A. Partition. Arts. 1078-1090 Neri v. Heirs of Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

XXII.
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE

A.
Partition. Arts. 1078- 1090
Neri v. Heirs of Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
Alsua Betts v. CA, 92 SCRA 332
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P.
RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO
ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
1wph1.t
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay
allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special Proceedings No. 699 and
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the two deeds of sale executed
by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied the probate of the will,
declared null and void the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendants,
petitioners herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their possession and to
reimburse the latter the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties from
the date of the firing of the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions are the
following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina Rella, both of Ligao,
Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered
into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then
present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated
in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which are stated in private
respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to wit:
t.hqw
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of the Alsua
spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by the
spouses and all the above named heirs in the left margin of every page
(parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in the
inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five parcels
of land Identified with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel
Brewery stock which are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a Tinay
(segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children but
five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
(old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning the
inheritance they are entitled to in the event of death of one of them they have
decided to effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the properties described
in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and conditions: (Parafo
quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all the real
properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1-12 of said
inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or
appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the real properties
with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 12-20 of said inventory or,
26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or appraised
value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all the real
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned all the real
t.hqw
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit
that the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as
described in the preceding paragraph, constitute one half of the properties
described in Annex "A", including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned
to them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the conjugal
properties but includes the paraphernal properties waiving now and
forever any complaint or claim they have or they may have concerning the
amount, value, extension and location of the properties that are allotted to
each and everyone. They also waive any claim they have or they may have
over the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses reserved for
themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the
heirs acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of the
surviving spouse, including any amount in cash, are even less than the onehalf that should correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they waive any claim
that they have or may have over said portion of said properties or any
amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, including any right
or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal properties of
Do;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the
surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the properties
assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The
properties which were reserved for them (the spouses) should be considered
as his or her legitimate participation in the conjugal properties and the fair
compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the surviving
spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be distributed in equal
shares among the heirs upon his or her death unless said properties of some
of them have been disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the
provision contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other heirs,
in the concept of damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus
attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or
adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his
share or participation in the estate or as his inheritance left by the deceased
and each heir shall become the absolute owner of the properties adjudicated
to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a Tinay separately
executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the provisions of which were
in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their
holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the
conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to
constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949.
The wigs also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of
them, one-half thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided
equally among the four children. The holographic will of Do;a Tinay written in Spanish
reads, as translated:
t.hqw
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus
Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the full possession of my mental and
physical faculties freely and spontaneously execute this my last will and
testament in my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the Spanish
language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of January, 1955
in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I ordain and
provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don Jesus
Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still living
and they are Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and Amparo
Alsua. The other five (5) died during their minority, single and without
children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during
our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able
to acquire conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands
and urban lands registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the
Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my spouse
Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal, and the
other half, to my children Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo
Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua,
married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be understood,
however, that the other half that corresponds as legitime to my above named
children have already been given to them, pursuant to a document dated
November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same day, month and year before
Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of
1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully comply
with each and every clause contained in the said document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above
named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same
proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my
children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without
having to post any bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this testament
on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, Philippines.
t.hqw
(SGD.)
FLORENTINA
R. DE ALSUA
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar holographic will on
the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above will of his
wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the Court of First
Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective holographic
wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and
Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their mutual and
reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the
codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties of the
spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned
among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that
they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or
those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition,
and that they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein
as well as in all properties which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also
declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or
would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was also
declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse
was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the
properties reserved for themselves.
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as translated:
t.hqw
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my
spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties which we have acquired
into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers all the properties
that I have partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition dated
November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No.
525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties
which by reason of this testament I leave to my husband as his share and the
other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that
up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands situated in
Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila, with
the exception of that portion that I bequeath to my husband as his inheritance
and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus
Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and
Amparo Alsua. I leave to my aforecited children all the properties described in
the above mentioned Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 which
correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits) expressed in the
same, and in the event that the properties granted to one or any of my
children should exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to another or
others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the same be divided among my
children as their inheritance from the free portion of my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance

the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in
favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire after the
execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that
it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or would
pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the partition,
should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after my death.
Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August 14,1956.
t.hqw
(SGD.)
FLORENTINA
RALLA DE
ALSUA
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus executed also a
separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions as the above codicil of
his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay
both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the probate of their respective codicils in
the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic
wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named executor to serve
without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters
testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and
performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in
the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to
make a list of all his remaining properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer,
Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by
Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay.
This notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had
three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of
Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of
the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into
account in the partition of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as
legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a Tinay had been
paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of
partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially confirmed the
provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6,
1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the
termination of the proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix named in the will
of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua
before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial
guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound
and disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will was
executed under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of person or
persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud;
(c) that the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d)
that the alleged will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed
upon by him, his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo,
Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don
Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively, essentially
confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949 which had already been partially
executed by all the signatories thereto in the partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in
December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated November 14,
1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Don
Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an inventory of the properties of the
estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did not
include some properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the
inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December 19,
1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According to the oppositors, these
properties consist of thirty- three (33) premium agricultural lots with a total land area of
1,187,970 square meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed value of
P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare,
and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi City
including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with
an assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time of
P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo
Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo
and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said
properties in the inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed
ownership over the same, alleging that she bought the properties from their father and
presenting the two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting
to show the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price
of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban
lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors filed Civil Case
No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with damages, which
upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No.
699 for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14,
1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First Instance of Albay
promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive portion of which states:
t.hqw
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to

wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS
the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14,
1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages, and
orders that the same be made the basis for division and distribution of the
estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds
that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on November 26,
1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and accordingly conveyed title to
the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly
and severally to pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
and to pay the costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed the appealed
decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as
translated, thus
t.hqw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set

aside as it hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following
manner: (1) in Special Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is
hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles
issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void, ordering the
appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs in the
concept of fixed damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an accounting
of properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain,
in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of litigation
in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this complaint, up to the
complete restoration of the properties pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition
to pay to the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four assigned errors,
to wit:
t.hqw
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the
probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents,
oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the
competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.
II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator Don
Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26,
1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that the same is of
no moment. The controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to
execute his will cannot be determined by acts of the herein private respondents as
oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua
de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of
their mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla de
Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any
accounting as executor in the proceedings, which petitioners claim and was upheld by the
trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private respondents from questioning the
competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling laid down in the
case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios
Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority
on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We quote:
t.hqw
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application

therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the truth
as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would
seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties
is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and
only if, executed conformably to law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S.,
502:
t.hqw
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the

existence of the right of any living person, but to determine
whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified
by the pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites
to personal direction of the mode of devolution of his property
on death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting
upon a proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the
departed, and he may and frequently does receive no
personal benefit from the performance of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is
that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be
compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes
of a deceased person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284,
294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc.
320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div.,
733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's
Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the
court is, in effect, an additional party to every litigation
affecting the disposal of the assets of the deceased. Matter of
Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court erred in not
allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that
the disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts
as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in providing the cases
where a will may be disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows:
t.hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a
wilt at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear,
or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the respondent
court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the due execution of the
questioned will and testament of Don Jesus, declaring:
t.hqw
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will and
testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance with
Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning
accepts the findings of the inferior court concerning the question,
t.hqw
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay.

About 2 weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua
decided to make a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling
his previous holographic will which he made on January 5,
1955 and also its codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and every page of said
page he wrote on each page the word "cancelado", and
affixed his signature thereon (Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up
to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to
make a list of all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don
Gregorio Imperial, Sr. and the latter came accompanied by
his son, Atty. Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga City, Camarines
Sur. Don Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to make
a new will, and accordingly gave more detailed instructions as

to how he wanted to divide his properties among his four
children. He handed to them a list and on the left he indicated
the name of the child to whom the listed properties shall
pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the instructions of
Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major
language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are
always in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959,
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final
draft of the will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was
as directed by him, and after making a few minor corrections,
he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final
form. He further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that the signing of
the will should be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of
November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses should be Mr.
Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose
Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya
who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio
and Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the
Legaspi residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the
latter that Don Jesus was requesting him to be one of the
attesting witnesses to his will. Mr. Balana, having a very high
regard for Don Jesus, considered it an honor to be so asked,
and gladly went with the Imperials. They arrived at the
residence of Don Jesus at Ligao; Albay, almost ten o'clock of
that morning, and they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya,
and the latter requested them to be seated at the usual
receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their
arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don
Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to be signed
placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr.
Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in
conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose
residence is just across the road from the house of Don
Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don Jesus
himself about the fact of signing the will that morning, and so,
on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had already
arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus,
without much delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the
coming back of Gaya, there were now six people gathered in
the living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio
Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose
Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who testified
for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and
lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and
the merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don
Gregorio made a remark that it is about time to do what they
were there for, and this was followed by a more or less
statement from Jesus, who said:
t.hqw
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a

ustedes que esten presentes para ser testigos
de rni ultimo voluntad y testamento que ha
sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio
Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo
documento tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro
que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo
cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n.,
hearing of December 7, 1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round
table on another part of the same sala for convenience in
signing because there were chairs all around this table. The
will which consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and
triplicate was laid on the round table and the signing began,
with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial assisting each person signing by
indicating the proper place where the signature shall be
written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first. After signing the
original and the two other sets, the three sets were then
passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting
witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as
another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished
signing all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose
Gaya who also signed as the third attesting witness. On each
of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten times, one on the
margin of each of the nine pages, and at the end of the
instrument proper. Each of the three attesting witnesses
(Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on each
set, one on the margin of each of the nine pages, one at
the end of the instrument proper and one below the
attestation clause. The original will was marked as Exh. A (or
set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate of
Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were
Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge)
imperial. It was also clearly established that when Don Jesus
signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were
present and witnessed said signing, and that when each of
these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two
other attesting witnesses were present and Witnessing said
Signing. The signing by the testator and the attesting
witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as
Notary Public with commission for the entire province of
Albay, notarized the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat
which seal he brought along that morning. After all the three
sets were notarized, they were all given back to Don Jesus
who placed them inside the same folder. At that moment, it
was already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of
them to lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted by all of
then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No.
54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude

that the same had not complied with the requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the
New Civil Code. ... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings of the lower
court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the formal requirements
of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal
and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence, there is no further need for Us to
dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the respondent appellate court have
declared that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and supported by the
records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at that the contested will was duly
executed in accordance with law. We rule that the questioned last will and testament of Don
Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain details which
were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life." First was
the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay together with their four children
Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial Partition of
November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties of the spouses between
the spouses themselves and the children under the terms and conditions and dispositions
herein before stated and to implement its provisions, Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay
subsequently executed separately their respective holographic wigs both dated January 5,
1955 and codicils dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced
herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and upon
the death of Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in due time the
partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by the probate court on July
6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 was an
enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse, barring
him from violating said partition agreement, barring him from revoking his holographic will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956, and further barring him from executing
his new will and testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate
proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the Extrajudicial
Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271
of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto. These Articles provide as follows:
t.hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the
commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos
of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subjectmatter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear intent of the law may
be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only
to one who has made a prior will or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an
exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in the exception any person whether
he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old and new Civil
Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even
before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The court further added that jurisprudence is
to the effect that the partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or
effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court
held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the
holographic will executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14,
1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior will before
the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and We quote the pertinent portions
of the decision:
t.hqw
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition
made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants
and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid
down the following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean
that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the
section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a testament
containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise,
a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not
provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments,
and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime,
whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes
reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be
entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article
1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a
partition thus made should be on the basis of a testamentary or legal
succession and should be made in conformity with the fundamental rules
thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of
the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they
simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner,
which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in
order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons
interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its
division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose
of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be understood in
accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide the estate among the
heirs designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the disposition
of the properties to take effect after his death, and said act must necessarily
appear in the testament because it is the expression of the testator's last will
and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second
part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator
may make this division in the same will or in another will, or by an act inter
vivos. With these words, the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057,
which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of
making the partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for
purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must accompany every
testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it necessary to observe the
special for. realities required in case of donations, because it is not a matter
of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which already
have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and
authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an
act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will
there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter
vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property
which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property
gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word
"testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely
donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect
after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as
against public policy had been validly ratified by the holographic will of Don Jesus executed
on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court
that a person who executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he
mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that
the respondent court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14,
1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949
was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his
participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions
or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and
inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved

future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties
to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949, contained
specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial
compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On
the other hand, there could have been no valid donation to the children of the other half
reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was
to be divided equally among the children for the simple reason that the property or properties
were not specifically described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under
Article 633 which provides as follows:
t.hqw
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made by
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the
donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice
thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the spouses which may
be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would like in regards to his or her
share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to
give equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The end result,
therefore, is that Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children
valid donations of only one-half of their combined properties which must be charged against
their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained
entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective shares.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was
distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil
dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the distribution of her properties was
subject to her holographic win and codicil, independently of the holographic will and codicil of
Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to
consider both wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil
Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only her
estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay
and We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both
the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets.
In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made in the fourth clause but it
only provided that, to wit:
t.hqw
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado

este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi esposo o hijos
arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la

mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes
iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that "Should I acquire
new properties after the execution of this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my
spouse and above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same
proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal
parts." From the above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don
Jesus whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in the
free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the codicil:
t.hqw
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se

sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los que no
he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en la escritura de reparticion
precitada y que excedieran de la mitad de gananciales que le corresponds
tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos bienes que se
adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo declaro
que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero que me
pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la reparticion,
se dividan por igual entre mis herederos mencionados despues de mi
muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states:
t.hqw
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance
the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in
favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire after the
execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare that
it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or would
pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the partition,
should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining estate of Do;a
Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress the point, Do;a Tinay
did not oblige her husband to give equally to the children, upon his death, all such properties
she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed on November
14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don
Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the children, it follows that all the properties of
Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her holographic win and codicil became part of
Don Jesus' estate unburdened by any condition obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with
exactly the same provisions as those of Do;a Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We
rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic
will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil
Code is clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any
waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his
absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still
hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated (Palacios
v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does
not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the
succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777,
New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his
death to whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced,
which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua
estate is being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir instituted to the
remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil resulting in all such
properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out that
Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will and codicil, by making another
win expressly cancelling and revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's resolution is
the validity of the provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear
that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by the probate
court, the Court had, on more than one occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a will
even before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared in Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA
499:
t.hqw
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the wilt Normally this comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for ought that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will
probability exists that the case win come up once again before us on the
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a behalf that we might as well meet head-on the time of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 contained an
express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14,
1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of
1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his
children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the
rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo
and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties distributed to
the children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the contested will of Don
Jesus does not show that the former had in fact been included in the latter. This being so, it
must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his last win was not to revoke the
donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or
that portion of the conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which he received
as his inheritance from Do;a Tinay. The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired,
as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that
were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and
may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as in fact he
was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus
in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to
wit:
t.hqw
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own
Idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of
disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in
order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the
estate of a deceased person. The only functions of the courts in these cases
is to carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the wig. Once
that intention has been determined through a careful reading of the will or
wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond
the place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness of
any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment upon the
motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated,
nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in any
manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate means of
ascertaining the inward process of her conscience. She was the sole judge of
her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which allegedly benefited and
favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who would have been entitled to an
equal share under the extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider
Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not snow himself to violate the previous
agreement, and the other as one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had
been diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of
age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his
properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part received instructions
from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court, the better explanation
is the latter, which is not legally tenable. Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which
provides as follows:
t.hqw
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win. Mere weakness of
mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not render a person
incapable of making a will.
t.hqw
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which

unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand
it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a
will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about
to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is essential that
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and under Article 800, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In the
case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court on
the due execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all
claim to the contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law. But more than that, gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the
described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one
suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents. From these accepted
facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer
as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his
properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer
w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at his house in
Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which ran
from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by
Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the
purpose of their meeting or gathering, to wit:
t.hqw
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para

ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por el
abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents
tengo aqui con migo y encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes
tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other details which, in the
words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things
and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of January 5,
1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of November
14, 1959 is concerned, he had no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime,
the alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the
properties under question to petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had
already been bequeathed to her in the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing,
absolutely nothing, could be made the basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded
his other children with less favor, and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or
forget the former depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the latter
with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to violate his previous
disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or
speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the win
of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated during his
lifetime while his previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still
alive is a mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the
testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator
and for not doing so there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence
therefrom. The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and
neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal ground
to reject allowance or disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever
reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had
already assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate that Don
Jesus desired to have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale
instead of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or speculation for the act of
the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was actually the reason. This is as good a
conjecture as the respondents may offer or as difficult to accept which respondent court
believes. A conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for annulment of the two
Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity
or nullity. Private respondents mainly contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated,
there having been no actual consideration paid. They further insist that the issue raised is a
question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the respondent
court to set aside on appeal the factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were
valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
conclusive; and this same principle applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement
with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of
fact. But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle
that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the
record or those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by
the Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made
by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the general rule, where We have reviewed
and revised the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna vs. Linatok,
74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G. 2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs. Sosing, L-4875,
Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590, April 30, 1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto
Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19
SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's conclusion as to the
nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the evidence on record and adduced
during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit U, a deed of
sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca
for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which document bears the
signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an
instrumental witness, again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or
threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for
the consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also bears the
signature of Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated
August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging
receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in the amount of Seventy Thousand
Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco under the
same date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a
Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the amount
of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a
second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the
amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and
"X-5 ", endorsements on the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures
thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal
Revenue Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging
the receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in
payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are
convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in fact, Don Jesus sold
the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total consideration of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void for being without
cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court
upheld said claim on the basis that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside
from the speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that showed what motivated Don
Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children.
The two contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by
Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time during
this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in the
contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were
even signed by one of the private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot
now deny the payment of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no transfer
of money was involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which
show that the checks of Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don
Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the
annulment case, which proved that Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete
payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of the inadequacy
of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven
which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article
1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the
court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value
of the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699
and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.

Melencio Herrera, J., concur in the result.
#Footnotes
t.hqw
1 First Division, Court of Appeals, Gatmaitan, J., ponente with de Castro, P.

and Reyes, S., JJ., concurring.
Doromal v. CA, L-36083, 2 Sept. 1975

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975

Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, SR., and ROSARIO SALAS, and Spouses RAMON
DOROMAL, JR., and GAUDELIA VEGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENA JAVELLANA, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Parlade and Associates and Marvin J. Mirasol for petitioners. Arturo
H. Villanueva, Jr. for private respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
47945-R entitled Filomena Javellana vs. Spouses Ramon Doromal, Sr., et al. which reversed
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo that had in turn dismissed herein private
respondent Filomena Javellana's action for redemption of a certain property sold by her coowners to herein petitioners for having been made out of time.
The factual background found by the Court of Appeals and which is binding on this Court, the
same not being assailed by petitioners as being capricious, is as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the facts are quite simple; Lot 3504 of the cadastral
survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz, one of its districts, with an
area of a little more than 2- hectares was originally decreed in the name of
the late Justice Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original Certificate of Title
No. 1314, Exh. A; but before he died, on a date not particularized in the
record, he executed a last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a
co-ownership between himself and his brothers and sisters, Exh. C; so that
the truth was that the owners or better stated, the co-owners were; beside
Justice Horilleno,
"Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza,"
all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she was
succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff. Filomena Javellana,
in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership each; now then, even though
their right had not as yet been annotated in the title, the co-owners led by
Carlos, and as to deceased Justice Antonio Horilleno, his daughter Mary,
sometime since early 1967, had wanted to sell their shares, or if possible if
Filomena Javellana were agreeable, to sell the entire property, and they hired
an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, and the latter came to
interest defendants, the father and son, named Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr.,
and in preparation for the execution of the sale, since the brothers and sisters
Horilleno were scattered in various parts of the country, Carlos in Ilocos Sur,
Mary in Baguio, Soledad and Fe, in Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Rosita in
Basilan City, they all executed various powers of attorney in favor of their
niece, Mary H. Jimenez Exh. 1-8, they also caused preparation of a power of
attorney of identical tenor for signature by plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, Exh.
M, and sent it with a letter of Carlos, Exh. 7 dated 18 January, 1968 unto her
thru Mrs. Harder, and here, Carlos informed her that the price was P4.00 a
square meter, although it now turns out according to Exh. 3 that as early
as 22 October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money from
defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price therein
agreed upon was five (P5.00) pesos a square meter as indeed in another
letter also of Carlos to Plaintiff in 5 November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her
that the Doromals had given the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P5.00 a
square meter, at any rate, plaintiff not being agreeable, did not sign the
power of attorney, and the rest of the co-owners went ahead with their sale of
their 6/7, Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by their common
attorney in fact, Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed and
ratified in Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh. 2, then brought to
Iloilo by Carlos in the same month, and because the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo refused to register right away, since the original registered owner,
Justice Antonio Horilleno was already dead, Carlos had to ask as he did, hire
Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file a petition within the cadastral case, on 26
February, 1968, for the purpose, Exh. C, after which Carlos returned to
Luzon, and after compliance with the requisites of publication, hearing and
notice, the petition was approved, and we now see that on 29 April, 1968,
Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the Register of Deeds and caused the
registration of the order of the cadastral court approving the issuance of a
new title in the name of the co-owners, as well as of the deed of sale to the
Doromals, as a result of which on that same date, a new title was issued TCT
No. 23152, in the name of the Horillenos to 6/7 and plaintiff Filomena
Javellana to 1/7, Exh. D, only to be cancelled on the same day under TCT
No. 23153, Exh. 2, already in the names of the vendees Doromals for 6/7
and to herein plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, 1/7, and the next day 30 April,
1968, the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum of P97,000.00 Exh.
1, of Chartered Bank which was later substituted by check of Phil. National
Bank, because there was no Chartered Bank Branch in Ilocos Sur, but
besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals according to their evidence
still paid an additional amount in cash of P18,250.00 since the agreed price
was P5.00 a square meter; and thus was consummated the transaction, but it
is here where complications set in,
On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the Doromals in Dumangas, Iloilo,
plaintiff's lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her letter of that date, reading,
"
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Mr. & Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Sr.
and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Jr.
"Dumangas Iloilo
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Doromal:
The bearer of this letter is my nephew, Atty. Arturo H.
Villanueva, Jr., of this City. Through him, I am making a formal
offer to repurchase or redeem from you the 6/7 undivided
share in Lot No. 3504, of the Iloilo Cadastre, which you
bought from my erstwhile co-owners, the Horillenos, for the
sum of P30,000.00, Atty. Villanueva has with him the sum of
P30,000.00 in cash, which he will deliver to you as soon as
you execute the contract of sale in my favor.
Thank you very much for whatever favorable consideration you can give this
request.
Very truly
yours,
(
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p. 26, Exh. "J", Manual of Exhibits.
and then and there said lawyer manifested to the Doromals that he had the
P30,000.00 with him in cash, and tendered it to them, for the exercise of the
legal redemption, the Doromals were aghast, and refused. and the very next
day as has been said. 11 June, 1968, plaintiff filed this case, and in the trial,
thru oral and documentary proofs sought to show that as co-owner, she had
the right to redeem at the price stated in the deed of sale, Exh. 2, namely
P30,000.00 of the but defendants in answer, and in their evidence, oral and
documentary sought to show that plaintiff had no more right to redeem and
that if ever she should have, that it should be at the true and real price by
them paid, namely, the total sum of P115,250.00, and trial judge, after
hearing the evidence, believed defendants, that plaintiff had no more right, to
redeem, because,
"Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the 6/7 share
belonging to the Horillenos."
and that,
"The plaintiff have every reason to be grateful to Atty. Carlos Horilleno
because in the petition for declaration of heirs of her late uncle Antonio
Horilleno in whose name only the Original Certificate of Title covering the Lot
in question was issued, her uncle Atty. Carlos Horilleno included her as one
of the heirs of said Antonio Horilleno. Instead, she filed this case to redeem
the 6/7 share sold to the Doromals for the simple reason that the
consideration in the deed of sale is the sum of P30,000.00 only instead of
P115,250.00 approximately which was actually paid by the defendants to her
co-owners, thus she wants to enrich herself at the expense of her own blood
relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins. The consideration of
P30,000.00 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of
the registration fees, stamps, and sales tax. pp. 77-78, R.A.,
and dismiss and further condemned plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, and moral
and exemplary damages as set forth in few pages back, it is because of this
that plaintiff has come here and contends, that Lower Court erred:
"I. ... in denying plaintiff-appellant, as a co-owner of Lot No. 3504, of the Iloilo
Cadastre, the right of legal redemption under Art. 1620, of the Civil Code:
"II. ... as a consequence of the above error, in refusing to order the
defendants-appellees, the vendees of a portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 3504
which they bought from the co-owners of the plaintiff-appellant, to reconvey
the portion they purchased to the herein plaintiff-appellant..
"III. ... in admitting extrinsic evidence in the determination of the consideration
of the sale, instead of simply adhering to the purchase price of P30,000.00,
set forth in the pertinent Deed of Sale executed by the vendors and owners
of the plaintiff-appellant in favor of the defendants-appellees.
"IV. ... in dismissing the complaint filed in this case." pp. 1-3, Appellant's
Brief,.
which can be reduced to the simple question of whether or not on tile basis of
the evidence and the law, the judgment appealed from should be maintained;
(Pp. 16-22, Record.) .
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that
although respondent Javellana was informed of her co-owners' proposal to sell the land in
question to petitioners she was, however, "never notified ... least of all, in writing", of the
actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said
respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for that
purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date. The
intermediate court further held that the redemption price to be paid by respondent should be
that stated in the deed of sale which is P30,000 notwithstanding that the preponderance of
the evidence proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was P115,250. Thus, in their
brief, petitioners assign the following alleged errors:
I
IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE
NOTICE IN WRITING OF THE SALE CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 1623
OF THE CIVIL CODE REFERS TO A NOTICE IN WRITING AFTER THE
EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF SALE,
HENCE, OF THE DOCUMENT OF SALE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
INSCRIPTION OF THE SALE IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY TAKES
EFFECT AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS INCLUDING CLAIMS OF

POSSIBLE REDEMPTIONERS.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT
TO REDEEM, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REDEMPTION PRICE SHOULD BE THAT STATED IN THE DEED OF SALE.
(Pp. 1-2, Brief for Petitioner, page 74-Rec.)
We cannot agree with petitioners.
Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 coowner of the property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is that for
purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil Code which provides that:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and
November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required notice in writing from which the 30-day
period fixed in said provision should be computed. But to start with, there is no showing that
said letters were in fact received by respondent and when they were actually received.
Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint which of these two letters, their dates being more than
two months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as found by the appellate court,
neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale. As may be observed, it was Carlos
Horilleno alone who signed them, and as of January 18, 1968, powers of attorney from the
various co-owners were still to be secured. Indeed, the later letter of January 18, 1968
mentioned that the price was P4.00 per square meter whereas in the earlier letter of
November 5, 1967 it was P5.00, as in fact, on that basis, as early as October 27, 1967,
Carlos had already received P5,000 from petitioners supposedly as earnest money, of which,
however, mention was made by him to his niece only in the later letter of January 18, 1968,
the explanation being that "at later negotiation it was increased to P5.00 per square meter."
(p. 4 of petitioners' brief as appellees in the Court of Appeals quoting from the decision of the
trial court.) In other words, while the letters relied upon by petitioners could convey the idea
that more or less some kind of consensus had been arrived at among the other co-owners to
sell the property in dispute to petitioners, it cannot be said definitely that such a sale had
even been actually perfected. The fact alone that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the
price indicated was P4.00 per square meter while in that of November 5, 1967, what was
stated was P5.00 per square meter negatives the possibility that a "price definite" had
already been agreed upon. While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in October,
1967, there is nothing to show that the same was in the concept of the earnest money
contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil Code, invoked by petitioner, as signifying perfection
of the sale. Viewed in the backdrop of the factual milieu thereof extant in the record, We are
more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the concept of earnest money as
the term was understood under the Old Civil Code, that is, as a guarantee that the buyer
would not back out, considering that it is not clear that there was already a definite
agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided to buy 6/7 only of the
property should respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7 share.
In the light of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the letters aforementioned sufficed to comply with the requirement of notice of a
sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the considered opinion
and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner's right of redemption granted by Article 1620 of
the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other coowners and from receipt of which the 30-day period to redeem should be counted is a notice
not only of a perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This
is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623 which requires that before a register of deeds
can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an affidavit to the effect
that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other co-owners. A sale may not be
presented to the register of deeds for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed
public instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of the sale
should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice Gatmaitan in the decision
under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code bestows unto a co-owner the right to redeem and
"to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract", and to
avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions under which the right to redeem may
be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should not be deemed to have commenced
unless the notice of the disposition is made after the formal deed of disposal has been duly
executed. And it being beyond dispute that respondent herein has never been notified in
writing of the execution of the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the subject
property, it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem the same made on June 10, 1968
was well within the period prescribed by law. Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have
actually come to know about said deed, it appearing she has never been shown a copy
thereof through a written communication by either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any of
her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et al. vs. CA et al., 16 SCRA 775.)
The only other pivotal issue raised by petitioners relates to the price which respondent
offered for the redemption in question. In this connection, from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, We gather that there is "decisive preponderance of evidence" establishing "that the
price paid by defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit 2, of P30,000 but
much more, at least P97,000, according to the check, Exhibit 1, if not a total of P115,250.00
because another amount in cash of P18,250 was paid afterwards."
It is, therefore, the contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of the
intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless that "the redemption price should be that
stated in the deed of sale."
Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained. As stated in the decision under review,
the trial court found that "the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to
minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax." With this undisputed
fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners' pragmatic but
immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy and injurious to public interest, the
seemingly wide practice of understating considerations of transactions for the purpose of
evading taxes and fees due to the government must be condemned and all parties guilty
thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-advised agreement to defraud
the state. Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to the Republic in officially
giving its stamp of approval to the stand of petitioners and even berating respondent
Javellana as wanting to enrich herself "at the expense of her own blood relatives who are her
aunts, uncles and cousins." On the contrary, said "blood relatives" should have been sternly
told, as We here hold, that they are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing tax evasion
and should not receive any consideration from any court in respect to the money paid for the
sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties to an illegal contract. 1
Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its considerations supporting
the conclusion that the redemption in controversy should be only for the price stipulated in
the deed, regardless of what might have been actually paid by petitioners that style
inimitable and all his own, Justice Gatmaitan states those considerations thus:
CONSIDERING: As to this that the evidence has established with decisive
preponderance that the price paid by defendants was not that stated in the
document, Exh. 2 of P30,000.00 but much more, at least P97,000.00
according to the check, Exh. 1 if not a total of P115,250.00 because another
amount in cash of P18,250.00 was paid afterwards, perhaps it would be
neither correct nor just that plaintiff should be permitted to redeem at only
P30,000.00, that at first glance would practically enrich her by the difference,
on the other hand, after some reflection, this Court can not but have to bear
in mind certain definite points.
1st According to Art. 1619
"Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing
by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby
ownership is transmitted by onerous title." pp. 471-472, New Civil Code,
and note that redemptioner right is to be subrogated
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract."
and here, the stipulation in the public evidence of the contract, made public
by both vendors and vendees is that the price was P30,000.00;
2nd According to Art. 1620,
"A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the share of all the other
co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. p. 472, New Civil Code, .
from which it is seen that if the price paid is 'grossly excessive' redemptioner
is required to pay only a reasonable one; not that actually paid by the
vendee, going to show that the law seeks to protect redemptioner and
converts his position into one not that of a contractually but of a legally
subrogated creditor as to the right of redemption, if the price is not 'grossly
excessive', what the law had intended redemptioner to pay can be read in
Art. 1623.
The right of a legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty (30) days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor as the
case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of

the vendor that he has given written notice thereof of all
possible redemptioners.' p. 473, New Civil Code,
if that be so that affidavit must have been intended by the lawmakers for a
definite purpose, to argue that this affidavit has no purpose is to go against
all canons of statutory construction, no law mandatory in character and
worse, prohibitive should be understood to have no purpose at all, that would
be an absurdity, that purpose could not but have been to give a clear and
unmistakable guide to redemptioner, on how much he should pay and when
he should redeem; from this must follow that that notice must have been
intended to state the truth and if vendor and vendee should have instead,
decided to state an untruth therein, it is they who should bear the
consequences of having thereby misled the redemptioner who had the right
to rely and act thereon and on nothing else; stated otherwise, all the
elements of equitable estoppel are here since the requirement of the law is to
submit the affidavit of notice to all possible redemptioners, that affidavit to be
a condition precedent to registration of the sale therefore, the law must have
intended that it be by the parties understood that they were there asking a
solemn representation to all possible redemptioners, who upon faith of that
are thus induced to act, and here worse for the parties to the sale, they
sought to avoid compliance with the law and certainly refusal to comply
cannot be rewarded with exception and acceptance of the plea that they
cannot be now estopped by their own representation, and this Court notes
that in the trial and to this appeal, plaintiff earnestly insisted and insists on
their estoppel;
3rd If therefore, here vendors had only attempted to comply with the law,
they would have been obligated to send a copy of the deed of sale unto
Filomena Javellana and from that copy, Filomena would have been notified
that she should if she had wanted to redeem, offered no more, no less, that
P30,000.00, within 30 days, it would have been impossible for vendors and
vendees to have inserted in the affidavit that the price was truly P97,000.00
plus P18,250.00 or a total of P115,250.00; in other words, if defendants had
only complied with the law, they would have been obligated to accept the
redemption money of only P30,000.00;
4th If it be argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust enrichment
for plaintiff, it need only be remembered that plaintiff's right is not contractual,
but a mere legal one, the exercise of a right granted by the law, and the law
is definite that she can subrogate herself in place of the buyer,
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract,"
in the words of Art. 1619, and here the price
"stipulated in the contract"
was P30,000.00, in other words, if this be possible enrichment on the part of
Filomena, it was not unjust but just enrichment because permitted by the law;
if it still be argued that plaintiff would thus be enabled to abuse her right, the
answer simply is that what she is seeking to enforce is not an abuse but a
mere exercise of a right; if it be stated that just the same, the effect of
sustaining plaintiff would be to promote not justice but injustice, the answer
again simply is that this solution is not unjust because it only binds the parties
to make good their solemn representation to possible redemptioners on the
price of the sale, to what they had solemnly averred in a public document
required by the law to be the only basis for that exercise of redemption; (Pp.
24-27, Record.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners..
Fernando, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, CJ., took no part.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.
Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

The legal (and moral) right of private respondent Filomena Javellana as (1/7) pro-indiviso coowner to exercise the right granted her by the Civil Code of legal redemption of the proindiviso 6/7 share of the property which was sold by her erstwhile co-owners to the Doromals
as interested third persons for the stipulated contractual price of P30,000.00 is unassailable.
It is admitted in the record (from the Doromals' own evidence and the trial court's factual
findings) that the Doromals (buyers) and the co-owners (sellers) had criminally understated
and falsified the contractual price in the deed of sale as registered with the Register of
Deeds to be P30,000.00 instead of P115,250.00 as "actually paid" by the Doromals,
admittedly for the illegal and criminal purpose "to minimize the payment of the registration
fees, stamps and sales tax. 1 (It may be added that such gross understatement of the actual
price was resorted to obviously to minimize the resultant tax liability of the co-owners for income
tax or capital gains from the sale of the property as well as to minimize, if not conceal, the
sources and assets of the Doromals as buyers and make it falsely appear that their capital outlay
for the purchase was only one-fourth () of the actual price which is a device notoriously
availed of by tax evaders to willfully and criminally evade the payment of taxes justly due to the
government).
This criminal and illegal conduct in no way entitles the Doromals to claim callously as against
respondent redemptioner who is merely exercising her legal right of redemption "to be
subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of
the Doromals as third-person buyers [Articles 1619 and 1620, Civil Code] that she may only
redeem the property from them by paying the larger amount of P115,250.00 that they had
actually paid the co-owners for their 6/7 share of the property. Such criminal-tax evasion can
in no way be abated if the courts and the law would yet pay heed to the plea of the tax
evaders that they had falsely understated the contract price and that the courts should order
the redemptioner to pay them not the contract price but the larger amount they had
actually paid but illegally understated in order to evade the taxes justly due to the
Government. A party to an illegal contract cannot come to court and ask it to help carry out
his illegal objects. 2
For the tax evaders to invoke in court their very act of tax evasion and to ask the courts to
sanction the same by declaring that the understated stipulated price was only for purposes of
tax evasion but that for the exercise of the legal right of redemption, respondent must be
ordered by the courts to pay them the larger amount they had actually paid but falsely
understated in the deed would be to put a premium on criminal conduct and frank cynicism in
gross derogation of the law, morals, good customs and public policy.
When the Doromals falsely understated the contractual price of their purchase from
respondent's co-owners, they did so at their own risk and with full knowledge of respondent's
right to redeem the property for the price stated in the contract.
By virtue of the rule of in pari delicto, they cannot even seek recourse against the co-owners
to refund to them the difference between the redemption price (of P30,000.00) and the much
larger amount (of P115,250.00) that they actually paid the co-owners.
If, say, there were no question of redemption but that they had a valid cause for rescission of
their purchase and brought suit therefor, (so that the case were strictly one between the
Doromals and their sellers), the courts would order the return of only the price as officially
stated in the deed and not the larger amount (of P115,250.00) that they had actually paid
(but understated for tax evasion purposes) since the law will not aid either party in pari
delictobut will leave the parties where it finds them, or more accurately where they have
placed themselves. Manifestly the law will not aid the Doromals as against respondentredemptioner who had no part in their illegal and criminal conduct.
Finally, if such notorious tax evasion is to be effectively curbed, and the facts of record in the
case at bar are duly established in the appropriate proceedings, the Doromals and the coowners-sellers should be criminally charged for falsification of public documents besides
being held liable by the proper authorities for the full amount of taxes, income and capital
gains, documentary stamps, registration fees, etc., that they had admittedly willfully evaded
by the false understatement of the real and actual price in the deed of sale executed
between them.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
The legal (and moral) right of private respondent Filomena Javellana as (1/7) pro-indiviso coowner to exercise the right granted her by the Civil Code of legal redemption of the proindiviso 6/7 share of the property which was sold by her erstwhile co-owners to the Doromals
as interested third persons for the stipulated contractual price of P30,000.00 is unassailable.
It is admitted in the record (from the Doromals' own evidence and the trial court's factual
findings) that the Doromals (buyers) and the co-owners (sellers) had criminally understated
and falsified the contractual price in the deed of sale as registered with the Register of
Deeds to be P30,000.00 instead of P115,250.00 as "actually paid" by the Doromals,
admittedly for the illegal and criminal purpose "to minimize the payment of the registration
fees, stamps and sales tax. 1 (It may be added that such gross understatement of the actual
price was resorted to obviously to minimize the resultant tax liability of the co-owners for income
tax or capital gains from the sale of the property as well as to minimize, if not conceal, the
sources and assets of the Doromals as buyers and make it falsely appear that their capital outlay
for the purchase was only one-fourth () of the actual price which is a device notoriously
availed of by tax evaders to willfully and criminally evade the payment of taxes justly due to the
government).
This criminal and illegal conduct in no way entitles the Doromals to claim callously as against
respondent redemptioner who is merely exercising her legal right of redemption "to be
subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of
the Doromals as third-person buyers [Articles 1619 and 1620, Civil Code] that she may only
redeem the property from them by paying the larger amount of P115,250.00 that they had
actually paid the co-owners for their 6/7 share of the property. Such criminal-tax evasion can
in no way be abated if the courts and the law would yet pay heed to the plea of the tax
evaders that they had falsely understated the contract price and that the courts should order
the redemptioner to pay them not the contract price but the larger amount they had
actually paid but illegally understated in order to evade the taxes justly due to the
Government. A party to an illegal contract cannot come to court and ask it to help carry out
his illegal objects. 2
For the tax evaders to invoke in court their very act of tax evasion and to ask the courts to
sanction the same by declaring that the understated stipulated price was only for purposes of
tax evasion but that for the exercise of the legal right of redemption, respondent must be
ordered by the courts to pay them the larger amount they had actually paid but falsely
understated in the deed would be to put a premium on criminal conduct and frank cynicism in
gross derogation of the law, morals, good customs and public policy.
When the Doromals falsely understated the contractual price of their purchase from
respondent's co-owners, they did so at their own risk and with full knowledge of respondent's
right to redeem the property for the price stated in the contract.
By virtue of the rule of in pari delicto, they cannot even seek recourse against the co-owners
to refund to them the difference between the redemption price (of P30,000.00) and the much
larger amount (of P115,250.00) that they actually paid the co-owners.
If, say, there were no question of redemption but that they had a valid cause for rescission of
their purchase and brought suit therefor, (so that the case were strictly one between the
Doromals and their sellers), the courts would order the return of only the price as officially
stated in the deed and not the larger amount (of P115,250.00) that they had actually paid
(but understated for tax evasion purposes) since the law will not aid either party in pari
delictobut will leave the parties where it finds them, or more accurately where they have
placed themselves. Manifestly the law will not aid the Doromals as against respondentredemptioner who had no part in their illegal and criminal conduct.
Finally, if such notorious tax evasion is to be effectively curbed, and the facts of record in the
case at bar are duly established in the appropriate proceedings, the Doromals and the coowners-sellers should be criminally charged for falsification of public documents besides
being held liable by the proper authorities for the full amount of taxes, income and capital
gains, documentary stamps, registration fees, etc., that they had admittedly willfully evaded
by the false understatement of the real and actual price in the deed of sale executed
between them.
Footnotes
1 See Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, 917; Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and
Hanopol, 40 Phil. 209.
TEEHANKEE, concurring:
1 Decision of the CFI, Rec. on Appeal, pp. 77-78.
2 Ex dolo malo non oritur action and in pari delicto potior est condition
defendentis.
Alonzo v. IAC, 150 SCRA 517

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are
a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer
justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do
neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for
that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22,
1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was
an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other
co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square
meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her
portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption
petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and neighbors
whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible
for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them
from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the permanent
semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part
or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of
the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article
was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of
Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed
the need for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the
co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy
the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is
informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the
written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623,
reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held
that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day
period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases
make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was
really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted,
Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30
day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to
reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give
effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within
the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale
and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering
the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by
Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of
course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such
notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in
writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long
before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that
they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified.
We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint
for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have
happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a
move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its
exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of
an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts
upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should
have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily
available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere
mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation,
none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were
readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of
redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we
are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing
was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during
the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in
1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with,
that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 5.
2 Ibid, p. 6.
3 Id, p. 64,
5 Id. p. 21
6 Id, p. 21.
* Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco.
7 Id, p. 65.
8 Id, p. 5.
9 Id, p. 64.
10 Id, p. 26.
** Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.
11 16 SCRA 775.
12 4 SCRA 527.
13 Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.
14 Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila
Race Horse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho,
96 Phil. 622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs,
23 Phil. 315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578: People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
15 Ater v. Smith 245 111. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.
16 Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo
F., p. 39, 1981,
Bautista v. Grino- Aquino, 166 SCRA 760

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 79958 October 28, 1988
EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late MANUEL BAUTISTA and EVANGELINE
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUSTICES CAROLINA C. GRINO-AQUINO, MANUEL T. REYES, AND JAIME M.
LANTIN in their capacity as Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE
GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias BEATRIZ BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA,
GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N. BAUTISTA and ROSALINA BAUTISTA, respondents.
Roberto M. Mendoza for petitioners.
Florante R. Mendoza for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the
estate of the deceased wife? This is the singular issue in this petition.
In Civil Case No. 4033-P, petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title
Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration
No. 5147, null and void.
On January 6,1976, the parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December
15, 1975:
1. That both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner
Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father,
Mariano Bautista;
2. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and
the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document,
although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition;
3. Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, T.C.T. No.
2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was issued;
4. The parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property;
5. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista;
6. On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private
respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents;
7. Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo;
8. Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a
child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949;
9. That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on
December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel
Bautista;
10. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property;
11. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature
of Manuel Bautista;
12. That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. (Pp. 37-38, rollo;
pp. 2-3 of decision of respondent court)
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against
plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was rendered in due course by the Court of Appeals on
August 3, 1987, affirming the decision of the trial court. 1
Petitioner now seeks a review of said decision alleging the following errors committed by the
respondent courtA. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ARE
MANIFESTLY ABSURD AND MISTAKEN;
B. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE EXTRA- JUDICIAL
PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1347 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE:
C. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE PRETERITION OF
PETITIONER EVANGELINE BAUTISTA IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW ON
SUCCESSIO. (P. 7, petition for review; p. 8, rollo)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as
examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even
granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of
Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts
renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a
partition without court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of
Manuel Bautista, constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista
appears to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to the
estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the
same from his father Mariano Bautista, which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No.
2210.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate
applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors,
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it
cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial
partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive
the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the
estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of
an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of
Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista
as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is
difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her
daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing
the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their
half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad
faith hence the said partition must be rescinded. 2
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance of the
title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of
absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose name the title was also issued.
And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by Manolito Bautista
selling back the same property to private respondents in whose names the respective titles
were thus subsequently issued. This series of transactions between and among private
respondents is an indication of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of
those lawfully entitled thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property during the
lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law. 3
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging exclusively to
petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions
involving the same property between and among the private respondents are also null and
void.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-owners for
partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even assuming that the present action may
prescribe as ruled by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista
who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only soon
before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not prescribed.
WHEREFORE, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated
August 3, 1987, of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 03631 and the
Resolution of September 11, 1987, in the same case, are hereby reversed and set aside;
and a new one is rendered declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22,
1966, as null and void ab initio, nullifying and cancelling T.C.T. Nos. T-14182, T-14186, T15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671, and Tax Declaration No.
5147, restoring and reviving T.C.T. No. 2210, in the name of Manuel Bautista, with costs
against private respondents. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City for implementation.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Penned by then Presiding Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, now member
of this Court, and concurred in by Justices Manuel T. Reyes and Jaime M.
Lantin
2 Articles 1080 and 1102, Civil Code.
3 Article 1347, Civil Code.
4 Cordova v. Cordova, L-9936, Jan. 14,1958,102 Phil. 1182; De Guzman v.
Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 75; Tero v. Tero, 131 SCRA 100; and Inting v.
Bernaldez 64 CRA 383.
De los Santos v. De la Cruz, supra

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes
de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging,
among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant,
executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which was attached to the
complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the
parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his
corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and
subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in
connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned
three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by the co-heirs, and by the residents of
the subdivision, the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had
already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to
comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the
plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was
included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had
disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not
sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer contained a
counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in
the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as
the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by
way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the
extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his
counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965, declaring the
plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-Judicial
Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was marked as Exhibit
"A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the defendant, which partition
agreement was marked as Annex "A" in the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-mentioned
Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution of the in
question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz; however the parties further agree
that several lots in the said land have been sold by some of the co-heirs, and
there are houses several houses constructed therein and residents therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed Administrator
and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the land in question, as
provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd
paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased
Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in
interest of the land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial partition
agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16,
1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit "2" for
tap defendant; and
8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of the
said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on
September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a
party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of
the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the
terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations to
develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial
Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the
subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The defendant
filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped from
questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the
relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the owner of
the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz,
who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said
decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana
de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died
on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the
extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the decedent.
We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la
Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending
line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place. ... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil.,
176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer
relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the
right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the
brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the
father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece
is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial
partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is concerned? They did
not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that
plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in representation of her deceased mother. The
pertinent portion of the agreement is herein quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to Anastasia de
la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos
Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila
David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in
representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by
these presents, mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to
equitably divide the property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ,
and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the estate
in the following manner ... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were
laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the partition is void with respect
to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who
is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner
thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully
such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the
deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). Afortiori, plaintiffappellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant.
Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are
prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co.,
et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). InRamiro vs. Grao, et al., 54
Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party sought to
be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there is
authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and
declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights
will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact known to
the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the party setting up
the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)
And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7
SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the
question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities
cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have
knowledge of the facts and be apprised of his rights at the time he performs
the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in view of
the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory damages
must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such damages was
presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of facts and no evidence was
adduced before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that plaintiffappelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and claims that he is
entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that plaintiffappellee had been declared in default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but the latter
did not present any evidence to prove the material allegation therein more specifically, the
alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no such evidence had
been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case for the
resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not make any
mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer or move to introduce
the necessary evidence to that effect for the consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having been
declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations in his
counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for by him. We
find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment by default.if the defendant fails to answer within the
time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and
proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court
shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This
provision applies where no answer is made to a counterclaim, crossclaim or
third-party complaint within the period provided in this rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:
Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by default
against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his answer does not
imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting
evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the
facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires
the latter to adduce his evidence in support of his allegations as an
indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his favor. Nor
could it be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff's
causes of action find support in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief
prayed for. ... .
Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that said
plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the extrajudicial
partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:
(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as described
in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos Santos, married
to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married to Regina Baluyot;
Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos,
married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and
Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and
share alike.
Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention that the
lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not sentencing
appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said portion received by appellee
under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and took
possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and
void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De Torres vs. De
Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to
a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of the
counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to defendantappellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale for the reason that, as
already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in the
stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence which appellant should have
presented in the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby

reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any ability to and in favor
of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced to
restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has received under
the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed
of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
B.
Effects of Partition. Arts. 1091-1096
Guilas v. Judge, L-026695, 31 Jan. 1972.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO
LOPEZ respondents .
Filemon Cajator for petitioner.
Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was
married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.
On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir
and executor (pp. 20-21, rec.).
In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el Asunto de la
Adopcion de la Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94, 103, rec.), herein petitioner
Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally
adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally
herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the aforementioned will
was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was
appointed executor without bond by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes "A"
and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.). Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office as executor (Annex
"C", p. 24, rec.).
Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both Alejandro
Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was
recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), described and
embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 13092, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga
Lot 3368 with an area of 68,141 square meters and Lot 3441 with an area of 163,231 square
meters, then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex "D", pp. 27-36, rec.)
were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens, encumbrances
and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free the said two parcels
from such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased
consisting of 28 other parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of P69,020.00 and a
combined area of 743,924.67 square meters, as well as personal properties including a 1953
Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were allotted to Don Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage
liens on the estate (Annex "D", pp. 25-37, rec.).
In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project of partition and
directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes (Annex "E", p. 38, rec.). Uponex-parte petition of the adjudicatees
Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez-Guilas dated August 25, 1961 (Annex "F", pp. 39-40,
rec.), the lower court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved the correction of clerical
errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41, rec.).
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to
set aside and annul the project of partition, which case was docketed as Civil Case 2539
entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs. Alejandro Lopez" in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro
Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver
immediately to Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were
allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.).
Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964
praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots
nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10)
tenants or lessees of the said two lots (Annex "H", pp. 42-44, rec.).
In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez claims that, by
virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 which approved the project of partition submitted by
both Alejandro and Juanita and directed that the records of the case be archived upon
payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, and the order of December 15, 1960 which
"ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had already been
closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the
estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the
petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could
have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960
under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria vs. Heirs of Antonio
Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 45-48, rec.).
In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends that the actual
delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court
declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the
probate proceedings (citing Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs.
Cano, 59 O.G. No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was ruled that "the probate court
loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the taxes,
and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same"); that the
executor Alejandro is estopped from opposing her petition because he was the one who
prepared, filed and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which she
seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July 20,
1964, her petition for he delivery of her share allocated to her under the project of partition,
less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition
was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion
(Annex "J", pp. 49-52, rec.).
In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated that because the
civil action for the annulment of the project of partition was filed on April 13, 1964, before the
filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition for delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties
have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares
until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided", and forthwith
set the civil action for annulment for trial on November 25, and December 2, 1964 (Annex
"K", pp. 53-54, rec.).
On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539 (pp. 78-110, rec.),
where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as
the allocation in her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is
seeking (pp. 106-107, rec.).
In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of the order dated
October 2, 1964 on the ground that while the said order considered her action for annulment
of the project of partition as a prejudicial question, her filing an amended complaint on June
11, 1965 in civil case No. 2539 wherein she admitted the partial legality and validity of the
project of partition with respect to the adjudication to her of the two lots as her share,
rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial question to her petition of July 20,
1964 for the delivery of her share (Annex "L", pp. 55-59, rec.).
Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid motion of Juanita to
set aside the order dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M", pp. 60-61, rec.), to which Juanita filed
her rejoinder dated December 6, 1965 wherein she stated among others that pursuant to the
project of partition, executor Alejandro secured the cancellation of OCT. No. 13093 covering
the two parcels of land adjudicated to her under the project of partition and the issuance in
his exclusive name on August 4, 1961 TCT No. 26638-R covering the said Lots Nos. 3368
and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre (Annex "N", pp. 62-71, rec.).
In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to set aside the
order of October 2, 1964 on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend
resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment
of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided (Annex "O", p. 72, rec.).
Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the order dated April 27,
1966 (Annex "P" pp. 73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro filed an opposition dated June 8, 1966
(Annex "Q", pp. 112-113, rec.).
Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the palay deposited
with Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants of the two parcels in question be
delivered to him (Annex "R", pp. 114-116, rec.),to which Juanita filed an opposition dated
July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp. 117-121, rec.). In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower
court denied the motion for reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966, and directed
Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro or his representative the 229
cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and 23 kilos of palay respectively deposited
with the said rice mills upon the filing by Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00
duly approved by the court (Annex "T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence, this petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the writs prayed for
granted.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment
of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil.,
730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the
heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor
or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the
aforecited doctrines.
The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control the present
controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal of the administratrix and the
appointment of a new administrator in her place was rejected by the court on the ground of
laches as it was filed after the lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court
issued an order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018, September
19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the
delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August
28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April
23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the
two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above
cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the
probate case did not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the
project of partition has not been delivered to her.
While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the parties suspended
resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the decision in the civil
action for the annulment of the project of partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10,
1964; the said order lost its validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11,
1965 an amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the partial
legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of lots
Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which she has been insisting all along (pp. 106-107,
rec.).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Granting the writs prayed for;
2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964 and April 27, 1966,
as null and void; and, without prejudice to the continuance of Civil Case No. 2539, which, by
reason of this decision, involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, .
3. Directing.
(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R covering
the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue
anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering the said two lots in the name of
herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and
(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez
(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the possession of lots
Nos. 3368 and 3441;
(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or income
collected by him from said lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from April 23, 1960 until
the possession of the two aforementioned lots is actually delivered to her, or
their value based on the current market price; and
(3) to pay the costs.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo
Agustines v. CFI, 45 O.G. Supp #9, p. 184 April 3, 1948.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-612. April 3, 1948.]
JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES, LOURDES

AGUSTINES, ESTELA AGUSTINES, and ABELARDO AGUSTINES, Petitioners, v. THE JUDGE
OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, SEVERO VALENZUELA, and THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Respondents.
Arturo Agustines, for Petitioners.
La O & Feria and Ignacio Lugtu, for respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Procopio S. Espiritu, for other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; WILL, FORCE OF; DEED OF PARTITION, EFFECT ON WILL.
Although the will of a decedent is law, it becomes secondary in value to the deed of partition
bearing the courts fiat in so far as the distribution of the decedents estate is concerned.
2. CERTIORARI; VOID ORDER. Certiorari may be interposed where the order in question is an
absolute nullity.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
A nine-hectare land in Marilao, Bulacan, is the subject of a three-cornered dispute between Severo
Valenzuela on one side and the relatives of his deceased wife Generosa Agustines on the other, with
the Archbishop of Manila as intervenor.
The main facts are unquestioned:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was subsequently submitted for
probate in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in special proceedings No. 4944. Having no
children, she named her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, but she specified
some bequests. There was opposition to the approval of the will; however, after some negotiations,
the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and nieces of the decedent (the other petitioners in this special
civil action) executed on February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition with the respondent Severo
Valenzuela, expressing conformity with the probate of the testament and dividing the properties of
the deceased. They promised specifically to respect the wishes of the testatrix, one of which was
this:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"Sexto Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que heya percibido todos los bienes recayentes en
mi herencia done . . . a la.
x
Iglesia Catolica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas, a discrecion tambien de mi
marido, del mismo terreno palayero e inculto, en el sitio de Quiririt, para que su producto se invierta
en misas en sufragio de mi alma."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Giving effect to the above direction, the extrajudicial partition stipulated that, "Quinta base. Que el
solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo Valenzuela, instituido heredero universal en el testamento
obrante en autos y marcado como Exhibit "A," por su parte renuncia a favor de los opositores, todo
derecho que tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela de terreno, descrito y deslindado en el inventario
de los bienes propios de la finada y designado con el numero cuatro (4) de dicho inventario, con
excepcion de, y despues de descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo producto, la
finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de su esposo, Sr. Severo
Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otras tres hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de
terreno que se adjudican y seran para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la
segregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se destina en sufragio del alma de
la finada y los otros tres hectareas que perteneceran al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con,
estar muy contiguos, a la pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la
finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3)."
Other items of the estate were apportioned among the signers of the deed of partition, which,
submitted for approval, was confirmed by the probate court on October 31, 1936, in an order
directing the administrator to deliver the respective shares to the heirs or legatees after paying the
corresponding inheritance taxes. No appeal was ever taken from such order.
Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to the parish church of
Polo or to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Wherefore, in May, 1944, the Agustines
connections, petitioners herein, filed a complaint against Severo Valenzuela (civil case No. 158)
seeking the return to them of that nine-hectare lot in Quiririt, alleging his breach of trust, plus
renunciation on the part of the church of Polo that had reportedly neglected to demand compliance
with the beneficial legacy.
Advised of this move, the surviving husband Severo Valenzuela hastened to submit in September,
1944, in the testamentary proceeding No. 4944, a motion in which he represented that under the
will he had discretion to determine the area of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that,
exercising such discretion, he elected to assign that tract actually cultivated by the tenant named
Benito Salazar in Quiririt (admittedly one hectare more or less). He asked that this assignment be
declared full compliance with the testamentary directions. The other parties to the testamentary
proceeding were not given notice of this petition. It was approved on December 2, 1944.
After the liberation and after they had become aware of Valenzuelas act that tended to frustrate
their civil action No. 158, the petitioners herein submitted motions for reconsideration, the main
theme of which was that the said last order amended the decree of distribution of October 31, 1936,
which had become final long ago. All was to no avail. Hence they started this special civil action to
annul the order of December 2, 1944, on the concrete proposition that the court had no jurisdiction
to issue it, the order of October 31, 1936, having become final and executory eight years before.
They contend, first, that under the will, and in accordance with the partition approved by the court
in 1936, the Polo church was entitled to nine hectares in the Quiririt farm of Generosa. They argue
next that when that church repudiated the nine-hectare lot, it again became a part of the whole
Quiririt property which, under the partition, had been adjudicated to them.
On the other hand, Severo Valenzuelas position is that the whole nine-hectare realty was awarded
to him, subject to his obligation to donate to the Polo church such portion thereof as he may
designate in his discretion.
The intervenor, the Archbishop of Manila, representing the Polo church, shares the petitioners
opinion that a nine-hectare lot had been granted to said church. He maintains, however, that no
voluntary renunciation of the legacy ever took place.
The questions at issue are these:
(a) What was the share of the church of Polo under the will and the extrajudicial partition?
(b) If it was a nine-hectare piece, is the order of December 2, 1944 in special proceeding No. 4944
valid?
(c) If invalid, is certiorari the proper remedy?
I. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a provision directing her husband
to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not exceeding nine hectares to the Polo church.
It will also be recalled that the extrajudicial partition, containing the promise of all parties to respect
all her testamentary directions, provided that all the land in Quiririt belonging to Generosa would be
adjudicated to the herein petitioners excepting "con excepcion de, y despues de descontar aquella
porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su
alma, a discrecion de su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otros tres
hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de terreno que se adjudican y seran para el Sr. Severo
Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la segregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo
producto se destina en sufragio del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectareas que perteneceran al
Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy contiguos, a la pesquera designada y
descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3)."
After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we reach the conclusion that, as
contended by petitioners and the intervenor, the extrajudicial partition definitely allotted a ninehectare parcel to the Polo church. Supposing, that under the will Valenzuelas discretion included the
determination of the area to be transferred and not merely the selection of the site where the
nine- hectare portion is to be segregated still it seems clear that in the partition he elected or
agreed that a nine-hectare portion shall be conveyed to the Polo church for masses.
While it is true, as pointed out by Valenzuelas counsel, that in the paragraph hereinabove quoted
from the extrajudicial partition the phrase "a discrecion de su esposo" appears, still it must be
admitted that it could not have implied a future choice by such husband, because immediately
thereafter the document speaks of nine hectares, "cuyo producto se destina en sufragio del alma de
la finada" without any discretionary reservations. It is obvious that "a discrecion de su esposo"
meant "segun discrecion que hoy ejercita su esposo." It might also have referred to the particular
location of the parcel to be separated.
It is markworthy that, in addition to the nine-hectare portion, the deed mentions another parcel of
three hectares exclusively given to Valenzuela. If the parties had not contemplated a nine-hectare
donation to the Polo church, but empowered Valenzuela to fix the area subsequently, they would
have assigned to him 12 hectares, with the provision that he will separate therefrom such portion as
he may desire to convey to the parish of Polo. They did not say so. Instead they clearly stipulated
that nine hectares were destined for "misas" (to the Church), and that three hectares would be
reserved for him.
It is quite probable that if Generosas kin had known, in the course of bargaining, that Valenzuela
would not deliver all the nine hectares to the Polo church but would retain eight hectares thereof,
they would not have ceded to him an additional lot of three hectares.
Proof positive that he had no choice as to the number of hectares is the fact that for eight years he
never exercised it, keeping for himself in breach of trust the fruits of all the land. He might have
ideas repugnant to the religious beliefs of his wife in regard to the celebration of masses for the
dead. But as a man of honor, as the surviving partner, he had no excuse to set his own notions
against those of his departed spouse, especially on a subject that concerned the disposition of her
own properties. The will of the testatrix is law 1 . And his action in fixing one hectare, when his wife
bequeathed a portion not exceeding nine hectares is surely such abuse of discretion (if he had any)
that will not easily commend itself to judicial approbation.
To make ourselves clear, we must state at the risk of repetition that although under the provisions
of the will Severo Valenzuela might have elected to transfer to the Polo church a portion less than
nine hectares, however, in the deed of partition he agreed exercising his discretion to assign
nine hectares for masses (to the Polo church). It must be emphasized that in the distribution of the
decedents assets, we must face the deed of partition which bears the courts fiat. The last will
becomes secondary in value. Important to bear this distinction in mind, because both in
Valenzuelas motion and in the courts order approving the assignment of one hectare, only the will
was quoted, and not the extrajudicial partition. Valenzuelas motion invoking the will exclusively
induced the court into error.
A third reason to hold that the document of partition deeded nine hectares to the Polo church is the
fact that the court and the parties considered it a final settlement of all the rights of all concerned,
the court approving it in toto and ordering the administrator to deliver to the beneficiaries their
respective portions or legacies. The courts order even wrote finish to the expediente. And the
parties, including Severo Valenzuela regarded it as final for eight years, until he found it necessary,
for his own interests, to make another move indirectly amending the final settlement of October,
1936. Now then, if that partition avowedly settled the estate and accomplished its distribution, the
implication is unavoidable that it left nothing to future judicial action or determination. Consequently
it did not contemplate any subsequent fixing by Valenzuela, and approval by the court, of the
portion to be transmitted to the Church of Polo. The parties deemed it final because the rights of
all beneficiaries were therein defined with certainty. Therefore, the attempt by the surviving
husband to modify it eight years thereafter was completely beyond the pale of the law.
This should be the logical place to discuss the effects of the nondelivery of the landed legacy for so
many years. But in the interest of orderly procedure that matter should be left open to debate and
decision in Civil Case No. 158 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
II. Having found in the preceding exposition that under the partition the Polo church (or the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila) was entitled to a nine-hectare lot, the conclusion becomes inevitable
that the order of December 2, 1944, attempted to modify the final order of October, 1936. Which of
course may not be done in this jurisdiction.
III. And certiorari may be interposed and granted under the circumstances, the order of December
2, 1944, being an absolute nullity. 2
Wherefore, the order of the Bulacan court of December 2, 1944 is declared null and void and of no
effect whatsoever.
Petition granted with costs against respondent Severo Valenzuela.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioners pray for the annulment of the order of respondent court issued on December 2, 1944, in
special proceedings No. 4944, concerning the estate of the deceased Generosa Agustines.
On February 8, 1935, an extra-judicial agreement of distribution of the estate was executed and the
same was duly approved on October 31, 1936. The order of approval adjudicates to the heirs their
respective shares and directs the administrator to make delivery of said shares within ten days.
On November 1, 1943, petitioners commenced civil case No. 158, seeking to recover from the
executor Severo Valenzuela, husband of the testatrix, 9 hectares of land.
On September 7, 1944, Severo Valenzuela filed a motion in the testate proceedings, asking
authority to assign and deliver to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, in full payment of its
rights under the will of Generosa Agustines, a definite parcel of land of one hectare. On December
2, 1944, the lower court issued an order granting the authority prayed for.
Petitioners gained knowledge of the order on December 6, 1944, and they filed a motion to vacate
the order. The motion was denied on October 5, 1945.
Motion for reconsideration was filed on October 10, 1945. It was denied by resolution dated May 20,
1946.
Petitioners impugn the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue the order of December 2, 1944,
alleging that the agreement of distribution approved on October 31, 1936, has become final and
that it fixed at 9 hectares the land adjudicated to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Respondent Valenzuela alleges that he had discretion to fix the area of the land bequeathed under
paragraph (6) of the will which reads as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"SEXTO. Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que haya percibido todos los bienes recayentes en
mi herencia, done . . . a la Iglesia Catolica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas,
a discrecion tambien de mi marido, del mismo terreno palayero inculto, en el sitio de Quiririt, para
que su producto se invierta en misas en sufragio de mi alma . . ."
The pertinent portion of the extra-judicial agreement is as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"QUINTA BASE. Que el solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo Valensuela, instituido heredero
universal en el testamento obrante en autos y marcado como Exhibit A, por su parte renuncia a
favor de los opositores, todo derecho que tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela de terreno, descrito y
deslindado en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada y designado con el numero cuatro (4)
de dicho inventario, con excepcion de, y despues de descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9)
hectareas, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de
su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otros tres hectareas mas, de esta
misma parcela de terreno que se adjudican y seran para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiendose,
que en la segregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se destina en sufragio
del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectareas que perteneceran al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deban
colindarse con, o, estar muy contiguos, a la pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los
bienes propios de la finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3); y el resto pasara a ser de la
exclusiva propiedad, la primera mitad sera de la Sra. Josefa Agustines y la otra mitad, hacia al
Norte, sera de los hermanos Encarnacion Agustines, Dr. Jose Agustines, Lourdes Agustines, Estela
Agustines y Abelardo Agustines; y para la Sra. Asuncion Agustines se entiende adjudicada a su
favor la cuarta parte del solar y casa descrita y deslindada en el inventario de los bienes propios de
la finada, e indicada como el numero dos (2), en el mencionado inventario y aquella otra cuarta
parte del solar y el camarin ruinoso, tambien descrito y deslindado en el referido inventario, como
bienes propios, de la finada y marcado como el numero uno (1); en el mencionado inventario."
Under the terms of the will and of the extrajudicial agreement of distribution, there should not be
any doubt that, until Severo Valenzuela had decided to fix the area of the land in question at one
hectare in his motion dated September 7, 1944, he had discretion to determine said area.
The will instructs him to donate a parcel of land to the Catholic Church of Polo.
According to article 618 of the Civil Code, "a donation is an act of liberality by which a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing in favor of another who accepts it." As no one can be compelled to
perform an act of liberality, it is evident that, under the wordings of the will, Valenzuela was free to
donate the land or not. If he elected to make a donation, he was subject to only one limitation, that
is, that the maximum area that he could donate would not exceed 9 hectares. Within said limitation,
he had full discretion.
The extrajudicial agreement of distribution has not in any way modified the terms of the will.
Therein the parties made the following commitment: "Respetaran todas y cada una de las
disposiciones del testamento." And it repeated that Valenzuela had discretion regarding the land to
be donated so that its products may be used for masses.
Valenzuela exercised his discretion on September 7, 1944, and he fixed the area of the land he
decided to donate at one hectare. No one has the power or right to compel him to donate more than
said area.
Having exercised his right to make the donation only on September 7, 1944, after the Constitution
of the Philippines had already taken effect, a constitutional question arises. Is the Catholic Church of
Polo or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, designated interchangeably by the parties as
meaning the same personality, entitled to acquire the land in question?
The provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution, especially section 5 thereof, have been definitely
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the well-known Krivenko case in the sense that the right to
acquire any kind of land in the Philippines is reserved exclusively to Filipino citizens or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens "save in cases of hereditary succession." Here there is no hereditary succession for two
reasons: 1. The Catholic Church of Polo is not an heir of the deceased Generosa Valenzuela, and 2.
The acquisition of the property here in question is by donation.
Was the Catholic Church of Polo or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila a Filipino citizen at the
time the donation was made by Valenzuela on September 7, 1944? Article IV of the Constitution
deals with Filipino citizenship and in all its provisions only individual persons are contemplated,
never an abstract entity such as the Catholic Church of Polo or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, which is a unipersonal corporation or, as alleged in the petition, "a corporation sole."
There is absolutely no showing that the Catholic Church of Polo is a corporation or association at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens. There is no showing that
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is such a corporation or association. Upon the statements
made at the hearing of this case, it appears that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a
branch of a universal church ruled by the Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy. Neither
the Catholic Church of Polo nor the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila appears to possess the
conditions which, according to express provisions of the Constitution, will entitle to acquire the one
hectare of land donated by Severo Valenzuela.
For all the foregoing, the donation made by Severo Valenzuela in favor of the Catholic Church of
Polo and the order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan dated December 2, 1944, approving said
donation, are declared null and void on constitutional grounds.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
Hay en este asunto una cuestion procesal importante. En la misma decision de la mayoria se admite
que se halla pendiente ante al Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bulacan el asunto civil No. 158,
entre las mismas partes, en que precisamente se plantea de modo directo y categorico el punto
principal discutido, a saber: si la extension de terreno a que tiene derecho la Iglesia Catolica de Polo
es 9 hectareas, o puede ser menos, a discrecion del viudo de la donante, Severo Valenzuela. Con
esta admision no alcanzo a comprender por que la mayoria estima el presente recurso de certiorari,
anticipandose a enjuiciar y decidir practicamente la cuestion que se litiga en el referido asunto civil
No. 158. No cabe duda de que esto es impropio y antijuridico. En el recurso especial que nos ocupa
no tenemos elementos de juicio suficientes para resolver la controversia. En el mencionado asunto
civil es donde los derechos de las partes debieran determinarse y resolverse, sobre todo los
derechos de la iglesia. Es elemental que el certiorari solo procede cuando no hay otro remedio
expedito y adecuado. Aqui hay otro remedio no solo mas expedito, sino mas adecuado, y es la
tramitacion del referido asunto civil No. 158.
La decision de la mayoria es puramente academica, no resuelve nada como no sea anticipando el
juicio sobre un asunto que todavia no ha llegado a esta Corte Suprema. Asi que estimo innecesario
expresar mi opinion sobre el fondo de la cuestion, esto es, si el viudo tiene o no derecho a donar a
la iglesia menos de 9 hectareas, de acuerdo con la discrecion que en el testamento le concede su
difunta esposa. Expresare mi opinion cuando llegue el momento oportuno.
Endnotes:
1. Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil., 209, 216.

2. Director of Lands v. Santamaria and Javellana, 44 Phil., 594; Centeno v. Centeno, 52 Phil., 322,
339.

A. Partition. Arts. 1078-1090 Neri v. Heirs of Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

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A. Partition. Arts. 1078-1090 Neri v. Heirs of Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

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XXII.

PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE

Partition. Arts. 1078- 1090

(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set

Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application

'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the

On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay.

a new will, and accordingly gave more detailed instructions as

'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a

which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude

inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved

Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado

arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la

Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which

Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para

De Castro, J., took no part.

1 First Division, Court of Appeals, Gatmaitan, J., ponente with de Castro, P.

Doromal v. CA, L-36083, 2 Sept. 1975

G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975

EFFECT AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS INCLUDING CLAIMS OF

Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Alonzo v. IAC, 150 SCRA 517

Bautista v. Grino- Aquino, 166 SCRA 760

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, supra

G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby

Effects of Partition. Arts. 1091-1096

Guilas v. Judge, L-026695, 31 Jan. 1972.

G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

Agustines v. CFI, 45 O.G. Supp #9, p. 184 April 3, 1948.

JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES, LOURDES

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The pertinent portion of the extra-judicial agreement is as follows:

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1. Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil., 209, 216.

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