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17 October 2014
Increased Positions
Maire Tecnimont is an Italian integrated industrial group providing engineering and construction services
in the Oil, Gas and Petrochemicals (OGP), Infrastructure & Civil Engineering (ICE) and Power sectors.
During the last two years MT has been undergoing a successful financial restructuring in the form of a
rights issue, debt rescheduling and a major business turnaround focused on building up its core OGP
business and downsizing/selling both Power and ICE.
The company has been uninvestable for many years as it suffered a rapid BS weakening after pursuing
an aggressive M&A expansion focused on the purchase of non-core businesses that were inadequately
integrated. We now think there is still much value to be found, especially in its OGP division. Since mid2012 the company has refocused towards this division, where it has enjoyed a historical competitive
advantage having considerably higher margins than its peers (Maires 6.1% vs. Tecnicas Reunidas 5.3%
EBIT margin) as they are engaged in niche projects (particularly in polyolefins and licensing urea plants
and granulation technology).
As a result of its past strategic mismanagements, shares have been beaten down and investors have
capitulated. At todays share price, we believe the market understates the underlying value of the
company. Should MT keep on delivering on its operational guidance and on its asset disposal plan, which
would enable the company return to the cash positive territory, we believe MT should not trade at a
discount to TRE as we are expecting the former to enjoy better margins. Currently MT trades at a 27%
2015 FCF yield compared to TREs 7.5%.
We find another positive in Fabrizio di Amato, its founder and current Chairman; while we could argue he
is the individual who brought MT onto its knees, we now also take into account that he is the self-made
and vigorous businessman who founded MT when he was just 21 years old and grew Maires OGP
division through acquisitions into a leading player with global footprint in the challenging Oil & Gas
engineering sector. He has a deep knowledge of the industry and we believe he has learned the lesson
well. In addition, he has reinvested in MTs rights issue proceeds he made when the company was floated
back in 2007, doubling down on the companys future.
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Westmoreland Coal is the 6 largest thermal coal producer in the US, operating 12 surface coal mines (6
in the US and 6 in Canada) which supply coal under long-term cost-indexed contracts to a stable customer
base, the majority of them being investment grade utilities. Moreover, it runs two coal-fired power
generating units located in the US.
The coal mining sector has been one of the worst performers in the commodity landscape for many years
now. Currently, it is still facing extraordinarily bad conditions due to a combination of high competition in
power generation (primarily the use of natural gas in combined cycle), plummeting coal prices derived from
excess supply and last, but not least, increasingly tougher regulations aimed at reducing carbon
emissions. This mentioned situation has led to many bankruptcies (James River Coal, Trinity Coal and
Patriot Coal to name a few). On a global basis, coal is by far the primary and cheapest source of energy,
but this competitive advantage is lost when a complex transportation infrastructure is needed.
Approximately 80% of the final selling price of each metric ton of coal is comprised by handling, rail or
shipping costs, making the location of the mining operations and that of the final customer essential in the
profitability of the business dynamics.
Westmoreland enjoys a much different situation than the one portrayed above. It operates mines that are
located intentionally near their customers thermal plants, this way, they can continuously supply coal with
a very low transportation cost to their customers. This results in a win-win situation, as the utility buys coal
at a discount from the broad coal market (50% cheaper than the natural gas combined cycle), making their
thermal plants more competitive and setting itself apart from the complex and dangerous activity of mining
their own coal. On the other hand, Westmoreland acquires a captive customer and supplies the coal under
cost-protected contracts (not being exposed to a rise or fall in coal prices) and thus, benefitting from very
stable and predictable cash flows, something unheard off in this cyclical industry. In the majority of cases
this long-term contractual structure resembles the take or pay concept making the client even more
captive.
In this depressed environment, utilities are found to be outsourcing the coal mines they own (which supply
to their own thermal plants) and coal companies are, at the same time, disposing of coal assets in order to
reduce their unsustainable debt levels. In this context Westmoreland is able to buy the coal mines it
considers attractive (under its current business model) at 3-4X Ebitda (Kemmerer and Sherritt Coal) and
subsequently incorporate them into their stable high yielding structure. With this profile, WLB is bound to
further expand their contract mining and cost-plus model, deliver on their bolt-on acquisition potential,
transform itself into an MLP and to pursue a bond refinancing to reduce its financial cost (which we
estimate in a USD40M impact). Valuation wise, the shares are currently trading at an attractive 15% 2014
FCF yield, whilst we willingly wait and see how the investment case unfolds.
Reduced Positions
Acciona is a Spanish conglomerate with a global footprint, operating businesses ranging from renewable
energies (its core business), civil infrastructures, logistics and heavy construction to water treatment,
homebuilding and asset management.
In the past years, Accionas share price has been under pressure as the market was discounting a severe
regulatory risk on its renewable assets due to the new Spanish energy reform to address the electricity
tariff deficit issue. Considering the Spanish renewable assets were run under high leverage levels,
investors feared that a significant reduction of the subsidies granted by the government could mean many
of these projects would enter into financial distress. By mid-year, the final regulation was passed and
although it still meant a strong hit, it was much less punitive to the companys cash flow than what the
initial draft had envisaged. In addition, during 2014 management carried out an in-depth strategic review,
leading to refocus its efforts on deleveraging, FCF generation and shareholder value creation. This new
strategy crystalized in the cancellation of the 2014 dividend, non-core asset disposals and a key deal with
Private Equity firm KKR by which Acciona sold a 33% stake of AEI (best-in-class international renewable
asset portfolio) with the idea of creating and subsequently floating a Yieldco in the US, which would unlock
significant value of those assets involved in the transaction. Considering all of the above, by mid-August,
we initiated a long position as we thought that the company was bound to generate a stable stream of
cash flows going forward and was trading at double-digit FCF yields.
In late September, Francisco Garca Params, the talented CIO of Accionas asset management firm
(Bestinver) announced its resignation due to discrepancies with Accionas top management. At the time,
Bestinver managed funds totaling EUR10bn and generated approximately c.15-20% (c.EUR70m) of the
companys FCF. Being a one mans show we granted him all of Bestinvers past and future success, and
thus we conservatively believed that we shouldnt count anymore on its EUR70m FCF contribution when
valuing the Group. Considering Accionas FCF was going to take a hit, we decided to exit our position at a
7% loss. We still believe management is taking steps in the right direction to streamline its core business,
and we would reconsider the investment case should the shares continue to de-rate to an attractive risk /
reward profile.
Sincerely,
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