Assignment No.

4
Case Digests in SCARP AND SPECPRO
Submitted by Christopher G. Halnin
To Atty. Christian Kit Villasis
1. Marcelo A. Mesina vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 70145 (145 SCRA 49
November 13, 1986
FACTS:
Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank a cashier's check for P800,000.00. Unfortunately,
he left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank
manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to Albert Uy, a bank official. While Uy was in
the men's room, the check was stolen by Alexander Lim, his visitor. Upon discovering that
the check was lost, Jose Go accomplished a "STOP PAYMENT" order and executed an
affidavit of loss.
Two days later, Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing from Prudential Bank.
After dishonoring the same check twice, Associated Bank received summons and copy of a
complaint for damages of Marcelo Mesina who was in possession of the lost check and is
demanding payment. Petitioner claims that a cashier's check cannot be countermanded in the
hands of a holder in due course.
Respondent Associated Bank filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go
ISSUE:
Whether IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleader suit by a
party who had earlier been sued on the same claim?

HELD:
No. Petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims and
interpleader is out of the question. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary.
Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances, respondent bank merely took the
necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was
its proper remedy. It has been shown that the interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank
1

because petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check, petitioner asking
payment thereon and Jose Go as the purchaser or owner. The allegation of petitioner that
respondent bank had effectively relieved itself of its primary liability under the check by
simply filing a complaint for interpleader is belied by the willingness of respondent bank to
issue a certificate of time deposit in the amount of P800,000 representing the cashier's check
in question in the name of the Clerk of Court of Manila to be awarded to whoever will be
found by the court as validly entitled to it. Said validity will depend on the strength of the
parties' respective rights and titles thereto. Bank filed the interpleader suit not because
petitioner sued it but because petitioner is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming.
On the very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit
for damages filed by petitioner against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case
was first entitled Associated Bank vs. Jose Go and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo
A. Mesina for John Doe when his name became known to respondent bank.

2. Felipe B. Ollada vs. Central Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-11357
May 31, 1962
FACTS:
Ollada, a CPA authorized to practice accounting at Central Bank filed in the CFI a petition
for declaratoy relief after his petition for a writ of prelim injunction had been dismissed in the
CFI assailing the enforcement of the Central Bank of the Philippines(Bank) with two
requirements for CPAs, re: that the applicant CPA should sign a statement under oath and
that, upon accreditation, a CPA would be governed by the rules and regulations of the Central
Bank and not by those of the Philippine Institute of Accountants. He alleges that because of
these requirements he had suffered serious injury, and that such enforcement has resulted in
the unlawful restraint in the practice of CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank. The CFI
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Declaratory Relief was properly dismissed?
HELD:
No. Petitioner commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for Declaratory
Relief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On the question of when a
special civil action of this nature would prosper, we have already held that the complaint for
declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached
or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in
the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent
had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a
complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding.
2

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach
which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief
is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of
action or proceeding.
3. Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee
G.R. No. 176831
January 15, 2010
FACTS:
Nixon Lees father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will,
which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his mother. Nixon Lee filed, on May
28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, to compel his mother to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the
allowance thereof could be instituted.
Allegedly, Lee had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate
and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so
without any justifiable reason.
KiaoEng traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a
condition precedent for the filing thereof. She denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that
photocopies of the will were given to Lee and to his siblings.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent Lees
evidence, petitioner KiaoEng demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had
in her custody the original holographic will.
She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay,
were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition and that they did not
prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue
the writ of mandamus.
RTC denied the demurrer but granted the same upon motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied and the case was dismissed.
Aggrieved, Lee appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which was denied or lack of
merit. However, it was granted when respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate
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court amended its decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ,
and ordered the production of the will anchored on the basis that this time respondent was
able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic
will.
KiaoEng moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Left with no other recourse
KiaoEng brought the case before the Supreme Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals in denying her motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy?
HELD:
NO. The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name
of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of
duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek
to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially
when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision
instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is
not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
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which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere
technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust,
or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On
the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a
public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right
against an individual The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the
public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its
prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in
matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the
sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here is the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or
a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.
The petition for review on certiorari was granted.
4. Malana vs. Tappa
G.R. No. 18130
5

September 17, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages against respondents alleging that they are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio
Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed
Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject
property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any
time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over
the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that
respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly
dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject
property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus,
petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from
their title. However, such complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred
to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real
actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that
the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover
the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing
their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title;
the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from
respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where
the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of

subject property was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the
RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set
aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also
contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of
title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint. And even if the two causes of action could not
be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a
ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that
their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should
be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of
remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must
be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real
actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in
Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or Rule 63, Section 1 (declaratory relief) is properly invoked in the instant case.
HELD:

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and
possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not
the RTC
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may
be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other
words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners
already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said
Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the
subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion
reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real
property as owner.
Petitioners

Complaint

contained

sufficient

allegations

for

an accion

reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property
8

involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not
the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in
Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
5. Planters Development Bank vs. James Ng, et. al.
G.R. No. 187556
May 5, 2010
FACTS:
James Ng and his brother Anthony (respondents) obtained loans from petitioner amounting to
P25,000,000.00 to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City and covered by TCT Nos. 79865 and 79866 of the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City.
Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation; hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public Stephen Z. Taala. The Notice of Auction
Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage at the Main Entrance of
the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City. The Notice was published in Metro Profile, a
newspaper of general circulation.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of Sale
that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filed an exparte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, lodged before RTC-QC, Branch 77.
In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale,
Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, raffled to RTC-QC, Branch 221 which issued a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties
and committing any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents right of ownership.
RTC-QC, Branch 77 denied the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, it filed, before
this Court, the present petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law, in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the denial of the issuance of the writ of possession is valid?
HELD:
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It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the
sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance
of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as in fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate
of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage.
The court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited respondents opposition to
petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
By crediting respondents opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo pre-empted its co-equal
branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over respondents annulment petition was laid, from
determining the merits of respondents claim-basis of said petition.
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the property; x x x
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy.
Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement
to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a
ministerial function.
The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the
validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is
annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of
possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is
shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so
when, as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in
the purchaser.
In fine, it was grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
25. Militante vs. Court of Appeals
330 SCRA 318
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Facts: Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. The three parcels are
covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067 and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315 expropriating forty (40)
hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. 70298, and 73960,
and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018.
The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that required the upgrading
of basic facilities and services and the disposal of the lots to their bona fide occupants in
accordance with the national Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the
Metro Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP). It set aside P40 million as the maximum
amount of just compensation to be paid the landowners.
The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national government, undertook
the implementation of P.D. 1315 in 7 phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The
properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which
includes petitioners land, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.
Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform
Zone. Proclamation No. 1893 was amended by Proclamation No. 1967 which identified 244
sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform
Zones.
P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and placed the NHA
under the supervision of said Department. Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory
functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasijudicial body attached to the DHS.
Petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land
Reform Program of the government. HSRC Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a
certificate declaring petitioners lots "outside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. Acting on
the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General Manager, sent a letter to Mayor
Macario Asistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to conduct a census of the families occupying
petitioners lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of amicably settling
the eviction problem and/or to find out why a clearance should be issued or not for the
11

removal/ demolition of all the illegal structures in the said property."The squatters did not
attend the meeting. In view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division
Manager, Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department Manager,
Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a demolition clearance.
NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all illegal
structures on petitioners property within three (3) months from receipt of the order. Clearance
was also granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement
Project.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982, General Tobias
inquired from Mayor Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans of developing petitioners
properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. Mayor Asistio replied that "considering the said
properties are private in character, the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future
to develop or underwrite the development of said properties."
BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation under the
governments Community Self-Help Program. The NHA, through General Tobias, approved
an emergency fund of P2 million for the acquisition of petitioners lots. NHA started
negotiations with petitioner. Petitioner, through an authorized representative, made an initial
offer of P200.00 per square meter. The NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00 per square
meter. Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA General
Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHAs maximum offer
was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his lawyer.
Petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and
relocation of the squatters.
NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and informed
Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in Bagong
Silang Resettlement Project for the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to
implement the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioners land. Carangdang claimed that
petitioners land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No.
1315" against the NHA and Carangdang.
The respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to
overcome the presumption of the decrees constitutionality. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
12

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition. Whether the petitioner is
entitled to a writ of mandamus
Held: Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
x x x."
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist
from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to
desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdangs
refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The
remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65 provides:
"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant."
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act
required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

13

It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records
show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent
Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The
NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the
mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico
Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there
is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition
for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. If
superior administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions are
generally not entertained. In the instant case, petitioner has not exhausted his administrative
remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time
directly addressed to respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the
Government Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought Carangdangs
inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke
judicial action as the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to
act. The General Manager, as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of
supervision over the operations and internal affairs of NHA.
6. Martelino vs. National Home Mortgage Finance Corp.
G.R. No. 160208
June 30, 2008
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with urgent prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed before
the RTC of Caloocan City, by petitioners against the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), herein
respondents, and Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo.Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing
loans from respondents who directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision
developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).
However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to its representations and the
subdivision plan. They were thus compelled to spend their own resources to improve the
subdivision roads and alleys, and to install individual water facilities. Respondents, on the
other hand, failed to ensure Shelters completion of the subdivision. Instead, respondents
ignored their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelters failure to complete the
subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to
foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael

14

Martelino. Hence, they prayed that respondents be restrained from foreclosing their
mortgages.
Moreover, petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the RTC that their right as house
and lot buyers to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to fully develop the subdivision
also applied to respondents who released their loans directly to Shelter; and that during the
suspension of payment, respondents should not assess them accrued interests and penalties.
Petitioners further prayed that they be allowed to pay their housing loans without interest and
penalties.
In its June 17, 1998 Order, the RTC set the preliminary injunction hearing, On July 9, 1998,
the RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents
from foreclosing the mortgages on petitioners houses.The writ was issued on July 14, 1998.
On August 10, 1998, the NHMFC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Petition
on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its person or over the subject matter of
the case.
In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of the subdivision
should have been brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judicial declaration can be
made because the petition was vague. The RTC assumed that the subject of the petition was
Republic Act No. 8501 or the Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998 which was cited by
petitioners. But the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state which section of the law
affected their rights and needed judicial declaration. The RTC also noted that, as stated by
petitioners, respondents still foreclosed their mortgages, a breach of said law which rendered
the petition for declaratory relief improper. The proper remedy was an ordinary civil action,
the RTC concluded
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE:
Whether declaratory relief is not the proper remedy?
HELD:
Yes, declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file
a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other
written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that
respondents assessed them interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated
foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of
extra-judicial sale and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in
disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the
15

subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already suspended
paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments
defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed
right to suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now
identified as P.D. No. 957 and relied upon -- correctly or otherwise -- by petitioners, and
assumed by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we
said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an authoritative statement
of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their
guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged
breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed,
contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened
prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has
already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to
explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order
7. Dario vs. Mison
G.R. No. 81954 (176 SCRA 84)
August 8, 1989
FACTS:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3,
"DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED
BY

THE

PEOPLE,

PROTECTING

THEIR

BASIC

RIGHTS,

ADOPTING

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION

TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION.

Among other things,

Proclamation No. 3 provided:

SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all
iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the
President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their
courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the
1973 Constitution.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
16

THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary

anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing
government reorganization had generated, and prescribed several grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel.
Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety
and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career
civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to ensure that only
those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from the government service.
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be
made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.
The Presidents Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be considered. We
quote, in part: Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same subject, I have
ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this year of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization.
On

January 30,

1987,

the

President

promulgated

Executive

Order

No.

127,

"REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order

No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new
staffing pattern therefore.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution. On
January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. On the same date,
Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating
appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials.
A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual
notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization
Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission. The first thirty one
mentioned above came directly to this Court. The records indeed show that Commissioner
Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18,
1988.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the
reinstatement of the 279 employees. On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by
the Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil
17

Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. On October 20, 1988,
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court.
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the appeal (from the
resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees. On January 6,
1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commissions Resolution in this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which provided for the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs is valid?
HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a government
reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs by mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the
various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking
authority under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under
the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a government
reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain conditions.
RATIO: Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith.
8. Tomatic Aratuc vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-49705-09
February 8, 1979
FACTS:
Petitioners are independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa
who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan. They complained of
alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of
Lanao del Sur, and eleven towns in Sultan Kudarat, by reason for which, petitioners had
asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. The Regional
Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of petitioners, declaring all eight
KBL candidates elected.
Appeal was taken by the petitioners to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winners.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction

18

alleging that the COMELEC committee grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy?
HELD:
This is as it should be. A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not
exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent
disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent
considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an
error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are
matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of
certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance
of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used
to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent
and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing
contentions of the parties in this cases.
9. Emelinda Abedes vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 174373
October 15, 2007
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, respondent ReliaQuizonArciga filed an action before the RTC of Pasig
City against Wilfredo, husband of herein petitioner EmelindaAbedes, seeking support for her
daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga. A Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the
natural father of Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by the RTC of Pasig City to
support Danielle Ann.A writ of execution was issued. Unfortunately, the Sheriff's Return
showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.
Later, a real property was discovered to be allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo in the
Province of Tarlac. Herein petitioner filed a Third Party Claim. Petitioner alleged that the
property belongs exclusively to her, and Wilfredo had no present and existing right thereto.
Therefore, it may not be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered against her husband
Wilfredo.Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice of Sheriff's Sale was made announcing
the sale to the public and to the highest bidder. For such purpose, a public auction was
scheduled. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO which was also granted.
19

The RTC of Tarlac City opined that the property is petitioner's paraphernal property. As her
exclusive property, it may not be made liable for the obligations of Wilfredo. Even assuming
that the property is part of the conjugal partnership, it may not be held liable for the support
of Danielle Ann who is an illegitimate child of Wilfredo. Hence, the RTC enjoined
respondent Sheriff RonbertoValino from conducting the public sale of the property. However,
CA reversed the decision. Abedes filed a motion for reconsideration raising issue of lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper?
HELD:
No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.An appeal
by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of the judgment
complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. We have
underscored that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at
bar, the Resolution of the appellate court which denied reconsideration of its Decision was
received by petitioner on 2 August 2005. She had until 17 August 2005 within which to
perfect her appeal. However, none was made. Instead, she comes to this Court via a petition
for certiorari in an effort to salvage her lost appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to
petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Petitioner
was unable to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petition is dismissed.
10. New Frontier Sugar vs. RTC Iloilo
G.R. No. 165001
January 31, 2007
FACTS:
New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of raw
sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations with its creditors as they fell due,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with
Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation. RTC issued a Stay Order appointing Manuel B. Clemente as rehabilitation
receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition.

20

One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank filed a Comment/Opposition with
Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that petitioner is not qualified for corporate
rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate because it has no assets left. Respondent bank also
alleged that the financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets,
affidavit of general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan submitted by petitioner are
misleading and inaccurate since its properties have already been foreclosed and transferred to
respondent bank before the petition for rehabilitation was filed, and petitioner still owes
respondent bank deficiency liability.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing the
case.Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC. Petitioner then filed
with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied by the CA by sustaining
the findings of the RTC that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and properties to
continue with its operations and answer its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible
for rehabilitation. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the
same could not be corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it as improper,
appeal being an available remedy?
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in upholding the RTCs dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation in
view of the fact that the titles to petitioners properties have already passed on to respondent
bank and petitioner has no more assets to speak of, especially since petitioner does not
dispute the fact that the properties which were foreclosed by respondent bank comprise the
bulk, if not the entirety, of its assets.
The Interim Rules was enacted to provide for a summary and non-adversarial rehabilitation
proceedings.This is in consonance with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case, which
is aimed to be resolved expeditiously for the benefit of all the parties concerned and the
economy in general.
As provided in the Interim Rules, the basic procedure is as follows:
1) The petition is filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court;
2) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court shall issue
a Stay Order, which shall provide, among others, for the appointment of a
Rehabilitation Receiver; the fixing of the initial hearing on the petition; a directive to
the petitioner to publish the Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks; and a directive to all creditors
21

and all interested parties (including the Securities and Exchange Commission) to file
and serve on the debtor a verified comment on or opposition to the petition, with
supporting affidavits and documents.
3) Publication of the Stay Order;
4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any comment and/or
opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial court is satisfied that there is
merit in the petition, it shall give due course to the petition;
5) Referral for evaluation of the rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation receiver who
shall submit his recommendations to the court;
6) Modifications or revisions of the rehabilitation plan as necessary;
7) Submission of final rehabilitation plan to the trial court for approval;
8) Approval/disapproval of rehabilitation plan by the trial court;
In the present case, the petition for rehabilitation did not run its full course but was dismissed
by the RTC after due consideration of the pleadings filed before it. On this score, the RTC
cannot be faulted for its summary dismissal, as it is tantamount to a finding that there is no
merit to the petition. This is in accord with the trial courts authority to give due course to the
petition or not under Rule 4, Section 9 of the Interim Rules. Letting the petition go through
the process only to be dismissed later on because there are no assets to be conserved will not
only defeat the reason for the rules but will also be a waste of the trial courts time and
resources.
The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is
an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of
the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty
days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal
an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
11. San Fernando Rural Bank vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development
G.R. No. 168088
April 3, 2007

FACTS:
22

Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC) was the registered owner
of a parcel of land. PODC secured loans from San Fernando Rural Bank (petitioner SFRB).
Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and daughter of Federico Mendoza), also secured a loan
from the petitioner. PODC failed to pay the loan. SFRB, filed a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure. SFRB emerged as the winning bidder. The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a
Certificate of Sale and stated that "the period of redemption of the property shall expire one
(1) year after registration in the Register of Deeds. On May 11, 2002, PODC executed a
notarized deed of assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to
redeem the property. Respondent Aquino redeemed the property but petitioner rejected the
offer due to lack of the redemption price. Ex-Officio Sheriff made another computation and
allowed Aquino to redeem the property consequently issuing Certificate of Redemption.
However ex-officio sheriff failed to file the Certificate in the ROD. On June 10, 2002, SFRB,
executed an Affidavit of Consolidationover the property. It was alleged therein that PODC or
any other person/entity with the right of redemption did not exercise their right to repurchase
within one year from June 7, 2001. The affidavit was filed with the Office of the Register of
Deeds on the same day.
On June 14, 2002, Aquino sent a letter to ROD informing them that he has redeem the
subject property and requested not to register the Affidavit of Consolidation requested by
SFRB. On June 18, 2002, ROD requested the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), by way of consulta, to issue an opinion on whether a new title should be
issued to SFRB, or the Certificate of Redemption in favor of respondent Aquino.
On October 15, 2002, SFRB filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession over the property to be
issued in its favor upon the filing of the requisite bond in an amount equivalent to the market
value of the property or in an amount as the court may direct. By way of rejoinder,
respondent PODC averred that the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio
Sheriff is presumed valid and legal; the RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the Certificate of Redemption.
On December 12, 2002, the LRA resolved the consulta of the Register of
DeedsConsidering that the document first presented and entered in the Primary Entry
Book of the registry is the Affidavit of Consolidation in favor of the creditors, the mortgagee
bank and not the Certificate of Redemption in favor of the assignee of the debtor-mortgagor,
although admittedly, the latter instrument was executed on the last day of the redemption
period but not, in fact, registered within the same period, under the premises, the
consolidating mortgagee is possessed with a superior right than the redemptioner. Under the
law, the first in registration is the first in law.
On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC No. 890 issued an Order granting the petition and
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. PODC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order, but the court denied the motion. On March 6, 2003, PODC,filed a Petition for
23

Certiorari with the CA averting error that the RTC should have dismissed the petition for a
writ of possession pending determination of the substantial issues by the LRA.
SFRB in its comment asserted that that the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had
jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of possession; thus, the remedy of respondents should
have to appeal the assailed order and not to file a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May
14, 2003 The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of possession and the Sheriff
implemented the writ and placed petitioner in possession of the property. On September 4,
2003, SFRB filed a Complaint against PODC and the Ex-Officio Sheriff in the RTC of
Pampanga, for the Nullification of the Deed of Assignment executed by PODC in favor of
Aquino and of the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff and for
damages.
Meanwhile, the LRA Administrator issued a Resolution recalling the Resolution dated
December 12, 2002 and declared that the Certificate of Redemption executed by the ExOfficio Sheriff was superior to the Affidavit of Consolidation filed by petitioner.
On September 10, 2003, PODCfiled a Joint Motion to quash the writ of possession issued by
the trial court and for the issuance of a new TCT. They averred that the LRA Administrator
finally resolved that the Certificate of Redemption issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff was
superior to the Affidavit of Consolidation of petitioner.
On November 10, 2003, the court denied the motion holding that respondent Aquino, as the
registered owner of the subject property, should initiate the appropriate action in the proper
court in order to exclude petitioner or any other person from the physical possession of his
property.The court ruled that after placing SFRB in possession of the property, the court had
lost jurisdiction over the case.
On November 27, 2003, PODC filed before the CA their Joint Notice of Appeal from the
November 10, 2003 Order of the RTC.
On December 18, 2003, the CA rendered judgment in the joint appeal granting the petition of
PODC and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that
the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was
interlocutory and not final; hence, it may be questionedonly via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal. SFRB moved for the reconsideration of the
CAs decision however, the CA denied the petition. SFRB then filed a petition for review on
Certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of CA. SFRB avers that the
December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the writ of possession in its favor was final;
hence, the remedy of respondents herein, as oppositors below, was to appeal to the CA and
not to file a special civil action for certiorari. In fact, petitioner asserts, the writ of possession
issued by the RTC had already been implemented when respondents filed their petition in the
CA on December 10, 2003. SFRB further insisted that the RTC, acting as a Land Registration
24

Court, had limited jurisdiction; it had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues on the validity of
the deed of assignment and the legality of respondent Aquinos redemption of the property, as
well as its ownership. Only the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in Civil Case
No. 12765 (where petitioner assailed the deed of assignment and the Certificate of
Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff) was vested with jurisdiction to resolve these
issues. In resolving these issues, the CA thereby preempted the RTC in Civil Case No. 12765
and deprived it of due process. In any event, according to petitioner, the pronouncement of
the CA on the validity of the Deed of Assignment and Certificate of Redemption was merely
an obiter dictum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it sanctioned the PODC resort to
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final order and not an
interlocutory order of the RTC?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the
petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory orders are those that
determine incidental matters and which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end
to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On the other hand, a final order is one
that disposes of the whole matter or terminates the particular proceedings or action leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is one that
finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower
court.The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Even if the trial court erred in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is
merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a petition for a writ of
certiorari. Such writ cannot be legally used for any other purpose.
Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general
utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.
Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.
A certiorari writ may be issued if the court or quasi-judicial body issues an order with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
25

implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Moreover, a party is
entitled to a writ of certiorari only if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate
relief in the ordinary course of law.
The raison detre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
12. People vs. Almendras
G.R. No. 145915
April 24, 2003
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Almendras were arrested by the PNP NARCOM of Calamba, Laguna for
selling Shabu at the Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol between the hours of three
to six in the morning of June 18, 1998. The prosecution rested its case and reception of
defense evidence was then set for for May 12, 13, and 17, 1999.
On May 10, 1999, defense counsel move for leave to a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence and
the admission of said Demurrer with alternative prayer for bail. The trial court denied the
Demurrer to Evidence and ruled that what is material in a prosecution for sale of an illegal
drug is proof that both the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court.
The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court gravely abused its judicial
disretion in denying their demurrer to evidence and their prayer for bail.
On March 20, 2000, defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings of the trial court pending
the final disposition by the Court of Appeals on their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus.
The trial court resumed and promulgated its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
ISSUE:
Whether trial court erred in proceeding to resolve the case without awaiting the resolution of
CA in the appellants petition for certiorari?
26

HELD:
The case for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction, which was
filed by the defense counsel with the CA to assail the trial courts denial of their demurrer to
evidence, did not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the
reglementary periods involved in the proceedings.
Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
certiorari proceedings, there must be restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
from the appellate court directed to the lower court. There was none in the instant case.
Case remanded to the trial court for reception of defense evidence.
13. Banco Filipino vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132703
June 23, 2000
FACTS:
Banco Filipino Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch site holdings but
contemplated further expansion of its operations and Consequently, it unloaded some of its
holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala
Realty which was conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major
stockholder of Banco Filipino. After the issuance of

the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) to Tala Realtys certificate of registration, the board of directors of Banco
Filipino authorized negotiations for the sale of some of its branch sites, through a Board
Resolution with other numerous real properties owned by the former being treated the same
to the latter.
The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots in
Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two
million one hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00) Tala Realty then leased them back
to Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a
period of twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The lease contracts
of the other branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions,
except for the amount of the rent.
Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from Banco
Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. Due to Banco
Filipinos failure to comply with Tala Realtys terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing
numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on
August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust.
The court rendered judgment in favor of Tala Realty to wit;
27

A thorough and careful perusal was made by the undersigned Presiding Judge of the
arguments of opposing counsels, ventilated in their respective memoranda. Opposing
counsels cited the pertinent Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the Rules of Court and
related Decisions of the Supreme Court in support of their arguments.
After weighing the foregoing, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the contention of
the defendants in their motions to dismiss, etc., is meritorious.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the defendants separate motions to dismiss are hereby
granted Therefore, let this case be, as it is hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration. Banco Filipino received a
copy of said order of denial July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24,
1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals
dismissed Banco Filipinos petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioners
recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos. Banco Filipinos
failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate
attempt by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to correct by certiorari the
dismissal order by the RTC and that respondent court gravely erred in ruling that a writ of
error should be the proper remedy instead of a petition for certiorari under rule 65?
HELD:
Banco Filipinos proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an
ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. We have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by
reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.
Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipinos bare assertion that the Court of
Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. The availability to
Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the Court of
28

Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has
often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco
Filipinos recourse to a special civil action for certiorariwas borne not out of the conviction
that grave abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of
Appeals but simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45
to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefore.
Banco Filipino from the order of the RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen
(14) days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Likewise, when it filed its petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have
already passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal
to the Supreme Court.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part
of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. There
must be exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules, we cannot find any
such exceptional circumstances in this case and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to
prove the existence of any. Another elementary rule of procedure applies and that is the
doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less to entertain the appeal
14. Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121438
October 23, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1984, a probate court allowed the sale of the lot located in Cebu for
P200,000.00 to the spouses Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida, the heir of the decedent,
agreed to rescind the said sale. On January 1988, the probate court again issued an order
allowing the re-sale of said lot, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200,000.00
already paid by the Enriquez spouses. On April 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was
executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for P1,000,000.00 payable

29

with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of
squatters.
On July 1991, Intervenor Sagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the
sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of he decedent. He claimed that
the lot could be sold for P1.5 million pesos. Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers
attended by Aida and her counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of
Sagrario Morelos, and Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented
undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land. During the conference, Atty. Cabilao
revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the seller undertaking the eviction
of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with the buyer shouldering the expenses to clear the
lot of its present occupants. Aida objected to Atty. Cabilao's statement. She explained that the
latter's offer was made only after the sale to Sanchez was already approved by the court.
On August 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to
Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida
Morada said that the court's order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become
final and executory, and that she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith
and for value. She added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by the
administratrix.
On November 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and
declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier approved on the
basis that the Administratrix deliberately concealed from the Court the fact that Sanchez had
extended to her a loan of P300,000.00 before the execution of the Deed of Sale and that the
said amount was already deducted by Sanchez from the down payment of P500,000.00 where
the procedure jointly resorted to by the Administratrix and by Sanchez was tantamount to a
foreclosure of their loose mortgage agreement, a procedure that is not allowed to take place
in a probate court.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty.
Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million.
On January 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of
P1.6 million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The
motion was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order
approving the sale to Atty. Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer
was not a compelling reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the property
was bought by Felix Uy Chua, Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy Chua, the clients of Atty.
Cabilao who are now petitioners before this Court.

30

Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent
Judges Abarquez and Alio-Hormachelos abused their discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when they issued the questioned orders.
The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the Deed
of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court held the proper remedy was to appeal under Rule
65. Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45
under which private respondent was already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not
have taken cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and
precedents.

A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may
be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Both have original
concurrent jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While
ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions.
Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b)
when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void;
(d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As
early as Crisostomo vs. Endencia, we held:
". . . The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an
appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or
without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or
decision which is the subject matter of the remedy."
The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the
sale and after its order of approval had become final and executory amount to oppressive
exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
15. Celsa P. Acuna vs. Dep. Ombudsman for Luzon
G.R. No. 144692
January 31, 2005
31

FACTS:
A certain Erlinda Yabut, a teacher of Angeles City National Trade School (ACNTS)
requested a dialogue with private respondent Pascua, ACNTS officer-in-charge of ACNTS on
some unspecified matter. Pascua agreed to the request. Petitioner Acua, a former teacher of
ACNTS attended said meeting with the invitation of Yabut. Before the meeting started,
Pascua allegedly did not allow the petitioner to attend said meeting for she is an outsider.
Petitioner charged respondent Pascua with misconduct and with violation of Article 131 of
the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman dismissed
both the cases filed by petitioner and Yabut.
Petitioner charged private respondents of perjury based on their sworn statement in the case
filed. Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the dismissal of the
complaint.
Public respondent finds no evidence to indict respondents for perjury, thus dismissed
petitioners complaint.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her motion. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition. Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable cause.
In their Comment, private respondents claim that petitioner filed this petition out of time.
Hence, this petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits, private respondents submit
that public respondent correctly dismissed the perjury charge against them.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on time?
HELD:
The petition, while filed on time, has no merit. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 states in
part:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 27 relates only to appeals from rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from the Ombudsman rulings in criminal
32

cases such as the present case. The remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints
before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she filed this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 alleging that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in dismissing her
complaint against private respondents. Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner
had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000 Order within which to file this petition.
Petitioner received a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order on 13 July 2000. Thus, petitioner had
until 11 September 2000 within which to file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11 August
2000. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on time.
16. Angel Jardin vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 119268
February 23, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama International Inc., engaged in the
operation of "Goodman Taxi" who were paid under the boundary system. They earned an
average of P400.00 daily. Respondent admittedly deducts on a regular basis said daily
earnings P30.00 supposedly for the washing of the taxi units.
Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect
their rights and interests. Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent
refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor
arbiter a complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
illegal deduction of washing fees.
The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit. law library
On appeal, public respondent NLRC reversed and set aside the judgment of the labor arbiter.
It declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their dismissal
must be for just cause and after due process.
Private respondents first motion for reconsideration was denied. They filed another motion
for reconsideration and this time, public respondent, granted the same ruling that it lacks
jurisdiction over the case as petitioners and private respondent have no employer-employee
relationship. It held that the relationship of the parties is leasehold which is covered by the
Civil Code rather than the Labor Code.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed this special civil action
for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the NLRC.

33

ISSUE:
Whether public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance and granting
private respondents second motion for reconsideration?
HELD:
Yes. Public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance and granting
private respondents second motion for reconsideration as it wrecks the orderly procedure in
seeking reliefs in labor cases.
The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment by the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power as to amount to lack of
power.
In labor cases, the Court has declared in several instances that disregarding rules it is bound
to observe constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of labor tribunal. library
In this case, private respondent exhausted administrative remedy available to it by seeking
reconsideration of public respondents decision, which public respondent denied. With this
motion for reconsideration, the labor tribunal had ample opportunity to rectify errors or
mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had.
Thus, when private respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, public respondent
should have forthwith denied it in accordance with Rule 7, Section 14 of its New Rules of
Procedure which allows only one motion for reconsideration from the same party.
"SEC. 14. Motions for Reconsideration. --- Motions for reconsideration of any order,
resolution or decision of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision with proof of service that a
copy of the same has been furnished within the reglementary period the adverse party and
provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained."
The rationale for allowing only one motion for reconsideration from the same party is to
assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor cases. For
obvious reasons, delays cannot be countenanced in the resolution of labor disputes. The
dispute may involve no less than the livelihood of an employee and that of his loved ones
who are dependent upon him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine, and education. It may as
well involve the survival of a business or an industry.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the second motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent is indubitably a prohibited pleading, which should have not been entertained at
all.

34

Public respondent cannot just disregard its own rules on the pretext of "satisfying the ends of
justice" especially when its disposition of a legal controversy ran afoul with a clear and long
standing jurisprudence as elucidated in the subsequent discussion. Clearly, disregarding a
settled legal doctrine enunciated by the Court is not a way of rectifying an error or mistake.
Public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance and granting private
respondents second motion for reconsideration as it wrecks the orderly procedure in seeking
reliefs in labor cases.
The Court also ruled that the relationship of the parties is more of a leasehold or one that is
covered by a charter agreement under the Civil Code rather than the Labor Code."
It also noted that after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
driven to the same clean condition when he took it out. Car washing after a tour of duty is
indeed a practice in the taxi industry and is in fact dictated by fair play. Hence, the drivers
are not entitled to reimbursement of washing charges.
The Court granted the petition. It however, directed the private respondent to reinstate
petitioners to their positions held at the time of the complained dismissal and was ordered to
pay petitioners their full backwages.
17. Romys Frieght Service vs. Castro
G.R. No. 141637
June 8, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondent Castro and Veloria were hired by petitioner as a mechanic andas a
carpenter , respectively. Castro suffered a stroke while Veloria suffered an accident when
theoverheated water coming from the radiator of a car he was repairing spurted onto his face,
burning it. Both receivedshow cause lettersrequiring them to explain why they should not be
disciplined. Petitionerfiled complaints for estafa and qualified theft against Castro
andcharged Veloriafor qualified theft of the missing tools.Because of petitioners acts against
them, both joined in filing a case for illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.
For its part, petitioner denied that private respondents were dismissed from their
employment, asserting that private respondents abandoned their work. Executive Labor
Arbiter JesselitoLatoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to
pay private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay,
backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and
attorneys fees. Private respondents moved for the clarification of the decision, specifically
on the award of backwages in their favor. While the decision discussed their entitlement to
backwages, it was not included in the computation of the judgment award in the dispositive
portion of the decision. The labor arbiter, in his order, recognized his inadvertence and

35

granted the motion. He amended the decision and increased the award to P985,529.20 to
include backwages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its decision, reversed and set aside the labor
arbiters ruling. It found private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed
their complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were
constructively dismissed by petitioner.
The appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor arbiter
were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals.
Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing
private respondents, hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal.
The CA held that the respondents failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and
that they had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and
set aside the decision of the NLRC.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct that the petition for certiorari of private respondents should have
been dismissed outright for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before
filing the petition for certiorari with the CA?
HELD:
Yes. SC affirmed the CA decision. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed
before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to.However, there are well
recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents petition for certiorari before the CA
was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private
respondents were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue
raised before the NLRC and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondents was impressed with public interest.Thus, it was
proper for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for
reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.

36

The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
phrase grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion
"too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not
encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the
contending parties respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not
include the review of public respondents evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings
based thereon.Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the
affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents were
illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay
and attorneys fees.
18. Barrazona vs. RTC Baguio City

G.R. No. 154282

April 7, 2006
FACTS:
San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located at
Naguilian corner Asin Road, Baguio City. VangieBarrazona, petitioner, has been leasing
portions of the building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the
lease is for two (2) years, commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly
rental is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203
B.
Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to
pay despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC,
Branch 61, Baguio City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among
others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations
therein clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.Barroza, petitioner, filed the instant
Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the

37

Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal
basis.
On the other hand, respondent RTC Baguio City, in praying for the dismissal of the petition,
contends that (1) the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is absolutely no
allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner should have
first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari;
and (3) the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory and,
therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether Motion for reconsideration should have been filed prior to filing certiorari?
Whether denial of motion to dismiss which is an interlocutory order be subject of a petition
for certiorari?
HELD:
YES. While the complaint is captioned Collection of Sum of Money with Damages, the
allegations therein show that respondents action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Hence, the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the
case.
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non appeallable, however, if
the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies from such order of denial.
In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held: The motion
to dismiss was predicated on the respondent courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action;
and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in
case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
YES. The Supreme Court cannot go along with respondents contention that petitioner should
have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari.
While the rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion
for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such rule
is not without exception.

38

The SC have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration
of a lower courts ruling, such as:
1. where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity;
2. where the question is purely of law;
3. when public interest is involved;
4. where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; and
5. where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this case
19. Longino vs. General
G.R. No. 147956
February 16, 2005
FACTS:
On March 1, 1988, the Philippine National Railways (PNR) executed Contract of Lease No.
10320 in favor of Julian Estrella over its property located in Polo, Valenzuela, Bulacan. The
lease agreement was for a period of two years up to March 1, 1990. Although Estrella had
unpaid rentals on the initial agreement, the contract of lease was renewed until December 31,
1992. Estrella constructed his house on the property.
On April 6, 1992, Estrella filed an application with the PNR for a lease of an additional 848
square meters with the intention of constructing a 12-door commercial apartment building on
the said property. However, the PNR did not act on the said application.
Sometime in November 1992, Estrella and Elsa Serrano, owner and operator of the I.V.B.
Construction Supply entered into a verbal contract of lease in which one of the apartments,
which were still to be constructed, would be leased to Serrano. However, Estrella failed to
construct the planned 12-door apartment.
Meanwhile, Serranos lease contract with the owner of the property where she had established
her business had expired. She was compelled to construct, at her expense, a one-door
commercial apartment on a portion of the property leased by Estrella from the PNR. She and
Estrella later agreed that she would construct another commercial apartment beside the
existing one, with the latters assurance that the portion of the property in which the second
commercial apartment would be constructed would be leased to her for a period of ten (10)
years.
Serrano caused the construction of the second commercial apartment, but was aghast to
discover in September 1993 that, after the expiration of Estrellas contract with the PNR in
December of 1992, Estrella no longer had an existing lease contract with the PNR. Worse,
PNR officials told her that Estrella had no right to lease a portion of its property to third

39

persons, and advised her not to pay any more rentals to Estrella for the property occupied by
the commercial apartment.
On January 13, 1994, Serrano filed a Complaint for Damages against Estrella. Estrella was
declared in default. Serrano adduced her evidence ex parte.
On March 31, 1995, the PNR and Serrano entered into a Lease Contract over the portion of
the subject property where Serranos commercial apartment building stood. The effectivity of
the contract was until December 31, 1995.
On September 28, 1995, the court rendered judgment in favor of Serrano and against Estrella.
On January 22, 1996, the PNR and Serrano executed Lease Contract over a portion of the
property of the PNR.
Meanwhile, the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94 became final and
executory. Estrella failed to pay the amount adjudged by the court in favor of Serrano. The
Sheriff sold the house owned by Estrella at public auction to Serrano on May 5, 1997 as the
winning bidder. Estrella vacated the house, and the Sheriff turned it over to Serrano.
Serrano wanted to renew her lease with the PNR. She and her close friend, Esperanza S.
Longino, a PNR retiree, executed an Agreement on August 4, 1998, in which Serrano
allowed her to occupy a portion of the property without paying any rental therefor, on
Longinos promise to help her secure a lease contract over a property with an area of 146
square meters. Serrano then filed her application for a lease contract. However, the
application could not be acted upon by the PNR because of the suspension of its lease
contracts over its property, which was a part of its North Rail Project. Moreover, Serrano still
had unpaid back rentals. Despite her agreement with Serrano, on August 6, 1998, Longino
filed an application with the PNR for a lease of the property occupied by her.
When Serrano learned of the application, she wrote the PNR on September 26, 1998, citing
the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4287-V-94. She, likewise, informed the latter about
her purchase of Estrellas house at public auction. Serrano also cited her agreement with
Longino in which the latter bound herself to help her (Serrano) secure a lease contract from
the PNR. Serrano alleged that the property applied for by Longino was part of the property
on which the house she had purchased at public auction from the Sheriff in Civil Case No.
4287-V-94 was located. She also declared that she had allowed Longino to occupy the said
property.
On November 10, 1998, Director Divina Gracia Dantes, Officer-in-Charge of the Real Estate
Department of the PNR, recommended the approval of Serranos application and the denial of
that of Longinos.

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Meanwhile, on January 19, 1999, the Board of Directors of the PNR approved Resolution
No. 99-03, directing the PNR Management to desist from selling or leasing its properties
needed for the right-of-way of its North Rail Project.
However, despite the said Resolution of the Board of Directors of the PNR, the General
Manager of the PNR directed Dantes to prepare the contract of lease in favor of Longino and
to transmit the same for his signature on January 21, 1999. Dantes complied.
On January 26, 1999, the PNR and Esperanza Longino executed a Lease Contract over a
portion of its property near the house of Serrano, formerly owned by Estrella, with an area of
146 square meters, for a period of three months up to April 26, 1999. After securing the
requisite building permits, Longino then embarked to construct her building on the property.
On February 25, 1999 Serrano filed a handwritten Complaint against Longino, with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), demanding that the PNR lease the
property to her, and the eviction of Longino from the property on the ground that she had a
preferential right to lease the property. Serrano alleged that the house she had purchased at
public auction from Estrella was located on the said PNR property, and that Longino
occupied the property on her sufferance under their August 4, 1998 agreement. Serrano
prayed that she be declared entitled to lease the property and that her application for a lease
contract over the property be approved by the PNR. As prayed for by Serrano, the COSLAP
issued, on February 26, 1999, a status quo order.
The COSLAP opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint and issued summons on the
respondent. It also issued, on March 4, 1999, an Order directing the Real Estate Department
of the PNR to implement the Status Quo Order. Longinos motion to quash the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction was denied by the COSLAP.
Despite the pendency of the case, the PNR and Longino executed, on May 5, 1999, a
Contract of Lease over the property to expire on July 26, 1999, revocable within fifteen (15)
days in the event that the Northeast Project would start in the area.
On August 9, 1999, Dantes met with Serrano, informing her that she could re-apply for a
lease contract covering the property in question, provided that she first settle her back rentals
of P154,945.02 as of July 31, 1999. On September 17, 1999, the General Manager of the
PNR and Serrano reached an agreement to lease out the property with an area of 111.11
square meters where her structures were constructed, subject to the condition that she first
pays her back rentals of P154,945.02 as of July 31, 1999. However, Serrano failed to pay her
back rentals.
On December 16, 1999, the COSLAP rendered a Resolution in favor of Serrano and against
Longino, holding, inter alia, that Serrano was the lawful possessor of the property and had a
preferential right to lease the same. Longino received a copy of the Resolution on December
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30, 1999 and failed to appeal the same. Instead, on January 19, 2000, she sent a letter to the
General Manager of the PNR, urging the latter to disregard the resolution/recommendation of
the COSLAP for being partially irregular. She recalled the testimonies of Dantes and of the
PNR counsel before the COSLAP that only the PNR had the right to determine who was
entitled to lease the land, such determination was reversible only by the regular courts.
In the meantime, the October 27, 1999 Lease Contract of Longino with the PNR was not
renewed after its expiration. On motion of Serrano, the COSLAP issued a Writ of Execution
on February 8, 2000. Per the request of the COSLAP, the RTC of Valenzuela issued an Order,
on March 2, 2000, ordering the Sheriff to implement the writ of execution. On March 31,
2000, the Sheriff served a notice on Longino to vacate the property, but she refused. The
complainant then filed a motion for the demolition of the structures constructed by the
respondent on the property pendente lite, which the COSLAP granted. It forthwith issued the
writ.
Longino filed a petition for prohibition against the COSLAP and Serrano with the Court of
Appeals (CA) for the nullification of the December 16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP and
the February 8, 2000 Writ of Demolition issued by it, with a plea for injunctive relief.
Longino alleged that in taking cognizance of Serranos complaint, the COSLAP acted without
jurisdiction; and, when it issued the said Resolutions, with grave abuse of its discretion. She
averred that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction to review the lease contracts entered into
between her and the PNR. She contended that she had the preferential right to lease the
property.
On April 17, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The appellate court
held that the COSLAP had jurisdiction over Serranos complaint because it merely
determined who had the preferential right over the property but did not review the lease
contract between the PNR and Longino. The CA also ruled that Serrano had the preferential
right over the disputed lot and that the December 16, 1999 Resolution of the COSLAP had
already become final and executory. Hence, the appellate court concluded that the petition for
prohibition was moot and academic.
Longino, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal
of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the proper
remedy of the petitioner?
HELD:
The private respondent avers that the remedy of the petitioner from the December 16, 1999
Resolution of the COSLAP was to appeal, by way of a petition for review, to the CA under
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Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. The private respondent avers that since the petitioner opted not
to appeal the resolution to the CA, she is proscribed from filing a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We are not in full accord with the private respondents contention. The principal purpose for
the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of
jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or multiplicity of actions. The writs of certiorari
and prohibition, for that matter, are intended to annul or void proceedings in order to insure
the fair and orderly administration of justice.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must first be
demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as
would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or office has
jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority. The writ of
prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in the excess of its
jurisdiction, if such error is one of judgment, it is revocable only by appeal. On the other
hand, if the act complained of was issued by such court or body with grave abuse of
discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Indeed, a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void. It could
never become final and executory; hence, appeal therefrom by writ of error is out of the
question. The aggrieved party should file a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the petition for prohibition filed with the CA by the petitioner could have
been dismissed by the CA because the structures on the property had already been
demolished; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined by the petitioner had already been effected
43

by the respondent sheriff. For another reason, the lease contract of the petitioner and the PNR
had not been renewed after its expiration on January 26, 2000. Manifestly, the petitioner was
obliged to vacate the property and remove her structures thereon. Nevertheless, the CA took
cognizance of the petition and resolved the same on its merits, precisely because the issues
raised therein, namely, whether the COSLAP had jurisdiction over the complaint of the
private respondent; and whether the COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the
private respondent the legal possessor of the property and of having priority in leasing the
subject property raised in the petition, were substantial.

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