Assignment No.

2
Case Digests in SCARP AND SPECPRO
Submitted by Christopher G. Halnin
To Atty. Christian Kit Villasis

1. NASECOR vs. Energy Regulatory Commission

G.R. No. 190795
July 6, 2011
FACTS:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), created under the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA), used to apply the Return on Rate Base (RORB) method to
determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the services it
provides. The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity
charges in the Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43(f) of the
EPIRA allows the ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of
internationally accepted rate-setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions. The ERC,
through a series of resolutions, adopted the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to
set the allowable rates DUs may charge their customers. Meralco, a DU, applied for an
increase of its distribution rate under the PBR scheme docketed as ERC Case No. 2009-057
RC (MAP2010 case) on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA, and
Engineer Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions for Intervention to
oppose the application of Meralco.
At the initial hearing, on 6 October 2009, the following entered their appearances: (1)
Meralco, (2) Mallillin, and (3) FOVA. Petitioners NASECORE and FOLVA failed to appear
despite due notice. Meralco presented its first witness on 13 November 2009. At the date of
hearing, FOLVA failed to appear despite due notice. Likewise, on 19 November 2009, the
continuation of Meralcos presentation of its witness, petitioners NASECORE, FOVA, and
FOLVA all failed to appear despite due notice. NASECORE had sent a letter requesting that
it be excused from the said hearing, but reserved its right to cross-examine the witness
presented by Meralco. The latter objected to this request by virtue of the ERCs Rules of
Practice and Procedure. ERC ruled that the absence of NASECORE and FOVA was deemed
a waiver of their right to cross-examine Meralcos first witness.
On 14 December 2009,10 Meralcos application in the MAP2010 case was approved by
ERC. Petitioner NASECORE protests this claiming approval as premature, that there were
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still four days before the expiration of the period given to it to file its opposition to the formal
offer of evidence of Meralco, and before petitioner NASECORE received its copy of the
documents Meralco was required to additionally submit in the 7 December 2009 ERC Order.
Petitioners main assertion is that the ERC Decision approving the MAP2010 application of
Meralco is null and void for having been issued in violation of their right to due process of
law.12 They further ask this Court to stay the execution of the aforementioned Decision for
being void, to wit: As already shown earlier, the assailed ERC Decision is a patent nullity due
to lack of due process of law. Thus, being a void decision, it can not (sic) be the source of any
right on the part of MERALCO to collect additional charges from their customers. Invariably,
the 4.3 million customers of MERALCO has (sic) no obligation whatsoever to pay additional
distribution charges to MERALCO. To implement such void ERC decision, is plainly
oppressive, confiscatory, and unjust.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a TRO?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is
entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a
final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or
continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners assert that this Court should issue a TRO because of the huge amount that would
unduly burden the consumers with the continued application of the MAP2010 rates.
According to petitioners, "if not stayed, the present financial hardships of 4.3 million
MERALCO customers due to the global financial meltdown and the recent calamities in the
country will surely further worsen." Petitioners also claim that there is an extreme urgency to
secure a TRO, considering that the assailed Decision is immediately executory.
The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights
involved from further injury, until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.
Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if
it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction
could be heard.
If such irreparable injury would result from the non-issuance of the requested writ or if the
"extreme urgency" referred to by petitioners indeed exists, then they should have been more
vigilant in protecting their rights. As they have all been duly notified of the proceedings in
the ERC case, they should have appeared before the ERC and participated in the trials.

We find that petitioners erred in thinking that the non-issuance of the TRO they requested
would put consumers in danger of suffering an "irreparable injury". But this asserted injury
can be repaired, because, had petitioners participated in the proceedings before the ERC and
the latter had found merit in their appeal, the undue increase in electric bills shall be refunded
to the consumers.
2. Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili vs. Judge Rasad Balindong
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
September 6, 2011
FACTS:
An Action for damages was filed in RTC branch of Iligan City against Mindanao State
University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus
Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.
RTC in its decision held that MSU is liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90.
CA affirmed the decision. Entry of Judgment was made.
RTC issued a writ of execution. MSU failed to comply. Thus, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje
served the Notice of Garnishment to MSUs depository bank, Land Bank of the Philippines.
Office of the Solicitor Genereal opposed the motion for execution in behalf of MSU.
RTC denied the opposition.
MSU responded to the denial by filing a petition with RTC for Prohibition and Mandamus
with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition was raffled to the RTC,
Branch 8, Presided by Respondent Judge Rasad Balindong.
Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing the amount of P2,726,189.90.
He required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Respondent Judge granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case filed the
complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct PRejudicial to the Interest of the
Judicial Service for the interfering with the order of a co-equal court by issuing TRO to
enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing the said amount.
OCA found respondent Judge guilty of Gross Ignorance of the law for violating the
elementary rule on Non-Interference with the proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction
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ISSUE:
Whether the Respondent Judge is guilty for the interfering with the order of a co-equal court
by issuing TRO to enjoin the Sheriff from garnishing amount from the bank?
HELD:
Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-interference states that No court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having
the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. Rationale is founded on the concept of
Jurisdiction: A court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings
in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own
processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in
the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
The law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a
writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation.
The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court
has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the
Courts deliberations, finds no application to this case since this provision applies to claims
made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his agent; a third-party claimant
of a property under execution may file a claim with another court which, in the exercise of its
own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order.
If Sheriff Gaje committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the
writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from,
the same court which issued the decision, not from any other court, or to elevate the matter to
the CA on a petition for certiorari. In this case, MSU filed the proper motion with the Iligan

City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse through another
co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
Wherefore, Respondent Judge is FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law.
3. Spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap vs. International Exchange Bank
G.R. No. 175145
March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank) filed a collection suit with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go
in the RTC of Makati, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent iBank and
found Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to pay the amount of ninetysix million pesos (P96,000,000.00), plus penalty.
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued against Mr. Go for his part of the liability.
Thereupon, respondent Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City,
issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale on 12 May 2000 notifying all the parties concerned, as well
as the public in general, that the properties allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold at a
public auction.
On 13 June 2000, petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a Complaint for
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction with
the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioners sought to stop the auction sale alleging that the properties
mentioned in the auction , are already owned by them by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed by Jimmy Go in their favor, that respondent sheriff disregarded their right over the
properties despite their execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim over
the properties and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that various deeds had
already been issued in their favor evidencing their right over the same.
On 21 August 2000, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 158, issued an Order in Civil Case No.
67945 denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The public auction took place on 22 August 2000 for which respondent sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale stating that the subject properties had been sold at public auction in favor
of respondent iBank, subject to the third-party claims of petitioners.8
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for Annulment of Sheriff's
Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against iBank, the Clerk of Court and ExOfficio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora, including a writ of preliminary
injunction. A hearing was held on the application for preliminary injunction. On 18 July
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2001, an Order was issued by Judge Janolo granting petitioners' application for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
The Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs' application for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, and defendants and their representatives are enjoined
from proceeding further with the execution, including consolidating title and taking
possession thereof, against plaintiffs' real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. PT-66751, PT-66749, 55469, 45229, 4621, 52987 and 36489.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon plaintiffs' posting of a bond executed
to defendant in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to the effect that plaintiffs
will pay defendants all damages which the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if it
be ultimately decided that the injunction is unwarranted.
On 13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Respondents iBank
and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which the trial court denied in an Order dated 21
November 2001.
With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction praying
that it:
(a) issue immediately a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Janolo from taking
any action or conducting any further proceeding on the case;
(b) annul the Orders dated 18 July 2001 and 21 November 2001; and
(c) order the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. 68088.
In its decision dated 18 July 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It explained
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by Judge Janolo in promulgating the two
Orders. It emphasized that its ruling only pertains to the propriety or impropriety of the
issuance of the preliminary injunction and has no bearing on the main issues of the case
which are still to be resolved on the merits. The Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
filed by respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora was denied for lack of merit.
Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora thereafter filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari which we dismissed.
The Court's Resolution dated 7 March 2005 reads:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, the
Court Resolves to DISMISS the petition for being a wrong remedy under the Rules and
evidently used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. Besides, even if treated as a petition under Rule 65 of the
said Rules, the same would be dismissed for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment was
issued by the Supreme Court certifying that the resolution dismissing the case had become
final and executory on 30 July 2005.
Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve
Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration
dated 26 February 2001 which seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved.
In a Manifestation dated 24 March 2006, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora submitted an
Affidavit of Merit to emphasize their resolve and willingness, among other things, to file a
counter-bond to cover whatever damages petitioners may suffer should the trial court decide
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction.
In an Order dated 29 April 2006, the trial court recalled and dissolved the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 13 August 2001, and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond amounting
to ten million pesos. It directed the Branch Clerk of Court to issue a Writ Dissolving
Preliminary Injunction upon the filing and approval of the required counter-bond.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court's writ of preliminary injunction dated August 13, 2001 is recalled
and dissolved. Defendants are hereby ordered to post a counter-bond amounting to ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to cover the damages plaintiffs would incur should a
favorable judgment be rendered them after trial on the merits.
ISSUE:
May the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings
of the Court of Appeals and by the SC that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
HELD:
In our jurisdiction, the provisions of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow the
issuance of preliminary injunction. This court granted plaintiffs' prayer preliminary
injunction in the Order dated July 18, 2001 and the corresponding writ issued on August 13,
2001. Defendants in this case, however, are not without remedy to pray for dissolution of
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preliminary injunction already granted because it is only interlocutory and not permanent in
nature. The provisions of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow dissolution
of the injunction granted provided there is affidavit of party or persons enjoined; an
opportunity to oppose by the other party; hearing on the issue, and filing of a bond to be
fixed by the court sufficient to compensate damages applicant may suffer by dissolution
thereby.
A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject
to the latter's outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy. The status quo should be that existing at the time of
the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the
parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs' deed of sale was purported to be not duly notarized. As such, the
legal right of what the plaintiffs claim is still doubtful and such legal right can only be
threshed out in a full blown trial where they can clearly establish the right over the disputed
properties.
When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal
right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper and constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. In the case at bar, plaintiffs' deed of sale was purported to be not duly notarized.
As such, the legal right of what the plaintiffs claim is still doubtful and such legal right can
only be threshed out in a full blown trial where they can clearly establish the right over the
disputed properties.
In the case of Lasala v. Fernandez the highest court has enunciated that "a court has the
power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by it. The
issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at
all times within the control of the court
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is
governed by Section 3 Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its
dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long
as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of
any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court
previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Citing Section 6 of Rule 58
A preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof,
as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the
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applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a
bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the
applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order.
Two conditions must concur: first, the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the
continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff
can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a
counter-bond. The Order of the trial court dated 29 April 2006 is based on this ground.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or, otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that
issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may
warrant. In the case on hand, the trial court issued the order of dissolution on a ground
provided for by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with the rules, we find no
reason to disturb the same.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed outright their Petition for Certiorari by failing to apply existing jurisprudence that
a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the controverted act is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. It must be stressed that a petition
for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing
of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct
any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual issues. By
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of the
opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any.
Moreover, a perusal of petitioners' petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
shows that they filed the same because there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law except via a petition for certiorari . When same was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's Order, they argue that while the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari is instituted, the same is not entirely without exception
like where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction. It was only when the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition did
they argue that exceptions to the general rule should apply. Their invocation of the
application of the exceptions was belatedly made. The application of the exceptions should
be raised in their Petition for Certiorari and not when their Petition has already been

dismissed. They must give their reasons and explain fully why their case falls under any of
the exceptions. This, petitioners failed to do.

Petitioners' argument that they filed the Petition for Certiorari without filing a motion for
reconsideration because there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law except via a Petition for Certiorari does not convince. We have held that the
"plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. The mere allegation that there
is "no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy" is not one of the exceptions to the
rule that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may be
filed.
All told, we hold that the act of the trial court of issuing the Order dated 29 April 2006 was
not patently illegal or performed without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
was correct in dismissing outright petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for failing to file a
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order.

4. Manila Banking Corp. vs. CA and Luzon Brokerage Corp.

G.R. No. L-45961
July 3, 1990

FACTS:
Private respondent Luzon Brokerage Corporation entered into a "Field Warehouse Storage
Agreement" with PACOCO to operate warehouses in Surigao, Surigao del Norte for
Philippine copra in bags and/or in bulk, and some three and a half years later, a lease of the
latter's two warehouses for the purpose of depositing copra therein. Pursuant to the
agreements, LUZON received from PACOCO for deposit in said warehouses 150 long tons
of copra resecada valued at P84,000.00, in connection with which LUZON issued a
warehouse receipt dated July 29, 1964 for 150 long tons copra resecada. Some two months
later, petitioner MANILABANK addressed a formal request to the Provincial Sheriff of
Surigao del Norte to extrajudicially sell the copra above described at public auction.

The request was made without prior satisfaction of LUZON's warehouseman's lien, the
surrender of the warehouse receipt, or presentation of a "written order" from the entities
mentioned in said receipt. Thus private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte for a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the
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defendants, their agents, representatives or deputies from selling the 150 long tons of copra in
the two warehouses of PACOCO leased to plaintiff. The Trial Court issued a temporary
restraining order and set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing and at the
same time ordered the public auction of the copra to prevent the deterioration which would
result to the ultimate loss to the prejudice of the party or parties who may be found to be
entitled to the same. Petitioner filed an opposition to the injunction application. The copra
was accordingly sold at public auction for P78,470.11, which amount was deposited with
MANILABANK in the name of the Provincial Sheriff of Surigao del Norte, subject to the
orders of the Trial Court. Thereafter petitioner filed for a motion to dismiss on the injunction
prayed for by the private respondent. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss
considering that the acts prayed for for injunction had already been committed since the
copra has already been sold.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an injunction can be issued against consummated acts?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both types of
remedies: a preliminary and a final injunction. Section 1 of the Rule defines a preliminary
injunction as
. . . an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the final judgment, requiring a person
to refrain from a particular act . . . (or) the performance of a particular act, in which (latter)
case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Section 10 of the same Rule, on the other hand, treats of a final injunction. It reads as
follows:
. . . If upon the trial of the action it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to have the act
complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the defendant from the commission or continuance of the act or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 39, also adverted to by the Appellate Tribunal, deals inter
alia with "an action for injunction," and decrees that the judgment therein "shall not be
stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal."
An action for injunction, therefore, is as it has always been, a recognized remedy in this
country. It is, as above intimated, a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the
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defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a

specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. As well
established is the rule that an action for permanent injunction should be dismissed when it
appears in the trial or otherwise that the acts, to restrain which the action was begun, have
been accomplished or fully executed.
The acts sought to be restrained by LUZON's complaint have already been accomplished.
What the complaint sought essentially was to perpetually stop the Provincial Sheriff of
Surigao del Norte and his co-defendants, and "their agents, representatives or deputies from
selling the 150 long tons of copra in the two warehouses of PACOCO leased to plaintiff
(LUZON) . . . and from molesting said plaintiff in its possession thereof." This, on the theory
that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was being attempted without prior satisfaction of
LUZON's warehouseman's lien, the surrender of the warehouse receipt, or presentation of a
"written order" from the entities mentioned in said receipt.
But the undisputed fact is that LUZON had long since ceased to have possession of the copra
resecada and the mortgage sale thereof has already been consummated. It is obviously no
longer possible to grant it the relief it was seeking against MANILABANK, i.e., the
permanent restraint of the mortgage sale of the copra, and of any interference with its
possession thereof.
5. First Global Realty & Devt. Corp. vs. Agustin
G.R. No. 18249
February 19,2002
FACTS:
The subject matter is a parcel of land, including a house builtthereon, covered by a TCT
issued in the name of respondentsmother, Lilian San Agustin, who, together with his parents,
brothers and sisters, have been in possession of the since 1967. The subject property was sold
to spouses Enrique and Angelina Camacho, supposedly for PhP2,500,000.00. However,
spouses Camacho succeeded in convincing herein respondent to accept a partial payment
of P100,000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of absolute sale in their favor over the
subject property. The balance of P2.4 million pesos would be paid once the title over the
same was transferred in the name of spouses Camacho and the latter will use the property as
collateral to secure a loan in order to pay the balance. On May 26, 1994, TCT No. 194868
was issued in the name spouses Camacho.
The First Global Realty Development Corporation (FGRDC), granted the spouses Camacho
loan application with the subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190 million.
However, despite receipt of the loan and San Agustins demand to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, spouses Camacho did not pay the same. The
Camachos failed to pay the loan and thus, FGRDC sought the foreclosure of the mortgage.
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Before the foreclosure, the parties agreed on a dacion en pago, in which the spouses ceded
ownership of the property in favor of herein petitioner in consideration of the payment of the
loan.FGRDC then demanded the payment of rentals from the respondents but the latter did
not heed the demand of the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a motion for issuance of a
writ of possession. Respondent then filed an action to enjoin petitioner from taking
possession of the subject property.
Respondent filed a separate complaint for rescission of the deed of absolute sale, annulment
of the dacion en pago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction against FGRDC, seeking
to enjoin the latter from taking possession of the subject property.
The RTC denied the application of respondent for a preliminary injunction to prevent
petitioner from evicting him from the subject property.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief prayed for by
respondent. Aggrieved by the CA Decision, petitioner lodged the present recourse
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the possession of the property while the main action
is pending in the RTC?
HELD:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. It is
issued to preserve the

status quo ante the

last actual,

peaceful,

and uncontested status

that preceded the actual controversy. Respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the
relief demanded. The Camachos non-payment of the purchase price agreed upon and the
irregularities of surrounding the dacion en pago are serious enough to allow him to possess
the property pendente lite. To allow petitioner to take immediate possession of the property
would result in grave injustice.
6. Elidad C. Kho vs. CA and, Summerville Gen. Merchandising and Co.
G.R. No. 115758
March 19, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondents Summerville General
Merchandising and Company and AngTiamChay.
Kho alleged that she, doing business under the name and style of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory,
is the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream
Container/Case, and that she also has patent rights on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin
13

Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, the registered
owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office way back in 1980.
She alleged that respondent Summerville advertised and sold petitioners cream products
under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby
misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioners business sales and
income; and, that the respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the
copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive
and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured
by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized
Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine
Patent Office and other appropriate governmental agencies; and, that the authority of Quintin
Cheng, assignee of the patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su
products in the Philippines had already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing
Company.
The trial court granted the petitioners application for preliminary injunction. The
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled
in favor of the respondents. It set aside and declared null and void the orders of the trial court
granting the writ of preliminary injunction. It directed the trial court to forthwith proceed
with the trial of the case and resolve the issue raised by the parties on the merits.
The appellate court held that the registration of the trademark or brandname "Chin Chun Su"
by KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer cannot be equated with registration in the principal register, which is duly protected
by the Trademark Law.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she followed with several other
motions.
In the meantime, the trial court went on to hear petitioners complaint for final injunction and
damages. It afterwards rendered a Decision holding that the petitioner does not have
trademark rights on the name and container of the beauty cream product. It barred the
petitioner from using the trademark Chin Chun Su and upheld the right of the respondents to
use the same. It, however, recognized the copyright of the petitioner over the oval shaped
container of her beauty cream.
The petitioner duly appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was
denied.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution almost a year after, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration and her other motions previously filed.
14

Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari contending among others that the
appellate court denied her right to seek timely appellate when it failed to rule on her motion
for reconsideration within ninety (90) days from the time it was submitted for resolution in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court ruled only after the lapse of three hundred fifty-four (354) days.
ISSUE:
Was petitioners right to file a timely relief violated?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 58 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is a proof that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act
or acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. Thus, a preliminary
injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of the same
shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.

This is the reason why the Court have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear
and unmistakable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive order on
the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark on Chin Chun Su and its container
based on her copyright and patent over the same.
The Court found it appropriate to rule on whether the copyright and patent over the name
and container of a beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the use and ownership
over the same to the exclusion of others.
It was found that the petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the
subject trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are
proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In
order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the
user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The
petitioners copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee
her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate
subjects of the said intellectual rights.

15

Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the
petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the
exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the
same before anyone did.
The Court also gave weight to the decision of the trial court in the case for final injunction
and damages. which held that the petitioner does not have trademark rights on the name and
container of the beauty cream product. The said decision on the merits of the trial court
rendered the issuance of the writ of a preliminary injunction moot and academic
notwithstanding the fact that the same has been appealed in the Court of Appeals.
This is supported by the Courts ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
which held that:
Considering the preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at any
time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established that
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts
entitling such reliefs. And it appearing that the trial court had already granted the issuance of
a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered after trial on the merits, the
Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot and academic.
An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to
the plaintiffs right thereto, that is, after the same issue has been decided on the merits, the
trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that
the decision rendered is not yet final . . .
Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merit of the main case
for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already determined in favor of the
applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and
effect.
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final injunction renders any question
on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic despite the fact that the decision
granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a decision denying the applicantplaintiffs right to a final injunction, although appealed, renders moot and academic any
objection to the prior dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction.
7. MIAA vs. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 118249
February 14, 2003

16

FACTS:
K Services is a provider of porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the Manila
International Airport (now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport) under a provisional
permit for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. MIAA and K Services
subsequently executed a contract effective from May 1976 to April 30, 1977 that was
renewed yearly until December 1984.
Although the parties did not renew their contract for the succeeding year, K Services
continued as porterage contractor from January 1985 until February 1987. Sometime in
February 1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services of K Services would be
terminated on February 20, 1987. In response, K Services filed a petition for injunction on
February 26, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No.
4692-P.
On December 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 4692-P ruling that MIAA could terminate its contract with K
Services at any time. On April 12, 1991, K Services appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 23053. The Court of
Appeals also denied K Services subsequent motion for reconsideration. As K Services did not
appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. Thus, the issue as to
whether MIAA could terminate the contract with K Services became res judicata.
Shortly after, K Services received a letter dated May 31, 1991 from then MIAA General
Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, the relevant portion of which stated: Due to certain
administrative problems that are preventing us from taking over, please continue operating
said service until further notice from us.Please understand however that in continuing the
operation of the porterage service, you will be charged the monthly Concession Privilege Fee
in the amount of P45,000.00 for each Terminal or a total of P90,000.00 per month; further,
you will also abide by the terms and conditions of your expired contract. K Services alleged
that it was initially hesitant to accept MIAAs offer. However, it continued to provide porters
for Domestic Terminal I and expanded its operations to cover Domestic Terminal II upon the
alleged verbal assurance of MIAAs officers that MIAAs policy was to relinquish porterage
operations to the private sector. K Services likewise claimed that MIAA officers also gave
verbal assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another porterage contractor
without a public bidding in which K Services could participate. In support of its contention,
K Services cited the memorandum dated August 28, 1992 from General Manager Guillermo
G. Cunanan to the MIAA Board of Directors, stating that Management has decided to
relinquish the management of these concessions and award them to the private sector at fair
and reasonable fees. It also recommended to the MIAA Board of Directors the approval of a
schedule of concession fees chargeable to concessionaires of porterage and other services.
However, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice to K Services to wind up its
17

operations as Management has decided to take over the aforecited services at the Domestic
Passenger Terminals I and II on December 1, 1992.
K Services opposed the takeover, by filing a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued on December
28, 1992 a temporary restraining order against MIAA. The trial court granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by K Services, restraining and preventing the respondent
Manila International Airport Authority or anyone acting for on its own behalf, from
terminating the porterage services of the petitioner K Services Company until further order
from the trial court provided, however, that the petitioner files before this Court a bond with
sufficient sureties in the amount of Php 500,000.00.
MIAAs legal department duly received a copy of the trial courts order. However, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) did not receive a copy of the injunctive writ,
despite having already entered its appearance as counsel for MIAA during previous hearings
before the trial court.
On February 11, 1993, the OSG filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by K Services
on the grounds that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; or (2) assuming the
existence of a cause of action, a prior judgment barred the same. At the time MIAA filed the
instant petition before the Court, this motion to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending
consideration by the trial court.
On July 7, 1993, K Services filed a motion to cite MIAAs General Manager Cunanan for
contempt as the latter ostensibly attempted to oust and replace K Services with another
porterage contractor.
On July 23, 1993, the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion which mainly alleged that: (1) the
injunctive writ lacked legal and factual basis; and (2) K Services was using the injunction as
a shield to violate the terms of the porterage agreement by charging fees in excess of the
amount authorized by the contract. The Omnibus Motion prayed for reconsideration of the
order of January 20, 1993 and for the lifting of the injunction.
On August 5, 1993, the trial court denied MIAAs Omnibus Motion, ruling that the allegations
that the complaint states no cause of action, and that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction has no factual and legal basis to the mind of this Court, are not tenable. The OSG,
on MIAAs behalf, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial courts orders of January 20, 1993 and August 5, 1993. The OSG argued that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction and denied the Omnibus Motion without
18

sufficient factual and legal basis.

The Court of Appeals set aside the questioned orders of the trial court for lack of sufficient
basis, that the granting of the writ of preliminary injunction at this stage of the proceeding,
being based on the doubtful genuineness and validity of the alleged extended agreement, has
not been successfully established.
Thus, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.
The Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision reversing its earlier decision of
December 22, 1993 and dismissing MIAAs petition for certiorari. Citing misapprehensions
of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence submitted by both parties, as well as the
issues raised in the oral arguments, also by both parties, were the very bases upon which the
writ of preliminary injunction was issued to avoid any irreparable loss that might be caused
to the plaintiff. No grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to a judge or body in the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a party was not deprived of its day in court
as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses (Santos vs. CA,
214 SCRA 162).
On January 26, 1995, the OSG filed with the Court a petition for review and prayed for: (1)
the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals; (2) the annulment of the
assailed orders issued by the trial court; and (3) the issuance of a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from implementing its assailed orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.K Services argument is incorrect.We find for MIAA.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time, prescribed
that a preliminary injunction could be granted provided: (a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the
relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work
injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
19

existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The duty of the court taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it.
Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court should
have exercised more prudence and judiciousness in its issuance of the injunction order. We
remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on
the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of such discretion.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of
the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.
Thus, the trial court's grant of the injunctive writ in favor of K Services despite the lack of a
clear and unmistakable right on the part of K Services constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A finding that the applicant for preliminary injunction may
suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation does not suffice to support an injunction,
where it appears that the right of the applicant is unclear or disputed.
Finally, in deciding to dismiss MIAAs petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals cited the
Courts pronouncement in Santos v. Court of Appeals. We clarify that Santos does not
constitute an exception to the requirement of a clear and unmistakable right before an
injunction may issue. On the contrary, the Court in Santos expressly declared that all the
requisites for the proper issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction were present, and the
right of the government to the injunctive writ was clear, well-defined and certain.
8. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes
G.R. No. 181274
June 23, 2010.
FACTS:
Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes and the heirs of MaximinoCarantes are in
possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land located in Loakan Road, Baguio City. On
June 20, 1997, they obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) No. CAR-CALC-022
over the land from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). On the
strength of said CALC, respondents secured a building permit and a fencing permit from the
Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. Before long, they fenced the premises and
began constructing a residential building thereon.

20

Soon, respondents received a letterdated February 9, 1999 from Digna D. Torres, the Zone
Administrator of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), informing them that the
house they built had overlapped PEZAs territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to
demolish the same within sixty (60) days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its
demolition at respondents expense.
Without answering PEZAs letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction before
the RTC of Baguio City which was subsequently granted and which enjoined PEZA to cease
and desist from threatening respondents with the demolition of their house before
respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. On September 19, 2001,
the RTC likewise issued an Order,which directed the parties to maintain the status quo
pending resolution of the case.
On October 2, 2001, the RTC granted respondents petition and ordered the issuance of a writ
of injunction against PEZA The trial court ruled that respondents are entitled to possess,
occupy and cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their CALC. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling. Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents satisfied the requisites for the issuance of Preliminary
Injunction?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a
party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction
or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As
a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction
issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, provides,
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it
appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance
of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be
protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said
right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the
plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To
authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie
showing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right
21

not inesse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction. The
petitioner does not pose an adverse claim over the subject land neither does it dispute that
respondents hold building and fencing permits over the lots.
Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited
to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1, Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the
same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully
within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much
less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands an act of ownership that
pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Title. On this score alone, respondents action for injunction must fail.
Yet, even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up
fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and
regulations. By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has
authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned
or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its
director general may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such
structures within sixty (60) days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the
expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures.
From the foregoing disquisition, it clearly appears that respondents likewise failed to satisfy
the second requisite in order that an injunction may issue: that the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed, are violative of said right. PEZA acted well within its functions
when it demanded the demolition of the structures which respondents had put up without first
securing building and fencing permits from the Authority.
9. Gov. Enrique T. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 185132
April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Sometime in 2004, the provincial government of Bataan caused the tax delinquency sale of
the properties of Sunrise Paper Products Industries, Inc. (Sunrise). Without any other bidder
at the public auction, the province acquired the immovables consisting of a paper plant with
its machineries and equipment and the parcels of land where it is erected. To annul the
auction sale and to prevent the province from consolidating in its name the titles over the
properties, Sunrise, on April 21, 2005, filed a petition for injunction in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bataan.
During the pendency of the case, the province represented by the governor entered into a
compromise agreement with Sunrise on June 14, 2005. On the same date, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, through a unanimous resolution, approved the same. Subsequently, the parties
22

moved for the dismissal of the civil case, not on account of the settlement, but on the ground
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction for failure of any of the parties to comply with
Section 267 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991. Upon the same ground, the parties no longer sought judicial approval of the
compromise agreement.
However, the trial court refused to dismiss the case and, on June 15, 2007, rendered its
Decision declaring, among others, that the auction sale was invalid, that the transfer
certificates of titles in the name of the province were falsified, and that the compromise
agreement executed by the parties was illegal.
Meanwhile, private respondents Josechito B. Gonzaga, Ruel A. Magsino and Alfredo B.
Santos, utilizing the June 15, 2007 Decision of the trial court as basis, filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman the January 22, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit administratively and criminally
charging, among others, the petitioners with violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, falsification of public documents, serious
illegal detention, malversation of public properties and funds, and plunder. On October 28,
2008, the Ombudsman, in the administrative case docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0039-A, issued
the Order preventively suspending petitioners for six months.
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the
Ombudsmans Order, petitioners, on November 10, 2008, filed with the CA the petition,
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance of an
injunctive relief.
On November 14, 2008, the appellate court issued the assailed Resolution directing the
respondents to file their comment and not a motion to dismiss. Action on the injunctive relief
prayed for is held in abeyance pending receipt of the pleadings ordered filed or until the
period to file the same shall have lapsed.
Alarmed over the impending implementation of the Ombudsman order and distraught with
the apparent inaction of the appellate court, petitioners instituted the instant petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. On November 19, 2008, the
Court issued a TRO enjoining and prohibiting public respondents and any person
representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the October 28, 2008
Order of the Ombudsman until further orders from the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether it is correct for the appellate court to hold abeyance or deferment of action on
petitioners urgent prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief?

23

HELD:
For the CA to defer action on petitioners application for an injunctive relief pending the
filing of respondents comment is to foreclose altogether the very remedy sought by
petitioners when they questioned the alleged illegal preventive suspension. This is so,
because the Ombudsmans Order is immediately effective and executory, and the filing of the
comment by all of the respondents will entail considerable time.
While the court do not entirely blame the CA for being too cautious in not granting any
injunctive relief without first considering the counter-arguments of the opposing parties, it
would have been more prudent for it to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme
urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued
a TRO while it awaits the respective comments of the respondents and while it judiciously
contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Verily, the basic
purpose of the restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction. It is a preservative remedy for the protection of
substantive rights and interests.
As the appellate court failed dutifully and prudently to exercise its discretion, in violation of
fundamental principles of law and the Rules of Court, its action is correctible by a certiorari
writ from this Court.
The Court therefore accept as correct petitioners direct elevation to this Court via the petition
for certiorari the CAs November 14, 2008 Resolution even if no motion for reconsideration
was filed to afford the appellate court an opportunity to rectify its error. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the certiorari petition, and not a motion for
reconsideration with the appellate court, is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Indeed,
had they not filed the petition, they would have been left with no avenue to protect their
rights.
While the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
before the filing of a petition for certiorari, the same admits of exceptions, namely: (1) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (3) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay will
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration will be
useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the

24

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
Without further belaboring the point, the court found it very clear that the extreme urgency of
the situation required an equally urgent resolution, and due to the public interest involved, the
petitioners are justified in straightforwardly seeking the intervention of this Court.
10. Power Sites and Signs, Inc vs. United Neon (a Division of Ever Corporation)
GR No. 163406
November 24, 2009
FACTS:
Power Sites and Signs, Inc. (Power Sites) is a corporation engaged in the business of
installing outdoor advertising signs or billboards. It applied for, and was granted, the
necessary permits to construct a billboard on a site located at Km. 23, East Service Road,
Alabang, Muntinlupa (the site).After securing all the necessary permits, Power Sites began to
construct its billboard on the site.
Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent United Neon, a Division of Ever
Corporation (United Neon), had also began installation and erection of a billboard only one
meter away from its site and which completely blocked petitioners sign. Thus, petitioner
requested United Neon to make adjustments to its billboard to ensure that petitioners sign
would not be obstructed. However, petitioners repeated requests that respondent refrain from
constructing its billboard were ignored,and attempts to amicably resolve the situation failed.
Petitioner requested the Muntinlupa City Engineer and Building Official to revoke United
Neons building permit and to issue a Cease and Desist Order against it.
However, before a resolution could be made by the City Building Official, Power Sites filed
a Petition for Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Damages against United Neon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Muntinlupa City.
After the filing of the parties respective memoranda,which took the place of testimonial
evidence, the RTC granted petitioners prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The
Writ of Injunction was issued on the same day.
United Neon then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunctionbefore the Court of
Appeals. In brief, United Neon claimed that the grant of preliminary injunction was
unwarranted, particularly because Power Sites only prayed for a prohibitory injunction in its
original petition, but the Order went as far as to grant a mandatory injunction in favor of
25

Power Sites. United Neon prayed that the Court of Appeals invalidate the RTCs Order and
Writ, issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. 02-143, and, after hearing, enjoin the RTC from enforcing the Order.
After the parties exchange of pleadings, the Court of Appeals invalidated the Order of the
RTC dated August 1, 2002 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, but denied the prayer for
prohibition.
Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in invalidating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC?
HELD:
The Supreme Court finds that petitioner was not entitled to the grant of a preliminary injunction for
two reasons: first, the alleged right sought to be protected by the petitioner was not clearly
demonstrated; second, the requirement of grave and irreparable injury is absent.
A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly
entitled to the relief soughtand has substantial interest in the right sought to be
defended.While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be
clear.The standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
The evidence presented in support of a preliminary injunction is weak and inconclusive, and
the alleged right sought to be protected by petitioner is vehemently disputed. Both parties
allege that: (1) they began construction of their respective billboards first; (2) the billboard of
the other party blocks the others exclusive line of sight; (3) they are entitled to protection
under

the

provisions

of

the

National

Building

Code

and

OAAP

Code

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Ethics/Guidelines. However, the Supreme Court is not in a position to resolve these factual
matters, which should be resolved by the trial court. The question of which party began
construction first and which party is entitled to the exclusive line of sight is inextricably
linked to whether or not petitioner has the right that deserves protection through a
preliminary injunction. Indeed, the trial court would be in the best position to determine
which billboard was constructed first, their actual location, and whether or not an existing
billboard was obstructed by another.
It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and
irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no
irreparable injury as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner,
namely, immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients and the cost of the
billboard which is a considerable amount of money is easily quantifiable.

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Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if
proven, is fully compensable by damages.Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
11. China Banking Corp. vs. Benjamin Co
G.R. No. 174569
September 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot located at St. Benedict Subdivision,
Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 450216-R to petitioner-spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (the Castro
spouses). It sold two other lots also located in the same place covered by TCT Nos. 450212R and 450213-R to petitioner-spouses Richard and EdithaNogoy (the Nogoy spouses).
The lots of the Castro spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly bound on their
southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E, which is covered by TCT No. 269758-R in the name of
respondent Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent Three Kings Construction
and Realty Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, a subdivision project
covering Lot No. 3783-E and adjacent lots. For this purpose, they contracted the services of
respondent, Engineer Dale Olea.
In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on Lot No. 3783-E.
On November 28, 2003, petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents asking them to stop
constructing the wall, and remove all installed construction materials and restore the former
condition of Lot No. [3]783-E which they (petitioners) claimed to be a road lot. They also
claimed that the construction obstructed and closed the only means of ingress and egress of
the Nogoy spouses and their family, and at the same time, caved in and impeded the
ventilation and clearance due the Castro spouses residential house.
Petitioners demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 12834, for
injunction, restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Before respondents filed their Answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that
the construction of the perimeter wall was almost finished and thus modifying their prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, After
hearing petitioners application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, Branch 44 of
the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC denied the same, without prejudice to its resolution after
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the trial of the case on the merits. Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
same and denied their subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in not granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction?
HELD:
No. Petitioners have no urgent and paramount need for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound discretion
of the court, and the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be
interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. It is likewise settled that a court should
avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of
the main case without trial.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners must establish the
following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not
preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainants right is thus
doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is improper.
In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction on
Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential
Decree 1529, and their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
The best evidence thus that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot would be a memorandum to that
effect annotated on the certificate of title covering it. Petitioners presented TCT No. 185702R covering Lot No. 3783-E in the name of Sunny Acres Realty Management Corporation
which states that the registration is subject to the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act
496, as amended by Rep. Act No. 440.The annotation does not explicitly state, however, that
Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
Further, the findings of the lower court are still given much weight, their ocular inspection
showed that [petitioners] will not lose access to their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 378328

E is not being used as an access road to their residences and there is an existing secondary
road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access road to the highway.With
respect to the blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps. Castro, suffice it to
state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of the defendants
is situated on the left side of the garage and its front entrance is still open and freely
accessible.
12. Teodoro EODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR. vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA
G.R. No. 143591
May 5, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys feesagainst Urban Bank and herein
petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Atty.
Pea anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agencyallegedly entered into
with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent
any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismissarguing that they never
appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the following
documents:
1) Letter dated 19 December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;
2) Unsigned Letterdated 7 December 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G.
Ong;
3) Letterdated 9 December 1994 addressed to TeodoroBorlongan, Jr. and signed by Marilyn
G. Ong;
4) Memorandumdated 20 November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.
Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as
agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioner. Atty. Pea filed his ComplaintAffidavitwith the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.He claimed that said documents
were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the
signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners
introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
September 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of
petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor
concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully
stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents
were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents
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formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as
evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their
Pre-Trial Brief. On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.Petitioners insisted that they were denied due
process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the
right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on
the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest,
also in contravention with the Rules of Court.
In an Orderdated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the
ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case which fell within
the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant
of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court
added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already
posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case was not a
prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Lastly, the court was convinced that the Information contained all the facts necessary to
constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the
Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest,
reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion. They, likewise, questioned the courts
conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of
the warrants of arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause,
should the prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or require the respondent to submit his counteraffidavit?
HELD:
NO, Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined before an information
may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his
counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the
prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss
outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the
case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.
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The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the
accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public
prosecutors function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in
his findings. Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court a quo committed
manifest errors in their findings of probable cause; this Court therefore annuls their findings.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings
of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo as to the existence of probable cause. The
criminal complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed. The petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made
permanent.
13. Jesus Lim Arranza vs B.F. Homes, Inc.
GR No. 131683
June 19, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent BFHI is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and selling
residential lots. BFHI filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it
was in a state of suspension of payments. A receiver was appointed and a Revised
Rehabilitation Plan approved by SEC. Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and
in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent "to
enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes Paranaque. Petitioners charged
respondent with failing to comply with its contractual obligations relative to the subdivisions
development.
BFHI claimed that petitioners were precluded from instituting the instant action on account
of Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902~A providing for the suspension of all actions for claims
against a corporation under receivership. Respondent interposed counterclaims and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint. The HLURB issued a 20~day temporary restraining order
to avoid rendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgment that could be issued in the case;
and subsequently, an Order granting petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction was issued.
Respondent thus filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It
contended in the main that the HLURB acted "completely without jurisdiction" in issuing the
Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction considering that inasmuch as respondent is
under receivership, the "subject matter of the case is one exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the SEC." The CA rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the HLURB. It ruled that private respondents action may properly be
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regarded as a "claim" within the contemplation of PD No. 902~A which should be placed on
equal footing with those of petitioners other creditor or creditors and which should be filed
with the Committee of Receivers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the SEC or the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the complaint?
HELD:
In the cases that reached this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the
HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to
comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to
live in. In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to enforce their
rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and
perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the
complaint.
The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that
jurisdiction. In this case where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon respondent as
it undergoes rehabilitation receivership, respondent continues to exist as a corporation and
hence, continues or should continue to perform its contractual and statutory responsibilities
to petitioners as homeowners. No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to
creditors would result as far as petitioners complaint before the HLURB is concerned. To
reiterate, what petitioners seek to enforce are respondents obligations as a subdivision
developer. Such claims are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally
involve monetary considerations.
In this case, under the complaint for specific performance before the HLURB, petitioners do
not aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement should be viewed in
the light of respondents alleged failure to observe its statutory and contractual obligations to
provide petitioners a "decent human settlement" and "ample opportunities for improving their
quality of life." The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with that
matter.
This case is REMANDED to the HLURB for continuation of proceedings with dispatch as
the SEC proceeds with the rehabilitation of respondent through the Board of Receivers.
14. Philippine Trust Co. vs. Francisco Santamaria
G.R. No. 31951
September 4, 1929

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FACTS:
There are two civil cases filed before CFI Ilo-Ilo against F. M. Yaptico& Co., Ltd.. Both
judgement was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner asked for an execution of the
judgment pending the appeal to SC, which was denied, and that after the cases were affirmed
by SC, it again asked for an execution of judgments. The petitioner then applied to the court
for the appointment of a receiver upon the ground that F. M. Yaptico& Co., Ltd., was
fraudulently putting its property beyond the reach of its creditor and the petitioner in
particular. After a hearing, that motion was denied, and the lower court suspended the
execution of the judgment of the judgments for four months. Hence, this petition for
mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the writ of
execution?

HELD:
Yes. The SC found that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending the execution
for the period of four months and ordered the lower court to appoint a receiver for F. M.
Yaptico& Co., Ltd., to protect and preserve its property and assets for the use and benefit of
its creditors and in particular this petitioner.

After a final judgment has been rendered in this court, in particular or even in the Court of
First Instance, it is the duty of the court to enforce the judgment according to its terms, and
no court has the power to suspend an execution issued on the final judgment, except as to
matters and things which may have arisen after the rendition of the judgment, and which
would be a valid defense.

It is true that the court retains a certain amount of control over a writ of execution even after
it leaves its hands, but such control is limited and regulated by such fairly definite rules of
law and is not unrestricted. A writ of execution may thus be quashed when it appears that it
has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid, or when the writ has been issued
without authority, etc. But the writ had not been recalled by reason of any defense which

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could not been made at the time of the trial of the case, nor can the recall be made so as to
practically change the terms of a judgment which has become final.

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