that they appear as part of the
objective determinism of nature. By unchaining reason from domination, and exalting Eros over Thanato s, humans
with the new sensibility would mobilize the aesthetic to develop freedom hand in hand with
emancipation as art merges with technology, and science serves liberation. The aesthetic universe is the
Lebenswelt on which the needs and faculties of freedom depend for their liberation. They cannot develop in an
environment shaped by and for aggressive impulses, nor can they be envisaged as the mere effect of a new set of
social institutions. They can emerge only in the collective practice of creating an environment: level by level, step by stepin the
material and intellectual production, an environment in which the nonaggressive, erotic, receptive faculties of man, in harmony with
the consciousness of freedom, strive for the pacification of man and nature .
In the reconstruction of society for the

attainment of this goal, reality altogether would assume a Form expressive of the new goal. The
essentially aesthetic quality of this Form would make it a work of art, but inasmuch as the Form is to emerge in the social process of
production, art would have changed its traditional locus and function in society: it would have become a productive force in the
material as well as cultural transformation. Art would cancel the deadening operation facticity of technological domination in todays
abstract machines with its enlivening visions of technological emancipation in tomorrows tangible communities. In the
development of society and the subject, Marcuse argues, the human pacification of existence can be repressive or liberating.
Nature is not seen as some benevolent, all-knowing fount of positive goodness; it is instead
constructed by Marcuse as a combination of ferocious, inventive, blind, fertile, and destructive
processes. And, the liberating pacification of Nature should reduce the misery, violence, and
cruelty of Nature in the face of it scarcity, suffering, and want. Nature and Revolution, in Counterrevolution
and Revolt, beings Marcuse directly to ecology and the environment through his new sensibility. Now trapped by psychosocial
performance principles no longer needed to produce the material foundations of civilization, Marcuse sees individuals as having
fresh chances for attaining liberation by developing intentionally new sensibilities about the unlimited liberatory potential of all
modern technology. On this count, Marcuse asks Frued for some preliminary directions, but he does not accepts Freud
unquestioningly as an all-knowing guide in these murky realms of analysis. For advanced industrial society, Marcuse argues, the
if the
unintended consequences of technological rationalization have rendered the institutions of the
performance principle obsolete, then it would also tend to make obsolete the organization of the
instinctsthat is to say, to release the instincts from the constraints and aversions required by the performance principle.
performance principle enforces an integrated repressive organization of sexuality and of the destruction instinct. However,
impact racism
Western modes of Environmentalism are doomed to environmental
racism towards those who are people of color / the indigenous
Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation, Aurora
Magazine Interview with Timothy Luke,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91, acc. 7/29/14, arh)
the slow taking up of questions of colonialism, power and race in
environmental questions? Timothy Luke: To me that's a really interesting question. Because I think it's not
addressed at all in most environmental programs. There are environmentalisms that are
non-western, non-North American, indigenous, that really presume a different (and
this is an odd word but it's the only way I know how to express it), a different kind of meta-economy . An
economy, which is not tied to the production and consumption of commodities. It's tied to the
production and consumption of use values. If one looked at it anthropologically, it would be feudalistic,
Question: Could you comment on
hunter/gathering, it's just a different engagement materially with the earth that non-western colonized peoples had and have in the
confrontation with colonialism.
Given the choice, how would you choose to live? Well, when I was
younger, I thought, "I'd really like to go follow the buffalo." That would be a great way to live.
You just follow around your food source, your shelter source, your clothing source . That would
be a great way to live. But there aren't very many buffalo left these days. But those kinds of issues are
other economies or ecologies have been crushed by colonialism. There are other ways of
engaging with the earth that have been destroyed in the mono-productive qualities of the global economy, which is where we're at
now. I think some, whatever you want to call them, environmentalisms
in developing countries,
underdeveloped states, whatever, raise those kinds of questions . How might we live
otherwise with the earth? Yet in turn they would be seen as essentially quaint or
anachronistic, because it would be very difficult to live that way at this level of
population for most societies . But they present that challenge. I think the other thing that is
raised by that is just a different vision of nature or a different vision of divinity, a different vision
of humanity together that is not shared by global transnational capitalism. That also rests in the
experience of colonized peoples. Finally, of course, there's the environmental racism question, that
colonized peoples are poor, powerless, and it's pretty convenient to dump stuff
that nobody else wants on them. The environmental justice movements in a lot of
places have raised those issues . But the problem with them often is, and while I see what they're doing and one
must respect it, it sometimes becomes a "where's my share" sort of thing . It accepts the existing system and it
basically says, "I want to be in the existing system and I want to be at the top of the chain instead
of the bottom of the chain." That's how the system presents justice. It's who does it to whom and
who gets stuck with the cost, which is the power of the existing mode of production. And yes, I
think an environmental studies curriculum for the 21st century must bring those kinds of issues
into the study of environmental affairs, because they largely have not been in it in many places. I
haven't thought about that as much as I could, because it leads you to re-examine everything,
colonialism, western expansion, how everything works together. It's very complex, but even
when you start getting into it a little bit you see that that's a very unifying thread for a lot of
these problems.
impact serial policy failure

Western modes of Environmentalism are doomed to serial policy
failure
the slow taking up of questions of colonialism, power and race in
environmental questions? Timothy Luke: To me that's a really interesting question. Because I think it's not
addressed at all in most environmental programs. There are environmentalisms that are
non-western, non-North American, indigenous, that really presume a different (and
this is an odd word but it's the only way I know how to express it), a different kind of meta-economy . An
economy, which is not tied to the production and consumption of commodities. It's tied to the
production and consumption of use values. If one looked at it anthropologically, it would be feudalistic,
Question: Could you comment on
hunter/gathering, it's just a different engagement materially with the earth that non-western colonized peoples had and have in the
confrontation with colonialism.
Given the choice, how would you choose to live? Well, when I was
younger, I thought, "I'd really like to go follow the buffalo." That would be a great way to live.
You just follow around your food source, your shelter source, your clothing source . That would
be a great way to live. But there aren't very many buffalo left these days. But those kinds of issues are
other economies or ecologies have been crushed by colonialism. There are other ways of
engaging with the earth that have been destroyed in the mono-productive qualities of the global economy, which is where we're at
now. I think some, whatever you want to call them, environmentalisms
in developing countries,
underdeveloped states, whatever, raise those kinds of questions . How might we live
otherwise with the earth? Yet in turn they would be seen as essentially quaint or
anachronistic, because it would be very difficult to live that way at this level of
population for most societies . But they present that challenge. I think the other thing that is
raised by that is just a different vision of nature or a different vision of divinity, a different vision
of humanity together that is not shared by global transnational capitalism. That also rests in the
experience of colonized peoples. Finally, of course, there's the environmental racism question, that
colonized peoples are poor, powerless, and it's pretty convenient to dump stuff
that nobody else wants on them. The environmental justice movements in a lot of
places have raised those issues . But the problem with them often is, and while I see what they're doing and one
must respect it, it sometimes becomes a "where's my share" sort of thing . It accepts the existing system and it
basically says, "I want to be in the existing system and I want to be at the top of the chain instead
of the bottom of the chain." That's how the system presents justice. It's who does it to whom and
who gets stuck with the cost, which is the power of the existing mode of production. And yes, I
think an environmental studies curriculum for the 21st century must bring those kinds of issues
into the study of environmental affairs, because they largely have not been in it in many places. I
haven't thought about that as much as I could, because it leads you to re-examine everything,
colonialism, western expansion, how everything works together. It's very complex, but even
when you start getting into it a little bit you see that that's a very unifying thread for a lot of
these problems.
alternative
alt cosmo
The alternative is to open national boundaries and identities
As the twentieth century moves to a close, the world has changed enormously. New metaphors for an integrated "one world" proliferate in the form of
visual images such as photographs of earth taken from space, and turn up in such unlikely places as fundraising mailings from Planned Parenthood, in
a drawing in which human beings crowd together, ringing the planet. On the one hand, the
contemporary recognition of the

interrelated nature of our planet, and the archaic nature of national boundaries, suggest the
possibility of a new transnational cooperation and a popular realization that national boundaries
are arbitrary and political, they are products of history, not nature. Potentially, it calls forth the
notion of an interconnected world in which all inhabitants of the planet have an equal claim
on wealth and freedom, opening , rather than closing, national boundaries and national
identities in a recognition of all that joins us, rather than separates us as human beings sharing this
planet with each other and the rest of nature.
alt discursive reframing

Neither corporate managerialism nor traditional environmental
activism has any hope of securing lasting change in contemporary
environmental debates literally the ONLY hope for change is a
representational strategy like ours.
Luke 3
(Timothy W. Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
June-July 2003, Alternatives, p. 413-14, arh)
These new modes of existence present us with an opportunity. A world where one
asks, What are world politics? and then funda mentally doubts all the answers
about what the political world is taken to be gives both individuals and groups the
opportunity to transform their spaces for effective action. Those who dominate the
world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is
known. Unless they also face resistance, question ing, and challenge from those
who are dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces . Looked at by itself,
the neat division of the world into the realms of international relations and
environmental affairs remains somewhat colorless. Such terms continuously
remediate our most common modes of interpretation , as they now prevail in the world. Indeed,
this language spins particular wordsglobalization, sustainability, development
into either important choke points or major rights-of-way in the flows of political
discourse. The connections between international relations and the environment assume considerable importance in the
2000s because much of the worlds ecology has deteriorated so rapidly during the past ten, thirty, or fifty years. This
omnipolitanizing deterioration, in fact, has spread so quickly that neither green

fundamentalist preservationism nor corporate capitalist conservationism can do
much to solve the pressing ecological problems of the present . Now, after the industrial
revolution, nowhere in the world holds out against machines; high technology is
everywhere. After two world wars, few places anywhere in the world hold onto traditional formulas of authority; liberal
democracy is spreading everywhere. After the Cold War, nowhere seriously holds forth as a real alternative to the market; corporate
capitalism is everywhere. So only
a truly critical approach to international relations and the

environment can unravel why these forces interact, and maybe correct how they
create ecological destruction. Improving the understanding of international
relations as a scholarly discipline is one possible response to this new context. Strangely enough, the
dysfunction of markets and states is a key constituent component of the contemporary world systems environmental crisis.
alt eco-critique
We should engage in criticism of the disciplinary processes that the
affirmative both critiques and engages in
Bowerbank 99
(Sylvia, professor in the Arts and Science Programme and English Department of McMaster
University, Ontario, 1999, Discourses of the Environment, p. 177, arh)
To say this is not to suggest that we abandon the wilderness retreat or the nature journal as green practices. It is to acknowledge
how arduous and inconclusive even our best efforts at greening are. Why should this discourage us? Quick
fixes and
big transformations in the name of an ecological world order are no doubt
dangerous and undesirable (Ferry 1995). What Foucault writes of recent little
improvements in the quality of Western culture applies equally well to
environmental matters: I prefer even these partial transformations that have
been made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude , to the
programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century (1984b: 467). In
Foucaults terms, deep
transformations of the self, as of material and social reality, can take place
only in a free atmosphere of criticism. Transformation and critique, far from being
contrary modes, work together toward slow, authentic change . As Foucault argues, a permanent
reactivation of critique is, at present, our only procedure for determining what is not or is no longer indispensable for the
the selfcultivation of the green subject is a long, difficult historical endeavour with an
uncertain result. The greening of the subject becomes a case of working on our
limits; it is a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty (ibid. 50). To understand the positive
implications of Foucaults writings is to be encouraged by these ironic words .
constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects (ibid. 423). Seen in the light of Foucaults work,
Rejections of flawed representations of ecosystem problematizes

entire logic of management of natural resources breaks chain of
biopower by posing unanswerable questions
Hopkins University, Beyond Sovereign Territory, pp. 17, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
The move away from notions of permanence, fixity, regularity, which is now, perhaps, occurring,
removes the simple standard against which Botkin argues we have judged our actions. We can
no longer be the shepherds or guardians (or masters ) as Marsh would call us to be. Or, at least, the task
can no longer be seen in such clear-cut terms. How are we to shepherd a world that is in continual
flux? If change is intrinsic to nature, how are we to understand the effects our
actions have upon earth? The ecological problematic of Marsh has been exploded
by contingency. We no longer have a nature of permanence to measure our actions against;
there is no original nature on which to base out decisions. This new ecological problematic (re) raises
the question of management (perhaps to problematize its standing). How do you manage something
that is always changing? Should forest fires be left uncontrolled? From where do
our valuations on change emerge? What changes can we say are natural? If we
no longer have a solid standpoint, a permanent, unchanging nature from which to
judge our effects upon the world, arent we turned loose upon the earth, free do to
anything and everything? In short, how can we possibly articulate an ethic of
ecology in such a world, let alone a politics of ecology?
The judge should be situated as an ecocritic; analyzing the operation

of discourse in power relations. This technique can help shape our
relationship to each other, nature and influence policy
Buell 99
(Lawrence, Professor and Chair of English at Harvard University, Literary History, 303,
http://muse.ihu.edu/journals/new_literary_history/v030/30.buell.html, arh)
At this point we perhaps seem to have reached, indeed transgressed, the very border of the "literary," and again the nagging question
arises of whether, if there is no limit to what might count as " ecocriticism," the term can be said to denote anything substantive.
But that would be a shortsighted response. Rather, the foregoing studies of green rhetoric
should be seen as testifying

crucially (a) to the interdisciplinaritv of vision that is or at least always should be at some level
present in ecocritical thought even when it is trained exclusively on poems or novels, (b) to the
importance for many ecocritical practitioners of the link between literary representation of
environment and the realms of social affairs as well as the realms of science, and (c) to the
transferability and pertinence of ecocritical expertise- the exegetical and and conceptual tools
requisite to textual analvsis-to virtually all aspects of environmental inquiry, whether scientists
and public policy experts recognize it or not. That does not mean we should expect Al Gore to sit
down and read the last dozen exegeses of the representation of seasonality in Thoreau's Walden
or Annie Dillard's Pilgrim at Tinker Creek. But it does mean that ecocritics have every right to believe that
if they do their jobs rightnot, of course to be taken for granted-- they will not only be able to
reveal to fellow literature department colleagues some hidden things about even the most
familiar and classic works but also have a basis to consider themselves participants in a
pandisciplinary inquiry of the first order of historical significance. From the multiple epicenters
of this inquiry-through a mixture of collaboration, solitary concentration, and sheer luck-not
just new regulatory codes, pharmaceuticals engineering marvels and the like may ensue but new
insights, new revaluations of the physical world and humanity's relation to it that will make a
difference in the way others live their lives. Admittedly nothing is more shocking for many humanists than to find
theirs ideas taken seriously. But it might just happen in this case. That self-identified ecocritics tend [End Page 709] to be folk who
seriously entertain that possibility is one reason why the best ecocritical work is so strange, timely, and intriguing.
Engaging in ecocriticism increases activism and decreases

anthropocentrism
Phillips 99
(Dana, Asst. Proffessor of English @ Brown University, New Literary History,
30.3,http://musc.iliu-edu.journals/new_literary_history/v030/30.3phillips.html, arh)
To some observers the antitheoretical spirit of ecocriticism has seemed entirely laudable, a
breath of fresh air-to use an expression which in this context is overdetermined . In a 1995 article in
The New | York Times Magazine. Jay Parini celebrated the formal debut of this new kind [ End Page 578] of
critique at a conference held that summer at Colorado State and attended by several hundred would- be ecocritics, myself included.
He explained the provenance of ecocriticism by suggesting that it "marks a return to activism

and social responsibility; it also signals a dismissal of theory's more solipsistic tendencies. From
a literary aspect, it marks a re-engagement with realism, with the actual universe of rocks, trees
and rivers that lies behind the wilderness of signs." This description is effusive, but accurate:
Parini is reporting on what he learned in interviews with well-known practitioners of
ecocriticism, including John Elder of Middlebury College and Lawrence Buell of Harvard
University^ whose work I address below.
alt eco-ethics
The alternative is to embrace Nietzschean Eco-Ethics; this serves to
revere the world in its glory and difference from ourselves, no longer
viewing it as a standing reserve for human consumption, control, and
manipulation this challenges dominant modes of thought
Hopkins University, Beyond Sovereign Territory, pp. 21-22, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
Blumenbergs reading of Nietzsche and his ecology never consider such statements of Nietzsche
as this: But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of life, it is covered by a veil interwoven
with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness,
mockery, pity, and seduction.'7 Nietzsches vision of life, nature, the world carries with
it elements that resist the material at mans disposal reading, or the stewardship
reading . A nature that is in all eternity chaos further suggests a break from the nature- asplastic reading Blumenberg presents. If nature is chaos, rather than plastic , it will confound our
ability to mold it, to shape it into what we want it to, or think it should be. Moreover,
Nietzsche even criticizes our insistences that nature be what we claim it to be,
when he argues for not divesting nature of its rich ambiguity, for not attempting to
rid nature of what is nature in it. Nietzsche's conception of nature evokes what one
might even call a nontheistic reverence for the difference of nature. Blumenberg appears unable to afford
nature such respect, for in his world, reverence is due to a God, or to nothing at all. Thus a world stripped of its
teleological bindings becomes a plastic world. But God is dead, and Nietzsche, who
would vanquish Gods shadow, too, still speaks of having a reverence to nature .
Nature receives Nietzsches reverence not from being predisposed to us , not from being
uniform, regular, or even unfinished material waiting for us to finish it. Nietzsches reverence toward
nature emerges from its ambiguous possibilities, its contingency, its resistance as well as its
promise, its mockery, its bashfulness, and its ability to confound human self-assertion. The
rejection of openly, or shadowy, theological underpinnings for nature and our
relationship to it need not release humans to assert their mastery over the world,
even if that would involve taking responsibility for the future condition of the
world. Rather than letting us loose to do anything at all, a Nietzschean eco-ethic
inserts a profound and troubling element of caution, that in our actions we may be
imposing our designs and interpretations on the world and the vast diversity of
life that occupies it along with us.
Rejecting representations of nature as static and embracing constant

change is key to effetctive environmental management
Botkin speaks directly about the Nietzschean problem of Gods shadow. Ecologies of constancy
operate in this shadow, comforting us in the presence of a world where God is dead. But changing our
reflection does not mean the end of ecology. Botkin argues that rethinking both nature
processes and our relationship to them is essential for the practice of ecosystem management. If
change is intrinsic and natural (at many scales of time and space), the principles of the
science of ecology must be reevaluated. Where change used to be the problem for
ecologists, now it describes the ecological problematic. If nature is change, the ecologists task
must also change. No longer can s/he gold to beliefs in the unquestioned good of
static landscapes; no longer can s/he unproblematically attack any changes that
might take place on the earth whatever the scale of time or space. Life itself is
dependent upon change.
Rejections of flawed representations of ecosystem problematizes

entire logic of management of natural resources breaks chain of
biopower by posing unanswerable questions
The move away from notions of permanence, fixity, regularity, which is now, perhaps, occurring,
removes the simple standard against which Botkin argues we have judged our actions. We can
no longer be the shepherds or guardians (or masters ) as Marsh would call us to be. Or, at least, the task
can no longer be seen in such clear-cut terms. How are we to shepherd a world that is in continual
flux? If change is intrinsic to nature, how are we to understand the effects our
actions have upon earth? The ecological problematic of Marsh has been exploded
by contingency. We no longer have a nature of permanence to measure our actions against;
there is no original nature on which to base out decisions. This new ecological problematic (re) raises
the question of management (perhaps to problematize its standing). How do you manage something
that is always changing? Should forest fires be left uncontrolled? From where do
our valuations on change emerge? What changes can we say are natural? If we
no longer have a solid standpoint, a permanent, unchanging nature from which to
judge our effects upon the world, arent we turned loose upon the earth, free do to
anything and everything? In short, how can we possibly articulate an ethic of
ecology in such a world, let alone a politics of ecology?
alt inappropriation
We should situate ourselves as inappropriate/d others this subjectposition is critical, refractive, and deconstructive, highlighting lines
of difference in the face of technosciences homogenizations.
Haraway 4
(Donna, professor of the History of Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz,
2004, The Haraway Reader, p. 69-70, arh)
If the stories of hyper-productionism and enlightenment have been about the
reproduction of the sacred image of the same, of the one true copy, mediated by the luminous
technologies of compulsory heterosexuality and masculinist self-birthing, then the differential artifactualism I
am trying to envision might issue in something else. Artifactualism is askew of
productionism; the rays from my optical device diffract rather than reflect . These
diffracting rays compose interference patterns, not reflecting images. The issue from this generative
technology, the result of a monstrous16 pregnancy, might be kin to Vietnamese-American filmmaker and feminist
theorist Trinh Minh-has (1986 17b; 1989) inappropriate/d others.17 Designating the networks of
multicultural, ethnic, racial, national, and sexual actors emerging since World War II, Trinhs phrase referred to
the historical positioning of those who cannot adopt the mask of either self or
other offered by previously dominant, modern Western narratives of identity
and politics. To be inappropriate/d does not mean not to be in relation with i.e.,
to be in a special reservation, with the status of the authentic, the untouched, in the allochronic and allotopic condition of innocence.
Rather to
be an inappropriate/d other means to be in critical, deconstructive

relationality, in a diffracting rather than reflecting (ratio)nalityas the means of
making potent connection that exceeds domination. To be inappropriate/d is not to fit
in the taxon, to be dislocated from the available maps specifying kinds of actors and
kinds of narratives, not to be originally fixed by difference. To be inappropriate/d is to be neither modern
nor postmodern, but to insist on the amodern. Trinh was looking for a way to figure difference as a
critical difference within and not as special taxonomic marks grounding difference as apartheid. She was writing about people; I
wonder if the same observations might apply to humans and to both organic and technological non-humans. The
term
inappropriate/d others can provoke rethinking social rela tionality within
artifactual naturewhich is, arguably, global nature in the 1990s. Trinh Minh-has metaphors suggest
another geometry and optics for considering the relations of difference among
people and among humans, other organims, and machines than hierarchical
domination, incorporation of parts into wholes, paternalistic and colonialist
protection, symbiotic fusion, antagonistic opposition, or instrumental production
from resource. Her metaphors also suggest the hard intellectual, cultural, and political work these new geometries will
require. If Western patriarchal narratives have told that the physical body issued from the first birth, while man was the product of
the heliotropic second birth, perhaps a differential, diffracted feminist allegory might have the inappropriate/d others emerge
from a third birth into an SF world called elsewherea place composed from interference patterns. Diffraction
does not
produce the same displaced, as reflection and refraction do. Diffraction is a
mapping of interference, not of replication, reflection, or reproduction. A diffraction pattern
does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of
difference appear. Tropically, for the promises of monsters, the first invites the illusion of essential, fixed position, while
the second trains us to more subtle vision. Science fiction is generically concerned with the interpenetration of boundaries between
problematic selves and unexpected others and with the exploration of possible worlds in a context structured by transnational
technoscience. The
emerging social subjects called inap propriate/d others inhabit
such worlds. SFscience fiction, speculative futures, science fantasy, speculative fictionis an especially apt sign under
which to conduct an inquiry into the artifactual as a reproductive technology that might issue in something other than the sacred
image of the same, something inappropriate, unfitting, and so, maybe, inappropriated.
alt public ecology

The alternative is to embrace is to embrace a public ecology when
things are treated as a shared environment rather than privatized and
state-owned, we are unlikely to treat it in a negative way
Question: Can you briefly talk about the forms of politics that would be attached to such a model? Do
we need an
apocalypse first? . . . What are the political forms that the resistance has to take? One option is one
suggested by Barry Commoner - a social democratic model. What forms of politics do you suggest - the way our forefathers brought
ideas from the 1960s into the first era of environmental studies? Timothy Luke: I don't have a good answer for that. I'm working on
it. My
approach is, and what I'll talk about a bit tomorrow, is what I call public ecology. Our ecology is
essential now seen as, in many ways it's a privatized affair. It is captured within the production
and consumption of commodities that we buy that are produced for us to buy and that way of
dealing with the environment is not sustainable. It's destroying carrying capacity . I think what we
need to do is see that in fact the built environment and the unbuilt environments
are public commonly shared projects . We need I think to politicize things that have not
been politicized, in probably a Social Democratic fashion, and to maybe kind of ask these difficult questions.
We're an automotive society. At the end of the day, the first mass produced car, the Model T, was an ecologically more
desirable automobile than the ones we have now. Low compression engine, low polluting production process, very simple. Anybody
who paid attention to it could sit down, take it apart, rebuild it in their backyard using commonly available tools, could go almost
anywhere, and carried you from point A to point B. It was an appliance. But
we've spent 100 years seeing

automobiles as more than an appliance. What is it in ourselves that makes us want to have a
Boxter, an SUV or whatever, as opposed to this appliance, which was to provide the service of
the car, which was to get you from point A to point B, and something that you had command
over. You could fix it yourself, and it wasn't terribly polluting. And is there something even
better than that? Ironically, the more ecologically desirable car is the car that was available in
1914, not the car that's going to be available in 2014 and is the environmental car that's being
offered to us -- you know, the hybrid cars, the electric cars, the fuel cell cars -- is that going to get us involved in even more
destructive industrial ecologies? Or is it going to get us into a better kind of industrial ecology? What do we want out of this? I think
if there's a politics engaged now in our environmentalism, it's that of a kind of eco-imperialism, which basically says, in the United
States we've got ours and we're going to keep it. What's ours is ours and what's yours is ours. That's the way it is. Out of the guise of
whatever - terrorism, radical Islamicism, whatever - if
the United States needs to go somewhere in order to

secure the world's oil or secure the world's anything, that will be done. And the kind of politics
that's engaged here is not one of mass democracy in the traditional sense of anybody who's part
of the republic should be willing to fight for the republic. It's really based upon technocratic
experts who go out and engage in war in multinational coalitions to make this happen. So there
is a pretty perverse kind of eco-imperialism building in this kind of global ecology .
And it's one that basically says a large number of people in the world are not going to get to live like United States. And instead
they're going to live like they do now. The goal that the United States should have is to take those billion people that live on $1 a day
and find a way to help them live on $3 a day. That is a radical improvement in their lives. Then as that occurs, some of them will get
to live maybe on $10 a day or $20 a day. But then if you look at how people live in the United States, maybe they live on $100 a day
or $500 a day. It presumes still radical inequality .
That is a pretty disturbing ecological politics. Yet at the

same time, one could ask, well is living on $3 a day or $5 a day a more ecological way of doing
things that maybe has a model for all of us in terms of how we might or should live? And to
recognize, for those of you who are worried about jobs, to rebuild everything that's been built in
the past 120 years to be ecological irrational and destructive will require lots of resources and
lots of labour to remake everything in a more ecologically sustainable and less destructive
fashion, it presumes a new built environment, it presumes a new urbanism . It presumes new land use
formations. It presumes a new kind of local, regional, national, international economy. It presumes new kinds of artifacts. It
really presumes the interrogation of everything that is around this kind of goal,
and then the remaking of it to get it to you to that point. Which is a big project, but
essentially that's what it asks. It really asks political questions of what have been seen as technical objects and
technical systems, in a way that is very rarely done. Doing that would require a different kind of politics. The one that is most
commonly able to get us there is a more Social Democratic one, but one of course that is not very popular in North America, because
again, our ecologies hide behind this veil of expertise and this veil of property. That's mine, don't screw around with it, I like my
SUV, I like my Corvette, and that's the way I want to live. Why do you want to do that? Well because I'm a unique individual sitting
there in the wheel of my SUV and Corvette, which is made in unit runs of 400,000 to 500,000 a year. I'm a unique individual. I'm
sitting here playing these unique individual tapes in my head as I drive down the road or sit in traffic, with all the other unique
individuals playing these tapes in their head of how cool and groovy we are. But that is the script in terms of how it exists. That is a
challenge for whatever environmental studies, environmental science, and environmental ethics to address. But that's a very
different one, but one I think needs to be done if you're going to get at the root of a lot of these problems.
alt reject tech

The alternative is to engage in precautionary civil deliberation
bottom-up approaches are key to avoiding quick-fix technological
catastrophe
Hallstrom 8 (Niclas Hallstrom director at the What Next Forum, exploring a broad range of issues and areas, including
new technologies, climate change and climate justice, development and globalisation, economics, and knowledge, science and
complexity, What Next? Climate change, technology and development, Society for International Development (2008), vol. 51, pp.
375-381, http://www.whatnext.org/resources/Publications/What-Next-article_Development-journal-issue-51-3.pdf // JJ)
I do not propose an anti-technology, luddite approach, rather I ask that we deal with techno-
logies in a careful, responsible and holistic manner. It is important that we thoroughly apply the
precautionary principle so that truly sustainable and equitable technologies can evolve (and
those already existing are recognized). We need to take the time necessary to ensure that undue
risks are not taken. Even if there is a climate crisis desperately calling for urgent
intervention. Sir Martin Rees, President of The Royal Society, and one of the most eminent scientists in the UK, discusses
in his book Our Final Hour the challenges of science and the emergence of new technologies, including geo-engineering, syn-
thetic biology and other climate change-related solutions. He somberlyconcludes the following: I think the odds are no better than
fifty-fifty that our present civilization on Earth will survive to the end of the present centuryy through malign intent, or through
misadventure, twenty-first century technology could jeopardize lifes potential, foreclosing its
human and posthuman future (Rees, 2003:8). Left in the hands of technocrats and the scientists
themselves, we are not likely to come to grips with climate change or emerging technologies.
Civil society , through the ordinary public and social movements, is crucial in order to ensure
transparency, critical inquiry, and open participation in debates and decisionmaking. Technology transfer is not a simple, value-free, technocratic matter. It is politics. As
Rees states: Choices on how science is applied ^ to medicine, the environment, and so forth ^ should be debated far beyond the
scientific communityy the views of scientists should not have special weight in deciding questions that involve ethics or risks:
indeed, such judgments are best left to broader and more dis- passionate groups (Rees,2003:78). As more positive, sustainable
and equitable ways forward, theWhat Next projectalso outlinesalter- native scenarios by asking what
if civil society in
collaboration with other actors managed to change focus from large-scale techno-fixes to
genuine equity-oriented, sustainable solutions? What if citizens and researchers would, for example, take
initiative to set up a decentralizedWikipidea- style system ^ Technopedia ^ to track and evaluate technology development and
act as more efficient watchdogs and whistleblowers? And on an international level ^ how could UN conventions and institutions
be called for to conduct fore- casting and technology assessments that would genuinely engage the public and civil society and
have the power to regulate and impose caution when justified? The What if scenarios weave a
webofpossibilitiesintryingtoanswertheseques- tions. They also highlight the potential for communities to link up and increase
resilience by preserving well-functioning, local systems of natural resource management while trying and embracing new,
climate-friendly technologies on theirownterms. The
climate crisis must be understood for what it is ^ an

expression of a grossly inadequate development model. In solving the climate crisis, the deep
problems of mainstream development thinking must be tackled at the core, including our very
understanding of progress, markets, technology and growth (What Next project, 2005). Grandiose
quick-fix technological solutionsas well as quick-fix economic solutions such as
carbon tradingcould very well exacerbate the crisis. They are expressions of the same
kind of thinking that created the problems in the first place. What may seem hard, tedious
and politically challenging routes that focus on equity, social movement building
and structural change are in the end likely to be the most efficient, and probably
the only viable and sustainable roads ahead. The urgent imperative to tackle the
climate crisis should be seen as a golden opportunity to ask fundamental questions and come
to grips with many of the other pressing global problems. For technology to be part of the solution rather
than adding new and even more pressing challenges, we need open debate on the crucial ethical and political questions
accompanied by social mobili- zationand action.
alt relational ontology

The alternative is to embrace a relational ontology use the ballot to
affirm our interconnectedness with other existences
Malette 10 (Sebastien Malette M.A. from Laval University, Green Governmentality and its Closeted Metaphysics:
Toward an Ontological Relationality, dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Department of Political Science with a concentration in Cultural, Social and Political Thought at the University of
Victoria (2010), https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/3165/Dissert_Malette_Final.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y // JJ)
Problematizing the cultural, metaphysical and epistemological heritage of Newtonianism and Mechanistic materialism (fact\value
distinction, matter\spirit dualism\dead-like matter dissociated with the realm of Life), we have argued that Foucault still bears the
influence of both the temporal and spatial disjunctions which we attributed following Harold H. Oliver to the subject\object
paradigm and its Newtonian modulation through Mechanistic materialism. Although it is certainly true that contemporary physics
has surpassed Newtonian physics in many ways, we have insisted that the contemporary
comprehensions of the
universe (or cosmology) are still framed by an overarching ontological notion that precedes the
unfolding of relationality itself. Consequently, relationality is still not accounted as an ontological
principle in its own right, which explains why pluralism and monism are still the two main
solutions when it comes to explain the fundamental structure of reality. Our dissertation has
proposed the solution of relational ontology as a middle path to resolve the philosophical
problem opposing monism to pluralism. More precisely, we have suggested that a relational ontology
could offer an alternative to the way in which we come to understand the
organization of a world predicated upon the existence of entities in atomistic
terms. From the standpoint of a relational ontology, relations are not contained in an absolute time and
space; rather, our understanding of time and space results from specific and more fundamental
relations. In the same vein, we argued that subject and object are not absolutized at the expense of the other. Both are rather
accounted as co-aspectual features derived from experience if we agree that a relation is immediately the bearer of both differences
and unity. Hence, we would no longer need to evoke a quasi-transcendental historicity to secure the processes of differentiation by
which the genealogical method is justifying our ability to seize difference. The experience of differentiation can simply be conceived
Hence it is possible to
release the grip of an assimilative form of historicism when we negotiate with
holders of different worldviews the meanings of Nature; this, by understanding
that we do not need an overarching historicity that makes all cosmologies only
transient and cultural constructions to generate critical thinking. We only need to
understand the dynamic character of relations from a standpoint we described as
a shared modality of inter-constitutive affects. Ecologically speaking, we have suggested that a relational
as immanent in relations themselves (which precisely implies difference to be a relation).
ontology could promote a broader sense of ecological relatedness without compromising the processes of differentiation without
which the notions of singularity and discrimination are lost. The
notion of relational ontologies can help us to

understand Nature as an active field of infinite relationships through which emerge various
singular entities by virtue of the relationships they have with others than themselves to begin
with. As such, a natural being is not considered ontologically independent by virtue of its irreducible form, essence or nature;
what are irreducible are rather the inter-constitutive relations that all natural beings have with others than themselves by which
they may receive, sustain and transmit life. By
understanding Nature as an active, responsive and dynamic

web of infinite relations in synch with the activities of our consciousness, it is possible to relax
the grip of the Idealist\Realist paradigm which makes Nature or Reality either the product of
our minds (either subjectively or culturally) or a pre- existing and objective reality that our minds can
only approximate. Both Nature and our minds would emerge together in our
experience of the world. From a relational standpoint, there is indeed no single point of
departure for consciousness. Consciousness rather consists in an integrative and everexpanding mode of relating to what is always beside oneself to begin with.
alt solves inequality

Environmental justice alleviates racial, gender, and class inequalities
Bullard and other voices
in the environmental justice movement concentrate on issues of spatially

unequally negative environmental impacts, especially those due to the racial, gender, and class
inequalities whose unequal distributions lead to greater or less ecological ill-effects (Bullard, 1993). Pollution is found
everywhere, but it is truly more common in specifically polluted locales. Where one finds racial
minorities, ethnic outsiders, working class people, or poor women and children , it is clear that air,
water, and soil pollution are far more common and serious. Racial majorities, ethnic elites, or rich people in
general all tend to be living, working, and playing at locations where pollution is much less
frequent and intense (Mellor, 1992; Salleh, 1997; Baumann, 2000). Environmental justice politics typically
focus upon localized inequalities and generalized imbalances in the workings of advanced
industrial capitalism. Climate change or species endangerment often is an issue that
more privileged groups express their apprehensions over, while they tend to be
mum about a lack of adequate sewer facilities, clean drinking water, toxic soils,
point-based air pollution, wood smoke pollutants or insufficient food . The greater
visibility of environmental justice politics in the global world economy follows from runaway shops, job loss, and capital
disinvestment plaguing some locations over others. And, as economic worries about sites with such problems increase, it is apparent
the flight of jobs, businesses, and capital to poorer, less regulated and more underdeveloped new sites quickly compound themselves
in serious ecological problems (Paehlke, 2003; Mol, 2003; Goldman, 2005).
alt solves spillover

The alt spills-over to political solutions - empirics
While these rich traditions must be acknowledged, they should not be the anchor lines for ascertaining the depth of greening in
today's academy. With today's widespread and intense worries about the Earth's ecology, the processes of greening the academy in
light of the modem environmental movement are accelerating. In political science, one can turn to the newer thematics, like those of
green citizenship, environmental justice, green statism, natural capitalism, green urbanism, climate change, or green globalism.
There certainly are strains of environmental political analysis that still cling to older texts like William Ophuls" Ecology and the
Politics of Scarcity (1977) or Jared Diamonds Collapse (2005), whose neo-Malthusian and neo-Hobbesian visions of politics find
during the more

hopeful times of the 1950s-1960s, or even 1980s-1990s, many political thinkers have reimagined
Nature in less harsh, essentialist or naturalistic terms. Important figures, like Murray Bookchin Postsome environmental followers whether it is during the hard times of the 1970s or the 2000s. However,
Scarcity Anarchism (1971), Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature? Women, Ecology, and The Scientific Revolution (1980), Neil
Smith, Uneven Development (1984), or even Christopher Manes, Green Rage (1990), all saw
todays economy and

society as very human constructs whose inequalities, irrationalities, and inconsistencies could be
remade in better ways with the right green theories and practices. The promise of Earth Day in
1970 was based on rethinking humanitys relations with the environment after the whole world
saw it from space during the Apollo moon missions from 1968 to 1973 as a verdant and vital sphere of
life. Driven by this image, many thinkers have sought to develop public policies and
political practices tied to protecting and preserving of Earths abundance to
benefit all forms of life rather than following hard naturalistic dictates driven by accepting
and accommodating humans to the strictures of scarcity. The changing qualities of the ecological crisis in the
twentieth and twenty -first centuries are probably nowhere as pressing as with various articulations of environmental thinking
across the general field of political science. With
the swelling anxieties about the risks of global warming,

climate change, widespread drought, water shortages, and dangerous pollution (Beck. 1992; Diamond.
2005). The Earths ecologies have become central preoccupations for different cultural, economic, political, and scientific interests.
Efforts to interpret, evaluate, and then act effectively on the basis of deepening
worries about human depredations of the environment frequently are linked to
their analysis by political scientists in policy studies, political theory or
bureaucratic responses, especially given their perceived importance to assuring the survival
and well-being of the Earth (Dryzek, 2000; Bam and Eckersley. 2005; Dobson and Bell, 2006; O'Neill. 2000).
at: perm
Inclusion of a summoning for state action delivers a deathblow to
Nietzchan eco-ethic
The state as a sovereign, politically autonomous, bounded, self-regarding, acting unit is given.
It is summoned as an original (re)source. Its originality is reflected un the enduring anarchic
character of international politics the striking sameness in the quality of inter national life
through the millennia."*' Moreover, the original location of the state is further supported by the
wide asserted that international political theorists have given to this view of international life
across the centuries.*' The anarchic system of international politics requires the (enduring) presence of sovereign territorial
units to give it its structural character; similarly, these units must have an anarchic interstate to establish their internal structure
and/external boundaries: National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm
of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a political one. The national realm is variously
described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; the international realm, as being
anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive." Having inscribed international space by
locating the sovereign state within it, Waltz draws the border of the state by opposing it to the interstatethat which required the
state to already be there to give it its character. The structure, for all intents and purposes, is in the place. All that is needed is all that
is therestates in anarchy. Or; as Waltz puts it: the structure of the system and its interacting units."" Two moves arc being made
here. While international politics is being established as a decentralized realm grounded in the structure of the various sovereign
state entities that populate it, national politics is established as a centralized realm in order to provide the necessarily hierarchical
spaces to give the anarchical space of international politics its structure. The state musr be an unproblematic unified site for Waltz;
otherwise his theory of international politics has no foundationand Waltz cannot envision a theory (a structural theory, at least)
without a firm foundation. A major portion of my argument in this work is that this conception of sovereign state politics is
problematic. To construct an unambiguous relation between sovereignty and territory eliminates the interrelatedness of political
reality that exists within and between these geographic boundaries and the rich ambiguity of political existence that swirls about
inside the territorial boundaries of the sovereign state.
The possibility for a Nietzschean eco-etic is

delivered a death-blow through this move. The presence of hierarchal, vertical,
centralized, directed territories known as sovereign states squeezes out the
space(s) in which in which my Nietzschean eco-ethic operates not just within the
state but across the globe as well, due to the structure that encompasses the global
arena. How can an eco-ethic of difference find space to operate in a world
structured by the presence of Waltzs sovereign territorial states?
Including discourse of state sovereignty and warrant for state action

undermines Nietzschean eco- ethic
Hopkins University, Beyond Sovereign Territory, pp. 22-23, acc. 7/28/14, arh)
A final element in Nietzsches potential eco-ethics involves the ques tion of where. A funny
question to raise, perhaps, when thinking' about ethics. Although numerous political theorists
from Aristotle to Hegel have placed ethics within the boundaries of the state in the sense that
ethics provide a foundation for the state, Nietzsches, critique of the state suggests a different
space for his ethics. Speaking of the state as a foul-smelling, cold monster and a new idol, Zarathustra urges us to break the
windows and leap to freedom . . . only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous: there begins the
song of necessity ... Where the state ends ... Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges-of the overman?" Nietzsche
attacks the state for a variety of reasons, from its lies about being the people," to the way it
sacrifices humans for its purposes, to its lies about being the most important creature on earth.
In order to overcome these, and other, aspects of the state, Nietzsche suggests looking to the end
of the state. And here I read him not to be making a temporal suggestion bur a geographic one .
The overman, that human who exists beyond resentment against the nature of things, that human who refuses to divest existence of
its rich ambiguity, is not a creature of the state, if, as I suggested through a brief glimpse at Lockes theory of property in my
Rather
than being a creature who resides in the space of sovereign territory, the Nietzschean overman
may best be said to exist where the state ends. Following a number of post-Nietzscheans, whom
I will engage in the next three chapters, where the state ends is a multidirectional and
polymorphous space. Moreover, Nietzsches perspectivism, his radical reading of inter pretation,
throws into question the concept of space at work in dis courses of state sovereign. Zarathusrra speaks
introduction, the state can be read as the product of both a particular orientation to nature and a particular type of human.
of the lies that spew from the mouth of that new idol" the state. On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God
am I." The problem, Zarathustra contends, is that people believe-the state .
They accept its statement

concerning the space of politics, among many other things, as though it were
carved into stone tablets. But it is only one inter pretation.
framework
discourse first
Critical analysis of ecomanagerial discourse is key to effective
policymaking
Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia (Generating Green Governmentality: A
Cultural Critique of Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation,
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim514a.pdf) ENH
*card has been gender modified
From the concepts and categories embedded in mission-defining languages and practice-determining beliefs used by schools of the
environment or colleges of natural resources, one
can get a feel for the raw understandings of

environments and natural resources shared by many environmental professionals in
government, business and academe. By reconsidering how these academic institutions and their
graduates discursively construct the environment, as Foucault suggests, one can attempt to
define the way in which individuals or groups represent words to themselves, utilize their forms
and meanings, compose real discourse, reveal and conceal in it what they are thinking or saying,
perhaps unknown to themselves, more or less than they wish, but in any case leave a mass of verbal traces of those
thoughts, which must be deciphered and restored as far as possible to their representative vivacity. At the conjunction of life, labor,
and language in discourses
of environmental studies, one find an analytic of power/knowledge which

shows how [hu]man, in his being, can be concerned with the things [s]he knows, and know the things that,
in positivity, determine his mode of being in highly focalized academic constructions of the environment .
The environment, if one follows Foucaults lines of reasoning, must not be understood either as the naturally
given sphere of all ecological processes that human power keeps under control or as a mysterious
domain of obscure terrestrial events which human knowledge works to explain. Instead, it emerges as
a historical artifact that is largely constructed by technoscientific interventions, because it cannot remain an occluded reality that is
difficult to comprehend. In this great network of technical
interventions into Nature, the simulation of spaces, the

the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of
controls, and the provocation of resistances all can be linked to one another as the the
empiricities of academic environmental studies. II. The Thee Rs of Eco-Managerialism. The scripts of
green governmentality embedded in environmental studies are rarely rendered totally articulate
by scientific and technical discourses. Yet, there are elaborate systems for guiding political activity in these scripts. The
advocates of more radical ecological movements, like deep ecology, ecofeminism or social ecology, dimly perceive
the destructive biases in these scripts in their frustrations with reform environmentalism, which weaves logics of geopower in and out of the technocratic eco-managerialism that has defined mainstream of
environmental science and traditional natural resource policy-making . The three foci of eco-managerialist
intensification of resources, the incitement of discoveries,
interventions have coaligned in schools of the environment as the theories and practices of resource, risk, and recreationist
managerialism. The mission statements and core curricula of such educational operations identify and initiate the discursive
practices which encircle the environment or the resources their training gives students knowledge-of and power-over as
professionals. The association of resource managerialism/risk assessment/recreationist administration in range management at
Berkeley, environmental toxicology at Duke, or visitor management strategies at Colorado State with the environment as a
terrestrial infrastructure gives professionals the discursive practices they need in the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition
of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. A.
Resource Managerialism Resource
managerialism can be read as a geo-power/eco-knowledge of modern

governmentality. While voices in favor of conservation can be found in Europe early in the nineteenth century, the real
establishment of this stance comes in the United States with the Second Industrial Revolution from the 1880s through the 1920s and
the closing of the Western Frontier in the 1890s. Whether one looks at John Muirs preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchots
conservationist codes, an awareness of modern industrys power to deplete natural resources, and hence the
need for
systems of conserving their exploitation, is well-established by the early 1990s. Over the past nine decades,
the fundamental premises of resource managerialism have not changed significantly . At best, this
code of eco-knowledge only has become more formalized in bureaucratic applications and legal interpretations. Keying off of the
managerial logic of the Second Industrial Revolution, which empowered technical experts, or engineers and scientists, on the shop
resource managerialism
imposes corporate administrative frameworks upon Nature in order to supply the economy and
floor and professional managers, or corporate executives and financial officers, in the main office,
provision society through centralized state guidance. These frameworks assume that the national economy, like the interacting
capitalist firm and household, must avoid both overproduction (excessive resource exploitation coming with excessive demand) and
underconsumption (inefficient resource exploitation coupled with inadequate demand) on the demand side .
To even construct
the managerial
problem in this fashion, Nature is reducedthrough the encirclement of space and matter by
a system of geo-power systems that can be dismantled , redesigned,
and assembled anew on demand to produce resources efficiently and when and where needed in the modern
marketplace. As a cybernetic system of biophysical systems, Natures energies, materials, and sites are redefined by the
eco-knowledges of resource managerialism as manageable resources for humans beings to
realize great material goods for sizeable numbers of some people, even though greater material and immaterial bads
also might be inflicted upon even larger numbers of other people, who do not reside in or benefit from the
advanced national economies that basically monopolize the use of world resources at a
comparative handful of highly developed regional and municipal sites . Echoing California-Berkeleys
national as well as global economiesto
declaration that environmental studies boil down to mobilizing the biological, physical and social sciences to address the major
social and political effects of current and future anthropogenic environmental problems, Yales Dean Cohon tells would-be
environmental studies enrollees that their professional power/knowledge will be crucially significant in the coming years: Your role
in helping to protect and manage the integrity and survival of natural systems and human health globally could not be more
important.
Since so much is now in human hands, people are needed, more than ever, who are
focused, informed, and dedicated to learning. Here, environmental sciences infrastructuralize the
Earths ecologies. The Earth becomes, if only in terms of technosciences operational assumptions, an immense
terrestrial infrastructure. As the human races ecological life-support system, it has with only
occasional localized failures provided services upon which human society depends consistently
and without charge."19 As the environmentalized infrastructure of technoscientific production, the Earth generates
"ecosystem services," or those derivative products and functions of natural systems that human societies
perceive as valuable.20 This complex system of systems is what must survive; human life will continue only if such survivalsustaining services continue. And, as Colorado State's, Yale's, Berkeley's or Duke's various graduate programs all record, these
infrastructural outputs include: the generation of soils, the regeneration of plant nutrients, capture of solar energy, conversion of
solar energy into biomass, accumulation/purification/distribution of water, control of pests, provision of a genetic library,
maintenance of breathable air, control of micro and macro climates, pollination of plants, diversification of animal species,
development of buffering mechanisms in catastrophes, and aesthetic enrichment.21 Because it is the terrestrial infrastructure of
transnational enterprise, the planet's ecology requires highly disciplined reengineering to guide its sustainable use. In turn, the
academic systems of green governmentality will monitor, massage, and manage those systems which produce all of these robust
services. Just as the sustained use
of any technology "requires that it be maintained, updated and changed

periodically," so too does the "sustainable use of the planet require that we not destroy our
ecological capital, such as old-growth forests, streams and rivers (with their associated biota), and other natural amenities."22
To learn about eco-managerialism enacts discourse within the round,

and only then will we learn about the true condition of the
environment in the status quo
B. Risk Managerialism As Beck suggests, this risk
managerialism is now an integral part of the self-critical

production and reproduction of globally thinking, but locally acting, capitalism.28 Schools of environmental
studies train students to conceptually contain, actuarially assess, and cautiously calculate the many dimensions of ecological risk in
their ecotoxiology, environmental assessment, or ecoremediation courses. Yet, the fictive assumptions of such modelling techniques
only constitute a scientized first take for the sweep of reflexivity. They do not, and indeed cannot, capture the depth, scope, duration,
or intensity of the damage they pretend to measure.29 Colorado State's Department of Fishery and Wildlife Biology, for example,
casts itself as an international leader in the areas of risk assessment and analysis. Combining
practical laboratory
experiences and field studies, it suggests that areas of growing emphasis are risk analysiscentered concerns, like integrated resource management, conservation biology, and
environmental risk analysis.30 This quantitative surveillance and evaluation focus in risk analysis also can be found in the
other graduate programs' curricula. Yale's graduate course, Ecological Resource Risk Assessment and Management, for example,
hints that related course work in statistics, ecotoxicology, and environmental chemistry will help its enrollees
to understand
the impact of pollution, disease, and ecological management practices on the health of
ecosystems. However, "assessment of risk of an adverse impact on an ecological resource caused by
one or more chemical, biological, or physical stressors, and monitoring the status and trends of
an ecological resource are priority needs of contemporary environmental management. "31
Likewise, Duke's highly economistic reading of environmental studies stresses the benefits and costs of policies relating to sustaining
resource productivity and maintaining environmental quality in its risk analyses. Its graduate course, Survey of Environmental
Health and Safety, directs the attention of students toward "environmental risks from the perspective of global ecology, biology,
chemistry, and radiation" such that "the nature and scope of environmental hazards" might be addressed by its understanding of
"risk assessment and management strategies,"32 the economics and ecologies
of risk, then, create tremendous new

opportunities for cadres of educated professionals to work productively as better resource
managers. Risk management at colleges of natural resources presumes its11 calculations "are based on a (spatially, temporally,
and socially circumscribed) accident definition" or that its analyses truly do "estimate and legitimate the potential for catastrophe of
modern large-scale technologies and industries."33 Superfund site after supertanker spill after superstack bubble, however, indicate
that this degree of managerial knowledge is precisely what risk management sciences at schools of environmental studies fail to
produce, "and so they are falsifications, and can be criticized and reformed in accordance with their own claims to rationality."34
This trend toward developing
a fully self-conscious risk managerialism grounded in economistic

trade-offs also surfaces fully in the curriculum of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, whose
recent strategic restructuring commits it fully to risk assessment methods because these techniques are "redefining forestry to
encompass all of the social and political factors which we know from experience to be fundamental to good forest management."35
These visions of environmental science recapitulate the logic of technical networks as they already are given in the states and
markets of the existing world-system.
Rather than the environment surrounding humanity, the frictionfree global marketplace of transnational capital is what envelopes Nature. Out of its metabolisms are
produced ecotoxins, biohazards, hydrocontaminants, aeroparticulates, and enviropoisons whose impacts generate inexorable risks.
These policy problematics unfold now on the global scale, because fast capitalism has colonized so many more sites on the planet as
part and parcel of its own unique regime for sustainable development. As Yale's Dean Cohon asserts: The challenge we all face now,
as you know, is not limited to one resource in one nation, but extends to the protection of the environment worldwide. The fabric of
natural and human communities is currently torn or tattered in many places. There
is hardly a place on earth where

human activity does not influence the environment's current condition or its prospects for the future.36
In turn, well-trained environmental professionals must measure, monitor or manage these risks, leaving the rational
operations of global fast capitalism wholly intact as "risks won" for their owners and beneficiaries, while risk analyses performed by
each environmental school's practitioners and programs deal with the victims of "risks lost." C. Recreationist
Managerialism Schools of environmental studies also must prepare their students for more tertiary uses of
Nature as recreational resources. As the USDA says about its managed public lands, the natural environment
is "a land of many uses," and mass tourism, commercial recreation, or park administration all12 require special knowledges
and powers to be conducted successfully. Instead of appraising Nature's resources as industrial production resource reserves,
recreationist managerialism frames them as resource preserves for recurring consumption as

positional goods, scenic assets, or leisure sites. The entire idea behind national parks or protected areas is to park certain
unique sites or particular undeveloped domains beyond the continuous turnover of industrial exploitation for primary products or
agricultural produce. Yet, the recreational pursuits of getting to, using, and appreciating such ecological assets are mass produced
through highly organized sets of practices. Consequently, recreationist managerialism "develops expertise in managing public lands
and waters and in providing quality outdoor recreation experiences to their visitors."37 As Colorado State University's Department
of Natural Resource Recreation and Tourism puts it, "there is an exciting trend to establish park and outdoor recreation programs
worldwide."38 So this graduate program moves beyond undergraduate studies of "recreationists and tourists" to examine other
publics, like "concessionaires, private land owners, policy-makers, agency personnel, communities, and special interest groups,"
which need to be managed as part of providing "quality outdoor recreation experiences" to visitors of parks and protected areas.39
This focus upon "the human dimensions of natural resources" in recreationist management, in turn, permits this disciplinary unit to
tout its Human Resources Survey Research Lab to prospective enrollees, assuring them that this "state of the art telephone survey
lab helps to develop skills in measuring preferences, perceptions, and behaviors among outdoor recreationists."40 Armed with this
sort of knowledge about recreationist management, graduates are assured secure professional placement with some power center
Beyond the
recreationist management functions of governmental resource management agencies, this
graduate program also underscores a U.S. Department of Commerce study that forecasts
tourism will be the world's largest industry by 2000. Hence, prospective students are assured
how easily recreationist managerial knowledge can be pitched to "that sector of the tourism industry that is
because the program "is oriented to employment with federal and state agencies, counties, and municipalities."41
dependent on natural resources: park and recreation concessionaires, adventure and tour guide companies, private campgrounds
and hunting/fishing preserves, destination resorts, ecotourism establishments, and tourism development boards and advertising
companies"42 to embed green governmentality into private sector pursuits. The
obligation to supervise human

recreationists rightly in "the conduct13 of their conduct" within the natural environments is aptly
summarized by Yale's Dean Cohon, who characterizes environmental studies as almost another
mode of police work, or "helping to protect and manage the integrity and survival of natural
systems and human health globally," because recreationist management, like all environmental studies, needs skilled
people "who are focused, informed, and dedicated to leading."43 Discourses of green governmentality give
dedicated students the right disciplinary paths for leading others to the right kind of information produced by
professional schools of the environment. Their power/knowledge foci, in turn, authorize and legitimate the acts taken by "a corps of
professionals" whose policing of anthropogenic environmental crises will bring about more positive recreational experiences.
Environmental discourse is imperative

VI. Conclusion: Environmentality
as Governmentality This investigation's approach to some specific

environmental discourses circulating through modern research universities may offend some in the
academy because it asks how involved, and in what ways have academicians become implicated, in causing the
current ecological crisis, even though they might believe themselves to be ameliorating it. The cultural politics of
environmental discourse, however, can be studied most effectively by following the actors back
to their sites of professional-technical training at schools of environmental studies or colleges of
natural resources. This is where the18 heterogeneous engineering cultures of mainstream environmentalists--or conventional
understandings manifest in the acts and artifacts of these social groups--are both produced and reproduced. As this discussion
illustrates, here is where one can discover how and why environmental
studies are shaped by its disciplines of

heterogeneous engineering as every environmental professional gets his or her education to protect and
manage the Earth. A few may be engaged, on the one hand, by dreams of preservationist restoration
ecology, but most others are devoted, on the other hand, to vast projects of conservationist ecorationalization in which Nature's forests, lands, and waters technocratically are to be reengineered as vast terrestrial
infrastructures for resource/risk/recreationist managers to administer.62 There are limitations to this analytical approach. On one
level, it cannot delve beneath the manifest intentions of such schools and colleges as they portray themselves in their own literature.
One must assume that they are what they profess to be, and actually do what their documents promise. On a second level, it cannot
catch any resistances or all deviations from the official institutional line, which clearly are always afoot in any academic institution.
Many courses carry bland descriptions of totally conformist approaches, but their instructors and students may very well follow
none of them when their classes actually convene. And, on a third level, it does not consider how state or corporate power centers, in
the last analysis, often will ignore or belittle academic knowledge, because its guidance contradicts what their organizational powers
can, or will, in fact, do against all informed advice to act otherwise. So well-trained professionals, even when armed with sound
science, can be flouted to serve the expedient goals of far more naked power agendas. Nonetheless, even this very tentative survey of
the professional-technical practices fostered at
schools of environmental studies discloses a great deal about

how technoscience discourses frame regimes of discipline in the everyday workings of
governmentality. Power and knowledge are pervasive forces whose agents often move in quite
different channels sometimes tied to interlocked, but at other times not thoroughly networked, social structures. Universities
provide an unusual opportunity to view them working more in unison and out in the open as the formal knowledges needed by
power centers are imparted to new generations in the ruling, owing, knowing, or controlling elites; and, at the same time, those
specific power agendas required to define, implement or reproduce knowledges and their truth systems quickly get adopted through
university programs of study and research. Therefore, this analysis has only begun the examination of discursive frames and
conceptual definitions for common theoretical notions, like "the environment," "environmental studies," or19 "environmental
sciences."
Nonetheless, contemporary American universities are giving Nature a new look as "the
environment" by transforming their formal knowledges about its workings into the professionaltechnical practices of a managerialistic "environmentality" in their schools of the environment
or colleges of natural resources. The heterogeneous engineers behind fast capitalism's
environmentalizing regime must advance eco-knowledges to activate their command over geo-power as well as
operationalize a measure of operational discipline over environmental resources, risks, and recreationists in their reconstruction of
contemporary governmentality as environmentality. Like governmentality, the disciplinary articulations
of
environmentality now center upon establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things" by
policing humanity's "conduct of conduct" in Nature and Society. Nature loses any transcendent aura, however,
as its stuff appears preprocessed in the academy as mere "environments" full of exploitable, but
also protectable, "natural resources" that university faculty and post-graduate students study continuously in order to
rationalize how particular research-oriented and management-oriented applied sciences can get down to the
business of administering their geo-power processes as terrestrial fast capitalism's "natural
resource systems."
Pedagogy comes into question when nature is on subject of discourse

This chapter asks how specialized
discourses about Nature, or the environment, are constructed by

professional-technical experts as
disciplinary articulations of eco-knowledge to generate performative disciplinary systems of
geo-power over, but also within and through, Nature in the managerial structures of modern
economies and societies. The critical project of Michel Foucaultparticularly his account of how discursively
formed disciplines operate inside regimes of truth as systems of governmentalityprovides a
basis for advancing this critical reinterpretation. These continuously institutionalized attempts to capture and
contain the forces of Nature by operationally deploying advanced technologies, and thereby linking
many of Natures apparently intrinsic structures and processes to strategies of highly rationalized
environmental management as geo-power, develops out of university-level environmental studies as a
strategic supplement to various modes of bio-power defined by existing academic human studies in
promoting the growth of modern urban-industrial populations. Moreover, the rules of economic
performativity now count far more materially in these interventions than do those of ecological
preservation. The first efforts to realize these goals in the United States began with the Second Industrial Revolution and the
American university programs in graduate-level teaching and research by
conservation movement over a century ago as progressively-minded managers founded Schools of Forestry, Management,
Agriculture, Mining and Engineering on many university campuses to master Nature and transform its stuff into goods and
services. In the ecological upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, however, schools of the environment or colleges of natural resources
went beyond the conservationist project when they began training new even more specialized experts in environmental science
ranging from ecotoxicology to national park administrationneeded to define, develop and deploy new varieties of geo-power more
broadly in all dimensions of everyday work and play. The mission of redefining and then administering the Earth as natural
resources, as it is articulated, for example, by Yales School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, expresses these managerial
goals very powerfully: The mission of the School of Forestry and Environmental Studies is to provide leadership ,
through
education and research, in the management of natural resource systems and in the solution of environmental problems.
Through its focused educational programs, the School develops leaders for major institutions concerned
with the earths environment. Through its research activities, the School fosters study in selected areas of
particular importance for resource and environmental management. The entire planet, then, can
be reduced by environmental studies at research universities to a complex system of interrelated
natural resource systems, whose constituent ecological processes are left for humanity to
operateefficiently or inefficientlyas the geo-powers of one vast terrestrial infrastructure.
Directed at generating geo-power from the more rational insertion of natural and artificial bodies into the machinery of global
production, the discourses of a green governmentality produced by graduate programs in environment studies define many new
physical and social ecologies where environmental professionals operate as disciplined representatives of geo-power and ecoknowledge in diffuse projects of ecological modernization. There are scores of academic programs across the United States that
now purport to offer this kind of comprehensive scientific instruction in environmental studies. This brief analysis cannot survey all
of them in order to determine what the general foci of their curricula are or how each specific program varies in its substantive
concerns. Instead it selects four well-known and highly regarded programstwo elite private universities, two at respectable public
institutionsfrom around the nationone in the Pacific region at the University of California-Berkeley, one in the Mountain States
at Colorado State University, one in the Northeast at Yale University, and one in the South at Duke University. These programs
provide highly suggestive examples of how the discourses
and practices of contemporary university training

reimagine Nature as the environment in their graduate courses of study and professional codes of
self-interpretation. While analyses of other American universities might yield additional insights, these institutions represent
many of the most crucial disciplinary tendencies in mainstream academic environmental discourses today. Most importantly, this
investigation suggests university
training discourses comprehensively reframe the environment as a
highly complex domain far beyond the full comprehension of ordinary citizens or traditional naturalists: it instead becomes
something to be managed by expert managerialists armed with coherent clusters of technical acumen and administrative practice.
Reading through the self-representation of environmental studies at these colleges of natural resources or schools of the
environment in the United States, one sees this ideology at work as deans, directors and department heads promise to prepare
prospective students to master the ins-and-outs of resource managerialism, risk assessment, and/or recreationist management.
Resources, risks, and recreationists become the three Rs or higher education in contemporary environmental
studies, giving students and faculty specific new foci for their knowledge and granting specialized managerial power
by administering this green governmentality in their mostly technocratic professional activities. I. Environments and
Geo-power surveying the very focalized public representations made about the environment or natural resources at American
universities with a distinguished school of the environment or an outstanding college of natural resources can indicate a great
deal. Because so many environmental professionals and natural resource workers from all over the world now are being trained in
these academic settings, one gains an important sense of how their professional practices both are shaped by, and, in turn, shape
academic environmental discourse. Investigating
the recruitment language used to enlist students for graduate study

in their ecological curricula and analyzing the formal categories deployed to understand natural resources in the
classrooms at such schools of the environment, then, permits us to reappraise what the
environment means at these schools and which natural resources are valorized at such colleges. As actions on the behalf
of Nature have shifted from the avocational register of belle-letteristic naturalist writings into the professional-technical knowledge
codes of environmental science, larger
public discourses about ecological degradation, resource waste or

environmental remediation also have changed significantly . On the one hand, many see this shift as
positive: scientific personnel with positivistic technical knowledge allegedly now can identify
ecological problems objectively as well as design efficient solutions for the most pressing ones.
On the other hand, this change is regarded by others with suspicion : a spirit of shallowness
occludes the enchantments of Nature in the dark shadows of anthropocentrism, capitalism, and
statism as the environment often is treated as being little more than terrestrial infrastructure
for global capital. How the environment is understood today by most government bureaus, major corporations, and interest
groups derives from discursive frameworks of technoscientific training that are propagated by schools of the environment or
colleges of natural resources at major research universities. Technoscientific
knowledge about the

environment, however, is, and always has been, evolving in response to changing interpretive
fashions, shifting political agendas, developing scientific advances, and meandering

occupational trends. Changes in those discursive principles of exclusion or inclusion, which are used to determining when to
study, how to study it, what to exclude, where to include, or why, often cannot be pinned precisely. Instead, such variations
designate a will to knowledge that is anonymous, polymorphous, suspectable to regular transformations, and determined by the
play of identifiable dependencies.
at: education
Inclusion of our knowledge is vital to political education
The place of Nature, in political science, depending on how one sees environmental issues and
Nature itself, is either very old and truly foundational or quite new and still evolving. In its older
traditional forms, political discourse is complex. Nature inescapably can be regarded as the determinate
condition of scarcity, necessity, and limits; or , with the coming of modernity, its newer modern
forms cast it as potentially a realm of abundance, freedom, and possibility, depending on how humans
think and act about creating the wealth of nations. From Aristotle onward, and gaining strength with
Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes as well as Hume, Smith or Malthus, the state(s) of Nature
cannot be ignored in politics. Yet, to observe its impact on political thought and
action, it is crucial to not limit ones attention only to the narrow confines of
political science as a discipline.
**aff answers**
perm
perm solves generic

Perm solves combination of critical ecology theory and sustainable
development are necessary to solve current environmental challenge
Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University *Cites Buckminster Fuller a renowned American neo-futuristic
architect, systems theorist, author, designer, inventor, and was the second president of Mensa from 1974 to 1983. (9/13/2010,
Timothy W. Ephemeralization as Environmentalism: Rereading R. Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth,
Organization & Environment, DOI: 10.1177/1086026610381582, http://oae.sagepub.com/content/23/3/354 // SM)
While he is not as widely recognized today, Fuller was one of the 1960s most public, and truly peripatetic, intellectuals, and he
regarded his Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth as an accessible argument in favor of
finding a more ecological and truly sustainable future for humanitys ongoing industrial
development (Castro, 2004; Gottlieb, 1993). At the time, John Cage (1971) predicted the 21st century would regard this
revolutionary era in the 1960s as one defined by Buckminster Fuller. Seeing his own writings as works of clarification addressed to
all humanity, which he regarded and called fellow earthians (Fuller, 1969/2008a), Fuller delighted himself with the role of serving
as a prognosticator and forecaster (Fuller, 1969/2008a, pp. 22-23). Consequently, this
foundational work should be

revisited by anyone interested in how a once cheerful, dauntless, and energetic appraisal of
living ecologically has changed in the hands of the green movements reprocessing of
sustainable development (Brown, 2009; de Geus, 2002) into the currently more dour, highest,
and most necessary expression of capitalism . Fullers good cheer about the Earths bounty is harder to
accept in times marked by increasingly serious global warming trends and huge
unchecked deep-water oil spills ; but, even granted these tough realities, Fuller should not be
ignored today.
Only the perm solves a shift to green managerialism is a prerequisite to the alt
Fullers own notions about design-science initiatives are a green governmentality project (Luke, 1999) that
presume a very radical change in humanitys relationships with the nonhuman
natural and artificial worlds will occur only to the extent that they become a new
managerial mode of social and political life. And, yet, all these gains must be based on his
general systems thinking approach to management tied to maintaining much of the urbanized
worlds already realized fundamental changes in industrial production and consumption. While not
trusting wholly in managerialism, Fuller also believes his synergetic enhancements for the cycles of industrial
production and consumption will boost both economic efficiency and environmental
justice. Treating Dobsons approved forms of ecologism as the only real ecological politics is a major strategic mistake, since
Fuller puts his considerable genius, as a management- oriented and design-science initiator, to work in full
recognition of the finitude of the planet, the need to restrict growth, and the consequent need to
reduce consumption (Dobson, 2007, p. 73). Even though it is often not understood in Fullers unconventional
terminological codes for always doing much more with much less, todays sustainability science is essentially rooted
in a technocratic faith in his style of engineered efficiency and designed developmentall
executed in a register of ecology as economy.
The permutation is natural capitalism that solves

Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (4/23/2014, Timothy W., Routledge,After Sustainable Cities?, Page
32, http://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=UK9wAwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA24&dq=tw+luke&ots=qdhMM_7Xmq&sig=_Xa5WkAJ0VKYNzcaGPSMLPi0_Zo
#v=onepage&q=luke&f=false // SM)
While a backlash against neoliberalism reverberates in these plans for a Green New Deal, neoliberal articles of faith remain. Indeed,
the superstructure of the Green New Deal rests upon many deep foundations, and one of the deepest is 'natural capitalism*.
Developing more or less alongside the maturation of the Whole Earth Catalogue generation since 1968, the natural
capitalism
provided an allegedly radical new vision of practicing local and global exchange by keeping
'the environment' as well as 'the economy* equally in mind in the marketplace (Hawken el ii/., 1999).
Natural capitalism is suspicious of concentrated state power, and not entirely comfortable with the
technocratic flavour of ecomodernization, but its devotees realize it needs both as political allies.
Working together, green capitalists supposedly will turn to the smaller scale, fast-reacting and broadly engaged responses
of business enterprises eager to leverage the full spectrum of pressing environmental problems
as new market-building opportunities in full accord with the world's actually existing capitalist
economies (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007). Natural capitalists re-imagine the market and its complex division of labour as
school has
an allegedly underleveraged natural asset. The use of Nature as a capitalist tool, they assert, has been stymied during the twentieth
century by shortsightedness, greed and waste as the big business practices of concentrated ownership, planned obsolescence, huge
profits and rapid return-on-investment distorted the traditions of commercial probity and rationality cherished by natural
capitalists. Consequently, proponents
of natural capitalism, like Paul Hawken, Anion,- Lovins, Hunter Lovins or Ernest
von Weizackcr, reimagine the Earth itself as a complex economy rather than a primitive wilderness. The
environment is not merely a site; it is an entrenched operational assemblage with an elaborate system
of services that fundamentally must be reimagined in terms of cost, benefit, asset, liability, gain,
loss and value.
perm solves ecomodernization

Eco-modernization is a feasible political strategy that solves without
reliance on apocalyptic environmentalism
Arts, Greening the Political pg. 51-52, Sense Publishers, ISBN: 978-94-6209-101-6 // SM)
A third highly visible variant of green politics is the school of ecomodernization, which sees
the looming challenges

of the coming ecological collapse as the opportunity to simultaneously look beyond old wave
gloom and doom environmentalism and move ahead to a more affirmative green
political economy that will break through decades of deadlock in environmental
polic y (Commoner, 1971; Schnaiberg, 1980; Benton, 1994; Goldman, 2005). While prior forms of industrialization have
disrupted the Earths environment, ecomodernizationists place their faith in the inventive potential and
ethical promise of modernization as an ethico-political project of more just and effective
rationalization. Therefore, the project of modernization can advance and, indeed, attain even greater success
simply by curbing waste, controlling excess, and curtailing externalities that past
managerial philosophies and industrial design practices accepted as tolerable
overhead costs . There many proponents of ecomodernization, but the most vocal and visible ones today are Michael
Nordhaus and Ted Shellenberger. Their works, The Death of Environmentalism (2004) and Breakthrough (2007), are dedicated to
developing a postenvironmental politics centered on a comprehensive ecomodernization program. The ideological spin on
ecologism asserts when
we called on environmentalists to stop giving the I have a nightmare

speech, we did not mean that we should close our eyes to the increasingly hot planet, the
destruction of the Amazon, or continued human suffering (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 240). Not
unlike all modernizationist thinking, they claim we should open our eyes to the multiplicity of ways we can
see and experience the world. Global warming could bring drought, disease, and war
and it could bring prosperity, cooperation, and freedom (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p.
10). Ecomodernizationists, then, argue that the regulatory pressures imposed by certain countries and the market forces exerted
through overall cost competition are causing actual institutional transformations in advanced industrial societies, and these
Sophisticated
high technology and astute capital investment combined with a new postindustrial social
contract are ready to be integrated into existential decisions about the whys-and-wherefores of
ecomodernization: What kind of a country do we want? How can we achieve it? These questions implicitly contain a question
changes should no longer be interpreted as mere window dressing (Mol, 1996, p. 303) as they were in the past.
about investment: How will Americans invest our wealth and our labor (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 10). To crack open the
Fruitless
environmentalism politics only imagine solutions that seek to constrain the economy and
society as ecomodernization assets; the fruitful alternatives of ecologism seek instead to
unleash, human activity and economic growth (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 40). This
basic reorientation towards capital-intensive, large scale, technology-centered, and quality
growth based projects, therefore, can be counted upon to make green politics triumphant in its
ecomodernizationist forms.
doors to ecologisms promised future, the worn-out brands of dead environmentalism must be forgotten.
perm solves green statism

Green statism is good solves economical collapse, democracy, and
ecological crises
A fourth increasingly common articulation of green politics is green statism. Taking note of the alarm raised by critical
climatologists, and yet becoming frustrated
by the slow progress being made by ecomodernizationsts,

green statism pushes fusing the thinking of ecologism with power of larger effective states. While
the willingness to mobilize state power to rescue Nature from Society has been a frequent theme in many environmentalists
writings, ranging from William Opfuls (1977) to Lester Brown (1980), the particular angle that ecologism adds to green statism is the
coercive decisionism lying at its heart. Whether
it is species loss, global warming, severe drought, coastal

flooding or economic collapse, contemporary green statism uses such conditions of crisis to declare a
general state of emergency to correct ecological imbalances. A solid instance of such green politics
at work is Robyn Eckersleys The Green State (2004). Eckeresleys notion of green statism is rooted in a green
public sphere of humans and nonhumans; and, for her, the project of building the green state can never be finalized: inasmuch as it
will lead to a dynamic and ongoing process of extending citizenship rights and securing an
inclusive form of political community (Eckersley, 2004, p. 16) to many of a global scale. Indeed, the brief for a
green state would be to far more effectively and comprehensively protect ecosystems and environmental
victims (Eckersley, 2004, p. 16). Even though it is aware of the contributions of environmental science, ecomodernization or
green business, the green state becomes critically important to enact, and then enforce more ecologically
responsible modes of state governance (Eckersley, 2004, p. 15). Nonetheless, green statism ultimately means to
empower experts rather than citizens. Even though it speaks about a public sphere and its democratizing possibilities, it is less clear
that Eckersley and other green statists see, as Bookchin (1995, p. 232) advocates, an ecological politics able to inculcate the values
of humanism, co-operation, community, and public service in the everyday practice of civic life.
perm solves renewables

Renewable energy solves the K and prevents extinction
For what still seems like an impossible transition in energy use, even today, to using biofuels, solar energy,
windpower, or other renewables, Fuller was touting this necessity in 1969 as a paradigm shift in
civilization to benefit everyone rather than only the nations and companies
developing them (Mitcham, 1995). Utopia or Oblivion posed questions that Fuller in many ways believed could be
answered only by mastering the space-faring environmental necessities for living recounted in his Operating Manual for Spaceship
Earth. Written in a quite technocratic manner (Laird, 1990), chapter 1 of Utopia or Oblivion is titled A Citizen of the 21st Century
Looks Back, and it presumes
human skills and natural systems will successfully merge as planners,

architects, and engineers take the initiative (Fuller, 1969/2008b, p. 138) in a manner that will allow
human beings to start emancipating humanity from being muscle and reflex machines as well
as giving every- body a chance to develop their most powerful mental and intuitive faculties (p.
125). Only then, as he argues in the Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth , can earthians fulfill their function and thus
avoid extinction as unfit (Fuller, 1969/2008a, p. 83) by realizing their synergies together on the planet.
All of Fullers books can be taken as odd theoretical excursions, combining his propensity for thinking out loud with a penchant for
engaging in abstract thoughts expressed in complex, run- on sentences full of terms pounded out in his own unique wordsmithing.
As Zung (2002) puts it, Reading Bucky is an exploration process. As the new reader ventures into Fullers work, he may need a
gestation period before he comes to an understanding of Fullers words, as he talks about our universe and the nonsimultaneous
Fuller , then, can be

simultaneously illuminating and infuriating, but the environmental insights that most of his books
contain are still invaluable . In particular, Fullers greatest faith in human energy and intelligence leaves him
underscoring how human ingenuity always will find trustworthy paths for attaining some kind of fullspectrum sustainability for earthians. Once planetarianized by granting removal of all political boundary
restrictions, Fuller asserts that the physical resources of the Earth can support all of a multiplying
humanity at higher standards of living than anyone has ever experienced or dreamed (1969/2008b,
flow scenario of omnirelated events, often in light hearted, Mozartian manner. (p. xvii) Rereading
p. 33). His engineering-oriented fascination with design, mechanics, and systems, which tie directly into todays cradle-2-cradle
sense of efficiency, is foundational for him. The progressively automated wealth-producing machinery of modern life is, in fact,
centered upon the transcendence of unleashing humanitys unique capabilityits metaphysical capability (Fuller, 1969/2008a, pp.
124-125).
impact turns
apocalyptic reps good

Apocalyptic imagery constructively redirects biopolitics and
overcomes state backlash and cooption
Schatz 12 (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing
Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012))
Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical
manner ignores how any particular metaphorapocalyptic or notalways risks getting co--
opted. It does not excuse inaction . Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining
environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the
halls of Congress. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems will go unsolved only to fester more ominously into
the future. [E]cological crisis cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets,
finance, and communications (Boggs 774). If it werent for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the
world it wouldnt get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention
spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, Those
who
dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is
known. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are
dominated, they certainly will remain the dominant forces (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and
theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the gains activists are
making on the ground. It also allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the
debate over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change , whether it be radical
or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of
combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that we cannot fully
escape the masters house since the surrounding environment always shapes any form of
resistance. Therefore, we ought to act even if we may get coopted. As Foucault himself reminds us,
instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society
that shift about[.] And it is doubtless the strategic
codification of these points of resistance that makes a

revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power
relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power (96--97). Here Foucault
asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on
the exercise and circulation of power, then we open up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of
environmentalism (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary
actions that
are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility
that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change . Again, this is why
people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to
the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment
through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we
must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETAs ad campaigns have
drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women whod rather go naked than wear fur,
their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and
reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negris theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how utilizing
the power of the

masters biopolitical tools can become powerful enough to deconstruct its house despite
the risk of co--optation or backlash. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people
around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While
Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis
of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able,
through its networks of communication and cooperation [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic
society on its own. Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of
common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of
exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] creating a new constitutive
temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnectedinstead of constructed by different nation--states and single
environmentsconditions in one area of the globe couldnt be conceptually severed from any other. In short, wed all have a stake in
the global commons. Ecocritics
can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse and fight against
governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for
there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--of--the--world tactics is not the same
biopower of the state so long as it doesnt singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to hope
that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and
communication among singularities will destroy its [very] possibility (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when
wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably
distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--in--my--backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction
elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not ones own. Ultimately, images
of
planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a
new world where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.
Climate discourse breaks down securitization- only way to solve the

environment
Trombetta 8 (Maria Julia, Professor of Economics of Infrastructures of Delft University of Technology, The meaning
and function of climate security
http://tudelft.academia.edu/MariaJuliaTrombetta/Papers/899481/The_meaning_and_function_of_climate_security)
The two main arguments against considering the environment as a security issue come from Realists, and from those who warn
against the problematic implications the word security brings with it. Constructivists and poststructuralists have challenged the
narrow realist perspective suggesting that threats are socially constructed. Amongst these approaches, the most innovative and
thoughtful attempt to conceptualise the social construction of security issues, is the theory of securitization elaborated by the
Copenhagen School, a body of research mainly associated with the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. It is relevant to this
analysis because it allows considerations on how discourses can transform the way of dealing with an issue but at the same time it
narrows down this possibility by adopting a rather static understanding of what security is about. The theory of securitization argues
that there are not objective threats, waiting to be discovered, and various issues can be transformed into security issues through a
successful speech-act that transforms the way of dealing with them. Security in this perspective is not a value or a condition but a
form of social practice, which by successfully labelling an issue as a security issue transforms the way of dealing with it. Considering
the discursive
formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the

environmental security discourse. First, it allows an investigation of the political process behind
the selections of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent
than others. Second, it suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant
role in defining and transforming political communities and their identities, since the process
creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points
out, securitization can open the space for a genuinely political constitutive and formative
struggle through which political structures (including the practices associated with security) are contested and
re-established (2000, 91). For the Copenhagen School however this transformation has problematic consequences. The label
security brings with it a set of practices and a way of dealing with a problem that characterizes an issue as a security issue. The word
security brings with it a specific logic or rationality, independently from the context or the intentions of the speakers. Security is
about survival, urgency and emergency. It allows exceptional measures, the breaking of otherwise binding rules, governing by
decrees rather than by democratic decisions and implies a decisionist attitude, which emphasizes the importance of reactive,
emergency measures. This mindset, once activated, is not open to negotiation. While it is possible to decide whether or not to
securitize an issue and securitization, as a social process, is determined by a collectivity rather than by individuals, once an issue is
securitized the logic of security necessarily follows. This logic, it has been noted, has been borrowed from the Schimittian
understanding of the political.1For Schmitt the political is about the friend-enemy distinction and successfully evoking security
brings about that distinction.
The logic of security is the logic of war; this suggests an extreme form of
antagonism and a zero sum understanding of security. With the codification and
institutionalization of a national security discourse this rationality has been narrowed down to a
specific context, attempts to broaden the security agenda results in the spreading of this
rationality to other contexts from which it had been excluded (Buzan and Waever 1998). Climate
change challenges this logic on several aspects. The first one concerns the identification of the
referent object of security. Climate itself is not the referent. What is intended to be secured are
the political communities that depend on a stable climate. In this sense representing climate
change as a threat to the whole humankind, suggests the possibility of creating a global
1
community. As Beck has argued threats create society and global threats create global society.(Beck 2000b: 38) A process of
securitization can be considered as part of a broader process of transformation of political communities. As Weaver has noticed
securitization identifies security units, whose existence is legitimised by reference to their own survival. (Wver 1997: 355) The
question then becomes whether these security units are always limited collectivities, or can they also be inclusive and universalist?
(Wver 1997: 357). The second possibility is particularly relevant within climate security discourses since several attempts to link
security and the environment, since several attempts have been don with cosmopolitan intents, Weavers answer however tends to
be negative and the reason is to be fund in a specific understanding of security and in its fixity. The second problematic aspect
concerns the identification of the enemy. Several environmental problems, including climate change can affect the whole
humankind. It is impossible to create barriers and distance oneself from them, from the enemy. For the Copenhagen School security
is about the inscription of enemies and the logic of war. For Beck instead [t]he concept of enemy is the strongest possible
antithesis to the concept of security, (Beck 1997, 82) since enemy stereotypes empower as they create the relationships and the
behavioural logic of attack and defence, pro and contra, which first kill the question and then the people. (Beck 1997, 82) The final
aspect concerns the fixity of security practices. The theory of securitization, following Austin and Derrida argue that securitization is
a performative, in saying something, something is done and the context is transformed. In this perspective communication is more
than the transmission of a meaning, which depends on the intention of the speaker and her presence. It has to be itereable,
independently for the context and the intention of the speaker. In this perspective, the securitiness of security is associated with a
specific meaning and specific practices that are supposed to be fixed. 2 The theory of securitization downplays two aspects. First,
security as a social practice is embedded in a specific context. Different sets of practice characterises different sectors. The theory of
securitization has the great merit of having characterised the main aspects of the dominant western security formation that has
characterised theory and practices of international relations (quote Huysmans), but the Copenhagen School downplays the existence
and role f other security practices, from those based on risk to that related with preventions and safety standards .
Security
means different things for different people and in different contexts and to subsume all these
understanding to the understanding of suggested by realism is problematic. Second, social
practices are reflexive, in this sense the understanding provided by Beck is relevant. Social
practices are subject to a process of repetition and are checked against specific formats in
unreflective manners but by repeating these practices over and over again and by transporting
them to different sectors they become the subject of reflection. In this sense securitization can
be considered as a reflexive process, which is not only rule-directed but also rule-transforming
(see Beck) In this respect Becks analysis of risk society is relevant for two reasons. First, he
provides an analysis inspired by environmental problems which argues that contemporary risks
are unbound and challenges existing security practices and institutions on two aspects: the first
is the possibility of inscribing enemies into a context, the second is the possibility of relying on
emergencies measures. The second reason that makes Becks analysis relevant is his suggestion
that the awareness of the environmental crisis is making modernity becoming reflexive . Second
he suggests that modernity is becoming reflexive. In this sense it is relevant to explore how the
climate security discourse has evolved and transformed security practices.
Warming reps are key to mobilization and avoids militarization

Rodrigues, 11 (Rafaela Rodrigues de Brito, PhD Student, Department of Politics & International Relations, A Climate
for Conflict or Cooperation? Addressing the Securitisation of Climate Change 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal,
http://www.wiscnetwork.org/porto2011/papers/WISC_2011-724.pdf)
Climate change has unequivocally entered the international security agenda. However, there is extensive debate on the advantages
the securitisation of
climate change is acknowledged a positive role, mainly because it is seen to attribute a sense of
urgency to the issue and consequently attract political support. However, on the other hand, there is a strong
and disadvantages of establishing a link between climate change and security. On the one hand,
concern in the literature that linking climate change and security could represent a militarisation of the issue and lead to a statecentred approach to deal with it, hindering necessary cooperation to tackle the issue. 12 Mostly
focusing on the case of

the EU, this paper has analysed the assumption of militarisation that is usually connected to
securitisation. The paper has sought to demonstrate how security is no longer seen exclusively in
military terms, as the securitisation of non-military issues, and notably climate change, is
transforming security practices. In the EU, although climate change is increasingly being framed
as a security issue, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal
2
environmental politics, namely through adaptation and mitigation measures. What

securitisation created was an increase sense of urgency that is speeding the response to both
causes and consequences of climate change.
delay extinction
The environmental crisis will collapse democracy---embracing
deliberation now causes delayed response that ensures extinction
Shearman 7,( David ,( Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of
Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC); and Joseph
Wayne Smith(, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism), 2007,
The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 153-156
As we have said, it is not too difficult to see how this
present regime of global capitalism and liberal

democracy will end: It will end through ecological necessity. Nature will take humanity
by the throat and confront it with the biospherical damage that it has done. It is most
unlikely in our opinion that some form of spontaneous, unorganized democratic groundswell
will awaken the masses to their fates before it is too late. Rather any such resistance to the system
must come from an organized vanguard, unafraid to ultimately rule in the name
of the common good. These new philosopher kings feature what we call the authoritarian
alternative discussed earlier.
top-down solves
Top-Down centralized planned constraints can solve for the inevitable
ecological crisis Eco-authoritarianism is inevitable they delay it
enough to cause extinction
Humphrey 7 (Mathew, Reader in Political Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, UK,
2007, Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory: The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal, p. 1415)
In terms of the first of these points, that our
democratic choices reflect a narrow understanding of our

immediate interests and not an enlightened view of our long-term welfare , the case is made by
Ophuls. He claims that we are now 'so committed to most of the things that cause or support the evils' with which he is concerned
that 'we
are almost paralysed ; nearly all the constructive actions that could be taken at
present... are so painful to so many people in so many ways that they are indeed totally
unrealistic, and neither politicians nor citizens would tolerate them' (Ophuls, 1977: 224).4
Environmentally friendly policies can be justifiably imposed upon a population
that 'would do something quite different if it was merely left to its own immediate desires and
devices' (Ophuls, 1977: 227): currently left to these devices, the American people 'have so far evinced little willingness to make
even minor sacrifices... for the sake of environmental goals' (Ophuls, 1977: 197). Laura Westra makes a similar argument in relation
to the collapse of Canadian cod fisheries, which is taken to illustrate a wider point that we cannot hope to 'manage' nature when
powerful economic and political interests are supported by 'uneducated democratic preferences and values' (Westra, 1998: 95). More
generally reducing
our 'ecological footprint' means 'individual and aggregate restraints the

like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world . For this reason, it is
doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would severely curtail their
usual freedoms and rights... even in the interests of long-term health and selfpreservation. (Westra, 1998: 198). Thus we will require a 'top-down' regulatory regime to
take on 'the role of the "wise man" of Aristotelian doctrine as well as 'bottom-up' shifts in values (Westra, 1998: 199). Ophuls also
believes that in
certain circumstances (of which ecological crisis is an example ) 'democracy

must give way to elite rule' (1977: 159) as critical decisions have to be made by competent
people. The classic statement of the collective action problem in relation to environmental phenomena was that of Hardin (1968).
The 'tragedy' here refers to the "remorseless working of things' towards an 'inevitable destiny' (Hardin, 1968: 1244, quoting A. N.
Whitehead). Thus even if we are aware of where our long-term, enlightened interests do lie, the preferred outcome is beyond our
ability to reach in an uncoerced manner. This is the n-person prisoners' dilemma, a well established analytical tool in the social
analysis of collectively suboptimal outcomes. A brief example could be given in terms of an unregulated fishery. The owner of trawler
can be fully aware that there is collective over-extraction from the fishing grounds he uses, and so the question arises of whether he
should self-regulate his own catch. If he fishes to his maximum capacity, his gain is a catch fractionally depleted from what it would
be if the fisheries were fully stocked. If the 'full catch' is 1, then this catch is 1 - , where is the difference between the full stock
catch and the depleted stock catch divided by the number of fishing vessels. If the trawlerman regulates his own catch, then he loses
the entire amount that he feels each boat needs to surrender, and furthermore he has no reason to suppose that other fishermen
would behave in a similar fashion, in fact he will expect them to benefit by catching the fish that he abjures. In the language of game
theory he would be a 'sucker', and the rational course of action is to continue taking the maximum catch, despite the predictable
conclusion that this course of action, when taken by all fishermen making the same rational calculation, will lead to the collapse of
the fishery. Individual rationality leads to severely suboptimal outcomes. Under these circumstances an appeal to conscience is
useless, as it merely places the recipient of the appeal in a 'double-bind'. The open appeal is 'behave as a responsible citizen, or you
will be condemned. But there is also a covert appeal in the opposite direction; 'If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly condemn
you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside while the rest of us exploit the commons' (Hardin, 1968: 246). Thus the
appeal creates the imperative both to behave responsibly and to avoid being a sucker. In
terms of democracy, what this

have to be prepared to accept coercion in order to overcome the
collective action problem.5 The Leviathan of the state is the institution that has the
political power required to solve this conundrum. 'Mutual coercion, mutually agreed on"
is Hardin's famous solution to the tragedy of the commons. Revisiting the 'tragedy' argument in 1998,
entails is that, in general, we
Hardin held that '[i]ts message is, I think, still true today. Individualism
is cherished because it produces

freedom, but the gift is conditional: The more population exceeds the carrying
capacity of the environment, the more freedoms must be given up' (Hardin, 1998:
682). On this view coercion is an integral part of politics: the state coerces when it taxes, or when it prevents us from robbing banks.
Coercion has, however, become 'a dirty word for most liberals now' (Hardin, 1968: 1246) but this does not have to be the case as long
as this coercion comes about as a result of the democratic will. This however, requires overcoming the problems raised by the likes of
people can agree to coerce each

other in order to realise their long-term, 'enlightened' self-interest. If they cannot, and both
the myopic and collective action problem ecological objections to democracy arc valid, then this coercion may not be
'mutually agreed upon' but rather imposed by Ophuls' ecological 'elite' or Westra's
Aristotelian 'wise man'. Under these circumstances there seems to be no hope at all for a reconciliation of
ecological imperatives and democratic decision-making: we are faced with a stark choice,
democracy or ecological survival.
Ophuls and Westra, that is, it is dependent upon the assumption that
Eco-crunch turns their impacts but Top-Down authoritarianism is

key to stop war and ecological crisis
Shearman 7(David, Emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, Secretary of
Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an Independent Assessor on the IPCC; and Joseph
Wayne Smith, lawyer and philosopher with a research interest in environmentalism, 2007, The
Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, p. 85-86)
Our position differs from Wolff and other anarchists also insofar as we reject the principle of autonomy, the foundation belief of
liberalism. It is the argument of this work that liberalism
has essentially overdosed on freedom and

liberty . It is true that freedom and liberty are important values, but such values are by no
means fundamental or ultimate values . These values are far down the list of what
we believe to be core values based upon an ecological philosophy of humanity: survival
and the integrity of ecological systems . Without such values, values such as
freedom and autonomy make no sense at all . If one is not living, one cannot be free.
Indeed liberal freedom essentially presupposes the idea of a sustainable life for
otherwise the only freedom that the liberal social world would have would be to perish in a
polluted environment. The issue of values calls into question the Western view of the world or perhaps more
specifically the viewpoint that originates from Anglo Saxon development. It is significant that the clash of civilizations
thinking espoused by Samuel Huntington, a precursor of the neoconservatives, has generated
much debate and support. Huntingtons analysis involves potential conflict between Western
universalism, Muslim militancy and Chinese assertion. 18 The divisions are based on cultural
inheritance. It is a world in which enemies are essential for peoples seeking identity and
where the most severe conflicts lie at the points where the major civilizations of the
world clash. Hopefully this viewpoint will be superseded, for humanity no longer has time for the indulgence of irrational
hates. The important clash will not be of civilizations but of values. The fault line cuts across all
civilizations. It is a clash of values between the conservatives and the consumers. The latter are
well described in this book. They rule the world economically, and their thinking excludes true care for the
future of the world. The conservatives at present are a powerless polyglot of scientists,
environmentalists, farming and subsistence communities, and peoples of various
religious faiths, including a minority of right-wing creationists who think that God wishes the world to be cared for. They
recognize the environmental perils and place their banishment as the preeminent task of
humanity. The fight for minds, not liberal democracy, will determine the future of
the worlds population . If conservative thought prevails it may unite humanity in
common cause and heal the cultural fault lines.
Environmental authoritarianism would be super-effective

Daniel 12 (Charles, University of Leeds, Summer 2012, To what extent is democracy
detrimental to the current and future aims of environmental policy and technologies?, POLIS
Journal, Vol. 7, http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ugsummer-12/charles-daniel.pdf)
Whilst not completely discrediting democracy, the previous chapter certainly highlights a number of shortcomings in the reality of
the continued pursuit of consumerist tendencies through a culture based on liberalism and individuality. The evidence
suggests that there needs to be a higher level of adaptability from modern states and a
move away from the pursuit of the values of modernity , however difficult a concept this may be to accept.
Despite its clear political shortcomings, is it possible that an authoritarian approach may be the most
logical and efficient system to tackle the challenges of the environment? As stated
previously in the introduction, the reference to authoritarianism should not be perceived in its
traditional expression but rather in a more hybrid and rational sense. The best reference point for this
is to be found in Robert Scalapinos model of soft authoritarianism. He defines this as controlled political life, where
freedom of speech is limited, yet those in power accept the existence of a civil society outside the state (Scalapino 1993: 74). It also
combines a market-orientated system with a paternalistic social order that persuades rather than coerces (Roy 1994).
Scalapinos model, it should be noted, is centred on defining the nature of Asian political
models, such as those used by Singapore and to an extent China, rather than a historical
western expression of authoritarianism. Francis Fukuyama, who regarded it as the most serious competitor to
liberal democracy, furthered Scalapinos discussion on soft authoritarianism. He emphasised the cultural relativity of this mode of
government, as a result of its grounding in historical values and regarded it as the primary explanation for Asias continued
economic dominance. As he put it: The
Asian experience has forced people in the West to confront

weaknesses in their own societies in a way that none of the other ideological alternatives
has. Only Asians have been able to master the modern technological world and create capitalist societies competitive with those of
the West - indeed, some would argue, superior in many ways. This alone is enough to suggest that Asia's relative share of global
power will increase steadily. But Asia also poses an ideological challenge. (Fukuyama 1995: 61) For Fukuyama, the Asian political
grounding in Confucian values of loyalty and obedience to authority combined with historical experience, has allowed soft
authoritarianism to build a system that will arguably be considered as a more popular mode of government over democracy in Far
Eastern political culture. Whilst
Western societies attempt to cultivate their democratic values

from an ideological grounding that in turn produces institutions, civil society and culture,
Asian models are orientated in a reverse structure, putting primacy on cultural
experience and teachings (Fukuyama 1995). The essence of Asian society is therefore not centered
on individual rights and freedom but rather on a deeply ingrained moral code and
communitarian ethics . The difficulty however, as Fukuyama highlights, is that soft authoritarianism is culturally
relative and therefore would be difficult to transfer to western societies as a viable alternative to democracy. However when it
comes to environmental issues, there is no reason to suggest that soft authoritarianism
cannot be used as a political reference point for policy decisions , even amongst
Western governments. For, contained within soft authoritarianism lies transferable
principles, the most compelling one being trust and obedience in authoritative bodies to
carry out policies for the long-term benefit of the community , rather than the shortterm interest of the individual. If democracy is to be considered a failing political system in the context of an over-developed society,
then this well articulated form of government does pose an interesting alternative.
Authoritarianism key to solve extinction, Singapore proves its

feasible (gender modified)
Ortmann 9 (Stephan, Research Fellow, Department of Asian and International Studies, City
University of Hong Kong, 9/25/09, Environmental Governance under Authoritarian Rule:
Singapore and China,
https://www.dvpw.de/fileadmin/docs/Kongress2009/Paperroom/2009VglDiktaturpOrtmann.pdf)
Even though today the consensus argues that democracy is preferable over authoritarianism, some
authors continue to
claim that an authoritarian form of government would be better able to protect the
environment. The most recent formulation of this argument comes from Shearman and Smith (2007) who
maintain that (hu)mankind can only survive the environmental crisis if it gives
up personal liberties, an argument that has been made by many others (for instance: Beck 1997). In their opinion, the
main fault of democracy is its link to capitalism and the main goal must be a nogrowth economy because
that is the only way mankind can survive . While Shearman and Smith recognize
the fact that existing authoritarian regimes have performed worse than democracies, they
envision an authoritarian meritocracy that can achieve the goals democracies have thus far
failed to accomplish. In their opinion, an ideal political system would be governed by an
altruistic, able, authoritarian leader, versed in science and personal skills (Ibid. p. 13) who could possibly
overcome the existing environmental crisis. This argument is partially based on the author's
perceptions of Singapore, a self-proclaimed meritocracy ruled by a small
technocratic elite . They assert that a Singapore system could be developed to drive vital
environmental outcomes in the interests of humanity (Ibid., p. 126). Let us now turn to Singapore in
order to first understand whether that assertion is true and secondly whether this model can be adapted to other countries. With
other words, is it possible to achieve some general form of environmental governance under authoritarian rule which is superior to
the democratic alternative? 3. Singapore, the authoritarian garden city Singapore, a small city-state in Southeast Asia with
roughly 4.7 million inhabitants and an area of 274 square miles (710 square kilometers),
epitomizes the
authoritarian technocracy that some environmentalists such as Shearman and Smith have
envisaged in their writings. The city-state recruits its leaders solely from the highest achieving
scholars. Education is a central concern of the leadership, which considers technocratic decisions
superior to other forms of decision making. It is therefore not surprising that Singapore's
democracy has been hollowed out, leaving only procedures to generate a certain degree of electoral legitimacy for the
ruling party. The city-state has been labeled the Garden City because it combines beautiful natural gardens with clean air that is
The
government has been instrumental in developing and steering the environmental
programs since the country's independence in 1965. In that same year, the government introduced the Green City Concept,
incomparable to other cities in Asia and rivals places in Europe (unless, of course, there are massive forest fires in Indonesia).
which provided for the large scale planting of trees and scrubs. The Singapore Government has been intent on protecting drinking
The government is the principal

agent driving the agenda on environmental protection. For instance, it conducts a yearly campaign
water reservoirs, reclaiming waste water, and most recently also recycling.
called the Keep Singapore Green and Clean Campaign to educate people to become more environmentally conscious. Former Prime
Minister and founding father Lee Kuan Yew took credit for this result when he asserted in 1995: Singapore today is a verdant city,
where abundant greenery softens the landscape. This was no accident of nature. It is the result of a deliberate 30-year policy, which
required political will and sustained effort to carry out (qt. in: CLAIR, 2001). Savage and Kong (1993: 38) also argue that
Singapore's success is due to [e]nlightened elites and decision makers and firm
government (which) are the only ways to ensure the successful management and
sustenance of viable urban ecosystems. At the same time, Singapore's environmental
protection efforts have been achieved through regulation and direct controls using
legal and fiscal measures (Kong, 1994: 5). In effect this means that the government is willing and capable
to exact high penalties for violators. This has earned the city-state the reputation of a fine city. Of course these
fines do not primarily punish those who violate environmental rules but rather target a wide range of unacceptable behavior, such as
eating and drinking on the MRT, Singapore's subway, or the failure to flush a toilet. Nevertheless, the
government has
become known for its successful implementation of its laws and regulations, which can
be attributed to the strong administrative centralization in this relatively small city-state and a
largely effective legal system.
impact defense
climate change o/w

Luke is wrongclimate change is a greater risk than green biopolitics.
Eckersley 4
Robyn ECKERSLEY Politcs @ Melbourne 4The Green State p. 89-93
Green poststructuralists have likewise sought to deconstruct the disciplinary effects of biopower
and green governmentality, while green critics of technocracy have lamented the cult of the expert the so-called the
scientization of politics, and the concomitant disenfranchisement of the lay public and vernacular knowledge in affairs of state
administration." The bureaucratic rationality of the administrative state is inn as too rigid, hierarchical, and limited to deal with the
variability, nonreducability, and complexity of ecological problems." Bureaucratic rationality responds to complex problems by
breaking them down, comparnncntalizing them, and assigning them to different agencies that respond to a hierarchical chain of
command. This often leads to the routine displacement of problems acn bureaucratic system boundaries,' Once we add to these
developments the more recent revolution in public sector management, we have good reasons to concur with Paul Hint that the
traditional liberal architecture has increasingly "become a gross misdescription of the structure of modern societies?" The tenuous
link between popular political participation and control and technocratic state administration has also been a major theme in the
work of Ulrich Beck. Indeed, Beck(like Martin Janickel argues
that politicians and state functionaries act in

ways that seek to mask problems rather than solve them. Ecological problems pens because they are generated
by the same economic, scientific, and political institutions that are called upon to solve them. While the state cannot but acknowledge the ecological crisis, it nonetheless continues to function as qir were not present by denying, donplaying, and naturalizing
ecological problems and declining to connect such problems with the basic structure and dynancs of rccmomic and bureaucratic
rationality. According to Beck, this organized irresponsibility can sometimes take on a Kafkaesque form. The state seeks to
manufacture security by providing social insurance systems-health services, unemployment benefits, pensions, and workers
compensation-but it can provide no protection against major hazards that can pierce the thin veneer of normality and expose the
inadequacies of the welfare stare As Beck puts it 'What good is a legal system which prosecutes technically manageable small risks,
but legalises large scak hazards on the strength of its authority, foisting them on everyone, including even those multitudes who still
resist them?' It might be tempting to conclude from this general critique that states are part of the problem rather than the solution
to ecological degradation. With its roots in the peace and antinuclear movements, the green movement has long been critical of the
coercive modality of state power-including the state-military-industrial complex-and might therefore be understandably sceptical
toward the very poiisibility of reforming or transforming states into mare democratic and ecologically responsive structures of
gosemment The notion that the state might come to represent an ecological savior and trustee appears both fanciful and dangerous
rather than empowering. Yet such an
anti-statist posture cannot withstand critical scrutiny from a critical

ecological perspective. The problem seems to be that while states have been associated with violence,
insecurity, bureaucratic domination, injustice, and ecological degradation, there is no reason to
assume that any alternatives we might imagineor develop willnecessarily befree of, or less burdened by,
such problems. As Medley Bull warns, violence, insecurity, injustice, and ecological degradation predate the state system, and we cannot rule out the possibility that they are likely to survive the demise of the
state system, regardless of what new political structures may arise." Now it could be plausibly argued that
these problems might be Lessened under a more democratic and possibly decentralized global political architecture (as
hioregionalists and other green decentralists have argued). However, there is no basis upon which to assume that they will be
lessened any more than under a more deeply democratized state system. Given
the seriousness and urgency of many

warming), building on the state governance structures that already
exist seems to be a more fruitful path to rake than any attempt to move beyond or around statesin the
quest for environmental sustainab.ility.2t' Moreover, as a matter of principle, it can be argued that environmental benefits
are public goods that ought best be managed by democratically organized public power , and not by
ecological problems (e.g., global
private power." Such an approach is consistent with critical theory's concern to work creatively with current historical practices and
associated understandings rather
understandings. In short, there
than fashion utopias that have no purchase on such practices and

is more mileage to be gained by enlistingand creatively developing the existing
norms,, rules, and practices of state governance in ways that make start power more democratically and ecologically accountable
than designing a new architecture of global governancede novo (a daunting and despairing proposition).
Skeptics should take heart from the fact that the organized coercive power of democratic states is not a
totally untamed power, insofar as such power must be exercised according to the rule of law and principles of democratic
oversight. This is not to deny that state power can sometimes he seriously abused (e.g., by the police or national intelligence
agencies). Rather, it is merely to argue that such powers are not unlimited and beyond democratic control and redress. The focus of
critical ecological attention should therefore be on how effective this control and redress has been, and how it might be
strengthened. The same argument may be extended to the bureaucratic arm of the state. In liberal democratic stares, with the
gradual enlargement, spe- cialization, and depersonalization of state administrative power have also come legal norms and
procedures that limit such power according to the principle of democratic accountability. As (,ianfranco Poggi has observed, at the
same time
as the political power of the state has become more extensive in terms of its subject
matter and reach, so too have claims for public participation in the exercise of this power
widened? This is also to acknowledge the considerable scope for further, more deep-seated democratic oversight. Indeed, it is
possible to point to a raft of new ecological discursive designs that have already emerged as partial
antidotes to the technocratic dimensions of the administrative state, such as community rightto-know legislation, CornmtlnLtV environmental monitoring and reporting, third-party litigation
rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens' juries, consensus
conference.,-, and public environmental inquiries. Each of these initiatives may he understood as attempts to confront both public
and private power with its consequences, to widen the range of voices and perspectives in stare administration, to expose or prevent
problem displacement, and/or to ensure that the sites economic, social, and political power that create and/or are responsible for
ecological risks are made answerable to all those who may suffer the consequences This is precisely where an ongoing green critical
locus on the state can remain productive.
tech challenge fails

Challenging technocratic control of the environment prevents the
governments ability to respond to the impending ecological crunch
Beeson 10 ( mark , Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science &
International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, The coming of environmental
authoritarianism, Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, )
Yet, whatever we may think about Asia's authoritarian regimes, we need to recognise that they have frequently been associated with
a (generally successful) historical pattern of development that has prioritised the economic over the political, and that this model
may continue to have appeal and potential efficacy (Beeson 2007b). The possibility that the
state will, for better or

worse , remain at the centre of attempts at environmental management is
recognised by some scholars (Meadowcroft 2005), but even some of the most sophisticated analyses of the state's role seem
overwhelming Eurocentric, highly abstract and not terribly helpful in explaining current or likely future political and environmental
outcomes in places like Southeast Asia. For example, Eckersley's (2004, p. 178) belief
that there is the

potential for a vibrant public sphere and innovative discursive procedures to lift the
horizons of not only democratic opinion formation but also democratic will-formation beyond the territorially
bounded community of citizens, has little obvious resonance with the history of much of Southeast
Asia [emphasis in original]. The reality is that the Philippines, the country with arguably the most vibrant civil society in Southeast
Asia, also has one of the most appalling environmental records (Fahn 2003, p. 117). Even in developed industrial
democracies with long traditions of political pluralism and arguably more effective civil societies, it has long been
recognised that the exercise of effective green agency is highly problematic and faces
fundamental problems of mobilisation, organisation and collective action . The
perhaps understandable suspicion of traditional politics, hierarchy and political authority has often rendered green parties
politically ineffective (Goodin 1992). Even
if we recognise the changes that have taken place in the social

structures and even consciousness of many Western societies (Carter 2007), the reality on the
ground in much of Southeast Asia and China is very different. Quotidian reality becomes
especially important when we consider the potential efficacy of deliberative democracy ,
which some see as a way of resolving political conflicts over the environment. Although deliberative
democracy has been described as the currently hegemonic approach to democracy within environmental thinking (AriasMaldonado 2007, p. 245), it has little obvious relevance to the situation in East Asia . While there is much
that is admirable about the central precepts of deliberative democracy (see Bohman 1998), its underlying assumptions
about the circumstances in which political activity actually occur are strikingly at
odds with the lived reality outside North America and Western Europe . This
merits emphasis because for some writers rational, informed discourse is central to sustainable
environmental management and the resolution of the competing interests that inevitably surround it (Hamilton and
Wills-Toker 2006). And yet, as the very limited number of studies that actually examine environmental politics under
authoritarian rule demonstrate, the reality is very different and the prospects for the development
of progressive politics are very limited (Doyle and Simpson 2006). Even if we assume that
political circumstances do actually allow for a politically unconstrained and informed
discussion of complex issues, as Arias-Maldonado (2007, p. 248) points out, the belief that citizens in a
deliberative context will spontaneously acquire ecological enlightenment , and
will push for greener decisions, relies too much on an optimistic, naive view of
human nature , so frequently found in utopian political movements. In much of East Asia, the
population may not have the luxury or capacity even to engage in these sorts of discursive practices, while the absence of effective
democracy in much of the region stands as a continuing obstacle to achieving anything approximating deliberative democracy. Even
more problematically in the long-run, there
is no compelling evidence that democracy of any sort

will necessarily promote good environmental outcomes (Neumayer 2002), or that rising living standards
will inevitably deliver a sustainable environment (Dinda 2004). On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest that in the initial
phases at least, democratisation could indirectly promote environmental degradation through its effect on national income
(Li and Reuveny 2006, p. 953). In other words, even
the best of all outcomes rising living standards

and an outbreak of democracy may have unsustainable environmental
consequences that may prove to be their undoing in the longer-term . In such
circumstances, ideas about possible ways of reorganising societies to lessen their impact on the natural environment may not find
sufficient support to make them realisable or effective. As Lieberman (2002, p. 709) points out, an idea's time arrives not simply
because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it. In much of Southeast Asia
and China the forces supporting environmental protection are comparatively weak and unable to overcome powerful vested interests
intent on the continuing exploitation of natural resources. In short, predominantly
Western concerns with thick

cosmopolitanism and the hope that a metabolistic [sic] relationship with the natural environment
might bind us to strangers (Dobson 2006, p. 177), seem bizarrely at odds with lived
experience where climate change is already profoundly undermining sociability within
national frameworks, let alone between them (Raleigh and Urdal 2007). The sobering reality would seem to be that as the
human population grows and environmental damage progresses , policymakers will
have less and less capacity to intervene to keep damage from producing serious
social disruption, including conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991, p. 79).
Eco-authoritarianism is inevitable its only a question of whether it

can solve the crisis
Beeson 10 (Mark , Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science &
International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, The coming of environmental
authoritarianism, Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918
The conclusions that emerge from the following discussion are necessarily impressionistic, speculative and rather dispiriting.
The
empirical evidence upon which such inferences depend is, by contrast, more and more compelling and
unequivocal . There is little doubt that the natural environment everywhere is under
profound, perhaps irredeemable stress. Parts of Southeast Asia and China are distinctive only in having already
gone further than the most of the West in the extent of the degradation that has already occurred (see Jasparro and Taylor 2008).
The only issue that remains in doubt is the nature of the response to this
unfolding crisis. The extent of the problem, the seemingly implacable nature of the drivers of environmental
decline, the limited capacity for action at the national level and the region's unimpressive record of
cooperation and environmental management do not inspire confidence. Consequently, the prospects for an
authoritarian response become more likely as the material base of existence
becomes less capable of sustaining life , let alone the good life upon which the
legitimacy of democratic regimes hinges.

Luke K - Michigan7 2014

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**luke kritik**

Ecogovernance turns exploitation into the organizing principle of

Neither corporate managerialism nor traditional environmental

omnipolitanizing deterioration, in fact, has spread so quickly that neither green

a truly critical approach to international relations and the

Sierra Club's own celebration of Nature through

Sierra Club green gaze looks through

ecological catastrophes-to-come, the

apocalyptic imaginaries are leaving behind any hope of rebirth or

and nurturing apocalyptic

It insists that we have to

expanded logic of privatization,

Through egg-to-plate farming, cod become increasingly conceptualized

wild cod fishery.

from the analysis of the notion of biodiversity. Although

discursive control exercised over indigenous people and knowledge

first step toward realizing this challenge is to comprehend bioprospecting as a "discourse"

critically analyze bioprospecting as a hegemonic discourse that appropriates nature,

early origins of "the environment" as a term, or its historical emergence as

if we understand environment in these terms, there are many

presidential pledge to deploy American

efforts to connect economic growth with ecological responsibility,

program for earth stewardship takes a unique

green geo-politics of this Global Marshall Plan provides a

invoke international norms

Modern environmentalism denies nature its own agency and seeks to

human ecologies on Earth

reshaping the Earth

consigned to the hands of terraforming professionals with graduate training in the

is hardly a place on Earth

are manifold relations of power which

The affirmative reentrenches traditional modes of ecology the

is meaningless unless or until particular human beings assign significance to

educational operations now routinely produce professional-technical workers with

Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to

Environmental expertism renders nature a tool for experimentation

Encircled by enclosures of alarm, environments can be disassembled, recombined,

link food security

resolution adopted at the

link free market

one might have expected, this

link green policy

organized a coalition of environmentalists, labour

Environmental policy guarantees a biopolitical state the impact is

ecological limits to growth

"an environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a bioeconomic spreadsheet

Governmentality reemerges as environmentality, re-establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of

link keystone species

unassayed stock of biodiversity is saved "for other reasons,"

link law of the sea

announced at a major address hosted by the

link legal reform

the art of government now find the principles of

Environmental Regulations are a mechanism by which the

announced at a major address hosted by the

Legal reforms to environmental policy serve to expand the reach of

Banks pro-active response to transnational environmental organizations,

number of important decrees relating to property rights

in distinction from the colonial era,

change came institutional restructuring Of the Lao government, and

link limited growth

"an environmentalist" provides the grounds for draping a bioeconomic

risk analysis unfortunately serves dark purposes as an

link resource extraction

luke kritik