Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Author(s): Barbara Farnham

Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 3, Special Issue (Part Two): Prospect Theory (Jun., 2004)
, pp. 441-463
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792551
Accessed: 09-11-2015 03:16 UTC

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Vol.25, No. 3, 2004

PoliticalPsychology,

ImpactofthePoliticalContexton ForeignPolicy
Decision-Making
Barbara Farnham
Columbia University

relations
One ofthemostpressingconcernsinthestudyofinternational
todayis todevelop
on
accountoftheimpactofdomestic
a systematic
politics foreign
policy.Thispaperargues
a processof decisionthatdomesticpoliticsfrequently
influences
foreignpolicythrough
awarenessoftherequirements
makingthatgrowsoutofthedecision-maker's
foreffective
It is therefore
actioninthepoliticalcontext.
thatcan explain
necessarytodevelopa theory
In
how thepolitical context'scharacteristic
thinking.
featuresaffectdecision-makers'
to
combine
culled
the
literature
on
with
attempting
insights
from
politicaldecision-making
a firststeptoward
psychologicaltheoriesofdecision-making
processes,thispaper offers
sucha theory.
KEY WORDS: decision-making,
domesticpolitics,foreign
policy,politicalcontext

One ofthemostpressing
concernsinthestudyofinternational
relations
today
is developinga systematic
accountof theimpactof domesticpoliticson foreign
not
policy(Buenode Mesquita,2002; Fearon,1998).' Untilthisis accomplished,
butour
only will our explanationsof foreignpolicydecisionsbe incomplete,
theoriesmayoftenbe less usefulto policymakers
thanwe wouldlike (George,
1993,pp. xxv,7-11).
Some tryto addressthisproblemby turning
to thedomesticpoliticslevelof
others
the
betweeninternational
and
analysis;
proposemodeling relationship
domesticfactors
as a two-levelgame(Evans,Jacobson,
& Putnam,1993;Putnam,
I agreethatdomesticpoliticsinflu1988).I suggesta different
approach.
Although
encesforeign
to cope simultaneously
with
policythrough
policymakers'
attempts
international
anddomesticimperatives,
I arguethatitis oftenbrought
tobearnot
Fortheviewthatbothclassicalrealismandcontemporary
research
ofdomespointtotheimportance
tic politicalconsiderations
in themakingof foreign
policy,see Snyder(1991, p. 20).
441
0162-895X? 2004 International
Societyof PoliticalPsychology
Publishedby BlackwellPublishing.
Inc.,350 Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA, and9600 Garsington
Road,Oxford,OX4 2DQ

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442

Farnham

throughbargainingas in two-levelgames,but througha processof decisionforeffective

actionin
makingthatgrowsoutofan awarenessoftherequirements
thepoliticalcontext.Thus,to explaintheimpactof domesticpoliticson foreign
thatcan
policy,we need to developa theoryof foreignpolicydecision-making
to
an
account
of
the
that
underdecision-makers'
we
must
context;2
give
response
standhow thepoliticalcontext'scharacteristic
features
affecttheirthinking.3
how thepoliticalcontextinfluences
Such a theoryshouldtellus, first,
what
decision-makers
focuson whenconsidering
a foreignpolicyproblem.Does it
withpersonalpower,or does ithaveless parochial
merelyfostera preoccupation
as
well?
to thedemands
Second,we wantto knowhow sensitivity
consequences
ofthepoliticalcontextaffects
I argue
actualdecision-making
processes.Although
thatitfosters
tomakesharpvaluetrade-offs,
a reluctance
itsimplications
fordecibehaviormaybe broaderthansimplyencouraging
a tendencyto
sion-making
capitulateto politicalpressures.Third,we mustask how suchprocessesaffect
foreign
policyoutcomes.Whatkindsofdecisionsdoes awarenessofthepolitical
contextproduce?The ultimategoal, howeverdistantits achievement,
is to give
an accountoftheimpactofthesedecisionson outcomesat theleveloftheinternationalsystem.
In attempting
to combineinsights
culledfromtheliterature
on politicaldeciwithpsychological
theories
ofdecision-making
sion-making
processes,thispaper
a first
offers
researchto testthetheory
of
step.Ratherthanpresenting
systematic
in a politicalcontext,
it suggestsa direction
forsuchresearch.
decision-making
see Farnham,1997.)As Lamborn(1997)
(For a plausibility
probeof thistheory,
has suggested,
theoretical
workon thepoliticalsignificance
ofcognition
andperception
is simultaneously
and
tied
to
theories
of strateindependent inextricably
interaction.
These
theoretical
in
gic
bridgescarrytraffic bothdirections.
interaction
to buildmorecon... To use thecommonthreadofstrategic
structive
conversations
acrossdifferent
researchprograms,
we need to
linkseparatetheoretical
them.(p. 210)
agendas,notconflate
The PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making
Simon(1990) has arguedthat"eachkindoftask"thehumanmindaddresses
definesa "different
and because cognitiveperformance
'species' of thought,"
2

As Alan Lamborn(1997) has observed,"even researchprogramsthatfocuson theinteraction

of
domesticand international
incentivestypicallydo nothave a theorythatexplainshow theyare
connected"(p. 201).
This meansrelating
the"domainindependent"
aspectsof thinking-suchas recognition
processes,
heuristicsearch,and serialpattern
features.
The challengeis "to
recognition-tobasic contextual
discoverwhendifferent
characteristics
comeintoplayin particular
situations
andwithwhateffect"
(Simon,1990; see also Bennett,1981).

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

443

and sociallyacquiredknowledge,[we]
"dependsheavilyon sociallystructured
mustpay constantattention
to the social environment
of cognition.... Social
tosettheboundaries
ofourgeneralizations."
In other
variablesmustbe introduced
be
behavior
cannot
understood
without
thesitwords,decision-making
specifying
uationto whichthe decision-maker
is responding-andforpoliticaldecisionmakersthatincludesnotonlysubstantive
butalso thepolitical
policyproblems,
contextwithinwhichtheymustbe addressed(Simon,1990,pp. 4, 16; see also
Bennett,1981,pp. 172-173;Farnham,1990; Levine,Resnick,& Higgins,1993,
p. 586; Tetlock,1985,pp. 300-306).4
The basic featuresof any contextencouragedistinctive
ways of thinking
about decisionproblemsand characteristic
proceduresfordealingwiththem
influencethe
(Tetlock,1985, p. 306), and how theyare definedwill strongly
thatcan be developedaboutbehavior:Different
contextual
features
hypotheses
have different
Thus, the politicalcontext
implicationsfor decision-making.5
affectsthedecision-making
behaviorof thosewho are sensitiveto it in distinct
andidentifiable
ofcharacteristic
modesofanaways,leadingto thedevelopment
lyzingand dealingwithdecisionproblems.
A reviewof thepoliticalsciencedecision-making
literature
of thepast40
ofthepoliticalcontext
is a pervasiveconcern
years6suggeststhatthebasicfeature
withacceptability.
In a politicalcontext,
effective
actionwithrespectto substantivegoals normally
consensus"in support
ofproposedpolirequiresa "sufficient
cies (George,1980b,pp. 1, 3; see also George,1980a,pp. 234-235; Kissinger,
To be effective,
as
1964,p. 24), andthatdependson acceptability.
internationally
well as domestically,
a policymustbe acceptableto someminimum
numberof
relevantgroupsand individuals(Diesing,1962,p. 214; Hilsman,1967,p. 547).7
"Thereis seldomone optiondictatedbytheinternational
system(or ... whenthereis, it is seldom
obviousto all in advance)and . . adaptation
to externalimperatives
involvespoliticalcompetition
amongviewsof whatis rational"(Betts,1994,p. 807).
For a morecompletediscussionof thenatureof contextand how it can shape decision-making
behavior,see Farnham(1990).
focuseson theworkof the"first
wave" theorists
of politicaldecision6 My reviewof thisliterature
RichardNeustadt,
andWarnerSchilling,all of whom
making:RogerHilsman,SamuelHuntington,
of effective
actionin thepoliticalcontext,
to definethedecianalyzedtherequirements
attempting
sion-maker's
to thepoliticalstrategies
used to
uniquelypoliticalproblemsand pointing
commonly
cope withthem(Art,1973; see also Farnham,1990, pp. 85-89). AlexanderGeorge'sand Paul
intothenatureof thepoliticalcontextwerealso indispensable,
andtheworkof a
Diesing'sinsights
numberof contemporary
policyanalystsprovedhelpfulas well.
Tetlock(1992) has proposedthattwocontextual
features
characterize
all social and organizational
ofconduct"and (2) peopleas "approvaland statusseekers"(in partic(1) "accountability
settings:
ular,theyseektogaintheapprovalofthoseto whomtheyareaccountable)(pp. 336-339). However,
aboutdecision-making
in social contextsgenalthoughthesecharacteristics
maytellus something
a specifically
erally,theyarenotlikelyto lead us to thedecision-making
processesthatcharacterize
politicalcontext.For example,althoughacceptability
(1992,
appears in Tetlock'sformulation
on theother
pp. 338-342), it is soughtas a meansofgainingsocial approval.In a politicalcontext,
notprimarily
becausetheyneedsocialapprovalbut
hand,decision-makers
emphasizeacceptability
becausetheydesireto accomplishvariousgoals withinthatcontext.In fact,thekindof acceptance
thatmovespeople to do a decision-maker's
politicalbiddingmayat timesbe obtainedonlyat the
4

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444

Farnham

As former
of StateJamesBaker(1995) observed,"in a democracy
Secretary
any
a
that
cannot
attract
domestic
consensus
will
have
diffiforeignpolicy
political
cultysucceeding"(p. 144).
ofthepoliticalcontext
arerelatively
thefundamental
features
fixed,
Although
from
to
and
itsspecificoperational
maychange
society society, even
requirements
withinthesame societyovertime[see George's(1980a, p. 236) discussionof
legitimacyin foreignpolicy; see also Majone (1975, p. 264)]. For example,
is presentto somedegreein anypolitical
althougha concernwithacceptability
the
of
those
who
must
finda decisionacceptableand thequalcontext,8 identity
itiesthatmakeitso mayvaryin specificcontexts.
Thus,all politicalsocietiesmay
be locatedalonga continuum
on whichtheneedforacceptability
rangesfroma
a
to
mostextreme
condition
ofnear-anarchy
almost
has
the
veto)
(where
everyone
formof tyranny
which
almost
no
one
The
to
(in
does).
degree whichthose
are
a
decision
constrained
by acceptability
approaching
politically
dependson
is also
The need foracceptability
wheretheirsocietyfallson thiscontinuum.9
on
the
of
decision
(George,1980b,p. 1; Hilsman,1967,
partlycontingent
type
(Neustadt,
place in thepolicyhierarchy
pp. 553, 561) and thedecision-maker's
1980,p. 135).
Whateverthe specificrequirements,
the politicaldecision-maker's
most
taskis to findan alternative
aroundwhicha consensuscan be builtthat
important
also deals satisfactorily
withthe substantive
issues at stake in the decision
(Hilsman,1987,p. 78; see also Hilsman,1959,p. 372). This leads to a fundamentallystrategic
approachto decision-making
involvinga constantinteraction
betweenevaluationsof thesubstantive
meritsof a proposaland assessmentsof
its acceptability."'
are likelyto incorporate
a
Indeed,politicaldecision-makers
forgettingagreement
intothedecisionitself,rarelychoosingan option
strategy
without
first
howto implement
it.Unlikepurelyanalyticaldecisionconsidering

expenseof social approval,as was pointedoutbyMachiavellisometimeago (1979, chap. 17) and

RichardNeustadtquiterecently
(1990, p. 48). As Payne(1984) also pointedout,social approvalis
do without
something
politiciansmustfrequently
(pp. 1, 3, 78ff.).
"To remaininhighofficein bothdemocracies
anddictatorships,
a manmusteithersatisfy
thevalues
of thegroupswithpoweror pitthepowerofone groupagainstthepowerof another,
and usually
he mustdo a bitof both.The number
ofgroupsthathavepoweris undoubtedly
smallerin a dictatorship... buttheydo exist"(Hilsman,1956,pp. 147-148). In thepoliticalrealm,therealitiesof
powerare alwaysto some degreebehindtheneed foracceptability
(Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950,
the
pp. 144-146,see also pp. 72, 85, 240). In fact,thecentralroleof poweris whatdistinguishes
politicalcontextfromothersocial contexts.
is a continuous
rather
thana dichotomous
variable.
9 Thus,acceptability
"whiledeferring
his decision,.... takessound10As George(1974) describedit,thedecision-maker,
withotherpoliticalactorswhoseinterests
are involvedor who
ings,preparestheground,interacts
can be helpfulto him,and manipulates
and orchestrates
thepoliticalprocessas partof his search
fora decisionthatwillsecureforhimas muchas possibleofthemultiple
stakeshe seeks"(p. 185).
In otherwords,politicaldecision-makers
conflict
and tryto defusepotential
anticipate
opposition
thedecisionitself.We must,however,
thisprocess,as George
bythewaytheystructure
distinguish
did,fromstraightforward
politicalcombat.

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

445

makers,theydo not treatdecisionsas thoughtheywere "self-executing"

(C.
Kaysen,personalcommunication,
February1993).
The need forsucha focusoftencomesas a shockto thoseused to a more
analyticalapproachto foreignpolicy.For example,in movingfromthe State
to theWhiteHouse, EdwardDjerejian"expressedsurpriseat 'the
Department
of domesticpoliticsand foreignpolicy.... At theStateDepartment
interaction
on theforeign
oftheU.S. Hereyou
policyinterests
youmakethebestjudgments
in
the
domestic
haveto be abundantly
aware,and put
equation,
politicalconsiderations.That'snew forme'" (Weinraub,1985). Some,of course,neverunderstandthis requirement-witness
the alleged separationbetweenpoliticaland
of
GeorgeH. W. Bush and his secretary
policyconcernspracticedby President
state,JamesBaker." Not everydecision-maker
operatingin a politicalsetting
andsupport
Butiftheneedtoreconcilesubstance
decisionspolitically.
approaches
is recognized,decision-making
affected,
processescan be strongly
particularly
whentheissue involvesa clashof important
values.12
AcceptabilityConcernsat All Stages of Decision-Making
is a constant
themeand an inteFor politicaldecision-makers,
acceptability
gralpartofthedecisionprocess.It is botha priorconcernthatmustbe addressed
of an alternative
can be seriouslyconsideredand an
beforetheotherattributes
at all stages
unavoidableconstraint
fundamentally
shapingdecision-making
1972,p. 865).
(Diesing,1962,p. 229; Meltsner,
whether
Partof thetaskof problemdiagnosis,forexample,is determining
thereis a politicalproblemas well as a policy problem(Diesing, 1962,
to acteffectively
policy,becauseitis difficult
pp. 228-229). In theareaofforeign
if policieslack domesticacceptability,
internationally
politicaldecision-makers
assess domesticsentiment
situation.
[Somepolitical
alongwiththeinternational
decision-makers
oftenconsultinternational,
as well as domestic,
publicopinion;
JohnF. Kennedy'sattention
to
see, e.g.,Haefele's(2001) discussionofPresident
international
publicopinion.]
" Accordingto Mandelbaum,
"'For theseguys,thereis no relationship
betweenpoliticsandpolicy.
... In theBush-Bakerworldview,youdo ugly,distasteful
thingsto getelected.... Andthenwhen
yougetintooffice,
youdo whatyouthinkis right.The idea thatyoushouldhaveto explainyour" (Dowd, 1992a). Althoughthismay have been trueof Bush, Baker (1995)
self..,.is grubby'
"At itscore,theSecretary
of State'sjob is
view,at leastin retrospect:
espousedquitea different
political,just on an international
stage.... As a Cabinetsecretary,
youfocusnoton thetechnical
side ofgoverning
buton thepolitical.You don'tresolvequestionssolelyon thebasisoftheirpolitical impactand you don'tmakedecisionssolelybecauseof theirpoliticalpopularity,
butyou do
makedecisions,pushinitiatives,
avoid disasters,and developstrategies
withthoseconsequences
in mind"(pp. 38-39).
firmly
12Unlikethosewhoclaimthattheirtheoriescan explainall decision-making
behavior(e.g.,Janis&
in a politicalsettingwill inevitably
Mann,1977,p. 80), I do notsuggestthateveryoneoperating
treata decisionpolitically.
(see
Clearly,thereare otherresponsesto theproblemof acceptability
Hermann,
Preston,& Young,1996).

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446

Farnham

uncovera seriousconflict
between
Moreover,shouldsuchdecision-makers
domesticand international
will
be
to
motivated
look for
interests,
they
strongly
to
transcend
it.
the
Cuban
missile
for
decisioncrisis, example,
policies
During
makersdevelopeda policythatcould servetwovaluesthatappearedto be in a
trade-off
threat
posedbySovietmissilesin
relationship
(dealingwiththesecurity
war
in
and
the
risk
of
involved
actionto removethem).
Cuba,
military
avoiding
The needtotradeoffwas avertedwiththetranscendent
solutionofblockade,ultimissilesfromTurkey
matum,and assurancesabouttheremovalof theJupiter
1985,pp. 145, 149, 155, 165-166,171-173, 182, 192-193).13
(Trachtenberg,
is an alternative
thataims
Indeed,theultimate
goal of suchdecision-makers
all
values
none-a
that
affects
at serving the
involved,sacrificing
foreign
quest
as well as domesticpolicy.14A good exampleof thisimpulsecan be foundin
PresidentJamesMonroe's handlingof AndrewJackson'sseizureof Spanish
postsin Floridain 1818:
military
to acceptanyadverseconsequencesat all in this
Monroewas unwilling
less than
The leadership
affair.
problemhe setoutto tacklewas nothing
the
moderate
the
domesto save Jackson,
Florida,
assuage Spanish,gain
tic politicaldebate,and wrapup thewholesordidbusinessin vindicationof theenduring
virtuesof republicaninstitutions.
Once he reached
thisassessmentof thechallengeat hand,therewas no limitto his creto piece it all together.
(Skowronek,1993,p. 95)
ativityin trying
Translatedintothe vocabularyof decision-making,
the quest fortranscendent
or thosebeston all dimeninvolvesa searchfordominant
alternatives
solutions,
musteventually
which
sions.Even if a decision-maker
settlefora compromise,
of
is
to
be
the
hallmark
that
is
not
what
believe
politicaldecision-making,
many
to
former
con1986,
Rather,
(Neustadt,
20-21).
according
initiallysought
pp.
are inclinedto push for
gressmanMickeyEdwards,politicaldecision-makers
no
last
bit
of
what
want
until
can
notuntiltheyfinally
more;
they
they get
every
"hitthatbrickwall" do theyentertain
theidea of compromise
(personalcommunication,June1993). 5

value,whichKennedyalso
Accordingto some,therewas a domesticvalueattachedto thesecurity
refusedto tradeoff(Kaufman,1993).
14 George(1974) calledthisthestrategy
of"seekingmultiple
payoffs"
(pp. 184-185)-somethingthat
Bill Clintonpracticedin his 1993decisionto cooperatewiththeRussiansin thespace station:"By
thespace station[Clinton]keepscontractors
theRussianshe lends
continuing
happy,by involving
of BorisYeltsin,and by trimming
thespace stationbudgethe
supportto thetroubledpresidency
mayreducetheFederaldeficit"(Broad,1993).
or "integrative"
transcendent
solutionsarespecifically
withcompromise,
contrasted
5 In psychology,
thetwoparties'interests
solutiongiveseach
"a solutionthatonlypartlysatisfies
... The integrative
moreof whatshe/hewants"(Carnevale& Isen, 1986,p. 2). Foran interesting
exampleof howthe
searchfortranscendent
alternatives
worksout in practice,see De Rivera's(1968, pp. 112-113)
discussionofTruman's1950budgetdecision.
'3

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

447

Screening
forAcceptability
The goal of finding
a transcendent
alternative
can affecteveryaspectof the
decisionprocess-searchas well as evaluationand choice.However,it is most
normative
whenstriking
fromtraditional
departures
prominent
duringevaluation,
decision-makers
sensitiveto politicalconsidstandards
oftenoccur.In particular,
As
to tradeoffimportant
values. a consequence,evaluation
erationsarereluctant
and a policyjudgedincapable
usuallybeginswitha screeningforacceptability,
tobe evaluatedfurther.
tosomeminimallevelis unlikely
ofbeingbrought
Lyndon
he
to have seriouslyconsideredno alternative
forexample,is reported
Johnson,
had not previouslyjudged achievablein politicalterms,accordingto Adam
of defensein his administration
an assistantsecretary
Yarmolinsky,
(personal
communication,
July1987; see also Diesing,1962,pp. 228-232).
thedecision-maker
Theacceptability
constraint.
Duringthisinitialscreening,
matchesthealternatives
constraint,
againstwhatmightbe calledan acceptability
a sortofcalculusofpoliticalfeasibility
1991,pp. 186-201;
(Farnham,
performing
elementsof sucha
May, 1986,pp. 111-113).16As we have seen,theparticular
situations.
tospecifyapartfromparticular
calculusaredifficult
However,twoconhow to geteffective
actionon thedecisionat hand,and
cernsare fundamental:
actionin thepoliticalcontext
how to preserveand fostera capacityforeffective
as well as thepresent(Diesing,1962,p. 171).17Thus,
as a whole-in thefuture
theacceptability
constraint
resemblesa kindof checklistofthosewhosesupport
to acceptability
is neededforeffective
action,plusotherqualitiesthatcontribute
Moreover,it oftenincludeseach of thevalues
(such as procedurallegitimacy).
ofeventhosewhose
theinterests
in thedecision.Indeed,overlooking
implicated
crucial
current
decision
be
unwise
because theiraid
is
not
to
the
may
support
couldbe neededin thefuture
(Hilsman,1959,p. 371; Majone, 1975,p. 261).
The screening
screening.
Noncompensatory
processitselfis likelytobe nonAlternatives
to
reach
a
minimal
level of acceptability
are
failing
compensatory.
because
a
serious
on
the
dimension
eliminated
deficiency
normally
political
cannotbe offsetby highscoreson otherdimensions.
Because a policylackinga
sufficient
consensusis unlikelyto succeed,itis inherently
unattractive
in a political context,even thoughthismaywell resultin diminished
in
utility termsof
substantive
values.Thus,whenitcomesto acceptability,
arelikelyto
preferences
be lexicographic.18
Inhisdiscussionof"backward
Neustadt
similar
(1990,pp.214-215) advocateda strategy
mapping,"
to theapplicationof an acceptability
constraint.
has reference
... notmerelyto theholdingorstriving
forpoliticaloffice,
but
17"Theterm[politician]
to thetendency
to consideralwaystheeffecton influence
or powerpositionof projectedlinesof
conduct"(Lasswell& Kaplan,1971,pp. 74-75, 146; see also May,1986,p. 113).
has lexicographic
one dimensionis "incomparably
moreimporpreferences,
8 If a decision-maker
tant"thantheothers,and therecan be no value trade-offs.
Elster(1984) has notedthat"lexicoare perhapsmorefrequent
in politicallifethanin economiclife"(pp. 124-127,
graphicorderings
n. 27; see alsoAbelson& Levi, 1985,p. 260; Ordeshook,1986,pp. 17-18;Svenson& Montgomery,
1976,pp. 285-286).
16

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448

Farnham

In foreign
influenced
policy,thismeansthatdecision-makers
bythedemands
of thepoliticalcontextwill be reluctant
to tradeoffdomesticinterests.
Rather,
to international
and domesticconstraints,
and
theyare likelyto reactdifferently
theweighttheyassignto domesticfactorsoftenstrongly
affectshow theydeal
withtheinternational
thatforeign
problem.We cannotassume,therefore,
policy
decisionsare madeon a levelplayingfieldwhereall therelevantconsiderations
arefreelytradedoffin pursuit
ofan optimalpolicy.Instead,theunavoidability
of
theacceptability
constraint
an
the
values
(and
suggests implicithierarchy
among
it maybe a rather
different
one fromthatpositedbythestandard
realistaccount,
whichconsistently
accordspriority
to thesecurity
value).
The hypothesis
thatpoliticaldecision-makers
are likelyto beginan evaluationwitha noncompensatory
ofthealternatives
is supported
byexperscreening
In a seriesof
imentalfindings
as well as thepracticeof actualdecision-makers.
Geva and Mintz(1993; see also Mintz,1993) foundevidencenot
experiments,
considerdomesticpoliticalfactorswhen making
only that decision-makers
Anecdotalevidence
foreign
policydecisions,butalso thattheyconsiderthemfirst.
ofan initialscreening
foracceptability
is also abundant.
May (1986),forexample,
in theKennedyadministration
that
citesthestatement
ofa WhiteHouse assistant
"thefirst
questionwas always,Willitflyon theHill?" (p. 111).
FurtherEvaluation
Aftertheinitialscreening,
unbiasedpoliticaldecision-makers
will continue
to evaluatealternatives
thathave satisfiedtheacceptability
constraint
on other
decision-makers
substance
Nonetheless,
grounds,balancing
againstsupport.19
sensitiveto thedemandsof thepoliticalcontextmaystillbe unwillingto make
sharptrade-offs.
may be
Althougheven the mostpoliticalof decision-makers
forcedeventually
to tradeoff(George,1980b,p. 1),20theymakesuchsacrifices
and usuallyonlyafterfirsttrying
to accommodateall theinterests
reluctantly,
involved.Tradingoffmayattimesbe necessary,
butitis neverthefirst
thingpolitical decision-makers
aredisposedto do,2'notmerelybecausesuchtrade-offs
are
difficult
to justifypublicly,butbecause theymayhamperthe achievement
of
effective
action.Thus,thesearchforacceptablepoliciesgoes beyondtheinitial
evaluationin a numberof ways.
screening,
influencing

of acceptability,
to discover
theyare also likelyto attempt
19Moreover,giventhecriticalimportance
whichof theminimally
excel on thepoliticaldimensionas well.
acceptablealternatives
20George(1980b, pp. 1-3; see also George,1993,pp. 22-24) saw decision-makers
as sometimes
notonlybetweenqualityand acceptability
butalso betweenbothoftheseandthe
facingtrade-offs
factorof timeand otherpolicyresources.
21 See, for
example,Neustadt's(1986, p. 15) accountof theappealto Congressof the1985 GrammRudmanact in termsof itspromiseto ease thepainof necessarytrade-offs.

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

449

is one characteristic
In thepoliticalcontext,
methodof evalexperimenting
both
and
Between
1936 and 1938,
for
uatingpolicies
acceptability substance.22
D. Roosevelt,facedwithuncertainty
forexample,President
Franklin
abouthow
to achievehismostimportant
values(keepingtheUnitedStatesatpeace andpreventinga disastrousgeneralwarthatmightjeopardizethatgoal), experimented
of thealternaratherthancarefully
weighingtheadvantagesand disadvantages
tivesandmakingtrade-offs
(Farnham,1997,chap.3). Thisallowedhimto avoid
and committing
himselfto
bothpassivityin theface of impending
catastrophe
solutionsof dubiousefficacy.
Instead,he kepthis optionsopen,politicallyand
whilehe searchedfora policythatwouldworkdomestically
as well
strategically,
as internationally.23
Another
evaluationis thelikelihood
qualityofthepoliticalcontextaffecting
have had priorexperiencewithmanyof thealternatives.24
thatdecision-makers
Because issuestendto recur,theymaywell have beendealtwithbefore,which
This is relatedto the
meansthatpolicyoptionscan have a significant
history.
incremental
character
of muchpoliticaldecision-making
(Lindblom,1959). If a
decisionaddressesonlypartof a problem,thatproblemmaywell surfaceagain,
and withit a numberof alternatives
initially
judged infeasible.Thus,failureto
considerpriorexperiencemaylead to theconclusionthata decisionprocessis
markedby attenuated
searchor a cursoryappraisalof thealternatives,
whenin
factsearchand evaluationhave been performed,
and performed
in
repeatedly,
thepast.Of course,a readilyavailablestockof pre-screened
alternatives
could
abouttheirrelevanceto thepresentsituationor the
encourageoverconfidence
oftheirramifications.
decision-maker's
Butwhentimeis short,as
understanding
in a crisis,havinga bankaccountof pre-examined
in
optionsto drawon might,
fact,be quiteuseful.
PoliticalRationalityand PoliticalBias
Politicalconcernscan be satisfied
in a rationalor a biasedmanner.
Rational
decision-makers
to
balance
domestic
and
international
try
political
imperatives,
As Voss (1990) explainedit,"in thepoliticaldomain,a solutionmaybe proposedandadopted,but
it usuallyis by no meansclearthatthesolutionwill work.Solutionsin thepoliticalarenaare in
factoftenmorelike hypotheses
thatneed to be testedthen[sic] theyare 'real' or 'correct'solutions"(see also Hilsman,1967,p. 548).
his 1937 QuarantineSpeech as preciselythiskindof
23 Roosevelt(1941) seems to have regarded
As he explainedto reporters,
he was "activelysearching"
fora wayto promotepeace,
experiment.
butcouldnotyetsaywhatthemethodswouldbe. His speechindicatedan "attitude,
anditdoes not
outlinea program;butit says we are lookingfora program"(pp. 414-425; see also Borg,1964,
p. 383).
24 As Voss (1990)
howan alternative
to
pointedout,"In considering
policyis selected,itis important
to an existingpolicyis notan isolatedevent.Changing
acknowledgethatchoosingan alternative
a policy takes place withinthe contextof a policy makingprocessand thatprocessitselfis
embeddedin a historical
context."
22

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450

Farnham

intoaccountwithout
basingtheirdecisionssolely
takingdomesticpoliticalfactors
on them.25
Effective
actionis theirprimary
goal,buttheyrecognizethatitis difficultto achievewithout
acceptability.
At times,however,a concernwithdomesticacceptability
can lead decisionmakersto slighteffectiveness.26
In foreignpolicy,reconcilingsubstanceand
difficult
whena value enjoysa measureof support
supportmaybe particularly
to itssubstantive
fromkeydomesticgroupsdisproportionate
Moreimportance.27
decision-makers
over,in suchcircumstances,
maybe temptedto end an evaluationas soon as theyidentify
a policywitha fairlyhighdegreeof acceptability
(George,1980b,p. 42). Theymayeven refuseto makeunavoidabletrade-offs
betweenvalueswithequivalentpoliticalbacking,insteadadvancingpoliciesthat
seemto satisfy
moreinterests
thantheyactuallydo.28Moreover,
a preoccupation
withacceptability
can lead to failureto offerneededpolicyinitiatives29
or reluctanceto altercurrently
a
for
need
acceptablepoliciesdespite pressing
change,a
the
of
a
tendencycompoundedby
difficulty renegotiating majoritycoalition
&
see also George,1980a,p. 248).
1977,
351;
(Snyder Diesing,
p.
Excessiveconcernwithacceptability
mayalso be fueledby preoccupation
withpersonalpower,whichagainmanifests
itselfin a reluctance
to makeneceschoices
an
or
to
needed
A
saw this
sary
unwillingness develop
policies.30 reporter

25 As

(1985) argued,the statesman"muststrikea prudentbalancebetweenadapting

Morgenthau
himselfto [popularpassions]and marshaling
themin thesupportof his policies"(p. 109).
numerousexamplesof President
RichardNixonengagingin thispractice.
26 Nelson(2000) offered
Forexample,he citedthis22 March1972entryfromtheunpublished
partofchiefof staffHaldeman's diary:"The President'wantsto be surethatI go to workon [Alexander]Haig and Henry
him,to makethepointthatsomeof thedecisionshavegotto be madeon the
[Kissinger],
through
basis of theeffectthey'llhave on theelection.For example,[thePresident]
feelsstrongly
thatwe
shouldgo to PolandaftertheRussiantrip,whileHenryis equallystrongly
opposedto that,so we
havetoconvinceHenry.'" In fact,itis Nelson'sconviction
that"matters
internal
tothenation,
especonditionand desires,playedan immenserolein thecreationand definition
ciallytheelectorate's
of detente.It was thepublic'sdespairabouttheVietnamWarand itsdemandforpeace thatled the
to tryto developleveragewiththeSovietsin thefirstplace,and it was his inability
to
president
end thewarthatled himto offerthevotersthesubstitute
of superpower
d6tente
as timelyproofof
his sincerity
and statesmanship"
(p. 136,n. 73; p. 142).
bias can be foundin President
27 An exampleofthistypeofpolitical
GeorgeW. Bush'sabandonment
of his own free-trade
on steelimports,
to gainthesupport
policiesto espousea tariff
presumably
of thesteelindustry
and itsworkers(Sanger,2002).
refusaleithertoconsidera neededtaxincreasetofinance
28LyndonJohnson's
boththewarinVietnam
and theGreatSocietyor to sacrificeone of themshowsthistypeof reluctance
to tradeoff:"The
thattherewas no needto
budgetresolvesof 1966echoedtheStateoftheUnionmessage,insisting
'haltprogress
inthegreatandvitalGreatSocietyPrograms
inordertofinance
thecostofourefforts
in SoutheastAsia.' Playingforthebreaksposed the lesserriskto Johnson'spoliticalauthority"
(Skowronek,1993,p. 253).
29
Accordingto theNew YorkTimes,whereIsraeliPrimeMinisterShimonPeres"hada nationalconsensusalreadybehindhim. .. hismanagerial
skillsenabledhimto scoresomeimpressive
achievements.But wherehe did nothave a built-inconsensus... , he tendedto compromise
or hesitate
and failedto shapeanynewreality"(Friedman,1986).
30 Of course,biasedbehavior
can be drivenby bothpoliticaland personalmotives.For example,on
theeve of the 1997 election,BritishPrimeMinisterJohnMajor changedhis position,and in an
attemptto "invigoratehis flaggingre-electioncampaign.. . declaredhis oppositionto current
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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

451

in President
in the
GeorgeH.W.Bush'sfailuretotakeadvantageofhispopularity
wakeof thePersianGulfwar:"Fromthebeginning
of hisAdministration,
itwas
clearthathe hadno ideas orprograms
he wantedtoenact,thathisgreatest
pleasurecame fromsimplybeingPresident.
Afterhis firsthundreddaysin office,it
thepoliticsof minimalism"
was clearthathe was practicing
(Dowd, 1992b).
Thiskindofpoliticalbias has beenamplydocumented
byLebow,Stein,and
others(Lebow,1981; Lebow & Stein,1994). It is important,
however,to recognize thedifference
betweenthebehaviortheydescribeand thatof a decisionmakerwhose attemptsto balance domesticand international
are
imperatives
comof
effective
action.
Columnist
motivated
the
by requirements
JosephAlsop's
parisonof LyndonJohnson's
decision-making
duringtheVietnamwarwiththat
of Rooseveltmakesthepoint:
first
also thinks
As an unparalleled
masterofdomesticpolitics,[Johnson]
ifhe
aboutinternal
Whatwillbe said or thought
politicalrepercussions.
does thisor that,is his immediate,
instinctive
calculation.The crucial
subordinated.
calculationsaboutwhatneedsto be doneareunavoidably
betweenLyndonJohnsonand his
... Here is one essentialdifference
D. Roosevelt.WhenMr.Rooseveltfinally
hadto turnhis
hero,Franklin
he alwaysdecided,firstof all, what
mainattention
to foreignaffairs,
neededto be done.And onlyafterthatdecision,did he beginto figure
outhow he could getaway withdoingit,or how close he couldcome
to doingit. (citedin Berman,1982,p. 131)"'
Attemptsto EnhanceAcceptability
Traditional
Strategies
Acceptability
forImproving
to politicalimperatives
neednotmeanpassivityin thefaceofthe
Sensitivity
andpoliticaldecision-makers
topushagainst
constraint,
acceptability
mayattempt
itsboundaries,
notbytrading
offcompeting
valuesbutbyusingoneofthestrategies fordealingwithit thathave grownup in thepoliticalcontext.Thus,if no
alternative
has emergedfromthe searchprocess,theymay either
satisfactory
tinkerwithone to makeit so or designa newone.32
into Europe" (Hoge, 1997). See also Neustadt's(1990,
proposals for Britain'sintegration
behindLyndonJohnson's
aboutthepotenpp. 210-212) discussionofthemotivation
deceptiveness
tialcostsof theVietnamwar.
noteCantril's(1967) observation
aboutRoosevelt'suse ofpublicopinionpolls:
3' In thisconnection,
"Rooseveltregardedthereports
senthimthewaya generalwouldregardinformation
turnedin by
his intelligence
servicesas he plannedthestrategy
of a campaign.As faras I am aware,Roosevelt
neveralteredhisgoals becausepublicopinionappearedagainsthimor was uninformed.
Ratherhe
utilizedsuchinformation
to tryto bringthepublicaroundmorequicklyor moreeffectively
to the
courseof actionhe feltwas bestforthecountry"
(pp. 41-42; see also Steele,1985,p. 6).
evidenceshowsthatdecision-makers
use bothdesignand manipulation
32Experimental
(Abelson&
etal., 1976,pp. 255-256; Newell& Simon,
Levi, 1985,p. 273; Alexander,
1979,p. 384; Mintzberg
1972).

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452

Farnham

Because politicaldecision-makers
oftendesireto servea numberof values,
or
elements
of
several
alternatives
intoa newone,is likely
"blending," combining
to be a prominent
featureof thedesignprocess(Alexander,1979,pp. 397-398,
& Theoret,
402; see also Abelson& Levi, 1985,p. 275; Mintzberg,
Raisinghani,
In
the
survivors
blend
of
1976,pp. 252, 256-259). particular,
theymay
together
theinitialscreening
inordertoincorporate
foracceptability
as muchofeachvalue
as possible.President
Eisenhower'scombination
of theverydiverserecommendationsof threetaskforceson U.S. policytowardEasternEuropeis an example
defined
ofblending.
ofeach,Eisenhower
By mixingelements
replacedthesharply
alternatives
and clear-cuttrade-offs
of thetaskforcereportswitha formulation
toone
thatservedbothhissubstantive
concernsandhispoliticalneeds.According
of theparticipants,
thetaskforceswerenotat all happyto see theirproductthus
"mongrelized"
("ProjectSolarium,"1988,pp. 13-14).
In preference
to designinga new policy,politicaldecision-makers
can also
tryto enhance acceptabilityby modifyingan existingoption (May, 1986,
pp. 111-112;see also Hilsman,1959,pp. 365-366, on thetechniquesof accointofivetraditional
Procedures
fordoingso arelargelyincorporated
mmodation).
calculated procrastination,
political strategies:transcendence,
compromise,
and minimaldecisions.33Thesestrategies
aredirectedat minimizing
sequencing,
and threaten
consensus-in other
sacrificesof value thatreduceacceptability
words,at avoidingsharpvalue trade-offs.
Theyincreaseacceptability
by bringtheconsensus
inga decisionlackingitintoan acceptablerangeorbybroadening
an alreadyacceptablepolicybytheinclusionof otherinterests.
supporting
Each of thesestrategies
has bothrationalandbiasedforms.Rationalstrateandresolution
ofvalueconflict,
as wellas congiesaremarkedbytherecognition
siderableattention
to the substantive
concernsat stakein thedecision.Biased
tendtomaskvalueconflicts
andeitheravoidorresolvespuriously
those
strategies
thatarerecognized,
substance
to
in
This
results
sacrificing
acceptability.
spurious
needto decide,biasedcompromise,
transcendence,
delayin thefaceofan urgent
anddecidingwithout
A compromise,
for
incrementalism,"
"disjointed
choosing.34
is
biased
when
at
in
values
stake
the
decision
are
sacrificed
solely
example,
major
to getagreement
(George,1980b,p. 30). Thisis a productof"consensuspolitics"
as partof the
(1961,p. 164) identified
(George,1980b,p. 42), whichHuntington
In
one
the
decision-maker
form,
strategiclegislativeprocess.
merelymediates
betweencompetinginterests.
to
Thies
was President
this
(1980),
According
in
to
the
Johnson's
1966
critics
of
his
Vietnam
faced
withconresponse
policy;
he
the
role
of
the
switch
'brakeman,'
flicting
pressures, "played
pulling
against
calcuGeorge(1980b,pp. 29-31, 36, 41; see also George,1974,p. 185) discussedtranscendence,
latedprocrastination,
and sequencing.For minimaldecisions,see Schilling(1961).
compromise,
For a moredetailedanalysisof thesestrategies,
see Farnham(1997, appendixC).
four,see George(1980b,pp. 30-31, 36, 41-42; see also George,1974,p. 185) and
34 For thefirst
(1961, p. 162). For thelast,see Schilling(1961, pp. 36-40, 43-44).
Huntington
33

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PoliticalContext
andForeignPolicyDecision-Making

453

boththeadvocatesof 'decisiveescalation'andtheadvocatesof 'disengagement.'

The keywas to stakeoutthemiddleground"(pp. 352-355).35Neustadt's(1970)
discussionof theplanningfortheIsraeli,French,and Britishattackon Egyptin
can occurat theinternational
1956 showsthatthiskindof biased compromise
comlevel withequallyunfortunate
results.In thatcase, a seriesof three-way
to
all
the
fatal"
on
the
make
it
to
parties"proved
military
acceptable
promises
plan
to thecoverstoryon whichthesuccessof theoperation
depended(p. 22).
Constraint
LooseningtheAcceptability
Taken together,
Time-buying.
manyof these classical politicalstrategies
thatreduce
to sidestepthe value trade-offs
reflecta relianceon time-buying
In theface of value conflict,
oftenbide
politicaldecision-makers
acceptability.
theirtime,relyingon thelogic of events.If thereis nothingto be done at the
moment,
They
theyarecontentto waitforchangein a morefavorabledirection.
moreacceptable
becausebetter,
are notanxiousto foreclosechoiceprematurely
solutionsmayemerge-solutionsthatwillalienatefewerpeople.
This resistanceto actinguntilthetimeis righthas long been remarked.36
Neustadt(1986) gave itsrationalein explainingthebehaviorofRonaldReagan,
timeaftertime,yearafteryear,thetrade-offs
"a President
consistently
refusing,
his own analystspresson him"(pp. 20-21). In this,Neustadtsaw
an implicitmodeof thought
aboutpriorities
and timing.Beneaththese
lie commensurate
valuesand notionsof risk.To wit:If youhave three
incompatibleobjectives-say,tax cuts, defensehikes,and balanced
budgets-andyou reallywantthemall, don'ttradethemoff,hangon.
... In an uncertain
world,someunexpected
goodmightcomeofhanging
ontoeverything
youcan.... Timeenoughto tradeoffifand as [adviswithout
starttobe substantiated
ers'] warnings
offsetting
advantage.But
wait upon events; events mightbreak in a more favorableway.
(pp. 20-21; emphasisin original)37
Relatedto thisstrategy
is a reluctanceto engagein long-term
planning.Thus,
WinstonChurchilltoldtheHouse of Commonson returning
fromYaltain 1945,
of graduated
inabilityto executea strategy
pressure
35Thies (1980) also pointedout thatJohnson's
thatdependedon carefully
controlled
airwarwas a directresultofhisneedforconsensus."To the
extentthatthePresident
soughtto keepeveryone'on board,'he was unableto turnthebombingup
or down in accordancewiththegoal of 'negotiating'
by wordand deed in an optimalfashion"
(p. 373).
36 Machiavelli(1979), forone,advisedthat"themanwhoadaptshis courseofactionto thenature
of
thetimeswillsucceedand,likewise,. . . themanwhosetshiscourseofactionoutoftunewiththe
timeswillcome to grief'(pp. 160,344-345).
Rooseveltonce toldhis wifethatshewould"neverbe a goodpolitician"becauseshewas
37 Franklin
It was necessary
"tooimpatient."
towaituntilpeoplewerereadytosupport
they
changes,otherwise
wouldrevolt(Friedel,1973,p. 500).

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454

Farnham

"It is a mistaketo look too farahead.... Onlyone linkin thechainof destiny

does not
can be handledat a time"(citedinDavis, 1972,p. 411). Thisdisposition
indicatetheabsenceof long-range
goals,butdoes implya desireto
necessarily
be flexibleaboutwhenand how to achievethem.For suchgoals,in fact,evaluoutovera considerable
ationmaybe stretched
periodoftime,as George's(1980a,
ofRoosevelt'sGrandDesignforthepost-war
245ff.)accountofthedevelopment
ofthepoliticalstratorderdemonstrates.
international
(Thisis also an illustration
egyof sequencing.)
The politicaldecision-maker's
tendencyto focuson one stepat a timeis
of success,butalso about
relatedto uncertainty-not
onlyabouttheprobability
even the value of the nextmove; witnessRoosevelt'sfavoritecomparisonof
in a footballgame:"He couldnotsaywhattheplayafter
himselfas a quarterback
nextwas goingto be untilthenextplay was completed.'If theplaymakesten
inApril1933,'thesucceedingplaywillbe difyards,'he tolda pressconference
ferentfromwhatit would have been if theyhad been thrownfor a loss'"
1957,p. 193). This focusamountsto morethantacticalmaneuver(Schlesinger,
on thebeliefsboththatone cannotsee probableoutcomestoo far
It
is
based
ing.
of thenextmoveuntilone has
ahead and thatone cannotknowthedesirability
one.Thissuggeststhatina politicalcontext,
seentheconsequencesofthepresent
to thestipulations
of normative
theory,
preferences
maynotalwaysbe
contrary
It
to
the
decision
also
exogenous
process.
suggeststhat,exceptforverysmall
notion
of
of
a
the
segments decision,
expectedvaluemaynotbe as usefulin anaof
decision-makers
as theproponents
of rational
the
decisions
political
lyzing
choicetheorycontend.
Education.Buyingtimemayalso afford
an opportunity
toincreasereceptivto
a
Not
do
decision-makers
view
the alternatives
as
ity
policy.
only political
also
see
as
malleable.38
Thus,although
manipulable,
they
people's preferences
highlysensitiveto theconstraints,
theywill at timestryto alterthem,deciding
on a policyfirst,
thenattempting
to createsupportforit (Dror,1971,pp. 83-84,
basis. Overthelongterm,politi92). This can be doneon a long-or short-term
cal decision-makers
use the timegainedwithtraditional
to
politicalstrategies
increaseconsensusby actuallychangingwhatpeoplefindacceptable,engaging
in whatmanybelieveto be one of mostimportant
of politicalleaderfunctions
ship:teaching(Farnham,1997,chap.6)."
President
Richard
38In criticizing
GeorgeH. W. Bushforinadequatesupportof Russiandemocracy,

Nixonarguedthat"themarkof greatpoliticalleadershipis notsimplyto supportwhatis popular,

butto makewhatis unpopularpopular"(Friedman,1992). President
Reaganwouldhave agreed.
of state,GeorgeShultz(1993), Reagan"did notacceptthatextensive
Accordingto his secretary
idea. He wouldfight
foran idea,believingthat
politicaloppositiondoomedan attractive
resolutely
if it was validhe couldpersuadetheAmericanpeopleto supportit. He changedthenationaland
international
agendaon issueafterissue"(p. 1135).
Roosevelt'sattitude
towardtheneedto begineducating
thepublictothe
(1985) contrasted
39Bennett
situationbeforetheSecondWorldWarwiththatof his secretary
of
dangersof theinternational
was awareofthepossibility,
andeventheprobability,
ofa develstate,CordellHull:"The secretary
threatto Americansecurity,
buthe balkedat anymoveto
opingworldwarand itsaccompanying
him"(p. 104).
prepareforitpubliclybecausepublicopinionterrified

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

455

Many politicalleadersrecognizethatone of theirprimefunctionsis to

educate.WitnessPresident
Bill Clinton'sobservation
that"theimportant
thingis
we have to make foreignpolicymake sense to mostordinary
Americans....
thatI needto takeon evenmoreis trying
to figureouta wayto make
Something
theAmericanpeoplebelievenotjustepisodicallybutinstinctively
thatthere'sno
an
line
between
domestic
and
longer easy dividing
foreign
policy
policy"("The
ClintonRecord,"1996).40
be willing(or
Moreover,althoughpoliticaldecision-makers
maysometimes
to
confront
issues
for
which
is
forced)
tough
support lacking,theygenerallydo
so onlyas partofa concomitant
effort
to bringpeoplealong-to showthemwhy
a painfultrade-off
maybe necessaryand thusmakeit moreacceptable,attemptto
educate
them
to thepointwhere,ifa trade-off
cannotbe avoided,at least
ing
a bruising
can
be
battle
(Neustadt,1986,pp. 24-25).
political
Decision-makers
mayalso need to createsupportfora policyin theshort
and timepressure
run.41This is mostlikelyto occurwhentheissueis important
is considerable.
The attempt
to "sell" policiesshould,however,
be distinguished
froma genuineeducationaleffort
(Renshon,1995,pp. 80-81). Educationfocuses
on changingvalues,whereassellinginvolvesmanipulation
of preferences
in the
shortrun,as illustrated
behaviorin 1992 overthe
by theFrenchgovernment's
issue of tradepolicyin thefaceofbitteroppositionby Frenchfarmers:
Franceappearsto havebeguna publicrelations
effort
thatcouldamount
to a preparation
foran eventualconcession.... Ifa GATTaccordcan be
shownto be no moreharmful
to farmers
thanwhathas alreadybeen
undertaken
in the reform,
thenit may be politicallysalable. (Cohen,
1992)
Much as politicalleaders may wish to extendthe domainof acceptability,
on the prospectsand processesof looseningthe
however,the largeliterature
constraint
acceptability
suggeststhatalthoughleadershave some latitude,
they
are limitedin a numberof ways (Rieselbach,1966, pp. 184, 193)-witness
Roosevelt'sanswerto criticism
thathe had notmovedaheadwithlegislation
his
desired:
progressive
supporters
I thinktheimpression
was thatLincolnwas a sad man.. . because he
could notdo all he wantedto do at one time,and I thinkyou will find
to gaina littlesomething.
exampleswhereLincolnhad to compromise
... If youeversithere,youwilllearnthatyoucannot,justby shouting
fromthehousetops,
getwhatyouwantall thetime.(Lash, 1976,p. 124)
40Accordingto an earlyassessment
Jr.,Clintonsucceededat thisevenfrom
by Arthur
Schlesinger

thebeginning
1993).
(Schlesinger,

fordecision-makers
to takeadvantageof thepossibility
that
4' Here,theremaybe someopportunity
an international
can sometimescreatenew domesticopportunities
issue
agreement
("synergistic
linkage")(Putnam,1988,pp. 446-447; Moravchik,1993).

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456

Farnham

less
is also a good illustration
ofthepoliticaldecision-maker's
(Thisobservation
thanenthusiastic
attitude
towardcompromise.)
Impact of Contexton Outcomes:PoliticalDecision-Making
and Rational Choice
fosters
The decision-making
processesthatawarenessofthepoliticalcontext
If
the
for
outcomes.
have severalinteresting
process
implications foreignpolicy
nor
international
is unbiased,itwillproducepoliciesthataretheresultofneither
the
claims
decision-maker's
to
balance
domesticpressures
alone,butthe
attempt
thesepolicies
ofboth.Owingto a pervasiveconcernwithacceptability,
however,
in severalways.For
fromtheproductof a pureoptimizing
maydiffer
strategy
betweenimportant
one thing,theyare likelyto exhibitfewersharptrade-offs
them
willoftensearchpastalternatives
values,becausedecision-makers
involving
In addition,
an effort
to
to findone withgreater
acceptability.
policiesmayreflect
broadenacceptability,
not only by blendingtogetherfeaturesborrowedfrom
severalalternatives,
butalso by incorporating
additionalvaluesthatmayor may
notbe directly
relatedto thepolicyissue. [As Hilsman(1967) pointedout,in a
politicalcontextthetestof a policyis thata greaternumberof peopledecideto
endorseit(p. 547).] In fact,we maysee foreign
policydecisionsin whichdomesare includedforlittlereasonotherthanto increasesupport.[David
tic interests
November1993) has suggestedthe term
Epstein (personalcommunication,
this
for
"bundling"
practice.]
AccordingtotheNew YorkTimes,forexample,this
was
behind
President
Clinton'ssuccesswiththeNorthAmericanFree
strategy
TradeAgreement
(NAFTA):
He keptshovingmoreand morechipsintothepoton an issuethatfew
Americansreallyunderstood...[and]turnedtheHouse in hisdirection
becausehe skillfully
series
[with]a bewildering
repackedthe
issue,....
ofsidedealsthatweremadetowinvotes
... , someofthemunabashedly
corollaries
toa free-trade
theorem.
... Theymeantthatfree
protectionist
tradewouldnotbe quiteso freeas it mighthave been,butmorewalls
came downthisweekthanwentup. (Apple,1993)
Decisionsmayalso be stretched
outin orderto makethemmoreacceptable,as
in sequencing.Indeed,becauseof theimportance
of acceptability,
politicaldecision-makers
be
reluctant
to
that
cannotbe brokendowninthis
may
adoptpolicies
we mayexpectpoliciesreflecting
a certainamountofrisk-taking
way.42Moreover,
to increaseacceptability.
A decision-maker
might,forexample,choosea policy
of
less certain successon theinternational
butsatisfying
dimension,
politicalconin preference
to one morelikelyto workbetterinternationally
butless
straints,
42This notionwas
suggestedby RobertJervis(personalcommunication,
May 1993).

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

457

because gainsand losses maybe more

Furthermore,
acceptabledomestically.43
immediatein domesticpoliticsthanin the international
arena,thispracticeis
the
to
discount
to
be
reinforced
consequencesmore
likely
by tendency
long-range
in
run
than
those
the
short
(RobertJervis,
heavily
surfacing
personalcommuniMarch
3
cation,
2004).
is thepossibility
thatdecision-makers
Ofgreatest
influenced
interest,
perhaps,
will
a
the
demands
of
the
context
sometimes
choose
by
political
policythatis
in cost/benefit
acceptable,or can be madeso, evenifit appearsless satisfactory
termsthanothers.In Roosevelt'scase, forexample,althoughovertdeterrent
threatsmighthave had a greaterimpacton Hitler,theywerepoliticallyunacchoseto aid theallies instead.
ceptable,and thepresident
but also
Thus,because the politicalcontextnot onlyprovidesconstraints
in thedecision-making
process
waysof handlingthem,theroleof acceptability
thefeasiblesetofalternatives4
andmayoftenlead to
goes farbeyondnarrowing
outcomesthat,althoughrationalin some sense,are quitedifferent
fromthose
instead
producedby economicrationality
(Diesing, 1962, pp. 2-3), reflecting
without
(Simon,1990,p. 8).
"rationality
optimization"
thechanceofderiving
suchoutcomesfroma deductive
modelmay
Moreover,
be quiteslim[and,as Elster(1984) pointedout,as well as beingable to determinea feasibleset,we needtheabilityto selectfromit (p. 13)]. Explainingand
behaviorsuchas a reluctance
to tradeoffevenamongalternatives
that
predicting
arealreadyminimally
the
or
of
and
acceptable,
prevalence time-buying
strategies
a disposition
to stretch
outdecisions,requiresa wholesetof "auxiliaryassumptions"thattherationalmodeldoes notsupply(Simon,1995,p. 53).45Thus,while
itmaybe thatmostintelligent
decision-makers
takepoliticsintoaccount,we still
need a theoryof how thepoliticalcontextaffectsdecision-making
processesto
learnhow theywill do it and how thataffectsdecisionoutcomes.It wouldbe
moreparsimonious,
as well as moreaccurate,to acknowledgethisand include
contextin ourtheoriesfromtheoutset.
In any case, optimizing,
as it is commonlyunderstood,
is not alwaysthe
of
such
and
not
because
a narrowconcern
decision-makers,
primary
objective
just
withacceptability
deflectstheirattention
fromthebest.Rather,theirchoicesare
oftheacceptability
constraint
topushthemtowarda polshapedbythetendency
iticsofincorporation
rather
thana politicsoftrading
off.Thus,itoftenseemsthat,
in a politicalcontext,the whole thrustof decision-making
is towardblurring
betweenpolicyrisksand politicalrisksto describethisstrat43Lamborn(1997) usedthedistinction
in whichthepolicyandpoliticalincentives
cutin different
thehigher
directions,
egy:"In situations
thepoliticalrisksattachedto optionswitha low policyrisk,themorelikelyitis thatactorswillbe
drawntowardoptionsthattradean increasein thelevel of policyriskfora decreasein political
risks"(p. 195).
4 On theconceptof feasiblesets,see Elster(1984, p. 113; 1986,p. 4).
45"BeforeSEU can tellus
we have to tellit a greatdeal" (Jervis,1989,p. 184; see also
much,....
Jervis,1988).

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458

Farnham

andweavingtogether
interests.46
It centerson
differences
seemingly
incompatible
for
values
and
interests
ratherthan
findingstrategies reconcilingcompeting
them
is
a
of
It
off.47
of maximizing
process buildingup politicalcapital,48
trading
the entirepoliticalcontext,
inclusivenessto promoteeffectiveness
throughout
withina singledecision.
ratherthanmaximizing
utility
tradepolicy
Thisimpulsecanbe seeninRoosevelt'sapproachtointernational
from
the
an
different
1932
tradingoff
during
campaign, approachdramatically
in
win
sets
as
two-level
Faced
withadvigames(Putnam,1988,p. 446).
among
to free
sors whoseviewsrangedfromeconomicnationalism
and protectionism
advisorRaymondMoleyby
tradeandreciprocity,
Rooseveltstunned
presidential
(Cole, 1983,p. 97). Whetheror notone
tellinghimto "weave themtogether"
itis clearthatthelogicofinclusiveness
sharesMoley'sdismay,
operatesinforeign
thefactthatpolitias well as domesticpolicy.Foreignpolicies,too,mayreflect
is notprimarily
aboutsacrificing
some values in orderto
cal decision-making
themin orderto reach
achievethemostefficient
outcome,butaboutreconciling
themostacceptable,one.49Such policiesmay
themostinclusive,and therefore
buttheyarelikelyto be different
fromtheproductofa straightnotbe irrational,
to optimize.
forward
attempt
on foreign
The influence
ofthepoliticalcontext
policymaythusbe mostpronouncedwhenthereis a seriousconflict
betweendomesticandinternational
interests.Atminimum,
thenatureofthepoliticalcontextsuggeststhatexceptin cases
of extremethreatto nationalsecurity,
domesticimperatives
will not be easily
Andeventhenitmaynotbe a matter
of
tradedoffagainstinternational
interests.
the
because
that
secuconstraints,
actuallyignoring
public'srecognition
political
threatened
rityis obviouslyandimminently
maybroadentherangeofacceptable
policies-witnessthevariousairportsecuritymeasuresand theaggressivelaw
in theUnitedStatesin theimmediate
aftermath
of9/11.
enforcement
Conclusion
At theoutset,I notedtheimportance
of developinga systematic
accountof
theimpactofdomesticpoliticson foreign
Two-level
are
policy.
games a response
to thisproblem.However,while acknowledging
the "Janus-faced"
qualityof
46Hilsman(1967) characterized
the Britishparliamentary
and Americancongressionalsystemsas
thatblurthealternatives
thansharpenthem"(pp. 541-542).
rather
workingto "findcompromises
47 "A President
whoknowswhatpoweris and wantsit has to faceirreconcilables
whenever
he considershis own stakesin actsof choice .... The essenceofhis expertiseis an awarenessthatthese
are irreconcilable
and thattheymustbe reconciled.Viabilityin policycalls forthesame awareness"(Neustadt,1980,p. 141).
March1993).
48This notionwas suggestedbyRobertShapiro(personalcommunication,
49 Neustadt
theimpulseto deal withincompatible
to reconcile
(1986) contrasted
objectivesbytrying
themratherthanchoosingamongthemto economicthinking
whose"essenceis a consciousand
. .. intheinterest
deliberate
choiceofpreferences
ofanoptimalresultfromthechoicemaker's
standpoint"(p. 4).

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PoliticalContextand ForeignPolicyDecision-Making

459

1961,p. 2), such gamesdeal witha rathernarrow

foreignpolicy(Huntington,
of
decisions
to international
andtellus
range foreign
policy
relating
negotiations
littleabouthow domesticconstraints
are likelyto be handled.5o
a decision-making
By contrast,
approachnotonlysuggestsoutcomesthat
differfromstandardrealistpredictions,
butalso, by describing
process,tellsus
about
how
that
decision-makers
something
theyemerge.Recognizing
normally
domesticoppositionwell beforeentering
international
tryto anticipate
negotiaand explaininghow muchof thepoliticaland psychological
jugglingis
tions51
done,a politicalapproachis thusbetterable to predicthow domesticpolitical
considerations
actuallyaffecta decision.
It is important
to stress,however,
thatemphasizing
theinfluence
ofthepolitical contextdoes notreduceforeignpolicyto domesticpolitics.Theoriesat that
level of analysisare no betterthantwo-levelgamesat explaininghow political
considerations
affectforeignpolicy.For example,in the wake of theMunich
when
most
of thepoliticalincentives
crisis,
pointedtowardisolation,Roosevelt
chose to aid theEuropeandemocracies,notonlypushingagainsthis domestic
constraints
butalso trying
to changethem,leadingpolicyin a different
direction
thana domesticpoliticsperspective
wouldhavepredicted.
Although
undeniably
alive to politicalconstraints,
he used his decisionsto makethedomesticenvironment
a place wherehis policiescouldsucceed,andhis awarenessoftheneed
to do so shapedhis choicesfromtheoutset(Farnham,1997,chap.6).
The approachsuggestedhere acknowledgesthe importanceof domestic
butitalso emphasizesthecriticalroleofthedecision-maker
politicalconstraints,
in reconciling
nor
values.52Captiveto neitherinternational
competing
pressures
domesticforces,a politicaldecision-maker
takesbothintoaccountthrougha
withthegoal ofobtaining
as muchofboth
processofbalancing(notbargaining),
as possible.Thisis theimpulsebehindthequestfortranscendent
solutions,
which,
at its best, leads notjust to marginaladjustments
but to the designof new
options-and eventheexpansionof thedomainof acceptability.
A decision-making
focusedon theimpactofthepoliticalcontextthus
theory
offersthepossibility
of a richerunderstanding
of foreignpolicyoutcomesthan
eithertwo-levelgamesor theoriesof domesticpolitics.Intimately
connectedto
thepoliticalprocessofforeign
it
leads
to
a
more
nuanced
account
policymaking,
oftheimpactofdomesticpolitics.By illuminating
thedecisionprocessesofpolitical decision-makers,
it offersinsightintohow domesticpoliticalconstraints
are
transformed
intopolicythrough
thesubjectiveadjustment
ofcompeting
valuesin otherwords,howthevaluesofthesocietybecomethepreferences
ofthestate.
is also doggedbyunsolvedproblemsof indeterminacy
occasionedbytheprevalenceof
5o The theory
1993,p. 79).
multipleequilibria(Johnson,

i' Specifically,
theyanticipatethe"level II" gameand tryto weed out optionsjudgedto be outside

52

the"win-set"beforetheyallowthemto go forward
to "levelI." Putnam(1988) acknowledged
this
butdid notpursueit (p. 436).
possibility
As Jones(1994) has noted,"politiciansare a criticalkeyto aggregation"
(p. 229).

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460

Farnham

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
at theannualmeetingsof the
Earlierversionsof thispaperwerepresented
StudiesAssociation,Chicago,February1995, and theAmerican
International
PoliticalScience Association,San Francisco,September1996. I thankLance
Bennett,JamesDavis, David Epstein,AlexanderGeorge,Ole Holsti,Robert
Jervis,Deborah Larson, Helen Purkitt,Jack Snyder,Eric Stern,Yaacov
andStephenWalkerfortheircomments.
concerning
Correspondence
Vertzberger,
thisarticleshouldbe sentto BarbaraFarnham,SaltzmanInstitute
of War and
New York,NY 10027.
Peace Studies,ColumbiaUniversity,
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