Neuroscience of Free Will

6/9/2015
Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Neuroscience of free will

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Neuroscience of free will is the part of neurophilosophy that studies the interconnections between free will and
neuroscience. As it has become possible to study the living brain, researchers have begun to watch decision making
processes at work. Findings could carry implications for our sense of agency and for moral responsibility and the
role of consciousness in general.[1][2][3]
Relevant findings include the pioneering study by
Benjamin Libet and its subsequent redesigns; these
studies were able to detect activity related to a
decision to move, and the activity appears to begin
briefly before people become conscious of it.[4]
Other studies try to predict activity before overt
action occurs.[5] Taken together, these various
findings show that at least some actions - like
moving a finger - are initiated unconsciously at first,
and enter consciousness afterward.[6]
Some areas of the human brain implicated in mental

disorders that might be related to free will. Area 25 refers to
Brodmann's area 25, related to long-term depression.
In many senses the field remains highly

controversial and there is no consensus among researchers about the significance of findings, their meaning, or what
conclusions may be drawn. It has been suggested that consciousness mostly serves to cancel certain actions
initiated by the unconscious,[7] so its role in decision making is experimentally investigated. Some thinkers, like
Daniel Dennett or Alfred Mele, say it is important to explain that "free will" means many different things; among
these versions of free will some are dualistic, some not. But a variety of conceptions of "free will" that matter to
people are compatible with the evidence from neuroscience.[8][9][10][11]
Contents
1 Overview
1.1 Free will as illusion
1.2 Disputed relevance of scientific research
2 Notable Experiments
2.1 The Libet experiment
2.2 Unconscious actions
2.3 Unconsciously cancelling actions
2.4 Neuronal prediction of free will
3 Other related phenomena
3.1 Retrospective construction
3.2 Manipulating choice
3.3 Manipulating the perceived intention to move
3.4 Related models
3.5 Related brain disorders
3.6 Neural models of voluntary action
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will
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3.6 Neural models of voluntary action

3.7 Prospection
4 See also
5 References
6 External links
Overview
One significant finding of modern studies is that a person's brain
seems to commit to certain decisions before the person becomes
aware of having made them. Researchers have found delays of
about half a second (discussed in sections below). With
contemporary brain scanning technology, other scientists in 2008
were able to predict with 60% accuracy whether subjects would
press a button with their left or right hand up to 10 seconds before
the subject became aware of having made that choice.[5] These
and other findings have led some scientists, like Patrick Haggard,
to reject some forms of "free will". To be clear, no single study
would disprove all forms of free will. This is because the term "free
will" can encapsulate different hypotheses, each of which must be
considered in light of existing empirical evidence.
A monk meditates. Human agency, the ability

to affect the surrounding world, may be a
result not so simply of conscious choice
but instead a result of training unconscious
habits beforehand. [12]
There have been a number of problems regarding studies of

free will.[14] Particularly in earlier studies, research relied too
much on the introspection of the participants, but introspective
estimates of event timing were found to be inaccurate. Many
brain activity measures have been insufficient and primitive as
there is no good independent brain-function measure of the
conscious generation of intentions, choices, or decisions. The
conclusions drawn from measurements that have been made
are debatable too, as they don't necessarily tell, for example,
what a sudden dip in the readings is representing. In other
words, the dip might have nothing to do with unconscious
decision, since many other mental processes are going on while
performing the task.[14] Some of the research mentioned here
has gotten more advanced, however, even recording individual
neurons in conscious volunteers.[13] Researcher Itzhak Fried
says that available studies do at least suggest consciousness
comes in a later stage of decision making than previously
expected - challenging any versions of "free will" where
...the current work is in broad

agreement with a general trend in
neuroscience of volition: although we
may experience that our conscious
decisions and thoughts cause our
actions, these experiences are in fact
based on readouts of brain activity in a
network of brain areas that control
voluntary action...It is clearly wrong
to think of [feeling of willing
something] as a prior intention, located
at the very earliest moment of decision
in an extended action chain. Rather, W
seems to mark an intention-in-action,
quite closely linked to action
execution.
-Patrick Haggard[6] discussing an in-depth

experiment by Itzhak Fried[13]
intention occurs at the beginning of the human decision process.[10]
Free will as illusion

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It is quite likely that a large range of cognitive operations are necessary to freely press
a button. Research at least suggests that our conscious self does not initiate all
behavior. Instead, the conscious self is somehow alerted to a given behavior that the
rest of the brain and body are already planning and performing. These findings do not
forbid conscious experience from playing some moderating role, although it is also
possible that some form of unconscious process is what is causing modification in our
behavioral response. Unconscious processes may play a larger role in behavior than
previously thought.
It may be possible, then, that our intuitions about the role of our conscious "intentions"
have led us astray; it may be the case that we have confused correlation with causation
by believing that conscious awareness necessarily causes the body's movement. This
possibility is bolstered by findings in neurostimulation, brain damage, but also research
An activity like playing
into introspection illusions. Such illusions show that humans do not have full access to
the piano may be
various internal processes. The discovery that humans possess a determined will would
intentional, but is
have implications for moral responsibility. Neuroscientist and author Sam Harris
generally regarded as
believes that we are mistaken in believing the intuitive idea that intention initiates
requiring many
actions. In fact, Harris is even critical of the idea that free will is "intuitive": he says
practiced actions.
careful introspection can cast doubt on free will. Harris argues "Thoughts simply arise
Studies suggest that
in the brain. What else could they do? The truth about us is even stranger than we may
each key press could be
suppose: The illusion of free will is itself an illusion".[15] Philosopher Walter Jackson
initiated unconsciously.
Freeman III nevertheless talks about the power of even unconscious systems and
actions to change the world according to our intentions. He writes "our intentional
actions continually flow into the world, changing the world and the relations of our bodies to it. This dynamic system
is the self in each of us, it is the agency in charge, not our awareness, which is constantly trying to keep up with
what we do."[16] To Freeman, the power of intention and action can be independent of awareness.
Disputed relevance of scientific research

Some thinkers like neuroscientist and philosopher Adina Roskies think these studies can still only show,
unsurprisingly, that physical factors in the brain are involved before decision making. In contrast, Haggard believes
that "We feel we choose, but we don't".[10] Researcher John-Dylan Haynes adds "How can I call a will 'mine' if I
don't even know when it occurred and what it has decided to do?".[10] Philosophers Walter Glannon and Alfred
Mele think some scientists are getting the science right, but misrepresenting modern philosophers. This is mainly
because "free will" can mean many things: It is unclear what someone means when they say "free will does not
exist". Mele and Glannon say that the available research is more evidence against any dualistic notions of free will but that is an "easy target for neuroscientists to knock down".[10] Mele says that most discussions of free will are
now had in materialistic terms. In these cases, "free will" means something more like "not coerced" or that "the
person could have done otherwise at the last moment". The existence of these types of free will is debatable. Mele
agrees, however, that science will continue to reveal critical details about what goes on in the brain during decision
making.[10]
"[Some senses of free will] are

compatible with what we are learning
from science...If only that was what
This issue may be controversial for good reason: There is

evidence to suggest that people normally associate a belief in
free will with their ability to affect their lives.[2][3] Philosopher
Daniel Dennett, author of Elbow Room and a supporter of
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scientists were telling people. But

scientists, especially in the last few
years, have been on a rampage writing ill-considered public
pronouncements about free will
which... verge on social
irresponsibility.
-Daniel Dennett discussing science and free
will[17]
deterministic free will, believes scientists risk making a serious

mistake. He says that there are types of free will that are
incompatible with modern science, but he says those kinds of
free will are not worth wanting. Other types of "free will" are
pivotal to people's sense of responsibility and purpose (see also
"believing in free will"), and many of these types are actually
compatible with modern science.[17]
The other studies described below have only just begun to shed
light on the role that consciousness plays in actions and it is too
early to draw very strong conclusions about certain kinds of "free will". It is worth noting that such experiments so
far have dealt only with free will decisions made in short time frames (seconds) and may not have direct bearing
on free will decisions made ("thoughtfully") by the subject over the course of many seconds, minutes, hours or
longer. Scientists have also only so far studied extremely simple behaviors (e.g. moving a finger).[18] Adina Roskies
points out five areas of neuroscientific research: 1.) action initiation, 2.) intention, 3). decision, 4.) Inhibition and
control, and 5.) the phenomenology of agency, and for each of these areas Roskies concludes that the science may
be developing our understanding of volition or "will," but it yet offers nothing for developing the "free" part of the
"free will" discussion.[19]
There is also the question of the influence of such interpretations in people's behaviour. In 2008, psychologists
Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler published a study on how people behave when they are prompted to think
that determinism is true. They asked their subjects to read one of two passages: one suggesting that behaviour boils
down to environmental or genetic factors not under personal control; the other neutral about what influences
behaviour. The participants then did a few math problems on a computer. But just before the test started, they were
informed that because of a glitch in the computer it occasionally displayed the answer by accident; if this happened,
they were to click it away without looking. Those who had read the deterministic message were more likely to
cheat on the test. "Perhaps, denying free will simply provides the ultimate excuse to behave as one likes," Vohs and
Schooler suggested.[20][21]
Notable Experiments
The Libet experiment
A pioneering experiment in this field was conducted by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, in which he asked each
subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain (in
particular, the build-up of electrical signal called the readiness potential). Although it was well known that the
readiness potential preceded the physical action, Libet asked how the readiness potential corresponded to the felt
intention to move. To determine when the subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second
hand of a clock and report its position when they felt that they had felt the conscious will to move.[22]
Libet found that the unconscious brain activity leading up to the conscious decision by the subject to flick his wrist
began approximately half a second before the subject consciously felt that he had decided to move.[22][23] Libet's
findings suggest that decisions made by a subject are first being made on a subconscious level and only afterward
being translated into a "conscious decision", and that the subject's belief that it occurred at the behest of his will was
only due to his retrospective perspective on the event.
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The interpretation of these findings has been criticized by Daniel Dennett, who argues that people will have to shift
their attention from their intention to the clock, and that this introduces temporal mismatches between the felt
experience of will and the perceived position of the clock hand.[24][25] Consistent with this argument, subsequent
studies have shown that the exact numerical value varies depending on attention.[26][27] Despite the differences in
the exact numerical value, however, the main finding has held.[5][28][29] Philosopher Alfred Mele criticizes this
design for other reasons. Having attempted the experiment
himself, Mele explains that "the awareness of the intention to
move" is an ambiguous feeling at best. For this reason he
remained skeptical of interpreting the subjects' reported
times for comparison with their 'readiness potential'.[30]
Criticisms
Libet's experiment: (0) repose, until (1) the
readiness potential is detected, (2-Libet's W) the
volunteer memorizes a dot position upon feeling
their intention, and (3) then acts.
In a variation of this task, Haggard

and Eimer asked subjects to decide
not only when to move their hands,
but also to decide which hand to
move. In this case, the felt intention
correlated much more closely with the "lateralized readiness potential" (LRP), an ERP
component which measures the difference between left and right hemisphere brain activity.
Haggard and Eimer argue that the feeling of conscious will must therefore follow the decision
of which hand to move, since the LRP reflects the decision to lift a particular hand.[26]
A more direct test of the relationship between the readiness potential and the "awareness of
the intention to move" was conducted by Banks and Isham (2009). In their study,
participants performed a variant of the Libet's paradigm in which a delayed tone followed the
button press. Subsequently, research participants reported the time of their intention to act
(e.g., Libet's "W"). If W were time-locked to the readiness potential, W would remain
uninfluenced by any post-action information. However, findings from this study show that W
in fact shifts systematically with the time of the tone presentation, implicating that W is, at least
in part, retrospectively reconstructed rather than pre-determined by the readiness
potential.[31]
Typical
recording of the
readiness
potential.
Benjamin Libet
investigated
whether this
neural activity
corresponded to
the "felt
intention" (or
will) to move of
experimental
subjects.
A study conducted by Jeff Miller and Judy Trevena (2009) suggests that the readiness
potential (RP) signal in Libet's experiments doesn't represent a decision to move, but that it's
merely a sign that the brain is paying attention.[32] In this experiment the classical Libet
experiment was modified by playing an audio tone indicating to volunteers to decide whether
to tap a key or not. The researchers found that there was the same RP signal in both cases, regardless of whether
or not volunteers actually elected to tap, which suggests that the RP signal doesn't indicate that a decision has been
made.[33][34]
In a second experiment, researchers asked volunteers to decide on the spot whether to use left hand or right to tap
the key while monitoring their brain signals, and they found no correlation among the signals and the chosen hand.
This criticism has itself been criticized by free-will researcher Patrick Haggard, who mentions literature that
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distinguishes two different circuits in the brain that lead to action: a "stimulus-response" circuit and a "voluntary"
circuit. According to Haggard, researchers applying external stimuli may not be testing the proposed voluntary
circuit, nor Libet's hypothesis about internally triggered actions.[35]
Libet's interpretation of the ramping up of brain activity prior to the report of conscious "will" continues to draw
heavy criticism. Studies have questioned participants' ability to report the timing of their "will". Authors have found
that preSMA activity is modulated by attention (attention precedes the movement signal by 100ms), and the prior
activity reported could therefore have been product of paying attention to the movement.[36] They also found that
the perceived onset of intention depends on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied over the preSMA after a participant performed an action shifted
the perceived onset of the motor intention backward in time, and the perceived time of action execution forward in
time.[37]
Others have speculated that the preceding neural activity reported by Libet may be an artefact of averaging the time
of "will", wherein neural activity does not always precede reported "will".[27] In a similar replication they also
reported no difference in electrophysiological signs before a decision not to move, and before a decision to
move.[32]
Despite his findings, Libet himself did not interpret his experiment as evidence of the inefficacy of conscious free will
he points out that although the tendency to press a button may be building up for 500 milliseconds, the conscious
will retains a right to veto any action at the last moment.[38] According to this model, unconscious impulses to
perform a volitional act are open to suppression by the conscious efforts of the subject (sometimes referred to as
"free won't"). A comparison is made with a golfer, who may swing a club several times before striking the ball. The
action simply gets a rubber stamp of approval at the last millisecond. Max Velmans argues however that "free
won't" may turn out to need as much neural preparation as "free will" (see below).[39]
Some studies have however replicated Libet's findings, whilst addressing some of the original criticisms.[40] A
recent study has found that individual neurons were found to fire 2 seconds before a reported "will" to act (long
before EEG activity predicted such a response).[13] Itzhak Fried replicated Libet's findings in 2011 at the scale of
the single neuron. This was accomplished with the help of volunteer epilepsy patients, who needed electrodes
implanted deep in their brain for evaluation and treatment anyway. Now able to monitor awake and moving
patients, the researchers replicated the timing anomalies that were discovered by Libet and are discussed in the
following study.[13]
William R. Klemm pointed out the inconclusiveness of these tests due to design limitations and data interpretations
and proposed less ambiguous experiments.[41] Adrian G. Guggisberg and Annas Mottaz have also challenged
Itzhak Fried's findings.[42]
A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in PNAS [43] challenged assumptions about the causal nature
of the readiness potential itself (and the "pre-movement buildup" of neural activity in general), casting doubt on
conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet's [22] and Fried's.[13] See The Information Philosopher
(http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/schurger/) and New Scientist
(http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22144-brain-might-not-stand-in-the-way-of-free-will.html) for commentary
on this study.
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Unconscious actions
Timing intentions compared to actions
A study by Masao Matsuhashi and Mark Hallett, published in 2008, claims to have replicated Libet's findings
without relying on subjective report or clock memorization on the part of participants.[40] The authors believe that
their method can identify the time (T) at which a subject becomes aware of his own movement. Matsuhashi and
Hallet argue that this time not only varies, but often occurs after early phases of movement genesis have already
begun (as measured by the readiness potential). They conclude that a person's awareness cannot be the cause of
movement, and may instead only notice the movement.
The experiment
Matsuhashi and Hallett's study can be summarized thus. The researchers hypothesized
that, if our conscious intentions are what causes movement genesis (i.e. the start of an
action), then naturally, our conscious intentions should always occur before any movement
has begun. Otherwise, if we ever become aware of a movement only after it has already
been started, our awareness could not have been the cause of that particular movement.
Simply put, conscious intention must precede action if it is its cause.
To test this hypothesis, Matsuhashi and Hallet had volunteers perform brisk finger
movements at random intervals, while not counting or planning when to make such (future)
movements, but rather immediately making a movement as soon as they thought about it.
An externally controlled "stop-signal" sound was played at pseudo random intervals, and
the volunteers had to cancel their intent to move if they heard a signal while being aware of
their own immediate intention to move. Whenever there was an action (finger movement),
the authors documented (and graphed) any tones that occurred before that action. The
graph of tones before actions therefore only shows tones (a) before the subject is even
aware of his "movement genesis" (or else they would have stopped or "vetoed" the
movement), and (b) after it is too late to veto the action. This second set of graphed tones
is of little importance here.
It is difficult to
identify exactly
when a person
becomes aware of
his action. Some
findings indicate
that awareness
comes after actions
have already begun
in the brain.
In this work, "movement genesis" is defined as the brain process of making movement, of which physiological
observations have been made (via electrodes) indicating that it may occur before conscious awareness of intent to
move (see Benjamin Libet).
By looking to see when tones started preventing actions, the researchers supposedly know the length of time (in
seconds) that exists between when a subject holds a conscious intention to move and performs the action of
movement. This moment of awareness (as seen in the graph below) is dubbed "T" (the mean time of conscious
intention to move). It can be found by looking at the border between tones and no tones. This enables the
researchers to estimate the timing of the conscious intention to move without relying on the subject's knowledge or
demanding them to focus on a clock. The last step of the experiment is to compare time T for each subject with
their Event-related potential (ERP) measures (e.g. seen in this page's lead image), which reveal when their finger
movement genesis first begins.
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The researchers found that the time of the conscious intention to move T normally occurred too late to be the cause
of movement genesis. See the example of a subject's graph below on the right. Although it is not shown on the
graph, the subject's readiness potentials (ERP) tells us that his actions start at 2.8 seconds, and yet this is
substantially earlier than his conscious intention to move, time "T" (1.8 seconds). Matsuhashi and Hallet concluded
that the feeling of the conscious intention to move does not cause movement genesis; both the feeling of intention
and the movement itself are the result of unconscious processing.[40]
Analysis and interpretation
This study is similar to Libet's in some ways: volunteers were again asked to perform
finger extensions in short, self-paced intervals. In this version of the experiment,
researchers introduced randomly timed "stop tones" during the self paced movements.
If participants were not conscious of any intention to move, they simply ignored the
tone. On the other hand, if they were aware of their intention to move at the time of the
tone, they had to try to veto the action, then relax for a bit before continuing self-paced
movements. This experimental design allowed Matsuhashi and Hallet to see when,
once the subject moved his finger, any tones occurred. The goal was to identify their
own equivalent of Libets W, their own estimation of the timing of the conscious
intention to move, which they would call "T".
A simple "signalling
noise" is used, but it is
to warn participants
that they must prevent
any actions they are
aware of.
Testing the hypothesis that 'conscious intention occurs after movement genesis has
already begun' required the researchers to analyse the distribution of responses to
tones before actions. The idea is that, after time T, tones will lead to vetoing and thus a
reduced representation in the data. There would also be a point of no return P where a
tone was too close to the movement onset for the movement to be vetoed. In other
words, the researchers were expecting to see the following on the graph: many
unsuppressed responses to tones while the subjects are not yet aware of their
movement genesis, followed by a drop in the number of unsuppressed responses to tones during a certain period of
time during which the subjects are conscious of their intentions and are stopping any movements, and finally a brief
increase again in unsuppressed responses to tones when the subjects do not have the time to process the tone and
prevent an action - they have passed the action's "point of no return". That is exactly what the researchers found
(see the graph on the right, below).
The graph shows the times at which unsuppressed responses to tones occurred when the volunteer moved. He
showed many unsuppressed responses to tones (dubbed "tone events" on the graph) on average up until 1.8
seconds before movement onset, but a significant decrease in tone events immediately after that time. Presumably
this is because the subject usually became aware of his intention to move at about 1.8 seconds, which is then
labelled point T. Since most actions are vetoed if a tone occurs after point T, there are very few tone events
represented during that range. Finally, there is a sudden increase in the number of tone events at 0.1 seconds,
meaning this subject has passed point P. Matsuhashi and Hallet were thus able to establish an average time T (1.8
seconds) without subjective report. This, they compared to ERP measurements of movement, which had detected
movement beginning at about 2.8 seconds on average for this participant. Since T like Libets original W
was often found after movement genesis had already begun, the authors concluded that the generation of awareness
occurred afterwards or in parallel to action, but most importantly, that it was probably not the cause of the
movement.[40]
Criticisms
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Haggard describes other studies at the neuronal levels as

providing "a reassuring confirmation of previous studies that
recorded neural populations"[6] such as the one just
described. Note that these results were gathered using
finger movements, and may not necessarily generalize to
other actions such as thinking, or even other motor actions
in different situations. Indeed, the human act of planning has
implications for free will and so this ability must also be
explained by any theories of unconscious decision making.
Philosopher Alfred Mele also doubts the conclusions of
these studies. He explains that simply because a movement
may have been initiated before our "conscious self" has
become aware of it does not mean our consciousness does
not still get to approve, modify, and perhaps cancel (called
vetoing) the action.[44]
Unconsciously cancelling actions
Graphing tones as they appeared (or didn't) in the

time before any action. In this case, researchers
believe the subject becomes aware of his actions at
about -1.769 seconds (this is time 'T'). A typical
subject's ERP recordings suggest movement
preparation as early as 2.8 seconds.
The possibility that human "free won't" is also the

prerogative of the subconscious is being explored.
Retrospective judgement of free choice
Recent research by Simone Khn and Marcel Brass suggests that our consciousness
may not be what causes some actions to be vetoed at the last moment. First of all,
their experiment relies on the simple idea that we ought to know when we consciously
cancel an action (i.e. we should have access to that information ). Secondly, they
suggest that access to this information means humans should find it easy to tell, just
after completing an action, whether it was impulsive (there being no time to decide)
and when there was time to deliberate (the participant decided to allow/not to veto the
action). The study found evidence that subjects could not tell this important difference.
This again leaves some conceptions of free will vulnerable to the introspection illusion.
The researchers interpret their results to mean that the decision to "veto" an action is
determined subconsciously, just as the initiation of the action may have been
subconscious in the first place.[45]
As green light switches
to yellow, research
seems to suggest that
humans cannot tell the
difference between
"deciding" to keep
driving, and having no
time to decide at all.
The experiment
The experiment involved asking volunteers to respond to a go-signal by pressing an

electronic "go" button as quickly as possible.[45] In this experiment the go-signal was
represented as a visual stimulus shown on a monitor (e.g. a green light as shown on the
picture). The participants' reaction times (RT) were gathered at this stage, in what was
described as the "primary response trials".
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The primary response trials were then modified, in which 25% of the go-signals were subsequently followed by an
additional signal either a "stop" or "decide" signal. The additional signals occurred after a "signal delay" (SD), a
random amount of time up to 2 seconds after the initial go-signal. They also occurred equally, each representing
12.5% of experimental cases. These additional signals were represented by the initial stimulus changing colour (e.g.
to either a red or orange light). The other 75% of go-signals were not followed by an additional signal and was
therefore considered the "default" mode of the experiment. The participants' task of responding as quickly as
possible to the initial signal (i.e. pressing the "go" button) remained.
Upon seeing the initial go-signal, the participant would immediately intend on pressing the "go" button. The
participant was instructed to cancel their immediate intention to press the "go" button if they saw a stop signal. The
participant was instructed to select randomly (at their leisure) between either pressing the "go" button, or not
pressing it, if they saw a decide signal. Those trials in which the decide signal was shown after the initial go-signal
("decide trials"), for example, required that the participants prevent themselves from acting impulsively on the initial
go-signal and then decide what to do. Due to the varying delays, this was sometimes impossible (e.g. some decide
signals simply appeared too late in the process of them both intending to and pressing the go button for them to be
obeyed).
Those trials in which the subject reacted to the go-signal impulsively without seeing a subsequent signal show a
quick RT of about 600 ms. Those trials in which the decide signal was shown too late, and the participant had
already enacted their impulse to press the go-button (i.e. had not decided to do so), also show a quick RT of about
600 ms. Those trials in which a stop signal was shown and the participant successfully responded to it, do not show
a response time. Those trials in which a decide signal was shown, and the participant decided not to press the gobutton, also do not show a response time. Those trials in which a decide signal was shown, and the participant had
not already enacted their impulse to press the go-button, but (in which it was theorised that they) had had the
opportunity to decide what to do, show a comparatively slow RT, in this case closer to 1400 ms.[45]
The participant was asked at the end of those "decide trials" in which they had actually pressed the go-button
whether they had acted impulsively (without enough time to register the decide signal before enacting their intent to
press the go-button in response to the initial go-signal stimulus), or had acted based upon a conscious decision
made after seeing the decide signal. Based upon the response time data however, it appears there was discrepancy
between when the user thought they had had the opportunity to decide (and had therefore not acted on their
impulses) - in this case deciding to press the go-button, and when they thought they had acted impulsively (based
upon the initial go-signal) - where the decide signal came too late to be obeyed.
The rationale
Kuhn and Brass wanted to test participant self-knowledge. The first step was that after every decide trial,
participants were next asked whether they had actually had time to decide. Specifically, the volunteers were asked
to label each decide trial as either failed-to-decide (the action was the result of acting impulsively on the initial gosignal) or successful decide (the result of a deliberated decision). See the diagram on the right for this decide trial
split: failed-to-decide and successful decide; the next split in this diagram (participant correct or incorrect) will be
explained at the end of this experiment. Note also that the researchers sorted the participants successful decide
trials into "decide go" and "decide nogo", but were not concerned with the nogo trials since they did not yield any
RT data (and are not featured anywhere in the diagram on the right). Note that successful stop trials did not yield
RT data either.
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Kuhn and Brass now knew what to expect: primary response trials, any failed stop trials, and the "failed-to-decide"
trials were all instances where the participant obviously acted impulsively they would show the same quick RT. In
contrast, the "successful decide" trials
(where the decision was a "go" and the
subject moved) should show a slower RT.
Presumably, if deciding whether to veto is
a conscious process, volunteers should
have no trouble distinguishing impulsivity
from instances of true deliberate
continuation of a movement. Again, this is
important since decide trials require that
participants rely on self-knowledge. Note
The different types of trials and their different possible outcomes.
that stop trials cannot test self-knowledge
because if the subject does act, it is
obvious to them that they reacted impulsively.[45]
Results and implications
The general distribution of reaction times for the

different trials. Notice the timing of the two peaks
for trials labelled "successful decide".
Unsurprisingly, the recorded RTs for the primary response

trials, failed stop trials, and "failed-to-decide" trials all
showed similar RTs: 600 ms seems to indicate an impulsive
action made without time to truly deliberate. What the two
researchers found next was not as easy to explain: while
some "successful decide" trials did show the tell-tale slow
RT of deliberation (averaging around 1400 ms), participants
had also labelled many impulsive actions as "successful
decide". This result is startling because participants should
have had no trouble identifying which actions were the
results of a conscious "I will not veto", and which actions
were un-deliberated, impulsive reactions to the initial gosignal. As the authors explain:
[The results of the experiment] clearly

argue against Libets assumption that a
veto process can be consciously initiated.
He used the veto in order to reintroduce
the possibility to control the unconsciously
initiated actions. But since the subjects are
not very accurate in observing when they
have [acted impulsively instead of
deliberately], the act of vetoing cannot be
consciously initiated.[45]
In decide trials the participants, it seems, were not able to reliably identify whether they had really had time to
decide at least, not based on internal signals. The authors explain that this result is difficult to reconcile with the
idea of a conscious veto, but simple to understand if the veto is considered an unconscious process.[45] Thus it
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seems that the intention to move might not only arise from the subconscious, but it may only be inhibited if the
subconscious says so. This conclusion could suggest that the phenomenon of "consciousness" is more of narration
than direct arbitration (i.e. unconscious processing causes all thoughts, and these thoughts are again processed
subconsciously).
Criticisms
After the above experiments, the authors concluded that subjects sometimes could not distinguish between
"producing an action without stopping and stopping an action before voluntarily resuming", or in other words, they
could not distinguish between actions that are immediate and impulsive as opposed to delayed by deliberation.[45]
To be clear, one assumption of the authors is that all the early (600 ms) actions are unconscious, and all the later
actions are conscious. These conclusions and assumptions have yet to be debated within the scientific literature or
even replicated (it is a very early study).
The results of the trial in which the so-called "successful decide" data (with its respective longer time measured) was
observed may have possible implications for our understanding of the role of consciousness as the modulator of a
given action or response and these possible implications cannot merely be omitted or ignored without valid
reasons, specially when the authors of the experiment suggest that the late decide trials were actually
deliberated.[45]
It is worth noting that Libet consistently referred to a veto of an action that was initiated endogenously.[38] That is, a
veto that occurs in the absence of external cues, instead relying on only internal cues (if any at all). This veto may be
a different type of veto than the one explored by Khn and Brass using their decide signal.
Daniel Dennett also argues that no clear conclusion about volition can be derived from Benjamin Libet's
experiments supposedly demonstrating the non-existence of conscious volition. According to Dennett, ambiguities in
the timings of the different events involved. Libet tells when the readiness potential occurs objectively, using
electrodes, but relies on the subject reporting the position of the hand of a clock to determine when the conscious
decision was made. As Dennett points out, this is only a report of where it seems to the subject that various things
come together, not of the objective time at which they actually occur.
Suppose Libet knows that your readiness potential peaked at millisecond 6,810 of the experimental
trial, and the clock dot was straight down (which is what you reported you saw) at millisecond 7,005.
How many milliseconds should he have to add to this number to get the time you were conscious of it?
The light gets from your clock face to your eyeball almost instantaneously, but the path of the signals
from retina through lateral geniculate nucleus to striate cortex takes 5 to 10 milliseconds a paltry
fraction of the 300 milliseconds offset, but how much longer does it take them to get to you. (Or are
you located in the striate cortex?) The visual signals have to be processed before they arrive at
wherever they need to arrive for you to make a conscious decision of simultaneity. Libet's method
presupposes, in short, that we can locate the intersection of two trajectories:
the rising-to-consciousness of signals representing the decision to flick
the rising to consciousness of signals representing successive clock-face orientations
so that these events occur side-by-side as it were in place where their simultaneity can be
noted.[46][47]
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Neuronal prediction of free will

Despite criticisms, experimenters are still trying to gather data that may support the case that conscious "will" can be
predicted from brain activity. fMRI machine learning of brain activity (multivariate pattern analysis) has been used to
predict the user choice of a button (left/right) up to 7 seconds before their reported will of having done so.[5] Brain
regions successfully trained for prediction included the frontopolar cortex (anterior medial prefrontal cortex) and
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (medial parietal cortex). In order to ensure report timing of conscious "will" to
act, they showed the participant a series of frames with single letters (500ms apart), and upon pressing the chosen
button (left or right) they were required to indicate which letter they had seen at the moment of decision. This study
reported a statistically significant 60% accuracy rate, which may be limited by experimental setup; machine learning
data limitations (time spent in fMRI) and instrument precision.
Another version of the fMRI multivariate pattern analysis experiment was conducted using an abstract decision
problem, in an attempt to rule out the possibility of the prediction capabilities being product of capturing a built-up
motor urge.[48] Each frame contained a central letter like before, but also a central number, and a surrounding 4
possible "answers numbers". The participant first chose in their mind whether they wished to perform an addition or
difference operation (and noted the central letter on the screen at the time of this decision). The participant then
performed the mathematical operation based on the central numbers shown in the next two frames. In the following
frame the participant then chose the "answer number" corresponding to the result of the operation. They were
further presented with a frame which allowed them to indicate the central letter appearing on the screen at the time
of their original decision. This version of the experiment discovered a brain prediction capacity of up to 5 seconds
before the conscious will to act.
Multivariate pattern analysis using EEG has suggested that an evidence based perceptual decision model may be
applicable to free will decisions.[49] It was found that decisions could be predicted by neural activity immediately
after stimulus perception. Furthermore, when the participant was unable to determine the nature of the stimulus the
recent decision history predicted the neural activity (decision). The starting point of evidence accumulation was in
effect shifted towards a previous choice (suggesting a priming bias). Another study has found that subliminally
priming a participant for a particular decision outcome (showing a cue for 13ms) could be used to influence free
decision outcomes.[50] Likewise, it has been found that decision history alone can be used to predict future
decisions. The prediction capacities of the Soon et al. (2008) experiment were successfully replicated using a linear
SVM model based on participant decision history alone (without any brain activity data).[51] Despite this, a recent
study has sought to confirm the applicability of a perceptual decision model to free will decisions.[52] When shown a
masked and therefore invisible stimulus, participants were asked to either guess between a category or make a free
decision for a particular category. Multivariate pattern analysis using fMRI could be trained on "free decision" data
to successfully predict "guess decisions", and trained on "guess data" in order to predict "free decisions" (in the
precuneus and cuneus region).
Contemporary voluntary decision prediction tasks have been criticised based on the possibility the neuronal
signatures for pre-conscious decisions could actually correspond to lower conscious processing rather than
unconscious processing.[53] People may be aware of their decisions before making their report yet need to wait
several seconds to be certain. Such a model does not however explain what is left unconscious if everything can be
conscious at some level (and the purpose of defining separate systems). Yet limitations remain in free will prediction
research to date. In particular, the prediction of considered judgements from brain activity involving thought
processes beginning minutes rather than seconds before a conscious will to act, including the rejection of a
conflicting desire. Such are generally seen to be the product of sequences of evidence accumulating judgements.
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Other related phenomena

Retrospective construction
It has been suggested that sense authorship is an illusion.[54] Unconscious causes of thought and action might
facilitate thought and action, while the agent experiences the thoughts and actions as being dependent on conscious
will. We may over-assign agency because of the evolutionary advantage that once came with always suspecting
there might be an agent doing something (e.g. predator). The idea behind retrospective construction is that, while
part of the "yes, I did it" feeling of agency seems to occur during action, there also seems to be processing
performed after the fact - after the action is performed - to establish the full feeling of agency.
Unconscious agency processing can even alter, in the moment, how we perceive the timing of sensations or
actions.[35][37] Khn and Brass apply retrospective construction to explain the two peaks in "successful decide"
RT's. They suggest that the late decide trials were actually deliberated, but that the impulsive early decide trials that
should have been labelled "failed to decide" were mistaken during unconscious agency processing. They say that
people "persist in believing that they have access to their own cognitive processes" when in fact we do a great deal
of automatic unconscious processing before conscious perception occurs.
Manipulating choice
Some research suggests that TMS can be used to manipulate the perception
of authorship of a specific choice.[55] Experiments showed that
neurostimulation could affect which hands people move, even though the
experience of free will was intact. An early TMS study revealed that
activation of one side of the neocortex could be used bias the selection of
one's opposite side hand in a forced choice decision task.[56] Ammon and
Gandevia found that it was possible to influence which hand people move by
stimulating frontal regions that are involved in movement planning using
transcranial magnetic stimulation in the left or right hemisphere of the brain.
Scientists were able

to change which
hand subjects
normally chose to
move without
subjects noticing the
influence.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation

Right-handed people would normally choose to
uses magnetism to safely stimulate
move their right hand 60% of the time, but when
or inhibit parts of the brain.
the right hemisphere was stimulated they would
instead choose their left hand 80% of the time
(recall that the right hemisphere of the brain is
responsible for the left side of the body, and the left hemisphere for the right). Despite the
external influence on their decision-making, the subjects continued to report that they
believed their choice of hand had been made freely. In a follow-up experiment, Alvaro
Pascual-Leone and colleagues found similar results, but also noted that the transcranial
magnetic stimulation must occur within 200 milliseconds, consistent with the time-course
derived from the Libet experiments.[57]
However, further attempts to replicate such results have failed[58] and later Jeffrey Gray
states in his book Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem, that tests looking
for the influence of electromagnetic fields on brain function have been universally negative in their result.[59]
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Manipulating the perceived intention to move

Various studies indicate that the perceived intention to move (have moved) can be manipulated. Studies have
focused on the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) of the brain, in which readiness potential indicating the
beginning of a movement genesis has been recorded by EEG. In one study, directly stimulating the pre-SMA
caused volunteers to report a feeling of intention, and sufficient stimulation of that same area caused physical
movement.[35] In a similar study, it was found that people with no visual awareness of their body can have their
limbs be made to move without having any awareness of this movement, by stimulating premotor brain regions.[60]
When their parietal cortices were stimulated, they reported an urge (intention) to move a specific limb (that they
wanted to do so). Furthermore, stronger stimulation of the parietal cortex resulted in the illusion of having moved
without having done so.
This suggests that awareness of an intention to move may literally be the "sensation" of the bodys early movement,
but certainly not the cause. Other studies have at least suggested that "The greater activation of the SMA, SACC,
and parietal areas during and after execution of internally generated actions suggests that an important feature of
internal decisions is specific neural processing taking place during and after the corresponding action. Therefore,
awareness of intention timing seems to be fully established only after execution of the corresponding action, in
agreement with the time course of neural activity observed here."[61]
Another experiment involved an electronic ouija board where the device's movements were manipulated by the
experimenter, while the participant was led to believe they were entirely self-conducted.[62] The experimenter
stopped the device on occasions and asked the participant how much they themselves felt like they wanted to stop.
The participant also listened to words in headphones; and it was found that if experimenter stopped next to an
object that came through the headphones they were more likely to say they wanted to stop there. If the participant
perceived having the thought at the time of the action, then it was assigned as intentional. It was concluded that a
strong illusion of perception of causality requires; priority (we assume the thought must precede the action),
consistency (the thought is about the action), and exclusivity (no other apparent causes or alternative hypotheses).
Lau et al. set up an experiment where subjects would look at an analogue-style clock, and a red dot would move
around the screen. Subjects were told to click the mouse button whenever they felt the intention to do so. One
group was given a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) pulse, and the other was given a sham TMS. Subjects in
the intention condition were told to move the cursor to where it was when they felt the inclination to press the
button. In the movement condition, subjects moved their cursor to where it was when they physically pressed the
button. Results showed the TMS was able to shift the perceived intention forward by 16 ms, and shifted back the
14 ms for the movement condition. Perceived intention could be manipulated up to 200 ms after the execution of
the spontaneous action, indicating that the perception of intention occurred after the executive motor
movements.[37] Often it is thought that free will were to exist, it would require intention to be the causal source of
behavior. These results show that intention may not be the causal source of all behavior.
Related models
The idea that intention co-occurs with (rather than causes) movement is reminiscent of "forward models of motor
control" (or FMMC, which have been used to try to explain inner speech). FMMCs describe parallel circuits:
movement is processed in parallel with other predictions of movement; if the movement matches the prediction - the
feeling of agency occurs. FMMCs have been applied in other related experiments. Metcalfe and her colleagues
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used an FMMC to explain how volunteers determine whether they are in control of a computer game task. On the
other hand, they acknowledge other factors too. The authors attribute feelings of agency to desirability of the results
(see self serving biases) and top-down processing (reasoning and inferences about the situation).[63]
In this case, it is by the application of the forward model that one might imagine how other consciousness processes
could be the result of efferent, predictive processing. If the conscious self is
the efferent copy of actions and vetoes being performed, then the
consciousness is a sort of narrator of what is already occurring in the body,
and an incomplete narrator at that. Haggard, summarizing data taken from
recent neuron recordings, says "these data give the impression that conscious
intention is just a subjective corollary of an action being about to
occur".[6][13] Parallel processing helps explain how we might experience a
sort of contra-causal free will even if it were determined.
Neurological disorders such as
How the brain constructs consciousness is still a mystery, and cracking it
alien hand syndrome make a
open would have a significant bearing on the question of free will. Numerous
person lose his sense of agency.
different models have been proposed, for example, the Multiple Drafts
Model which argues that there is no central Cartesian theater where
conscious experience would be represented, but rather that consciousness is located all across the brain. This
model would explain the delay between the decision and conscious realization, as experiencing everything as a
continuous 'filmstrip' comes behind the actual conscious decision. In contrast, there exist models of Cartesian
materialism that have gained recognition by neuroscience, implying that there might be special brain areas that store
the contents of consciousness; this does not, however, rule out the possibility of a conscious will. Other models
such as epiphenomenalism argue that conscious will is an illusion, and that consciousness is a by-product of physical
states of the world. Work in this sector is still highly speculative, and researchers favor no single model of
consciousness. (See also: Philosophy of mind.)
Although humans clearly make choices, the role of consciousness (at least, when it comes to motor movements)
may need re-conceptualization. Only one thing is certain: the correlation of a conscious "intention to move" with a
subsequent "action" does not guarantee causation. Recent studies cast doubt on such a causal relation, and so
more empirical data is required.
Related brain disorders

Various brain disorders implicate the role of unconscious brain processes in decision making tasks. Auditory
hallucinations produced by Schizophrenia seem to suggest a divergence of will and behaviour.[54] The left brain of
people whose hemispheres have been disconnected has been observed to invent explanations for body movement
initiated by the opposing (right) hemisphere, perhaps based on the assumption that their actions are consciously
willed.[64] Likewise, people with 'alien hand syndrome' are known to conduct complex motor movements against
their will.[65]
Neural models of voluntary action

A neural model for voluntary action proposed by Haggard comprises two major circuits.[35] The first involving early
preparatory signals (basal ganglia substantia nigra and striatum), prior intention and deliberation (medial prefrontal
cortex), motor preparation/readiness potential (preSMA and SMA), and motor execution (primary motor cortex,
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spinal cord and muscles). The second involving the parietal-pre-motor circuit for object-guided actions, for
example grasping (premotor cortex, primary motor cortex, primary somatosensory cortex, parietal cortex, and
back to the premotor cortex). He proposed that voluntary action involves external environment input ('when
decision'), motivations/reasons for actions (early 'whether decision'), task and action selection ('what decision'), a
final predictive check (late 'whether decision') and action execution.
Another neural model for voluntary action also involves what, when, and whether (WWW) based decisions.[66]
The 'what' component of decisions is considered a function of the anterior cingulate cortex, which is involved in
conflict monitoring.[67] The timing ('when') of the decisions are considered a function of the preSMA and SMA,
which is involved in motor preparation.[68] Finally, the 'whether' component is considered a function of the dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex.[66]
Prospection
Martin Seligman and others criticize the classical approach in science which views animals and humans as "driven
by the past", and suggest instead that people and animals draw on experience to evaluate prospects they face, and
act accordingly. The claim is made that this purposive action includes evaluation of possibilities that have never
occurred before, and is experimentally verifiable.[69][70]
Seligman and others argue that free will and the role of subjectivity in consciousness can be better understood by
taking such a "prospective" stance on cognition, and that "accumulating evidence in a wide range of research
suggests [this] shift in framework".[70]
See also
Thought identification, through the use of technology
Unconscious mind
Adaptive unconscious
Neural decoding
Sam Harris
Dick Swaab
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External links
Fate, Freedom and Neuroscience (http://iai.tv/video/fate-freedom-and-neuroscience) - a debate on whether
neuroscience has proved that free will is an illusion by the Institute of Art and Ideas featuring Oxford
neuroscientist Nayef Al-Rodhan, East End psychiatrist and broadcaster Mark Salter, and LSE philosopher
Kristina Musholt debate the limits of science.
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Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Some areas of the human brain implicated in mental

In many senses the field remains highly

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

3.6 Neural models of voluntary action

A monk meditates. Human agency, the ability

There have been a number of problems regarding studies of

...the current work is in broad

-Patrick Haggard[6] discussing an in-depth

intention occurs at the beginning of the human decision process.[10]

Free will as illusion

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Disputed relevance of scientific research

"[Some senses of free will] are

This issue may be controversial for good reason: There is

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

scientists were telling people. But

deterministic free will, believes scientists risk making a serious

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In a variation of this task, Haggard

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Haggard describes other studies at the neuronal levels as

Unconsciously cancelling actions

Graphing tones as they appeared (or didn't) in the

The possibility that human "free won't" is also the

The experiment involved asking volunteers to respond to a go-signal by pressing an

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The general distribution of reaction times for the

Unsurprisingly, the recorded RTs for the primary response

[The results of the experiment] clearly

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuronal prediction of free will

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Other related phenomena

Scientists were able

Transcranial magnetic stimulation

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Manipulating the perceived intention to move

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Related brain disorders

Neural models of voluntary action

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

doi:10.3389/neuro.09.014.2007 (https://dx.doi.org/10.3389%2Fneuro.09.014.2007). PMC 2525986

Neuroscience of free will - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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