1

[G.R. No. 117734. February 22, 2001]

VICENTE G. DIVINA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VILMA GAJOSY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision [1] dated October 27, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03068 reversing and setting aside the judgment dated July 7, 1979 of
the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-147.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22,
1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion is particularly described as:
A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North by Lot #1464 - Fausto
Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria Fajardo: on the East, by Lot # 1446 - Silverio Garcia: on the South,
by Lot #1891 - Antonio Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 - Federico Faronas and Lot
#1890 - Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts are the visible signs of boundary. It has no
permanent improvement thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa. Declared under Tax
No. 13038, valued at P760.00 for the current year in the name of ANTONIO BEROSA[2]
On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos. In the deed
of sale to Gamos, the lot was more particularly described as:
A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 - Fausto
Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria F. Estonante: on the East, by Lot #1464 Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot
#1466 - Felix Arimado; on the South, by Lot #1898 - Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot
#1890 - Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 - Antonio Escobedo. Concrete cements posts are the
visible signs of boundary. No permanent improvements thereon. Covered by Lot #1893 of
Teotimo E. Berosa, and declared under Tax No. 13039, valued at P760.00 for the present year in
the name of TEOTIMO E. BEROSA.[3]
On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot
1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On
March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and
declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private
land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.
The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos,
showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was
approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.
On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032
was secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was
10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and
5.9347 were thickets.

2
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a
portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. It is described as follows:
A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, having an
area of 54,818 square meters and bounded on the N., by Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot
1887(Jaime Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of Zacarias Espadilla); on the (Illegible), by Lot 1466; on
the SE, by Lot 1893-A; on the S., by Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892
(Antonio Escobedo) and Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro
Fajardo); all of Gubat Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot 1893-B, a portion of Lot 1893,
Cad 308-D.[4]
On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after
November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated
property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision
PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval,
showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.
On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy,
for P20,000.00. The land was particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under Tax Declaration No. 12927 in the
name of Jose P. Gamos, covered by Lots No. 1466 and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area
of 100,034 sq. m., more or less.[5]
On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 12509.
On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property at the
then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO Record No.
42920. The application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of the said court to
include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described
in Plan AP-9021.
The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of private
respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.
On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before
the same court a Petition for Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the
owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on
January 19, 1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to
private respondents failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that
private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion
despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become
final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the
petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.
The trial court, in its Decision [6] dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review was
timely filed. It also ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her
application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the lot subject of her
application is not contested when in fact it was. Private respondent, according to the trial court,
should have included in her application at least the person of petitioners cousin, Elena Domalaon
who had, before respondent filed her application for registration, made known to the latters

3
sister her apprehension of their land being included in respondents application for
registration. This misrepresentation, according to the court, amounted to fraud within the
contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496.[7] The trial court in its decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case and revoking the
order for the issuance of a Decree;
(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of the land applied for
containing an area of 54,818 square meters which is described in paragraph 3 of the
Petition for Review of Judgment; and
(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion applied for which is
outside the limits of the portion herein awarded to the petitioner Vicente G. Divina;
and
(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting therein the area not
contested and which is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma Gajo-Sy, and the area
herein adjudicated to petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to whom the land registration
proceedings shall likewise be allowed to proceed after he shall have adduced such
other evidence as are appropriate in land registration cases.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. It
averred that the trial court erred (1) in declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a portion of Lot
1893, in ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to proceed with
registration after adducing evidence as are appropriate; (2) in declaring respondent-appellant
guilty of actual fraud in the land registration case; (3) in taking cognizance of the petition for
review of judgment, setting aside the decision dated June 29, 1975, and revoking the order of the
issuance of the final decree in the land registration case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for
review of judgment with cost. [9]
The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining
owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned
portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted
with bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration the
apprehension or claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in
the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding.
There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondentappellee.
xxx
There being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the registration of the property in the
name of respondent-appellee, We find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the assigned
errors.Suffice it to state that Lot 1893 bought by Teotimo Berosa which he sold to Jose P.
Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent-appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such
a manner as to put its identity beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot was determined
after a resurvey/relocation was conducted for Gamos in 1961 the result of which is reflected in
the Plan approved by the Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what really defines a piece of land is

4
not the area but the boundaries therein laid down (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds,
1988 Edition, p. 213); that the Lot 1893-B sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of any tax
declaration covering it, unlike the different deeds of sale covering Lot 1893, thereby raising the
presumption that Lot 1893-B was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos to respondentappellant; and that the subdivision of Lot 1893 into Lots A and B, caused to be made by
petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B to have been the Lot 1893-B subject of the January 19,
1967 Deed of Sale in his favor which was registered on November 28, 1968, appears to have
been made in 1977, ten years from the date of said deed of sale, a confirmation that there was
no such Lot 1893-B subject of his purchase in 1967; and in any event, as the subdivision survey
prepared for petitioner-appellee was not approved by the Bureau of Lands, it is not of much value
(vide Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).
In fine, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of the judgment
rendered in the land registration case in respondent-appellants favor are present. The present
appeal is thus meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another rendered
DISMISSING petitioner-appellees petition at the court a quo.[10]
Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the reversal of the Court of Appeals of the
trial court decision. In substance, he raises the primary issue of whether or not, there was
deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondents part when she
failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land,
such that it was error for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of the disputed land.
Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of judgment, we have repeatedly said
that the adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then final decree. As long as
the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed,
the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree,
which court after hearing may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another
party.[11] In the present case, a certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that
no final decree of registration had yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated
September 28, 1977, it restrained the Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling
of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial court did not err when it entertained
the petition.
Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and appellate courts found that
petitioners name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor
possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on whether or not
there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it
failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the
application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the appellate court disagreed.
Section 15 of P.D. 1529[12] is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land
titles, the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land
and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the
search made to find them. As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we
emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary. The
trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted
that she had a conversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters
apprehension that their land may have been included in respondents application for registration
of the disputed land.[13] Respondents omission of this material information prevented petitioner

5
from having his day in court. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its
conclusion with jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact
upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. [14] Such omission can not but be
deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of
judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act.
Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long
after the initial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who
in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioners name would not
be found on the said survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his
purchase of the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-147 of the then
Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29075 June 10, 1971

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED FEWKES, applicant-appellant,
vs.
NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ, TRINIDAD GERARTE, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO
ARAMBURO, SIMEON ARAMBURO, RAMON VELASCO, JOSEFINA VELASCO ISAAC, EMILIA
VELASCO SAMSON, HEIRS OF JUAN VELASCO, SEGUNDO CERDENIA, MAURICIO SAYSON,
PACITA SAMSON and FLORENCIO DYCOCO, oppositors-appellees.
Ignacio Calleja, jr. & Rafael Lucila for applicant-appellant. Victoriano Abrera for oppositor-appellee
Florencio Dycoco.
Antonio Alfane, & C. Bautista for oppositors-appellees Ramon Velasco, et al.
Delfin de Vera for oppositors-appellees Nacita Vasquez, et al.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal (before Republic Act 5440) from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay (In Land
Reg. Case No. N-434), dismissing an application for registration on jurisdictional grounds.
On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Albay a proceeding for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It was alleged
in the application that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C. Velasco
and Trinidad G. Velasco two (2) parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a
portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D), with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less,
and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan),
municipality of Libon, province of Albay; that applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and
that said properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the application were the
tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of
Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land, and

6
the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the
Velascos in favor of applicant.
On 31 March 1967, finding that the application did not contain the plans and technical
description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate, the court
required the applicant to submit the same. Upon compliance with the foregoing requirement, the
applicant then submitted a motion praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land
Registration Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan Psu-61470, wherein it appeared
that the lots sought to be registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as
Lot No. 21.
In its order of 28 April 1967, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for
registration of land, it had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan. On 2 August
1967, the court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to
include the respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein.
On 23 February 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the
application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding that the properties sought to be
registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was described in the plan attached to
the application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of
the land involved in the registration proceeding. When the motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid dismissal-order was denied, applicant filed the present appeal.
Appellant's complaint in this instance actually is directed against the outright dismissal of the
application. It is not denied that what was published in the Official Gazette at applicant's
expense, 1 was not the description of the two lots subject of the registration proceeding but that
of a bigger parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1383 of Libon Pls-763-D referred to as Lot No. 21 of
Psu-61470). It is here contended, however, that since the published description includes the
motions being registered, then the court below erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction over
the proceeding. In other words, according to appellant, as the description of the bigger parcel,
1383 of Pls-764-D, of which the properties sought to be registered formed part, was already
published, then there would have been no necessity for further publication of the aforesaid small
portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration court. The flaw in this argument lies
in the assumption that by the publication of the bigger tract of land, jurisdiction over the said
property was acquired by the court below. That is not correct.
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to
contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and
address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of
all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the
application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners,
and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being
registered, 2 shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this
publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, 3for the proceedings being in rem, it is only
when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that
jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of
the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the
property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is
not to be granted.
It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for
registration, not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot No. 21), but of certain

7
portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical
description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons
who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof. For, considering that the
adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining
Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the
notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smolder lots required by law. In short, it is the
publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the
interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the
land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the
applicant.
Appellant insists, however, that the lower court should have merely directed the amendment of
the application or the approval by the Director of Lands of the subdivision plan, instead of issuing
an order of dismissal. There is no merit in this contention. Considering that it has been dully
apprised of the absence of the requisite survey plan and the technical description of the lots
being registered. and of the inadequacy of the necessary publication and notice to the interested
parties, and consequently of the existence of jurisdictional defects in the application, the lower
court could not have taken any other course of action than to order the dismissal of the case.
In Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482, this Court ruled:
'It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its
publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed,
without the publication of new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the
said alterations and amendments. Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the
publicity which characterizes the procedure, and third parties who have not had an opportunity
to present their claims, might be seriously affected in their rights, through failure of opportune
notice.'
Nor was the court below technically qualified to declare the subdivision plan true and correct,
and compel its approval by the land authorities.
It may even be pointed out that on two occasions, the lower court had already directed
appellant's counsel to submit necessary annexes and amend the application. It can not really be
charged, therefore, that said court had been unfair or unduly harsh on the applicant-appellant
when, finding the application to be still fatally defective, it ordered the dismissal of the case.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. The dismissal of the application here is understood to be without,
prejudice to the filing of a proper application in conformity with the legal requirements.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

8
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings
of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision
of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came
into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted
from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land
or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court
during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of

9
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of
the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article
XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b)
and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert
before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in
question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by
themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled
to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by
it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition
therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not
exceeding 1,000 hectares.

10
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947
two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors
and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of
the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were
public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only
Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on
the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title
and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 19253 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and
reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land
for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and,
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June
25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,

11
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation
of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly
rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to
be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.Thereafter, it is
no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title

12
already vested. The proceedings would notoriginally convert the land from public to private land,
but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution
which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that
might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that
confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before
that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court
has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section
2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural
lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the
right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and
was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15

13
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the
land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended)
is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to
apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions.
Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is
no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through
all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in
their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice
to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence
suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past

14
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of
Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that
the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence
with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo,
p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however,
they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quorendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and
confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in
the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth

15
but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road rightof-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they
bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as
has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed
out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm
and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High
Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the
applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it
not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights
over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to
justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessorsin-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bonafide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent
parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to
the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)

16
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable
zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had
been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had
been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they
acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly
executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the
instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for
registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p.,
27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessorsin-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have
been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec.
also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the
required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove
thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the
Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

17
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been
in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only
in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn,
have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped
into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves
scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in
the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated
in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect

18
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in
Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78
[1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does
not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered
to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels
of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of
her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented
in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no
forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the
ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra)
supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.

19
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The
land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court
on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of
the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado"
title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion
posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]),
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R.
Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property
subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire
property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently
baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means

20
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has
learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of
private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of
both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in
such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines.
Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right
whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes
without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the
property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time
held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents
have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution
itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections
7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of
the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

21
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail
of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by
the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor
of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it
is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied
with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to
lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to
the register of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement
showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse
and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his
Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant
case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom

22
compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied,
that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the
register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is
the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the
office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior
to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 68946 May 22, 1992

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELINA SARMIENTO, respondents.
Marvil Hill for private respondent
W. Topacio Garcia & Associates collaborating counsel for private respondent.
Dollete, Blanco, Ejercito & Associates for movants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner urges this Court to review and set aside the decision of 12 October 1984 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court 1(now Court of Appeals) in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 which affirmed
the decision of 2 June 1982 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Land Registration Case No.
(SM) N-167 granting the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 376,397 square meters,
located in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, in favor of private respondent.
After the filing of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in its resolution of 27 February
1985, 2 gave due course to the petition, considered the Comment as the Answer and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The petitioner moved for leave to adopt the
petition as his Memorandum 3 which this Court noted in its resolution of 17 April 1985. 4 Private
respondent filed her Memorandum only on 8 December 1986, 5 after her attorneys were held in
contempt of court and fined in the amount of P300.00.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the following factual antecedents in this case:
On 13 August 1970, private respondent and the spouses Placer A. Velasco and Socorro Busuego
filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, Branch V, at Sta.

23
Maria, Bulacan, an application for the registration of title over Lot No. 1005 of the Cadastral
Survey of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 376,397 square meters.
On 18 January 1971, private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador filed their opposition on the
ground that the land belongs to them.
On 19 January 1971, an Order of special default against the whole world, with the exception of
oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador and the municipal mayor of San Jose del Monte, was issued
by the trial court.
Upon the filing of an Opposition by the petitioner and upon motion by the Provincial Fiscal for the
lifting of the order of special default and for the admission of the Opposition, the trial court
issued an Order on 24 August 1971 granting the motion and admitting said
Opposition. 6 Separate oppositions filed by Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco Maningas and Simeon
Albarico were also admitted by the court after the lifting of the order of special default. 7
Subsequently, private respondent moved to drop as co-applicants spouses Placer Velasco and
Socorro Busuego on the ground that they were made co-applicants because of a contract of
services 8 between her and the spouses under which the latter agreed to shoulder all the
litigation expenses and the cost of survey and attorney's fees in this case; the spouses failed to
comply with their commitment. The trial court deemed said agreement validly rescinded by
private respondent and considered her as "the only applicant in this case." 9
After hearing the application on its merits, the trial court handed down on 2 June 1982 a decision
in favor of private respondent granting the registration of the lot in question, together with all
the improvements thereon, in her name:
. . . with the exception of the three (3) houses erected therein owned and possessed by her
predecessors-in-interest, who are claimed (sic) to be tenants of the property, namely: Macario
Cruz, Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo. . . . subject, however, to the payment of real property
taxes in arrears since 1971 as well as to the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 65 and 296,
with respect to those portions of the perimeter bounded by the river, barrio and provincial roads,
respectively.
The decision is based on the trial court's findings of fact, to wit:
. . . That the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Angelina
Sarmiento as early as 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 8388 (Exhibit J), with an assessed value of
P10,350.00. That the real property taxes from 1965 to 1970 were paid in full (Exhibit K). That a
small portion of the subject parcel of land consisting of 94,000 sq. m. is devoted to agriculture
while the rest is cogonland. That the subject parcel land was acquired by applicant Angelina
Sarmiento from:
1) Juan Reyes, married to Avelina Emocling, who had been in possession of a portion of the
subject land consisting of 168,000 sq. m. for 41 years prior to the transfer of their rights,
interests, and participation over the same in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, which
transfer was made through a deed of absolute sale (Bilihang Lampasan at Patuluyan Exhibits
G and G-1), executed on April 7, 1969, for and in consideration of P42,000.00.
2) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who had been in possession of a portion of the
subject land, consisting of 14 hectares since 1948, until on August 16, 1965 said spouses
transferred their rights, interests and participation over the eastern 1/2 portion of said 14-hectare
property, in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration of P1,500.00 (Exhibits
I and I-1 Bilihang Lampasan at Patuluyan).

24
3) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who, by virtue of a deed if (sic) absolute sale
executed by them on November 15, 1965, sold the remaining 7-hectare property covered by
Exhibits I and I-1, to applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration of P21,000.00; which
deed of absolute sale, having been lost, was confirmed by vendor Mariano Castillo thru a
Confirmatory Deed of Sale executed on April 18, 1969 (Exhibits H and H-1).
4) Macario Cruz, married to Antonia Guilalas, who had been in possession of a portion of the
subject land, consisting of 73,000 sq. m. more or less prior to the transfer of their rights, interest
and participation in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento on March 31, 1969, for and in
consideration of P18,750.00.
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and
possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, the spouses Mariano
Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets of spouses having been in possession as early as
1928 and 1948, respectively, during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their
respective portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. That by
virtue of the aforesaid deeds of sale (Exhibits G, G-1, H, H-1, I and I-1), possessions over the
same were transferred to the herein applicant. That, thereafter, said spouses remained in the
same property, maintaining their houses and acting as tenants for the new owner, applicant
Angelina Sarmiento. That applicant likewise introduced improvements on the property by fencing
the same with barbed wire, planting crops and other fruit trees, and by constructing there a
house of her own. The oral testimony of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, insofar as location,
possession and ownership over the said parcel of land is concerned, was corroborated by the
testimony (sic) of Victor Jarvinia and Enrique Buco, both claiming that they were with the group
who conducted the survey of the subject property; and said Enrique Buco also declaring that he
had known the subject land since 1932, he being the owner of an adjoining titled property.
Witness Enrique Buco likewise claimed that the subject land is way beyond the perimeter of the
titled property of oppositor 2nd Manila Newtown City Development Corporation, the latter's land
being situated far from the subject land.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject parcel of land appears not to be within any military, naval, civil or a government
reservation; nor is it traversed by any road, river or creek, except that it is bounded on the North
and East, along lines 4 to 33 by the Katitinga River; and on the Southeast, along lines 34 to 40 by
Dean Kabayo Barrio Road; on the South by Igay Provincial Road, along lines 40 to 44. 10
The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seasonably appealed from said
decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the appeal as A.C.-G.R. CV No.
00126. The Director raised before it the following assignment of error:
The lower court gravely erred in holding that the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the land applied for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application. 11
In its decision promulgated on 12 October 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court found no merit
in the appeal and dismissed the same. It held follows:
We find no merit in the appeal. While it may be true that the vendors of the portion of the land in
question to the herein applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been clearly established that
Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Sarmiento (sic) and also spouses Mariano
Castillo and Petronila Robes were in possession of the land in 1928 and 1948, respectively in

25
concept of owners, without anybody molesting them. They introduced improvements by planting
different kinds of trees and constructing houses thereon. When a person occupied (sic) a parcel
of land under a claim of ownership making improvements and generally held (sic) himself out as
owner of the land, it is only upon the most convincing testimony, in the absence of any
competent documentary evidence, that the courts would be justified in declaring him to be the
real owner thereof.
A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a certain
lands (sic) for more than thirty years, in the concept of owner, is entitled to a confirmation of his
title to said land. (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956).
Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in concept of owner from her
predecessors-in-interest.
Moreover, the land in question was surveyed as Lot 1005 for the herein applicant for the
cadastral survey of San Jose del Monte, without anybody else claiming ownership of said land.
It further appears that the land in question is within the alienable and disposable land as certified
to by the officials of the Bureau of Forest Development. It is for this reason that the oppositor
Director of Lands did not introduce any evidence opposition (sic) and merely submitted the case
for decision.
We reiterate what we have said in previous decisions in similar cases that unless the government
has serious grounds of opposition such as the fact that the land applied for is within a forest zone
or government reservation, registration of agricultural lands within the alienable or disposable
area should be encouraged to give more value to the land and this promotes their development
rather than remain as idle lands. 12
Undaunted by this second defeat, the Director filed on 5 December 1984 this petition asserting
that the respondent Court had decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law
and the applicable decisions of this Court. 13
The petition is impressed with merit. This Court will have to overturn the challenged decision, as
well as that of the trial court.
While the rule is well settled that findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive upon this
Court, 14 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are
not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. 15 This exception is present in this case insofar as the findings of the respondent Court
and the trial court on the character of possession are concerned.
It is not disputed that private respondent seeks registration of the questioned lot on the basis of
paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land
Act, 16 as amended by R.A. No. 1942, 17 which reads as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public

26
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
offorce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. 18
This section is the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. By its very
nature, the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he as an imperfect or incomplete
title. Such is the duty of one who holds the affirmative side of an issue In Heirs of Jose
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 19 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr., held:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942. . . .
Specifically, under paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notirious possession and
occupation of an agricultural land of the public domain; (b) such possession and occupation must
be for a least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such
possessionand occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the order. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive andnotorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one
to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be
mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs.The Director
of Lands: 20
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of
Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should
be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject
to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is
"one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion
actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended
by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere
planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over
an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. . . .
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands,

21

this Court noted:

. . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once
in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession.
In the case of The Director of Lands vs. Reyes,

22

this Court also stated:

27
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. 23 It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; 24 exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
his own use and benefit; 25 and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. 26
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.

27

Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not affect the continuity of possession is
that caused by war or force majeure.
Private respondent does not pretend to be the original possessor of the property in question. She
relies on the alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest, namely: Juan Reyes, Mariano
Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos. From Juan Reyes, she acquired a parcel of land
located in Karahumi, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 168,000 square meters as
evidenced in a deed of sale executed on 7 April 1969. 28 From Mariano Castillo, she first acquired
a portion, consisting of 7 hectares, of a parcel of land located in Licau-licau, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, per a deed of sale executed on 16 August 1965. 29She purchased the remaining portion
thereof, with an area of 7 hectares, allegedly on 15 November 1965, but she lost the deed of
sale; however, Mariano Castillo subsequently executed a so-called Confirmatory Deed of Sale on
8 April 1969. 30 Per the findings of the trial court, the property purchased from Cruz on 31 March
1969 for P18,750.00 consists of 73,000 square meters. 31 No deed of sale was presented to prove
this acquisition. There is no proof as to the area of the property allegedly purchased from Santos.
None of private respondent's predecessors-in-interest declared for taxation purposes their
alleged land holdings. Accordingly, they had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the private
respondent who declared them in one (1) tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 8388, on 18
September 1969. 32 Per this tax declaration, the land covered is located at Gaya-Gaya, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 37.6 hectares, of which 9.4 hectares are ricelands while the
remaining 28.2 hectares are cogonal.
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos were not presented by private
respondent as witnesses during the hearing of her application. There can be no question that
they were the best witnesses to identify the parcel they sold to the private respondent and prove
the character of their possession thereof. Instead, she presented Victor Jarvina and Enrique Buco,
whose testimonies on direct and cross examinations are partly summarized by the petitioner as
follows:
Victor Jarvina testified that he knew the applicant (p. 4, tsn, June 20, 1977) who bought a parcel
of land with an area of more than 37 hectares, located in Licau-Licau, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, from Macario Castillo and Juan Reyes (pp. 5-6, ibid); that he was with the surveyor when
the survey was done; no person contested the survey; he identified the survey plan, Exhibit "F",
the deed of sale executed by Juan Reyes, Exhibits "G" and "G-1", the deeds of sale executed by
Mariano Castillo, Exhibits "H" and "H-1" and Exhibits "I" and "I-1" (pp. 7-11, ibid); the land was
declared for taxation purposes by Angelina Sarmiento and the taxes were paid; he identified
Exhibit "J", the tax declaration, and Exhibit "K", the tax receipt (pp. 12-13, ibid); after the
properties were purchased by the applicant, her possession was never disturbed by any other
person (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 29, 1977). On cross-examination, Victor Jarvina stated that he could no
longer recall the date when the survey was made (pp. 14-19, ibid); the land was bought by the
applicant from different persons, including Mariano Castillo, Juan Reyes, Macario Cruz and

28
Feliciano Santos; he was present when the sales were made, and the vendors did not show any
written document to prove that they owned the property, but they claimed to have been in
possession of the same for ten (10) years (pp. 14-16, tsn, Sept. 16, 1977); the property is hilly
and rolling and full of cogon, but a portion was planted with camote, corn and seasonal crops by
the vendors; he came to know the (sic) property three (3) years before Angelina Sarmiento
bought it in 1969 (pp. 20-22, ibid); Castillo had a house on the land but it was wrecked by a storn
(sic), so that there was no more house existing on the land (p. 25, ibid).
Enrique Buco testified that he had known the land subject of the case since 1932 because he
owned a parcel of land adjoining it; he had known Angelina Sarmiento since 1950; since 1932,
the land was in the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano
Santos, Mariano Castillo, and a certain Arsenio, whose family name he did not know; the
possession by the parents of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes was never disturbed by anyone;
Mariano Castillo and his parents planted bananas, mango trees, palay and sweet potatoes, but
he did not know how many hectares were cultivated (pp. 2-7, tsn, October 24, 1977); Juan Reyes
and his parents planted two (2) hectares with palay, and the rest of the area with mango,
caimito, avocado and langka trees, some of which were already fruit bearing; Mariano Castillo
and Juan Reyes sold their rights over the land to Angelina Sarmiento; the land was surveyed by
the cadastral team, and Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were present during the survey; and
Castillo and Reyes remained in possession of the land as tenants of Angelina Sarmiento (pp. 713, ibid). On cross-examination, he admitted that in 1932, he and the parents of Mariano Castillo
and Juan Reyes were just starting to clear up the area, and that only around three (3) hectares
were cleared up by the parents of Castillo and Reyes (pp. 13-16, ibid); that Feliciano Santos was
still in possession of a small portion of the land in question; they were not able to take
possession of the land in question because it was already occupied by the Japanese forces; they
returned to the land only after liberation (pp. 16-18, ibid); that his land adjoined the land in
question on the east, adjoining the property of Isidro Cabacang and Roman Reyes, who were the
ones appearing as adjoining owners in Exhibit "F", the plan of lot 1005; that he left his land and
stayed in Quezon City in 1973 because the security men of Puyat Enterprises were mauling many
persons in the community; to avoid trouble he transferred his family to Quezon City (pp. 1923, ibid); that the parents of Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo cleared up a portion of the wooded
area in 1932 and that was how they came into possession of their respective portions of the
property; that he did not know the extent, in terms of square meters, of the land possessed by
Castillo and Reyes; that the subject land was no longer occupied since two years ago because
the people ran away (pp. 27-30, ibid). On redirect examination, Enrique Buco stated that at
present only Mariano Castillo is staying on the land in question as an overseer of Angelina
Sarmiento; and that the last time he went there was in April, 1978 (pp. 3-5, tsn, August 18,
1978). On re-cross-examination, he admitted that when he went to the land in question in April,
1978, he did not see anyone cultivating the property, and that Puyat Enterprises had built a
factory near the property (pp. 6-7, ibid). 33
It was further established that from the Land Classification Report dated 8 August 1971, 34 only
one-half (.5) of a hectare is planted with banana and fruit trees, while 36 hectares are "grass
land."
From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. As
earlier stated, none of them even thought of declaring their respective areas for taxation
purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. 35 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of

29
acquisition of ownership. Added to this, as certified to by Jarvina, who claimed to have been
present when the sales were made to private respondent, none of the vendors could show any
written document to prove their ownership of land; they merely alleged that they have been
possession of the same for ten (10) years. In the case of the 73,000 square meters (7.3 hectares)
purportedly purchased from Macario Cruz, no deed of sale from the latter was presented.
Interestingly enough, without this acquisition, private respondent would only have more or less
308,000 square meters, or 30.8 hectares, which she acquired from Juan Reyes and Mariano
Castillo, and not the 376,397 square meters, or 37.6 hectares which she applied for. No plausible
explanation was offered as to why Macario Cruz did not or could not execute a deed of sale.
There is as well no evidence concerning the area of the property purchased from Feliciano Santos
and no explanation why no deed of sale was executed by him. Then too, there is absolutely no
credible testimony describing the boundaries and extent of the areas each vendor had allegedly
occupied before the sale to the private respondent. On the contrary, the testimony of Enrique
Buco throws more doubts thereon. He claims that the land applied for was, since 1932, in the
possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano
Castillo and a certain Arsenio. If that be so, then the parents of Luis Pascual and Arsenio have a
claim on portions of the property applied for. Private respondent miserably failed to show that
she also acquired such portions or that they were earlier sold to any of her vendors.
Respondent Court considered the year 1932 as the starting point of the possession of the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. In the light of the aforesaid testimony of Enrique
Buco, such a conclusion has no basis. As a matter of fact, the trial court itself found and so held
as follows:
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and
possessed by Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, and spouses Mariano
Castillo and Petronila Robes, the two latter sets spouses having been in possession as early as
1928 and 1948, respectively, during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their
respective portions unmolested, openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. . . . 36
If the Castillo spouses' possession actually commenced in 1948, as found by the trial court, it
goes without saying that their possession of the 14-hectare portion was only for seventeen (17)
years since they sold the same to the private respondent in 1965. Tacking this possession to that
of the latter as of the time the application was filed on 13 August 1970, it is obvious that the 30year possession required by paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act was not satisfied.
Further, if indeed private respondent has a genuine claim of possession over the property in
question, We find no reason why, as reflected in the Land Classification Report dated 8 August
1971, 37 or barely a year after the filing of the application, only one-half (1/2) hectare of the vast
area applied for was in fact planted with nothing but banana and fruit trees while thirty-six (36)
hectares thereof are "grass land". These fruit trees are not identified. If the testimony of private
respondent to be believed, these could be kamias, santol and mangoes which, according to her,
were existing at the time she bought the property. Also, if the testimony of Enrique Buco is to be
believed, these fruit trees could be mango trees allegedly planted by Mariano Castillo and his
parents or, mango, kaimito, avocado and langka trees planted by Juan Reyes and his parents.
This Court can not accept these testimonies at face value. The respondent court and the trial
court should not have been credulous enough to have given them full faith and credit. In her own
Tax Declaration No. 8388 dated 18 September 1966 and which she secured sometime after she
allegedly purchased the property and almost a year before she filed the application, private
respondent merely declared that the property is comprised of riceland with an area of 9.4
hectares and cogonal land with an area of 28.2 hectares. the existence of this 9.4-hectare
riceland is even doubtful. Private respondent herself admitted that the land is not conducive to
the planting of palay, 38 the portions cultivated by her vendors Castillo, Reyes and Cruz were
scattered in different places and the area each cultivated could not be more than one (1)

30
hectare. 39 Upon the other hand, as earlier mentioned, Enrique Buco only mentioned two (2)
hectares planted to palay by Juan Reyes and his parents.
Another factor which impairs the bona fides of private respondent is her failure to pay the real
estate taxes after the filing of the application. She made a payment on 26 September
1969 40 after declaring the property for taxation purposes on 18 September 1969, 41 and only for
the taxable years 1965 to 1969. Evidently, such payment was made only for purposes of the
application. A picayune amount was involved annually. For the period beginning in 1965 and
ending in 1969, she paid P517.50 only. She did not want to part with any sum thereafter until it
would become certain that the court would award the property to her. Such an attitude is an
execration of good faith.
One last point which bears heavily against the claim of private respondent is the fact that she
had the temerity to make it appear in the application that she and the spouses Placer Velasco
and Socorro Busuego are co-owners of the property who have registerable title thereto and who
must, therefore, be awarded the property. This claim is of course deliberate falsehood for, as
private respondent later revealed when she decided to drop the spouses as co-applicants, the
latter do not have any claim of either possession or ownership over the property. They were
made co-applicants only because they agree to shoulder all the expenses of litigation, including
the cost of survey and attorney's fees. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that such an
agreement was in fact made with the spouses, it was not necessary that they be made coapplicants. The interest of the spouses could still be effectively protected without sacrificing the
truth. To this Court's mind, there was a clear attempt on the part of the private respondent and
the spouses to deceive the trial court. Unfortunately, the trial court glossed over this point and
impliedly declared as validly rescinded the contract with the said spouses.
The foregoing disquisitions sufficiently prove that private respondent is a smart land speculator
who saw in the land applied for not just the blades of cogon grass, the color of which changes
from green during the rainy season to brown during summer, but huge profits as business,
industry and the general population move outward from the metropolitan area. It is incumbent
upon land registration courts to exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding so-called
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles over lands of the public domain; if they
are lax in these proceedings, they may, wittingly or unwittingly, be used by unscrupulous land
speculators in their raid of the public domain.
More deserving citizens should be given priority in the acquisition of idle lands of the public
domain. These could serve as relocation sites for the urban poor. They may be disturbed to
landless farm workers. In so doing, the ends of social justice, appropriately the centerpiece of the
1987 Constitution, could be further enhanced.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of 12 October
1984 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 is hereby REVERSED. The decision of the trial court of 2 June
1982 in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC Record No. N-39192 is likewise REVERSED
and said case it hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19535

July 10, 1967

31
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all
surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE
CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants'
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less,
situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated
in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them
from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant
known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the
provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that
they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land
in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de
Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares,
more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S.
de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same
Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30,
1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said
decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an
interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas
have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the
applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and
incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and
that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the
appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other
words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court
has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having
transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact
that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former
registration case.

32
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated
January 27, 1961, holding,inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public
land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land
registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same
by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether
the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and
declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by
an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at
least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act
No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of
ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on
adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were
not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners
under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor
had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public
land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such
declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial
confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no
longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty
years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary
personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in
possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of
Lands.1wph1.t

33
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for
trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.

[G.R. No. 104296. March 29, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF IRENE BULLUNGAN, represented by her
husband DOMINGO PAGGAO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ISABELA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX, [2] Cauayan, Isabela declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-88 17 in the name of Irene Bullungan null and void so far as the
portion of Lot No. 1, Psu- 150801 involved in this case is concerned.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On September 10, 1955, Irene Bullungan (now deceased) applied for a free patent covering
lots situated in Fugaru (now San Guillermo), Angadanan, Isabela. The lots included a portion of
Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, consisting of 1.04 hectares, which
Vicente Carabbacan claimed. In her application, Irene Bullungan stated that the land applied for
by her was not claimed or occupied by any other person and that it was public land which had
been continuously occupied and cultivated by her since 1925. [3]
Upon certification of Assistant Public Land Inspector Jose M. Telmo at Ilagan, Isabela that
Irene Bullungan had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse
possession of the land since 1925, the Director of Lands approved Bullungans application on June
4, 1957. On December 26, 1957, Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 was issued in the name
of Irene Bullungan.
Alleging that a portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 covered by the free patent issued to Irene
Bullungan overlapped the lot between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, which he was occupying,
Vicente Carrabacan filed a protest onSeptember 7, 1961. The District Land Officer at Ilagan,
Isabela recommended the dismissal of the protest on the ground that the Bureau of Lands no
longer had jurisdiction over the matter as a result of the grant of a free patent to Irene
Bullungan. But the Director of Lands on March 23, 1982 ordered an investigation of the protest.
Vicente Carabbacan also brought an action for the reconveyance of the portion of Lot No. 1,
Psu-150801 and the cancellation of free patent against Irene Bullungan on September 5, 1961,
although this was dismissed by the court without prejudice.
The heirs of Irene Bullungan in turn sought to recover possession of the land in an action
which they brought in the Court of First Instance of Isabela on April 13, 1972. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Br. II-1102. On the other hand, refusing to give up his claim, Vicente
Carabbacan filed a case for reconveyance on August 15, 1972, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1108. The cases were thereafter tried jointly.

34
On November 22, 1972 the court rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint of Vicente
Carabbacan and ordering him to vacate the land, even as it upheld the ownership of Irene
Bullungan. Carabbacan, who had been in possession of the land in question, was finally ousted
on December 10, 1981.
As already stated, the Director of Lands ordered on March 23, 1982 an investigation of
Carabbacans protest. The investigation was undertaken by Senior Special Investigator Napoleon
R. Dulay, who found that Vicente Carabbacan had been in actual cultivation of the land identified
as Lot No. 763, Pls-594 since 1947, having acquired the same from Tomas Tarayao on May 4,
1947. In his report dated September 17, 1985, the land investigator stated that due to a big flood
which occurred in December 1947, the Cagayan River changed its course by moving north-east,
resulting in the emergence of a piece of land, which is the subject of this dispute. Carrabacan
took possession of the land and cultivated it. He was in the continuous, peaceful, open and
adverse occupation and cultivation of the land from December 1947 until 1981 when he was
ejected by virtue of the decision in Civil Cases No. 1088 and 11102. [4]
Based on these findings, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands recommended
on March 10, 1986 that steps be taken to seek the amendment of Free Patent No. V-79740 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-8817 of the late Irene Bullungan so as to exclude the disputed
portion and for the reversion of the same to the State.
On November 28, 1986, the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines a complaint for the cancellation of Free Patent No. V- 79740 and OCT No. P-8817
on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining the free patent. The case was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which, on September 25, 1989, rendered a decision
declaring Free Patent No. V-79740 and OCT No. P-8817 null and void insofar as the portion of Lot
No. 1, Psu-150801 between Lot No. 763 and Lot No. 764, is concerned. The lower court found
that Irene Bullungan made misrepresentations by claiming in her application for a free patent
that she was in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1, Psu-150801, when in fact Vicente
Carabbacan was occupying and cultivating the land. The court justified the reversion of the land
in question as an assertion of a governmental right.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground
that, after the lapse of one year from the date of issuance of the patent, the State could no
longer bring an action for reversion. The appellate court held that the certificate of title issued in
the name of Irene Bullungan became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the lapse of one
year from the issuance of the free patent.
The Republic controverts the ruling of the Court of Appeals. It contends that the doctrine of
indefeasibility of Torrens Titles does not bar the filing of an action for cancellation of title and
reversion of land even if more than one year has elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in
case of fraud in obtaining patents.
We agree with petitioner. To begin with, there is no question that Free Patent No. 79740 and
Original Certificate of Title P-8817 were obtained through fraud. The trial court found that Irene
Bullungan falsely stated in her application for a free patent that Lot No. 1, Psu-150801 was not
claimed or occupied by any other person. The trial court found that a portion of the lot in
question had been in the possession and cultivation of Vicente Carabbacan since December
1947.[5] Indeed private respondents admit that before Irene Bullungan filed her application for a
free patent, she had filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vicente Carrabacan. The
complaint, which was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Angadanan, Isabela, was dismissed
precisely because the court found that Carabbacan had been in possession of the land long
before it was sold to Irene Bullungan by Leonida Tarayao. [6]

35
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial courts finding in this case that Irene Bullungan
committed fraud and misrepresentation. Its decision rests solely on the ground that after the
lapse of one year from the date of issuance of a free patent an action for the cancellation of
patent and title on ground of fraud and misrepresentation can no longer be maintained.
We think that this is error. It is settled that once a patent is registered under Act No. 496
(now P.D. No. 1529) and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part
of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands will no
longer have either control or jurisdiction. [7] The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent
or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the
expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent as provided in P.D. No. 1529, 32 (formerly
Act No. 496, 38). However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna, [8] even after the lapse of one
year, the State may still bring an action under 101 [9] of the Public Land Act for the reversion to
the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. This has
been the consistent ruling of this Court. [10]
The failure of Irene Bullungan to disclose that Vicente Carrabacan was in possession of the
portion of land in dispute constitutes fraud and misrepresentation and is a ground for annulling
her title.[11] Thus 91 of the Public Land Act provides:
91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts
of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false
statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the
facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to
time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether
they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of
such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process
from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad
faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be
presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey
a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail. to give direct and specific answers to pertinent
questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue out further
proceedings.
The appellate court said in its decision:
We are not, of course, unaware of cases where the patent and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto were declared null and void notwithstanding the expiration of the
aforementioned period of one (1) year simply because of false statement of material and
essential facts made in the application therefor. Be it noted, however, that in these cases the lots
patented or granted were no longer part of the public domain but private ones segregated from
the mass thereof. Consequently, no right whatsoever was awarded in said cases for it is already
settled that a free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have
any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true
owner (Suva v. Ventura, 40 O.G. 8, 4th sup. August 23, 1941; Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855; Director
of Lands v. Abanilla, G.R. No. L-26324, August 31, 1983). This does not obtain in the present case
for it is beyond dispute that the subject land was still a part of the public domain when the same
was patented by the Government in favor of appellants predecessor in interest. Accordingly,

36
there was indeed a title awarded such that when the same was brought under operation of Land
Registration Act in 1957, it became incontrovertible in 1958.[12]
This is not so. Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and
misrepresentation, as in the case at bar, the State may institute reversion proceedings even after
the lapse of the one-year period.
Nor is there merit in the claim of private respondents that the action taken by the Republic in
this case is not in keeping with the policy of State to foster families as the factors of society, to
give them a sense. of protection and permanency in their homes. [13] Public policy demands that
one who obtains title to a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit
therefrom. Vicente Carabbacan had been in possession of the land even. before Irene Bullungan
bought the possessory rights to the land. It was therefore a misrepresentation for her to state in
her application for a free patent that she had been in possession of the lot in question when the
fact is that Carabbacan had been there ahead of her.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the decision
dated September 25, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch XIX is
REINSTATED.

[G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA
BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYACONDE, and JOHN DOE REBAYA, all
represented by ANDREA RIBAYA-BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of
Luis Ribaya, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution [1] of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision [2] of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed
the decision[3] of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in
Civil Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to
a decree and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925.
After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's
findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the
Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [4] We are
thus compelled to review the factual antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the
parties, the following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, [5] on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July
1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses

37
Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to
comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as
noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision, [6] these exhibits do not at all show
the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of
Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for
disposition only on 31 December 1930.[7]
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot
covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was
docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing
thereof were published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, [8] and in its decision of
18 September 1925,[9] the CFI granted the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel
of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave
rise to Plan II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an
aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square
meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26
February 1926.[10] The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended
plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, [11] while on 19 August
1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. [12]
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's
duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-10848 (3947).
[13]

In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the
land during the war. [14]
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land
covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075,
approved on 16 December 1968.[15]Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents. [16]
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land [17] and claiming
ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO10848 (3947).[18] Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated
17 August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of
nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the
original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the
land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the
amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874.
[19]
The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land
covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.

38
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and
prayed that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively
occupied by them confirmed.
In its decision of 11 November 1987 [20] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as
follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without
force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T31336, T- 31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T31345, T-31346, T-31347, T- 31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating from OCT No. 3947 and
OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect;
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their
copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title
to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel
the same;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration,
the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then
CFI, as a land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of
publication or republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of
the decree of registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative
titles were void.[21] In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez,[22] where it was held that any
amendment or alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of
registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses
Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona
fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any
tax declarations. It then concluded that the said Spouses may have occupied portions of the land
at a later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising
of cattle on the land did not constitute "possession" as contemplated by law. [23]
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in
its decision[24] of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The
appellate court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants
was invalid, thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in
their names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public
disposition only on December 31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the

39
Bureau of Forestry (Exhs K, K-5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO10848 is void ab initio.
It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable
of registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title
(Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.) [25]
In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was
unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon,[26] the Court of Appeals held
that the facts in Benin were different.In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before
the property was decreed for registration, while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed
sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.)
thereof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey
plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in the instant case was approved when the land was
already decreed for registration. . . .[27]
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496.
[28]

The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.

In its resolution[29] of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11
November 1987, and dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No.
6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of
Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec.
47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42,
Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." [30]
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the
spouses Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions
required by law, in particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus
burdened the Republic "to prove otherwise." [31]
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal,
and that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their
possession for "[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before he can be said that he is in possession." [32]
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead,
the decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an
amendment in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the
exclusion of a portion covered by the original application and the original survey plan as
published. Accordingly, the land registration court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed
part of the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that
there was insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on
the basis of the date of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have
been made later by authority of a prior executive declaration. [33]

40
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that (1) the indefeasibility of
title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants
failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows
that their possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim
of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No.
3947 was then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey
was doubtful.[34]
In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual
matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was
no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further
contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of
the original survey plan was already had in compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the
land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof
in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war
sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the original survey
plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner. [35]
As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:
1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for
annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land
subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree
issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the
decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947
was, to repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec.
38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its
transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title
became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496). [36]
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for
review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other
remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance,
covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties
to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title."[37] Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property
has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years
from discovery of the fraud.[38] Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund. [39]
Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of
the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too,
public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any
time. In Republic vs. Animas,[40] we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not

41
lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the
state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.
We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the
public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, [41] the land registration court acquired no
jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action
to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred
by prescription.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan
(Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the
first and total want of publication of the second.
As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of
the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the
original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there
was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two
publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void
for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential
bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; [42] it is a jurisdictional requisite.[43] Land
registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice. [44]
Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey
plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended
(Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that
the court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that
the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently
issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. [45] On the basis of the
decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have
amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found
their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No.
3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the
decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of
publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction
over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private
respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary
under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon.[46] This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine
Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial,[47] Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz,[48] Bank of the Philippine Islands
vs. Acua,[49] Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus,[50] and Director of Lands vs. Benitez,[51]that only
where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of
land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the
original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary,
a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the
original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land
registration court rendered its decision.It follows then that a re-opening of the case was

42
indispensable; however, no such re- opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as
earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the
original plan because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been
sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the
amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan. This
conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered
by Plan 13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the
amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings
and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province
of Albay, P.I. x x x (Italics Supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27,
1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the
Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the
March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18,
1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square meters are applied for. On
November 23 and 30, 1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor
Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square
meters separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square
meters, more or less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square
meters more or less;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square
meters, more or less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square
meters, more or less.[52]
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991. [53]
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons,
dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it therein, [54] they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the
Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in
the decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters.[55] (Italics supplied)

43
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four
Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares);
and the 10,975,022 square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares,
and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II13961, as well as, that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the
report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true
and correct, . . . that Plan II 3961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of
489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21,
December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-l and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-l
and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an
area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November
23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of
Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-l and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2
for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of
land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square meters more
or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or
less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-13961- Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less,
and Lot No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less
with a total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; x x x that Plan II-13961 of property as
surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province
of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23,
24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor
of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on
January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . . [56] (Italics supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered
by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a
period (.). The change from a commato a period is of vital significance. For, translated into
hectares, the 25,542.603 square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five
hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the
four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventyfive (975) centares.
Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land
area of the original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters
(twenty-five million five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square
meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five
hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters) as found by the latter, only shows
the unreliability of the original plan sought to be established through Exhibits 6 and 6-A. The
Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits
did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:
Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6,
6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (Plan II-13961)
does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness
and due execution. x x x[57] (Italics supplied)
Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found
by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters with a comma before the last three digits

44
it would have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10,
12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments
were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in
addition to the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the
amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and
Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for
Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay,...
(Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); [58] (Italics
supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely
resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6 and 6-A
are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are
inadmissible for failure of the offer or to prove any of the exception provided therein and to
established the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no
probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land
included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9
January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11
November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85515

June 6, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
The Solicitor General for petitioner
J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision of 29
August 19881 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 2 and its Resolution of 18 October
19883 which, respectively, affirmed the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region, of 17 June 1987 4 granting the petition of private respondent for
the reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of a transfer certificate of title

45
despite lack of service of notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, and
denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the Decision. 5
The issue in this petition is whether notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the
land are mandatory and jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.
On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano,
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing
an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the
Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the
original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the
owner's duplicate copy.6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter
of" the petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
In its Order of 4 November 1986 the trial court set the petition for hearing and required its
publication in the Official Gazette, which was done. Required notices, except to the adjoining
owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given.
Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by
the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an
Order7 which made the following findings of facts:
From the evidence adduced by the petitioner, it appears that she is one of the vendees of a
certain parcel of land situated in Malamig, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of
33,294 square meters, embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 and
registered in the name of Epifania Alcano (Exh. "B") as evidenced by a document of sale
executed by the registered owner (Exh. "I"). The original copy of said title which was usually kept
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of this province was destroyed by reason of the fire which
razed to the ground the entire Capitol Building then housing said office on August 12, 1977 (Exh.
"C"). It appears further that there are no co-owner's, mortgagee's, lessee's duplicate copy of said
certificate of title which had been previously issued by the Register of Deeds of this province;
that the petitioner is in actual possession of the area of 16,647 square meters which was sold to
her and that she is benefiting from the produce of the improvements existing on the area
belonging to her.
and disquisition:
Accordingly, finding the instant petition to be well-founded and there being no opposition to its
approval, same is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to
reconstitute the original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T66062 in the name of the registered owners (sic) thirty days after receipt of this Order by the
Register of Deeds of this province and the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission,
on the basis of the existing owner's duplicate copy thereof.
Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the
Court of Appeals and made the following assignment of errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE COPIES OF TCT NO. T-66062
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SERVICE OF NOTICE OF HEARING TO THE ADJOINING OWNERS AND
ACTUAL OCCUPANTS OF THE LAND AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION. 8

46
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163.
In support of the first assigned error, petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., 124 SCRA
394.
In its Decision of 29 August 19889 respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of
petitioner and held that:
1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners
and actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which
provides that in original registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. Section 110 of said Decree provides:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens Title. Original copies of
certificates of title lost or destroyed in offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this
Decree. (emphasis supplied)
2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the
original and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike
in the instant case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in
the custody of the Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been
lost were later found intact in the names of other persons; and, more importantly, the Petition
was not published in the Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant
case.
3) The duty to send notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed upon the court,
not the party filing the petition for reconstitution (herein private respondent); any lapse in regard
thereto should not prejudice or injure the latter.
4) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the
original copy of the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol
Building; she should not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of 18 October 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition on 22 December 1988 alleging
therein that:
a. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law when it did not consider that
the trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution of the original
owners (sic) duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062 as there is no requisite service of notice of
hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by Section 13 of
R.A. No. 26;
b. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in granting the petition for
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copies of TCT No. 66062.
In Our resolution of 16 January 1989,10 We required the respondents to comment on the petition.
Private respondent filed her comment on 10 February 1989. 11 She practically copied therein the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals.

47
In Our resolution of 15 March 1989 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda, which petitioner complied with on 3 July
198912 and private respondent on 10 June 1989.13
The petition is impressed with merit.
The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent
Court of Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro
of 17 June 1987, must be set aside.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended.1wphi1 Since the
requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the
actual occupants of the land was not complied with in this case, the court below did not,
therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at
least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took
effect on 11 June 1978.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 14 We ruled that the requirements of Section 12
and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 reading as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f),
3 (c), 3 (e) and/or 3 (f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the
registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall
state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c)
the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings
or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and
addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and
of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the
encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be
attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3 (f) of this Act, the petition shall be
further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken
from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petition, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and
to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at
the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number
of the lost or destroyed certificates of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the name
of the occupants or person in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties
and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date
on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to

48
the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and
service of the notice as directed by the court.
are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings
utterly null and void. We reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.15 where, in respect particularly to the required notice to an adjoining owner, We
categorically declared:
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property
adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having interest, title or claim to a substantial portion
(about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the
Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality (sic) on which the land is situated, at
the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
In MWSS vs. Sison et al., supra., We further re-affirmed the foregoing doctrine:
The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, the service of the
notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land, as well as the posting
of the notices in the main entrance of the provincial and municipal buildings where the property
lies at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing, as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are
mandatory and jurisdictional requisites.
This re-affirmation is clear enough as to leave no room for any convoluted logic to support a
sophistic distinction between said case and the instant case and an implausible interpretation of
the law.
We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A.
No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529."
There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even
remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or
read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:
. . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of
implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides,
inter alia, that:
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court . . .
This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and
by posting.1wphi1 What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is

49
sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates
that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord
primacy to the official publication.
That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which
remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of
notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of
adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree,
which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through
safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and
irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of
certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or
could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the
Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday
painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had
caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the
property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon
the private respondent the duty to comply with the requirement of service of notice because it
was not through her fault that the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is
unacceptable since the law does not make any exception or exemptions; besides, it is, to say the
least, a ludicrous proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was the
duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and private respondent should not be
prejudiced if it failed to do so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong impression
that mandatory requirements of notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply with them
is attributable to the court. It likewise negates the principles of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency which the Constitution directs public officials and employees to faithfully observe.
We should stress here that lapses on the part of courts or their personnel cannot be made a
reason or justification for non-observance of laws. By the very nature of their functions, they
should be the first to obey the laws.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition
and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15163 and the Order of Branch No. 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Fourth Judicial Region in Petition No. 11,456.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100995 September 14, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELFINA S. DOLOR, respondents.

50
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo C. Nagera, Jr. for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 10 August 1988, private respondent Delfina S. Dolor filed an application before the Regional
Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a 908square meter residential lot located at the interior of Dencio Cabanela Street, Poblacion, Daet,
Camarines Norte, described on Plan Ccn-05-000025 and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 005-0823.
On 25 November 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Delfina S. Dolor
moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which
had filed an opposition. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, stating:
When this case was called for initial hearing today, only the Fiscal in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines interposed an opposition to the application.
Applicant, thru counsel, prayed for the issuance of an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Fiscal.
It appearing from the record that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with and
there being no private oppositor to the application, the reception of evidence is hereby delegated
to the Branch Clerk of Court who is required to render a report within twenty (20) days from the
date of hearing which is hereby set on Dec. 20, 1988 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. 1
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor's counsel marked as Exhibits "A" to "D,"
respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing in the Official Gazette, the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of the "Weekly Informer,"
and the Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court in its
decision of 17 August 1989 confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her
exclusive property. 2
Petitioner assailed the trial court's decision before the Court of Appeals on a purely jurisdictional
ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or
before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the
requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration
Decree, to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; Provided,

51
however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted . . . .
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were
complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988
before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 3 It
found petitioner's submission not only too formalistic but also contrary to the facts and the law
and in derogation of substantial justice, rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial
Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (Exh. "A") had been published in the September 10, 1988 issue of the
"Weekly Informer" (Exh. "C") and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17,
1988 (Exh. "B"), and posted in the prescribed conspicuous places in the subject parcel of land the
municipal building of Daet, Camarines Norte by the Sheriff (Exh. "D"). The documents attesting
to the compliance with Sec. 23 of PD 1529 were attached to the record even before the date of
the initial hearing of the instant Land Registration Case No. N-678 . . . .
The appellant claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that "the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with" on November 25, 1988, the jurisdictional
requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before the Branch Clerk of Court,
the designated Commissioner. Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988 had no
basis in fact and in law; there was no notice to interested persons adjoining owners, and the
whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the
court on November 25, 1988.
We cannot agree. The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as
exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as
shown by those documents proving compliance therewith, identified later as Exhibits "A" to "D,"
which were all attached to the records of the case even before November 25, 1988. The trial
court is not precluded from taking cognizance of its own record. Although in actual practice, it is
incumbent upon the applicant's counsel to mark those documents as exhibits at the initial
hearing to prove the jurisdictional facts, the omission of such markings by applicant's counsel
who might have been as yet unfamiliar with such practice would not deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with the trial of the case, for the simple reason that the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with as shown by the documents that were
already attached to the record of the case and of which the trial court can take judicial notice.
The failure of the Fiscal as well as the Presiding Judge to have called the attention of the counsel
for the applicant to proceed with the marking of the documents to prove the jurisdictional facts
would not have deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Neither
would the marking of those documents later after the initial hearing deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction. 4
In this petition, while petitioner concedes that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is
not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits but, rather, by the fact that
all the jurisdictional requirements of law had been carried out, yet, it takes exception to the
factual finding that there was compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. As borne out by
the records, at the scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the

52
actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet
to be complied with. Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was
however released for publication only on 31 January 1989, as shown by the Certification of
Publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office. 5 In other words, the actual
publication of the notice came out sixty-seven (67) days after the scheduled initial hearing
and/or forty-two (42) days after private respondent had rested her case. Petitioner concludes that
the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
In petitioner's brief filed before respondent Court of Appeals, we note that the issue of late
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no
apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court
could have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by
competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence.
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the
trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction,
the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. 6Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly
provides that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be
given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 7 citing Caltex v.CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases
where the authority of the courts to proceed
is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of
publication of petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. 9 And when the court lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its
aspects. 10
In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, 11 an issue similar to the one presented in the
present petition was posed, that is, whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in
the Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing, 12 was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and
determine the petition. We answered in the negative since the purpose of the publication of the
notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that
such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so
within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial
hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the
property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
application should not be granted. In particular, the notice in this case commanded all persons
concerned:
. . . to appear before this Court at its session to be held at Branch XXXVIII, Municipality of Daet,
Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, on the 25th day of November, 1988, at 8:30 o'clock in
the forenoon, then and there to present such claims as you may have to said land or any portion
thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims, and unless you appear at said Court at
the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the land will be
adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and
thereafter you will forever be barred from contesting said application (or petition) or any decree
entered thereon 13 (Emphasis supplied).

53
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in
the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of
initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17
October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only
on 31 January 1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of reference in
establishing lack of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that
date when the notice was made known to the people in general. 14 Verily, the late publication of
the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.
By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID
and it was error for respondent Court of Appeals to have sustained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is VACATED and
SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her
title over the property described therein is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26093

January 27, 1969

VIRGINIA L. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, and RUFITO
AKIA, respondents.
Rogelio A. Cortes for petitioner.
Moises P. Cating for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The corrective powers of this Court are invoked in this, an original petition for certiorari, to
strike down the reopening proceedings before the cadastral court below upon the jurisdictional
ground of lack of publication, or, in the alternative, to annul said court's orders rejecting
petitioner's intervention for want of personality to sue.
The litigation below commenced from the petition of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral
proceedings, pursuant to Republic Act 931. 1 Respondent Akia there sought the registration in his
name of 15,922 square meters of land situated in the City of Baguio.
On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000
square meters allegedly included in the 15,922 square meters of land specified in respondent
Akia's petition below. 2
It appears that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales
Application [TSAV-3559 (E-V-405)] covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land identified as Lot
1, Quezon Hill Subdivision, Residential Section "K", Baguio City. It was surveyed for which she
paid a fee of P150.00 on October 21, 1955. Public auction, duly published, was conducted at
which petitioner de Castro was the highest bidder. On December 17, 1955, the lot was awarded
in her favor at a cost of P4.30 per square meter, or a total of P4,300.00. Petitioner fully paid the
purchase price which, with interests, amounted to P4,306.38. Petitioner, it is claimed, had been
paying taxes on the lot.

54
On August 16, 1965, petitioner's motion for intervention, despite Akia's opposition, was granted
by the court below.
At the trial on the merits, petitioner de Castro, respondent Akia, and different government
agencies were duly represented. Petitioner de Castro there presented documentary and
testimonial evidence in support of her opposition to the inclusion of said 1,000 square meters of
land. The case was submitted for decision.
Thereafter, on October 24, 1965, Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioner's opposition to his
(Akia's) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst others, was that
petitioner lacked personality to sue.
On December 4 1965, over the objection of herein petitioner de Castro, respondent judge ruled
out her intervention and dismissed her opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings.
He declared that mere applicants of public land have no capacity to sue independently of the
Bureau of Lands. The judge did not go into the merits of the case upon the evidence presented.
But, on January 13, 1966, de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that she was not
a mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner thereof. Because, she was an awardee
who had paid to the government, in full, the sales value of the land she applied for.
On February 1, 1966, respondent judge refused reconsideration, this time upon a different
ground. The judge based his action on a "Manifestation" of counsel for the Director of Lands of
January 21, 1966 stating that on October 15, 1965, the Director of Lands had cancelled the
award in favor of petitioner.
A second "motion for reconsideration dated February 21, 1966 was registered by petitioner de
Castro. She there informed the court that, thru a letter of December 3, 1965, she had urged from
the Director of Lands reconsideration of the revocation of the award in her favor. She appended
to her motion the foregoing letter where she made it clear that construction of her residential
house on the lot as required was an impossibility because, in the year 1955 and several years
thereafter, there were no lighting, water and road facilities within the immediate vicinity of the
land, and later on, the City Engineer of Baguio refused to issue the required building permit
because of the pendency of respondent Akia's petition for reopening heretofore adverted to. She
also acquainted the court with the fact that because of her letter aforesaid, the Director of Lands
had asked its Baguio office to re-examine the revocation. At any rate, the land in question, so she
continued to aver in her motion, could not be the subject of petition for judicial reopening as it
was never in possession of respondent Akia.1awphil.t
On March 2, 1966, the foregoing second motion for reconsideration was perfunctorily denied by
respondent judge.
Then, on March 15, 1966, the Director of Lands came out with an order reinstating petitioner de
Castro's award, for the reason that lack of water and lighting facilities found to be true in the
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands caused delay in the construction of petitioner's
house. The Director, however, held in abeyance further action thereon until respondent Akia's
petition for reopening is finally decided by the Baguio court.
The next move of petitioner Virginia L. de Castro was to start certiorari proceedings in this Court
thru a verified petition praying that the orders of respondent judge, dismissing her opposition to
the reopening, be set aside and annulled.

55
Upon the return of respondents, and the memoranda of the parties, the case is now before us
for decision.
1. First to merit attention is the question of jurisdiction.
The thrust of petitioner's argument is that the reopening of the cadastral case below is
jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication.
Respondent Akia's petition for reopening was instituted under Republic Act 931, effective June
20, 1953, which in its Section 1 reads:
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper
court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years 3 after the date on
which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as
amended,only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall
notify the Government, throughthe Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said
court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all
taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should
have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order said judicial
proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels. 4
The foregoing provision establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such
procedure does not include publication. Neither is publication mentioned in any of the other
provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court
of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor
General." About two years back, we held in a case, 5 that under Republic Act 931, it is
unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as
said Act [931] only required service thereof to the Solicitor General."
Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in a cadastral case amending the official
plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new
publication is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new publication." 6 Upon the other hand, the
jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for exclusion of land included in the original plan
is not affected by failure to order a new publication. 7
Here, it should be undisputed that the court already acquired jurisdiction over the entire
territory of the Baguio Townsite in the original cadastral case sought to be reopened. It was a
reservation suit instituted by the Director of Lands in 1912 (Civil Reservation Case No. 1) to
compel registration of lands in Baguio. 8 The final decision therein was rendered on November 13,
1922. A petitioner who wishes to reopen that case under Republic Act 931 is thus to be logically
considered a claimant in the original cadastral proceedings. The view has been expressed that in
a sense, the government here is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants, 9 who thus
become oppositors. 10Otherwise, the petition should not be one for reopening but one that begins

56
an entirely new proceeding completely distinct and separate from said case of the Director of
Lands.
The view we take is not without foundation. If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by
an alleged right that has accrued prior to the institution of the original cadastral case, a
proceeding in rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to have received notice thru the publication
therein made. If his rights are derived from the government after the land has been declared part
of the public domain by the cadastral court, then notice to the government of a reopening
petition as provided by law, should suffice. For the government is supposed to take up the
cudgels for a public land grantee, or at the very least, notify the latter. It must be remembered
that a petition for reopening under Republic Act 931 can successfully be blocked if it is shown
that the land involved therein has already "been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government."
True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen
filed in that caseunder Republic Act 931, must be published as required in Section I of the
Cadastral Act (Act 2259) because such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by the
latter law. The Benitez case, however, must be read in its factual context. There, the petition of
the Benitez spouses for reopening the cadastral proceedings covering the entire city of Tacloban,
was based on the claim that "through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion
of" 1,805 square meters of Lot 2157 of the land originally registered in the name of petitioners
therein "has not been included in the original survey." They prayed that after appropriate
proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision plan) be adjudicated to
them pursuant to Republic Act 931. In fact, back of the Benitez declaration that publication is
necessary is jurisprudence heretofore stated, 11 that such publication is required when additional
territory is sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the record ofBenitez in this Court
shows that the opposition to the reopening petition is predicated on the averment that the
cadastral court did not include the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of the
offshore land" and hence, of the public domain which could not be the subject of cadastral
survey or of the cadastral case. 12
To hold without qualification that failure of publication is jurisdictionally fatal in reopening cases
under Republic Act 931 is to inject into our statute books something not required.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by
respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of
Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said
property. The petition, the wherefore, need not be published.
We hold that the authority of the cadastral court over the reopening proceedings below is not
impaired by failure of publication.
2. This brings us to the next question: Does petitioner Virginia L. de Castro have legal standing
in the proceedings below?
In an early case, 13 this Court declared that mere citizens could have no interest in public land.
At about the same time, this Court also held that to give a party standing in a court of land
registration, he must make some claim to the property. 14Then, in Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio
of Sto. Cristo, 15 this Court pronounced that although an opponent in a land registration
proceeding could not show title in himself, he was not discapacitated from opposing the
registration sought by another. Plain was the statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to
enable anyone to exert the faculty of opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in
the property." And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial whether this interest is in the character

57
of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust." Later,
this Court described a homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who had fulfilled all
the conditions required by law, as a person who should be regarded as an equitable owner of the
land. 16 Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an equitable title to the land before the issuance of
the patent.17 Pitargue vs. Sorilla,18 laid down the principle that a bona fide applicant of public land
may protect his right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful detainer or pursue any
suitable remedy provided by law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is authorized to take
possession of the land to enable him to comply with the requirements of the award before title
can be issued. 19 We held in still another case, 20 that a homestead entry segregates the
homestead from the public domain and divests the Director of Lands of control and possession
thereof except if the homestead application is finally disapproved and the entry annulled or
revoked.
Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and
have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to oppose
registration. 21 We have held, too, that an award under a sales application has "the effect
of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands." 22
Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions
therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such
of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 23 The statute made it
abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall
find that all conditions herein established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the
alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the
government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held
upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now has not been fully
implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But, if the
award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent
reopening by respondent Akia as to the land disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral court below.
3. The plight of petitioner Virginia de Castro arrests attention. She is an awardee in a sales
application of the lot she claims. She paid the government the full price thereof. As such
awardee, she was at first allowed by respondent judge to intervene in the present proceedings.
She had presented all her evidence. And so had respondent Akia. In truth, the controversy
between the two was already ripe for decision. Then came the motion of Akia to throw out
petitioner's opposition for want of personality to sue. Despite petitioner's objections thereto,
respondent judge granted said motion. Petitioner asked for reconsideration. This was rejected by
respondent judge, not on the ground originally set forth, but on a certain "Manifestation" of the
Director of Lands that petitioner's award had already been cancelled, because she failed to make
the necessary improvements on the property, a condition tacked to the award. That revocation
was done without notice to petitioner who came to know of the existence thereof only after she
had presented her evidence in this case.
Worse, petitioner was not served a copy of that manifestation. She was not given a chance to
explain in the Bureau of Lands and in court why she failed to introduce improvements on
the property. When she was finally apprised of the action by the court, she moved to reconsider.
She told the court that she had sought reconsideration from the Bureau of Lands of the
cancellation of her award because it was an impossibility for her to make the necessary

58
improvements on her property as there were no lighting, water and road facilities in the area,
and that when she was about to construct her house afterwards, she was told by the City
Engineer of Baguio that she could not be issued the required building permit for the reason that
her lot was included in respondent Akia's reopening petition. She even made it of record in court
that because of her letter of reconsideration, the Director of Lands issued a memorandum to the
Office of the Bureau of Lands in Baguio directing reexamination of the cancellation. There was
nothing more that petitioner could have done at that time.
Respondent judge should have taken all these facts into consideration. While petitioner's plea
for reconsideration before the Bureau of Lands was pending, appeal by petitioner from
respondent judge's order would have been futile. For, there was then nothing definite on which
to base her appeal. So, there was really nothing to do but to wait. Upon the other hand,
respondent judge should have taken stock of the fact that petitioner was at an obvious
disadvantage.
It should be here stressed that the court manifestation of counsel for the Director of Lands
heretofore adverted to was explicitly "without prejudice" to the Director's right "to submit further
evidence within the period allowable by law, if future circumstances so warrant." Respondent
judge should have waited. But he did not. Add to this the fact that if the court in this case should
grant Torrens title to Akia, then all the rights of petitioner would be foreclosed. Where else could
petitioner go to establish her claim? Thus, when respondent judge finally shut out petitioner's
opposition, we perceive a grave abuse of discretion which calls for the corrective powers of this
Court.
The injustice suffered by petitioner becomes the more accentuated by the fact that shortly after
the court order throwing petitioner's case out of court, the Director of Lands did set aside the
order of revocation and reinstated petitioner's award. Well it is to remember that "[c]ourts
ordinarily do not deny the writ [of certiorari] if the result would be to deprive a party of his
substantial rights and leave him without remedy." 24
For the reasons given, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted; the orders of December 4, 1965,
February 1, 1966, and March 2, 1966 dismissing the opposition filed by petitioner Virginia L. de
Castro in the matter of the petition for reopening of judicial proceedings by respondent Rufito
Akia (Civil Res. Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I),
are hereby annulled; and the respondent judge or whoever may take his place is hereby directed
to reinstate petitioner's opposition aforesaid and to decide the case on the merits.
Costs against respondent Rufito Akia. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986

FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.

59
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2]
orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled,"Application for Registration of Title,
Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors,"the
order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res
judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal
heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed
Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province
of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the
Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario,
on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by
Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of
Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by
one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the north by Matias
del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west
by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation
purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as
caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land
in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on
June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of
the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a
complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who
were declared owners thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of
Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision
promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
complaint of petitioners on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr.
Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the
appelles appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property
encroaches, much less covers that of the property presently occupied by the appellant, except
the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any

60
weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who' has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state
what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that
described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the
provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine
enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he
purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door
apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being the
actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not
show or prove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly
choose the latter in the matter of Identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan
[Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not only to the properties adjoining the
same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the
appellees' evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since
the area and boundaries of the property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-work.
[Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted
authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are
the main factors to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently
certain and the Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous
statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of
Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v.
Salud, L-15620, September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was
denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance
of Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing
his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41,
Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground
that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No.
60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued
the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res
judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN
LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.

61
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS.
FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES
JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS
OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED
IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN
COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT
RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF
THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
[ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file
his brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case was consider
submitted for decision without the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by
Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included
as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in
the case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly,
granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as
petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the
application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory
character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the
land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the
application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5]
oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over
the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered
in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual
course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at
bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In
ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the
original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the
counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a
motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although
as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the
irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to
dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation.
In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res

62
judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant,
nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said
opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras
dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral
proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription. Of
course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication
of title to the individual respondents but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims
which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said
rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp.
286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil.
657,Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court
invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of
certain land is res judicata in a registration case when the parties and the property are the same
as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle
to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the
merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R.
No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and
the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the
application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One
right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership.
This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the
deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be
recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in
Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and
the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion
reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases
there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the
basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name
is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other
persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case,
the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion
is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact,
this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a
cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It
is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action,
does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v.
Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v.
Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go
Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].

63
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the
second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is
enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a
requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the
alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to
present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would
necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And
supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res
judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle
of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of
another court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the
dismissal of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been
indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The
ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their
day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case No.
Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was
fully aired and ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with
respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said
decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners'
opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.