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PhilosophyofMind

Dualism:

Introduction

SubstanceDualism

Interactionism

Occasionalism

DoubleAspectTheory

PsychophysicalParallelism

OtherFormsofDualism

Epiphenomenalism

FurtherReading

Behaviourism

IdentityTheory

Functionalism

Dennett

Eliminativism

Idealism

PersonalIdentity

OtherMinds

ReadingList

Links

NonCartesianDualism

AnexampleofsuchatheoryisthatofthephilosopherE.J.Lowe
whoattemptstoshowinwhatwayanonCartesiandualismcan
exist.Hedoesthisbyredefiningthenatureofthemental,arguing
thattheconceptofanimmaterialsubstancedoesnotmakesense
(fortraditionalreasonsproblemofinteraction,etc.).

NonCartesianDualism

Summary

Dualism

Whilstallofthetheorieslookedatsofarpresentdifferentpictures
ofdualism,theyatleasthaveonethingincommoninthatthey
treatmentaleventsasnonphysical.Inotherwords,theymental
eventsexistasacompletelyseparatesubstance(Cartesianism,
Occasionalism,ParallelismandPlatonism),abyproductofphysical
substance(Epiphenomenalism)orthepropertyofsomeother
intermediatesubstance(DoubleAspecttheory).Assuch,allofthe
abovetheoriesrepresentmodificationsofCartesiandualism.
However,thereremainothertheoriesthat,whilstbeingdualistic,
presentadifferentviewofthesubstancesorpropertiesinvolvedin
therelationofmindandbody.

Platonism

Introduction

Assignment

However,tounderstandtherestofthetheoryitisnecessaryto
analysetheconceptsof"self"and"identity".Letus,forinstance,
taketheideaofacar.Imayreplacecertainengineparts,wheels,
etc.,andyetstillsaythatitisthesamecarasitwas.Thecollection
ofpartsthatmakeupthecarmayhavechangedslightly,butthe
carisstillacar.Ontheotherhand,iftakealloftheoriginalparts
andmakeacompletelydifferenttypeofmachineoutofitsuchas
apetroldrivenelectricitygeneratoralthoughthepartsareexactly
thesame,thecarnolongerexists.Therefore,Loweconcludes,the
thingthatgivessomethingits"identity"or"self"isnotcollectionof
partsoranyonepartofwhichitismadeup.

Whenwerelatetheseideastotheconceptofanindividual,we
discoverthatsimilaranalogiescanbedrawn.Apersonisnotthe
merecollectionoflimbsandorgansthatconstituteit,norisita
singlepartsuchasthebrain.Therefore,thepersonorself,
althoughitismaterialinthatitreliesontheexistenceofabody
isnotidenticalwithit.
Thisrathersubtleandingeniousformofdualismisquitealongway
fromthatofDescartesandPlato.
Firstly,thenotionofselfisnotindependentofthephysicalbodyand
althoughLowemightcalltheselfamaterialsubstance,itisonlyin
asmuchasitisanotherwayoflookingatthephysical(i.e.thereis
nospecialindependentsubstanceormaterialsoul).
Secondly,thisnotionofdualismseemstodenythepossibilityof
immortalityorexistenceoftheselfbeforeorafterbirthideasthat
weresoimportanttoDescartesandPlato.
Thirdly,thistheoryseemstoimplyaformofdeterminisminthat,
sincethereisnooverridingcentreofdecisionmakingsuchasthe
mindorthe"I"thematerialselfisopentothesamematerial
influencesasanyothermaterialsubstance(andthereforearguably
determinedbythem).Lowe'scounterargumenttothistriestoshow
thatitispossiblethatthewillisacomplexinteractionofsocialand
physicalprocesseswherebynoonecauseisresponsibleforevents.
So,becausetheselfcontainsallofthese"parts"social,physical,
mental,emotional,etc.decisionsandactionsarebroughtaboutby
thearrangementofthesepartsinacertainway(inthesameway
thataspider'sweballowsthespidertomovebybothrestrictingand
facilitatingitsmovements).