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Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models

Author(s): Maurice A. East
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Jul., 1973), pp. 556-576
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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SIZE AND FOREIGN

POLICY

BEHAVIOR:

A Test of Two Models

By MAURICE A. EAST*

THE

ofstatesaccording
tosizehaslongbeena part
categorization

ofworldpolitics.Rothstein
notes,forexample,thattheformalizaof
and
smallpowersoccurredas a resultof
the
tionof
categories great
thesigningof theTreatyof Chaumontin I8I7.1 Recently,
theconcept
amountof attention
ofsize has receivedan increasing
as a factoraffectof thisis therenewedinterest
in
ing foreignpolicy.One manifestation
In his pre-theory
offoreign
theforeignpolicybehaviorof smallstates.2
policy,Rosenauincludessize as one of three"genotypic"variablesason foreignpolicy.3In addition,empirsumedto exerta majorinfluence
ical studieshave shown size to be an importantfactorunderlying
behaviorof nation-states.4
variationsin theinternational
thepresentstudyhas beeninfluenced
The researchdesignunderlying
by the studyof foreignpolicyof small statesand by recentdevelopmentsinvolvingthe use of eventsdata analysisin foreignpolicyrethe focusof thisstudyis on the similarities
search.More specifically,
in theforeignpolicybehaviorof smalland largestates.
and differences

* This article was firstpresentedat a facultymeeting of the Department of Political

Science and Public Administrationat Makerere University,Kampala, Uganda, where
Research for this article has been
the author was a Visiting Lecturer in I97I-72.
supported as a part of the CREON Project with grants from the National Science
Foundation (GS-3Ii7) and the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University.Computational assistance was given by the Ohio State UniversityInstructionaland Research
Computer Center. Thanks are also due to my colleagues on the CREON Project and
to my formercolleagues at the Graduate School of International Studies at the Universityof Denver for commentsand criticismsof an early draft.
1 Robert L. Rothstein,Alliances and Small Powers (New York i968), I2-I3.
2Recent books focusing on small size and foreign policy behavior include David
Vital, The Survival of Small States (Fair Lawn, N.J. i97i);
August Schou and Arne
0. Brundtland,eds., Small States in InternationalRelations (New York i97i);
Jacques
Rapoport and others, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (UNITAR
V. V. Sveics, Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in
Studies, New York i97i);
Unequal Conflicts (Jericho,N.Y. i970).
3James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill. i966),
27-92.

4See R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior,"

World Politics, xxi (January i969), 226-4i; Jack Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations:
Size, Wealth, and Politics," American Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (September i967),
I45-72;
Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, "The Effectsof Size, Development and Accountabilityon Foreign Policy," Peace Research Society (International)
Papers, xiv (i969), I5-30.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN

POLICY BEHAVIOR

557

a discussion
oflargeandsmallstatemodels
I willbeginbypresenting
andwillthenanalyzeforeign
policyevents
policybehavior,
offoreign
on the
Research
bytheCREON Project(Comparative
datagenerated
the
Eventsof Nations)whichprovidesomeevidenceforassessing
ofthetwomodels.
validity
a description
ofthewaysmalland
presents
theliterature
Although
in theirforeign
whichis farfrom
policybehavior
largestatesdiffer
in forbehavior
modelofsmall-state
perceived
a generally
consistent,5
asmodelgenerally
This conventional
can be abstracted.
eignaffairs
byoneormoreofthefollowsumesthatsmallstatesarecharacterized

ing: (i) small land area, (2) small totalpopulation,(3) small total
GNP (or othermeasureof totalproductivecapacity),and (4) a low
levelof military
capabilities.
small statesare traditionally
Based on thesedefiningcharacteristics,
depictedas exhibitingthe followingforeignpolicybehaviorpatterns
whencomparedto largestates:6
in world affairs;
(a) Low levelsof overallparticipation
organizations
(b) high levels of activityin intergovernmental
(IGO's);
legalnorms;
(c) highlevelsofsupportforinternational
(d) avoidanceto theuse offorceas a techniqueofstatecraft;
(e) avoidanceof behaviorand policieswhich tend to alienatethe
morepowerfulstatesin thesystem;
and geographicrangeofconcernin foreign
(f) a narrowfunctional
policy activities;

(g) frequentutilizationof moral and normativepositionson internationalissues.

to small states,there
Underlyingthesebehaviorpatternsattributed
behavioris the
seemsto be a major implicitassumption:small-state
thatare found
resultof thesamegeneralprocessesof decision-making
in largerstates.For example,the above patternscorrespondquite
closelyto what mightemergefromthe applicationof a "rational"
5For an excellent discussion of the inconsistenciesin the literatureregarding the
relationship between power and aggressiveness, see Stephen A. Salmore, Foreign
Policy and National Attributes:A MultivariateAnalysis, unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Princeton
UniversityI972), 40-68.
6 The abstractionof these foreignpolicy behavior patternsis based on wide reading
in the general literatureof internationalpolitics and foreign policy. Among the more
revealingsourcesare the following: Hans J.Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations (New
York i967); Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations
(Garden City,N.Y. i966); A.F.K. Organski, WorldPolitics(New York i968); George
Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore i968).

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558

WORLD POLITICS

facinganystatewithlimited
policyto thesituation
modelofforeign
patevery
potential.In virtually
international
anda limited
resources
of
action,
course
a
low-profile
exhibit
small
states
indicated
above,
tern
of scarcererisksand theirexpenditure
theirperceived
minimizing
In
andhardcurrency.
capabilities,
military
suchas manpower,
sources
policy
thattheforeign
it is oftenassumedin theliterature
addition,
arrived
at by a deciofdecisions
ofsmallstatesaretheresults
actions
closely,
relatively
worldaffairs
sionalunitwhichhasbeenmonitoring
and has a
basefromwhichto operate,
has an adequateinformation
the convenRothstein,
Paraphrasing
policyperspective.8
long-range
morethanorno difarenothing
thatsmallstates
tionalmodelassumes
writsmall.9
ferent
fromlargestates
However,if one beginsby makingtheoppositeassumption-that
policyprocesses
theforeign
between
difference
thereis a fundamental
alternaa plausible
oflargeandsmallstates-itis possibletoconstruct
charwiththedefinitional
Starting
behavior.
tivemodelofsmall-state
of
amount
the
total
it can be assumedthat
of smallstates,
acteristics
ofsmallstates
systems
bythepolitical
availableforallocation
resources
small.Eventhoughthedemandsmadeuponthepolitical
is relatively
it canfursmaller,
ofsmallstatesmayalsobe proportionately
systems
in smallstatesis smaller
surplus"
therbe assumedthatthe"economic
thanitis in largerstates.(Economicsurplusas usedhereis an impreforredistribution
anyavailable
ofresources
cisemeasure
oftheamount
formainafterall of theminimalrequirements
wherein thesystem
havebeenmet.)Moreover,
ofthesystem's
structures
essential
tenance
in thepostdramatically
peopleshas increased
thecostof governing
is that,compared
to
The resultofall thesefactors
WorldWarII era.10
ofan alreadysmall
proportion
smallstateshavea smaller
largestates,
sector.
basetodevotetotheinternational
resource
thatthereare
one canhypothesize
If theseassumptions
arecorrect,
and
smallstates
between
differences
large
likelytobe someimportant
7In this instance,the term "rational" is used to imply the minimizing of costs and
the maximizing of impact by operating under the same assumptions and rules that
might apply in a large, developed state. It is this "rationality"that will be questioned
below.
8 Although it would be difficult
to point to an author who explicitlyespouses these
assumptions,much of the discussion of small states within a strategicperspectiveimplies as much. There is discussion of strategicroles, long-rangeand short-rangealliance
objectives,etc. See especiallyLiska (fn. 6) throughout.
9 Rothstein(fn. I), I.
10For similar arguments,see Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising
Demands and Insufficient
Resources," World Politics, xx (July i968), 660-93; Karl W.
Deutsch, "The Future of World Politics," Political Quarterly,xxxvii (January-March
i966), 9-32.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

559

in thestyleandtechniques
usedwhenprocessing
and reacting
to foreignpolicyissues.Withfewerresources
availableforallocationto
theforeign-affairs
sector,
the size and capacityof the organization
charged
withtheprimary
responsibility
forforeign
policyarelikelyto
be small.Thismeansthattherewillbe fewerpersons
inmoninvolved
itoring
international
events
andexecuting
foreign
policydecisions.
One
consequence
ofthisis theirinability
to copeadequately
withthetotal
rangeofinternational
issuesfacingthesmallstate.Certainfunctional
and geographic
areasmustbe emphasized,
whileothersare ignored.
Moreover,
thisreduced
organizational
in foreign
capacity
affairs
means
thatsmallstateswillbe lessactiveoverall,and differentially
activein
variousareasofpolicy.
A secondconsequence
is thatsmallstatesarelikelytobe slowerin
perceiving
eventsand developments
in theinternational
system.
Becausetheyhavea smaller
tomonitor
thesystem,
capacity
itis lesslikely
thattheywillperceive
variousearlywarningsignalsindicating
new
andimportant
developments
policyshifts
byotherinternational
actors.
This in turncan havea profound
effect
on theirforeign
policybehavior.
Conflicts
areoftencharacterized
in termsofstagesin theirdevelopment.A statewhichperceives
a potentially
troublesome
situation
at an
willhavefarmoreopportunity
earlystageofdevelopment
toinfluence
theoutcomeof the situation.
a statewhichperceives
Conversely,
a
situation
at a laterstageof development
mayhavefeweralternatives
toconsider.
forone,arguesthat"governments
Deutsch,
frequently
...
decidetogo towarwhentheybelievethemselves
tobe constrained
by
thelackofanyacceptable
towar."1Bythetimethe
alternative
political
thesituation
signalsareperceived
bythesmallstate,
mayhavereached
a stageof development
wheredefinite,
unambiguous,
behigh-risk
must
be
A
small
taken.
statedoesnotenjoytheluxuryof enhavior
gagingin early,low-level,
behaviorwhentrying
ambiguous
to take
actionin suchsituations.
effective

Thebehavior
fromthealternative
predicted
runscounter
model,then,
to thatof theconventional
model.According
to theformer,
smallis morelikelytobe at a higherlevelofintensity,
stateactivity
lessam-

11Karl W. Deutsch,"The Point of No Returnin the Progression

Toward War,"
in D. Pruitt and R. C. Synder, eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War
(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.i969), 6o. The generalcommunications-based
model utilized

here owes much to the work of Deutsch,althoughthereare severalpointsof disabetweenhis positionand mine. See Deutsch,Nervesof Government
greement
(New
York i963); Deutschand J. David Singer,"MultipolarPower Systemsand International Stability,"World Politics, xvi (April i964),

390-406.

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560

WORLD POLITICS

The majordifmorehostileand threatening.

biguous,
andfrequently
policybehavior,
therefore,
ference
between
thetwomodelsofforeign
concerns
thedegreetowhichsmallstatesengagein whatcanbe conmodelpredicts
morehighThe alternative
sidered
high-risk
behavior.
a
model
predicts
whiletheconventional
riskbehavior
forsmallstates,
morecautious,
low-risk
behavior
pattern.
modelaccountsfora
the alternative
The assumption
underlying
by theconventional
one thatis alsopredicted
thirdbehavior
pattern,
availableforforeign
lack of resources
model.Becauseof therelative
thatare less
of interaction
affairs,
thesmallstatemustseekmethods
diplomacy
is a very
Traditional
bilateral
costlyand moreeconomical.
of
theinterests
affairs,
andonethatserves
expensive
wayofconducting
of
thelargestateswell.Smallstateswillrelymoreon othermethods
suchas multilateral
international
conferences,
diplomacy,
interaction,
andmultiple
representation.
diplomatic
regional
organizations,
difference
betweenlargeand small
Finally,thereis an important
ofvariousissuesin world
oftheimportance
statesin theirperception
ofinternal
demandson politicaldecipolitics.
Becauseoftheprimacy
evenmoreacutein smallstatesbecauseof
sion-making
(a situation
base),
surplusand theirsmallertotalresource
theirlackof economic
of little
issuesin international
traditional
politicsaregenerally
certain
Theseareissuessuchas theColdWar,global
tothesmallstates.
interest
orspheres
ormaintaining
alliances
of
acquiring
prestige
andinfluence,
On theotherhand,thoseinterand territorial
expansion.
influence,
relatedto theireconomicgrowth
nationalissueswhichare directely
willbe mostsalientforsmallstates.'2
anddevelopment
modelsof small-state
Two different
foreign
policy
To summarize:
Bothmodelsallowone to makepredichavebeendiscussed.
behavior
tionsaboutthebehaviorof smallstatesin foreign
policy.In several
In one major
fromthetwomodelsaresimilar.
areas,thepredictions
themodelsoffer
to high-risk
opposite
predicbehavior,
area,relating
in
this
will
allow
differences
data
to
be
events
tions.
The
study
analyzed
to
oflargeandsmallstates
theforeign
between
policybehavior
patterns
itshouldbepossible
tomake
onthebasisoftheseanalyses
beidentified;
and utilityof the two
aboutthe relativeveracity
somejudgments
models.
12
See Michael O'Leary, "Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in
Underdeveloped Nations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York
i969), 324-46; Robert C. Good, "State-Buildingas a Determinant of Foreign Policy in
the New States," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment (New
York i962).

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SIZE AND FOREIGN

POLICY BEHAVIOR

561

THE DATA SET

The eventsdata analyzedhereweregeneratedby theCREON Project and consistof 4,448foreignpolicyeventsinitiatedby 32 nationstatesduringrandomlyselectedquartersof each of the yearsin the
forthedata setis Deaddecadei959-i968.`3The sourceof information
producedand continually
lineData on WorldAgairs,a commercially
of world eventscompiledprimarilyfrommajor
updatedchronology
theworld.A majorworking
and wireservicesthroughout
newspapers
an
of the CREON Projectis thatthe data set represents
assumption
of actual foreign
acceptablefirstapproximationof the distribution
duringthetimeperiodunder
forthese32 nation-states
policyactivities
study."
For a betterunderstanding
of the analysis,it is necessaryto have
some knowledgeabout the definitionof a foreignpolicy event as
used in thisstudy.'5ProjectCREON utilizesa conceptionof an event
froma decisionby thepoliticalauthorities
as a discreteactionresulting
An
of a statewho havethepowerto committhenationalgovernment.
eventis stipulatedas havingan actor,an action,one or more direct
and one or moreindirectobjects.In orderto be consideredas
targets,
foreignpolicy,an eventmusthave eithera directtargetor an indirect
state.
of theinitiating
objectwhichis externalto thenationalterritory
or
,Actors
consistof individualpoliticalexecutivesof a nation-state
theirrepresentatives.
Each eventinvolvesactorsfromonly one state.
as in the issuingof a jointcommu(If two or morestatescollaborate,
in each government
have made a decinique,thepoliticalauthorities
a
each decisionrepresents
sion to acceptthe joint action; therefore,
separateevent.)The directtargetis the immediaterecipientof the actioninitiatedby the actor.It is the entityor entities(not necessarily
13For a more complete description of the CREON Project data set, see Charles
F. Hermann, Stephen S. Salmore, and Maurice A. East, Code Manual for an Analytic
Deck of Comparative Foreign Policy Events (mimeo), Ohio State University,I971.
The exact time periods included are the following: October-December I959, AprilJune i960, January-March i96i, October-December i962, April-June i963, JulySeptember i964, January-March i965, July-Septemberi966, April-June i967, and
October-December i968.
14 It should be noted that a major task of the CREON Project is to undertake a
series of quality control procedures to determine the effectand extent of source bias.
Also, the data analyzed in this research representonly a part of those available in the
data set.
15 For a more complete description of the rules and procedures governing the
identificationand abstractionof foreignpolicy events,see Charles F. Hermann, "What
is a Foreign Policy Event?" in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy
(New York I971), 295-32I.

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562

WORLD POLITICS

addressed.
The
othergovernments)
to whichtheactionis explicitly
fromcommunicaactor/direct-target
relationship
has beenborrowed
is requiredto havebotha
tionstheory
in whicha communication
ofan indirect
sender(actor)andreceiver
(directtarget).The concept
thatofficial
actionsof politicalauobjectis basedon theassumption
toinfluence
somepersonorcolthorities
areundertaken
in an attempt
to influence
lectivity.
Anyentity(or entities)thattheactorattempts
an indirect
object.Directtargets
and
or affect
byhisactioncomprises
indirect
objectsmaybe one andthesame,butneednotbe. However,
bothmustbe explicitly
An actionispurposeful
citedinthedatasource.
verbalor nonverbal
byan actor.One actionis difbehavior
initiated
timeframe,
ferentiated
fromanother
on thebasisofa changein actors,
or skillsinvolved.
or kindofresources
degreeofcommitment,
THE ANALYSES

The foreign
policyeventis theunitof analysisin thisstudy.The
of the
to attributes
strategy
of analysisis to groupeventsaccording
differences
in foreign
policybeinitiating
statein orderto identify
of nation-states
are the
haviorbetweengroups.Thus,the attributes
The dependent
variables
usedto groupevents.
variables
independent
oftheforeign
policyeventitself;e.g.,whether
includevariousaspects
or
conflictful
or cooperative,
was
nonverbal
theevent verbal
behavior,
or ambiguous,
etc.These different
whetherthe actionwas specific
willbe discussed
measures
offoreign
morefullyas they
policybehavior
below.
areintroduced
intotheanalyses
as follows.
First,thediswillbe organized
Theresults
oftheanalyses
willbeexamined
tribution
ofevents
initiated
bylargeandsmallnations
in thelevelofactivity.
willbe
differences
Second,events
forimportant
whether
smallstatestendto utilizemoreecoanalyzedto determine
of statecraft.
asnomicalor "low-cost"
Third,substantive
techniques
thedegreeto which
pectsof eventswill be examinedto determine
therewillbe an
smallstates.
behavior
characterizes
"low-risk"
Finally,
whichareasofforeign
todetermine
policyaremostimportant
attempt
to largeand smallstates.
focusof theseanalysesis on thedifferences
A secondary
between
states.The argument
is fresmalldevelopedand smalldeveloping
difference
betweenthe
quentlymade thatthereis a fundamental
states(primarily
Western
"older"smalldeveloped
European)andthe
in Africa,
states(primarily
"newer"smalldeveloping
Asia,and Latin

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SIZE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

563

all relaempirically,
America).16In orderto examinethisargument

havebeencontrolled
tionships
between
sizeandforeign
policybehavior
Onlyin thoseinstances
wherethe
forlevelofeconomic
development.
by development
will theresize relationship
is significantly
affected
fordevelopment,
be
sultsof thethree-variable
controlling
analysis,
presented.
to size and development
are
The groupings
of nationsaccording
on
a discriminant
analysis
thoseestablished
byBurgess
whoperformed
i963 data.'7The distribution
of the32 statesincludedin theCREON
is givenbelow.
datasetacrossthefourgroupings
LARGE
DEVELOPING

SMALL
DEVELOPED

SMALL
DEVELOPING

LARGE
DEVELOPED

Belgium
Chile
Cuba
EastGermany
Israel
NewZealand
Norway
Switzerland
Uruguay
Venezuela

CostaRica
Ghana
Guinea
IvoryCoast
Kenya
Lebanon
Philippines
Thailand
Tunisia
Yugoslavia
Zambia

France
China
India
Italy
Japan
Turkey
Mexico
Spain
U.S.S.R.
U.S.A.
WestGermany

LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL

ACTIVITY

modelsof foreign
policybeBoththeconventional
and alternative
lessin
haviorof smallstatespredictthatsmallstateswillparticipate
16Both Vital (fn. 2) and Rothstein (fn. i) attemptto grapple with this problembut rather unsuccessfully,it seems. Rothstein's analysis of developing states is in a
single chapter toward the end of the book and is not well integratedwith the other
sections which deal almost exclusivelywith the "older" small developed states. Vital's
work focuseson case studies of Czechoslovakia, Israel, and Finland, none of which fit
the criteriafor small developing states. Furthermore,Vital, in an earlier work (The
Inequality of States [Fair Lawn, N.J. i967], 8), uses a different"rough upper limit"
of population for developed than for developing states. For economically advanced
countries,the upper limit of population is I0-I5 million; for developing states it is
20-30 million.
17 Discriminant analysis is a statisticaltechnique for partitioninga linear combination of a set of variables so as to minimize the number of misclassificationsand maximize the distance between the resultinggroupings, taking into account the entire set
of variables. In the final partitioning,large countriesare those with populations above
23.7 million; developed countries are those with a GNP per capita exceeding $40L.
See Philip M. Burgess, "Nation-Typing for Foreign Policy Analysis: A Partitioning
Procedure for ConstructingTypologies," in Edwin H. Fedder, ed., Methodological
Concerns in International Studies (Center for International Studies, University of

Missouri-St.Louis I970),

3-66.

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WORLD

564

POLITICS

thanwill largestates.An analysisofthedatawithregard

foreignaffairs
to numberofforeignpolicyeventsinitiatedgivesamplesupportto this
The averagenumberofeventsinitiatedand themedianfor
proposition.
each groupis givenin Table i.
TABLE I
AVERAGE AND MEDIAN
BY GROUPS

OF EVENTS INITIATED,

NUMBER

OF NATION-STATES,

Group

All States (N

32)

Large States(N
Small States (N

Small Developing States (N

*

Average

Median

I39

50

288*
55

I I)
2I)

SmallDevelopedStates(N

i959-i968

io)

II)

65**

46

i96
43

46
36

at thep = .o5
in meansbetweenlargeand smallstatesis significant
The difference

level using a

test.t

2.63 with df = 30

in means betweensmall developedand small developingstates

The difference
at thep = .o5 level. t = 0.95 withdJ = i9
is not significant
**

more eventsthan do small states,

Large statesinitiateconsiderably
overall.Using a t test
activity
a higherlevelof international
reflecting
difof means,large and small statesshow a significant
fordifference
betweensmall developed
ferenceat the p =.o5 level.The difference
at thesamelevel.
however,is notsignificant
and smalldevelopingstates,
of
the rank-ordering
is not significant,
Even thoughthis difference
groupsof statesindicatesthatsize and developmentoperatecumulaactivity;i.e.,a small statewithlow
tivelywithrespectto international
economicdevelopmentinitiatesfewereventsthan does a small state
withhigheconomicdevelopment.
the data tend
activity,
With regardto level of overallinternational
to confirmthe originalproposition.Large statesdo exhibita higher
activitythansmall states.The factthat"the oblevelof international
vious"is validatedin thisinstancealso tendsto confera degreeof crediTable i indicatesthatsize is more
bilityon thedata set.Furthermore,
in thelevel
in accountingfordifferences
thandevelopment
important
activity.18
of international
18
Althoughthe 32 nationsincludedin the data set are not a randomsampleof all
nations,the choiceof timeperiodsforwhichdata werecollectedis randomby quarin the tablespresentedhere.In
statistics
thereare certaininferential
ters.Therefore,
difference
of four
additionto thestatistics
given,it shouldbe notedthata percentage
at thep = .o5 level,giventhe size of the
significant
per centor largeris statistically
groupsbeingcompared.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN

LOW-COST

FOREIGN POLICY

POLICY BEHAVIOR

565

TECHNIQUES

It has been arguedabovethatbecauseof thelack of resources,

small
statesare morelikelyto employvarioustechniquesof statecraft
which
willminimizethecostofcarrying
outtheirforeignpolicy.Severalstudieshavenoted,forexample,thetendency
ofsmallstatestoutilizeintergovernmental
organizations(IGO's) to a larger extentthan large
states.19
Using the CREON Projectdata, it is possibleto examinethe
degreetowhichstatesengagein jointactionin initiating
foreignpolicy
is thatsmallstatesare morelikelyto engagein
events.The hypothesis
jointbehaviorin foreignpolicybecausethisallowstwo or morestates
to pool theirresources
to achievegreaterinfluence.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF EVENTS
BY SIZE

AND NUMBER

One

Large States
Small States
chi square=

202.57;

INITIATED,

OF STATES PARTICIPATING

Number of States
Two
Three

65

46

30

40

4
14

(N -

3,153)

1,135)

(N

gamma- .38

Table 2 supportsthe hypothesis:

Small statesdo initiatemorejoint
behavioreventsthanlargestates.The chi squarevalue and thepercentage difference
are bothquite large,and themagnitudeof therelationshipusingthe Goodman-Kruskal
gamma is .38. Althoughit was not
possibleto separateout IGO eventsfromall others,it shouldbe noted
thatthe thirdcolumnof Table 2 includeseventsinitiatedby statesas
participants
in IGO's. Thus, the evidencewould seemto indicatethat
small statesdo initiatea greaterproportionof theirforeignpolicy
eventsas jointundertakings,
includingeventsinitiatedin IGO's.20
Anothereconomicalmeansof conductingforeignpolicyis to direct
at groupsof statesand at IGO's ratherthanat
one'sinfluence
attempts
individualnations.Thus, it is hypothesized
thatmanyof thetargetsof
smallstates'actionswill be groupsof statesor IGO's. Table 3 presents
thesedata.
19See Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in
National Capitals and IntergovernmentalOrganizations," World Politics, xix (July
i967), 646-63; and MauriceA. East, Stratificationand International Politics, unpub.

Ph.D. diss. (PrincetonUniversity

i969),

I28-46.
20For this and the remaining tables, the significancelevel of the chi square value
will be given only if it is below p = .oi. Also, it should be noted that the chi square

values are likely to be large due to the large number of cases being analyzed.

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566

WORLD POLITICS
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF EVENTS INITIATED,
BY SIZE

One
Target

Large States
Small States

85
75

AND NUMBER

OF TARGETS

Number of Targets
Two or Four to Eleven
Three
Ten
or More

5
5

IGO as
Target

8
17

(N
(N

3,166)
1,145)

chi square = 83.90; gamma -.30

The majordifferences
betweenlargeand small statesappearin the
firstand lastcolumns.Eighty-five
per centof all large-state
eventshave
a singletarget,while only75 per centof small-state
eventshave one
target.Looking at the frequencywithwhich IGO's are the targetof
is significant
and in thepredicted
foreignpolicyevents,thedifference
direction.Small statesinitiate9 per centmoreeventswherethetarget
is an IGO.
There is a thirdtypeofforeignpolicybehaviorwhichmightalso be
modelpredictsthat,ifforeign
considered"low-cost."The conventional
policy eventsare dichotomizedinto verbal and nonverbalbehavior,
smallstateswill engagemorein verbal("words") and lessin nonverbal
is thattalkingis a moreeconom("deeds") behavior.The assumption
ical formof activity
thanaction.
modeloffers
a competing
Small
However,thealternative
hypothesis.
states,accordingto thealternative
model,areunableto maintaina high
levelof attention
focusedon foreignaffairs.
Furthermore,
theydo not
oftenperceivedevelopingsituations
untilratherlate.The resultis that
smallstatesare notlikelyto exhibitmuchof theverbalbehavior(comments,acknowledgements,
posturing)thathas beenshownto makeup
much of international
behavior.The actionof small states,when it
eventuallycomes,is morelikelyto be in theformof "deeds"or other
nonverbalbehavior."Low-cost"verbalbehavioris not likelyto prove
in influencing
a situationwhichmay have just come to the
effective
attention
of a smallstate.Thus,thecompetinghypothesis
is thatsmall
less verbalbehaviorand morenonverbal
stateswill exhibitrelatively
behaviorthanlargestates.
In thiscontext,it is necessaryto discussbriefly
the basis on which
eventswereclassifiedas verbalor nonverbalbehavior.Verbalbehavior
involvesno actualcommitment
of a state'sresources.
Examplesof such
on situations,
behaviorincludecomments
threats,
accusations,
proposals,
denials,promises.On theotherhand,nonverbalbehavior(i.e., deeds),

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SIZE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

567

The
alwaysinvolves
theactualcommitment
orutilization
ofresources.
useofmilitary
force,
granting
a loan,buying
orsellinggoods,andsendingpersonnel
orequipment
areall examples
ofdeeds.2'
Table4 clearly
supports
thehypothesis
derived
fromthealternative
modelofsmall-state
behavior.
Thereis a statistically
significant
differenceofI4 percentin theamount
ofverbalbehavior
exhibited
bylarge
andsmallstates,
withsmallstatesgenerating
lessverbalbehavior
and
morenonverbalbehavior.

TABLE 4
VERBAL/NONVERBAL
(IN

Verbal
(Words)

Large States
Small States

BEHAVIOR BY SIZE

PERCENTAGES)

Nonverbal
(Deeds)

76

(N
(N

24

38

62

3,168)
-

1,146)

chi square = 7.39

It is instructive
ofdevelopment
tolookat theeffect
on thisrelationthanlevelofecoship.In Table5,itisclearthatsizeis moreimportant
inaccounting
nomicdevelopment
fordifferences
intheamount
ofnonThe percentage
verbalbehavior.
differences
betweensmalland large
statesaresubstantial,
whilethedifferences
betweenlevelsof developmentwithin
areverysmalltovirtually
thesizecategories
nonexistent.
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF NONVERBAL

BEHAVIOR

BY SIZE AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

Small
Small
Large
Large

States
Developing
Developed States
Developing States
Developed States

Percentage

Total N

40

501

37

645

24
24

774

2,394

of
The rankings
of size and development
groupings
bypercentage
the
alternative
model.
events
nonverbal
behavior
support
Developing
to devoteto international
affairs
thandestateshavefewerresources
21 Under certain conditions, announcementsof actions may qualify as deeds rather
than verbal behavior. Generally,this is where the announcement is of an action that
has already taken place, or where there are no conditional factorslikely to intervene
between the announcementand the action. See Hermann and others (fn. I3).

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568

WORLD POLITICS

on
ofsizeanddevelopment
velopedstates;thus,thecumulative
effect
states
resources
wouldpredict
toanordering
inwhichsmalldeveloping
resources
to expendon less
rankedfirst(becausetheyhavethefewest
Bothof
states.
important
verbalbehavior)
followed
bysmalldeveloped
This is
thesegroupshavefewerresources
to expendthanlargestates.
precisely
therank-ordering
ofstatesfoundin Table5.
HIGH-RISK

BEHAVIOR

policybehavior
preThe conventional
modelof small-state
foreign
dictsthatsmallstateswill exhibitbehaviorthatproducesthe least
summarizes
thispointwell:
amount
ofriskforthem.Stanley
Hoffmann
"At all times,
thelineseparating
smallerfromlargerpowershas corresponded
to two different
attitudes
towardrisk.Smallpowersare
tobe satisfied
andthesystem,
bytheirresources,
theirlocation,
forced,
tominimize
withestablishing
a hierarchy
ofrisksandwithattempting
is likelyto
Suchbehavior
theriskstheyconsider
tobe mostserious."22
a
or hostilebehavior,
includean unwillingness
to engagein conflict
otherstates,and
tendency
to employambiguity
to avoidalienating
Therewouldnotbe as muchcomuchcooperative
verbalbehavior.
operative
nonverbal
behavior,
sinceitis more"costly."
competing
hypotheses.
First,
The alternative
modelagainpresents
moreconflict
behavior
thanlargestates,
smallstates
arelikelytoexhibit
becauseofthefrequent
need
particularly
conflictful
nonverbal
behavior,
to takeactionof a definitive
and oftenhostilenature.By thetimea
a situation,
thatsituation
has
smallstateperceives
thesignalsregarding
"high-commitment"
acfrequently
reacheda stagewhereonlydefinite
itis possible
tionwillbe effective.
that,before
beingperFurthermore,
thesituation
alonglines
ceivedbythesmallstate,
mayhavedeveloped
undesirable
orhostilebeconsidered
byit.In thiscase,onlyconflictful
in changing
thecourseofevents.
havioris likelytobe effective
It is too
lower-level
actions
suchasbargaining
andnegotiation.
lateforutilizing
thehypothesis
derivedfromthe
Usingthesamegeneralargument,
modelisthatsmall-state
behavior
willbelessambiguous
and
alternative
morespecific
thanlarge-state
to avoidmisunderbehavior,
precisely
andmisinterpretations.
mayreflect
maneuvering
standings
Ambiguity
andattempts
at enhancing
one'sbargaining
position
whenitoccursat
an earlystage.Butin thelaterstages(at whicha smallstateis likelyto
can be misleading
becomeinvolved),ambiguity
and dangerous
to a
smallstate'sposition.
first
I willexaminethesecompeting
withregardto conhypotheses
22

The State of War (New York i965),

StanleyHoffmann,

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I38.

SIZE AND FOREIGN

POLICY

BEHAVIOR

569

andcooperative
flictful
behavior
byanalyzing
theCREON datawhich
havebeencodedusinga modified
version
of theWorldEvent/InteractionSurvey(WEIS) schemeforcategorizing
foreign
policyinteractions.23
Thismodified
codingschemeis organized
intoeightmajor
ofevent-types,
categories
whichcanbestbe displayed
in matrixform
(FigureA).
FIGURE A
REVISED

SCHEME

FOR CATEGORIZING

FOREIGN POLICY EVENT ACTIONS

VERBAL

CONFLICT

NONVERBAL

Evaluation

Desire

Intent

Deeds

Deny
Accuse
Comment (Neg.)

Demand
Protest
Propose (Neg.)
Request (Neg.)

Threaten
Warn
Reject
Intend (Neg.)

Force
Demonstrate
Increase
Military
Capability
Aid Opponent
Reduce
Relationship
Seize
Expel
Subvert

Comment (Pos.)
Approve

Request (Pos.)
Propose (Pos.)
Negotiate

Intend (Pos.)
Offer
Promise
Agree

Yield
Grant
Decrease
Military
Capability
Consult
Carry Out
Agreement
Reward
Increase
Relationship

COOPERATION

Increasing Commitmentto Action

-

>

>

Action
>

The eightcellsin thematrix

threedimensions
offoreign
represent
behavior:(i) verbaland nonverbal
and cooperabehavior,
(2) conflict
levelsofcommitment
toactionwithin
tion,and(3) differing
theverbal
230n
WEIS, see Charles A. McClelland and Gary Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in
the InteractionsAmong Nations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics
and ForeignPolicy,rev. ed. (New York i969), 711-24. The revised scheme follows
closely the work of Walter Corson, "Measuring Conflictand Cooperation Intensityin
East-WestRelations: A Manual and Codebook" (mimeo), Universityof Michigan 1970.

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WORLD

570

POLITICS

behaviorcategory,
in which it is assumedthat evaluativestatements
of into action.Statements
symbolizethelowestlevelof commitment
of
with statements
tentsymbolizethe highestlevel of commitment,
desirehavingan intermediate
position.
The categories
scalein thefollowing
willbe arrayedon an eight-point
manner:
I

Deeds

Intent

Evaluation

Evaluation

Desire

7
Conflict

Cooperation
Desire

Intent

Deeds

variables.For example,the
This scalecan be collapsedto formdifferent
firstand lastcategories
represent
nonverbalbehavior,whiletherestare
verbal; categoriesone throughfourrepresentcooperativebehavior;
fivethrougheightrepresent
conflict
behavior.
and conflict
The empiricalrelationship
betweensize, development,
behavioris a complexone. Nevertheless,
the simplebivariaterelationship will be examinedfirst.The predictionfromthe conventional
behavior.By
modelwas thatsmallstateswould engagein less conflict
thesame argument,
modelalso predictsthatdeveloptheconventional
model,
ing stateswill engagein less conflict
behavior.The alternative
on theotherhand,predictsthatsmallstates(and developingstates,by
behaviorbecauseof theperthesame logic) will exhibitmoreconflict
ceivednecessityto take high-riskand oftenhostileactionif theyare
to influence
as theydevelop.
thedirectionof situations
of conflictand cooperative
Tables 6 and 7 show the distributions
Note thatboth models,given
actionforboth size and development.
thesedata,rateequallywell: Bothyieldone correctand one incorrect
prediction.Small statesexhibit6 per cent less conflictbehaviorthan
belargestates,and developingstatesexhibit4 per centmoreconflict
is statistihaviorthandevelopedstates.In bothcases,the relationship
callysignificant
abovep
.5o, but themagnitudeof therelationship
is relatively
small.
TABLE 6
BY SIZE

CONFLICT/COOPERATION
PERCENTAGES)

(IN

Cooperation

Conflict

63
69

37
3I

Large States
Small States
chi square=

i6.76,

gamma=-

.15

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(N

3,168)

(N -,I46)

571

SIZE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

TABLE 7
BY DEVELOPMENT

CONFLICT/COOPERATION
(IN

PERCENTAGES)

Cooperation

Conflict

66

34
38

Developed States
DevelopingStates

62

chi square = 6.o4 (Significantat the p =

.02

(N
(N

3,039)

= I275)

level); gamma = .o8

is elaborated
betweensize and conflict/cooperation
The relationship
in a mostinteresting
way (one not predictedby eithermodel) when
forlevelof development.
Large developingstateshave the
controlling
highestpercentageof conflictbehavior,and small developingstates
havethelowest.24
(See Table 8.)
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF CONFLICT

BEHAVIOR

BY SIZE AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

Large Developing States

Small Developed States
Large Developed States
Small DevelopingStates

Percentage

Total N

49
38
33

774
645
2,394

22

50I

to utilizetheuncollapsedcodingschemeto examIt is nownecessary

As indicatedabove,the alterine anothersetof competinghypotheses.
nativemodelpredictsthatsmallstatesare morelikelyto exhibitnonverbal behaviorand especiallynonverbalconflictbehavior.These
to Table 9.
predictions
can be testedby referring
of deeds,bothcooperativeand conflictful,
is higher
The percentage
conflictful
nonverbal
forsmallstates,and smallstatesdo exhibitmore
model of
behaviorthanlarge states.Table 9 supportsthe alternative
small-state
foreignpolicybehavior.
SeveralotheraspectsofTable 9 also lend support,at leastindirectly,
24 The findingspresentedin Table 8 correspondnicely to a status discrepancymodel
of internationalconflict;i.e., those states whose status on one dimension (size) is incongruentwith status on another dimension (development) are most likely to exhibit
conflictbehavior. Large developing and small developed states are the two statusdiscrepanttypes,and theyrank firstand second in percentageof conflictbehavior. See
JohanGaltung, "A StructuralTheory of Aggression,"Journalof Peace Research, i, No.
2 (1964), 95-Ii9;
East, "Status Discrepancy and Violence in the InternationalSystem,"
in James N. Rosenau and others, eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New
York I972), 299-3I9.

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572

WORLD POLITICS
TABLE 9
REVISED

FOREIGN

POLICY

ACTION

SCHEME

BY SIZE

(IN PERCENTAGES)

Cooperation
Deeds

Large States 2I
Small States 30
chi square =

Intent Desire

i6
14

Io
i6

Conflict
Evalu- Evaluation
ation Desire 1Ud1UIDeeds

I7
Io

20
I4

5
4

3
8

3,168
II46

i89-42

tothetheoretical
basisofthealternative
model.I notedabovethatmuch
international
behaviorconsistsof low-commitment
verbal behavior.
However,the model predictedthat,becauseof the lack of resources,
small stateswould initiatefewerof thesetypesof eventsthan large
states.In the revisedcodingscheme,thislow-commitment
verbalbehavioris represented
by theevaluativeverbalcategories.
When thecooperativeand conflictful
evaluativeeventsare combined,the small
statesinitiatefewerevaluativeeventsthan do the large states.
The finalaspectof high-risk
behaviorto be examinedrefersto the
degreeof specificity
of foreignpolicybehavior.It will be recalledthat
the conventionalmodel predictsthatambiguity(lack of specificity)
will be a characteristic
of thebehaviorof small states,who use it as a
meansto avoid alienatingothers.The alternative
model,on the other
hand,predictsthatthebehaviorof smallstateswill be morespecific,
as
a way to avoidmisunderstandings
and misperceptions.
It is possibleto testthesetwo hypotheses,
sincetheCREON Project
data set allowsforthe analysisof two dimensionsof specificity:
problem specificity
and targetspecificity.
A problem-specific
eventis one in
whichthetargetof theeventis clearaboutwhat theissueis and what
theinitiating
statedesiresto accomplishas a resultof theeventaction.
An eventhas a specifictargetwhen it is clearwhatentitiestheactoris
concernedaboutwithregardto theissueat hand,and/orwhatentities
theactorwishesto influence
byhis action.The followingis an example
of an eventwhichhas bothan unspecified
problemand an ambiguous
target:CountryA expressesits concernover recentdevelopments
in
the South Pacific.Althoughspecificity
is clearlya matterof degree,
forthepresentanalysisthevariablehasbeenassigneda dichotomous
yes
or no.
As indicatedin Table io, thealternative
modelis supportedwithreSmall statesshow 8 per cent
gard to both dimensionsof specificity.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN

573

POLICY BEHAVIOR

andi8 percentmorewith
morespecificity
withregardtotheproblem
withreno difference
regardto target.
Development
makesvirtually
theonlydifference
gardtoproblem
specificity.
As fortarget
specificity,
occursbetweenlargedevelopedand largedeveloping
states,and,as
implied
bythealternative
model,largedeveloped
statesshowtheleast
specificity
oftarget.
Theseareprecisely
thestateswhichcan mostaffordtobe ambiguous.
TABLE IO
SPECIFICITY

OF FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT

(IN PERCENTAGES)
Specificity of

Problem

70 (N

Large States

3,I54)a

78 (N = 'IJ44)

Small States

Small Developed States

Small DevelopingStates
Large Developed States
Large DevelopingStates

79 (N

78 (N
7I (N
68 (N

644)Y

500)

2,385)

769)

Target

64 (N
82

(N

82
82

(N

(N
6i (N

72(N

3,I52)b
I-44)
643)501)

2,382)

770)

a The chi square value for the 2

X 2 table of size and problem specificityis I4.33.

The chi square value for size and targetspecificityis 55.86.
c The chi square value for the 4 X 2 table of state-types
by problem specificityis 31.93.
d The chi square value for type of state and targetspecificityis i62.93.

RELATIVE

IMPORTANCE

OF FOREIGN

POLICY

ISSUES

Boththeconventional
andalternative
modelspredict
thatsmallstates
willbeinterested
ina narrower
rangeofforeign
policyissuesthanlarge
states.
The alternative
modelfurther
thateconomic
specifies
issueswill
be ofgreatimportance
to smallstates(and,bythesamelogic,to decan be examined
veloping
states).Certainaspectsof thisrelationship
withtheaid oftheCREON data.All events
werecodedon a seriesof
dimensions
tocapture
variousaspects
oftheinternal
designed
decision
unitand decisionprocesses
involvedin theevent.For example,each
eventwascodedaccording
tothebureaucratic
structures
thatwereinvolvedintheevent."Also,eacheventwascodedaccording
towhether
theprimary
skillorresource
usedinexecuting
theeventwaseconomic,
or diplomatic.
military,
By analyzing
therelationship
of size and de25 Informationon the bureaucratic structuresinvolved in foreign policy events was
available for 52 per cent of all events. Given the nature of the source, Deadline Data,
this degree of richnessin the data exceeded the highest expectationsof the most optimistic membersof the project.

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574

WORLD POLITICS

velopment
toeachofthesevariables,
itis possible
toinvestigate,
atleast
inan indirect
manner,
therelative
importance
ofvarious
foreign
policy

issues.

Theprediction
isthattheeconomic
bureaucracies
(i.e.,thoseagencies
responsible
fortheeconomicaspectsof thepolity)of smallstatesas
wellas developing
states
willbe involved
in theexecution
ofa higher
proportion
of foreign
policyeventsthantheeconomicbureaucracies
of largestates.Table II indicates
thatthisis in factthecase.When
controlling
fordevelopment,
thedataindicate
thatsmallstates
stillhave
a higherproportion
of eventsinvolving
economic
bureaucracies
than
TABLE II
INVOLVEMENT

OF ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT

(IN PERCENTAGES)

Percentage
5

Large States
Small States

i8

Small Developing States

Small Developed States
Large Developed States
Large Developing States

22

i6
6
I

TotalN
I,365
90I
4V6

485
I,079
286

of
do largestates.Smalldeveloping
stateshavea higherproportion
suchevents
thansmalldeveloped
as mightbe expected
fromthe
states,
alternative
model.26
An examination
ofthedataon theskillor resources
utilizedin exevents
is evenmorerevealing.
The assumption
this
ecuting
underlying
variable
isthatdifferent
ofstates
willemploy
different
types
techniques
of statecraft
in conducting
theirforeign
policy.Somemayrelyheavily on diplomacyor othertraditional
meansof influencing
other
states;somemayrelymoreon economic,
or evenmilitary
cultural,
techniques.
26
It is not clear why large developing states have such a small proportion of
events involving economic bureaucracies. Size again is the dominating factor,but the
alternativemodel would predict that the large developing state would show more
economically oriented activity.Also, it is of interest to note that in large developed
states (the principal actors in internationaleconomic affairs),only 6 per cent of the total
foreign policy activityinvolves economic bureaucracies.
27 Given the conceptionof techniques of statecraftemployed here, it is possible for a
state to use economic aid as a technique of statecraftto secure military advantages.
Similarly,military techniques, for instance mobilizing troops, could be used to gain
economic or diplomatic advantages.
The original coding used six categories,but the distributionof events across categories was so skewed that three categories (containing only 3 per cent of the events)
were omitted. The omitted categories were political-legal,cultural, and ideological.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN

POLICY

575

BEHAVIOR

of foreignpolicyeventsacrossthe
Table i2 showsthe distribution
model predicts,small
threeskillor resourceareas.As the alternative
statesinitiatei5 per cent more eventsinvolvingeconomicresources
thando largestates.Again,thesmalldevelopingstatesinitiatethehighof suchevents.The evidencedoes seemto indicatethat
estproportion
and economictechniquesof statecraft
aremore
economicbureaucracies
frequently
involvedor utilizedin theforeignpolicybehaviorof small
states.
TABLE 12
TYPE

OF SKILL

OR RESOURCES BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT

(IN PERCENTAGES) a

Economic

Military Diplomatic Total N

Small States
Large States

25

I"I

Io

82

Small Developed States

Small DevelopingStates
Large Developed States
Large DevelopingStates

22
28

I2
Io

57

I2

5
5

59'b
6oc

8i
85

II45

3,i66
644
50I
2,392

774

a As noted in the text,the percentagesin this table do not add to ioo per cent be-

cause three categories have been omitted. The omitted categories account for about
three per cent of all events. However, the total N-column includes events classed in
all six categories.
b The chi square value for this 2 x 3 table is 240.25.
c The chi square value for this 4 x 3 table is 257.93.

Finally,anotherlook at Table i2 revealsseveraladditionalfindings.

Althoughtheprimaryfocusherehas beenon economicaspects,examiand diplomaticaspectsshowsthatseveralhypothnationofthemilitary
eses presentedabove are also supportedby thesedata. For example,
comparedwith large states,small statesare shown to be involvedin
6 per centmore eventsutilizingmilitaryskills and resources.Also,
small statesinitiate23 per cent fewerdiplomaticeventsthan large
states.In bothcases,thesefindingsprovideadditionalsupportforthe
alternative
modelof small-state
foreignpolicybehavior.
CONCLUSIONS

In thisstudyI havefocusedon theimpactof size on theforeignpolmodelofsmall-state

behaviorwas
icybehaviorofstates.A conventional
fromtheliterature.
This modelis basedon thedefiningcharabstracted
of small size and the projectionof a "rational"decisionacteristics
thatfacesmallstates.I also presented
makingmodelintothesituations

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576

WORLD POLITICS

an alternative
model,basedtoa largedegreeon a communications
perspective:
Smallstatesactas theydo precisely
becauseoflimitations
on
theirorganizational
andability
tomonitor
affairs
capacity
international
Thisleadstoa lackofinformation,
an inability
adequately.
toperceive
situations
at an earlystage,and a tendency
to employhigh-commitment,
high-risk
types
ofbehavior.
I haveusedforeign
policyeventsdatafromtheCREON Projectto
testthehypotheses
stemming
fromthetwomodels.The generalthrust
ofthedatasupports
thealternative
do tendtominimodel.Smallstates
mizethecostsofconducting
foreign
policybyinitiating
morejointactionsandbydirecting
influence
atjoint-ormultiple-actor
tarattempts
gets.Contrary
tothepredictions
oftheconventional
model,smallstates
do notinitiate
is
as muchverbalbehavior
This finding
as largestates.
thatsmall
consistent
withthealternative
model,inwhichitis assumed
statesdo nothavethecapacityor theresources
to engagein large
amounts
oflow-level
verbalbehavior.
In termsof high-risk
smallstatesengagemuchmorein
behavior,
conflictful
nonverbal
behavior.
Also,smallstatestendto avoidambiguityin foreign
policybehavior,
morespecificity
as to the
exhibiting
issueat handand thetargetbeinginfluenced.
Bothof thesefindings
runcounter
to theconventional
model'spredictions
thatsmallstates
willtendtominimize
risks.
of economicfactors
in small-state
Finally,theimportance
foreign
policyis demonstrated.
The involvement
of economicbureaucracies
and theutilization
of economic
of statecraft
techniques
aremorefrequentin theforeign
policyofsmallstatesthanin thatoflargestates.
Although
thedataathanddo givereasonforbelieving
thatthereare
in thebehavior
profound
and significant
differences
patterns
of large
andsmallstates,
sucha beliefcannotbe sustained
without
considerably
moreresearch
on foreign
policydecision-making
in small
procedures
anddeveloping
states.
Forexample,
itisimportant
todetermine
whethertheforeign
ministries
ofsmallstatesdo indeedperceive
situations
at
laterstagesof development.
Do smallstatedecision-makers
perceive
thesenseofurgency
andneedforhigh-risk,
high-commitment
action
thatis positedbythemodel?Theseandotherareasofresearch
at the
ofthenation-state
mustbe carried
micro-level
outbefore
thealternative
modelcanbe fullyaccepted.
In addition,
suchresearch
mayrevealand
in foreign
differences
thatarenotyetfully
emphasize
policyprocesses
in foreign
or appreciated
ministries
aroundtheworld.To
perceived
theextent
thatthisis thecase,additional
research
mayaid in reducing
in
tensions
someofthe
international
arising thecontemporary
system.

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