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offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on
April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in
the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge
Infantes Branch.
On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta,
and another releasing Ancheta from custody.
In his motion for inhibition,3 Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently
required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason,
a judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he
should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual that several
persons charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on
bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity
of Judge Infantes court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration
included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent
error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross ignorance of
law.
Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge
either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he
did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will
rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge; that at one
time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or without the
comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail
issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve
the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he
should not be too dependent on the public prosecutors comment considering that
the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge;4
and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or
a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the
rules. [Gacal vs. Infante, 658 SCRA 535(2011)]
Held:
EVALUATION:The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt
is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law (Sec. 13, Art. III).
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a
capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).
With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure as a backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail to
the accused dispense with the hearing of Application for Bail?
The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 03-61, entitled Benito M.
Occasion vs. Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R.
Balanag, Jr., of MCTC, Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of probable
cause that an offense of Murder was committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
together with the records of the case, with No Bail Recommended. Upon review of
the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for Murder against accused
Faustino Ancheta but a bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the latter
found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts
on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the
Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David
Khos term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of
effectivity of Kho s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term
of Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six
months which is merely half of [the] three-year term. This is totally opposed to the
prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by
SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such
term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.
Held:
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable
before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily
discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections47 the concept of due process as
applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an
administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative
proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at
hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we
have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC,
Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these
serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due
process.
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing
carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the
opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation
was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing
agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a
material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a
party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were
deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the termsharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their
position.