Complaint About The ASADA/AFL Joint Investigation: Bruce Francis 11 November 2015

Complaint about the
ASADA/AFL Joint
Investigation
Bruce Francis
e | bfrancis@onthenet.com.au
11 November 2015
COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

ASADA / AFL JOINT INVESTIGATION
PREAMBLE
1.
The ASADA web site states: The Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) is a
government statutory authority that is Australia's driving force for pure performance in
sport. ASADA's mission is to protect Australia's sporting integrity through the elimination
of doping. To achieve its mission ASADA focuses on three key themes - to deter, detect,
and enforce:
1.1.
ASADA deters prohibited doping practices in sport via education, doping control
(testing), advocacy and the coordination of Australia's anti-doping program;
1.2.
ASADA detects a breach of a sport's anti-doping policy via its doping control
(testing) and investigation programs; and
1.3.
ASADA enforces any breach of a policy by ensuring those violating anti-doping

rules are prosecuted and sanctioned.
2.
A substantial component of this complaint is the inappropriate behaviour of various

authorities even before the first witness was interviewed. This was arguably little different
from match-fixing and resulted in a denial of procedural fairness to Essendon Football
Club, senior coach James Hird, other support staff, and the players. But there were also
many other examples of misconduct and incompetence that lead to the conclusion that
ASADA and the AFL conducted a corrupted and contaminated investigation.
3.
The emphasis on the lack of procedural fairness as a major part of this complaint is
supported in comments by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Robert S
French on 7 October 2010, when he delivered the Sir Anthony Mason Lecture at the
University of Melbourne Law School, Law Students' Society. The subject was: Procedural
Fairness Indispensable to Justice? Inter alia, French said:
Procedural fairness is part of our cultural heritage. It is deeply rooted in our law. It lies at
the heart of the judicial function and conditions the exercise of a large array of
administrative powers affecting the rights, duties, privileges and immunities of individuals
and organisations. As a normative marker for decision-making it predates by millennia the
common law of England and its voyage to the Australian colonies. In his conclusion, the
Chief Justice said: The concept of procedural fairness has its origins in the natural law
which informed the development of the rules of natural justice as part of the common law
of England. Its scope has broadened, then narrowed, then broadened again, through its
history. Despite incidents of legislative exclusion, procedural fairness is alive and well
today in Australia. There is little doubt that the norms of procedural fairness reach well
beyond the confines of the courtroom in judicial proceedings or judicial review of
administrative decisions. They are important societal values applicable to any form of
official decision-making which can affect individual interests. I do not think it too bold to
say that if the notion of a 'fair go' means anything in this context, it must mean procedural
fairness would be widely regarded within the Australian community as indispensable to
justice that before a decision is made affecting a person's interests, they should have a
right to be heard by an impartial decision-maker.
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4.
Given that the Essendon boards representatives, Chairman David Evans and chief
executive Ian Robson, did little but capitulate from day one to the AFLs demands to
accept guilty findings for the club and support staff, I have treated the Essendon board,
the Essendon Football Club, Essendon players and Essendon support staff as separate
entities in the documentation of my complaint. Evans and Robsons lack of resistance
against then AFL deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlans improper demands suggest
they were prepared to penalise the club as long as the board members escaped attention
and the players escaped penalty.
5.
Although the ASADA Interim Report (page 32) stated that: The investigation sought to
establish whether players and support persons from the Essendon FC used substances or
engaged in methods prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) and the AFLs
Anti-Doping Code, it is clear that a second de-facto investigation was set up by stealth
and came to run parallel with it. The first investigation, whose objective was well
publicised, was supposed to ascertain whether the Essendon players had been
administered banned substances. As it transpired, the second, unannounced investigation
of governance failures outside the purview of ASADA was run by the same
investigators, and without informing those questioned of the new intention. It is difficult
to believe that this covert investigation was established for any reason other than to
deliver the government and the AFL a major public face.
6.
Although Federal Court judge John Middleton ruled that the ASADA Act permitted ASADA
to conduct a joint investigation with the AFL, and although he ruled that ASADA was
allowed to give the AFL a report, Middleton was never asked to determine whether the
investigation was corrupted nor was he asked to determine whether the investigators
and/or ASADA and/or AFL officials were guilty of misconduct and/or incompetence in the
manner of the investigations, findings and determinations.
7.
Some of the following contains repetition. For example, issues such as the crucial meeting
on 9 February 2013 between ASADA, AFL, Essendon and federal government officials
required mentioning in four categories denial of procedural fairness; misconduct;
unacceptable government interference; and unacceptable AFL interference.
BACKGROUND
Essendon Football Club
8.
In May 2011, the Essendon board expressed concern about the number of injuries
suffered by the players. Chairman David Evans, chief executive Ian Robson, general
manager football operations Paul Hamilton, football manager Danny Corcoran, senior
coach James Hird and assistant coach Mark Thompson met and discussed Essendons onfield performances and injuries. Consensus was reached that Essendon had fallen behind
the other clubs with respect to fitness and recovery. It was decided to embrace other
clubs perceived more scientific approach to high performance.
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9.
Essendons high performance coach resigned on 16 June 2011. After an exhaustive

recruitment process, Dean Robinson started as the high performance coach on 25 August
2011. Robinson reported to Hamilton. Robinson insisted on bringing two staff with him
Stephen Dank and Ms Suki Hobson. Despite Robinsons demands, Dank was required to
attend a job interview on 28 September 2011. Dank commenced work as a consultant on
4 November 2011.
10.
Dank drew up a supplements program and passed it to Robinson for approval. Although
James Hird was on a different branch of the organisation structure, and therefore with
neither responsibility nor authority in relation to the supplements program, in general
discussions he always reminded everyone that all substances had to be WADA permitted
and Dr Bruce Reid had to approve their use.
11.
On 19 October 2011, the first day of 2012 pre-season training, Dr Reid discovered that
Robinson had given some of the players a peptide called Tribulus without his permission.
Dr Reid reprimanded Robinson and immediately phoned AFL medical officer Dr Peter
Harcourt to report the incident. Dr Reid was not only concerned that he had been
marginalised but was concerned Tribulus may have been a WADA prohibited substance. It
is not.
12.
During the first week after the 2011-2012 Christmas-break, Dr Reid once again discovered
that the players had been administered substances without his approval. Dr Reid
discussed the situation with James Hird who suggested he report the matter to his
department head, Paul Hamilton. Hamilton then reported the matter to chief executive,
Ian Robson. Robinson acknowledged that protocol had been breached but assured the
group none of the substances was banned by WADA. Robinson then drew up a new list of
procedures and protocols.
13.
Inter alia, it was decided that once a Dank recommended supplement was approved by
Robinson, Dr Reid, and then Hamilton, each player would be required to sign an informed
consent form prior to the first administration of the supplement.
14.
On 2 February 2012 Hamilton sent an email to Dank, Robinson and Jonah Oliver in which
he indicated his intention to centralise all paperwork relating to the supplementation
program. From Mr Hamiltons perspective:
It is imperative that [the club through his office] keep a file of all approvals that we have
received and all correspondence on this matter with players, staff etc.
15.
In May 2012, Dr Reid discovered the players had received Cerebrolysin injections and
complained to Thompson. Although Thompson had no authority in anything to do with
the high performance branch he admonished Dank and told him to cease injections.
16.
In July 2012 Evans, Robson, Corcoran and Dr Reid met at Hirds home. Dr Reid, supported
by Corcoran and Hird, requested that Robinsons employment be terminated. Evans and
Robson refused on the grounds that the club couldnt afford the pay-out. This decision
was backed by the full board at its August board meeting.
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The Australian Crime Commission
17.
In early 2012, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), with assistance from the Australian
Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) and the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA)
commenced an investigation into drug use in sport and the involvement of organised
crime. The investigation was named Project Aperio. Based on intelligence provided to the
ACC, the investigation concentrated primarily on two major codes, the Australian Football
League (AFL) and the National Rugby League (NRL).
18.
Project Aperio examined four key issues:
19.
18.1.
The availability of new generation Performance and Image Enhancing Drugs

(PIEDs), which were previously considered to be only used by elite athletes.
18.2.
The involvement of organised criminal identities and groups in the distribution of

new generation performance and image enhancing drugs.
18.3.
The use of World Anti-Doping Agency prohibited substances by professional

athletes in Australia.
18.4.
Current threats to the integrity of professional sport in Australia.
The Australian Crime Commission identified:

19.1.
the use of these substances in the AFL and NRL facilitated in some cases by sports
scientists, high-performance coaches and sports staff.
19.2.
the involvement of organised crime identities and groups in the domestic

distribution of performance and image enhancing drugs, including peptides and
hormones.
19.3.
significant integrity concerns within professional sports in Australia related to

athletes use of prohibited substances and increasing associations with criminal
identities.
20.
Essendon sports scientist Stephen Dank was interviewed under oath by the Australian
Crime Commission in May and November 2012. On both occasions he denied using
Thymosin Beta-4, the only banned substance still under accusation at Essendon. To this
day, Dank hasnt been charged with perjury by the ACC for having given false evidence, so
it is reasonable to assume there is no evidence to contradict his testimony.
21.
On 31 January 2013, ACC chief executive John Lawler and his deputy Paul Jevtovic briefed
AFL chief executive Andrew Demetriou, deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlan, and
manager integrity services Brett Clothier, on the findings of Project Aperio. Lawler also
invited ASADA chief executive Aurora Andruska to attend the meeting.
22.
Lawler told the attendees that one AFL club featured heavily in Project Aperio.
23.
According to Andruskas notes taken at the meeting [Source: ASA.0032.0149; Andruska

affidavit, exhibit AA-2], Andrew Demetriou, who had previously commissioned the AFLs
general manager football operations Adrian Anderson, to look into the increased
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influence of sports scientists at AFL clubs said a lot not a surprise by what Lawler had
said. Gillon McLachlan asked: Whether it is Essendon? Jevtovic responded: Say no
more.
24.
During this 31 January 2013 meeting with the ACC and ASADA, the AFL expressed its
desire to share and co-operate with ASADA. There was a general discussion about an
investigation. [Source: Andruska affidavit, paragraph 6, exhibit AA-2].
25.
Federal Court Justice John Middleton later remarked on 12 August 2014 during the
Federal Court proceedings that: It was a wink and a nod. Demetriou, McLachlan and
Clothier all accepted it was Essendon.
26.
Demetrious comment about not a surprise needs to be understood in its context. In

2012, the AFL chief medical officer Peter Harcourt organised for ASADA, under the Doping
Control Agreement, to take blood samples from selected players at Essendon for testing.
Those samples were sent to a specialist laboratory in Germany for testing. The test results
came back negative. The Essendon Football Club was never told about this process.
27.
On 5 February 2013 Essendon Chairman David Evans, chief executive Ian Robson, senior
coach James Hird, marketing manager Justin Rodski and public relations consultant
Elizabeth Lukin attended a meeting with Gillon McLachlan and Brett Clothier at AFL
House. McLachlan insisted that Essendon players had taken performance-enhancing
drugs. McLachlans comment was extraordinary given the first witness had not even been
interviewed.
28.
On 7 February 2013, the ACC released the findings of Project Aperio in a 43-page
document. Inter alia, it stated: The use of peptides and growth hormones by Australian
athletes is widespread, facilitated by unscrupulous sports scientists, high-performance
coaches and support staff.
29.
On the same day as the release of the ACC findings, the Minister for Justice the Hon. Jason
Clare MP, and the Minister for Sport Senator Kate Lundy, released the joint media
statement:
The Australian Crime Commission today released the findings of a 12-month investigation
into the integrity of Australian sport and the relationship between professional sporting
bodies, prohibited substances and organised crime. The investigation identifies widespread
use of prohibited substances including peptides, hormones and illicit drugs in professional
sport. It also found that this use has been facilitated by sports scientists, high-performance
coaches and sports staff. The ACC also identified organised crime identities and groups
that are involved in the distribution of PIEDs to athletes and professional sports staff. The
ACC report notes increasing evidence of personal relationships of concern between
professional athletes and organised crime identities and groups. This may have resulted in
match fixing and the fraudulent manipulation of betting markets. The Australian Crime
Commission has found that professional sport in Australia is highly vulnerable to
infiltration by organised crime, Mr Clare said. Multiple athletes from a number of clubs
in major Australian sporting codes are suspected of currently using or having previously
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used peptides, potentially constituting anti-doping rules violations. Officials from clubs
have also been identified as administering, via injections and intravenous drips, a variety
of substances. The report concluded that some coaches, sports scientists and support staff
of elite athletes have orchestrated and/or condoned the use of prohibited substances [my
emphasis]. Some sports scientists have indicated a preparedness to administer substances
to elite athletes, which are untested or not yet approved for human use. The ACC has
referred its findings in relation to suspected criminal activity to relevant law enforcement
agencies including the Australian federal Police and all State and Territory Police Forces.
30.
Following the ACC media conference, Demetriou conducted his own media conference at
which he stated: Id say to all our supporters: Dont lose faith in the game The AFL
commission and the AFL management is going to tackle this head on, to clean this sport
up, to rid the game of insidious infiltration of organised crime figures, to rid the game of
the use of drugs, to rid the game of cocktails [my emphasis]. It is incomprehensible that
Demetriou accepted that the AFL had been infiltrated by organised crime figures. It is
arguable whether anyone has brought the game more into disrepute than Demetriou did
with his comments.
31.
Demetrious comments were based on briefings he had received from the ACC and
ASADA. Given that the ASADA/AFL joint investigation into Essendon had just commenced
he was arguably guilty of gross misconduct and impropriety in making such incendiary
statements to the media that implied guilt. It is incomprehensible that ASADAs chief
executive Aurora Andruska didnt reprimand Demetriou for compromising the joint
investigation in this way.
32.
The ACC investigation had concentrated on the AFL and NRL and only Essendon and
Cronulla Rugby League Club were identified. Inevitably, these two clubs were linked in the
public mind to doping, organised crime and fraudulent behaviour.
33.
The former chief executive of ASADA Richard Ings, labelled the day of the media release as
the blackest day in Australian sporting history, a label that became synonymous with
the subsequent so-called Essendon scandal. Demetrious presence alongside the
government ministers, and his statements later that day, acted as an endorsement of the
ACCs findings in relation to his sport and compounded the damage to Essendons
reputation. The negative impact on the publics perception of Essendon FC and its senior
coach James Hird, was enormous and egregiously unfair.
34.
Project Aperio did not investigate governance issues at Essendon and the 43-page report
made no reference to governance issues.
35.
The AFL/ASADA joint investigation, and the AFL tribunal hearing, in which the Essendon
players were found not guilty of being administered a banned substance, indicate the ACC
had only collected information of interest and nothing that amounted to proof of any such
wrongdoing, contrary to what Lawler and Ministers Clare and Lundy had claimed. In
appalling errors of judgment, Demetriou and McLachlan echoed Lawler, Clare and Lundys
sentiments as if they were facts, much to the Essendon club and James Hirds detriment.
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36.
As it was a joint investigation, legally, and morally, both ASADA and the AFL must own
mistakes/breaches/misconduct/illegalities of the other. If the AFL acted improperly during
the investigation, ASADA has to accept equal responsibility, as does the AFL for any ASADA
misconduct.
37.
On 1 February 2013, the AFLs Brett Clothier had a telephone conference with Aurora
Andruska, ASADA Chief Executive; Elen Perdikogiannis, ASADA National Manager Legal
and Support; Paul Simonsson, ASADA Director of Intelligence and Investigations; and
Richard Eccles, then serving Sports Minister Kate Lundy as a deputy secretary within the
Department of Regional Australia Local Government Parks and Sport. The telephone
conference was to discuss a strategy for the investigation. Clothier adverted to the AFL
Player Rules and the powers therein: that, under threat of sanction, the AFL could compel
persons subject to the AFL rules to attend any such investigation; and further, that any
person, who was subject to the AFL rules and the anti-doping code, not answering a
question truthfully might face a sanction under the code and the rules [Source: Andruska
affidavit, paragraph 11; exhibit AA-3].
38.
Andruska responded with words to the effect: We can use the AFLs powers until we get
our own powers. [Source: Andruska affidavit, paragraph 11; exhibit AA-3].
39.
At approximately 12pm on 5 February 2013, Clothier told McLachlan, Essendon (then)

Chairman, David Evans; Essendon (then) chief executive, Ian Robson; and (then) senior
coach, James Hird, that the AFL had received information from ASADA about Essendon
Football Club. He said: There will be a joint investigation. Clothier later sent an email to
ASADA chief investigator John Nolan, which stated: I told them that there would be a
joint investigation between ASADA and the AFL [my emphasis]. Clothiers phone
conversation with Andruska on 1 February 2013, his comment on 5 February 2013 to the
Essendon officials that there will be a joint investigation, and his email to Nolan prove
that Essendon did not self-report.
40.
At about 1:30pm on 5 February 2013, Robson phoned Andruska and told her that he
wanted a full investigation. Subsequently, this telephone conversation was portrayed
disingenuously both as Essendon self-reporting the possible use of prohibited substances
during the 2012 season, and as a request for a joint ASADA/AFL investigation. Essendon
did not self-report, and at no point did the club ask for a joint investigation. ASADA and
the AFL had already decided to undertake such an investigation and Clothier had informed
Essendon of this decision. Consequently, Demetriou, McLachlan, Evans and ASADAs claim
that Essendon self-reported is untrue.
41.
The AFL, ASADA and the Essendon board championed the self-reporting line by Essendon
in the belief that it may mitigate the penalties that would normally be imposed on the
players. ASADA was again behaving contrary to its charter in trying to manufacture
circumstances that would allow a particular outcome for the players, even prior to the
investigation being formalised.
42.
The AFL didnt want the players penalised because it had very lucrative contracts with
Channel Seven and Fox Sports for them to televise nine matches a week. If the Essendon
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players had been suspended, Channel Seven/Fox would have only had eight competitive
matches to televise and the AFL would have been forced to refund up to $100 million.
43.
Paragraph 13(1)(f) of the ASADA Act and clause 3.27(1) of the National Anti-Doping
Scheme authorise ASADAs chief executive officer to investigate possible anti-doping rule
violations by athletes or athletic support personnel. The Interim Report, which was
completed on 31 July 2013, stated that: The investigation sought to establish whether
players and support persons from the Essendon FC used substances or engaged in
methods prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) and the AFLs AntiDoping Code.
44.
On 5 March 2013, the Essendon board, at Elizabeth Lukins (then Essendons PR person
but now the AFLs head of corporate affairs) insistence, commissioned Ziggy Switkowski to
conduct an investigation into governance issues at Essendon. On 22 April 2013, Evans
called Andruska to let her know that Switkowski had completed his report. This was an
extraordinary call. Andruskas ASADA was supposed to be preparing a case against Evanss
Essendon and here we had Evans discussing possible ammunition that would be used
against Essendon. John Nolan, ASADAs investigator was even given a copy of the report.
45.
On 6 May 2013, the Essendon board, through Chairman David Evans, arguably breached
its fiduciary duty to the Essendon members by giving the report to the AFL, which then
used it against the club. Despite the report being commissioned for internal purposes, and
despite the report containing many flaws, the investigators used the Switkowski Report to
help build its case against the Essendon club and support staff James Hird, Danny
Corcoran and Mark Thompson, though inappropriately, on governance issues.
46.
On 3 August 2015, I made a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to ASADA for the
following documents:
46.1.
The Terms of Reference for the joint ASADA/AFL investigation (Operation Cobia)
into possible anti-doping rule violations by Essendon Football Club;
46.2.
All communication (letters, emails, SMSs, telephone notes) between ASADA and
the AFL, which refer to creating / determining the Terms of Reference;
46.3.
All communications (letters, emails, SMSs, telephone notes) between ASADA and
the AFL, which refer to changes to the Terms of Reference.
47.
On 28 August 2015 ASADAs National Manager Operations (A/g) Michelle Heins informed
me: No documents were found to satisfy your FOI Request.
48.
It is incomprehensible that a government agency could legitimately conduct an

investigation without having established a formal Terms of Reference. It is beyond belief
that there isnt a single note, email, piece of paper or SMS referring to the rules or
protocols for conducting the investigation.
49.
The absence of a Terms of Reference and/or rules or protocols for conducting such an
investigation indicates either intentional impropriety, or that neither ASADA nor the AFL
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was qualified to conduct the investigation. Accordingly, the evidence collected in this
unsound process should not be admissible in any hearing.
DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND IMPROPER PRACTICES

50.
The investigation was not conducted in accordance with the ASADA Act, and wilfully so. It
was flawed and corrupted at every step of the way. Inter alia, the Act made no provision
for ASADA to decide on a guilt finding (9 February 2013) before the first witness was
interviewed (14 February 2013). Nor did the Act provide for another government agency
(the ACC) to declare the players guilty, which conditioned the public to expect a guilty
finding from the ASADA/AFL joint investigation.
51.
Incomprehensibly the Australian Crime Commission made it impossible for ASADA and the
AFL to run a fair investigation by stating Essendon players were guilty. Demetriou, who
made a similar outrageous claim on 7 February 2013 (see clause 30), acknowledged this,
and the consequent flaws in the process. On 28 May 2014, the Herald Sun reported his
stating:
In the normal course of events, ASADA would have conducted the investigation under the
power and rules that they operate under and they would have interviewed players and
other people involved, they would have done it on a confidential basis. They would have
gone through their process and if they thought there was a case to answer they would
have laid a charge and it would have been dealt with under the ASADA code.
Unfortunately it wasnt done that way, it was done via a very public press conference
where I like other chief executives of other major sports were in Canberra and put before
the public and the world was told there was some very large issue underworld infiltrating
sport - and it impugned just about every athlete in this country and that was a very
unfortunate way to commence that investigation. It damaged lots of very good sports, lots
of very good people Im not saying that the issue wasnt a real issue, but the
methodology that devised it to be announced in that fashion was severely damaging.
52.
53.
In the above, Demetriou acknowledged:

52.1.
ASADA did not conduct the investigation under the power and rules that they
operate under; the way they normally would
52.2.
It was not conducted on a confidential basis;
52.3.
The media conference on 7 February 2013 impugned just about every athlete in
this country;
52.4.
It damaged lots of very good sports, lots of very good people;
52.5.
The methodology that devised it to be announced in that fashion was severely

damaging.
In January 2013, ASADAs intelligence and investigations section was run by Michael
OLeary. OLeary warned Andruska that if the ACC goes public, ASADAs investigation will
become a media circus. Andruska says that, in an ideal world, ASADA wouldnt have
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embarked on a major investigation with so much background noise. [Source: Interview
between Chip Le Grand and Aurora Andruska 23 January 2015]. Nothing could be clearer.
Andruska acknowledged that the investigation was compromised before the first witness
was interviewed. In acknowledging that it was not an ideal investigation, Andruska was all
but saying that Essendon was denied procedural fairness.
54.
The media conference was just one part of a flawed and corrupted process. ASADA and
the AFLs breaches of relevant Acts and their improper processes amounted to a gross
denial of procedural fairness (natural justice) for the Essendon Football Club and all
individual defendants James Hird, Danny Corcoran and Mark Thompson.
55.
The AFL had an increasing conflict of interest the moment the ASADA/AFL investigators
decided without jurisdiction to widen the investigation to ascertain whether Essendon
provided a safe work place. As it was impossible to assess Essendons degree of
responsibility, without also assessing the AFLs responsibilities, it was essential that the
investigation was completely independent of the AFL. Any investigation that involved the
AFL as investigators meant that there would be a conflict of interest, which would not only
deny the Essendon club procedural fairness but would compromise the integrity of the
investigation. The AFL had at least four agreements that carried governance and legal
occupational, health and safety (OH&S) responsibilities to the Essendon Football Club and
its players. The AFL had similar OH&S and duty of care responsibilities to each player at
Essendon as the Essendon board did. AFL chief executive Andrew Demetriou,
acknowledged this when he said: The AFL has a duty to all its stakeholders that we look
after our players. Demetriou did nothing.
56.
There is no doubt the AFL failed to meet those OH&S and duty of care responsibilities, but
with respect to determining whether there was a conflict of interest in having a joint
investigation with ASADA, its success or failure in the carriage of these responsibilities is
irrelevant. To determine the extent of Essendons alleged governance and OH&S failures,
and to ascertain whether there were any mitigating circumstances that would reduce
penalties, the AFL should have been investigated along with Essendon and its officials.
Participating in a joint investigation with ASADA, not only enabled AFL officials to avoid
being questioned, but made it impossible to ascertain whether the AFL was culpable.
Inexplicably, at no stage were the AFLs governance and OH&S obligations scrutinised by
ASADA, (nor Ziggy Switkowski), nor was its compliance.
57.
As the original investigation was widened, though improperly, to include OH&S

governance issues, Demetriou, AFL deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlan, former
general manager football operations Adrian Anderson, integrity manager Brett Clothier
and medical officer Dr Peter Harcourt, should have been compelled to give evidence to
help ascertain whether they did everything possible to not only protect the integrity of
the competition, but whether they did everything possible to ensure the AFL commission
and Essendon board fulfilled their duty of care to the players.
58.
Incomprehensibly, although David Evans was the likely to be the first defendant, he was
briefed regularly by ASADA, including by investigators John Nolan and Paul Simonsson,
about developments in the investigation. As it transpired, Evans became ASADA and the
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AFLs carrier pigeon. On one mission Evans told Hird that ASADA had evidence that he
[Hird] had taken the banned substance Hexarelin and that the AFL wanted him out. Evans
told Hird that the board believed it would be best for the club if he resigned. As Hird
hadnt been administered Hexarelin (not banned for other than players, anyway), and as
the investigators had no such evidence, Hird refused to resign.
59.
An interview between Chip Le Grand and current Essendon chairman Paul Little on 19
March 2015 enabled Le Grand to capture in his book The Straight Dope, the rationale
behind Evanss and the Essendon boards actions in 2013. Little was a member of the
Essendon board in 2013 and was privy to Evanss thinking and participated in all the
boards decisions.
60.
Le Grand wrote: David Evans believed he had an agreement that would hold as long as
Essendon did the right thing. This was what the AFL kept telling him. This was what he
kept telling his fellow club directors. Evans was told that if Essendon allowed ASADA to do
its work, if the club investigated and accepted its own failings of governance and
management, if it accepted whatever AFL sanctions were necessary and took tough action
against club officials who allowed Stephen Dank through the door at Windy Hill, ASADA
would spare the players. This was the grand bargain that shaped the management of the
drugs scandal throughout 2013 both at Essendon and within AFL house. The AFL believed
it had an understanding with ASADA. The AFL Players Association believed the deal was in
place. The Essendon board believed it would be painful but wouldnt end badly for the
players.
61.
We understood that whilst this was obviously very serious and certain investigations
needed to and should occur, it would never culminate in infraction notices, says Paul
Little, the Essendon director who will later replace Evans as club chairman. We were told
that at board level. That was an understanding. I wouldnt go so far to say it was a deal.
62.
The Essendon players were told as much. As the team was waiting to fly to Canberra on
11 March to play a preseason match against GWS, Hird received a call from Evans. Tell
the players it will all be okay. Evans has met with the AFL, he has met with ASADA, and
the players dont have anything to fear from the doping investigation. [Source: Chip Le
Grand The Straight Dope].
63.
Evans was told by the AFL that if Essendon accepted expulsion from the finals series and if
Hird accepted a suspension, the players would be free to play in the 2014 season. When
Evans raised the issue with Hird in Dr Reids company, Hird and Reid were outraged.
64.
Inexcusably, AFL media officer James Tonkin was also given access to the evidence from
the investigation and used it in public statements, seemingly in an attempt to exonerate
Demetriou and denigrate Hird. This again was a conflict of interest that compromised the
integrity of the investigation.
65.
The joint investigation gave the AFL access to all witness statements, which enabled it to
leak confidential information selectively, and in a way that influenced public opinion
enormously. Participating in the joint investigation also placed the AFL in a position where
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it could steer the investigation away from itself, as well as influence the contents of the
Interim Report and the timing of its release. It also gave the AFL an opportunity to defend
Essendon general manager football operations Paul Hamilton, and shift any blame to
James Hird and Mark Thompson, neither of whom had line responsibility for the
performance unit and its sports scientist, though Hamilton did. Hamilton was
subsequently employed by the AFL.
66.
One of the key incidents that highlighted both lack of procedural fairness and the conflict
of interest in the AFL partnering ASADA in the investigation, was the dispute over whether
Demetriou improperly informed Essendon chairman David Evans that the Australian Crime
Commission was about to expose the club for having breached the AFLs anti-doping code,
and encouraging Evans to self-report the club in order to mitigate any wrong-doing. Hird
revealed Demetrious tip-off in the course of the ASADA/AFL interviews. Demetriou and
Evans denied it. ASADA didnt even bother to question the other witnesses to Demetrious
comments, Danny Corcoran, Dr Reid, and Ian Robson, which was indicative of its bias.
Once AFL Chairman Mike Fitzpatrick, learnt that Demetrious honesty in this important
matter was in dispute, he should have withdrawn the AFL from the (already improperly
formulated) joint investigation because of the enhanced conflict of interest.
67.
James Hird was interviewed by the ASADA/AFL investigators on 16 April 2013 and on 18
April 2013 Brett Clothier wrote to ASADA requesting ASADA provide the AFL with a report
arising out of the investigation which could be used by the AFL for its purposes. He stated:
As you know AFL and ASADA are investigating Essendon FC jointly We understand that
it is possible that interviews of coaches and administrators will be completed in the
coming weeks, prior to the player interviews commencing. In this case, the AFL would
request that the ASADA investigators provide us with an interim investigation report. It is
likely we would provide this interim report along with interview transcripts and other
relevant documents to Essendon FC for similar reasons. Furthermore, we think it may be
important to put Essendon FC on notice regarding any potential disciplinary action against
the club in order to give it an opportunity to respond.
68.
ASADA knew from February 2013 that the AFL was contemplating its own disciplinary
charges sanctions against Essendon and its officials: see, for example, exhibit AA-7,
amongst other documents.
69.
Part of the arrangement the joint investigation between ASADA and the AFL was that the
AFL used information obtained from the investigation to bring disciplinary charges against
Essendon and support staff under the AFLs rules. The charges contemplated by the AFL
did not depend on proof of any anti-doping violations.
70.
Andruska gave evidence to the Middleton Federal Court hearing that she knew that the
AFL wanted a report as at April 2013.
71.
The investigation was supposed to identify whether there was sufficient evidence for
ASADA to initiate action against the Essendon players for having been administered
banned substances. But here we learn that the AFL wanted an interim report that could
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be used to take disciplinary action against Essendon officials for breaches unrelated to the
players allegedly taking banned substances.
72.
As it was a joint investigation, there was no distinction between an ASADA investigator

and an AFL investigator. The Interim Report should have been co-authored by the
investigators. However, Clothier obviously wanted to create an appearance of distance
between the report and the AFL so that the AFL could claim it was pursuing action against
the Essendon officials on the basis of an independent report.
73.
On 26 April 2013, Clothier replied to ASADAs Darren Mullalys 18 April 2013 request for
comment on what use the AFL would make of any interim report. Clothier stated, in bullet
point fashion:
73.1.
AFL interim disciplinary actions (e.g. stand down orders) would require natural
justice and disclosure of relevant matters to individuals. They would also require
some reasonable public comment.
73.2.
Essendon FC chairman may use interim report for purpose of disciplinary action
with his employees if any and same would apply to him;
73.3.
We can manage the process working closely with you
74.
The improperly written, and issued, Interim Report was the brief of evidence used against
the Essendon club, James Hird, Mark Thompson and Danny Corcoran for governance
failures, despite governance issues being outside the purview of the ASADA Act. There
were so many flaws in the investigatory process behind the report and in its findings that
a normal court or body committed to procedural fairness would never have allowed it to
be used as evidence to support a charge of any nature against the Essendon club and
individual members of the club.
75.
On 16 July 2013, AFL integrity manager Brett Clothier met with ASADA officials to discuss
the Interim Report. During the meeting Clothier indicated that he wanted the Interim
Report assembled in a way that paints a picture of an uncontrolled environment at
Essendon [my emphasis]. As the Interim Report was the brief of evidence used against
the club, Hird, Corcoran and Thompson, it is impossible to imagine that there could have
been greater misconduct by Clothier in making the demand, and greater misconduct by
ASADA, in capitulating to his demand.
76.
Although there are many examples of the Interim Report being massaged to support the
pre-determined desired outcomes of the investigation in the meeting between
McLachlan, ASADA and federal government personnel on 9 February 2013, including to
find Hird guilty, one example should suffice to have the investigation declared terminally
compromised and thus null and void.
77.
With no foundation in fact, ASADA inexcusably accused Hird of failing to disclose Dr Reids
concerns to Ian Robson at the meeting at David Evanss home on 4 February 2013. Page
48 of the Interim Report states:
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A meeting was convened later that evening (4 February 2013) at Evans home which was
attended by Robson, Corcoran, Hird and Evans. [Inexplicably, ASADA doesnt mention the
presence of Dr Reid at the meeting]. Robson recalled that specific questions were asked of
Hird who informed the group that the instruction was always that we were to be WADA
compliant, everything was to be signed off by [the club, doctor, Bruce Reid] ... What is
notable from Robsons account is the purported failure of Hird to disclose serious concerns
about the supplement program that had been raised by Dr Reid in January 2012. It is
known that Hird had intimate knowledge of Dr Reids concerns and had talked [to Dr Reid]
about him writing a letter to [the then Football Operations Manager] Paul Hamilton and
talked about what would that letter would include so that Paul was alerted to the fact
that this was happening. According to Robson, he had not been made aware of Dr Reids
concerns until a board meeting on 7 February 2013.
77.1.
ASADAs editorialising comment: What is noticeable from Robsons account is the

purported failure of Hird to disclose serious concerns about the supplement
program that had been raised by Dr Reid in January 2012, is an example of ASADA
testifying falsely in its own investigation. Though ASADA failed to mention it in
their reference above, Dr Reid attended the meeting at Evanss home and
answered questions put to him by Evans and Robson. Reid explained his concerns
to Robson in Hirds presence, so how could ASADA accuse Hird of not disclosing Dr
Reids concerns? This was a typical example of ASADA creating a poor impression
of Hird with their selective and often false editorialising, as if their comments were
facts.
77.2.
Robsons evidence was factually untrue. Evans and Hird both testified that Dr Reid
attended the meeting at Evans home on 4 February 2013. ASADA knew Dr Reid
had attended the meeting.
77.3.
ASADAs author of the Interim Report knew his (the authors) statement was
untrue and that it was in stark contrast to ASADAs director of investigations Paul
Simonsson view. On 6 May 2013, Simonsson addressed the Essendon players,
Hird, Robson and a host of lawyers and said: The coach [James Hird] was given a
massive tick of approval in terms of his integrity and how he helped; and I just look
to him to give you guys guidance.
77.4.
Robsons claim that he had not been made aware of Dr Reids concerns until a
board meeting on 7 February 2013 is clearly untrue. On the same page (page 48)
the Interim Report says: Evans recalled that on Friday evening, 1 February 2013
he attended the home of Dr Reid to ask if he had any suspicions about whats
going on. During the course of those discussions, Dr Reid expressed concerns
about the 2012 supplementation. (Page 49 of Interim Report): Dr Reid also
discussed a letter he had written to the former football manager, Paul Hamilton
on or about 17 January 2012. Evans stated that upon learning of this letter it
immediately put [his] radar up. Evans recalled Dr Reid stating: that effectively he
was very uncomfortable with what had been going on [and he then] started
talking to me about the letter that he wrote. He read the letter out to me. Upon
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returning home Evans contacted Robson who attended his (Evans) home. Evans
recalled asking Robson what he knew about the situation, including Dr Reids
letter, but Robson claimed that he was unaware of Dr Reids letter or concerns.
77.5.
Page 49: On 4 February 2013, Evans convened a meeting between himself, Dr

Reid, Hird, Corcoran and Robson. Although here ASADA clearly states that Dr Reid
attended the meeting, in clause 77 it leaves him out of the list of attendees and
denigrates Hird for allegedly not telling Robson of Dr Reids concerns. Obviously,
Hird had no reason to because Dr Reid himself told Robson of those concerns at
this very same meeting. In any event, Evans had already talked to Robson about
Dr Reids letter during Evans meeting with Robson the previous Friday evening, 1
February.
77.6.
Page 50/51: Hirds recollection: About 8.30 that night I was having dinner with
my kids for my birthday and I got a call from David [Evans] to say, Were in a lot of
trouble. The AFL believes that weve taken performance-enhancing drugs. Get over
here straight away. So I went to his house. Ian Robson was already there. Bruce
Reid arrived, and so did Danny Corcoran, and David said that hed been told by
[CEO] Andrew [Demetriou] that we were taking performance-enhancing drugs
And I said, I dont believe him, David. What source does he have? He said,
Theres a report coming out and that he had been told he had seen it or some
he had been told and hed rung David. He quizzed Bruce and I as to whether we
had what evidence there is there of this. [My emphasis]. The only thing that
Bruce could think about was AOD-9604, and we were both convinced that wed
seen WADA approval, we were both convinced that itd been approved by WADA
Dave then took a call from Andrew Demetriou again, came back in and said, Hes
definitely saying weve taken them.
78.
It is incomprehensible that ASADA first left Dr Reid out of the list of attendees at the
meeting on 4 February 2013, then later correctly includes him, but still attacks Hird for not
telling Robson of Dr Reids concerns at the same meeting.
79.
A substantial part of the report was devoted to building the case that James Hird bore
most responsibility in any charge that Essendon failed to provide a safe work place for its
players. Nothing could have been further from the truth.
80.
It is incomprehensible that even the most ignorant and incompetent investigator would
not have started with the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act to ascertain where
the legal responsibilities for providing a safe work place lay at Essendon. The Victorian
OH&S Act was not mentioned in the Interim Report.
81.
The AFLs medical director Dr Peter Harcourt told his audience at a Zurich anti-doping
conference that: under individual contracts all players are contracted to the league as
opposed to clubs [my emphasis]. This means that the AFL is deemed to be an employer
under the Victorian OH&S Act, and consequently, has a duty of care to provide a safe work
place for the Essendon players.
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82.
The second step should have been to examine Hirds job description. Hirds job
description was never mentioned.
83.
The third step undertaken by the investigators should have been to ascertain whether any
organisation other than the club itself had any legal responsibilities to ensure Essendon
provided a safe work place for its players. No other organisation was ever mentioned as
having responsibilities to provide a safe work place at Essendon.
84.
The AFL was party to a number of agreements, which assigned legal responsibilities to it
to ensure the Essendon players were provided a safe workplace:
85.
84.1.
The bi-lateral agreement it had with Essendon Football Club to compete in the
competition.
84.2.
The tripartite agreement it had with Essendon and each player. Clause 7.3 of the
AFL/Essendon/Player Contract states: The AFL club shall provide a playing,
training and working environment which is, so far as practicable, free of any risk to
the health, safety and welfare of the Player. Without limitation, the AFL Club shall
observe and carry out its obligations under the applicable Occupational Health and
Safety Act or its equivalent. Clause 12 of the tripartite agreement says: The
parties to this contract (AFL/Essendon/the player) shall use their best endeavours,
in relation to any matter or thing directly within their control, to bring about
compliance with all the provisions of this Contract.
84.3.
The bi-lateral agreement it had with the Australia Sports Commission in its
capacity as a national sporting organisation (NSO). Those responsibilities are set
out in the Australian Sports Commission Policy Statement: NSOs Governance
Mandatory Requirements for ASC large partner NSOs.
84.4.
The agreement it had with ASADA and its responsibilities under its own antidoping code
84.5.
Additionally, the AFL commissioners had onerous statutory obligations under the
Corporations Act. Simply put, the AFL had similar occupational, health and safety,
and duty of care responsibilities, to each player at Essendon as the Essendon
board. AFL chief executive, Andrew Demetriou, acknowledged this when he said:
The AFL has a duty to all its stakeholders that we look after our players.
84.6.
A former AFL lawyer told the Australians Adam Shand (4 October 2013) that: the
contracts players signed were tripartite - between the AFL, the player and the club
- meaning the AFL could not be excluded from occupational health and safety
requirements.
The fourth step that the investigators should have undertaken was to examine the
Essendon organisation structure and job descriptions of the key Essendon officials. No
case could be made, or judgment reached, without knowing who had responsibility for
what. The Essendon organisation structure was not mentioned in the Interim Report.
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86.
The fifth step the investigators should have undertaken was to clarify from the Essendon
organisation structure and job descriptions the descending order of responsibility for
providing a safe work place for the Essendon players. Incomprehensively, the Essendon
directors and the AFL commissioners, who according to the Victorian OH&S Act had the
most responsibility, were never mentioned in the Interim Report. At least 25 people had
more responsibility than Hird nine AFL commissioners; Gillon McLachlan (AFL); Brett
Clothier (AFL); Adrian Anderson (AFL); Dr Peter Harcourt (medical director AFL); AFL
human resource director; nine Essendon board members; Paul Hamilton (EFC); Dean
Robinson (EFC); Danny Corcoran (EFC); Dr Reid (EFC); Dr De Morton (EFC); and the
Essendon human resources manager.
87.
The findings against Hird, so far down the line of those with responsibility for OH&S at the
club, and who had no line responsibility for the performance unit and its sports scientist,
indicates that the investigators either failed to even consider the organisational structure,
or worse, they knew the structure and chose to ignore, or sidestep it.
88.
On 9 February 2013, Essendon Chairman David Evans and chief executive Ian Robson
attended a meeting in Canberra with ASADAs chief executive Aurora Andruska, chief
operating officer Trevor Burgess, general manager of anti-doping programmes and legal
services Elen Perdikogiannis, director of intelligence and investigations Paul Simonsson;
AFLs Gillon McLachlan and Brett Clothier; and, Richard Eccles from Senator Kate Lundys
office.
89.
In what constitutes gross misconduct by the ministers representative, during the meeting
Eccles asked McLachlan what he wanted from the investigation. The joint investigation
had nothing to do with the government and Eccles should not even have been at the
meeting. Although the investigation had officially commenced, the first interview of the
investigation wasnt scheduled until the 14 February 2013. But here we had the prime
ministers senior sporting bureaucrat not only denying Essendon and Hird procedural
fairness but corrupting the investigation. Eccles attendance and input is yet another
factor in the corruption of the investigation from the beginning.
90.
It was inappropriate for Eccles to ask McLachlan what result he wanted and worse that
McLachlan told the attendees what he wanted. McLachlan was not a member of the
investigation team. The investigation had commenced, and its stated objective was to
establish whether players and support persons from the Essendon FC used substances or
engaged in methods prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) and the AFLs
Anti-Doping Code. Specifying the AFLs desired outcomes, including who would be found
culpable, is yet another factor in the early corruption of the process that makes any
findings of the investigation both unfair and unsafe.
91.
ASADA chief executive Aurora Andruska kept a record in a note book of all important
comments made in meetings she attended. Andruska recorded McLachlans response to
Eccless question: Come to arrangement. Players found to be innocent. This is the
outcome. Sanctions against Essendon. Held responsible. Hold individuals accountable
[my emphasis]. In subsequent meetings James Hird was regularly mentioned as the
support person who had to be punished. Deciding the outcome of the investigation at this
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point is arguably little different from match-fixing. Recently a Greater Western Sydney
club recruiter was suspended for 13 months for placing a $100 bet on his team. If a player
fixed the result of an AFL match he would be suspended for life. In cricket those found
guilty of match-fixing receive gaol sentences.
92.
Basically, McLachlan was demanding that ASADA accept a no fault or negligence case
against the players, a provision only used in one previous case. On that occasion a hockey
player was given a banned substance while unconscious on an operating table,
undergoing emergency surgery. [Source: Chip Le Grand The Straight Dope].
Furthermore, McLachlan was demanding that the Essendon club be found guilty and
punished and that individual support staff personnel be found guilty and punished. It is
incomprehensible and irredeemably improper that McLachlan would make such requests
and beyond belief that Andruska would not understand that the meeting itself, let alone
the content of the meeting as it evolved, corrupted the entire investigation and made
unsafe any of its findings. With this start, any evidence produced was not only
irretrievably tainted, but any findings from such evidence, inherently invalid.
93.
Richard Eccles compounded the misconduct and contamination of the investigation by

telling the attendees that the PM [Julia Gillard] wanted the matter to end. This within days
of the investigation being announced.
94.
ASADA and the AFL had decided the Essendon players were guilty of taking banned
substances before the investigators had interviewed their first witness.
95.
ASADA and the AFL had also decided the support staff would be found guilty, which the
minutes from later meetings indicated was code for James Hird will be found the most
culpable and will be punished.
96.
In deciding only to find the Essendon club and support staff guilty, ASADA and the AFL in
essence decided that the AFL commissioners and Essendon board members roles and
legal responsibilities wouldnt even be examined. This was a further abrogation of the
investigators responsibilities. It was impossible to examine the support staff and Hirds
responsibilities and assess the degree of responsibility without examining the AFL
commissioners and Essendon boards responsibilities.
97.
Deciding within days of the investigation being announced to find the Essendon club,
James Hird and other support staff guilty but to find the players innocent, and not
even investigate the Essendon board and AFL commissions responsibilities, only makes
worse the corruption of the process and the denial of procedural fairness.
98.
On 10 February 2013, Clothier (AFL) wrote to Simonsson (ASADA) asserted as follows:

ASADA and the AFL agrees that any player that comes forward in this matter and makes
full disclosure will not be prosecuted [my emphasis] if he unknowingly used a prohibited
substance and was in the opinion of ASADA and the AFL, not culpable in relation to the
use of the substance.
99.
Although Andruska believed a no fault or negligence defence was not an option for the
players, the AFL, the governments Richard Eccles and ASADAs director of investigations
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Paul Simonsson did not accept Andruskas position. On 13 February 2013 Simonsson sent
an email to the AFLs Brett Clothier in which he stated: ASADA and the AFL will fully
explore all avenues in an attempt to provide substantial assistance to a no fault or no
negligence defence.
100. The AFL, Simonsson, and Eccles view held sway at this time, even to the point of written
agreement from ASADA to this effect. It is incomprehensible that not only was the AFLs
deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlan prepared to exonerate the players at this point,
but that ASADAs director of investigations was also prepared to do so. This was the most
senior ASADA investigator prepared to participate in a corrupted investigation, and to
even be a player in the contaminating of the process.
101. The AFL has a non-negotiable commitment to WADA, ASADA, the federal government, the
18 clubs, the players at every club, and the public to identify and punish those who take
banned substances. But here we had the AFLs then deputy chief executive, and now chief
executive, and ASADAs director of intelligence and investigations determining that the
players should not be punished, even before the first of them was interviewed about the
possibility of any banned substance being administered to them, and if so, their
knowledge of what was administered.
102. McLachlan could not even claim ignorance of the rules regarding player culpability, if hed
already determined theyd been administered banned substances, irrespective of whether
they knew they had. On 27 March 2015 he said: ASADA has never alleged the players
actually had any knowing part in whatever happened, but acknowledged that: its not a
defence under the [WADA] code.
103. ASADAs raison detre is to identify and punish those taking banned substances and here
we have the director of investigations agreeing not to penalise the Essendon players
despite believing the players took banned substances. If the ASADA director of
investigations is prepared to disregard the WADA code to exonerate a select group he
believed was guilty of breaching the code, how can his findings at this early stage of guilt
in others, and who in contrast should be punished, be in any way trusted and considered
safe.
104. Res ipsa loquitur that the senior ASADA and AFL executives having established the result
of the investigation before it had started, means that the investigators could not have
conducted the investigation with an open mind, and consequently, no information or
evidence they provided to support their findings can be considered untainted.
Therefore, the findings cannot be relied upon as safe.
105. On 13 February 2013, Richard Eccles informed ASADA lawyers in writing that he had told
AFL deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlan that if the anti-doping body took a view that
a player took a banned substance but was not at fault, the AFL Tribunal would view
things in a certain light, and it is as locked in as it can be. [Source: ASADA: 0001: 0342]. It
was one thing for the Gillard government, ASADA, and the AFL to run a corrupted
investigation but here we have the prime ministers representative implying that the two
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judges and the barrister who were to sit on the AFL tribunal would determine as the AFL
wished them to.
106. It was illegal for Prime Minister Gillard to interfere with a statutory body and ASADA
officials knew it was illegal and should have forbidden Eccless involvement. Andruska
should have abandoned the contaminated investigation at this point, and made a formal
complaint regarding government interference.
107. More discussions followed between ASADAs general manager of anti-doping programmes
and legal services Elen Perdikogiannis, Eccles and McLachlan. By 18 February, an
agreement had been reached. More corruption of the processes; more breaches of the
ASADA Act; more denial of procedural fairness to those being investigated. But this time
ASADAs general manager of legal services is also involved.
108. On 20 February 2013, ASADAs director of investigations, Paul Simonsson, and ASADA
lawyer Darren Mullaly attended the Essendon club and spoke to the players and other EFC
personnel en masse. Simonsson read from a prepared statement and handed out a
document. Inter alia, the document said: ASADA will explain to the players that these
are exceptional circumstances and the defence of no fault or negligence may be available.
It will be explained to players that under a no fault or negligence defence a player can
receive a complete elimination of sanction. Where a player does come forward and
provides a sworn statement regarding his involvement and the involvement of any other
person, ASADA will fully explore all avenues in an attempt to provide a no fault or
negligence defence was substantial assistance. In making this promise, and without even
having interviewed the players, ASADA was abrogating one of its major responsibilities,
which was to charge athletes who took banned substances.
109. AFL officials have acknowledged that after John Lawler, Andrew Demetriou and Ministers
Clare and Lundys Doomsday comments on 7 February 2013, the federal government,
ASADA and the AFL needed a big scalp. Having decided not to pursue any case against the
AFL commissioners, the Essendon board and the players, it meant that James Hird and a
couple of support staff had to be found guilty. Guilty of what, no one knew. The charge
and the case against them had to be created at a later date. As it transpired, the
investigators decided to investigate governance issues at Essendon despite the fact it was
outside ASADAs charter, outside the investigators area of expertise, and without
informing interviewees thats what they were doing. It is incomprehensible that the
investigators believed that the Act allowed them to investigate such things as whether
Essendon checked references when hiring staff. Incomprehensibly, The Interim Report
devoted over 6000 words to the hiring of Dean Robinson and Stephen Dank. In his
affidavit of 22 July 2014, ASADA investigator Aaron Walker said: [Abraham] Haddad [AFL
investigator] suggested to me that we would interview a particular person from within
Essendons human resources area about Essendons recruitment practices. Again the AFL
is telling ASADA what to do.
110. Australian footballs worst kept secret was confirmed on 25 August 2013 at a meeting at
Gillon McLachlans home. Hird asked for an explanation of the rationale behind the
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sanction the AFL insisted he accept. McLachlan told Hird: It is about the optics. AFL legal
counsel Andrew Dillon added: The scandal needs a public face. [my emphasis]
111. When John Marshall, ASADAs senior counsel for 20 years, became aware of the letter
Paul Simonsson read to the players on 20 February 2013 he told ASADA that what the
letter promises is in breach of the World Anti-Doping Code and ASADA must renege.
ASADA, now in a difficult position of its own making, at first refused. Marshall resigned.
[Source: Chip Le Grand - The Straight Dope].
112. On 7 March 2013, ASADAs general manager of anti-doping programmes and legal services
Elen Perdikogiannis wrote to the AFL and withdrew the 20 February 2013 letter.
McLachlan wouldnt accept the new statement claiming it was too late to change the
ground rules. McLachlan wrote back to Perdikogiannis: It is the AFLs, Essendon Football
Clubs and the AFL Players Associations clear understanding that the investigation and
any subsequent actions will be conducted in accordance with your original statement.
[Source: Chip Le Grand The Straight Dope].
113. On 4 April 2013, a meeting was held at Essendon Chairman David Evanss office. ASADAs
Andruska, Simonsson, and Nolan; AFLs McLachlan and Clothier; and Essendons Evans,
Paul Little and Elizabeth Lukin; attended the meeting. John Nolan was ASADAs lead
investigator and provided some information about the substances that he believed had
been taken by the players. This meeting should never have been held. At this point, no
player had been interviewed. Nolan could not identify a single player who had received a
particular substance. All the meeting did was re-inforce the belief that the Essendon club
and Hird were guilty. It denied the players and Hird procedural fairness.
114. The various briefings ACC to the AFL; AFL to Essendon; ASADA to AFL and Essendon
convinced Evans and Robson, and hence the Essendon board, that its players were guilty
of taking banned substances and that its senior coach James Hird had facilitated the taking
of the banned substances. Consequently, the Essendon board tried to ingratiate itself to
the AFL, ASADA and the federal government, presumably in an attempt to reduce the
penalties. As a result, the club and Hird were denied procedural fairness as the Essendon
board stood with the AFL and ASADA, based on selective information provided to it,
instead of defending the players and Hird against accusations with no sound foundations.
115. On 13 April 2013, AFL commissioner Bill Kelty visited James and Tania Hird at their home.
Kelty told the Hirds about a telephone hook-up between AFL commissioners two nights
earlier. He revealed that during the discussion, AFL deputy chief executive Gillon
McLachlan put forward arguments for why Hird should be stood down from his job - if not
by Essendon then the AFL. Hird was being publicly portrayed as the architect of the
Essendon drugs regime. People were likening him to Lance Armstrong. They were calling
for his head. [Source: Chip Le Grand The Straight Dope]. It is incomprehensible that the
commissioners, who were to sit on the jury and decide any penalty had Hird been
charged, had not only been briefed before ASADA or the AFL heard Hirds version of
events, but that they were calling for his head.
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116. Andruska testified before Justice Middleton in August 2014 that: By June 2013, ASADA
was coming under pressure from the relevant Commonwealth Minister Kate Lundy to
reach some form of conclusion, or an outcome from the investigation. Such
interference from Lundys office corrupted the investigation, and denied procedural
fairness to Essendon and the individuals under investigation. Andruska should have
formally protested Lundys pressure. Whether Andruska capitulated to Lundys demands
or not, it is clear (clause 117 below) that she felt the pressure. Justice not only has to be
done, it must also be seen to be done.
117. On 4 June 2013, Andruska and Ms Perdikogiannis of ASADA spoke to Ms Glenys
Beauchamp, deputy secretary Department of Sport. The handwritten notes taken by Ms
Perdikogiannis record the following: 9am conversation with Ms Glenys Beauchamp
[Secretary, Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport] with AA
[Aurora Andruska]. Clear instructions from Min [Minister Lundy]. Min [Lundy] her
colleagues at her, accusing her of hampering chances of re-election you need an
outcome. Heightened levels of anxiety by AA [Aurora Andruska], and Elen gets emotional
as well. Big business sponsors, Australias reputation, etc. Min [Lundy] has put it on
Glenys etcetera.
118. Andruska said the minister was demanding no players be sacked. According to court
documents Andruskas notes of that 4 June meeting said: Lundy: needs something [a]
deal with AFL; support staff sacked; points [taken] off [Essendon]; players off. [my
emphasis]. It is difficult not to see this meeting as anything other than the government,
the AFL and ASADA conspiring to find Essendon, Hird, and other support staff guilty and
for them to be harshly penalised, while finding the players with no case to answer.
119. Pre-determining to take points off Essendon had huge ramifications, which, as they played
out, arguably amounted to the AFL being guilty of fraudulent behaviour. The five elements
necessary to prove fraud appear to be in place. Taking points off Essendon meant
Essendon couldnt play in the finals series. However, the AFL and Essendon continued to
sell packages to Essendon members, which entitled them to preferential seating for
Essendon finals matches. The AFL and Essendon were selling a product that didnt exist
because they had already decided Essendon wouldnt play in the finals.
120. Later on 4 June 2013, Evans attended a meeting with McLachlan, ASADA staffers
Andruska, Simonsson, and Perdikogiannis, and the governments representative, Eccles.
McLachlan was concerned about $1 million worth of ticket sales for the first two weeks of
the finals. He wanted to maximise the opportunity for the best outcome for the players.
Simonsson made notes that certain persons have to go [my emphasis] followed by a
reference to a restructure of whole department. There is no doubt that Hird was the
one to go and that it was the football department that had to be restructured. ASADA,
the AFL and the federal government were guilty of misconduct and Hird was denied
procedural fairness.
121. Perdikogiannis notes of the 4 June 2013 meeting record as follows: McLachlan wanted
the matter dealt with this season. He said the AFL brand and competition feed into the
punters view of the integrity of the 2013 season. The players were okay. The brand could
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

not get any worse. The integrity of the 2013 season was the driver Andruska offered
transcripts to McLachlan; Andruska did not want Ziggy report actions and ASADA actions
separate in time; Andruska happy to push back to October that would help. [Source:
ASA.0001.0404-0406]. It was obvious that Andruska and ASADA had fallen into the role of
service provider to the AFL; that ASADA was there to help the AFL with its own processes
and time-tabling.
122. On 5 June 2013, ASADAs lead investigator, John Nolan, expressed concern that
Andruska was serving the political agenda of others. Justice must

not only be done it must be seen to be done. When the chief investigator implies ASADAs
chief executive is guilty of what amounts to misconduct it is impossible to accept justice
was done. Any evidence provided to support findings in the investigation is tainted and
should be declared unsafe and therefore inadmissible, or immediately dismissed, in this or
any other jurisdiction.
123. In early June 2013, the AFL commissioners were briefed by McLachlan to the effect that
the club officials at Essendon (Hird, Thompson, Corcoran and Dr Reid) were responsible
for this disgrace and will be held to account. The commissioners were told that Essendon
would be prevented from playing in the final series. The AFL informed Richard Eccles of
this decision.
124. As AFL rules dictated that its commissioners act as the jury to hear any charges against
Essendon, Hird, and any others, and then impose any penalties, they should not have
been briefed on the evidence, nor told that Essendon and Hird were guilty, nor told what
the penalties would be. The investigators, ASADA and the AFL were guilty of misconduct,
incompetence, or both, and plainly denied Essendon and Hird procedural fairness.
125. On 13 June 2013, Perdikogiannis took notes at a strategy meeting with Andruska. She had
been told of an AFL commission meeting where the AFL wished to keep the pressure on
ASADA to be the bad guy. It was reported that the AFL had stated in respect of the
player support staff, such as Hird, that the AFL will go them. McLachlan reported there
was board pressure and that prior to the AFL finals, how can this be resolved? The
commissioners were supposed to be the jury. They had no right to be briefed confidential
information from the ongoing investigation, let alone have a right to apply pressure for
particular outcomes, or even the timing of the release of any findings from the
investigation. The commissioners demands and behaviour further contaminated and
corrupted the investigation.
126. ASADA chief operating officer Trevor Burgess told the Federal Court he received a briefing
on 13 June 2013 from Richard Eccles, a deputy secretary within Senator Lundys office
about an AFL plan to take action against the club staff and
suspend Hird for at
least six months [my emphasis] Ducks all lined up notes Burgess. [Source: Trevor
Burgesss diary notes from his 13 June 2013 conversation with Richard Eccles, which were
tendered to the Federal Court on 13 August 2014, VID No. 327 of 2014.] This was an
extraordinary situation. The ASADA/AFL investigators were being usurped by ASADA, AFL
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

and government officials who should never have been involved in the process once the
investigation commenced.
127. On 19 June 2013, Andruska met with McLachlan, Andrew Dillon and Clothier from the AFL;
Malcolm Holmes QC (ASADA); and Trevor Burgess (ASADA). McLachlan asked for a high
level report and disclosed that such a report was required to resolve matters and preserve
the integrity of the 2013 season. There was talk of governance failure issues as well.
[Source: Andruska affidavit, paragraphs 40-44; exhibit AA-12; ASADA: 0001: 0102].
Essendon cant play

in the final series it would undermine the competition for ten
years [my emphasis]. McLachlan spoke of board pressures and prior to the finals.
Andruskas notes state McLachlan said words to the effect
How can it be resolved? It is incomprehensible that Andruska allowed such behaviour by

the AFL without at least formal complaint about it. She had to know this sort of
interference in the name of a wider agenda for the AFL corrupted the investigation and
made any findings unsafe and therefore invalid.
128. Andruska said: At the time of this meeting on 19 June 2013 I was of the understanding
that the AFL would use a summary report to consider whether it should take separate
action against Essendon or its officials under the AFLs rules for any governance of failures
it found in connection with the doping issues. [Source: Andruska affidavit paragraph 47].
129. On 19 June 2013, following the meeting with the AFL on that date, Andruska instructed
Perdikogiannis and Mullaly from her office to prepare a summary report to give to the AFL
as agreed at the 19 June 2013 meeting. [Source: Andruska affidavit paragraph 48].
130. On 25 June 2013 Andruska had a telephone conference call with Bill Rowe (an officer from
the then Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport), Trevor
Burgess and Darren Mullaly from ASADA, and McLachlan from the AFL. In that discussion
Andruska talked through a draft table of contents for the high level summary report that
ASADA was preparing to the AFL. McLachlans main comment was will the conclusions be
based on what is known at the time? He also asked what would be said about unwitting
involvement. [Source: Andruska affidavit, 22 July 2014].
131. In his affidavit, ASADAs Trevor Burgess said: I cannot remember whether it was Mr
Dillon, Mr Clothier or Mr McLachlan who asked that the 1 August 2013 report to be
provided to the AFL include ASADAs conclusions on everything the investigation had
raised to date on AOD-9604 and other prohibited substances
and the
environment that existed at Essendon
[my emphasis]. It was said for

ASADA, I think by Ms Andruska, we may be able to include some commentary on the
environment that existed [my emphasis] and to include some views on AOD-9604 but for
other prohibited substances this would not be possible as the investigation was ongoing.
My understanding at the time was that the AFLs intention was to use a summary report
provided to it by ASADA, together with other material, to provide a briefing to the AFL
commission. I understood that briefing would be about any uncontrolled environment at
Essendon that may have led to an increased risk of doping occurring Reference to
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

whether there was an uncontrolled environment at Essendon was an expression used by
Mr Clothier from time to time.
132. On 26 June 2013, Andruska received a telephone call from McLachlan. McLachlan said
that the AFL needed to get the fullest report possible. McLachlan said that he was
concerned that if the AFL took action against Essendon it could end up in litigation in the
High Court and Supreme Court. [Source: Andruska affidavit paragraph 51]. McLachlan was
simply applying more pressure to Andruska.
133. Andruska told McLachlan that ASADA would provide him with a high-level summary that
could be used for disciplinary purposes against Essendon. However, Clothier insisted the
AFL be given a very detailed report. At that stage, ASADA intended giving the AFL a
summary of about 30 pages. In her following absence overseas, Trevor Burgess became
acting head of ASADA and he was tasked with overseeing the writing of the summary.
Incomprehensively, ASADA capitulated again, and on 2 August 2013 gave the AFL a 434page Interim Report.[Source: Trevor Burgess affidavit 23 July 2014 and tendered to the
Federal court on 13 August 2014, VID No 327 of 2014, page 6].
134. In a damning revelation, Burgess stated: I was conscious of the need to maintain a good
working relationship with the AFL. It is very important for a body like ASADA to have
cooperative relationships with the peak bodies of sports. Co-operation is vital for ASADAs
purpose of upholding integrity in this sport and achieving the task, which it shares with
sports of addressing anti-doping issues I was concerned that the AFL not lose
confidence in ASADA over this issue of the summary report that had already been
promised to the AFL. I was concerned not to damage the cooperative relationship on
this particular investigation. At this time the ASADA investigation was ongoing. I
considered that the AFLs cooperation might still be needed. [Source: Burgess affidavit 23
July 2014 and tendered to the Federal court on 13 August 2014, VID No 327 of 2014, page
7]. This was an extraordinary admission by Burgess. Nothing could be clearer. ASADA
lawyers advice was not as important as placating the AFL bullies; and placating the AFL
was far more important than ensuring Essendon received procedural fairness.
135. During an interview with Chip Le Grand on 23 January 2015, Andruska said: Their [the
AFLs] objectives and ASADAs objectives are almost at odds with each other. They are
about protecting their business, protecting their brand. We are about making sure that
Australia complies with its legal obligations. Apart from the unintended admission of a
conflict of interest for both parties in conducting a joint investigation, Andruska was either
delusional or disingenuous in inferring that ASADA fulfilled its legal obligations. The
evidence indicates that ASADA rolled-over on most occasions and became a branch office
of the AFL, as exemplified in ASADA ultimately delivering a 434-page interim report, rather
than their intended and preferred 30-page summary, to the AFL on 2 August 2013.
136. In his affidavit of 22 July 2014, ASADA investigator Aaron Walker echoed Andruskas
sentiments. Whilst I understood the AFL investigation to be similarly concerned with the
use of prohibited substances and/or prohibited methods by AFL athletes and support
persons, I considered their focus to centre more on breaches of their respective AFL codes
of conduct, issues of corporate governance and administrative failings. I formed this
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

understanding on the basis of all the interactions that I had with the AFL including my
discussions with them, but particularly on the basis of my observations of the statements
made by [Abraham] Haddad at joint interviews and the questions which she asked such
interviews.
137. During the conversation between Andruska and McLachlan on 26 June 2013, the ASADA
head noted McLachlans comments as follows:
137.1. Take points off Essendon if High Court;
137.2. We need all the detail to get through that;
137.3. Problematic if not full report;
137.4. Get outcome we need;
137.5.
Take bits out that might compromise what we need
[my
emphasis].
138. It was obvious that McLachlan wanted a full report, but not so full as to interfere with his
desired disciplinary outcome; the punishment of Essendon FC and its support staff.
McLachlan was telling Andruska that what he needed in the interim report to find the
Essendon club and Hird guilty, which would enable the AFL to take points off Essendon.
The suggestion to take bits out of the report that might compromise
what the AFL needed is indicative of the constant contamination of the
investigatory process by external influences and agendas. The issuing of an
interim report and the content of that report suggests ASADA accommodated
McLachlans demands. This was only the tip of the iceberg. It is impossible for WADA or
the Court of Arbitration for Sport to be comfortable with the reliability of the evidence
provided by ASADA to support its findings, and the findings themselves, given their predetermined nature and the external influences brought to bear on the investigation.
139. On 4 July 2013 Burgess wrote to McLachlan. Inter alia, he said: ASADA confirms we will
provide a confidential report to the AFL on 1 August 2013 based on the material gained in
Specifically, the report will include

conclusions on the environment at Essendon [my emphasis] To
its investigation up to that date.
comprehend the significance of this comment it is essential to recall what ASADA said on
page 13 of the Interim Report.
140. ASADA stated: The report does not include conclusions, findings or recommendations
regarding potential anti-doping rule violations. Rather, it is intended to be chronological
summary of evidence received during the course of the investigation. On the one hand,
although the investigation sought to establish whether players and support persons from
the Essendon FC used substances or engaged in methods prohibited by the World AntiDoping Authority and the AFL Anti-Doping code ASADA wasnt prepared to make
conclusions or findings. However, on the other hand, ASADA was prepared to give the
AFL conclusions on the environment at Essendon in order to facilitate the AFL disciplining
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Essendon FC and Hird, Thompson and Corcoran. Nothing could be clearer. The
investigation was corrupted and should be declared null and void. It is incomprehensible
that WADA would contemplate using evidence gathered by ASADA in WADAs proposed
Court of Arbitration for Sport hearing.
141. In his affidavit, ASADAs Trevor Burgess said: On 9 July 2013, I was involved in a shorter
teleconference with the AFL to discuss ASADAs progress on the preparation of the
summary report. The discussion was with Mr Clothier (AFL), Mr Dillon (AFL), Mr Rowe
(Department of Sport) and I also think Ms Perdikogiannis (ASADA). I cannot recall if Mr
Mr Clothier was asking

questions about whether the summary report would have
sufficient detail about the environment at Essendon [my emphasis]
McLachlan was also present on the teleconference.
and ASADAs position on AOD-9604 which had come out of the ASADA investigation to
date. That seemed to me that he was quite concerned about whether the AFL would get a
report that would meet its needs in terms of providing a brief to the AFL commission on
ASADAs position to date on the matters raised in my letter:
141.1. Conclusions on the environment at Essendon during the 2012 season
141.2. ASADAs position on whether it intended to prosecute any cases on the use of a
substance known as AOD-9604; and
141.3. conclusions on whether there was considered to be sufficient evidence for ASADA
to further investigate individual players with respect to other prohibited
substances.
I understood these to be the agreed topics [my emphasis] for the summary report
between ASADA and AFL from before Ms Andruska went on leave.
142. On 16 July 2013, Mr Rowe and I visited Mr Clothier at the AFL in Melbourne to continue
the discussion about the content of the summary report. I took to that meeting a
proposed table of contents of the summary report. I recall Mr Clothier saying to me
words to the effect that if you dont give us something, we are just going to have to sit
down one weekend and do it ourselves.
143. Andruska attended a further meeting with AFL officials Demetriou, Clothier and senior
Demetriou stated that: two or

three things cannot afford to be made public [my emphasis].
counsel Andrew Dillon on 24 July 2013.
Andruska noted that Demetriou further stated:

143.1. On track for 17 August;
143.2. Deal with club before finals;
143.3. Allows one month to deal with club;
143.4. I can deal with individuals;
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

143.5. Charge Essendon in 2 3 weeks;
143.6. AFL Commission know the matter;
143.7. Decision cannot be appealed.
144. At this stage the investigation hadnt been completed. The AFL hadnt been given ASADAs
Interim Report. Essendon hadnt been given the evidence against it. Essendon hadnt even
been charged with anything. Essendon hadnt been given a hearing on any such charges.
Demetriou was to sit on the jury with his fellow commissioners to determine if, and
where, any guilt lay and any penalties to be issued. And yet the commissioners already
know the case and Demetriou has already decided on the penalties. Its impossible to
imagine greater misconduct and impropriety.
145. Andruska told the Middleton Federal Court that at one meeting, David Lording, a
corporate and government communications consultant brought in to advise ASADA, said
Senator Lundy needed a deal with the AFL and ASADA to relieve political angst created by
her decision, along with then Justice Minister Jason Clare, to invite sports chiefs to attend
a 7 February release of the ACC report. This suggests Ministers Lundy and Clare regretted
their stage-managed, over-the-top, damaging, media conference with the ACC, the AFL
and the NRL on 7 February 2013 and they needed a deal with ASADA and the AFL to get
the government out of trouble. The deal corrupted the investigation resulting in a denial
of procedural fairness to the Essendon club, James Hird, other support staff and, as it has
now transpired, the players.
146. Andruska was asked to explain why, given
ASADAs statutory obligation to

operate independent of government [my emphasis], Gillard government
officials were routinely present during meetings and telephone hook-ups throughout the
investigation. She couldnt explain. This was a clear admission by Andruska that
ASADA failed to fulfil its statutory obligations. Accordingly, the investigation

should be declared null and void and WADA should neither wish to, nor be allowed to
submit to any jurisdiction any of the supposed evidence collected or provided by ASADA
to support its unsafe findings.
147. Justice John Middleton asked Andruska whether it was unusual for her to be at a meeting
with the minister, her press adviser and the head of a sporting body. Yes it was, she
said. One would hope it was unusual, as in participating in these meetings she was
operating outside her statutory obligations to be independent of government, or any
other external influences.
148. The court was told that the governments Richard Eccles, had a persisting involvement
in the investigation from January 2013 until August 2013. Furthermore, Andruska told
Justice Middleton that Eccles had been at several meetings involving the AFL, ASADA, the
ACC and the government. In allowing these meetings and especially allowing Eccles to
participate in such meetings Andruska clearly breached ASADAs obligations, and denied
Essendon and individuals under investigation procedural fairness.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

149. Questioned at the Middleton hearing by Essendons QC, Neal Young, about a meeting on
24 May 2013, involving AFL chief executive Andrew Demetriou, AFL integrity chief Brett
Clothier, then Sports Minister Kate Lundy and Minister Lundys media adviser, Chris
Owens, Andruska agreed it was unusual for her or Demetriou to be at a meeting with
the minister and the head of a sports organisation. These unusual meetings denied
Essendon, Hird and others procedural fairness.
150. Andruska recounted to the Middleton Federal Court former sports minister Kate Lundys
determination to strike a deal to punish Essendon. Andruskas comments revealed the
level of political involvement in the ASADA and AFLs joint investigation of Essendon. In
allowing the interference, she allowed ASADA to breach its statutory obligations. The deal
between ASADA, the government and the AFL facilitated the AFL imposing grossly
onerous penalties on the Essendon club and Hird, with lesser penalties on other support
staff. Inter alia, Essendon was fined $2 million. And none of this resulting from a charge of
administering banned substances, but rather on a charge of governance failures. It could
be argued that the deal enabled the AFL to improperly obtain $2 million from the
Essendon club.
151. ASADA and the AFL investigators denied procedural fairness to Essendon, James Hird,
other support staff, and the players, by briefing senior AFL executives Andrew Demetriou
and Gillon McLachlan on not only what was said by various witnesses, but briefed them on
information collected from SMSs and computer hard drives. An AFL investigator, generally
Abraham Haddad, an intelligence coordinator who worked alongside Brett Clothier in the
AFLs integrity services unit, sat in on every ASADA interview. Haddad reported to Clothier
who, in turn, briefed McLachlan and the AFLs general counsel Andrew Dillon. McLachlan
briefed Demetriou and the commissioners.
152. Andrew Demetriou used information gained in this way, and seemingly selectively, in his
numerous radio broadcasts and media interviews. He denied Essendon and James Hird
procedural fairness by implying Essendon and Hird were guilty. This conditioned the
media, the public and the Essendon board to accept guilty findings and severe penalties. A
small number of examples:
152.1.
Weekly Times (6 February 2013): Last night he (Demetriou) said: They

(Essendon) dont know what they have taken or alleged to have taken, they dont
even know if they have broken any WADA rules. This was an outrageous
comment by Demetriou. The investigation had been announced and technically
begun; Demetriou was out of line saying anything. From day-one Demetriou was
creating a negative impression of Essendon in the publics mind.
152.2.
Demetriou Media Conference 7 February 2013: Id say to all our supporters:

Dont lose faith in the game The AFL commission and the AFL management is
going to tackle this head on, to clean this sport up, to rid the game of insidious
infiltration of organised crime figures, to rid the game of the use of drugs, to rid
the game of cocktails.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

152.3.
The Age (2 March 2013): It shocked me, not only as the CEO of the AFL but also
as a parent If it is right that there were instances of young men being taken
across the road and injected for a period of time, then that is unacceptable.
Demetriou should not have commented on any aspect of the issue until the
investigation was completed. As it transpired, the players were taken across the
road to a registered clinic where they were given vitamin C and D intravenously,
which didnt breach any rules. The facilities across the road were considered far
more hygienic than at the club.
152.4.
Demetriou (21 March 2013): Our fans have quite reasonably been outraged by
whats been happening, and with great justification. The investigation had
barely begun. Demetriou was again implying Essendon had done something
wrong. ASADAs chief executive Aurora Andruska should have been outraged at
Demetriou compromising the AFL/ASADA investigation by implying the players
were guilty, and thus denying Essendon procedural fairness.
152.5.
I am shocked by the complexity of the substances, the potential injurious nature

of these substances. If the substances werent banned there was no potential
injurious nature. In stating that they were potentially injurious, Demetriou was
implying that it had been established that the substances were illegal and
potentially injurious.
152.6.
Demetrious interview with Neil Mitchell on radio 3AW (12 April 2013): You
cant help but be disappointed, particularly as you find out more and understand
more about what was going on. Demetriou could only justify being disappointed
if Essendon had breached the anti-doping rules. Thus, he implied Essendon and
its officials were guilty of wrong-doing.
152.7.
Well I think the things that are allegedly in the public domain now. I mean they
are very fine reporters the fellows from the Age, Baker and McKenzie. I dont
think people print things like that unless they are pretty sure of their facts. So
there is a lot of what has already been published which is very, very disappointing
Neil. Demetriou was basically stating that all the damaging allegations made by
Baker and McKenzie against Essendon were true. Demetriou turned Baker and
McKenzies allegations into facts in the public mind.
152.8.
There are other things that are still yet to be determined, more substantive
things about people and individuals. But all of it is disappointing Neil because I
mean you know young men, young people have been subjected to injections of
the nature of thats been disclosed (so far [by Baker and McKenzie]) and
substances is horrifying Neil. As Demetriou implied everything Baker and
McKenzie said must be true, he was implying Essendon was guilty. Furthermore,
Demetrious use of the word horrifying to describe the nature of the substances
left the public in no doubt that it had been determined that Essendon and Hird
were guilty of the most heinous breaches of the doping rules.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

152.9.
Youd appreciate Ive got briefings that are more advanced than whats in the
public domain. As Demetriou had already implied that what journalists were
saying in the public domain meant Essendon and Hird were guilty, he was
implying with this comment that he had more substantial proof of their guilt. As
this comment was made in the general context of whether Hird should resign, it
could be interpreted as a veiled attempt by Demetriou to coerce Hird into
resigning, and it certainly damaged further Hirds reputation in the publics mind.
152.10. Mitchell: If you or I were accused of dishonesty or unethical behaviour we

would probably step down while it was being sorted out should James Hird
consider doing that? Demetriou: As he [Hird] goes through his thought process
that [considering standing aside] is an option he [Hird] has to consider. This
was an outrageous response by Demetriou. Apart from his own inappropriate
public statements implying guilt, journalists were the only ones who had accused
Hird of dishonesty and unethical behaviour. The investigators hadnt (publicly)
accused Hird of such things, let alone charged him with anything. Since when did
anyone have to resign because someone in the media accuses them of
dishonesty?
152.11. Hird could return to the Essendon coaching job if cleared. Cleared of what? At
this stage Essendon was only being investigated to ascertain whether its players
took WADA prohibited substances. No charges had been laid against Hird.
152.12. Herald Sun (15 July 2013): Essendon will not get a soft landing. This again
implied Essendon was guilty yet the statement was made prior to the ASADA
interim report being delivered and prior to any charges being levelled against
Essendon or Hird. This was a prejudgment by a man who insisted he would sit on
the jury if charges were laid and decide on any penalty.
152.13. The Age (12 April 2013): They are very disturbing (allegations by Baker and
McKenzie) particularly when they relate to the health and welfare of young men.
It is very clear that if any coach or official puts the duty of care of their players at
risk then they should be held accountable. There is no place for them in the
game. As Demetriou had already implied everything Baker and McKenzie wrote
was factual, he was once again proclaiming Essendons and Hirds guilt.
Demetriou obviously overlooked the fact that in condemning Hird he was
condemning himself. As CEO of the AFL, Demetriou had the same duty of care to
the Essendon players as did the Essendon board. He and his deputy admitted
they didnt do enough [to protect the players].
152.14. Demetriou implied in his interview with Mike Sheahan on 27 September 2013,
that he considered Essendon guilty the moment he read [many months before]
the Dr Reid letter to Paul Hamilton and James Hird, in which he complained
about being marginalised. Another indication of the AFL chiefs predetermination
of the outcome of the investigation, and without any foundation the letter
neither implicated anyone in the administration of banned substances to the
players, nor implied that such substances were administered.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

152.15. The Herald Sun (8 August 2013), quoted Demetriou saying it is unfortunate if
players believed Essendon would be stripped of premiership points in the doping
saga.
152.16. The Herald Sun (9 August 2013) quoted Demetriou saying the league is yet to
decide on penalties for Essendon. The charges werent even conveyed to
Essendon until 13 August 2013, and the hearing was scheduled for 26 August
2013. But here we have Demetriou implying Essendon was guilty. We also know
through McLachlans meetings with ASADA and his briefing to the commission
that Demetriou wasnt telling the truth.
Damaging Selective Leaks
153. The continuous leaks from the investigation to the media were an inexcusable breach of
confidentiality of the proceedings and ASADAs obligations under the Act, and were
extremely damaging to Essendon, players and support staff, particularly Hird. The leaks
were different from a whistle-blowers leaks in that they werent intended to expose a
problem swept under the carpet. The leaks were designed to damage Essendon and Hird
and influence the publics view of their culpability before the investigation was
completed. It is difficult not to believe that these were intentional leaks intended to
condition the public not just to their guilt - agreed to by ASADA, the AFL and the federal
government before the investigation had started - but also to accept any excessive
penalties.
154. The sources of the selective leaks were obviously using journalists to manipulate the
story in a way they wanted presented to the public. Space and time only permit including
examples of leaks to three journalists, all from the Age: Caroline Wilson, Richard Baker
and Nick McKenzie, but there were myriad more.
155. In taking no action to stem the constant leaks from the investigation, ASADA was in
serious breach of its obligations under the Act throughout the process. The leaks were
designed to harm Essendon Football Club, James Hird, Dr Bruce Reid and Mark Thompson,
and should have resulted in drastic remedial and disciplinary action from ASADA chief
executive Aurora Andruska, the Minister for Sport, Kate Lundy and her successor, Don
Farrell. No action was taken, and the selective leaks continued.
156. Those responsible for the leaks should have been removed from any part in the
investigation and possibly from their substantive positions. Many of the articles written
about the Essendon saga damaged Hird and Essendons image and reputation severely.
Much of Caroline Wilsons information, whether distorted in the retelling or not, was
derived from leaks from the investigation and those responsible for leaking should be held
accountable.
157. Caroline Wilson, the Age
157.1.
9 February 2013: But Fairfax Media understands that Essendon was not the club
singled out for team-based doping
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

157.2.
11 April 2013: Two months later, as the evidence against Hird continued to
deeply disturb those who are investigating him that claim (clause 101.i above)
seems fanciful.
157.3.
12 April 2013: Reid had told the Australian Sports Ant-Doping Authority and the
AFL he was marginalised by the inner sanctum after voicing his fears to several
levels of the clubs hierarchy That he (Reid) warned Hird and others about the
practices being adopted by Dean Robinson and Stephen Dank has been a matter
of grave concern for the AFL.
157.4.
13 April 2013: This claim (by Hirds camp) is inconsistent with previous
information received by the AFL
157.5.
7 May 2013: The AFL and ASADA will also investigate Stephen Danks assertion
that six Essendon staffers, including Hird and two of his assistant coaches, took
substances which are prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Agency.
157.6.
11 May 2013: Five Essendon staffers, including James Hirds personal assistant,
have admitted to the AFL and the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority that
they were treated last year by Stephen Dank with a variety of injections and oral
supplements.
157.7.
11 May 2013: It is understood the staffers have said they were treated by Dank
for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of sleep to weight management to
being generally run down and suffering from poor immune systems.
157.8.
15 June 2013: The games governing body appears well versed on the role Hird
played in the high-risk chemical program. There appears no doubt he was aware
of the jab-happy environment about the club.
157.9.
17 July 2013: The AFL warned James Hird in late 2011 to not involve his players
in a peptides program.
Sources close to the joint investigation by

ASADA and the AFL [my emphasis] into Essendon have told Fairfax Media
157.10. 17 July 2013:
that the AFL warning came after senior league officials had learnt that Hird had
been investigating the anti-doping status of certain peptides.
157.11. July 17, 2013: Investigators appear to have built a compelling case [my
emphasis] that Bombers coach James Hird was an enthusiastic supporter of the
clubs injecting program.
157.12. 17 July 2013: Evidence has also emerged [my emphasis] suggesting that Hirds
senior assistant, Mark Thompson, cautioned the Bombers coaching group and
football staff against the injecting program.
157.13. 17 July 2013: While Hird has said he was confident the club would be in a very
good position once the investigation had been completed, that investigation
appears to have built a compelling case that the Bombers senior coach was an
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enthusiastic supporter of Danks program, support strongly backed by his
football operations boss, Danny Corcoran.
157.14. 17 July 2013: It is believed that Hirds performance in his interview in May
with ASADA and the AFL did not completely convince investigators [my
emphasis] that the senior coach had acted appropriately in demonstrating due
diligence.
157.15. 17 July 2013: And evidence from some key witnesses has not been favourable
to Hird [my emphasis] painting a picture of a coach Never adequately
controlled or challenged within the club.
157.16. 17 July 2013: It is understood the staffers have said [my emphasis] they were
treated by Dank for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of sleep to weight
management to being generally run down
158. Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, the Age
158.1.
11 April 2013: Information gathered by ASADA corroborates this.
158.2.
11 April 2013: Governance and player welfare failings at Essendon may result in
the AFL charging the club or its senior officials with improper conduct or bringing
the game into disrepute.
158.3.
12 April 2013: Reid has since told anti-doping authorities that he was frozen
out of the supplements program after raising concerns about it.
158.4.
12 April 2013: In relation to the Bombers use of AOD, even ASADAs internal
advice suggests the doping case around the drug is weak.
158.5.
12 April 2013: Hird is one of several Bombers senior staff against whom
evidence of negligence is mounting.
158.6.
30 June 2013: Fairfax Media can reveal that the Australian Sports Anti-Doping
Authority is investigating whether the physical performance of Essendon players
given certain supplements, including AOD-9604, was measured against
teammates who had not received the drugs and whether results were passed to
external parties.
158.7.
30 June 2013: WADA were shocked by some of the substances going around
Essendon and some of the NRL clubs. Some of those drugs had not been thought
of in a sporting context before, said a source familiar with the progress of the
Australian Sports Anti-Doping inquiry. Weve got a playing generation of guinea
pigs.
158.8.
1 July 2013: As the drugs-in-sport inquiry enters its fifth month, Fairfax Media
has learnt that it seemingly slow pace can be largely attributed to Essendon
players being given every opportunity to build a no-fault or mitigatingcircumstances case that will meet WADAs high evidentiary requirements.
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158.9.
1 July 2013: Investigators from the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority are
examining whether players were given substances different to (sic) what they
were told. There is also confusion over whether club medical staff had actually
approved every substance administered.
158.10. 1 July 2013: It appears that the players have effectively been sabotaged by
their own club, said a source aware of the disclosures made to ASADA.
158.11. 4 July 2013: Fairfax Media understands that Essendon players have been unable
to explain to anti-doping investigators whether the clubs 2012 supplements
program involved Thymosin Beta 4.
158.12. 4 July 2013: It is understood that player testimony on the issue of Thymosin has
been vague, with players unable to specify which type of drug was taken.
158.13. 4 July 2013: However, sources with a knowledge of the progress of the
Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority investigation believe there is a strong
circumstantial case mounting to suggest the Thymosin peptide referred to in
the Essendon invoice was beta 4.
158.14. 23 July 2013: Fairfax Media understands the ASADA investigation is examining
which of the external doctors associated with the supplements program wrote
prescriptions for players, whether they actually physically examined them and
whether prescriptions were written in the players names.
158.15. 31 July 2013: ASADAs investigators have seized documents found inside the
Essendon Football Clubs headquarters
158.16. 31 July 2013: The documents are among several pieces of information gained by
ASADA that reveal the risky nature of Essendons sports science program
158.17. 31 July 2013: Fairfax Media can also reveal that ASADA has uncovered a bill sent
to Essendon in late 2012
158.18. 31 July 2013: It is understood the AFL and ASADA have been unable to confirm
what drug the amino acids referred to, but have been told that despite the bill
alarming several senior club officials official
158.19. 31 July 2013: Investigators have also obtained text messages from Essendons
former high performance coach Dean Robinson
158.20. 1 August 2013: Mr Robinsons warning, sent via a text message and recently
obtained by the anti-doping investigators
158.21. 7 August 2013: Players viewed as victims in leaked report.
158.22. 7 August 2013: Some Essendon players were given WADA-banned substances
AOD-9604 and Thymosin Beta 4 according to circumstantial evidence detailed
in the confidential ASADA report into the AFLs clubs 2012 supplements
program.
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158.23. 7 August 2013: Multiple sources aware of the contents of the report told Fairfax
Media
158.24. 7 August 2013: ASADA has also found
158.25. 7 August 2013: A source who has read the ASADA report
158.26. 7 August 2013: Separate to ASADAs deliberations, the AFL is weighing whether
to punish the club or officials Punishment could include the loss of premiership
points or the suspension of staff.
158.27. 14 August 2013: According to evidence gathered during the ASADA-AFL
investigation, the Mexican supplement [came from New Mexico in the US] 16
August
158.28. 14 August 2013: The revelation that an unknown substance was given to some
Essendon players was raised by ASADA investigators during the interviews at AFL
headquarters The Mexican supplement
158.29. 14 August 2013: ASADA has devoted considerable resources to examining the
circumstances around the provision of the Mexican supplement
158.30. 21 August 2013: On August 5, 2011, James Hird sat across the table from an AFL
integrity officer and an ASADA representative and was told to stay away from
peptides. AFL integrity officer Brett Clothier told Hird that peptides were a
serious risk to the integrity of the AFL and they were viewed similarly to
steroids and human growth hormone.
159. Andrew Crook (Crikey 1 August 2013) summed up the roll of intentional leaks and a
compliant and subjective media when he wrote: But the coverage of the drama, reliant
mostly on leaks from vested interests and off-the-record briefings, has led many readers
to seriously doubt the medias role as an impartial umpire. And then theres the hulking
media team working for the AFL headed by hard arse communications tsar Patrick Keane.
Their job is to protect the boss and, critics say, send anti-Hird stories to whoever will take
them.
160. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has said it conducted an investigation into ASADA
between 27 June 2013 and 13 October 2013 to ascertain whether ASADA had leaked
confidential information. Inexplicably, despite the 46 examples above from Wilson,
Mackenzie and Baker of leaking (clauses 157 and 158), and many more not listed, the AFP
couldnt find a single example of leaking.
MISCONDUCT AND/OR INCOMPETENCE

161. The Macquarie Dictionary defines misconduct as improper conduct; misbehaviour;
unlawful conduct by an official in regard to his office. ASADA was guilty of misconduct in
a number of ways.
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162. The ASADA/AFL investigators withheld the fact it had decided to go outside its brief and
outside its authority, to investigate governance issues: Paragraph 13(1) (f) of the ASADA
Act and clause 3.27(1) of the National Ant-Doping Scheme authorise ASADAs Chief
Executive Officer to investigate possible anti-doping rule violations by athletes or athletic
support personnel. The Interim Report stated that The investigation has sought to
establish whether players and support persons from EFC used substances or engaged in
methods prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) and the AFLs Anti-Doping
Code.
163. It was disingenuous of ASADA to claim that trying to establish whether players used
WADA prohibited substances was the only objective of the investigation. A significant
part of the Interim Report was devoted to making a false case that James Hird, and to a
lesser extent, Mark Thompson were responsible for governance failures at Essendon. Such
action by ASADA was clearly outside its charter and tantamount to misconduct by the
investigating committee. The Act did not empower ASADA to investigate such matters as
to whether Essendon checked would-be staff references. As stated in the preamble,
Justice Middleton was not asked to rule on this matter.
164. ASADA failed in its obligations under its charter to act independently of outside
influences, including government, by not only participating in talks with the Gillard
Government, but by accepting instructions from the Gillard Government. A few examples:
164.1.
On 9 February 2013, Essendon Chairman David Evans and chief executive Ian
Robson attended a meeting in Canberra with ASADAs chief executive Aurora
Andruska, chief operating officer Trevor Burgess, general manager of anti-doping
programmes and legal services Elen Perdikogiannis, director of intelligence and
investigations Paul Simonsson, AFLs Gillon McLachlan and Brett Clothier, and
Richard Eccles from Senator Kate Lundys office. See clauses 88-93 for details.
164.2.
On 13 February 2013, Richard Eccles informed ASADA lawyers in writing that he

had told AFL deputy chief executive Gillon McLachlan that See clause 105 for
details.
164.3.
Discussions followed between ASADAs general manager of anti-doping

programmes and legal services Elen Perdikogiannis, Eccles and McLachlan. By 18
February, an agreement had been reached. Totally improper behaviour by all
participants, but the head of ASADAs behaviour in allowing this external
influence on ASADAs investigation, was beyond improper, making all evidence
and findings of the investigation unsafe and therefore invalid. See clause 107 for
details.
164.4.
Andruska testified that: By June 2013, ASADA was coming under pressure from
the relevant Commonwealth Minister, Kate Lundy to reach some form of
conclusion, or an outcome from the investigation. See clause 116 for details.
164.5.
On 4 June 2013, Andruska and M/s Perdikogiannis of ASADA spoke to M/s Glenys
Beauchamp, deputy secretary Department of Sport. See clause 117 for details.
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164.6.
Andruska said the minister was demanding no players be sacked. According to

court documents Andruskas notes of that 4 June meeting stated: Lundy: needs
something [a] deal with AFL; support staff sacked; points [taken] off
[Essendon]; players off [my emphasis]. See clause 118 for details.
164.7.
On 4 June 2013, Evans attended a meeting with McLachlan, ASADA staffers

Andruska, Simonsson and Perdikogiannis, and governments Eccles. Simonsson
made notes that certain persons have to go [my emphasis] followed by a
reference to a restructure of whole department. See clause 120 for details.
164.8.
On 5 June 2013, ASADAs lead investigator John Nolan expressed concern that
Andruska was serving the political agenda of others. See clause 122 for
details.
164.9.
ASADA deputy chief executive Trevor Burgess told the Federal Court he received
a briefing on 13 June 2013 from Richard Eccles, about an AFL plan to take action
against the club staff and suspend Hird for at least six months Ducks all lined
up notes Burgess. See clause 126 for details.
164.10. Andruska told the Middleton Federal Court that at one meeting, David Lording, a
corporate and government communications consultant brought in to advise
ASADA, said Senator Lundy needed a deal with the AFL and ASADA to relieve
political angst created by her decision, along with then Justice Minister Jason
Clare, to invite sports chiefs to attend a 7 February release of the ACC report.
164.11. Justice Middletons court was told that Richard Eccles, had a persisting
involvement in the investigation from January 2013 until August 2013.
Furthermore, Andruska told Justice Middleton that Eccles had been at several
meetings involving the AFL, ASADA, the ACC and the government. See clause 148
for details.
164.12. Questioned by Essendons QC Neal Young about a meeting on 24 May 2013,
involving AFL chief executive Andrew Demetriou, AFL integrity chief Brett
Clothier, then Sports Minister Kate Lundy and Miss Lundys media adviser, Chris
Owens, Andruska agreed it was unusual for her or him to be at a meeting with
the minister and the head of a sports organisation. See clause 147 for details.
165. ASADA behaved improperly by not only listening to demands by the AFL but by
capitulating to demands by AFL officials. ASADA and the AFL agreed much of the result of
the investigation, within days of the investigation being announced, effectively prior to it
having begun. This is arguably little different from match-fixing and should incur the same
penalties. At the very least, any evidence and findings of the investigation must be
considered manifestly unsafe and therefore invalid.
165.1.
On 9 February 2013, Essendon Chairman David Evans and chief executive Ian
Robson attended a meeting in Canberra with ASADAs chief executive Aurora
Andruska, chief operating officer Trevor Burgess, general manager of anti-doping
programmes and legal services Elen Perdikogiannis, director of intelligence and
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investigations Paul Simonsson, AFLs Gillon McLachlan and Brett Clothier, and
Richard Eccles from Senator Kate Lundys office. ASADA allowed itself to be
under pressure from the AFL. See clauses 88-93 for details.
165.2.
ASADA and the AFL had decided the Essendon players were guilty of taking
banned substances before the investigators had interviewed their first witness.
165.3.
ASADA and the AFL also decided the support staff would be found guilty, which
later became obvious meant James Hird will be punished. See clause 110 for
details.
165.4.
In early March, ASADAs general manager of anti-doping programmes and legal

services Elen Perdikogiannis wrote to the AFL and withdrew the 20 February
2013 letter. McLachlan wouldnt accept the new statement claiming it was too
late to change the ground rules. See clause 112 for details.
165.5.
On 4 June 2013: McLachlan, Evans, Eccles, Andruska, Simonsson, Perdikogiannis.

McLachlan was concerned about $1 million worth of ticket sales for the first two
weeks of the finals. He wanted to maximize the opportunity for the best
outcome for the players. Simonsson made notes and noted that certain persons
have to go followed by a reference to a restructure of whole department, no
doubt the football department. See clause 120 for details.
165.6.
On 13 June 2013, Ms Perdikogiannis recorded a strategy meeting. She had

been told of an AFL commission meeting where AFL wished to keep the pressure
on ASADA to be the bad guy. It was reported that the AFL had stated in respect
of the player support staff, such as Hird, that the AFL will go them.
165.7.
Andruska met with McLachlan and Clothier on 19 June 2013. Andruskas notes
state McLachlan said words to the effect Essendon cant play in the final series
it would undermine the competition for ten years [my emphasis]. See clause
127 for details.
165.8.
On 26 June 2013, Andruska spoke to McLachlan. She noted McLachlans

comments as follows: Take points off Essendon; We need all the detail to get
through that; Problematic if not full report; Get outcome we need; Take
bits
out that might compromise what we need
[my emphasis].
McLachlan was telling Andruska what he needed in the interim report to find
Essendon guilty, which would enable the AFL to take points off Essendon. See
clause 137.5 for details.
165.9.
Andruska attended a further meeting with the AFL on 24 July 2013. Demetriou,
Clothier and AFL senior counsel Andrew Dillon were there. Demetriou stated
that: two or three things cannot afford to be made public [my emphasis]. See
clause 143 for details.
165.10. On 19 June 2013, Ms Andruska met with Malcolm Holmes QC, Burgess (ASADA),
Dillon (AFL), Clothier (AFL), and McLachlan (AFL). McLachlan asked for a high
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level report and disclosed that such report was required to resolve matters and
preserve the integrity of the 2013 season. There was talk of governance failure
issues as well. There were some outcomes recorded by Andruska as follows:
Outcome report: purpose of meeting is to understand what AFL required from
ASADA and to reach agreement on what could be provided by when. Agreed
ASADA would provide investigators report drawing together the outcome of the
interview of the EFC players. McLachlan spoke of board pressures and prior to
the finals. How can be resolved? Andruska summarised [McLachlans request]:
[Interim Report] Use as a basis of decision making; Table to commission.
165.11. On 19 June 2013, John Nolan contacted Clothier and informed him that he would
gain access to the Interim Report as early as the next day.
165.12. McLachlan spoke to Andruska on 25 June 2013 and made it clear the AFL
required a full report from ASADA. Andruska file note: ASADA/AFL Table of
Outcomes; Under heading Outcome; Purpose - AFL to advise it needed a report
on all aspects of the Aperio investigation, i.e. not just players, but also support
personnel and ancillary persons of interest.
165.13. On 2 July 2013, a further phone conference occurred between ASADA and the
AFL concerning the contents of the interim report. ASADA recorded the
outcomes of the conference as follows: ASADA/AFL Table of Outcomes; Under
heading Outcome; Purpose - ASADA will provide a report to the AFL with as
much information as is lawfully possible and which does not prejudice ongoing
investigations; the report to the AFL will include: a) Conclusions on the
environment at Essendon that goes to the behaviour of its support personnel; b)
ASADAs position on whether it intends to prosecute any cases on AOD 9604; c)
Conclusions on whether there is sufficient evidence for ASADA to further
investigate individual players (as required by statutory obligations) with respect
to other prohibited substances (including Hexarelin and Thymosin Beta-4).
165.14. On 4 July 2013, ASADA wrote to the AFL and proposed sending the AFL a report
prepared by its lawyers and not the ASADA investigation report.
165.15. On 4 July 2013, Ms Andruska wrote to the AFL and declined to provide the
complete ASADA investigation report. She stated: ASADA cannot disclose the
internal investigation report based on advice of counsel would disclose
information which ASADA cannot lawfully disclose.
165.16. On 8 July 2013, a teleconference took place between ASADA and the AFL. The
AFL expressed concern about any limitation on contents of the report ASADA
was to provide to it. The AFL wanted the report for its own decision-making
purposes: Outcomes; Under heading Outcome; Acknowledged; 2. The AFL
raised concerns about the comprehensiveness of the report and the ability to
rely on it for the purpose of the decision-making.
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165.17. On 16 July 2013, ASADA and the AFL discussed the impending interim report
under the heading Outcome: Uncontrolled environment at Essendon Clothier
wrote: The AFL is not looking for conclusions or commentary on the
uncontrolled environment. The AFL required the information/evidence collected
through the interview to be assembled in a way that paints a picture of the
controlled EFC environment to a large extent provide information [evidence to
support] the Ziggy report which is all conclusions.
165.18. The AFL also wants the report to include any evidence that the EFC was duped
notwithstanding its incompetence to protect themselves and the EFC against
such threats.
165.19. The AFL considers the report to be one of a number of items that the AFL will be
considering in determining appropriate action against the EFC.
165.20. In her affidavit, Andruska stated that Clothier spoke to Mr Burgess on 19 July
2013 and provided commentary on the draft report. Mr Clothier was keen to
emphasise the AFL requirements: Brett Clothier believes that the full content of
the investigators report (Environment, how was it allowed to continue.
Essendon culture) are all ultimately relevant, for the AFL to form a view that
there was an unacceptable risk of the player group taking/be administered
prohibited substances conduct prejudicial to the interests of the game
166. ASADA distorted evidence and testified falsely in its own investigation. In so doing it
misrepresented James Hirds responsibilities and culpability, inter alia. This misconduct by
ASADA enabled the AFL to build a false case against Hird, which led to him being
suspended for 12 months:
166.1.
Essendon used a matrix organisational structure. Matrix organisation structures

have been embraced by organisations since the late twentieth century to
leverage and recognise the professional credentials and expertise of an
increasingly specialised workforce. This ensures that elite subject matter experts
have the authority and responsibility commensurate with their professional
credentials and are not politically buried deep within archaic command and
control structures.
166.2.
The Essendon board created an organisational structure that established solid

line reporting by specialists to their accountable manager whilst staff within
departments that they served and advised had dotted line reporting
relationships. Solid line accountability and reporting confers authority and
responsibility with rights and obligations to set policies and procedures to ensure
proper compliance with standards required by their professions
166.3.
James Hird was appointed senior coach of Essendon Football Club in September
2010. Hird was on his own branch of the Essendon organisation structure and
reported directly to chief executive officer, Ian Robson. Hird had four assistant
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coaches reporting to him - Mark Thompson, Brendan McCartney, Simon
Goodwin and Sean Wellman.
166.4.
The football department was on a different branch of the organisational

structure from Hirds coaching branch. The football department was run by Paul
Hamilton, whose title was general manager, football operations. Hirds coaching
department, and Hamiltons football department, had a broken line link, only.
Hird had no link to Hamilton. Hamilton, like Hird, reported directly to CEO, Ian
Robson. This meant that Hird only had authority over, and responsibility for,
Mark Thompson, Brendan McCartney, Simon Goodwin and Sean Wellman.
166.5.
Dotted line accountability denotes consultation, advice and provision of expert

services. This meant that Hird could consult with, and seek advice from Dean
Robinson and Danny Corcoran. He had no power to admonish, let alone
discipline Robinson or Corcoran or anyone in any department other than his own
coaching department.
166.6.
The High Performance Unit was run by Stuart Cormack until June 2011, and then
by his replacement, Dean Robinson from August 2011 until February 2013. The
High Performance Unit formed part of the football department, with Cormack,
and then Robinson, reporting directly to Hamilton. On 2 February 2012, Hamilton
reinforced the fact that he was in charge of the supplements programme when
he sent an email to his staff in which he stated that everything to do with the
supplements programme had to come across his desk.
166.7.
At the beginning of Part 5 of the Interim Report (page 99) Mr Robson stated that
Mr Robinson had supervisory responsibility of the Sports Science Team, which
included Mr Dank and the club doctors. In turn, Mr Robinson reported to Mr
Hamilton who was accountable to both Mr Robson and the Clubs executive. Mr
Dank was part of the Sports Science Team and therefore reported to Mr
Robinson. (Footnote 303, Robson interview with ASADA 15 February 2013).
Robsons evidence accurately reflected the reporting relationships detailed in
Essendons organisational structure.
166.8.
Despite Robsons unequivocal description of the line of command, ASADA stated

in the Interim Report (page 62) that: Robinson in turn reported to Hird and
Hamilton. This claim was factually incorrect. ASADA knew it was incorrect.
ASADA was not only testifying in its own investigation but doing so with a known
falsehood. This again is a corruption and contamination of the investigatory
process that amounts to misconduct and makes all evidence presented by
ASADA in support of its findings and the findings themselves unsafe and
therefore invalid.
166.9.
This knowingly inaccurate attributing supervisory responsibility over Robinson to

Hird facilitated the former being falsely held culpable for governance failures,
and contributed substantially to Hird being suspended for 12 months, and all
that has happened to him since. This is just one of many examples of a
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manipulation of the evidence. It is difficult to see why this would have been done
other than to support a finding consistent with the decision made on 9 February
2013 that Hird would be found guilty.
166.10. On page 114 of the Interim Report, it is recorded that Robson also stated that
the supplementation protocols required Dank to outline his intended course to
Robinson, that would be put to the club doctors and then that would have had
visibility and sightlines from both [Mr Corcoran] and Mr Hamilton and ultimately
[Mr Hird]. This is another example of ASADAs distortion of the evidence and
bias. That would have had visibility and sightlines from both [Mr Corcoran] and
Mr Hamilton and ultimately [Mr Hird] is a direct quote from Robson. Robson
clearly did not say Mr Hird. The words Mr Hird are in square brackets. Square
brackets are used to add information by someone other than the person being
quoted. In this instance, Robson was the person being quoted and the words Mr
Hird were added by ASADA. This was unconscionable behaviour by ASADA. Hird
was on his own branch of the organisation structure and had no responsibilities
for the supplementation program. The investigators would have known that no
such organisational line of responsibility to Hird existed. This goes to the heart of
the credibility of the investigation. By this sleight of hand or, at best,
incompetence, ASADA has distorted the evidence so that the reader, including
the AFLs general counsel, would assume Hird was in charge. This inaccurate
representation of the hierarchy assisted the AFL in forcing Hird to stand aside for
12 months. As Essendon had to pay Hird and his replacement for 2014, ASADAs
chicanery cost Essendon approximately $1 million in addition to the $2 million
penalty issued against them by the AFL.
166.11. Essendon chief executive Ian Robson gave evidence to ASADA that Hird reported
to him and that four people reported to Hird Mark Thompson, Brendan
McCartney, Simon Goodwin and Sean Wellman. The Essendon organisational
chart and Hirds job description supported Robsons evidence. ASADA stated that
Dean Robinson reported to Paul Hamilton and Hird. This was factually incorrect,
and knowingly so. Robinson reported only to Hamilton.
167. ASADA manipulated the injection figures: On 15 July 2013, John Nolan (ASADA) asked
Abraham Haddad of the AFL to prepare an injections table based on assumptions and a
formula. Nolan said: Not really what we are looking for. Fourteen out of 58 persons at
EFC remember injections being referred to as Amino Acids. If we add the Multi vitamin
aspect then it is a little more convincing [my emphasis]. John Nolan was ASADAs lead
investigator and here we have him manipulating the evidence, seemingly to support the
pre-determined finding of wrongdoing. Its incomprehensible that Nolan used
assumptions and a formula, but to add the (innocuous) multi vitamin aspect seemingly to
present a picture of a large a number of supplements being administered, as if suspicious,
was more than improper. This sort of manipulation corrupted and tainted the process of
information gathering making evidence presented by ASADA in support of its findings, and
thus the findings themselves, unsafe and therefore invalid.
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168. ASADA included hypothetical injection figures in the interim report, which it knew
couldnt be correct: Appendix A (pages 406 and 407) was a table labelled Injection
Analysis. Inter alia, the table included the projected number of injections of Thymosin
and AOD-9604 that ASADA claimed were to be given to the players. ASADAs source was
the Patient Information/Informed Consent forms. Although ASADA had no idea when the
injecting was supposed to commence, ASADA decided to calculate the figures on an 8
February 2012 commencement and a 1 September 2012 finish. The table indicated that a
total of 1102 AOD-9604 injections would be given to the 38 players. As it transpires, 20
players received two AOD-9604 injections for a grand total of 40 injections, which is 3.6%
of ASADAs nonsensical figure. As ASADA knew when this table was created that only 20
people received AOD-9604 injections, it was dishonest to use 38 players in its calculation.
With manipulations such as this, it is impossible to rely upon the accuracy of any
information collected by the investigators. Its difficult to believe other than that the
investigators were distorting evidence to build a case against Hird to support the guilty
verdict pre-determined on 9 February 2013
169. There was considerable misrepresentation of responses in relation to admitted use of
substances by players. During the player interviews, the players were asked what
substances they were administered. Some players recalled the names of the substances,
but others couldnt. It appears those players who couldnt recollect the names of the
substances were then given the specific names of substances and asked if they could
recall being administered them. Despite this very questionable prompting, a number of
players were still not certain whether they had been administered the named substance.
ASADA collated the responses and produced a table titled, Admitted use of substances by
Players and Officials. The table was a total distortion of the evidence given by the
players.
169.1.
In creating the table in the manner it did, ASADA destroyed the integrity of the
investigation. ASADA translated the following responses as a player admitting to
having been administered the specific substance:
I did not use AOD-9604;

I did not use;
Im not 100% sure;
its a familiar name;
may have been;
not sure;
it could have been that or it could have been;
ringing a bell;
couldnt be exact if I was;
Ive definitely heard the word;
thats one of the reasons I didnt take it as on the sticker it said For medical
research purposes only;
more than likely;
couldnt recall.
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169.2.
Receiving one in the bum or a bit more painful was recorded as a yes for
Cerebrolysin even though the players never mentioned the word
Cerebrolysin. In some instances, when a player couldnt even be prompted,
ASADA decided for itself that it was more than likely. These more than
likely assessments by ASADA were recorded as the players having admitted
to being administered the substance.
Examples of the distortion of the evidence to record admissions by the players:
xxxxx is asked about Thymosin, Oh, Im not sure its just a very familiar name
to me yeah, Im not sure if I did or not, but. In the table this response is
recorded as yes in the Thymosin column.
xxxxxxx is unsure if he took Tribulus, I am not 100% sure. This response by
xxxxxx is recorded as yes in the Tribulus column.
xxxxxx recalls receiving cream from xxxxxx that he did not use, I could see
the amount of cream in there with the blue lid or I think it might have been
blue tack on top. Although xxxxxxxx also says he did not use AOD-9604 cream
ASADA recorded him with a yes in the AOD-9604 cream column.
xxxxxxx declares he was not sure if he used Colostrum, Yeah, Im not 100%
sure. This response is recorded as yes in the Colostrum column
xxxxx recalls that he may have been injected with Cerebrolysin, It could
have been that or it could have been Thymosin. Im not 100 per cent sure on
that. This response was recorded as a yes for both Cerebrolysin and
Thymosin. It should not have been recorded as yes for either substance.
xxxxxxx recalls that he may have been injected with Thymosin, But, to me,
Thymosin is ringing a bell. May have and ringing a bell would not
constitute a yes in a court of law. Thymosin was mentioned in the
newspapers almost daily so it is no wonder it rang a bell. That is a long way
from being 100 per cent certain he was administered Thymosin.
xxxxxx also recalls being given an injection at HyperMED, But we did receive
one in the bum and he said it was an Amino Acid. This response was
recorded correctly as a yes for an unknown amino acid and inappropriately
also as a yes for Cerebrolysin. Irrespective of what the others may or may
not have been administered, One [injection] in the bum hardly constitutes
a certainty it was Cerebrolysin!
xxxxxxxx recalls that he may have been injected with Thymosin, But couldnt
be exact if I was, but I believe I did have a that name certainly rings a bell,
yep. May have, couldnt be exact and ringing a bell didnt entitle
ASADA to record a yes in the Thymosin column.
xxxxxxx recalls receiving cream from xxxxxxx that he claims he did not use,
When I tore my quad later in the year I remember him giving like a syringe
it was like a thing and it had a little log on it and he said put it in the fridge for
a day and rub it on your quad. Although xxxxxx claims he didnt use the
cream, it was recorded as a yes in the AOD-9604 column.
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xxxxxxx recalls he may have been injected with Thymosin by xxxxx,

Thymosin rings a bell like. Ive definitely heard the word but, you know, I
wouldnt be up to tell you if I was injected with it or not. ASADA recorded
xxxxxx uncertainty as a yes in the Thymosin column.
xxxxxxx received AOD-9604 cream from xxxxxx. Yeah, thats one of the
reason I didnt take it is on the sticker it said For medical research purposes
only. This response was recorded as a yes in the AOD-9604 column.
xxxxxxx recalls receiving an injection at HyperMED. He couldnt name the
substance. That one was quite I remember that being quite a bit more
painful. It only lasted for, you know, maybe a minute, and then you are fine
again. Although some other players who admitted, with prompting of the
name, being administered Cerebrolysin experienced the injection in a similar
way, ASADA was out of order in recording xxxxxx as admitting having been
administered Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxxxx recalls receiving one injection [substance unknown] from xxxxxxx.
It was just one in the glute. This response was recorded as xxxxxx admitting
to having been injected with Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxxx recalls he may have used AOD-9604, Yes, I may have Im not 100%
sure but AOD now is a very familiar name but Im really unsure if or I havent
taken that. This was recorded in the table as xxxxxxx admitting he was
administered AOD-9604.
xxxxxxxx also recalls receiving an injection from xxxxxxxxx that may have
been AOD-9604, Id just assumed it was the same as the recovery thing that
we had had the whole way along. This is not an admission of having been
administered AOD-9604, but is recorded as one.
xxxxxxx also recalls receiving an injection from xxxxxx that may have been
Thymosin, No, not the first time. This was inappropriately recorded as an
admission of having been administered Thymosin.
xxxxxxxxx recalls he received an Amino Acid injection, and got an injection in
the bum. This is not an admission by xxxxxxx of having been administered
Cerebrolysin, but is recorded as such.
xxxxxxxx recalls receiving an injection xxxxxxxx that may have been
Cerebrolysin. Im going to give you a vitamin and as well to help in your
recovery. This is not an admission by xxxxxx of having been administered
Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxxxx claims he received two injections to his gluteal xxxxxx that were
described as vitamins. xxxxxx also claims that xxxxx indicated that the
injections might help him sleep. This response was not an admission by
xxxxxx that he was administered Melanotan II, yet it was recorded as a yes
in the Melanotan II column.
xxxxxxx recalls I got two from him on one occasion. ASADA was not entitled
to make a judgment on behalf of the player along the lines of one is likely to
have been Cerebrolysin and then record a yes in the Cerebrolysin column,
yet they did.
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xxxxxx recalls Thymosin being mentioned so yes, I think more than likely I
have had Thymosin. This is not an admission by xxxxxx that he had been
injected with Thymosin.
xxxxxxx recalls being injected at xxxxxx which is likely to have been
Cerebrolysin. This is not an admission by xxxxxx that he was administered
Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxxx recalls being injected up to 4 times, likely to be Cerebrolysin, He
said, Ill Ill give you another injection just into, like, side of my hip, sort of
thing. This is not an admission by xxxxxxx that he was administered
Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxx recalls an injection likely to be Cerebrolysin. Went into a room, yeah,
and got a, yeah, got a jab in, in, in the bum. This is not an admission by
xxxxxx that he was administered Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxx recalls that he may have been injected with AOD-9604, But I may
have, but, yes I couldnt - couldnt recall if I I certainly did, yeah. This is not
an admission by xxxxxx that he was administered AOD-9604.
xxxxxxx recalls receiving approximately 3 injections of Amino Acids I
received an injection, from what I can recall, in the glute, This is not an
admission by xxxxxx that he was administered Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxx recalls receiving and injection that is consistent with a Cerebrolysin
injection, And I that one stands out for me because I remember walking
out sore. This is not an admission by xxxxx that he was administered
Cerebrolysin.
xxxxx recalls that he was injected in his glute and suggests he may have
received Cerebrolysin. Yes, yes, it wasnt like a long lasting thing; it would be
like for 10, 15 seconds. This response doesnt constitute is not an admission
by xxxxx that he was administered Cerebrolysin.
xxxxxx recalls receiving two injections xxxxx that were likely to have been
Cerebrolysin. I know at the time like we were joking about it afterwards, like
apparently, Im pretty sure he said that the stuff that they were injecting was
pretty powerful and that it would kick start a dead horse, so. This is not an
admission by xxxxx that he was administered Cerebrolysin.
170. The above responses were recorded as a yes for various specific substances. In each
case, the name of the substance was suggested by the investigator. In some instances,
when a player could not even be prompted, ASADA decided that it was more likely than
not that a prohibited substance had been administered. ASADA was supposed to collect
evidence, not give and guess evidence.
171. It also needs to be reiterated that Thymosin was the only name used by Stephen Dank to
the players. The players were told Thymosin was a permitted substance. Dank used the
term Thymosin as the generic name for Thymosin Alpha 1 and Thymomodulin, which are
not banned. On 3 July 2012, ASADA lawyer Dr Stephen Watt sent an email to WADA in
which he also stated that Thymosin was the generic name for Thymomodulin. Despite
Watts words indicating that ASADA knew this, the investigators, without any supporting
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evidence, inexplicably testified on numerous occasions throughout the Interim Report
that Thymosin was Thymosin Beta-4. This impropriety or incompetence by the
investigators started on the sixth page of the Interim Report and was repeated so often it
undoubtedly influenced the AFLs general counsel Andrew Dillon.
172. It also needs to be reiterated that the other substances mentioned above, such as
Cerebrolysin were not prohibited substances.
173. Manipulating the media and public with an untrue story: On Tuesday evening, 16 July
2013, the Age newspaper published an article by Caroline Wilson in its on-line edition. The
article also appeared in the print edition of the Age on Wednesday morning 17 July 2013
under the heading, AFL warned Hird against peptides. Inter alia, Wilson said: The AFL
warned James Hird in late 2011 to not involve his players in a peptides program Sources
close to the joint investigation by ASADA and the AFL into Essendon have told Fairfax
Media that the AFL warning came after senior league officials had learnt that Hird had
been investigating the anti-doping status of certain peptides As the AFL-ASADA
investigation wraps up it has been alleged that the AFL told Hird to stay away from
peptides more than a year before
174. Wilsons claims were untrue. Someone involved in the investigation had provided
misinformation. Hird had attended a meeting at AFL House on 5 August 2011 with
Essendon general manager football operations, Paul Hamilton, and Essendon football
manager Danny Corcoran. The meeting was called by the AFLs integrity manager Brett
Clothier. ASADA investigator Paul Roland also attended the meeting. Hird claimed it was a
general discussion and that no warning was given. Roland, Hamilton and Corcorans
contemporaneous notes support Hirds position. Clothier had testified on 17 April 2013 to
the investigators and made no reference to having issued a warning to Hird.
175. Wilson had been given the story on Tuesday evening 16 July 2013 after an embarrassing
performance by Demetriou on Fox Footy 360. As ASADA and the AFL were conducting a
joint investigation they were both responsible for any leaks or disinformation given to the
media. As all peptides werent banned in 2011, and to this day are still not all banned, the
story has no foundation in truth. In the 713 days between the 5 August 2011 meeting and
the 16 July 2013, no one had ever suggested a warning was given at the meeting.
176. False evidence by AFL integrity manager Brett Clothier: Page 16 of the Interim Report
states On 5 August 2011, Hird was interviewed by ASADA and AFL Integrity Officers in
relation to his enquiry with the DCO [doping control officer]. At the conclusion of the
ASADA interview, The AFLs Manager Integrity Services re-iterated to Hird that peptides
were a serious risk to the integrity of the AFL, in the same category as steroids and HGH.
Mr Clothier told Mr Hird that peptides already appeared to be infiltrating other elite
sports in Australia and that [the AFL] we could be next. Mr Clothier also implored [Mr]
Hird to report to [the AFL] if he came across any information relating to peptides.
177. Clothiers so called evidence was in the form of an email, which was sent at 12:33pm on
17 July 2013. Although ASADA inexplicably didnt publish the full contents of such a crucial
email, and file notes, it claims the above comments by Clothier were part of the email.
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178. The investigators were guilty of misconduct in not only accepting an email from Clothier
as evidence but for the way it handled the email as detailed in clause 177 above. Clothier
was a de-facto member of the investigation team in that he was given access to every
witnesses evidence and was communicating with the investigators on almost a daily
basis. He was thus in a position to belatedly present evidence that contradicted witness
accounts, thus undermining those accounts.
179. Clothier was the only person allowed to submit an email as evidence. Neither Stephen
Dank nor James Hird would have been allowed to submit their evidence through an email.
180. Although Clothiers evidence was extremely damaging to Hird in the way it was used to
justify suspending him for 12 months, the latter was never recalled by the investigators to
give his version of what happened, unlike many others on other matters throughout the
investigation. To compound the misconduct, neither Paul Hamilton nor Danny Corcoran,
both of whom were not in agreement with Clothiers version of events, were recalled to
give their versions of what was said at the meeting to which his email refers.
181. ASADA was guilty of misconduct in accepting Clothiers evidence as fact, particularly as it
was provided under dubious circumstances late in the day, was not supported by any
other evidence, and was contrary to others views and notes on the meeting in question.
182. Andruska told Chip Le Grand in an interview on 23 January 2015 that I believed what he
[Hird] said [about the 5 August 2011 meeting with Clothier]. I accepted it and didnt
think any more about it. It was minor Clothiers testimony caused Hird a lot of damage
and here we have Andruska implying that Clothiers evidence was not only false but that it
being false was inconsequential. Andruskas careless attitude encapsulates ASADAs
improper and incompetent approach to the whole investigation.
183. Clothiers email was sent about 15 hours after Wilsons story appeared in the on-line
edition of the Age and about 12 hours after the story appeared in the printed edition. It
appears as if the email was sent by Clothier to the investigators to give some substance to
Wilsons inaccurate and damaging story.
184. Clothiers email was submitted 713 days after the meeting on 5 August 2011. In the
intervening period, no mention was made of Clothier imploring Hird to do anything. No
one claimed before the 5 August 2011 that all peptides were banned and no one since has
claimed all peptides were banned.
185. Clothiers claim that [all] peptides were a serious risk to the integrity of the AFL, in the
same category as steroids and HGH was factually untrue. All steroids and Human Growth
Hormones (HGH) are banned but many peptides are not banned, which means they are
not in the same category. For example, Thymosin Alpha 1 and Thymomodulin are peptides
and they are not banned. Clothier knew that all peptides were not banned and he knew
that they werent in the same category as steroids and HGH, so why would he have told
Hird they were? ASADA was aware Clothier wasnt telling the truth yet it accepted his
email and allowed it to be used against Hird.
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186. As Clothiers email was constructed 713 days after the 5 August 2011 meeting, perhaps he
had forgotten that Hamilton and Corcoran also had attended the meeting and would be
able to contradict his version of events. Hamilton, not Hird, was the senior Essendon
executive at the meeting and Clothier had asked him to bring Hird along to the meeting. If
a warning had been issued, Clothier would have issued it to Hamilton or to all three
Essendon officials, but certainly not just to Hird.
187. Hird testified on 16 April 2013. Inter alia, there was discussion on what was said at the 5
August 2011 meeting. Hird said it was a general chat and his version of what was said is
totally different from Clothiers.
188. An ASADA employee attended the meeting with Clothier, Hamilton, Hird and Corcoran
and his recollection is also totally different from Clothiers. On page 56 of the Interim
Report it states (regarding Hirds enquiry to ASADA about peptides): According to the
ASADA file note Mr Hird stated that he had never heard of the substance before and the
opportunity arose to ask ASADA testing staff on the day of the mission on his club on
26.7.11. Mr Hird reiterated that he had no knowledge of the substance whatsoever and
was simply making inquiries to satisfy the original question put to him. A general
discussion then followed covering off on ASADAs belief that various forms of peptides
were increasingly being detected by Customs and other agencies and that the products
were banned in sport. (ASADA file note Hird and the ASADA official both describe the
meeting as a general chat/discussion whereas Clothier belated evidence was that Hird was
given a specific warning and instructions.)
189. Although Hird had no responsibilities within the football department, these inaccurate
comments were used against him, and undoubtedly contributed significantly to the AFL
demanding he stand aside for twelve months.
190. It is inexplicable that the email was accepted as evidence. It was extremely damaging to
Hird. Clothiers evidence not only was different from the ASADA official who attended
the meeting, but it was different from the contemporaneous notes taken by Essendons
general manager football operations Paul Hamilton, and Danny Corcoran.
Understandably, as Clothiers notes were made 713 days after the meeting, possibly he
couldnt recall Hamilton and Corcoran attending the meeting. Clothier claimed he told
Hird all peptides were banned. As I write three years later, still all peptides are not
banned.
Corrupted Investigation
191. Brett Clothier was a de-facto investigator. He was involved in regular discussions with the
investigators and was given access to all witnesses testimonies. In an extraordinary
decision, on 17 April 2013 Clothier was allowed to give evidence to the investigation.
Thus, he turned from a de-facto investigator to a witness, while having been pre-armed
with what other witnesses had said. This action corrupted the entire investigation. To
compound the irreparable damage to the integrity of the investigation, at 12.33pm, on 17
July 2013, Clothier, having resumed his role as a de-facto investigator, decided to play
witness again and sent an email to the investigation. It is crucial to note that the players
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and staff were warned not to discuss their evidence with each other but Clothier, who
believed the players were guilty, was given every ones evidence to consider before he
testified.
192. Instructions from Demetriou (24 July 2013 - clause 83) and McLachlan (26 June 2013 82)
and Clothier (clause 103 xvii & xviii) to ASADA officials as to what should, and shouldnt,
be in the interim report also corrupted the investigation.
ASADA Withheld Information
193. An investigator has a legal obligation to present all the evidence whether it helps him/her
or not. The ASADA investigators failed on numerous occasions to include all the evidence.
Inter alia:
193.1.
On 26 June 2013, then AFL deputy, now chief executive, Gillon McLachlan, told
ASADA to take bits out that may compromise what we need.
193.2.
On 24 July 2013, then AFL chief executive, Andrew Demetriou told Andruska that
two or three things cannot afford to be made public.
193.3.
ASADA omitted possibly vital information from Clothiers email of 17 July 2013,
in which he alleged he told Hird all peptides were banned.
193.4.
ASADA omitted from the interim report Clothiers contemporaneous notes from
his 5 August 2011 meeting with Hamilton, Corcoran, Hird and ASADAs Paul
Roland.
193.5.
ASADA only included an extract from Rolands contemporaneous notes taken at

the 5 August 2011 meeting.
193.6.
ASADA claimed Shane Charter lodged customs declaration forms but didnt
produce such evidence in the interim report.
193.7.
Although ASADA included numerous emails and SMSs from Stephen Dank to
Shane Charter it didnt include an email or SMS that indicated that Dank ordered
substances from Charter. This suggests that no such email or SMS existed, or any
email or SMS that did exist was omitted because it did not match the negative
narrative being written by ASADA.
193.8.
ASADA interviewed 46 Essendon players. It recorded responses from 46 players

to questioning about which substances were taken. However, it only recorded
responses from 45 players to questioning about Thymosin. Jobe Watsons
response to questioning about Thymosin was omitted from the interim report.
As Watson was the only player who described the label on the bottle and as he
was the only player who made a distinction in his interview between the
permitted version of Thymosin and the banned version of Thymosin it is difficult
to come to any conclusion other than that ASADA deliberately omitted Watsons
evidence.
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193.9.
New Essendon chief executive Xavier Campbell, Dr Reid and James Hird all claim
that ASADA omitted vital evidence from them from the interim report.
194. There was a misuse of player consent forms. Either through wilful misconduct or
incompetence, ASADA accepted that Essendon chairman David Evans found the player
consent forms and that they were what influenced him to self-report. The truth is that
Hird found them 24 hours after Evans claimed he found them, which means the forms had
no part in Evans allegedly self-reporting. ASADA determining that Evanss version and
not Hirds was accurate undermined Hirds credibility.
Cherry Picking
195. Although ASADA included selective, damaging extracts from the Switkowski Report in its
Interim Report, it failed to include comments which indicated Hirds consistent statements
within the club that any supplement program could not be allowed to breach WADA or
the AFLs Anti-Doping codes. Inter alia, Switkowski said: The fitness strategy was
appropriately, bounded by instructions that all practices being compliant with the relevant
codes. The football department set a course of pushing to the legal limits, but clear
instructions were given to not cross the line and to stay within the WADA and ASADA
codes. Following concerns about the program in January, the Senior Coach reasserted the
principles about the supplement program that:
Any supplement must be WADA and ASADA compliant;

It must not be harmful to players health;
Players must be properly informed about anything entering their bodies, and
Every product was to be cleared by the doctor.
Selective use of Stephen Danks Media Interviews

196. The Interim Report included a few quotes from Dank and an interviewer in television and
newspaper interviews. One quote even included a claim made by an ABC reporter of an
alleged comment made by Dank off-air. Some of the comments made by the
interviewers were detrimental to Dank and Hird. Comments to the media should not have
been used as evidence. Accepting selective comments by journalists as evidence was
beyond the pale. Dank made many comments in the media in which he denied ever using
Thymosin Beta-4 at Essendon but ASADA didnt include those in the Interim Report. Such
comments would not support the case ASADA was trying to build against Essendon, Hird
and Dank.
197. ASADA was also aware Dank testified under oath in 2012 to the ACC that he didnt use
Thymosin Beta-4 at Essendon. Newspapers reported this fact on a number of occasions. If
ASADA werent biased, and if werent trying to create a case against Hird, why wouldnt it
have included a mention of Danks denial to the ACC. If the ACC had evidence that Dank
lied under oath, presumably it would have prosecuted him by now.
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Investigation of Human Resource Practices outside its Charter
198. ASADA widened its investigation to examine human resource practices at Essendon. As it
transpires, ASADA only made a case against James Hird, Mark Thompson and Danny
Corcoran. General manager Paul Hamilton and the Essendon board were not even
mentioned because ASADA chose either not to look at, or to ignore, the Essendon Football
Club organisational structure, the job descriptions, and the Victorian Occupation Health
and Safety Act. Paul Hamilton, who insisted everything to do with the supplements
programme had to come across his desk, acknowledging his supervisory responsibility for
the supplements program, is currently employed by the AFL.
Whether deliberately or through incompetence, ASADA overlooked the AFLs OH&S
responsibilities
199. Once ASADA decided to investigate, and assign responsibility for OH&S breaches, it was
morally required to investigate all parties with OH&S responsibilities at Essendon. The AFL
had at least four agreements that carried governance and legal occupational, health and
safety responsibilities to the Essendon Football Club and its players:
199.1.
The bi-lateral agreement it had with Essendon Football Club to compete in the
competition.
199.2.
The tripartite agreement it had with Essendon and each player.
199.3.
The bi-lateral agreement it had with the Australia Sports Commission in its
capacity as a national sporting organisation (NSO).
199.4.
The agreement with ASADA and its responsibilities under its own anti-doping
code
199.5.
Additionally, the AFL commissioners had onerous statutory obligations under the
Corporations Act. Simply put, the AFL had similar occupational, health and safety,
and duty of care responsibilities, to each player at Essendon as the Essendon
board. AFL chief executive, Andrew Demetriou, acknowledged this when he said:
The AFL has a duty to all its stakeholders that we look after our players.
ASADA and the AFL did nothing to stop the Essendon players taking what ASADA and the AFL
believed were dangerous, life-threatening banned substances
200. The AFL has stated that they believed for 15 plus months that the Essendon players were
taking dangerous banned substances; yet its officers did nothing. The moment the AFL
suspected the players were being administered (possibly dangerous) banned substances it
should have immediately demanded demonstrable assurances from Essendon that such
practices were not taking place, reminded players that they must make informed
decisions about what is administered to them as they will be held accountable for any
breaches of the anti-doping rules, and put in place oversight procedures until they were
comfortable there was no wrongdoing. If wrong-doing, or failures in OH&S governance
procedures were uncovered, action should immediately have been taken against the club,
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whether through direct penalty, or referral to ASADA. Contrary to their OH&S and duty of
care responsibilities to the players, for the 15 months that they supposedly believed
Essendon was administering banned substances, AFL officials were content to allow the
players to continue to take what they believed might have been life threatening
substances, without any intervention.
Manipulated and Misrepresented Thymosin-Beta-4 Assessment
201. The most important, in fact the only, task that fell within ASADAs brief and statutory
investigatory rights, was to ascertain whether there was any evidence that Essendon
players were administered WADA prohibited substances. Soon realising there was no
other possible anti-doping infringement, this came to mean Thymosin Beta-4 only. When
contacted by the AFL CEO, Andrew Demetriou, in late January 2013, Essendon FC was
certain that the players hadnt transgressed, and in good faith, and on the confiding
advice of Demetriou, placed themselves in ASADAs hands expecting they would be
treated fairly. This faith was misplaced. Misleading comments by ASADA throughout the
Interim Report provide convincing evidence that ASADA was determined that the AFL be
able to obtain a conviction and impose penalties where they had been predetermined,
irrespective of whether there was sufficient proof of guilt.
202. It took only five pages into the report to identify impropriety by ASADA on this issue.
ASADA quoted part of a Dank SMS to Robinson in which he stated: Dont forget how
important Thymosin is. ASADA followed the quote from the SMS with a comment of its
own: Thymosin Beta-4 is a WADA prohibited S2 category peptide. Dank had not
mentioned Thymosin Beta-4. Once again ASADA was testifying in its own investigation,
and falsely.
203. The position the ASADA investigators chose to present as fact differed substantially from
the experts position at head office. On 3 July 2012, ASADA lawyer Dr Stephen Watt sent
an email to WADA in which he stated unequivocally that Thymosin was also known as
Thymomodulin, which was not banned. It is inconceivable that ASADA investigators would
not be aware of this fact. Furthermore, on page 35 of the Interim Report ASADA stated:
No invoice has been located to support the proposition that Como Compounding
Pharmacy supplied Essendon FC with Thymomodulin (Thymosin) [my emphasis]. The
level of incompetence suggested by any such ignorance or inconsistency would itself
make any findings of the investigation unsafe and therefore invalid. The possibility of
gross incompetence aside, it is difficult not to believe that the distortion of Danks texts
and emails was designed to support desired outcomes of the investigation. The false
recording of Danks answer as Thymosin Beta 4 supported a suggestion of guilt.
204. There are two substances with Thymosin in the name. Thymosin Alpha which is not
banned. The second substance is called Thymosin Beta-4, which is a WADA prohibited
substance. A third variant called Thymomodulin is also not banned, as ASADA knew.
ASADA had no evidence that when Dank mentioned Thymosin in his SMS that he was
referring to Thymosin Beta-4.
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205. ASADA has stated unambiguously that Thymosin Beta-4 was administered to the players
despite there being no evidence to support the statement:
205.1.
There is no evidence that any mention by anyone at Essendon of Thymosin or

Peptide Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4
205.2.
There is no record of a compounding pharmacy, compounding Thymosin Beta-4;
205.3.
There is no record of anyone supplying Thymosin Beta-4 to Stephen Dank;
205.4.
There is no record of Dank supplying Thymosin Beta-4 to Essendon;
205.5.
There is no record of anyone invoicing Essendon for Thymosin Beta-4;
205.6.
There is no record of Essendon paying anyone for supplying Thymosin Beta-4;
205.7.
There is no record of anyone administering Thymosin Beta-4 to any Essendon

player;
205.8.
There is no record of anyone witnessing anyone administering Thymosin Beta-4

to any Essendon player;
205.9.
There is no record of any Essendon player admitting to having been administered

Thymosin Beta-4.
205.10. The Interim Report did, however, state: [Dean] Robinson emailed Dr Reid a list
of supplements to be administered between the mid-year bye and the 2012
Grand Final, which included Thymomodulin weekly. Yes, Thymomodulin, which
was NOT WADA prohibited.
206. Even if any a record of Stephen Dank being supplied with Thymosin Beta-4 did exist, it
would prove nothing regarding the players, as Dank was also in private practice and there
is no legal prohibition to administering the supplement to anyone not playing competitive
sport.
Improper or Incompetent Human Resource Assessment
207. Inexcusably, ASADA implied that James Hird, Mark Thompson, Dr Reid and Danny
Corcoran were responsible for all governance and human resource breaches at Essendon
in relation to this matter. This was clearly false. If ASADA had referred to the Act, Hird and
Thompson would not even have been mentioned. Hird and Thompson were on a different
branch of the organisation structure to Hamilton, Robinson, Dr Reid and Dank. Robinson
was responsible for designing the programme and Hamilton had the final say on its
implementation.
208. The Victorian OH&S Act, the various contracts the AFL had with Essendon, the Essendon
organisation structure all deem that the nine AFL commissioners, plus McLachlan,
Clothier, Anderson, Dr Harcourt and the AFLs human resource director, the Essendon
board members, plus Paul Hamilton, Dean Robinson, Dr Reid, Dr De Morton and the
Essendon human resources manager all had more governance responsibilities than Hird,
Thompson and Corcoran.
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209. ASADA also claimed that Essendon:
209.1.
Disregarded standard practices involving the human resource department when

employing Dean Robinson and Stephen Dank.
This was factually untrue. Essendons human resources manager Hailey Grimes,
said after the departure of Stuart Cormack, the football department approached
her about running a recruitment process for the high performance coach. In
response to the recruitment drive, Grimes said the club received upward of 100
applicants. Robinson was not initially considered for the position, as he had been
engaged by the Gold Coast Suns Football Club. Approximately 10 12 applicants
were short listed for interview from which three preferred candidates were
identified. Thompson said Robinson was not the first choice for the Essendon
role. The club tried to recruit one person who took a similar role at another AFL
club. The other two preferred candidates were unable to take up the position
due to a current contractual arrangement. Thompson said: We didnt ring
Robinson for probably another five or six weeks [until] after these people fell
through. Having failed to land its preferred candidate, Essendon was entitled to
approach someone from outside its original list of applicants. As Robinson had
worked for Thompson at Geelong FC for four years, and as they had won two
premierships together, Thompson pushed for Robinson to be offered the job and
was Robinsons first referee. Essendon assistant coach Brendan McCartney also
worked with Robinson at Geelong in a different capacity from Thompson and
was able to bring a different perspective to the table. McCartney acted as a
second referee for Robinson and was very supportive of his appointment.
209.2.
Failed to conduct routine systematic pre-employment checks in respect of Dean

Robinson and Stephen Dank.
This comment is further evidence that the investigators werent qualified to
investigate human resource matters or that they were intentionally distorting
the facts. Robinson had been poached from Geelong FC by the AFL owned Gold
Coast Suns (Suns). It appears Thompson was qualified to give a reference to the
AFL for Robinson, but wasnt qualified to give a reference to Essendon for
Robinson. Essendon, quite appropriately, assumed that the AFL had conducted
routine, systematic pre-employment checks before employing Robinson at the
Suns. As Robinson was still employed by the Suns, Essendon believed, perfectly
reasonably, he was still a man of good standing as he undoubtedly was when
first employed by the AFL.
Dank was also employed at the AFL owned Gold Coast Suns. Essendon, quite
appropriately, assumed that the AFL had conducted routine, systematic preemployment checks before employing Dank. Dank reported directly to Robinson
at the Suns and Robinson was very satisfied with his work and character and
pushed hard to bring a number of members of his team at the Gold Coast to
Essendon. This was standard practice. Essendon was entitled to use Robinson as
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its principle referee, combined with the earlier actions of the AFL in employing
Dank as virtual second reference.
Although Danks contract was terminated by the Gold Coast Suns, the Suns
offered no explanation for the termination at the termination meeting, which
was attended by Essendon staffers Robinson and Jonah Oliver. Failing to inform
Dank the reasons for his termination was a governance failure by the AFL. Given
the AFLs refusal to nominate a reason for the termination, Robinson and Oliver
were entitled to believe that the AFL had no serious concerns about Dank. As it
transpires, the only negative evidence produced against Dank by ASADA was that
he allegedly criticised the Gold Coast Suns coach to outsiders. The Interim
Report indicated that Dank believed he was terminated because the Suns
thought he made enquiries about joining the Brisbane Lions.
209.3.
Failed to ensure that persons with the necessary integrity, reputation and
training were engaged by EFC to implement the Program.
ASADA was either improper or incompetent in making this claim. The AFL had
employed Robinson and Dank at the Gold Coast Suns. ASADA either made the
allegation in ignorance of their qualifications for the job and their immediately
previous employment with the AFL, or it was aware and chose to ignore the
significance of their background. Obviously, the AFL would not have employed
Robinson and Dank in the same positions as they were employed at Essendon if
they didnt have the necessary integrity, reputation, training, and qualifications.
The only difference was they had 12 months more experience, which Essendon
interpreted as a good thing. In his report, Switkowski said: Both the head of the
[High] Performance Unit [Dean Robinson] and the sports scientist [Stephen Dank]
appeared to have credible qualifications in the sports science field and long
periods of relevant experience in elite sport.
210. ASADAs conclusions were blatantly wrong, ASADAs investigators were either
incompetent and did not have the necessary qualifications to investigate human resources
and OH&S; or were guilty of distorting the information before them; or both, as seems
most likely from all the errors of fact in their Interim Report, and the totality of
improprieties in the modus operandi of the investigation.
Contamination of Evidence
211. By making an agreement on 20 February 2013 with the AFL, and revealed to the players,
not to penalise the players provided they co-operated with the investigation, ASADA
compromised and potentially contaminated the evidence provided by the players. It was
in their interest to answer questions - frequently leading questions - in whatever way they
thought the investigators might be wanting. ASADA investigator Aaron Walker said in his
affidavit that at the start of each interview: I then gave my introduction, during which I
drew attention to the nature of ASADAs investigation, the players obligations under the
Commonwealth criminal code, the benefits of providing substantial assistance, and I
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caution them as to how their information might be used by ASADA (this information had
previously been provided to the players). The reference to substantial assistance
implies that the offer made to the players by Paul Simonson on 20 February 2013 was still
in play - if they cooperated they wouldn't be penalised.
212. In his introduction at the start of each interview, Walker made no mention of their being a
secondary investigation on governance, and no one interviewed was told that there was a
possibility that the club and support staff could be punished by the AFL for any
governance failures.
Breach of Confidentiality
213. The ASADA Act and the ASADA Regulations contain provisions that protect personal
information obtained by ASADA in the carrying out of its statutory functions (see, for
example, Part 8, Division 2 of the ASADA Act.). Broadly speaking, before such information
can be disclosed by ASADA to third parties, it must be satisfied that the (confidentiality
and other) protections attaching to the information will continue to be observed by the
party receiving the information.
214. In an inexcusable breach of confidentiality, ASADA briefed Professor Gary Wittert about
Stephen Dank and asked him whether he agreed with its assessment. ASADA was not only
making allegations against Dank to a third party but was asking the third party to make a
moral judgment about Dank. This was an outrageous breach by ASADA of its
confidentiality obligations. ASADA broke the law in divulging such information to a third
party. Furthermore, Witterts negative comments about Dank, which, inexcusably, were
included in the interim report, could have influenced those sitting in judgment on
Essendon.
215. ASADA and the AFL breached the confidentiality provisions of the Act by leaking
information from their interviews, including to the media. Unconscionably, the AFL then
breached the confidentiality clauses further by including vast slabs of the report in its 34page charge sheet, which it released to the public on 13 August 2013, only to then make
only one charge against Essendon and members of its support staff, and that a charge
regarding governance, not a charge of breaching the anti-doping code.
216. Corrupting the Interim Report: ASADA asked the AFL chief medical officer Peter Harcourt
to draft aspects of the interim report. Peter need only say he is aware of the medical
condition of xxxxx. It all seems fairly reckless to me. ASADA breached its charter by
advising Peter Harcourt what he need only say.
Flawed Switkowski Report
217. Dr Ziggy Switkowski was commissioned by the Essendon Football Club to review its
procedures and processes and to recommend improvements if there were any shortcomings. It was supposed to be an internal document for Essendon use only. It was a
flawed report, but irrespective, it should not have been provided to ASADA in an
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investigation that was supposed to be uncovering breaches of the anti-doping code, not
governance issues.
218. The Switkowski Report was flawed and should not have been used by ASADA or the AFL as
evidence. First, Switkowskis lack of knowledge of a matrix organisation and his faulty
interpretation of the Essendon organisation structure suggests he wasnt qualified to
undertake such a task. Second, in Switkowskis own words the work was inevitably
constrained, in this case primarily by two factors:
218.1.
Firstly, there is a parallel review underway led by the AFL and ASADA into the
nature of supplements administered by the EFC during this period, and their
compliance or otherwise with various anti-doping codes. This was a no-go area
for this report. Questions about the pharmacology of certain supplements, their
possible performance affecting properties, compliance or otherwise with antidoping codes etc. are issues for the AFL and ASADA investigations, which still
have some way to go. This review and report needed to be conducted in a
manner careful not to inadvertently compromise their work.
218.2.
Secondly, a number of individuals key to a full analysis of this period have been
unavailable for interview.
219. There were other factors which contributed heavily to the report being flawed, but it is
worth highlighting two glaring problems with it becoming part of the ASADA investigatory
process, admitted to by Switkowski himself:
219.1.
Switkowski said As well, performance enhancing and image enhancing drugs,

their delivery processes, and legitimacy for elite sportspeople, fall well outside my
expertise.
219.2.
A number of individuals key to a full analysis of this period have been

unavailable for interview. How anyone could expect a report written without
having interviewed Stephen Dank or Dean Robinson?
219.3.
Only three current players were interviewed. It is impossible to make a

judgment on the basis of interviewing only three players.
219.4.
New suppliers were used outside the approved list of vendors. There was not a
list of approved vendors.
220. Prior to publication, Hird challenged the accuracy of a number of aspects of the report
and was promised his required changes would be made. Those changes were not made.
221. Despite his admission of seriously constraining factors, Switkowski made comments that
he couldnt support, or were outside his area of expertise. Inter alia, he said: In particular
the rapid diversification into exotic supplements, sharp increase in frequency of injections,
the shift to treatment offsite in alternative medicine clinics, emergence of unfamiliar
suppliers, marginalization of traditional medical staff etcetera combine to create a
disturbing picture of a pharmacologically experimental environment never adequately
controlled or challenged or documented within the Club in the period under review. This
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comment was used repeatedly by the media to harm Hird, despite it having no validity.
The entire choice of wording, including exotic supplements conjures up something
sinister.
221.1.
Emergence of unfamiliar suppliers is a disingenuous comment. Switkowski

wouldnt know a familiar supplier from an unfamiliar supplier and wouldnt be
able to tell you why it made any difference. Ironically, Switkowski is casting
aspersions on the character and trustworthiness of compounding pharmacist
Nima Alavi and supplier Shane Charter Charter, while they are the two people
whose words ASADA is relying upon to secure a conviction.
221.2.
Frequency of injections conjures up something sinister, yet the method of

administering a substance is irrelevant. Many people inject themselves twice a
day with blood thinners, and diabetics inject themselves daily. Vitamin B is often
injected, and so the list could go on. WADA doesnt have any rules on the
number of injections that a player can receive. Furthermore, having interviewed
only three players, Switkowski wouldnt know how many injections were given.
Public estimates by those who had no idea, and who shouldnt have been
commenting on the number of injections administered, varied greatly:
Demetriou suggested 10,000 plus; WADA president John Fahey estimated 3000
plus; and new ASADA chief executive Ben McDevitt guessed hundreds.
221.3.
Switkowski said supplements were outside his area of expertise and then
proceeded to offer a strong opinion. Switkowski wasnt qualified to use the term
pharmacologically experimental environment. Not only damaging to Hird in
the formal investigation, but the release of the above words caused him as much
damage in the publics mind, as the now seemingly bogus phone call to Eddie
McGuire, supposedly from an Essendon players distressed mother. It was
unprofessional and outrageous for Switkowski to claim it was an experimental
environment without even talking to Dank. Dank knew what supplements he
was using and the results he expected from the supplementation program. Dank
claims vigorously he was not experimenting. Switkowski provided no evidence to
the contrary in his report.
222. Inexplicably, occupational, health and safety was never mentioned in the executive
summary of the Switkowski report. The term AFL was used five times but it wasnt used
even once in reference to its governance or occupational, health and safety
responsibilities to the Essendon players. As the executive summary didnt canvass any of
the above, and failed governance was the charge finally laid against Essendon, Hird,
Thomson, Corcoran, and initially Dr Reid, the use of this flawed report against them,
particularly Hird, who was promised inaccuracies would be corrected, but they were not,
amounted to a denial of natural justice.
Investigators Lacked the Human Resource and OH&S Qualifications
223. The ASADA investigators were not qualified to investigate human resources and OH&S
matters. They did not have the qualifications or training:
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223.1.
They demonstrated that they didnt even know, or worse, were choosing to
ignore, what a matrix organisation is, let alone know how to interpret the
information. The investigators assessments of the Essendon organisation
structure were factually incorrect. Consequently, any reference to human
resources in the grounds to support the charge against the defendants is
unsafe, unsustainable and therefore invalid.
223.2.
The Victorian OH&S Act was never mentioned once, which indicates that the
investigators knew nothing about OH&S. Consequently, any reference, direct or
indirect, to OH&S issues in the grounds to support the charge is unsafe,
unsustainable and therefore invalid.
224. In the Interim Report, ASADA bolded 112 words/phrases/sentences it clearly wished to
emphasise within interviewees testimony, and yet acknowledged the bolding as its own
only seven times, making the rest seem as if the interviewee had stressed that particular
point.
225. Page 17 ASADA Interim Report stated: 23 August 2011 Dank sent Robinson a reminder by
SMS: Dont forget how important Thymosin is. This is going to be our vital cornerstone
next year. It is the ultimate assembly regulatory protein and biological modifier. Page 18
stated: Thymosin Beta 4 is a WADA prohibited S2 Category peptide. At the time Dank
sent the SMS, Robinson had been selected for the role of High Performance Coach at
Essendon Football Club.
This comment was full of innuendo that Dank and Robinson had sinister plans. However,
there was no evidence that the SMS had anything to do with Essendon, and consequently,
should not have been included.
225.1.
Danks use of the phrase our vital cornerstone indicates they were involved in
a joint venture. Robinson hadnt started work at Essendon at this stage and Dank
didnt even know a job existed at Essendon that he might have been qualified to
undertake. He wasnt interviewed until 28 September 2011. Therefore, there is
no evidence Dank was indicating it would be used at Essendon.
225.2.
ASADA is guilty of bias and misconduct by stating that Thymosin Beta-4 is a

WADA prohibited S2 category peptide. Dank didnt mention Thymosin Beta-4.
There is no evidence to support ASADAs implied claim that Thymosin is the same
substance as Thymosin Beta-4. This comment was tantamount to ASADA
testifying in its own investigation.
226. Page 18/19 ASADA Interim Report states: 28 September 2011 Dank was interviewed for
the role of sports scientist at EFC. The interview panel comprised Hird, Robinson, Assistant
Coach Mark Thompson, Football Manager Danny Corcoran and [General Manager] Football Operations Manager Paul Hamilton. It appears that no background checks were
conducted with Danks past employers before an offer of employment was made by EFC.
This is factually incorrect. ASADA used it to make a case against Hird:
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226.1.
Corcoran said (page 59 of the IR): He tasked Robinson to conduct background

checks with Hasler and was later given an assurance that this had been done. So I
walked out of the interview room and said: Right Hammer [Hamilton], Dean you
better check this bloke A week later on the training track I remember asking
him on the track, Did you check out with Hasler? He said, Yeah, yeah, Desi
really reckons hes fantastic and wants to repair the damage they had, the fallout
they had.
226.2.
As Dank worked for Robinson at the AFL owned Gold Coast Suns, and as they had
worked together at Manly Rugby League Club, Robinson was qualified to act as
the second referee.
226.3.
Essendon assumed that as the AFL would not have employed Dank at their club
(Gold Coast Suns) if he didnt have impeccable references, it would be all right to
hire him.
226.4.
This is another example of ASADA playing down Paul Hamiltons importance. His
title here was misrepresented by ASADA. Hamilton was in charge of the football
department. He was responsible for a $50 million budget. He was the only
person in this group on the Essendon executive committee.
227. Page 19 of the Interim Report states: 4 October 2011 Dank sent Robinson an SMS
advising that peptides didnt make the WADA list for next year. Robinson replied advising
Dank to check out [WADA Code] section SO [as] it may fall there. Dank then sent the
following SMSs: I have a little grey. But CJC-1295 probably doesnt.GHRP-6 doesnt fall
under that Thymosin and GPLC doesnt. Robinson suggested to Dank that they call them
amino acids or something? Or something of that kind? Dank replied, Yes that is all they
are. An amino acid blend. During the course of the 2012 season, players were liberally
administered amino acids, and amino acid blend and other unspecified substances. CJC1295 and GHRP-6 are WADA prohibited S2 Category peptides (as from 2004).
My comment: ASADA was supposed to be collecting evidence. By implying that there was
something sinister in Danks comment ASADA is testifying in its own investigation.
228. Page 89 of the Interim Report states: Mr Charter believes that the term Amino Acid is a
sufficiently generic term within the anti-aging industry that it could, technically be used
to describe a variety of peptides. Charter said: An amino acid is simply a sequence of you
know, of base proteins at a specific length so all peptides are in short, sequences of
amino acids.
My comment: ASADA never suggested that the Essendon players used CJC-1295 and
GHRP-6 so its mention here appears to imply the use of those substances by the players.
228.1.
ASADA was guilty of misconduct by stating that players were liberally

administered amino acids, and amino acid blend and other unspecified
substances. The use of the liberally is a misrepresentation. Page 203 of the IR
states: ASADA has recovered an itemised list of treatments provided to
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Essendon players at HyperMED. In total 34 players were listed and their
treatments itemised. Notably, the injection of Cerebrolysin and Amino Acids are
reflected in the document. Although only 21 of the 34 players were administered
Cerebrolysin, all 34 players were administered Amino Acid in some cases on up
to 12 occasions (viz Jake Melksham). In total, the combined playing group
received (according to the HyperMED invoice) 32 Cerebrolysin injections and 112
Amino Acid injections. It should be noted that some players have disputed the
accuracy of the invoices submitted by Dr Hooper. There is no other evidence of
the players being administered amino acids. The average number of amino acids
given to the players was 3 (112/34). Three amino acid injections per player is not
liberal administering.
228.2.
As there is no evidence that anyone at Essendon intended administering CJC1295 and GHRP-6, ASADA was being underhanded in stating that CJC-1295 and
GHRP-6 are WADA prohibited S2 Category peptides (as from 2004).
229. Page 20 of the Interim Report states: 26 November 2011 Charter travelled to China on
behalf of Dank to procure the raw materials for GHRP-6, CJC-1295 and IGF1-LR3.
My comment: There is no evidence that Charter travelled to China on behalf of Dank to
procure the raw materials for GHRP-6, CJC-1295 and IGF1-LR3.
229.1.
Although ASADA produced numerous irrelevant emails and SMSs from Dank to
Charter on a wide range of issues, it never produced a single email or SMS from
Dank to Charter ordering anything.
229.2.
On numerous occasions newspapers reported that Dank denied ordering

anything from Charter. ASADA didnt include Danks denials in the Interim
Report.
229.3.
ASADA never produced an invoice from Charter to Dank for any service allegedly
performed by Charter for Dank.
230. Page 21 of the Interim Report states: 2 December 2011: Charter returned to Melbourne
with the raw material for the peptides GHRP-6, CJC-1295, Thymosin Beta-4 and IGF1-LR3
all of which were declared by him at Customs.
My comment: Once again ASADA is testifying in its own investigation.
230.1.
ASADA didnt produce any evidence that Charter declared anything to Customs.
My understanding is that ASADA breached its Act by obtaining information from
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service. Its also arguable that
ASADA broke the law by sharing SMSs with the AFL that were obtained from the
ACC.
230.2.
ASADA didnt claim that Dank ordered Thymosin Beta-4, yet here ASADA is
implying Charter brought back Thymosin Beta-4 for Dank.
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230.3.
ASADA didnt produce an invoice as proof that Charter bought these substances
in China.
231. Page 21 of the Interim Report states: Charter states that he provided the substances to
Alavi who subsequently compounded them for supply to Dank.
My comment: ASADA is testifying in its own investigation.
231.1.
There is no evidence Charter provided the substances to Alavi.
231.2.
There is no evidence Alavi compounded the substances for Dank.
231.3.
There is no evidence Alavi supplied the substances to Dank.
232. Page 27 of the Interim Report states: 31 January 2012 Como Pharmacy sent Essendon FC
an invoice for various substances including Hexarelin and Peptide Thymosin. The
invoice recorded that on 10 January 2012 Essendon was supplied 14 vials of Hexarelin
with a further 7 vials supplied on 18 January 2012 in conjunction with 26 vials of Peptide
Thymosin believed to be Thymosin Beta-4. However, on a subsequent invoice dated 29
February 2012, both the Hexarelin and Peptide Thymosin costs were re-credited to the
Club and did not form part of the final amount ultimately paid by Essendon, under the
authority of Hamilton sometime after 11 April 2012.
My comment: ASADAs comment: Peptide Thymosin believed to be Thymosin Beta-4 is
an outrageous example of ASADA testifying in its own investigation. ASADA had no
reason, let alone evidence, to believe Peptide Thymosin was Thymosin Beta-4. It was a
deliberate attempt to create a case against Essendon.
232.1.
This invoice had nothing to do with the substances that Charter allegedly brought
into Australia on 2 December 2011.
232.2.
As this invoice was cancelled it is irrelevant and therefore should not have been
included here.
233. Page 29 of the Interim Report states: 8 13 February 2012 The vast majority of Essendon
players (38) signed Patient Information/Informed Consent forms relating to AOD-9604,
Thymosin, Colostrum and Tribulus. In signing the Patient Information/Informed Consent
forms, the players agreed to: 1 AOD-9604 injection once a week for the season; 1
Thymosin injection once a week for six weeks and then 1 injection per month; 2
Colostrum daily as per training week and 2 Colostrum post to the game. The dose may
vary according to training needs; 1 Tribulus Forte daily as per training week and 1 Tribulus
prior to the game. The dose may vary according to training needs. Thymosin-Beta 4 is a
WADA prohibited S2 category substance.
My comment: ASADA has corrupted the investigation and denied Hird procedural fairness
by stating gratuitously that Thymosin-Beta 4 is a WADA prohibited S2 category substance.
233.1.
Thymosin Beta-4 was not mentioned in the Patient Information/Informed

Consent forms so ASADA should not have referred to it here.
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233.2.
There was no evidence that Thymosin was Thymosin Beta-4.
233.3.
ASADA was acting underhandedly by implying that Thymosin was Thymosin Beta4.
233.4.
ASADA was obviously trying to create a case a case against Essendon and Hird
where no case existed.
233.5.
The evidence has been so polluted it would be a great injustice to use it in any
hearing.
234. Page 29 of the Interim Report states: Some Colostrum products reportedly contain
Insulin Growth Factor 1 (IGF1) which is a WADA prohibited S2 Category substance.
My comment: Reportedly contain Insulin Growth Factor 1 (IGF1) is an unacceptable
comment. ASADA knew Colostrum was not banned. ASADA was acting underhandedly in
linking IGF1 with Colostrum and then stating it was banned.
234.1.
ASADA was testifying in its own investigation.
234.2.
ASADA had no evidence to support its claimed commencement date of the

program.
235. Page 29 of the Interim Report states: AOD-9604 and Thymosin were to be administered
by injection. If the dosages outlined in the Patient Information/Informed Consent forms
had been achieved, more than 1500 injections of the substances would have been
administered to the playing group during the 2012 season.
235.1.
If my aunty had testicles she would be my uncle. ASADAs comment proves the
investigators werent qualified to conduct such an investigation. It is
incomprehensible that the investigators were unaware that courts or hearings
deal in facts not in hypotheticals.
235.2.
ASADA had no evidence to support its claim that the supplementation

programme started on 8 February 2012. Consequently, the projected dosages
were fabricated. As it transpired, according to Dank, 20 players received a total
of 40 AOD-9604 injections. Furthermore, as AOD-9604 was not banned it is
irrelevant how many dosages were intended to be given.
235.3.
During the investigation five players admitted being administered Thymosin

injections. Six players thought they may have been. As the estimated dosages
were calculated on 38 players being administered Thymosin, the projected
figures were irrelevant. ASADA was underhanded in including the projected
figures.
236. Page 29 of the Interim Report states: Colostrum and Tribulus Forte were to be
administered orally. If the dosages outlined in the Patient Information/Informed Consent
forms had been achieved, more than 8000 doses of Tribulus and 16,500 doses of
Colostrum would have administered to the playing group during the 2012 season. (4
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based on a daily dosage of 1 tablet from 8 February to 1 September 2012 and 2 tablets of
Colostrum per day for the same period.
My comment: Neither Colostrum nor Tribulus Forte is a banned substance so the dosages
are irrelevant. Consequently, from WADA and ASADAs perspective, the players could take
as many as they liked.
236.1.
Although ASADA did not know the intended commencement date of the
administering of these substances it arbitrarily chose 8 February 2012 to
calculate its figures. As ASADA claimed only a handful of players had even signed
the consent form by 8 February 2012, ASADA was knowingly fabricating the
figures.
236.2.
As ASADA did not ask the players when they first started taking these substances
it obviously had no interest in estimating the correct number of intended
dosages
236.3.
ASADA should have found out from the supplier when it delivered the
substances.
237. Page 33 of the Interim Report states: 22 April 2012 Players underwent a range of
treatments at HyperMed, 643 Chapel Street South Yarra. treatment included injections
of Cerebrolysin and amino acid. Patient files maintained by HyperMED record 32
Cerebrolysin injections and 112 amino acid injections being administered to the playing
group. Page 34: All injections were administered by Chiropractor, Dr Malcolm Hooper. The
amino acid used for the injections had been sourced by Dr Hooper from a patient who had
purchased it over-the-counter from a Mexican chemist.
My comment: The amino acid was not sourced from a Mexican chemist and it is
unforgivable that ASADA made such a claim. ASADA had no evidence to support its claim.
The substance was bought in El-Paso, which is in the United States of America. ASADAs
false claim was leaked to the media and caused Essendon and Hird immeasurable
damage.
238. Page 34 of the Interim Report states: 15 June 2012 Robinson emailed Dr Reid a list of
supplements to be administered between the mid-year bye and the 2012 Grand Final
which included Thymomoduline (sic) weekly: two days pre-game; Cerebrolysin: two mil
split fortnightly two days before the game; and two monthly intravenous immune
booster.
My comment: Thymomodulin is not a banned substance. The injections were due to start
in June 2012, yet the figures mentioned in clause 171 were calculated by ASADA on an 8
February start. This is further evidence of unacceptable behaviour by ASADA.
239. Page 35 of the Interim Report states: No invoice has been located to support the
proposition that Como Compounding Pharmacy supplied Essendon FC with
Thymomodulin (Thymosin) [my emphasis]. However, the club did receive an invoice
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from Como Compounding Pharmacy for Peptide Thymosin but the transaction was
later reversed (debit to credit) before being removed from the invoice altogether.
My comment: On this occasion ASADA has stated unequivocally that Thymomodulin and
Thymosin are the same substance. On previous occasions ASADA has implied, without any
evidence, that Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4.
239.1.
The investigators stating that Thymomodulin is Thymosin concurs with ASADAs

Dr Stephen Watts understanding. On 3 July 2012 Watts sent an email to WADA
in which he stated unequivocally that Thymosin was the same product as
Thymomodulin.
239.2.
ASADA showed its bias by stating that: no invoice has been located to support
the proposition that Como Compounding Pharmacy supplied Essendon FC with
Thymomodulin (Thymosin). This is a disingenuous comment by ASADA. There
is also no record of Como Compounding Pharmacy having supplied Thymosin
Beta-4 but ASADA chose not to testify to that effect.
239.3.
To date, no supplier of Thymosin Beta-4 to Essendon has been identified.
240. Page 39 of the Interim Report states: The purpose of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC
The Code) and the World Anti-Doping Program is to protect the athletes fundamental
right to participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health fairness and equality for
athletics worldwide; and ensure harmonised, coordinated and effective anti-doping
programs at the international and national level with regard to detection, deterrence and
prevention of doping. The WADC is the fundamental and universal document upon which
the world anti-doping program in sport is based. Page 40: The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisations, International Convention against Doping in Sport
(the UNESCO Convention) requires signatories to implement arrangements that are
consistent with the principles annunciator do in the WADC. The Australian Governments
commitment to the UNESCO convention is evidenced by The Australian Sports AntiDoping Authority Act 2006 (ASADA Act); The Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority
Regulations 2006 (ASADA Regulations); and The National Anti-Doping Scheme (the NAB
scheme or NADS). The AFL is a National Sporting Organisation and is required to have in
place, maintain and enforce anti-doping policies and practices that comply with the
mandatory provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code and International Standards; and
the National Anti-Doping (NAD) scheme.
My comment: The deal done between ASADA, the federal government and the AFL (see
paragraph ) not to ban players they believed to have taken banned substances was a clear
breach by ASADA and the AFL of their legal obligations.
241. Page 47 of the Interim Report states: On Tuesday 5 February 2013, David Evans,
Chairman of EFC convened a media conference at AFL headquarters. Evans was
accompanied by the clubs CEO Ian Robson and senior coach James Hird. During that
media conference, Evans advised that: Over the last 48 hours, Essendon have received
information about supplements that have been given to our players as part of the fitness
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program. And further: The information weve gathered over the course of the last 24-48
hours is slightly concerning and we want to dig a bit deeper. But we want some experts to
help us do that. In response to Evans request for expert assistance, the AFL and Australian
Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) agreed to conduct a joint investigation.
My comment: Evanss evidence implies Essendon self-reported. This is untrue and ASADA
knew it was untrue. ASADAs comment: In response to Evanss request for expert
assistance, the AFL and Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) agreed to
conduct a joint investigation was also untrue.
241.1.
ASADA and the AFL had not only agreed to conduct a joint investigation prior to
the 5 February 2013 meeting but they had already started the investigation. On 1
February 2013, Brett Clothier spoke to ASADA chief executive Aurora Andruska
about conducting a joint investigation. Clothier pointed out that the AFL rules
compelled the players to cooperate under threat of sanction, whereas ASADA did
not have that power. At approximately 12pm on 5 February 2013, Clothier told
McLachlan, Essendon (then) Chairman David Evans, Essendon (then) chief
executive Ian Robson, and senior coach James Hird, there will be a joint
investigation. Clothier later sent an email to ASADA chief investigator John
Nolan, which said: I told them that there would be a joint investigation
between ASADA and the AFL. [my emphasis].
241.2.
ASADA and the AFL went along with this faade in the hope it may help reduce
any penalty imposed on Essendon.
242. Page 47 of the Interim Report: The investigation has sought to establish whether players
and support persons from EFC used substances or engaged in methods prohibited by the
World Anti-Doping Authority (WADA) and the AFLs Anti-Doping Code.
My comment: ASADAs comment was untrue by omission. ASADA and the AFLs
investigators also investigated governance issues at Essendon, which was outside the
parameters of the ASADA Act. The Act did not empower ASADA to investigate such
matters as whether Essendon checked job applicants references. Incomprehensibly,
ASADA devoted over 6000 words in the Interim Report to this issue. This secret, secondary
investigation was done at the behest of the AFL in order to build a case against James Hird
and the support staff. ASADA and the AFL had declared them guilty on 9 February 2013,
which was five days before the first witness was interviewed.
243. Page 51 of the Interim Report states: On 5 February 2013, Hird revealed that he attended
the club very early, to try and find to just try and find anything [in the office of the High
Performance Coach, Dean Robinson], or anything that could prove AOD-9604 was
approved, to try and find this WADA document. Following an unsuccessful search, Hird
spoke with Robson before approaching Robinson seeking the WADA approval. Robinson
did not have it.
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My comment: Hird also testified that he attended the club early to try and find the Patient
Information/Informed Consent forms, which he did. It is difficult to understand why Hirds
was omitted and Evanss inaccurate evidence was included.
244. Page 53 of the Interim Report states: Given the scope of ASADAs investigation, the
allegation that Demetriou breached ACC secrecy provisions has limited relevance. Whilst
the ACC was notified of Hirds allegation, it is outside ASADAs remit to investigate such
matters. The re-interview of Evans on 17 April 2013 was intended to affirm his position on
when key officials became aware of problems with the supplement program and what
they understood the problem to be. On those issues, ASADA considers Evanss evidence to
be well settled.
My comment: This disingenuous comment by ASADA is further proof of its bias.
244.1.
Resolving this issue would have helped clarify whether Demetriou was telling the
truth or whether Hird was telling the truth.
244.2.
ASADA re-interviewed Evans in an attempt to clarify the situation.
244.3.
Incomprehensively, ASADA either did not ask Dr Reid and Danny Corcoran what
was said at the 4 February 2013 meeting or ASADA did and omitted their
evidence. If it were important enough to re-interview Evans, it was vital that Dr
Reid and Corcoran were also re-interviewed. ASADA was either biased or
incompetent in not doing so.
244.4.
ASADAs statement that ASADA considers Evans evidence to be well settled is

another example of ASADA testifying in its own investigation. The implication of
ASADA supporting Evans was that Hird was wrong. This unconscionable
comment undermined Hird.
245. Page 58 of the Interim Report states: During the course of the investigation, there has
been considerable speculation about the level of influence exerted by Thompson during
the recruitment of staff for the High Performance Unit.
My comment: This was a further attempt by ASADA to undermine Thompson and was part
of its attempt to create a case against him.
245.1.
Thompson wasnt involved in the recruitment of the majority of the High

Performance Unit personnel.
245.2.
The statement proves the investigators werent qualified to investigate human

resources matters. The decision to appoint Robinson was made by a committee
of Hamilton, Corcoran, Hird and Thompson. The decision to appoint Dank was
made by a committee of Hamilton, Robinson, Corcoran, Hird and Thompson. Its
irrelevant who spoke the loudest or who spoke the longest or who marshalled
the best arguments. The committees made unanimous decisions to appoint
Robinson and Dank on the respective occasion.
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246. Page 73 of the Interim Report states: Grimes stated that ordinarily the HR Department
would conduct background and reference checks on prospective employees. However, in
the case of Dank the HR Department was completely excluded from the employment
process, she doubted reference checks were ever conducted. Notably, Grimes revealed
that Essendon have since rolled out a fully comprehensive background checking process
for everyone, a process which she asserts should have always existed. The evidence of
other witnesses validates the concerns Ms Grimes expressed regarding Mr Danks preemployment checks.
My comment: ASADA suggesting Grimes doubted reference checks were ever
conducted is proof she didnt know whether reference checks were conducted.
246.1.
Grimess comment that Essendon have since rolled out a fully comprehensive
background checking process for everyone, a process which she asserts should
have always existed means she was running an imperfect system at the time of
the appointments. The board, Robson, Hamilton and Grimes were responsible
for inadequate human resources systems, not Hird and Thompson.
246.2.
ASADAs comment that The evidence of other witnesses validates the concerns
Grimes expressed regarding Danks pre-employment checks is another example
of ASADA testifying in its own investigation.
246.3.
It is incomprehensible that ASADA would make such a statement without naming

the other witnesses and without tabling their evidence.
246.4.
It is beyond belief that ASADA thought the Act enabled it to investigate such
matters. This part of the investigation was just ASADAs attempt to create a case
against Hird and Thompson.
246.5.
Robinson told ASADA investigators that although he did not conduct background
checks on Dank, he knew of several people that (sic) could have been
approached including Professor Deon Venter and Des Hasler, former Head Coach
of Manly Warringah Rugby League Football Club The Sea Eagles.
246.6.
Corcoran testified (paragraph) that Robinson conducted a background check with

Des Hasler.
247. Page 73 of the Interim Report states: A simple check of Google would have also revealed
concerns that arose during Danks time at Manly Warringah Rugby League Football Club
(2004-2010)
My comment: This statement is proof that the investigators were incompetent and knew
nothing about human resources. It is incomprehensible that ASADA thought google was
an acceptable source.
248. Page 91 of the Interim Report states: The investigation established that Dank regularly
advised Essendon players that they were being injected with amino acids. The term
amino acids can be used to describe a large variety of substances and the use of such
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vague terminology will often disguise the true nature of the supplement being dispensed.
This issue was an obvious consideration in a SMS discussion between Dank and Robinson
on 4 October 2011 (Can we just call them amino acids or something)? Although the use
of amino acid chains within sporting codes appears commonplace, there (sic) use at EFC
could not be viewed as such. During her interview with ASADA, Lalor discussed the
general application of amino acids.
My comment: ASADAs comment the term amino acids can be used to describe a large
variety of substances and the use of such vague terminology will often disguise the true
nature of the supplement being dispensed is another example of ASADA testifying in its
own investigation. Although ASADA was implying Dank was disguising the true nature of
the substance it did not produce any evidence to support its claim.
248.1.
ASADAs comment: This issue was an obvious consideration in a SMS discussion

between Dank and Robinson on 4 October 2011 (Can we just call them amino
acids or something) is another example of ASADA testifying in its own
investigation. ASADA could not prove the opinion it expressed was correct.
248.2.
Ironically, ASADAs star witness Shane Charter stated that amino acids was a
common and acceptable term to describe particular substances.
248.3.
ASADAs statement that: Although the use of amino acid chains within sporting
codes appears commonplace, there (sic) use at EFC could not be viewed as such
is contradictory. ASADA implied Dank and Robinson used the term amino acids
and here it is stating that the term wasnt in commonplace at Essendon.
249. Page 93 of the interim report states: Essendon was resoundingly defeated in their final
game of the 2011 season [Elimination final against Carlton 62 point margin]. Cordy
recalled that his suspicions about Essendons program arose following Carltons surprise
loss to Essendon on 21 April 2012. Page 94: Following their meeting with Alavi, ASADA has
established that both Bilsborough and Alavi exchanged a number of emails one which is
of particular interest. On 6 July 2012, Alavi emailed Bilsborough to thank him for the
meeting and to recommend a series of essential testing for the Carlton players. In the
email Alavi stated that once they have an accurate hormone profile for each player we
can use peptide therapy peptides can be used to boost hormone levels without showing
any increase in the blood stream (via the use receptor modulating peptides)
My comment: The inclusion of the above extract indicates the investigators turned to
farce. The Carlton staffers did not provide any proof that the Essendon players took
banned substances.
250. Page 107 of the interim report states: Although it was wise to engage an intellectual
medium to Dank, it is difficult to understand why Dr Spano was approached as opposed to
club doctors, Bruce Reid and Brendan De Morten.
My comment: On page 13 of the interim report ASADA states: The report does not include
conclusions, findings or recommendations regarding anti-doping rule violations. Rather, it
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is intended to be the chronological summary of evidence received during the course of
the investigation. ASADAs comment it is difficult to understand why Dr Spano was
approached as opposed to club doctors is clearly in breach of the stated intention. ASADA
is editorialising and testifying in its own investigation.
251. Page 109 of the interim report states: Ms Grimes stated that she sought legal advice
about the best way to proceed with Danks termination, which caused her to pose a
number of questions via email to Hamilton on 29 August 2013: Q4. Does Dank report to
the High Performance Coach (as indicated at clause 2 of the Contract)? Answer He has for
his whole time at the club. Q6. Does Dank receive instructions from the High Performance
Coach (or any other employee of the club) in relation to the way in which provides those
service or performs those duties? Answer: The high performance coach oversaw all his
work.
My comment: Responses from Hamilton clearly indicate that Robinson was responsible
for Dank, which is contrary to the picture that ASADA has tried to create that Hird was
responsible for Dank.
252. Page 111 of the interim report states: Prior to the recruitment of Robinson and Dank,
Essendons supplementation programme was run by Benita Lalor. Lalor is highly qualified
having completed a Bachelor of Applied Science in Human Nutrition in 2001 and Masters
in Nutrition and Dietetics in 2004. Lalor is currently undertaking a PhD with Bond
University in the area of sleep, fatigue and match day performance in elite Australian
Football players.
My comment: This is further evidence of ASADAs bias.
252.1.
ASADA has tried to paint Lalor as a highly qualified clean skin in contrast to the
unqualified rogue Stephen Dank. At no point did ASADA mention Danks
qualifications, including that he has almost completed work for his PhD.
252.2.
This is obviously a Freudian slip by ASADA. ASADA, the AFL and Ziggy Switkowski
have all implied that Dank introduced a supplementation program to Essendon
for the first time at the behest of James Hird. But here ASADA has revealed that
Benita Lalor oversaw a supplementation program before Danks employment. As
there is no record of what supplements were administered to each player there
is no way of telling whether the supplements were any different from those
administered by Dank.
253. Page 113 of the interim report states: Upon arrival at the Gold Coast Suns, Lalor took
carriage of the supplementation program; a program that had been run by Robinson prior
to his employment at Essendon. Lalors view on the state of the Suns program upon her
arrival is telling: So when I arrived, again, there was no structure in place. There were no
systems for delivery of supplements, to monitor what athletes have taken, to evaluate
their effectiveness it seemed that a lot of the players were taking a lot of things in an
inappropriate way and by that I mean purely not from a performance benefit so to give
you an example it might be beta-alanine has its effects if you take it over a long period of
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time not acutely before a training session. So, [they] we doing a few things that were a
little skewed.
My comment: This is another example of ASADAs bias.
253.1.
It is irrelevant as to what the situation was when Lalor arrived at the Suns.
ASADA has included Lalors criticism of the situation at the Gold Coast Suns in an
attempt to undermine Robinsons credibility. Robinsons salary was being paid by
the AFL.
253.2.
Essendon was fined $2 million, and Hird was blamed, and suspended for 12
months, for allegedly presiding over the same type of operation that apparently
existed at the Suns. Ironically, the Suns are owned by the AFL.
253.3.
If the situation at the Suns is relevant, the AFL should also have been in the
dock.
254. Page 114 of the Interim Report states: In reality, the integrated standard of oversight
outlined by Robson was never achieved. For example, despite players having been
repeatedly injected with AOD-9604 and Thymosin, ASADA has been unable to recover any
purchase orders, invoices or remittance notices from Essendon in respect of these
supplements.
My comment: If the investigators were qualified to investigate human resource matters
they would have known that the chief executive Ian Robson, financial director and general
manager football operations Paul Hamilton were responsible for the above failures.
Inexcusably, all three avoided criticism while ASADA created the impression it was Hird
and Thompsons fault.
255. Page 114/115 of the interim report states: The ASADA investigation has established that
in the course of the 2012 season the following substances were documented as having
been used by the Essendon playing group: Amino acids; Aminobol; AOD-9604; Arginine;
Caffeine; Cerebrolysin; Coenzyme Q10 (CoQ10); Colostrum; Comfrey; Creatine; D-Ribose
powder; Glutamine; Glutathone; Glycogen; HMB (beta-Hydroxy-Beta-Methylbutyrate);
Humananoforte; Hydration shotz; Interleukin; IV immune boost (Vitamine B and C); K-OS;
Lactaway; Low Dose Neltraxone (recorded as having been proposed for use); Lube-allplus; Melibol; MP5O; Multivitamin (injection and intravenous drip); Multi-vitamins (tablet
form); Nitrovol; Platelet Rich Plasma; Protein Power; Thymomodulin; Thymosin; Traumeel;
Tribulus forte; Tribulus; Ubiquinol; Ubiquinone; Vitamin D (Total 38)
My comment: This list destroys ASADAs claim that no records were kept.
255.1.
If the AFL hadnt been so negligent in not checking with compliance with clause
7.4 of its anti-doping code, we would know which player took what. Inexplicably,
ASADA made no mention of clause 7.4.
255.2.
Throughout the Interim Report ASADA has claimed, without any evidence, that
Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4 and that it was the only variety from the Thymosin
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family used at Essendon. However, here ASADA is emphatically stating that
Thymomodulin was also used.
256. Page 115/116 of the interim report states: Robinson stated that the AOD-9604,
Thymosin, Lactaway, CoQ10 and Hexarelin were stored in Danks office fridge. Robinson
also told investigators that following the departure of Dank, he drastically wound back the
supplement program because I felt that things were not in the direction they should have
been. I got asked to follow a brief and got asked to do certain things, which, as I was
directed, I did. But I felt it was wise that we got back to basics. Got back to good nutrition
with the guys. So thats where we went and weve been there since October [2012].
Robinsons reference to Hexarelin is worthy of specific comment. During interview,
Robinson stated he was advised by Dank that Hexarelin was kept in his fridge but he
(Robinson) had never seen it.
My comment: This is another example of ASADAs bias.
256.1.
ASADA editorialised negatively about Hird on a number of occasions but

accepted with open arms questionable testimony by Robinson without
comment. It did so because Robinson was the only person who made negative
comments about Hird.
256.2.
As there is no such substance officially named Thymosin, Robinson could not

have seen a vial or bottle labelled simply Thymosin in Danks fridge. The
bottle/vial would either have been labelled Thymosin Alpha 1, Thymomodulin or
Thymosin Beta-4.
256.3.
The only direction that Robinson was given was to devise a plan to increase the
fitness and recovery times from injury without breaching the WADA/ ASADA/AFL
anti-doping codes.
256.4.
Dank reported to Robinson. Dank was paid $100,000 and Robinson was paid
$300,000 per annum. Dank was required to recommend a plan to Robinson and
if Robinson believed the suggestion had merit he was required to obtain
approval from Dr Reid. If Dr Reid approved, Robinson was required to obtain
approval from the general manager football operations Paul Hamilton. As
Hamilton was head of the department, and as he controlled a $50 million
budget, he had the final say. Although Hird had no say in what substances were
administered, ASADA tried to make the case he was the initiator and final
decision maker.
256.5.
Robinson wasnt instrumental in changing the program. There was no program to

stop. The supplementation program was wound back in June 2012. The report
delivered by Hamilton on 21 August 2012 stopped the program in its tracks.
Essendon played its last game on 1 September 2012 and the players then went
on holidays until the latter half of October.
257. Page 125 of the interim report states: Given the series of events to flow from Dr Reids
concerns it is worth recounting the contents of the letter in full: Dear James/Paul
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My comment: This is another example of ASADA manipulating the evidence. The
manipulation in this instance is not a serious matter but it is indicative of ASADAs mindset. The letter was addressed to Paul/James and was placed on Paul Hamiltons desk.
Here, through a sleight of hand, ASADA has changed it by putting James before Paul,
presumably to falsely indicate that James [Hird] was the key recipient.
258. Page 137 of the interim report states: On 2 February 2012, Mr Hamilton sent an email to
Mr Dank, Mr Robinson and Mr Oliver in which he indicated his intention to centralise all
paperwork relating to the supplementation program. From Mr Hamiltons perspective: It
is imperative that [the club through his office] keep a file of all approvals that we have
received and all correspondence on this matter with players, staff etc.
My comment: Although this email made it very clear that Hamilton was in charge and that
the buck stopped with him, throughout the Interim Report, ASADA still tried to make the
false case that Hird was in charge.
259. Page 137 of the interim report states: The investigation has revealed that Mr Hamiltons
wish to maintain comprehensive records of the supplement program was never realised.
My comment: Despite acknowledging that Hamilton failed to fulfil his obligations,
incomprehensibly, ASADA put forward a case that Hird and Thompson were to blame for
the problems.
260. Page 137 of the interim report states: This finding [Hamiltons plan not being realised] is
consistent with the findings of an independent review of governance and processes at the
EFC conducted by Doctor Ziggy Switkowski and published on 6 May 2013: The supplement
plan, if one existed, evolved and probably never reached a coherent, consistent shape
But a number of management processes normally associated with good governance failed
during this period, and as result, suspicions and concerns have arisen about the EFC. In
particular the rapid diversification into exotic supplements, sharp increase in frequency of
injections, the shift to treatment offsite in alternative medicine clinics, emergence of
unfamiliar suppliers, marginalisation of traditional medical staff etc. combine to create a
disturbing picture of pharmacologically experimental environment never adequately
controlled or documented within the club in the period under review. (475 Ziggy
Switkowski report)
My comment: ASADAs acceptance, and use of the Switkowski Report, indicates that the
investigators were not only biased but they werent qualified to assess such things. The
Switkowski Report was so flawed it should never have been used in building a case against
Hird.
260.1.
Switkowski didnt interview the two people who created the program, Robinson
and Dank.
260.2.
Switkowski only interviewed three out of 46 players, which means the standard
error and standard deviation would have been so high as to make the results
unusable.
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260.3.
Switkowskis lack of knowledge of a matrix organisation and his faulty

interpretation of the Essendon organisation structure suggests he wasnt
qualified to undertake such a task.
260.4.
In Switkowskis own words the work was inevitably constrained, in this case
primarily by two factors: Firstly, there is a parallel review underway led by the
AFL and ASADA into the nature of supplements administered by the EFC during
this period, and their compliance or otherwise with various anti-doping codes.
This was a no-go area for this report. Questions about the pharmacology of
certain supplements, their possible performance affecting properties, compliance
or otherwise with anti-doping codes etc. are issues for the AFL and ASADA
investigations, which still have some way to go. This review and report needed to
be conducted in a manner careful not to inadvertently compromise their work.
Secondly, a number of individuals key to a full analysis of this period have been
unavailable for interview.
260.5.
Switkowski said As well, performance enhancing and image enhancing drugs,

their delivery processes, and legitimacy for elite sportspeople, fall well outside my
expertise.
260.6.
Switkowski statement that A number of individuals key to a full analysis of this

period have been unavailable for interview, acknowledges that there were
major shortcomings in his report, yet ASADA used it to build a case against Hird
and Thompson.
260.7.
New suppliers were used outside the approved list of vendors. There was not a
list of approved vendors. Second, this comment implies the vendors may not
have been trustworthy and reliable, which is ironic, given Charter and Alavi were
the key ASADA witnesses.
260.8.
Prior to publication, Hird challenged the accuracy of a number of aspects of the

report and was promised his required changes would be made. Those changes
were not made.
260.9.
Despite these constraining factors, Switkowski made comments that he couldnt

support, or were outside his area of expertise. Inter alia, he said: In particular
the rapid diversification into exotic supplements, sharp increase in frequency of
injections, the shift to treatment offsite in alternative medicine clinics, emergence
of unfamiliar suppliers, marginalization of traditional medical staff etcetera
combine to create a disturbing picture of a pharmacologically experimental
environment never adequately controlled or challenged or documented within
the Club in the period under review.
260.10. Unfortunately for Hird, this comment was used repeatedly by the media to harm
him, despite it having no validity. Exotic supplements conjures up something
sinister. Exotic means from overseas. At some stage in their lives, every person in
Australia would have taken a pill or substance that was manufactured overseas.
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260.11. Emergence of unfamiliar suppliers is a disingenuous comment. Switkowski
wouldnt know a familiar supplier from an unfamiliar supplier and wouldnt be
able to tell you why it made any difference.
260.12. Frequency of injections conjures up something sinister. The method of
administering is irrelevant. Many people inject themselves twice a day with
blood thinners. Diabetics also inject themselves daily. Vitamin B is often injected.
WADA doesnt have any rules on the number of injections that a player can
receive. Furthermore, having interviewed only three players, Switkowski
wouldnt know how many injections were given.
260.13. Switkowski said supplements were outside his area of expertise and then
proceeded to offer a strong opinion. Switkowski wasnt qualified to use the term
pharmacologically experimental environment. It caused more damage to Hird
than anything except the now seemingly bogus phone call to Eddie McGuire,
supposedly from an Essendon players distressed mother. It was outrageous for
Switkowski to claim it was an experimental environment without talking to Dank
and Robinson. Dank knew what results he expected and claims he wasnt
experimenting.
260.14. Inexplicably, occupational health and safety was never mentioned in the
executive summary. The term AFL was used five times by Switkowski but it
wasnt used even once in reference to its governance or occupational health and
safety responsibilities to the Essendon players. As the executive report didnt
canvass any of the above, Hird was denied procedural fairness when the AFL
used such a poor report against him.
260.15. To save itself from the recycle bin, the Switkowski review had to:
Prove that he understood what a matrix organisation was

Identify Essendons governance and OH&S responsibilities
Mention that the Victorian Occupational, Health and Safety Act proclaimed
that the Essendon Board and the AFL commissioners were responsible for all
OH&S.
Identify those responsible for the supplementation program. Hird was on a
different branch of the Essendon organisation structure from the football
department, which was headed by Paul Hamilton. As the high performance
unit and the supplementation program were Hamiltons responsibilities, Hird
shouldnt have been even mentioned according to Victorian Occupational,
Health & Safety Act and the Essendon organisation structure.
Assess the degree of failure of those Essendon officials to fulfil their
responsibilities
Identify the AFLs governance and OH&S responsibilities to Essendon
Assess the degree of failure of the AFL officials to fulfil their responsibilities
to Essendon
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Determine whether the AFL breached Clause 12 of the tripartite agreement

which says: The parties to this contract (AFL/Essendon/the player) shall use
their best endeavours, in relation to any matter or thing directly within their
control, to bring about compliance with all the provisions of this Contract.
261. Page 138 of the interim report states: Oliver recalled witnessing a player signing a
consent form during which Stephen Dank showed paperwork to [the] player saying: This
is the authorisation of the WADA/ASADA. Oliver also recalled observing Dank explain the
purpose of the proposed supplement to the player in laymans terms and on occasions
where a player was a bit ambivalent he would stop the player and remind them to listen
and make sure they understood it. The evidence of Dank and Oliver is not entirely
consistent with evidence provided by the players. Further, it is difficult to accept that
players were shown paperwork that was the authorisation of the WADA/ASADA as the
evidence suggests that WADA/ASADA compliance documents did not exist at the relevant
time (to be discussed later in the report).
My comment: ASADA is testifying in its own investigation:
261.1.
ASADA is also displaying its bias. At no stage did ASADA question Evans, Robson
or Robinsons testimony, testimony which ASADA knew to be untrue, but here
ASADA is questioning Olivers testimony because part of it (the fact he explained
the reasons for being administered the substance) puts Dank in a better light.
Oliver did not claim he saw the authorisation from WADA/ASADA. He said he
heard Dank say: This is the authorisation of the WADA/ASADA. There is doubt
that the authorisation of the WADA/ASADA existed at the time, which means
that Dank may have massaged the truth in front of Oliver in relation to
documentation. However, there is no evidence that Oliver was anything but
truthful, yet ASADA has questioned the veracity of his evidence.
261.2.
ASADAs comment was relevant to the governance issues at Essendon. A

competent investigator would have elaborated on what he meant by not
entirely consistent. Furthermore, he would have included the players alleged
versions, which he believed were inconsistent with Olivers version.
262. Page 139 of the interim report states: The majority of players could not recall whether
other coaching staff or club doctors were present during the meeting. [Mark] McVeigh,
like the majority of players interviewed, was unsure of which coaches, if any, were
present during the presentation. According to Mr Robinson, Mr Hird was present at the
Auditorium meeting: It was James [Hird], Steve [Dank] and myself. Although most
players recall Robinson and Dank being present at the briefing, Hirds attendance has not
been established with any degree of certainty. That said, it is highly likely that Hird did
address players about the new supplement protocols, but at some point before the
Auditorium meeting.
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262.1.
ASADA was deceitful in stating that: the majority of players could not recall
whether other coaching staff or club doctors were present during the meeting.
As no player could recall Hird or anyone apart from Dank and Robinson being at
the meeting it should have said so instead of implying he may have been.
262.2.
As Hird denied attending the meeting ASADA should have declared Hirds denial
in this section.
262.3.
ASADAs comment Hirds attendance has not been established with any degree
of certainty is an example of ASADAs bias. Only one person (Robinson) out of
50 people claimed Hird was at the meeting and yet ASADA used the expression
any degree of certainty.
262.4.
ASADAs prejudice and desire to build a case against Hird reached new heights
with its comment it is highly likely that Hird did address players about the new
supplement protocols, but at some point before the Auditorium meeting. This is
a classic case of ASADA testifying in its own investigation with nothing to support
its claim. The use of the term highly likely is unacceptable. No one made this
claim. It appears ASADA was just trying to build its case against Hird.
263. Page 152 of the interim report states: Mr Kenleys PowerPoint presentation included a
number of comments that should have prompted Dank and Hird to reconsider the use of
AOD-9604 at EFC.
My comment: ASADA is testifying against Hird in a negative fashion in its own
investigation.
264. Page 162 of the interim report states: There is no record of Como Compounding
Pharmacy having supplied EFC with Thymomodulin (Thymosin). The only relevant invoice
relates to Peptide Thymosin but Como Compounding Pharmacy subsequently reversed
that transaction (debit to credit) before removing from the invoice altogether. To date, no
other supplier of Thymosin to EFC has been identified.
My comment: ASADAs bias, incompetence, duplicity and confusion are encapsulated in
the above comment and the following paragraph.
264.1.
In paragraph 200 (a) ASADA clearly states Thymosin is Thymomodulin. However,

in paragraph 201 (a) ASADA implies, without any supporting evidence, that
Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4.
264.2.
ASADAs comment that there is no record of Como Compounding Pharmacy

having supplied EFC with Thymomodulin (Thymosin) is an attempt to create
the impression that Thymomodulin was never administered to the Essendon
players.
264.3.
ASADA was being biased, duplicitous and unconscionable in not mentioning in

the same paragraph that there is also no record of Como Compounding
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Pharmacy having supplied EFC with Thymosin Beta-4. ASADAs omission was
obviously not an accident.
265. Page 162 of the interim report states: The use of Thymosin Beta-4 at EFC is given further
credence by Mr Danks admission to Fairfax journalists about his use of Thymosin Beta-4.
Those admissions were recounted in the Age on 5 July 2013 in an article titled Drug
suspicions over Essendon grow: In April, Mr Dank told Fairfax Media in an interview
that Thymosin Beta-4 had been part of his program at Essendon. However, when
informed of the clubs denial, he said he could not recall which type he had given the
players.
My comment: ASADA is testifying falsely in its own instigation. Using the expression
further credence is dishonest. ASADA has not produced any evidence Thymosin Beta-4
was used at Essendon. It hasnt even produced any evidence Thymosin Beta-4 was
supplied to Essendon.
265.1.
Danks alleged confession is not as clear cut as it appears. Dank was not asked
what substances he used. Baker and McKenzie used the old When did you stop
beating your wife approach? Baker and McKenzie put words in Danks mouth by
asking him why he used Thymosin Beta-4. Dank explained why he used it,
without referring to Thymosin Beta-4, which Baker and McKenzie interpreted his
response as an admission. However, the benefits that Dank articulated for using
it were in fact the benefits associated with the use of Thymomodulin and not
Thymosin Beta-4. Therefore no one could be certain Dank admitted to using
Thymosin Beta-4.
265.2.
It is crucial to understand that even if Dank intended to use Thymosin Beta-4,

and even if he thought he used Thymosin Beta-4, it is not proof that he
administered it. The compounding pharmacist Nima Alavi received a parcel from
China, which was labelled Thymosin. There is no such substance as Thymosin.
There is only Thymosin Alpha 1 (which is not banned), Thymomodulin (which is
not banned) and Thymosin Beta-4 (which is banned). As neither Alavi nor Dank
had the substance tested, no one in the world knows whether the substance was
Thymosin Alpha 1, Thymomodulin or Thymosin Beta-4 or an unknown substance.
Consequently, Danks conversation with Fairfax journalists is irrelevant and
proves nothing.
265.3.
ASADA investigators accepting an isolated newspaper report as evidence is

another example of its bias. Although many newspapers quoted Dank denying he
used Thymosin Beta-4, ASADA unconscionably did not include those newspaper
stories in the interim report. Worse than this, ASADA did not include newspaper
reports that Dank testified under oath to the Australian Crime Commission in
May and November 2012 that he didnt administer Thymosin Beta-4 to the
Essendon players. This omission is further proof that the evidence cant be relied
upon and that it should not be used in any hearing.
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266. Page 205 of the interim report states: It is difficult to understand how Cerebrolysin could
be of any practical or therapeutic benefit to an elite athlete. The notion that it may assist
or improve the cognitive awareness of an athlete is speculative and at best experimental.
My comment: ASADA is testifying in its own investigation. Cerebrolysin is not a banned
substance so it is irrelevant what benefits Dank and Robinson hoped to achieve.
Comments such as this are inconsistent with ASADAs claim on page 13 of the interim
report that the report does not include conclusions, findings or recommendations
regarding potential Anti-Doping Rule Violations.
267. Page 208/209 of the interim report states: ASADA has established that the Amino Acids
reportedly injected into 34 Essendon players by Dr Hooper was sourced from a patient
who for privacy reasons will be described as Patient A. In turn, Patient A had sourced
the supplement from Mexico.
My comment: The substance was sourced from El-Paso, which is in the United States of
America.
268. Page 209 of the interim report states: the Patient A suffers from a form of muscular
dystrophy. In addition to the treatments provided by Dr Hooper, Patient A has also
pursued experimental supplement treatments in Italy and Mexico. Patient A treatment
regime consisted of the subcutaneous injection of unspecified Amino Acids, Cerebrolysin,
SARM-22 and AOD-9604.
My comment: Patient A didnt play for Essendon in 2011 and 2012 and ASADA didnt
produce any evidence that he did. Therefore, it defies explanation as to why ASADA
included Patient As medical history in the interim report.
269. Page 209 of the interim report states: Patient A provided that Dr Robin Willcourt is the
medical practitioner from whom he obtains the necessary scripts for his treatment
regime. Additionally, Patient A used the services of Mr Alavis Como Compounding
Pharmacy to fill Dr Willcourts scripts. In respect of his Amino Acid treatment, Patient A
revealed that he had personally brought two large (500 ml) vials of Amino Acid over-thecounter at a local chemist in the Mexican town of El-Paso without a prescription.
My comment: Patient A did not say he bought the amino acid in the Mexican town of ElPaso. He said he bought it in El-Paso. ASADA investigators unconscionably added Mexico
to the dialogue.
270. Page 210 of the interim report states: ASADA: Right. And do you know where your patient
sourced that Hooper said: I think it was sourced out of Mexico, but then again he has
had product out of through Italy, the US. So hes it depends on which stem cell facility
hes attending.
My comment: Given Hoopers uncertainty about where the substance was sourced it is
unforgivable for ASADA to claim that it was sourced from Mexico. Unfortunately for
Essendon and Hird, the Mexican story was leaked to the media and caused further
damage to their reputations.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

271. Page 210 of the interim report states:
ASADA: Now, what did you understand the container to have in it?
Hooper:
Amino Acid amino acid and vitamin - So it has a list down on the side; it has a
list on it The label says that it is a multi- its a multi-vitamin amino acid, and
content.
ASADA:
Why would you need to import that from Mexico? Why couldnt you just go and
buy it at any supplement shop
Hooper:
As well, more than likely, yes, I mean, that would have been the ideal to do
that, definitely. So it probably has to be compounded - this particular product
I dont know whether its commercially available here in Australia, but that
would be, you know would certainly be a product that would need to be
compounded.
ASADA:
How were you able to vouch for the integrity of that particular product?
Hooper:
Well, I couldnt, other than just what I was read on the label. It was brought in
through customs, so I
ASADA:
Well, when you say it was brought in through customs, what do
Hooper:
Well, when [Patient A] has brought the product back in theres well, there
werent alarm bells or [customs] dogs or something else. I would naturally just
presume that what the product was was exactly what it is.
My comment: This is an identical situation as to that discussed in in paragraphs 201 (a)

and 201 (b). ASADA used the when did you stop beating your wife technique. ASADA
said: Why would you need to import that from Mexico? Hooper wasnt certain where
the substance had come from, but inadvertently, like Dank with Fairfax journalists, didnt
challenge ASADA on their presumption it was from Mexico.
272. Page 211 of the interim report states: The essence of Dr Hoopers evidence is that 34
Essendon players were injected with an amino acid compound sourced by Patient A,
from a chemist in Mexico. The identity and integrity of the commodity was inferred by Dr
Hooper from labelling without independent or professional verification. Additionally, the
amino acid appears to have been in storage at HyperMED for a considerable time prior to
its use. It is hard to reconcile Dr Hoopers conduct against the notions of informed consent
and duty of care.
My comment: ASADA is editorialising and testifying in its own investigation.
272.1.
ASADA had an obligation to get its facts right and here there was no excuse for
getting its facts wrong.
272.2.
Most, if not all, people rely on the label. Its hard to imagine that anyone would
see the need to send a labelled bottle sourced in the United States to a
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laboratory for professional verification. This was an underhanded attempt by
ASADA to build a circumstantial case against Essendon.
272.3.
ASADA was out of order in trying to reconcile Dr Hoopers conduct. It was the
AFLs general counsels task to assess such things, not ASADAs.
273. Pages 235/236/237 of the interim report state: Carmelo Gervasi, a volunteer at the
Essendon football club who works predominantly in the property steward department,
provides clear evidence of having witnessed Mr Dank injecting players some as late as
31 July 2012.
My comment: This is another ASADA attempt to create the impression that Dank was
breaching the WADA Code with respect to injections.
273.1.
The WADA Code permits injections. Dank wasnt breaching any rules
273.2.
ASADA editorialised when it used the expression clear evidence.
274. Page 234 of the interim report states: Occasionally I would pop in and sort of see the
players at the club and happened to sort of sit in Steves office a couple of times. And I
would see him inject players there was some in the backside, some in the stomach I
recall one day I think it was Dyson Heppell. Im not sure if Heath Hocking was one of them.
Paddy Ryder might have been one guy Leeroy Jetta I remember came in once. Now,
whether he got an injection I was a little bit surprised that he was doing this in front of
me. I mean that surprised me a little bit that I thought it was the norm, you know.
My comment: Gervasi evidence was a farce. He only mentioned four players by name
Heppell, Hocking, Ryder and Jetta and he wasnt certain any of them received an
injection. Furthermore, Gervasi had no idea what substance was administered.
275. Page 235 of the interim report states: One particular occasion stuck in Mr Gervasis mind
the two reasons; firstly because of that type of syringe used and the players reaction, and
secondly because Mr Danks associated comments. Mr Gervasi recalled that the event
occurred four games before the end of the 2012 season, on the Tuesday or Wednesday
of the week before the Adelaide game: Im sitting in his office and they were coming the
boys were coming in in. And the injection [into the players backside] that he was giving
was a little bit different than the ones I saw before in the sense of the size of the actual
syringe and, you know the product that he was inserting. A lot of them were walking out
going, Oh, my god, that you know [that hurt] I asked Steve how did he think we were
going and he sort of turned around to me and said, I dont think were going to lose
another game for the rest of the year, and there was four games to go and, You have
just seen what Ive injected the players with. And I said, Fair enough, and we still lost
every game after that anyway so.
My comment: This was a disingenuous comment by ASADA.
275.1.
It was irrelevant because the WADA Code doesnt specify the size of the syringe
that could be used.
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275.2.
A staffer stating that: I dont think were going to lose another game for the rest
of the year, is not evidence that Thymosin Beta-4 was administered.
276. Page 235 of the interim report states: Mr Gervasi continued: Some was clear and some
was coloured. Some was it was different. Every player wasnt the same. Yes, on this
occasion that were talking about three, [players being injected] yes. Yes, in the time that I
was there, yes. Yes, yes. Look again I cant recall 100% but probably thinking about or
trying to think about it, it was [a] different [substance] every time, yes. Well, there was
something I remember there was a yellow looking substance and there was a couple of
clear ones so, yes. Well, he was getting well, all the stuff that he was getting, he had a
fridge in his office there and he was getting it out of the fridge, so I didnt see the
container, no. No, no. I didnt I cant recall the container at all. I just seen him he had
the injection and he injected the boys and that was it, you know. Yes, thats right. [I could
see the yellowy substance because it was in the syringe?] Again I cant recall 100% which
player received that injection but I remember on that Dyson Heppell was definitely one of
them. And I think Paddy Ryder was another one on that day. Yes. I said there was a clear
substance No, no. [In relation to the clear substance did you see the container that it came
out of the fridge in?]
My comment: It is beyond belief that ASADA believed its case was so poor it had to
introduce Gervasi as a witness. Gervasi didnt know who was injected
276.1.
Although he was in the room with Dank, Gervasi claimed he didnt see the
containers the substances came in.
276.2.
He did see a yellow substance in one syringe and amazingly identified that there
were two different clear substances. How a layman can identify one clear
substance from another is beyond me. The fact that ASADA accepted Gervasis
comments as evidence and included it in the interim report is indicative of how
desperate ASADA was to build a non-existent circumstantial case against
Essendon.
276.3.
Gervasi had no idea of the names of the substances.
277. Page 241 of the interim report states: Dr Reids decision to stop all injections at the club
may have been influenced by concurrent discussions he was having with the AFL
regarding medical decision making and optimal medical structures for AFL football.
My comment: ASADA is testifying in its own investigation. It is hard to understand why
ASADA would use the expression: Dr Reids decision to stop all injections at the club may
have [my emphasis] been influenced by concurrent discussions ASADA had no right to
hazard a guess why Dr Reid did anything. A competent investigator would have asked Dr
Reid why he did something and then included Dr Reids response in the evidence.
278. Page 241 of the interim report states: On 24 April 2012, the AFLs General Manager,
Football Operations, Adrian Anderson sent an email to Essendon FC titled Leading
Approach to Sports Medicine & Sports Science in AFL:
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My comment: As Andersons email clearly demonstrated that the AFL had a duty of care
to all its players, the investigators should have known that the AFL and Essendons
governance responsibilities overlapped and that it was impossible to make a case against
Essendon without examining the AFL governance issues.
Shane Charter
279. Page 166 of the report states: ASADA has made attempts to speak with Mr Alavi, but to
date Mr Alavi has refused to be interviewed. Given Mr Alavis reluctance to assist ASADA,
this particular aspect of the investigation relies on documentary evidence (generally
financial) and evidence of other witnesses most importantly Mr Shane Charter.
My comment: This comment has no foundation whatsoever:
279.1.
There is no financial evidence that either Dank or Essendon purchased Thymosin

Beta-4.
279.2.
There is no evidence from other witnesses that either Dank or Essendon

purchased Thymosin Beta-4.
279.3.
There is no evidence from other witnesses that they saw Thymosin Beta-4 at
Essendon, nor did they see Dank or anyone else administer Thymosin Beta-4.
279.4.
Mr Charter told ASADA investigators that he had no direct knowledge of

Essendons supplementation program. Although Mr Charter told ASADA that he
procured WADA prohibited substances from China on behalf of Mr Dank he
could not positively say whether Mr Dank had administered those substances to
Essendon players.
279.5.
Charter did not see what was sent from GL Biochem (China) to Australian
compounding pharmacist Nima Alavi.
279.6.
Charter did not see what Alavi gave Dank.
279.7.
Charter did not see what Dank administered the Essendon players.
279.8.
There is no evidence Charter procured anything for Dank after September 2011.
Although ASADA has provided a number of email and SMSs communications
between Dank and Charter none involves Dank ordering anything.
279.9.
ASADA claiming Charter could not positively say whether Mr Dank had
administered those substances to Essendon players is further evidence of
ASADAs bias. Using the term positively is ASADA testifying in its own
investigation. Positively implies something like 99 per cent certain. Charter didnt
know enough to be one per cent certain whether Dank administered the
supplements to the Essendon players, let alone not quite positive that he
administered the substances.
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279.10. ASADAs comment Mr Charter has been independently corroborated, which
tends to underpin the veracity of his claims is untrue and further evidence of
ASADA testifying falsely in its own investigation.
279.11. No one has corroborated Charters claims.
279.12. Charter didnt provide any evidence he went to China at Danks request.
279.13. Charter didnt provide any evidence (SMS, email, meeting, telephone call, letter)
that Dank ordered anything.
280. Page 166 of the interim report states: Mr Charter has previously served a term of
imprisonment for the importation of pseudoephedrine; he was released in January 2009.
Despite his criminal history, Mr Charter is a well-educated man, describing his
qualifications as a biochemist with post graduate studies in nutrition, followed up by
exercise physiology and then [an] Australian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Diploma. At
material times to this investigation, Mr Charter was the owner and operator of an antiaging and supplementation business known as Dr Ageless. Given Mr Charters
antecedents, his motivation for assisting this investigation was an obvious consideration.
Mr Charter essentially described his motivation as being altruistic, borne of a life almost
lost due to the use and misuse of performance enhancing drugs.
My comment: This is another example of ASADAs bias:
280.1.
ASADA has once again waxed lyrical about one of its key witnesses qualifications
but failed to mention Danks qualifications.
280.2.
If ASADA were open about Charters credentials it would have mentioned that he
did not have a licence to import drugs into Australia.
280.3.
ASADA disingenuously tried to create the impression Charter was testifying for
altruistic reasons, which implied he was to be believed.
280.4.
Charter has subsequently been charged and convicted of another drug offence,
which indicates his alleged altruistic motivation for helping ASADA was nonsense.
If Charter believed he could help ASADA he would have testified under oath at
the AFL tribunal hearing.
281. Page 167 of the interim report states: Mr Robinson said that Mr Hird advised him of a
past relationship with Mr Shane Charter. Mr Robinson recalled that the conversation
occurred at Mr Hirds residence during the evening of 28 September 2011 (the date of Mr
Danks employment interview at Essendon): James Hird called me in that meeting,
thats where he also spoke about Shane Charters And he [spoke] about his house being
raided by the [Australian Federal Police] in in relation to the [Shane] Charters matters.
My comment: This was obviously included to help ASADA create a case against Hird.
Robinson was the only one who made negative comments about Hird. In this instance his
comment about Hirds home being raided by the federal police is false. Hirds home was
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

never raided and he made no such claim. The Australian Federal Police denied ever raiding
Hirds home.
282. Page 20/21 of ASADAs Interim Report states: November 26, 2011 Charter travelled to
China on behalf of Dank to procure the raw materials for GHRP-6, CJC-1295 and IGF1LR3.
282.1.
ASADA did not produce any evidence to support this statement. ASADA offered
no SMS, email, telephone call or meeting date between Dank and Charter as
evidence Charter went to China on behalf of Dank.
282.2.
ASADA didnt quote Charter making this claim.
282.3.
Neither ASADA nor Charter produced any invoice to prove Charter purchased
these substances.
282.4.
Neither ASADA nor Charter produced any evidence that Dank or his businesses,
Medical Rejuvenation Clinic (MRC), Best Buy Supplements or Institute of Cellular
Bioenergentics (ICB), paid for these substances.
282.5.
During a television interview on 14 April 2015 with Alan Jones and former
Queensland Premier Peter Beattie, Dank denied that he asked Charter to visit
China on his behalf to procure these substances.
283. Page 21of Interim Report states: December 2, 2011: Charter returned to Melbourne with
the raw material for the peptides GHRP-6, CJC-1295, Thymosin Beta-4 and IGF1-LR3 all
of which were declared by him at Customs. Charter states that he provided the substances
to Alavi who subsequently compounded them for supply to Dank."
My comment: There is no evidence Charter declared these substances at customs. Once
again, ASADA is testifying in its own investigation.
283.1.
There are no quotation marks to support ASADAs claim Charter stated that he
gave the substances to Alavi.
283.2.
There is no evidence that Alavi received these four substances.
283.3.
There is no claim, let alone evidence, that Alavi gave these four substances to
Dank after he allegedly compounded them.
283.4.
If ASADAs testimony were true, there would be no reason for Dank to be

hassling for the delivery of the raw materials from 13 December 2011 on.
283.5.
Chip Le Grand of the Australian newspaper claims that Vince Xu from GL

Biochem Shanghai told him that he only gave Charter samples. He did not supply
an order.
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283.6.
At 12:25hrs that same day (8 December 2011), Mr Xu replied to Mr Charters

email stating, glad to get your mail and order so soon! I believe you are satisfied
with our sample qualification result, right (page 179). This supports Le Grands
claim that Xu only gave Charter samples.
283.7.
Charter didnt claim Dank ordered Thymosin Beta-4. Logically, if there were any
Thymosin Beta-4 it must have been brought back to Australia by Charter for
Charter.
284. Page 178 of the interim report states: December 2, 2011, Mr Charter returned to
Melbourne with the raw material for the peptides GHRP-6, CJC-1295, Thymosin Beta-4
and IGF1-LR3 all of which were cleared by him at Customs. Preliminary checks with
Customs by ASADA reveal that Mr Charter had in fact declared a quantity of human
growth hormone material upon his passage through customs.
My comment: This is an expanded version of the statement by ASADA on page 21 of the
interim report.
ASADA is testifying in its own investigation.
284.1.
ASADA did not produce any evidence to support this statement. ASADA offered
no SMS, email, telephone call or meeting between Dank and Charter as evidence
Charter went to China on behalf of Dank.
284.2.
ASADA didnt use quotation marks to support a request of any description.
284.3.
Dank denied this allegation.
284.4.
ASADA stating that: preliminary checks with Customs is not only nonsense but
is a further example of ASADA testifying in its own investigation. It implies the
checks were incomplete. To be accepted as evidence, ASADA should have tabled
the custom declaration forms.
284.5.
Charter testified to ASADA on 8 May 2013 that he took all identifying material
tracing the peptides back to GL Biochem the batch numbers for the peptides
and the certificates of analysis provided with powdered chemicals. The reason,
Charter explains, is so the pharmacist cant deal direct with GL Biochem and cut
him out of future deals. [Source: Chip Le Grand The Straight Dope]. As a result
of his criminal record Charter couldnt get a licence to import such substances. It
is inconceivable that he declared unlabelled substances to Customs. It is
disingenuous for ASADA to testify in its own investigation that the substances
were cleared by Customs.
285. Page 178 of the Interim Report states: Mr Charter states that he provided the peptides to
Mr Alavi who subsequently compounded them for supply to Mr Dank Mr Charter was
paid by Mr Alavi for the peptides.
My comment: This is another example of ASADA testifying in its own investigation.
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285.1.
ASADA doesnt quote Charter.
285.2.
There is no evidence Alavi compounded the alleged substances.
285.3.
There is no evidence they were for Dank.
285.4.
There is no evidence they were supplied to Dank.
285.5.
There was no evidence Alavi paid Charter for the peptides.
285.6.
The Australian newspapers Chip Le Grand wrote that he interviewed My Xu and

Mr Xu said he only gave Charter some samples when he visited China.
Consequently, there was no need for anyone to pay for them.
285.7.
These supplements appear to have disappeared into the ether. ASADA did not
allege they were administered to anyone.
286. Page 178 of the interim report states: The second purchase Mr Charter recalled a second
order of peptides from Mr Dank. In support of his claims Mr Charter produced a number
of emails between the Chinese supplier (GL Biochem) and himself. Examination of this
material reveals that Mr Charter ordered: 10 grams of GHRP-6; 2 grams of GHRP-2; 10
grams of CJC-1295; 5 grams of Hexarelin; 10 grams of Melatotan II; 5 grams of Thymosin
Beta 4; 5 grams of Mechano-Growth Factor; 5 grams of AOD-9604 (unavailable); and, 10
grams of IGF-1 (purchased separately due to an ordering issue). (640 transcript of
interview between Charter and ASADA 8 May 2013)
My comment: No documentation was tabled by ASADA to support its allegation that the
above was a genuine order. Evidence supplied by ASADA indicates that this so-called
second order did not exist.
287. Page 179 of the interim report states: On 8 December 2011, Mr Charter emailed GL
Biochem ordering: 2 grams of GHRP-6; 0.5 grams of CJC-1295; 1 gram of Melanotan II; 0.5
grams of MGF (Mechano Growth Factor) 0.25 grams of Thymosin Beta 4. Mr Charter
queried in the email if the total price of $2835 USD was the best price they could offer. Mr
Charter also asked: Which courier do you use to send to Australia? And Send me an
invoice and I will have this paid today. (642 email from Shane Carter)
My comment: This was the first evidence that substances were ordered by Charter from
China. There is no evidence SMS, email, letter, meeting or telephone call that Dank
placed the order.
288. Page 179 of the interim report states: December 1, 2011 Mr Vince Xu, Global Sales
Manager for GL Biochem (Shanghai) Ltd, sent an email to Mr Charter stating thank you
very much for your time to visit us, Its our great honour. Mr Xu then outlined their ability
to supply Mr Charter with: GHRP-6; GHRP-2; CJC-1295; Melanotan II; Thymosin; Thymosin
Beta 4 and MGF (Mechano Growth Factor).
My comment: Vince Xu clearly informed Charter that he could supply both Thymosin and
Thymosin Beta-4. Nothing could be clearer, the Chinese supplier, Vince Xu, believed
Thymosin was a different substance from Thymosin Beta-4.
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289. Page 179 of the interim report states: Mr Charters order did not contain Thymosin
Alpha, in fact it is Mr Charters evidence that he only ever procured Thymosin Beta-4 for
Mr Dank, not Thymosin Alpha. Thymosin Beta-4 is a WADA prohibited S2 category
substance.
My comment: There is no SMS, email, letter, meeting date or telephone call notes from
Dank to Charter ordering anything.
289.1.
ASADA is testifying in its own investigation. It hasnt quoted Charter claiming

Dank ordered anything.
289.2.
Pages 114 and 115 of the Interim Report stated that: the ASADA investigation
has established that in the course of the 2012 season the following substances
were documented as having been used by the Essendon playing group: Amino
acids; Aminobol; AOD-9604; Arginine; Caffeine; Cerebrolysin; Coenzyme Q10
(CoQ10); Colostrum; Comfrey; Creatine; D-Ribose powder; Glutamine;
Glutathone;
Glycogen;
HMB
(beta-Hydroxy-Beta-Methylbutyrate);
Humananoforte; Hydration shotz; Interleukin; IV immune boost (Vitamine B and
C); K-OS; Lactaway; Low Dose Neltraxone (recorded as having been proposed for
use); Lube-all-plus; Melibol; MP5O; Multivitamin (injection and intravenous drip);
Multi-vitamins (tablet form); Nitrovol; Platelet Rich Plasma; Protein Power;
Thymomodulin; Thymosin; Traumeel; Tribulus forte; Tribulus; Ubiquinol;
Ubiquinone; Vitamin D (Total 38). ASADA has clearly stated that Thymomodulin
and Thymosin were documented as having been used. Charter either supplied
them or someone else did.
289.3.
ASADA is guilty of misconduct to the highest order by continually stating

Thymosin Beta-4 is a WADA prohibited S2 category substance. ASADA hasnt
produced any evidence Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4.
290. Page 179 of the interim report states: At 12:25hrs that same day (8 December 2011), Mr
Xu replied to Mr Charters email stating, glad to get your mail and order so soon! I believe
you are satisfied with our sample qualification result, right.
My comment: This supports Chip Le Grands claim that Xu told him he only gave Charter
samples when he visited China.
291. Page 179 of the interim report states: 9 December 2011 Mr Xu acknowledged receipt of
Mr Charters authority for and attached a proforma invoice [No. 211886-VX2288)
relating to his order (see email of 8 December 2012 above). Examination of the proforma
invoice confirmed Mr Charters final order totalling $2835 USD) as: (Page 180): 2 grams of
GHRP-6; 0.5 grams of CJC-1295; 1gram of Melanotan II; 0.5 grams of MGF (Mechano
Growth Factor); 0.25 grams of Thymosin Beta 4.
My comment: This is confirmation that Xu invoiced Charter for Thymosin Beta-4.
However, as will be discussed below, the label on the package supplied by Xu on 28
December 2011, said Thymosin.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

291.1.
As Xu quoted Charter on the cost of supplying Thymosin, and as he also quoted

Charter on the cost of supplying Thymosin Beta-4, it is impossible to prove the
package was mislabelled.
291.2.
As Alavi never had the substance tested, it is impossible to know what the
package from China contained.
292. Page 180 of the interim report states: 13 December Mr Charter emailed GL Biochem
seeking to include Hexarelin-5 [grams] to his current order. (649 email Charter to Xu). Mr
Charter said that this addition arose from a conversation he had with Mr Dank whilst at
the Gold Coast Sheraton Mirage during Essendons pre-season camp. Mr Charter recalled
that sometime after he arrived at the Sheraton Mirage he met with Mr Dank who asked
how his peptide order was progressing. Mr Charter said that Mr Dank stated that he
needed Hexarelin by the time they got back to Melbourne; which Mr Charter inferred to
mean that Mr Dank was intending to use Hexarelin on the players.
My comment: This is the first time ASADA has used quotation marks to support Charters
claim Dank ordered something from him.
292.1.
ASADAs comment which Mr Charter inferred to mean that Mr Dank was

intending to use Hexarelin on the players is another example of ASADA
testifying in its own investigation. There is no quote from Charter to support
ASADAs claim. ASADA was biased in stating what it thought Charter inferred.
292.2.
Page 22 of the report states: Charter recalled an impromptu meeting at the

Sheraton Mirage between himself, Hird and Dank. Dank advocated for the use of
peptides at EFC, claiming they were safe and legal under the World Anti-Doping
Code. According to Charter, Hird told Dank that anything used on the Essendon
players had to be WADA compliant and approved by Dr Reid. ASADA suggesting
it was an impromptu meeting was another example of ASADA testifying in its
own investigation. Dank and Charter had arranged to meet but Hird just bumped
into them.
292.3.
Given Charter quoted Hird saying anything used on the Essendon players had to
be WADA compliant and approved by Dr Reid, it is illogical that Charter would
have inferred that Mr Dank was intending to use Hexarelin on the players.
293. Page 181 of the interim report states: At 3.30pm, on 28 December 2011, the peptide
material is delivered to Mr Alavi at his Como Compounding Pharmacy.
My comment: This is the first evidence that substances purchased in China had arrived in
Melbourne.
294. Page 182 of the interim report states: 11 January 2012: Mr Charter asked Mr Dank via
SMS, Which peptides do you need [compounded] next? In reply, Mr Dank requested
Thymosin Beta 4 and CJC-1295. Mr Charter then said what sort of quantities?
My comment: Danks response Thymosin Beta 4 and CJC-1295 is in quotation marks.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

294.1.
There is no evidence Dank was ordering Thymosin Beta 4 and CJC-1295 for use
at Essendon. ASADA has never even alleged CJC-1295 was ever used at Essendon.
294.2.
Dank had separate business interests (aging clinics and on-line drug sales) in
which he had used these substances, which are not prohibited for use by nonsportspeople.
295. Page 182 of the interim report states: 12 January 2012: Mr Dank replied to Mr Charter
stating: Thymosin 20 of 5ml vials. (659 Charter & ASADA interview 8 May 2013). Charter
then advised Alavi via SMS: Hi Mate. Thymosin 20 x 5ml vial. Steves request.
Dank responded that he wanted Thymosin. There is no evidence Thymosin is Thymosin
Beta-4.
295.1.
Charter advised Alavi that Dank wanted Thymosin. There is no evidence

295.2.
On 3 July 2012, Dr Stephen Watt from ASADA sent an email to WADA in which he
stated that Thymomodulin also known as Thymosin.
296. Page 182 of the report states: 12 January 2012: Charter also emailed a document to both
Mr Dank which described How to use TB-500 (Thymosin Beta 4). The document
described the optimum means by which to prepare, administer and store Thymosin Beta4. Within the body of the accompanying email Mr Charter asked Mr Dank to check the
document to ensure his concurrence with the protocols suggested so we can make [the
Thymosin Beta-4] up accordingly. (660 email from Charter to Dank and Alavi dated 12
January 2012 at 6.42am [produced by Charter during interview].
My comment: There is no evidence that Dank or Alavi requested Charter to send them
such a document.
296.1.
Both Dank and Alavi had previously handled Thymosin Beta-4 so they had no
need to receive such a document.
296.2.
At various times Dank sent Dr Reid hundreds of documents about the use of
various peptides, many of which were for banned substances. Receiving such
documents wasnt evidence Dr Reid intended using those peptides. Similarly,
Dank receiving unsolicited, the How to use TB-500 document doesnt prove
Dank intended using it.
297. Pages 182 and 183 of the interim report states: Within Mr Charters document it is
recommended that Thymosin Beta-4 be administered subcutaneously, at the optimum
frequency of one vial per [subcutaneous] injection per week for 6 consecutive weeks,
then 1 vial per month. The frequency rate of administration for Thymosin on the
players Patient Information/Informed Consent form is 1 Thymosin injection once a
week for six weeks and then 1 injection per month.
My comment: ASADA is testifying that this injecting protocol is for Thymosin Beta-4. Dank
says it is the protocol for administering Thymomodulin. The internet includes a number of
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

differing protocols for administering Thymomodulin and Thymosin Beta-4. Consequently,
it is impossible to determine the variety of the substance by looking at possible protocols.
298. Page 183 of the interim report states: 15 January 2012: Charter contacted Alavi via SMS
stating, Hi mate. Thymosin 20 x 5 ml vial Steve request. Do you know when it will be
ready. In reply Alavi stated Should be today sometime.
My comment: Charter referred to Thymosin not Thymosin Beta-4. There is no evidence
299. Page 183 of the interim report states: 16 January 2012: Alavi advised Charter via SMS
that he had a few problems with the Thymosin formulation. Not dissolving very well, also I
am sending you a trial which may be of interest. Charter then replied to Alavi that he had
contacted the manufacturer to get some ideas. Try the CJC that is the next one [Mr Dank]
needs.
My comment: Alavi refers to Thymosin not to Thymosin Beta-4.
300. Page 183 of the interim report states: January 18, 2012, Charter asked Alavi via SMS
whether we [could] have CJC and [GH] RP6 ready by Friday? Alavi later replied to Charter
that, Ive had a chat to Steve Dank. He is picking up some of the peptides tomorrow. He is
still researching the Hexarelin. Have a chat to him, he may not need the others for now
My comment: ASADA has never suggested that CJC-1295 or GHRP-6 were used at
Essendon. This statement doesnt say Dank requested them although Charter used the
term we. If in fact Dank was part of the we it supports his claim he used substances
away from Essendon at two businesses he had a financial interest in, Medical
Rejuvenation Clinic and Best Buy Supplements.
301. Page 183 of the interim report states: January 18, 2012 Essendon were originally billed
by Alavi for 7 vials of Hexarelin (in addition to those supplied on 10 January 2012) and 26
vials of peptide Thymosin (at a combined cost of $9860) which are listed on the invoice as
having been delivered on 18 January 2012.
My comment: Essendon was billed for Thymosin not Thymosin Beta-4.
302. Page 184 of the interim report states: From Charters perspective his role was to simply
source the raw peptide material and did not get involved in the compounding process
required to convert the powder to injectable form as specified by Dank: Charter said:[He
never saw the finished product, and how it went off to Steve Dank] Never, Never. No. So I
would just communicate electronically, Steve would tell me what he wants made up [and]
when I would tell Nima [Alavi], tell him what solvent , he would go make it, go from
there because my job was quality control sourcing the products. Nima was
manufacturing and Steve was effectively, the marketing as such.
My comment: Although Charter said he communicated electronically with Dank, he never
produced evidence of Dank ordering anything.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

303. Page 184 of the interim report states: Although Alavi was engaged to supply peptides for
the Medical Rejuvenation Clinic and Best Buy Supplements (Sydney based companies in
which Dank had a business interest), from Charters perspective, the raw materials he
obtained from China were at the behest of Dank and were intended to fulfil Danks
order.
My comment: Charter could not produce evidence of a single order from Dank nor did he
produce a single invoice to Dank.
304. Page 184 of the interim report states: Charter stated that it was his job to guide the
compounding process and to determine the best recipe for the required peptides: So
this is what Id say, so for Steve [Dank] or for Nima [Alavi] that was my job to find out
whats the best preservative, solvent, how can we get a six month shelf life. So what Id do
is Id tell them how its made up, what you need to add to it as an antibacterial, what
you need to add as a solvent, and whats the best diluent to use. So thats what I said,
okay. This is what I believe. And I put it all in here, and then Id send it to Steve and Nima
and say, Steve, just check you agree with below, so we can make it up accordingly. How
to use Thymosin Beta 4, what the preservative is, what the solvent is. Have you got a
problem with that? Do you think the sodium chloride at 35% is going to give them welts or
problems? And hed say, yep. No thats fine. All good. And wed make it up.
My comment: Charter said all his communication was electronically. Charter gave ASADA
all his electronic communications with Dank. None contained an order. Just as
importantly, Charter didnt produce any evidence that he sent Dank anything along the
lines of what he claimed in Paragraph 239 (a).
305. Page 185 of the interim report states: Charter said Yep in response to ASADA stating
that: Steve Dank would come to you and say, Look, we need A, B, C, Youd go away and
do the research, come up with, I suppose the best recipe?
My comment: This is untrue. There is no evidence Dank ordered anything from Charter.
Its fanciful to think Charter would have to undertake research. Charter hasnt produced a
single email or SMS to support his claim.
306. Page 185 of the interim report states: ASADA Then youd go to China, source the best raw
materials?
My comment: ASADA was leading the witness and in essence testifying in its own
investigation.
306.1.
Charter said No. So what he did first was say, This is what the list Get all
that in. Once wed got it, we knew that we could do it was just a matter of trial.
So we got all the peptides in first then just tinkered till we got it right.
306.2.
The above comment about the best recipe and the exchange with ASADA is
nonsense. Dank was the expert and had used the substances before.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

306.3.
There is no evidence Dank asked Charter to go to China, let alone that Dank
asked Charter to source the best raw materials.
306.4.
Charter only went to China once and only brought back samples
306.5.
Charter did not bill Dank for the alleged trip on his behalf to China
306.6.
Alavi did not bill Dank for Charters alleged trip to China on Danks behalf.
307. Page 185 & 186 of the interim report states: Mr Charter advised, Dank failed to make any
payments for the peptides he had ordered in December 2011, and by March 2012 his bill
was upwards of $30,000. Charter produced an email received from Alavi dated 22 March
2012 in which he (Alavi) expressed concern about Danks billing arrangements: Im yet to
receive payment from MRC [Medical Rejuvenation Clinic a company of which Dank is a
director]. Ive reminded them a couple of times, still no payment. Theyre currently
reviewing the invoice, and will make payment when theyve accepted. Basically Ive not
received any payment from Steve Dank, Essendon, MRC or ICB [Institute of Cellular
Bioenergetics subsidiary company of MRC] ever MRC calls me one or two times a day.
Ive hired a new pharmacist for the past two months to prepare the injectables for MRC.
My comment: This exchange clearly demonstrates that Medical Rejuvenation Clinic (MRC)
was invoiced. There is no evidence the substances were purchased by MRC on behalf of
Essendon. There is no record of Essendon paying MRC, Alavi or Dank $30,000 for
substances. Consequently, it is ludicrous for ASADA to imply the substances were
purchased and used at Essendon.
Charter stating Can you check why EFC have not paid the Como invoice is not evidence
the substances were ordered by Dank for Essendon.
307.1.
Charter did not produce an order form from Dank let alone an order form from
Dank stating that the substances were for Essendon.
307.2.
There is no record of Essendon paying for these substances. Its inconceivable

that MRC or Dank would pay $30,000 for substances for Essendon without
invoicing Essendon for the substances.
308. Page 186 of the interim report states: The content of this SMS is also consistent with the
view by Charter that Danks procurement of peptides was in furtherance of his research
project involving the Essendon players.
ASADA is testifying in its own investigation:
308.1.
There was no mention of a research project here.
308.2.
Neither Charter nor ASADA mentioned the substances allegedly used in the
research project.
308.3.
No invoice was ever produced listing $30,000 worth of substances.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

309. Page 186 of the interim report states: Eventually, Dank settled the outstanding account:
So after telling [Mr Dank] were not going to supply peptides anymore, going to pull the
pin, within about, I think it was a week or so I think Dank turned up at Nima [Alavis
again, and Nima said, No forget it. Youre not getting anymore. The bill was paid pretty
quickly after that, and I was paid. I can actually find my bank records as to the date I was
paid, but Nima decided that he didnt want to continue the relationship anyway. So that
was the only products [the December 2011 supply] that I supplied to Nima in relation to
this business moving forward
My comment: Charters comment: So that was the only products [the December 2011
supply] that I supplied to Nima in relation to this business moving forward destroys
ASADA credibility completely.
309.1.
The December order Charter refers to was placed on 8 December 2011. Mr

Charter emailed GL Biochem ordering: 2 grams of GHRP-6; 0.5 grams of CJC1295; 1 gram of Melanotan II; 0.5 grams of MGF (Mechano Growth Factor) 0.25
grams of Thymosin Beta 4. Mr Charter queried the email if the total price of
$2835 USD was the best price they could offer.
309.2.
On pages 406 & 407 of the interim report ASADA produced a table in which it
alleged Dank intended administering 1102 doses of AOD-9604. Charter didnt
even allege he ordered AOD-9604 for Alavi or Dank.
309.3.
The table also indicated that Dank intended administering 456 doses of
Thymosin. Charter only ordered 0.25 grams of Thymosin Beta-4,
310. Page 186 of the interim report states: Mr Charter is unaware of where or how Dank
obtained the money to satisfy the bill.
My comment: This is a disingenuous response.
310.1.
Charter was either paid by cheque, bank transfer, credit card or by a brown
paper bag with $30,000 in cash in it. If ASADA thought it could link this payment
to Essendon it would have checked the source of the payment.
310.2.
The invoices were made out to MRC [Medical Rejuvenation Clinic a company of
which Dank is a director]. It is reasonable to assume MRC paid it.
310.3.
As there is no evidence that Essendon paid for it, nor a claim by ASADA that
Essendon paid for it, it is reasonable to assume the substances were secured for
Danks other businesses, with no prohibition, and not for use at Essendon.
311. Page 186 of the interim report states: Investigators have recovered five invoices received
by the club, from Como Compounding Pharmacy (viz Alavi) which revealed purchasing
arrangements from as early as 18 November 2011 through to 31 March 2012. One
particular invoice, dated 31 January 2012, suggests that on 10 January 2012 Essendon
were supplied 14 vials of Hexarelin with a further 7 vials supplied on 18 January (Page
187) 2012 in conjunction with 26 vials of Peptide Thymosin believed to be Thymosin
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Beta-4). However, on a subsequent invoice dated 29 February 2012, both the Hexarelin
and Peptide Thymosin costs were really credited to the club and did not form part of the
final amount ultimately paid by Essendon, under the authority of Mr Hamilton sometime
after 11 April 2012.
My comment: As the invoice for Hexarelin and Thymosin Beta-4 was reversed, what was
ASADAs motive for including a reversed transaction in the interim report?
311.1.
ASADAs comment Peptide Thymosin believed to be Thymosin Beta-4) is a

further example of ASADA testifying in its own investigation. There is no
evidence Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4. It was unconscionable for ASADA to
continually state Thymosin is Thymosin Beta-4 when it offered no evidence to
support its contention.
311.2.
Dank claimed he used Thymosin as the generic name for Thymomodulin.
311.3.
The Chinese supplier Vince Xu quoted Charter a price on supplying substance

Thymosin and a price for supplying substance Thymosin Beta-4. That is clear
evidence Thymosin is not Thymosin Beta-4.
311.4.
On 3 July 2012, Dr Stephen Watt from ASADA sent an email to WADA in which he
stated Thymomodulin also known as Thymosin.
312. Page 187 of the interim report states: The nominated customer for both the Hexarelin
and Peptide Thymosin are listed on the respective invoices under the heading
Description as Mrc & Icb (sic). Such references are consistent with the acronyms for
Medical Rejuvenation Clinic and Institute of Cellular Bioenergentics respectively,
companies where Dank is a director. In total, Essendon paid Alavi $19,111.36 for a
quantity of tablet based supplements including multivitamins, Tribulus, L Carnite and L
Argine.
My comment: ASADAs use of parenthesis around customer is disingenuous. Without any
evidence to the contrary, ASADA is implying MRC and ICB may not have been the
customers.
313. Page 188 of the interim report: The Medical Rejuvenation Clinic (MRC) is a Sydney based
company that sells peptides online, through distributors and from a business premises in
Bondi Junction. The Clinic has four Directors including Edward Van Spanje and Mr Dank.
MRC is affiliated with Best Buy Supplements (BBS) a company that sells peptides and
supplements online. Van Spanje is also a director of BBS. Mr Charter recalled that Mr Van
Spanje wanted both he and Mr Alavi to supply MRC with compounded peptides. In
support of this claim Mr Charter produced a spread sheet for the peptide analysis. (685
Charter / ASADA interview 8 May 2013) and a number of diarised notes pertaining to his
meetings and contacts with Mr Van Spanje. Charter believed that Dank had an interest in
MRC as it was through Dank that Charter first learnt of the Clinic. As a means of assessing
the quality of MRCs products, Charter purchased SARM 22, AOD [-9604] and CJC [-1295]
(686 Charter/ASADA interview 8 May 2013).in October 2011 in order to personally test
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

them out, see what theyre like. (687 Charter / ASADA interview 8 May 2013).In support
of this claim Charter produced a tax invoice he had received from MRC in respect of the
purchases. The invoice is addressed Attn: Shane Archer c/o Doctor Ageless
My comment: This is evidence Dank purchased substances for organisations other than
Essendon.
314. Page 189 of the interim report states: and is dated 10 October 2011. Listed on the invoice
were the peptides Sarms S22 25ml; AOD-9604 25ml and CJC-1295 10ml at a cost of
$2800. (688 MRC tax invoice addressed Shane Archer c/o Dr Ageless dated 10 October
2011, totalling $2800 [produced by Mr Charter during interview]. In reviewing his diary,
Charter identified an entry for ICB but could not recall the context. ICB is a company
created as the research and development arm of MRC possibly to get around legal issues
arising from the sale of peptides. (689 Charter / ASADA interview 8 May 2013). Charter
said that on 28 November 2011, he also received an email from Mr Edward Van Spanje
seeking a quote for 100 bottles per month of CJC-1295, GHRP-6, IGF-1, SARMS-22 and 200
bottles per month of Melanotan II. Mr Spanje additionally requested the commodities be
supplied in amber vials and subject to a shelf-life of 12 months. Charter said the
communication from Mr Van Spanje was not related to the orders received from Mr Dank.
Although Mr Dank was connected with MRC, the raw material Charter sourced from China
was in no way going to fill Mr Spanjes order. (690 Charter / ASADA interview 8 May
2013).In any event, Charters view and evidence is clear in that the orders placed by Dank
(personally) were order(s) specific to him.(691 Charter / ASADA interview 8 May 2013).
My comment: This indicates that companies associated with Dank were purchasing
substances from Charter prior to Dank joining Essendon on 4 November 2001.
Interestingly, although Charter produced evidence of companies associated with Dank
ordering substances, he never produced an order from Dank that he alleged was to be
used at Essendon.
315. Page 384 of the interim report states: In middle to late 2011, Mr Charter, Mr Alavi and
Mr Dank embarked on a business arrangement to source, manufacture and supply
peptides. The basic parameters of the arrangement were that Mr Charter would source
high quality raw products and invoice Mr Alavi for his services. Mr Alavi would then
compound the raw products, supply them to Mr Dank and invoice for the total cost
(including Mr Charters services).
My comment: Once again, ASADA is testifying in its own investigation. Charter may have
made this claim but there is no evidence either Dank or Alavi agrees with it. Furthermore,
on page 186 of the interim report ASADA records Charter saying: I was paid, but Nima
decided that he didnt want to continue the relationship anyway. So that was the only
products [the December 2011 supply] that I supplied to Nima in relation to this business
moving forward
316. Page 384 of the interim report states: In late 2011 Mr Charter visited China to purchase
raw peptides as part of his role in the business arrangement. Mr Charter purchased a
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

variety of substances from G L Biochem in Shanghai including: CJC-1295; GHRP-6;
Hexarelin; Melanotan II; MGF (Mechano Growth Factor); Thymosin Beta-4.
My comment: This is untrue. Charter alleges he only travelled to China once to order
substances for Dank. That trip commenced on 26 November and he returned home on 2
December 2011.
316.1.
On pages 20-21, ASADA claimed Charter travelled to China on behalf of Dank to

procure the raw materials for GHRP-6, CJC-1295 and IGF1-LR3. Now ASADA is
testifying in its own investigation that Charter also travelled to China to procure
Hexarelin, MGF, Melanotan II and Thymosin Beta-4.
316.2.
Although Charter claims he brought back Thymosin Beta-4, at no stage did he

claim Dank asked him to procure it during his China trip.
316.3.
Charter ordered Hexarelin, MGF and Melanotan II by email at a later date. They
were not procured by Charter on his China trip.
317. Page 384 of the interim report states: On 11 April 2012 Essendon Football Club received
three Tax Invoice Statements dated 31 January 2012, 29 February 2012 and 31 March
2012 from Como Compounding Pharmacy. Included on the initial invoice were the
substances Hexarelin and Peptide Thymosin. In later invoices the transaction relating to
these substances was annulled (debit to credit). A side note on the relevant invoices
indicated that the invoice for Hexarelin and Peptide Thymosin was redirected to MRC ICB
(Medical Rejuvenation Clinic, Institute of Cellular Bioenergetics), companies in which Mr
Dank is a director. The catalyst for this redirection has not been established, as no one at
Essendon Football Club has any recollection of the event.
My comment: This is the third time ASADA has included this story.
317.1.
There is no mention of Thymosin Beta-4
317.2.
The statement by ASADA indicates that the substances were procured for
Medical Rejuvenation Clinic and Institute of Cellular Bioenergetics
318. Page 403 of the interim report states: In late 2011, Mr Charter visited China to purchase
raw peptide as part of his role in the business arrangement with Mr Alavi and Mr Dank.
Mr Charter purchased a variety of substances from GL Biochem in Shanghai including
Thymosin Beta-4.
My comment: Once again ASADA is testifying in its own investigation. Once again the
testimony is false.
318.1.
There are no invoices to evidence Charter purchased anything.
318.2.
Although Charter claimed Dank ordered the raw materials for GHRP-6, CJC-1295
and IGF1-LR3, there is no paper work to support this claim.
318.3.
Charter claims he bought Thymosin Beta-4 for Dank while he was in China.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

318.4.
There is no evidence Dank asked Charter to purchase Thymosin Beta-4 for him on
this trip.
318.5.
There is no evidence Charter brought Thymosin Beta-4 back to Australia.
Page 100 of 103
COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

World Anti-Doping Authority
Though it is understandable that WADA would expect ASADA to have conducted its
investigation with complete propriety, competence and impartiality, and therefore it could have
confidence in the Australian bodys findings, in reality it could not. It is therefore most
regrettable that the world anti-doping body compounded ASADAs offences that denied
Essendon procedural fairness, by making public statements implying Essendons guilt. Although
during 2013 former WADA president, John Fahey often said he couldnt comment and that he
had not seen any evidence, he continually implied the players were guilty. Only recently, the
current chief executive, David Howman, having declared he wasnt across the case, defamed the
Essendon support staff, Hird, Thompson and Corcoran, by implying to the media that they were
the same as the Lance Armstrong medical team.
If WADA is truly concerned with the integrity of world competitive sport and the health and
wellbeing of competitors, it will acknowledge how unfair, improper, and/or incompetent the
investigation and proceedings against Essendon, individual staff members, and the players have
been, and will end the unconscionable three-year-long agony for all concerned, by withdrawing
its appeal against the not guilty finding for the players by the AFL tribunal.
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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

KEY PERSONNEL
Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA)
Aurora Andruska
chief executive officer
Trevor Burgess
chief operating officer
Elen Perdikogiannis
national manager legal and support
Paul Simonsson
director of intelligence and investigations
John Nolan
lead investigator
Aaron Walker
investigator
Australian Football League (AFL)

Mike Fitzpatrick
chairman
Andrew Demetriou
Gillon McLachlan
deputy chief executive officer
Brett Clothier
integrity manager
Dr Peter Harcourt
medical director
Essendon Football Club

David Evans
chairman
Ian Robson
Paul Little
director; then chairman from 1 August 2013 and
Paul Hamilton
general manager football operations
Danny Corcoran
football manager
Dean Robinson
high performance coach
Stephen Dank
sports scientist
James Hird
senior coach
Mark Thompson
assistant coach
Australian Crime Commission

John Lawler
Paul Jevtovic
deputy chief executive

Page 102 of 103
COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Gillard Government Ministers

Senator Kate Lundy
minister for sport
Jason Clare
minister for justice
Federal Public Servants

Richard Eccles
then serving sports minister Kate Lundy as a deputy secretary within

the department of regional Australia, local government, arts and
sport.
Bill Rowe
an officer from the then department of regional Australia, local

government, arts and sport,
Ms Glenys Beauchamp
deputy secretary, department of sport
Page 103 of 103

Complaint About The ASADA/AFL Joint Investigation: Bruce Francis 11 November 2015

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Complaint About The ASADA/AFL Joint Investigation: Bruce Francis 11 November 2015

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Complaint about the

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

ASADA enforces any breach of a policy by ensuring those violating anti-doping

A substantial component of this complaint is the inappropriate behaviour of various

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Essendons high performance coach resigned on 16 June 2011. After an exhaustive

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Project Aperio examined four key issues:

The availability of new generation Performance and Image Enhancing Drugs

The involvement of organised criminal identities and groups in the distribution of

The use of World Anti-Doping Agency prohibited substances by professional

Current threats to the integrity of professional sport in Australia.

The Australian Crime Commission identified:

the involvement of organised crime identities and groups in the domestic

significant integrity concerns within professional sports in Australia related to

According to Andruskas notes taken at the meeting [Source: ASA.0032.0149; Andruska

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Demetrious comment about not a surprise needs to be understood in its context. In

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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

At approximately 12pm on 5 February 2013, Clothier told McLachlan, Essendon (then)

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It is incomprehensible that a government agency could legitimately conduct an

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND IMPROPER PRACTICES

In the above, Demetriou acknowledged:

It was not conducted on a confidential basis;

It damaged lots of very good sports, lots of very good people;

The methodology that devised it to be announced in that fashion was severely

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

As the original investigation was widened, though improperly, to include OH&S

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

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As it was a joint investigation, there was no distinction between an ASADA investigator

We can manage the process working closely with you

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

ASADAs editorialising comment: What is noticeable from Robsons account is the

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Page 49: On 4 February 2013, Evans convened a meeting between himself, Dr

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Richard Eccles compounded the misconduct and contamination of the investigation by

On 10 February 2013, Clothier (AFL) wrote to Simonsson (ASADA) asserted as follows:

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

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Andruska was serving the political agenda of others. Justice must

suspend Hird for at

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Essendon cant play

How can it be resolved? It is incomprehensible that Andruska allowed such behaviour by

environment that existed at Essendon

[my emphasis]. It was said for

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COMPLAINT ABOUT THE

Take bits out that might compromise what we need

Specifically, the report will include