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Page 1 of 68
He filed a petition for bail but such was postponed several times. The bail
hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended
Information. He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its
questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law. Hence, the filing
of writ of harbeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due should thus be
released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: NO.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes." Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become
invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not
completely deprived of their liberty.
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of petitioner. The general rule thathabeas corpus does not lie where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the
same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Ombudsman of
the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities upon
learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile that habeas corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in
view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present case
because the hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy
for asserting one's right to bail.It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not
even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application
for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but
would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending
application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith
proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
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assisted Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering and
transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed her that she is under
arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 and likewise apprised
her of the Miranda Doctrine in the language she knew and understood but
she opted to remain silent. After which, they asked her name and she
introduced herself as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married,
businesswoman and a resident of Celiron, Iligan City. The entrapment
operation led to the arrest of Adam. The inquest prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor.
Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5,
Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filedbefore the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 58. On petition for review before the Department of
Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to hold Adam
liable for the offense charged, ruling that no payment was ever made by the
police officers for the supposed object of the buy-bust operations. The
police officers have not even alleged in their affidavits that payment was
made to respondent in exchange for the shabu. No buy-bust money was
ever presented. The certificate of inventory does not show any buy-bust
money. The Justice Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the Justice Secretary. Finding that Adam could not be held liable
for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order granting the Motion to
Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless
otherwise held for another valid ground.
ISSUE: Whether a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is proper in the case.
Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her
cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas petition for
habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the
warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so. (NOTE: The authority of
the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26SC.)
Page 3 of 68
With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. The
proper remedy, at the time, would have been for petitioner to file with the
Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the
grounds alleged in the instant petition. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through
habeas corpus.
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
Facts:Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth
certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should
be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should
be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition,
petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24,
1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and
that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's
surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and
Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.
of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in
his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and
effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of
the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents
were married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with
significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the
changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known
as An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation
to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections
to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
FACTS: Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of
various details in theirbirth certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John
from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and
Heddy Moira.
LIM
This is a Petition seeking to drop the petitioners middle name and have
his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin
Wang.
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February
20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to live in
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together
with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are
not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do
not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for
these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang.
ISSUE: Whether the change of name / dropping of the middle name of the
petitioner should be granted
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Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either
be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic
v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person
in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that
the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband
Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki
v. Maria Paz GalelaMarinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage.Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not.
1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes,
came in the morning of April 16, 2006, came in to the property armed with
bolos and suspected firearms, with force and intimidation, took possession
of the disputed property of the Sansons and built a nipa and bamboo
structure.
PREROGATIVE WRITS
TAPUZ ET. AL. VS. DEL ROSARIO (SPOUSES SANSON)
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008 554 SCRA
Petitioners claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the
final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to
life, liberty and security; There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue
of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with
finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted
Page 9 of 68
The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had
previous possession of the disputed land since 1993 up to 2006 when the
land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction prayed for. The petitioners
(Tupazes) appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the RTC
granted the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and also issued
a writ of demolition against the Tupazes. The MR filed by the Tupazes was
denied.
So the Tupazes went to the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and
Writ of Demolition reviewed. While in the CA, the sheriff of Aklan served
the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to the Tupazes. Thus, the Tupazes
came before the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under Rule 65, the
issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of the writ of Amparo.
ISSUE: May a Writ of Amparo be issued for the Tupazes in this case.
RULING: The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. What it is not, is a writ
to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with
the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their
claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty
and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.The
factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not
alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights
and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of
the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the
filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
CASTILLO VS CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009 605 SCRA
FACTS: Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband
Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province)
which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the
property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the
MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents
filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest
them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other
forms of light threats.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into
the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a
day after their arrest.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
RULING :
On the first issue: Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but
also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Page 10 of 68
Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the
ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is
indispensable in an amparo petition.
2.
3.
RULING:
1.
2.
Yes.
3.
No.
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2.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated
directives issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary
diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered
his
arrest
in
connection
with
Jonas
disappearance.
FACTS: These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution
referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as
the Courts directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of
the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction with the obligation
to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court.
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation
Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in
compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. On the basis of the gathered
evidence, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph
T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and
security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
In July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered,
we issued a Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA
CA issued its decision pursuant to the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution
referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for
appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions. For Petition
for Habeas Corpus . the CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas
corpus is not the illegal confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas
corpus. While it ruled that Writ of Amparo is proper. The CA found that the
totality of the evidence supports the petitioners allegation that the military
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Urgent
Ex
Parte
Motion
Ex
Abundanti
Cautela
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already
ruled with finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as these
terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of
the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioners prayer to issue
the writ of
Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioners request for the
reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be
redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed
by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation
directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court
a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it
cannot (without violating the nature of the writ ofAmparo as a summary
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would
complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas
was
a
victim
of
enforced
disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioners motion, we do not thereby rule
on the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence
submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation
by the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities
whose identities and participation in the enforced disappearance of Jonas
may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings. Considering that
the present case has already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioners
motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and
prosecutory agencies of the government.
which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code.
The petitioners prayed for, among others, the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in
the Municipality of Matnog.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court but it was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is dismissible on the ground that there
is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on
RULING: No.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing
mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for
the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part
II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition
or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with
the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed
under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality
or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ,
viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the
use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government
agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a
duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or
a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law.
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PEOPLE vs YATAR
G.R. NO. 150224 May 19, 2004
FACTS: On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers
(Isabel Dawangs) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City,
as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am,
accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where
Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first
cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black
pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at
the back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual since
Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon
Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had
been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black
shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were
reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of
Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off,
the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked
Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to
check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein
was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a
knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house,
she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding
out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments
beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with
blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile,
semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When
subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an
appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos
decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving
much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu
of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2)
the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on
prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm
specimen may be used as evidence for Yatars conviction?
HELD: Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was
three (3) years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect.
The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs.
Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so
long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then
as the DAUBERT TEST.
At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the
legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on
2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative
weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of
the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in
conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including
accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework
and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the
testing result, as hereinafter provided.
DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the
probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars
blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers
vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable
and relevant.
In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be
determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the evidence is
relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime; In giving probative
value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood
sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the
victims vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the
DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been
performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the
said case, the DNA test was done at the
UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem
Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to
be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA
analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The
analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly
appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be
admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
TATING vs. MARCELLA
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007 519 SCRA
FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale
was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for
tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972,
Page 16 of 68
1973 , 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession
Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that
she actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement
between her and Nena was simply to transfer the title over the subject
property in favour of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging
the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business
expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled
and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs . In a letter
dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and as
a consequence , they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply .
Efforts to settle the case amicably proved the futile.
Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification
of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decided in favor of the plaintiff and was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sworn Statement should have been rejected
outright by the lower courts.
RULING: The court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed
error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no
longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC
and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no
more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship
was created between them.
Page 17 of 68
PEOPLE vs KULAIS
G.R. NO. 100901, July 16, 1998
FACTS: On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom
and threeinformations for kidnapping were filed before the RTC of
Zamboanga City againstCarlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, JalinaHassan de Kamming, Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, ImamTaruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and several John and Jane Does. The informations for kidnapping
for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of
thevictims. The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of
the RevisedPenal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances,
except the names of thevictims. Of the twelve accused, only nine were
apprehended.The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of
kidnapping for ransom andone count of kidnapping a woman and public
officer, for which offenses it imposed uponhim six terms of life
imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight
illegaldetention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco.On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos,
Norma Sahiddan deKulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their Joint Notice of
Appeal. In a letter dated February 6,1997, the same appellants, except
Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
amnesty. In a Resolution dated March 19, 1997, it granted the
motion.Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of
this Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court is faulted with the following errors:
a. In taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by
Lt.Melquiades Feliciano
b. On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of
Page 18 of 68
The Comelec First Division held that Arnados continued use of his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation. It treated the petition of Balua as one for
disqualification, annulled the proclamation of Arnado and applied the order
of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner CasanMacodeMaquiling who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 mayoral elections, intervened in the case. He
contests the application of Section 44 of the LGC and argued that, as the
second placer, he should be proclaimed as the winner. The ComelecEn
Banc reversed the Division and held that the use of a US passport did not
undo Arnados earlier renunciation of his US citizenship.
ISSUE: Can our local court take judicial notice of Foreign Laws by mere
publication.
RULING: The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which
must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be
"evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States "providing that a person who is divested of American
citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American
citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us,
given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he
was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an
American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local
elective position.
PEOPLE VS BAHARAN
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011 639 SCRA
FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual
southbound route along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around
6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, two men aboard the bus. Andales, the bus
conductor immediately became wary of the two men, because of their
unusual behaviour. The two men insisted on getting off the bus at Ayala
Avenue. Later, Andales felt an explosion.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of
Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of
the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio that the group had a
Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As
stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad and Baharan gave ABS-CBN
News Network an exclusive interview and confessed their participation.
Asali, which later became a state witness, gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February
2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
RRCG bus on the evening.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does
were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment
for themultiple frustrated murder charge, accused Asali pled guilty.
Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to
both charges.
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty
to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency
in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and
Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two
accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness
for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and
Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
Page 19 of 68
ISSUES:
1.Whether the accused should be acquitted because of the error of the judge
in not conducting searching inquiry. (No, they made judicial and
extrajudicial confession)
2. The testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. No
RULING: Denied. We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of
the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This
requirement is stringent and mandatory.
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by
which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where
the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission by the person accused of the offense charged. The guilt of the
accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these
corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television
interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing. Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Second Assignment of Error
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to
Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible
only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the
Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon,
the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused
as they are deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine him. A judicial confession is admissible
against the declarants co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions
and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant. Mercenes admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness
stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried
together for the same offense, the testimony of a coaccused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.
December 7, 2010
662 SCRA
PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the
validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in
the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when
the Olot Rest house was sequestered; and that she intended to delay
proceedings
by
filing
the
motion
to
quash.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration
order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2
agents.
Hence
the
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
RULING: No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the
Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a
prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court
nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
PCGG.
In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence
of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the
Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and
consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's
evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what
makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its
acquisition.
As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot
be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the
view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration
order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on
sight.
*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis
pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the
Republic in another civil case.
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
OBJECT/ REAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE vs. MALLILIN
G.R. NO. 172953 APRIL 30, 2008 553 SCRA
FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the
RTC of Sorsogon City, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team
was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto
Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the
presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual
morsels of the said substance.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The trial court
reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was
prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict
him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over
which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It
also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to
fabricate charges against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. In his Appeal Brief filed
with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to
certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was
conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced
that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the
members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false
charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly
performed their duties should prevail.
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence
Page 20 of 68
The RTC, in its decision of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the
crime charged.
The appellant appealed to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the appellant despite
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act.
(1)
RULING: After due consideration, the court resolve to acquit the appellant
for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of
custody requirement of this Act.
Requirement under Section 2.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,physically
inventoryand photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required
because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise.The records of the present case are bereft of
evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure
despite its mandatory terms.
From the foregoing exchanges during trial,No physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of
the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on crossexamination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when
asked whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the
appellant.At any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in
the records.
EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is
not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the
present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained
in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation
to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose
core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute
the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs
this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain
of custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from
the appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory
for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the
absence of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body
of the crime the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.In effect,
the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal liability.
Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This
presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself,
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of
irregularity affects the whole performance and should make the
presumption unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the
Page 21 of 68
RULING:
1.
2.
YES. Both the trial and the appellate court agree that the illegal
sale of shabu was proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the
successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller,
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
YES. In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody
requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs
are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.
Page 22 of 68
The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially
complied with the rule on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as
provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has
decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to
make a physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well
as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs
inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain
of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution
proved that immediately after accused-appellants arrest, they were brought
to the FTI Barangay Hall. It was there, in the presence of two barangay
officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two plastic sachets of
shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, plus the other items seized from
accused-appellants possession during the search conducted incidental to
accused-appellants arrest. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul
marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants
as "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Sauls initials and
the date of the buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with
accused-appellants, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI
Headquarters, SI Saul made a request for examination of the two plastic
sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," and
personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI
Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together with NBI Forensic Chemist III
Viloria-Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory examination of the contents of
the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and kept
said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as
evidence during trial.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of
the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon
seizure and at the site of accused-appellants apprehension, and to mark and
make an inventory of the same in the presence of all the persons named in
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the
seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able
to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the
seized drugs and, hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had
been duly preserved. For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the
prosecution to present as witnesses before the RTC the two barangay
officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the
testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and
would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner operates a credit card system through which it extends
credit accommodations to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and
services from its member establishments. The purchases are later on paid
for by cardholders upon receipt of the billings or statements of account
from the company. Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one such cardholder.
On December 14, 1990, he applied for membership with petitioner. After
his application was approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A. Mastercard No.
5423-3920-4457-7009.
Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit
card, the cardholder undertakes to pay all the purchases made using the
card within the period indicated on the statement of account or within thirty
(30) days from the date or dates of its use. Charges that remain unpaid
within the period fixed in the monthly statement of account shall earn
interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per month plus a penalty fee equivalent to
5 percent of the amount due for every month or even a fraction of a months
delay.
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly,
he was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered
various payments.
Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent
stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Several
times it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming that
the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His
refusal prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The RTC, in an Order dated
April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the
Page 23 of 68
amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Makati City. During the trial, petitioner presented several
sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only P24,388.36.
Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to
bear the signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient
proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the
MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision ordered him to pay petitioner the
amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.
The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the
photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to
F-4, were competent proofs of the obligations of respondent. These were
the only evidence presented by petitioner that could prove the actual
amount of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former. In reversing
the trial courts, the CA ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove
any liability on respondents part.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge
slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in
evidence.
HELD: Petitioner contends that the testimony[10] of its principal witness
- Mark Hernando, assistant manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -proves the following:
a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices which
sufficiently proved respondents liability of P24,388.36;
b) the loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices; and
c) petitioners reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the originals.
It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of
respondent on the sales invoices, having recognized them as identical to the
signature on the latters credit card application form.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the
due execution of the sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not
privy to such execution and could not have properly or competently
declared that the signatures on the invoices and on the application form
belonged to the former. The latter was not the person before whom the
application form was signed, executed or acknowledged; he was not even
present then. As to the sales invoices and respondents alleged signatures
thereon, he saw them only after the Complaint had been filed in court or
long after those invoices had been executed. He was therefore not
competent to identify the signatures.
Because Hernandez had not actually witnessed the execution of the sales
invoices and the application form, respondent concludes that petitioner
failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the contents of the original may be proven by the testimony of
witnesses.
Finally, respondent contends that the alleged loss or unavailability of the
original sales invoices was not sufficiently established. Allegedly,
Hernandez had requested the originals from Equitable Credit Card
Network, Inc., but failed to show in court that he had followed up his
request as advised by another witness, Zen Hipolito. Therefore, the
requirement of reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the originals was not satisfied, because he had shown no
proof of having followed up the request.
The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case
based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases,
the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to
prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of
P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had
presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been
admissible, they would still have had little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the
alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As
such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove
any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals,
respondents obligation was not established.
LOON vs. POWER MASTER, INC.
G.R. NO. 189404 DECEMBER 11, 2013 712 SCRA
FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services
employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro
Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their
officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the
respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not
paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made
them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended
their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They
claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for
the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr.
Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents behalf.5 The respondents
counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5,
2001.6 However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor
proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the case. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Both parties appealed the LAs ruling with the National Labor Relations
Commission. The petitioners disputed the LAs denial of their claim for
backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays. Meanwhile, the
respondents questioned the LAs ruling on the ground that the LA did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with
summons and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the
petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and thirteenth month
pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and computerized copies of
payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. They further maintained
that the petitioners were validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners
repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their
violations of the company rules and regulations constituted serious
misconduct and willful disobedience.
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental
appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized copies of list of
employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental
appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the
employees ATM cards.11 They also attached documentary evidence
showing that the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been
accorded due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not photocopied documents have probative value in
administrative proceedings.
HELD: The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought
to be proven. Why the respondents photocopied and computerized copies
of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
serious question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we
generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present
the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted
their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with
no option but to rule that the respondents failure to present the originals
raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced.
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that
"[i]t is of common knowledge that there are many people who use at least
two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial notice
that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where
the petitioners themselves disown the signatures in the respondents
assailed documentary evidence. The NLRCs position is unwarranted and is
patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the
employees. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employers
cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the employees evidence.
Page 24 of 68
received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver
the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the
former the delivery of said titles.[3] Private respondents, however, refused
on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another
person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to
certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance
before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were
never reflected in the deeds of sale:
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the
defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that
all the following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398
sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the
segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of
defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may
be incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's
timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions
was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim. On appeal CA affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parole evidence introduced are admissible?
HELD: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party
who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale
were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.
Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the
sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of
Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court
ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol
evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this
case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that
it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which
were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this
case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other agreement. In fact,
the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to
the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written
instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of
the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
parties.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract,
"it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in
this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol
evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules,
specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of
the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere
reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject
matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the
facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation
of the instrument."
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they
"put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to
Page 25 of 68
express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents
did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did
not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private
respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." Private respondents
merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they
tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be
done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the
parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the
contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the
agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer
(and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" of his signing a
deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the
deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer
of title to said lots were conditional.
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it
should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the
record to sustain the existence of the alleged conditions. Not even the other
seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such conditions
between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
"[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement."
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and
the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as
follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5,
1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear
and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a
year-to-year basis or "rolled-over" annually until paid from the proceeds of
petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this
purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the
terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation had
been made by the petitioners in this case.
Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the petitioners jointly and
solidarily liable as it applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity. The petitioner Foundation asserts that it has a personality separate
and distinct from that of its President, petitioner Tan, and that it cannot be
held solidarily liable for the loans of the latter.
FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered
owners - three-fourths () and one-fourth () pro-indiviso, respectively of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna
Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When
Benigna died in 1944,she willed her three-fourths () share equally to her
sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa
each owned of Benignas shares. Alejandras heirs sold their
predecessors one-half () share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square
meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Also,
Josefa sold her own share (subject property) to the respondent and the
petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent
and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the
subject property. The petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took possession of
their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their
name for taxation purposes.
The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on
the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on
the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the
petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title.
The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on
the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters
identified in the parties Agreement.
The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles by
contesting the authenticity of the petitioners documents. Particularly, the
respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benignas death
certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a
deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in
1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that
neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her three-fourths () share
in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932.
The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration
that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his titles.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by
ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. As the
totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the respondents]
claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and
Page 26 of 68
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
HEIRS OF SABANPAN vs COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003
FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
against respondents before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial
Court.
The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor of LotNo. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del
Sur with an area of 1.2hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his
children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a
problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of [Marcos]
Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son,
[Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out
of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco
Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was
carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject
matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among
them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his
possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to
vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed
that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. A complaint was filed with the barangay
office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was
issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by
petitioners against respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the
complaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their
own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the
said lot way back in 1960 and upto the present time; that they have acquired
just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or
extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR,
Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question
when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors and
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment
in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. The CA affirmed
the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and
err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling giving weight to the
CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda
HELD: Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22,
1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a
mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr
.and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents
for the first time on appeal. We are not persuaded.
In Garvida , the Court held: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process
involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing
the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no
way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a
facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile
referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida . The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in
banking, financial, and business transactions.
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as
evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order .The Certification
was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able
to file their position paper. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence
would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
Page 27 of 68
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.
Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and
the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one
and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment
of the deed of donation before the RTC of Masbate.
Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC
granted respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would be hearsay as
she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their
motion. Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which however, dismissed their petition. The CA likewise denied their
motion for reconsideration.
Page 28 of 68
April 2, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.
NOTE:A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation
of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness,
no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency
of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to (Citing People v. Trelles).
However, It can not be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows, If his or her
testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
FACTS: Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental
retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2,
1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and
custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador
Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing,leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the
situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after
she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7 As he poked at
her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his
penis into her vagina.9 His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her.
Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns halfsister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch
Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City
where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellants home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her
sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought
her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches,
Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that
Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became
pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse
with her while holding a knife.
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal
complaint for rape against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulan, Sorsogon,
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed
Decision, convicted appellant as charged. Hence, the accused appealed, he
argues that the mind of the victim is not normal. He further alleged that
Evelyns testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions,
thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability. He further
ISSUE: whether Evelyn, a mental retardate is disqualify as a witness.
DECISION: No. Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein
mentally retarded private complainants testimony irregardless of her
"monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity,"
this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not
being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted
Page 29 of 68
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130.
The prosecution stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a
husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
Held: No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule.
WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other. In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said
house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the
deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have
been charged against said husband. It is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same
breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the
victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by
the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is
undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which
seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to
be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such
a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will
be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home.
DEATH OR INSANITY (DEAD MAN'S STATUTE)
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
G.R. No. 143340
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership
with Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
business name of their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted
by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly
his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody,
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting,
inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the
partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending
that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits,
interests, damages and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a
cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners filed
a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence,
this petition.
Page 30 of 68
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto
from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to
show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues
that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of
respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership
three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners
invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent
and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain
claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render
respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.
RULING:
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or
persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound
mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this
case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents
in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that
when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death
of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the
estate or representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not
make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means
"assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a
right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then,
Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff.
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced
him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her
wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but
when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got
worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered
by physician-patient privilege.The RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielenes motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting
her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the CA. The CA denied
Josielenes petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?
Held:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in anyother way
than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication
made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses
in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed ofExtra-judicial
Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications
with the deceased, the questioned testimonies wereproperly admitted by the
trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents
are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay.Other
than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was
presented by them to substantiate their allegations.Besides, in order that an
heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly
denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of
the physician-patient communication.
RULING: NO.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
xxxx
CHAN vs. CHAN
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013 702 SCRA
Page 31 of 68
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are
not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that
may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and
presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of
the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the
Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say
more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That
the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in
Question is That Homelot:
Page 32 of 68
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best
illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS
conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial
MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!
purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal
effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court
document. Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July
2001 motion only because of her husbands request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others
pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According
to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this
happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other." By
Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule
7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a
ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other
ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear
in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of VelascoJacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion. The Court
cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead,
Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he
"trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to
be gigantic and monumental." Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version
of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events
was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised
only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the
controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in
Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she had not
"actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying
that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before
deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari
anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact,
Jacobas handiwork.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by
failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct
that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba
who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
ISSUE: Whether Jacoba may invoke the marital privilege rule in evidence
HELD: The Marital Privilege Rule was waived.
a By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified
that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the
Page 33 of 68
The fact that respondent filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v.
Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is
protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between
him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is
required. Respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in
another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's
adversary either in the same case or in a different but related action. A
lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former
client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly
or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the former client.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He
learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
Almonte v. Vasquez
Page 34 of 68
subpoena
and
the
subpoena
duces
tecum
but
was
denied.
ADMISSIONS
CONSTANTINO vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR.
G.R. No. 181508
October 2, 2013
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions.
Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the
issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court
emphasized that:Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed
by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of
the disadvantage. (Highlighting ours)
706 SCRA
FACTS: Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and
respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is the subject
lang. Upon his death, he was survived by 6 children. Of of those is Pedro
Page 35 of 68
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial
admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the
course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pretrial can still be taken up.
GR No. 147201
January 15, 2004
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the
general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party
making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when
it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2)
when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation
before and during the trial.
DOLDOL vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164481
ISSUE: Did accused validly waive his right to counsel? Did the police
afford the accused the right to be inflormed?
Page 36 of 68
DECISION: The SC ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional
right to counsel. The facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration
of the custodial investigation. The right to a competent and independent
counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct
of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. In People v.
Deniega, the SC said that the desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives
perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired. The SC likewise ruled that the police
did not afford the accused the right to be informed. The right to be informed
requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. The police
failed in this regard.
TANENGGEE VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013 699 SCRA
FACTS: Carlos Tanenngee was a manager of a branch of Metropolitan
Bank and was charged with five counts of estafa for forging the promissory
notes which he caused to appear to be executed by a long time client of the
bank. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office
of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the
form of questions and answers. In said interview, Tanenggee admitted
having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging
the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or
personally received by him although it should be the client of the bank who
should receive the same. All the answers of the appellant were contained in
a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by
him. Among others, Tanengge alleged that said written statement was taken
in violation of his rights under the Constitution, particularly of his right to
remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two
rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against
him.
The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals admitted the written
statement of Tanenggee and found him guilty of Estafa.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in
evidence of the petitioners written statement based on its finding that he
was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same
was taken.
RULING:No. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is
applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means
any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
Page 37 of 68
-But Dec. 27, 1978, Efren Recio, land inspector, already submitted report
of his investigation and verification to District Land office.
-He was approved of his application and was issued OCT.
-2 years after, Felipe mortgaged the property to PNB for a security of a
loan.
-Ignacio Arrobang filed through counsel in a letter-complaint requested
the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the District Land
Officer, Roxas City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for
irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
[respondent].
-Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator, Legal Division,
Land Management Bureau (formerly Bureau of Lands) submitted his
Report dated April 17, 1989. The Chief, Legal Division, Land
Management Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands
appropriate civil proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title No.
(VI-2) 3358 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-15
in the name of [respondent].
-Solicitor General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas
City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent
Application (VI-2) 8442 of the parcel of land with an area of .3899
hectares more or less located at Dumolog, Roxas City.
RTC: declared that the approval of patent application was null and void
and cancelled the patent and title
CA: reversed decision; petitioner failed to prove that respondents obtained
the patent through fraud or mistake
Issue:
1) whether or not the grant was valid
SC:
-free patent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation is void.
Furthermore, the one-year prescriptive period provided in the Public Land
Act does not bar the State from asking for the reversion of property
acquired through such means
1) This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over
the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or
fraud, signs of which were20 ignored by the Court of Appeals.
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance
with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.22 Under Section 91
thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are
true.
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient
notice to the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in
order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their
claims.24 Note that this notice and the verification and investigation
of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an application for free
patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
verification should have been done only after the filing of the
application.
the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted
is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself,
which bears no signature.
>>the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not
been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted
that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios
alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A
witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the
latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without
violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself
to cross-examination, the Investigation Report33 he had submitted to
the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony.
Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal
knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.34 On the
other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered
as
independently
relevant.35
>>The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may be
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The
information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court
as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE vs MONTAEZ
G.R. No. 148257
March 17, 2004
Page 38 of 68
NOTES:Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at the
brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that
death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial
evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization
that he was in a dying condition.
FACTS:This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals under
Section 14, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court dated September 19, 1995
convicting the appellant of murder, as principal by direct participation, and
set aside the Order of the trial court dated November 17, 1995 modifying its
decision and convicting the appellant of murder, but only as accomplice.
On August 11, 1993, an Information was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Tangub City charging the appellant of murder.
Edmundo Ollanes testified that in the evening of July 20, 1993,
he was fishing along the seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo City with Joven
Hintogaya and his younger brother, Perlito Ollanes. They stopped fishing
by 11:00 a.m., sold their catch, and went home. Edmundo took a shortcut,
while Joven and Perlito walked home together. He and Perlito had a
flashlight with them, while Joven carried a kerosene lamp. Perlitos house
was only about forty meters from his, and Joven lived only about eighteen
meters away.
As Edmundo was climbing the stairs to his house, he heard
gunshot coming from the direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the
scene and passed by Jovens house. He then saw his brother lying prostrate
nearby. As he was facing towards the ground, the left side of his face tilted
towards his left shoulder, he saw the appellant, who was armed with a long
firearm.
Edmundo carried his brother in his arms and noticed the gunshot
wounds on the latters chest. He was still alive, but barely breathing. Perlito
told him that he was on the verge of death. When Edmundo asked Perlito
who shot him, the latter declared that it was the appellant. Perlito
mentioned the appellants name three times. Edmundo carried Perlito to the
hospital, but the latter died on the way.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Edmundo regarding the statement
of Perlito that it was Cesario Montanez who shot him is admissible.
HELD: YES.
Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying
declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity
when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is
gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the
declarant did not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the
degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded
shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a
dying condition.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
THEODORE BERNAL
NOTES: "Declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the
same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had
no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
Page 39 of 68
1.
2.
That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and
conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos
lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school
records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity.
With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of
age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if
Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that
Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high
standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous
possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance
of
evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate,
Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive
provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
RES GESTAE
PEOPLE vs. LOBRIGAS
G.R. No. 147649
December 17, 2002
are
DECSION: YES
The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be
deemed a dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by
the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same
are nonetheless part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made
to Castor Guden are admissible in evidence as such.
Page 40 of 68
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
PEOPLE vs. VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011 647 SCRA 43
FACTS: Villarico et al. were charged and convicted for the Murder of a
certain Haide Cagatan. During trial, the prosecution was able to present the
sister-in law and the father of the victim, both of whom positively identified
Villarico et al, as the perpetrators of the crime. In their testimony, they
actually saw the defendants at the time of the shooting because it took place
in their house (in the kitchen). Both of them testified that by their position
near the kitchen, they were able to see clearly all of the accused outside
their nipa hut. In addition, the mother of the victim who was in the sala at
that time testified that right after she heard gunshots, Haide called out for
help and exclaimed that it was Berting who had shot him. Shortly after he
was rushed to the hospital, the victim died. All of the accused pleaded not
guilty and offered an alibi. The RTC found all of them guilty of homicide
but this was modified by the Court of Appeals and ruled that they
committed Murder. Upon appeal, the accused contends that the prosecution
has failed to prove the identity of the assailant as the testimony of the
mother of the accused did not actually saw Berting shoot Haide.
ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
the mother of Haide who did not see the actual shooting.
RULING: No. The court was correct admitting the testimony of the mother
of Haide. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot
by the group of Berting uttered in the immediate aftermath of the
shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res gestae.
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act the shooting of
Haide was a startling occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother
about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide had time
to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the
shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling
occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of the
assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for
being uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS
ILANO,
DANIEL
ILANO
AND
FELIPA
JAVALERA, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros
Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros
Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264
from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for
Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in August 1985.
Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the following:
1. CHECK-IN TIME Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in
counter at least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight.
We will consider your accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted
passenger if you fail to check-in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED
departure time. (Exhs. (1-A-A, 2-A-1, S-A, O-A-1, tsn. Nov 23, 1987, p. 8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of
the defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published
departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before
departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the
employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats
awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and
seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach
of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of
contract of carriage. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the
questioned decision by the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial
court's finding that defendant-appellant is liable for damages on the sole
issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the material
admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that
substantiate the defense of defendant-appellant.
HELD: It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who
checked-in late after the private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p.
13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary
evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses
are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets
of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the
printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well
as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in
clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents) and the
passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed the nonaccommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents)are entries
made in the regular course of business which the private respondents failed
to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their
testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing
or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are
evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts,
is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force
than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory
and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p.
654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written
document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de
Page 41 of 68
Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is
amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in
their complaint (where they claimed that no one was at the counter until
thirty (30) minutes before the published departure time and that the
employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2)
and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different
PAL personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. TSNs of
November 17, 1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private
respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving
cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as
statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the
main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate,
qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32
C.J.S., S. 411, 30-31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to
believe the version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased their
tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract
of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement. The terms of the
contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not
militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the
result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their
tickets by PAL is only proper.
ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD
RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO.,
INC., respondent.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. RTC dismissed
the case for plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of action against the defendant.
CA affirmed
(b)
(c)
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police
blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records.
[20]
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of
the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact
therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or
nullified by other competent evidence. [21] Although police blotters are of
little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information
subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit
was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is
unlike People v. Mejia,[22] where we said that entries in the police blotters
should not be given undue significance or probative value, since the Court
there found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in material
particulars.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and
formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was
Page 42 of 68
FACTS: When Sabili filed his Certificate of Candicay for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of
the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections,
he had been twice elected as Provincial Board Member representing the
4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th
District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that
when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas.
Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification against him before the COMELEC. He
alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner
falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident
of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May
2010 local elections. Sabili, to prove his residence in Lipa, presented
among others the Certificate of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade.
Despite garnering the highest number of votes in the Mayoralty elections,
Sabili was ruled to be disqualified by the COMELEC. The COMELEC did
not take into consideration the certificate of residency executed by the
baranggay captain on the ground that it was not notarized. Hence, upon the
petition for review with the Supreme Court, another certificate was
submitted which has been duly notarized.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in not considering the
certificate of Residency executed by the baranggay captain
RULING: Yes. We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the
Barangay Captains Certification and find the same tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary public,
Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but
would also be entitled to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community
Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. The Supreme Court explained that the
following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to
be admissible in evidence:
a)
b)
c)
COMMERCIAL LISTS
QUISUMBING vs MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 142943
April 3, 2002
FACTS:Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022
.
Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private
corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the
government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized
and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
"Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of
a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City,
which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos.
They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of
furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the
1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a
member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the
Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of
Chamber of Furniture.
"On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-thespot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House
no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffsappellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of
asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which
was granted.
After an hour, defendant-appellant's head inspector, E. Orlina returned to
the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had
been tampered and unless they pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing
the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina
informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard
operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that
questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the
disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC)
may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal
Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio
instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffsappellees' electric service which the latter faithfully complied.
"On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish
electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted
with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting
their power supply which was done without due process, and without due
regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business
reputation.
ISSUE: whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed
by respondent.
HELD: YES
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been
conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96
that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this amount
was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer
Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary
evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding
computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and
examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been
meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical
consumption.
TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING
G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LANIE
ORTIZMIYAKE accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar
Page 43 of 68
del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false
pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan
alone.
A judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both
crimes as charged. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large
scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was
a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with
two counts of estafa. In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment
case, the court adopted the facts and conclusions established in the estafa
decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in
the case before it.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ADOPTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OF THE
FACTS STATED IN THE DECISION OF THE PARAAQUE TRIAL
COURT FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION AS THE EXCEPTION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW
PURSUANT TO SEC. 47 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT
RULING:
NO. Under the law, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it
is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already
testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the
hearsay rule previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious (section 47 of Rule 130).
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated
in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception
to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers
only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments. In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies
made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa
case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a
basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was
the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment,
while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. [30] It may not be used to prove that the
accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a
subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.
GO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 677 SCRA 213
FACTS: Go et al were criminally charged with Other Deceits under the
RPC for mortgaging a chattel with Highdone Ltd. et al misrepresenting the
same to be the first mortgage where the truth is it already had a prior
mortgage. Consequently, damages were sustained by the company.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to
the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take
Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung
infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health. MeTC granted the motion but this was nullified by
the RTC on the ground the rule on taking of depositions of witnesses in
civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific
provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness
against him face to face. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals held because
no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in
criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely
objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the
witness.
Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus, armed
with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Terrified,
Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father. Thereafter,
she saw her mother, Rowena, running out of their house and crying for
help.
Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However,
Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was pronounced dead on
arrival.
The three accused were charged with murder before the RTC. Edwin and
Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large.
Thereafter, trial ensued
The defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different
version of the events. The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the
sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being at the scene
of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.
RTC held that the accused were guilty which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rachel was a competent witness considering that
she is a mere child.
RULING: Yes, the SC ruled that Rachels testimony cannot be taken
lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the
incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing
that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating
the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may
be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in
court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.12 Thus, petitioners flimsy objections
on Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel
as to who killed her father.
OPINION RULE
Page 44 of 68
EXPERT WITNESS
PEOPLE vs PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL
G.R. No. 123137
October 17, 2001
NOTE: There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is
sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3)
presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based.
FACTS: On appeal is the decision dated May 17, 1995, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-30350
for murder and CBU-33664 for illegal possession of firearms, finding
appellants Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero, and Januario Dosdos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms.
The facts of the case are as follows:
At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news
reporter then aboard his jeep, had just reached the ABS-CBN compound in
P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, when he heard a couple of gunshots. He
looked around and saw a man running unsteadily towards the intersection
of P. del Rosario Street and Jones Avenue (Osmea Boulevard). The man
was shouting "Tabang, tabang!" ("Help! Help!"). Sta. Cruz, Jr., saw a red
"Jiffy" make a U-turn near the gate of the city central school that nearly ran
over the man shouting for help. The man turned back and staggered towards
the direction of Bacalso Avenue and Urgello Private Road, but after a few
meters on wobbly legs, he stopped and collapsed.
Meanwhile, the "Jiffy" followed. It stopped beside the fallen figure and a
tall, thin man alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure.
He boarded the "Jiffy" which sped away towards Leon Kilat Street. Romeo
Sta. Cruz, Jr., moved his jeep and focused its headlights on the victim.
While the patrol cars were chasing the "Jiffy," another police team
proceeded to the crime scene in response to the alarm. This team from
Police Station No. 3 in San Nicolas, Cebu City rushed the victim to the
Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police
Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from
the victim's body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain,
and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics
testing.
An information for murder and illegal possession of firearms were file
against Abriol. When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both
charges. Abriol was convicted.
Appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel
Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is
ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer,
goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with "the
required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject
by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the
caliber of a bullet." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and
expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and
cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the
crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's failure to take the
necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE: whether the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the
prosecution's ballistics is credible.
HELD: YES. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or
calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses
special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an
opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or
knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is
sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3)
presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based.
The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert
opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.
In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:
The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics
ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the
absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the
Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and
conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion
based on his examination deserves credit. He found the
impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were testfired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the
scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into)
the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence
that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply
imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to
that gun and that gun alone. These marking might be
microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their
origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification,
as the print left by the human finger.
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics
expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command
and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had
previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27)
murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not
present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to
support his findings. Examination under a comparison microscope showing
that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is
sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar
characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.
BAUTISTA vs. CA
G.R. No. 158015
August 11, 2004
NOTE: A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of
handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still
exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.
FACTS: On appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure is a Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Page 45 of 68
CA-G.R. CV No. 45549,1 reversing and setting aside the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII in Civil Case No. 83179002 and entering a new one declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of
Absolute Sale between the late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null and
void.
The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda (formerly
Washington) Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of approximately
105 square meters. This parcel of land was previously owned and registered
in the name of the late Cesar Morelos under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 27604. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being
the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos.
Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children.
Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15, 1982. During
his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in
favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 254843 was issued in the name of petitioner Laura
Bautista.
Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of
Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 83-17900, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII. At
the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the
signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his.
Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness
to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and
petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring the Deed of
Sale dated April 5, 1982 executed between the late Cesar Morelos in favor
of Laura Bautista valid, and dismissed for insufficient evidence the claims
and counterclaims for damages of the parties.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside
the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONIES OF EXPERT
WITNESSES ARE CONCLUSIVE TO BE A STRONG BASIS TO
NULLIFY A DULY EXECUTED AND NOTARIZED DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE.
HELD: NO. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony
of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge
still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the
handwriting expert.
The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same
sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or
molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over
allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of
the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the
contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an
expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed
the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been
physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura
Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioners.
AVELINO VS PEOPLE
GR 181444 July 17, 2013 701 SCRA 477
FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Chairman Hispano was shot by three men
while driving his owner type jeep at Tondo Manila. The incident was
witnessed by Alfredo Manlangsang. According to the witness he was not
able to identify the two assailant but was able to recognized the third
assailant as Bobby Avelino when the latter pulled his bonnet down to his
chin.
The accused denied the accusation and presented as evidence the
testimonies of PO2 Galang, Adonis Bantiling and SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
Moreover, the accused advance the defense of denial and alibi.
RTC held the accused guilty which was upheld by the CA.
Page 46 of 68
FEBTC VS CHANTE
GR 170598 October 9, 2013 707 SCRA 149
FACTS: Robert Mar Chante (Chan), was a depositor of FEBTC. FEBTC
issued him an ATM Card. The card, known as a "Do-It-All" card to handle
credit card and ATM transactions, was tagged in his current account.
As a security feature, a PIN, known only to the depositor, was required in
order to gain access to the account. With the use of the PIN, Chan could
then deposit and withdraw funds from his current account from any FEBTC
Page 47 of 68
Page 48 of 68
Cleofe, Antonio, and Angelica. On April 25, 1952, Honorata died. Later on,
Luis married Lourdes Pastor Rosaroso (Lourdes).
Hospicio, Antonio , Angelica and Cleofe (Petitioners) alleged the Luis, with
full consent of his second wife, Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
(First Sale) over six (6) parcel of land (Lot 8, 19, 22, 23, 5665 and 7967) in
Cebu on 04 Nov 1991.
Petitioners further alleged that on 23 Aug 1994, Lucilla and Laila, daughter
of Lucilla, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (Second Sale), by virtue of
SPA from Luis, over three (3) parcel of Lot in favor of Meridian Realty
Corporation (Meridian) despite the first sale. Such SPA was accomplished
by affixing Luis thumbmark and despite the latter being sick, infirm, blind,
and of unsound mind.
On January 16, 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
with Damages was filed by Luis, as one of the plaintiffs, against his
daughter, Lucila, Laila and Meridian.
Lucilla and Laila submitted that the petitioners were estopped from
questioning the validity of the second sale because of their failure to effect
the registration and annotation of the first sale.
Meridian claimed that they were buyers in good faith.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners because it held that when Luis
executed the second deed of sale he was no longer the owner of the
properties.
On appeal, CA reversed and held that the first sale was void due to lack of
consideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first sale was valid.
RULING: Yes, the first sale was valid.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are
disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and
regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there
was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate
against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They
create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case
they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being
from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside
from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration,
they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It
is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable
presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that
the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of
sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not
pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however,
is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence
required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption
that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed
712 SCRA
1982, since then his son Hermogenes cultivated the lot 5053-H. On March
1992, Hermogenes died.
The controversy arose when the Heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Petitioners)
found out that the tax declaration was cancelled and another one was issued
in favor of Dionisio on June 1996 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated 27 June
1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio.
Petitioner filed a Complaint against Heirs of Dionisio (Respondents) for
quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, recovery of possession and
ownership among others. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Sale was a
forgery. Respondent in their Answer alleged that that assailed deed was
genuine document.
Petitioner presented a document examiner of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Region VII as their witness. He testified that according to his comparative
analysis of Ciprianos signature on the assailed deed and standard
signatures on other documents, Ciprianos signature on the deed in question
was a forgery.
Respondents presented Dionisios son Gorgonio, who testified that he was
present when the assailed deed was executed.
RTC ruled in in favor of the petitioner and held that the deed was a forgery
based on the discrepancies of Ciprianos signature on other document
presented.
On appeal, the CA reversed and held that petitioners had failed to prove by
requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery.31
The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of
authenticity and due execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were not able to overturn the
presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.
RULING: Petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence that the
assailed deed is a forgery.
The Supreme Court sustain the findings of the RTC.
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as
regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy
the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.39 Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear
and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed.
First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in
the assailed deed had been forged. In concluding that the signature of
Cipriano in the assailed deed was a forgery, the document examiner found
that there were "significant differences in letter formation, construction and
other individual handwriting characteristics" between the assailed and the
standard signatures of Cipriano The fact that the document examiner
himself admitted that even the standard signatures of Cipriano showed
variations among themselves does not make the formers determination any
less convincing. He explained that while every signature of the same person
varies, the individual handwriting characteristics of the person remain the
same.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the
signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature
was forged through independent observation:
Finally, a scrutiny of the signature on the questioned deed of sale compared
to the eleven (11) signatures on the ten (10) standard documents there exists
a glaring difference in the letter formation of capital letters "C" in Cipriano
and "T" in Trazona. The capital C in questioned signature, the initial stroke
stopped at the upper curve of the letter C while in the standard signatures, it
overlaps from the upper curve. In the word Trazona, the capital T in the
questioned signature is disconnected from the T bar to the body of the
questioned signature whereas, in the standard signatures, the capital T is
SUPPRESSION OF TESTIMONY
PEOPLE vs ROBERTO PADRIGONE
G.R. No. 137664
May 9, 2002
NOTE:Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
"evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not
apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative;
and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
FACTS: It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant
Roberto Padrigone and the other accused broke into the house of Rowena
Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion, Buhi,
Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta
poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,2 and
threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to others. They gagged
Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then, appellant
undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her while
his co-accused watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape
Nimfa but failed because she was able to elude him.
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their
turns. Every one of the accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they
warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they will kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police
and identified appellant and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However,
based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was only appellant who
raped her.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist of Cadlan Mental Hospital in Pili,
Camarines Sur, testified that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was
crying, incoherent and had shouting episodes. She was confined at the
Cadlan Mental Hospital for further treatment. Upon further medical
consultation, Dr. Belmonte observed thus:
Rowena was in a depressed mood and at the same time
overactive. She was combative, violent, and was experiencing
auditory hallucination, meaning, she heard things that only she
could hear. She was also grandiously deluded, falsely believing
that she could do things others could not do. By that time,
according to Dr. Belmonte, Rowena had already lost touch with
reality.4
Dr. Belmonte diagnosed her illness as "Acute Psychotic Depressive
Condition."5 She found that her mental disorder was not hereditary because
before the incident took place, she did not exhibit any unusual behavior.
She concluded that her mental illness was strongly related to a traumatic
experience. She noted that at one point in the treatment, Rowena confided
to her that "she was raped."
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel
Ibaneta and Abelardo Triumpante were charged with rape in an amended
information.
All the accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Page 49 of 68
Page 50 of 68
The deed of sale 2 and the memorandum of agreement 3 between Mr. Chia
and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September
1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16
September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and
paid one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventyone centavos (P116,416.71), for which METROBANK issued an official
receipt acknowledging payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real
estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty.
Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an
action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr.
Chia.
In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of
sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner
for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the
advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with
respondent GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by
Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11
December 1990 granting the reliefs prayed for by respondent GTP as
plaintiff.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24
October 1994 reversing the trial court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling
in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen
pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to
petitioner METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage
inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past due loans secured by the
subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November
1994 filed before respondent Court of Appeals a "motion for
reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish
appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia.
On 03 July 1995, the now assailed amended decision was rendered
reconsidering the original 24 October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the
11 December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court. Respondent Court
of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously
considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by
the subject property, in concluding anew that "the present case for specific
performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980
did not suffice to pay in full the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas
Chia. There is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the amended decision of public respondent Court of
Appeals was filed by Metrobank.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC.
DECISION: NO
Petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of
Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other
unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It
was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to
defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following
pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals et. al, speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco, find rightful
application, viz.
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact
which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce
evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against
him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence,
the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his
prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. . . .
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to
prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to
prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to
establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the
party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny
or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of
the inferences afforded. . . .
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most
OFFICIAL DUTY
DE LOS SANTOS vs. COA
G.R. No. 198457 August 13, 2013 703 SCRA
b.
c.
Page 51 of 68
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which
were denied maintaining their solidary liability.
Page 52 of 68
COHABITATION
G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
JESUS EDUALINO
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Rowena Caabay Nantiza was found lying on the ground about eight (8)
meters from the store owned by a certain Sgt. Edep. He found Rowena was
very hysterical and he observed that she had too much to drink. He turned
over Rowena to the police. He later learned that accused-appellant was
picked up for questioning regarding his alleged rape of Rowena Nantiza.
Epifania Caabay, Rodolfo's wife, testified that she accompanied Rowena
and her mother on board the police vehicle which took them to Brooke's
Point District Hospital. She stated that Rowena was hysterical and kept on
shouting in the vernacular, "I want water!" Epifania further stated that
Rowena's mother slapped her and hit her on different parts of the body to
quiet her down. Epifania agreed with the other defense witnesses that
Rowena was quite drunk at the time.
On 23 December 1994, the trial court rendered a decision guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE with penalty of death.
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution,
particularly to the narration of the young complainant, expressing a quote
from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that
"even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which
(could) put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag
herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame." Hence automatic
review by the SC.
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant
should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct
cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength
for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and
to present any rebuttal evidence.
Page 53 of 68
arrested appellant and brought him to the police station at Palauig. Later,
the policemen took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is
not "Johnny" but "Jessie." He testified that on January 17, 1997, at around
12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa
which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.
The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove
that appellant was employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost
two years before the alleged rape incident. Appellant was purportedly of
good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The
prosecution admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed
with the testimony of Tolentino in open court.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 26,
1999, founding the accused guilty GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was
only 6 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
Hence, this automatic review.
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was
highly irregular.l^vvphi1.net Appellant points out that the prosecutor had
already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the
prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses
that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man
named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark.
Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified
him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification
was not done with the usual police line-up.
ISSUE: Whether allowance of leading questions in the direct examination
of Mayia is justified.
DECISION: YES. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However,
the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender
years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting
or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their
reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing
leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered,
making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained
in People v. Rodito Dagamos:
"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the
courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child
witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000,
namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to
ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of
time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child
are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice."
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a
child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a
charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part,
subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and reputation,
unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her.
Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia
to identify appellant is without basis. True, Mayia did not identify appellant
in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his cell. However,
appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in
his cell. Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a
police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police
line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the police did
not suggest such identification to the witnesses. The records are bereft of
any indication that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as
the rapist.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist
dispels any doubt as to the proper identification of appellant. Mayia
positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are satisfied
that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist.
IMPEACHMENT
REFERENCE TO MEMORANDUM
G.R. No. 90198
November 7, 1995
NOTE:The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not
altogether proscribed. Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Page 54 of 68
projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor
Construction Corporation.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C),
containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of
3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner's total account of
P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by private
respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery
receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and
the acceptance thereof by the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of
P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private
respondent as well as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986.
However, she disputed the correctness of the bill
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private
respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by
the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat
it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water,
and [petitioner] has already paid [private respondent]
about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not
issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments
and there is no agreement that [private respondent]
will charge 3% per month interest.
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into
sub-contracts with private respondent.
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vicepresident, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony.
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to
pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per
annum, and costs.
The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not
have any stipulation on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of
damages under Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court's' reliance
on private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis
of Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF
BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BOOK OF
COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON
WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE
BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
SAID ENTRIES.
DECISION: NO
It is argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under
Rule 132, 10 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum.
A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or
under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such
case the writing must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may
read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify
from such a writing, though he retain no recollection
of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
writing correctly stated the transaction when made;
but such evidence must be received with caution.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible
for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another
purpose. She cites the following from Chief Justice Moran's commentaries:
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified. Where the offer is general, and the
evidence is admissible for one purpose and
inadmissible for another, the evidence should be
rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or
more purposes and the evidence is incompetent for
one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The
reason for the rule is that "it is the duty of a party to
select the competent from the incompetent in offering
testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the
Page 55 of 68
Page 56 of 68
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents
issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight.
RULING: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted
by petitioner are all public documents As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC
erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of
authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not
only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, 16 which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it
was only on said date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo
was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
702 SCRA
The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila, and when the shipment
was unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was found that the package marked as
03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes identified two packages, as being dented and broken. Thereafter,
the cargoes were stored for temporary safekeeping inside CFS Warehouse
in Pier No. 5
The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage,
Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latters
warehouse in Mandaluyong City. Upon the request of Universal Motors, a
bad order survey was conducted on the cargoes and it was found that one
Frame Axle Sub without LWR was deeply dented on the buffle plate while
six Frame Assembly with Bush were deformed and misaligned. Owing to
the extent of the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a
total loss.
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount against
Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal
Motors demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a
Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint for damages
against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the
RTC of Makati City.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and
ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally, with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum by way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
The court a quo ruled that there was sufficient evidence to establish the
respective participation of Westwind and ATI in the discharge of and
consequent damage to the shipment. It found that the subject cargoes were
compressed while being hoisted using a cable that was too short and taut.
The trial court acknowledged the subrogation between Philam and
Universal Motors on the strength of the Subrogation Receipt. It likewise
upheld Philams claim for the value of the alleged damaged vehicle parts
for "7 pieces of Frame Axle Sub Without Lower and Frame Assembly with
Bush."
Westwind filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied
in an Order.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. The
appellate court directed Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and
severally with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until fully paid,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subrogation receipt is inadmissible for being
hearsay for not being authenticated by the persons who executed them.
RULING: The nature of documents as either public or private determines
how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public
documents, as enumerated under Section 19, 33 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order
to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is
proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
Page 57 of 68
673 SCRA
The RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure
to secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The
RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the
Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls.
Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real
agreement between the parties was merely one of loan, and not of sale; he
further claimed that the loan had been extinguished upon the return of
theP68,000.00 to Johnnys mother, Domes.
T he CA rejected Lomises claim that the true agreement was one of loan.
The CA found that there were two agreements entered into between Johnny
and Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other
was for the sale of the improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed
with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack
of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the
improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises private
properties. For this reason, the CA remanded the case to the RTC to
determine the value of the improvements on the two market stalls, existing
at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Lomises moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, contending that no
valid sale of the improvements could be made because the lease contract,
dated May 1, 1985, between Lomises and the Baguio City Government,
supposedly marked as Exh. "A," provided that "[a]ll improvements
[introduced shall] ipso facto become properties of the City of Baguio."
T he CA denied the motion after finding that Lomises lawyer, Atty.
Rodolfo Lockey, misrepresented Exh. "A" as the governing lease contract
between Lomises and the Baguio City Government; the records reveal that
Exh. "A" was merely a permit issued by the City Treasurer in favor of
Lomises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of lease dated May 1, 1985 was never
formally offered in evidence before the RTC and could thus not be
considered pursuant to the rules of evidence.
RULING: The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1,
1985 lease contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as
it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA
admonished Lomises lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was
part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered,
the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight." Although
the contract was referred to in Lomises answer to Johnnys complaint and
marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached.
In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after
Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was
formally offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was
permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. In
other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that
any and all improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio
City Government.
December 7, 2011
ISSUE: Whether or not Wincorp the CA should have based its decision on
the express terms, stipulations, and agreements provided for in the
documents offered by the Francias as the legal relationship of the parties
was clearly spelled out in the very documents introduced by them which
indicated that it merely brokered the loan transaction between the Francias
and Pearlbank.
As to Pearlbank, records bear out that the Francias anchor their cause of
action against it merely on the strength of the subject Confirmation Advices
bearing the name "PearlBank" as the supposed borrower of their
investments. Apparently, the Francias ran after Pearlbank only after
learning that Wincorp was reportedly bankrupt. The Francias were
consistent in saying that they only dealt with Wincorp and not with
Pearlbank. It bears noting that even in their Complaint and during the pretrial conference, the Francias alleged that they did not have any personal
knowledge if Pearlbank was indeed the recipient/beneficiary of their
investments.
Page 58 of 68
Another significant point which would support the stand of Pearlbank that
it was not the borrower of whatever funds supposedly invested by the
Francias was the fact that it initiated, filed and pursued several cases
against Wincorp, questioning, among others, the latters acts of naming it as
borrower of funds from investors.
It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its
pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary
value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these
documents werenot formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To
consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine
and rebut them. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence
for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."
The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as
to the evidence presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to
evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears that
Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the
formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any.
Page 59 of 68
Page 60 of 68
October 4, 2011
by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Page 61 of 68
FACTS: On October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial
road in ButubutOeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla
suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais
fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
because Joel Marquez and TirsoAbunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted
at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their fatherin-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival. On
April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an
information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC. The accused pleaded
not guilty. At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the
night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when
Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in
the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had
continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows; that
Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had
thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had
hit the right side of the victims head, causing the latter to fall face down to
the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing
that Olais was no longer moving. The RTC rejected Fontanillas plea of
self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone,
inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to the
victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not
suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that
Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested
to any injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released
from the hospital; that Fontanillas failure to give any statement at the time
he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of selfdefense;and that the manner of attack against Olais established the
attendance of treachery. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ignoring the accuseds claim of
self-defense
RULING: Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be
appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal
injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a
prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court,and he would be held
criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof.He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak,
would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the
killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals
that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and,
two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the
mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victims fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained
some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any
kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented
himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did
not issue any medical certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to
him. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified
that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense
was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not
merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. The Court
considersto be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the
determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend
himself
Page 62 of 68
the
checks.
Mrs. Nilda Laforteza, the Commercial Account Officer stated that it was
Balmaceda who forged Ramos signature on the Managers checks where
Ramos was the payee, so as to encash the amounts indicated on the
checks. These testimonies clearly dispute PCIBs theory that Ramos was
instrumental in the encashment of the Managers checks.
Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. (See Encinas v. National
Bookstore)
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to
obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the
burden to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the
defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if
established, will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim.
Page 63 of 68
then Penaloza and Reyes will consider his application. Acero agreed, and
handed P1000.00 to Penaloza who in turn handed the same to the cashier.
Penaloza, in turn handed him a change of P320.00, and a little later he
was given the LTO Official receipt, but only for P180.00, which OR
served as his temporary license for 60 days, and the balance of P500.00
was without OR and retained by Penaloza. He then issued an Affidavit to
file charges against the guilty parties. The affidavit was apparently filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, but was later
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, who ordered the
respondents to submit their counter-affidavits. Penalozadenied telling
Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and
Pealoza would reconsider his application. Pealoza stated that he did
administer the examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he
requested their security guard, DominadorDaypuyat, to check the answers
of Acero using their answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Aceros paper,
Pealoza noted the score of 22/40. Pealoza informed Acero of the failing
grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero
then went to the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back
and returned his application documents to Pealoza.The Office of the
Ombudsman called for the parties for a prelimary conference, but such
was waived by Acero. Both parties failed to appear in the preliminary
conference, so the case was then submitted for decision. The counsel for
Pealoza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that his client
was waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. The Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision adjudging Reyes
guilty of grave misconduct and finding Pealoza guilty of simple
misconduct.Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Review. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and
reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was
sufficiently proven by substantial evidence.
RULING: Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to
the rights of others.Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave
misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of Office of the
LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in
exchange for the issuance of a drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding
that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.The
findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence.In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for
or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. In reviewing
administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of the Court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to
the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the
Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an
exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.The exception applies
herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case
should be made in order to arrive at a just resolution.Reyes faults petitioner
for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Pealoza, as well
as the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not
furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its
Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to
due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes
was afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to be
heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of
petitioners adverse decision.Due process, as a constitutional precept, does
Page 64 of 68
not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents
right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts
of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not
complied with.Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision
that found him guilty of grave misconduct.
Page 65 of 68
DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a
DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the
Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to
supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving
motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation
cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.The Rule on DNA
Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction
and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA
test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It
seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA
analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused
and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
public."Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable,
and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing.The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity
Page 66 of 68
notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the
managers check payable to Atty. Reyes. Upon verification with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was discovered that there was
no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in its membership roster. Further,
upon inspection of the PNB-MWSS microfilm copy of Managers
Check No. 1165848, it was shown that the check was negotiated
and encashed at the PNB-Circle and was annotated with ok for
payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS by Tria on
the dorsal portion of the check.
PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought
to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. Following a preliminary
investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
stating that Trias identification of the payee did not consummate
the payment of the Managers Check. Rather, it was held, the
consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval
of the encashment. Undaunted, PNB filed a petition for review
with the DOJ and prayed for the reversal of the Resolutions issued
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP). Then
Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales issued a Resolution dismissing
PNBs petition for review. PNBs motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the existence of probable cause in
the instant case and affirming the OCPs findings that there is no
probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for trial in
the crime of qualified theft.
RULING: According to the CA, it was the approval of the request
for the issuance and for the encashment of the managers check by
the employees of PNB that resulted in the withdrawal of the
amount encashed by Atty. Reyes/John Doe. Hence, according to
the appellate court, the OCP was correct in not pursuing the
criminal case against Tria.
Clearly, the CA in the instant case erroneously overlooked vital
factual circumstances that call for a reversal of its ruling.
While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a
preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the
filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such
authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to review when it
has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And indeed,
grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges
against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed
against him for qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the
filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him,
but only that there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of
the crime charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused.
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the
encashment of the check provide more than sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause to file an information against him and
John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer
from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified
theft.
While it is truly imperative to relieve a person from the pain of
going through the rigors of trial, it is more imperative to proceed
with the prosecution of a criminal case to ensure that the truth is
revealed and justice served when there is a prima facie case against
him.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012. 664 SCRA
FACTS: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to
serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner
Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody
shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillos
house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate
from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him
with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not
guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge
against him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision.
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who
applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside
from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that
Masnayon (who served the search warrant) was conscious of the falsity of
his assertion or representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was no probable cause to issue the subject
search warrant in this case.
RULING:
This Court finds no merit on the argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable
cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause,
is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not
by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
Page 67 of 68
inferred
according
to
reason
and
common
experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with
approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she
and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of
the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan
several persons entered to rob the place;
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando
Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the latter uttering
somebody will die;
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo
where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and
with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo,
Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo, Alberto
Anticamara and Fred;
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the
Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan;
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was
dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon
reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her
in the vehicle;
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him
uttered: Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4) bullets
in his body, and the one left is for this girl.
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA
heard Fred utter Usapan natin pare, kung sino ang masagasaan,
sagasaan. (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June
23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and naming his
companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA
and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the
fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains
of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by
the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were
found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil
concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The
report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye
sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth was also found
tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of
Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the
appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and
blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly
shot and buried.
PEOPLE VS. DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. 185212
February 15, 2012
666 SCRA
FACTS: This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be
considered sufficient to support a finding of guilt in a murder case.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Sultan Kudarat charged the accused Maritess
Alolod (the adopted child of the victims), Efren Deocampo, Edwin
Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the (RTC) of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. The RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of
Lucena and Melanio Alolod, with Efren and Edwin as principals and
Maritess and Elmer as accessories. While the case was on appeal, the (CA)
granted the request of Maritess and Elmer to withdraw their appeals,
leaving only those of Efren and Edwin for its considerationThe CA
rendered judgment, affirming with modification the RTC decision. The CA
reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that
accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based
on circumstantial evidence.
RULING: No, the CA is correct.
The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of
the crime provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a)
There is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and
(c)
The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads
to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of
all others.
Here, those circumstances abound.
1.
Efren had always been banned from the old couples
(Alolod couple) house because they strongly disapproved his relationship
with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around
that house.
2.
The old couple were enjoying good health before the
evening of May 27, 1998.
3.
On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house,
meaning that they were killed on the night of May 27 or early morning of
May 28.
Page 68 of 68
4.
On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman
Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next
to the old couples house. They even tried to conceal themselves in th
school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had
been cut.
5.
At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound
of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig.
6.
At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod
kitchen.
7.
From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old
couples house, with Efren wearing the old mans watch.
8.
Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going
to Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment
when people started looking for them. They were of course buried in the
garden.
9.
A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant
more camote on a pile of red soil beside the house.
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath
those plants.
The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old
couple was killed does not encourage belief. The security guard saw him
with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the couples house where they
had no business being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that
house on the morning following the slaying of the couple. And it was
not physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it
happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South Upi, Maguindao was merely 15
kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.