TSAç Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

Notes from Lab
TSA = important b/c its visible?

Take out the Taylor structural violence card
Challenging the system but also challenging us to be aware?
Prohibit racial profiling and create a cause of action against TSA
Links to cut
SPOT Bad: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659010.pdf
Aero industry hurt: http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/gb78/wp/JLE_6301.pdf
TSA bad: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-82_Apr13.pdf
Car crashes: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=677549
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/the-hidden-costs-of-extraairport-security/?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1
TSA AFF
1AC
Plan
Text
Plan: The United States federal government should
substantially curtail its domestic surveillance conducted by the
Transportation Security Administration.
Race Adv
1AC
Advantage one is racial and ethnic violence
TSA agents are 95% ineffective, failing to detect a majority of
undercover trialsit is long past time to eliminate TSA
surveillance policies
Capps 15
(Kriston Capps is a staff writer at CityLab for The Atlantic. He writes about housing, architecture,
design, and other factors that shape cities. Previously, he was a senior editor at Architect magazine.
"Airport Security: Astoundingly Expensive and 95 Percent Ineffective," CityLab, The Atlantic. 6-3-2015.
http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/06/airport-security-astoundingly-expensive-and-95-percentineffective/394778///ghs-kw)
Airline security is a miserable business. Getting through a checkpoint is much like being in a fire drill in the middle of a traffic pileup at the busiest intersection in the city. And now,
thanks to a leaked report on the Transportation Security Administration, we

have a hard number to assign to our feelings of frustration: Airline
security is 95 percent ineffective. ABC News reports that TSA agents failed to detect a threat
in 67 out of 70 recent trials. Posing as passengers, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Red Teams were able to carry weapons and fake explosives (simulant threats)
through security checkpoints without any trouble. Former TSA Administrator James Loy, who led the agency in its first year,
called the leaked results an abominable failure. Homeland Security has since announced a series of steps to overhaul the agency, including the resignation of the TSAs acting director.
the nation should be looking more criticallyand more analyticallyat the costs
and benefits of even attempting to provide total airport security. When the TSA isnt
doing its job, then airport security is a complete waste of money. But by the strictest measure, airport
But
security screenings are not worth the cost even in the best of circumstances. Back in 2008, researchers from the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of
Newcastle Australia tried to calculate the annual cost per life saved of various then-new security measures implemented in the U.S. after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The paper
is a bit dated now, and it depends on a number of generous assumptions. But the fundamental inquiry is still sound, and even more relevant now in light of the revelations about the
How much does totalistic American risk-mitigation for flight really cost us?
Airport security screenings are not worth the cost even in the best of
circumstances. The researchers found that reinforced cockpit doors come at an annual cost per life saved of $800,000a great investment. (According to the
TSA:
researchers, annual costs per life saved of $110 million pass the costbenefit threshold for most U.S. federal agencies.) On the other hand, another security feature designed to prevent
a 9/11style attack, the Federal Air Marshal Service, has an annual cost per life saved of $180 million. Using the same formula* as the researchers (and some similar assumptions), I
estimated the same costs for airport pre-boarding security. TSA checkpoints have an annual cost per life saved of $667,000,000two-thirds of one billion dollars. Heres how this
equation works. One critical figure is counterfactual: the number of lives saved annually by post9/11 security measures. We have no way of knowing what this number really is.
Terrorists havent hijacked or bombed any American flights since 9/11. We have no basis for comparison, either. No one was ever killed by a hijacking within the U.S. before 9/11. So the
researchersMark G. Stewart and J. Muellercame up with a number: 300. Heres how they arrived at this figure: As the threat to the U.S. homeland is from Al-Qaeda, it would be
reasonable to consider the period of a heightened threat from Al-Qaeda to be a suitable time period for the estimation of fatality ratethis is a 10-year period, 19922001. Accordingly,
we will assume that, in the absence of enhanced security measures, there would be a 9/11 replication every 10 years in the United States. That is, the annual fatality rate before
enhanced security measures is 300 per year. Risk reduction is also difficult to calculate. Stewart and Mueller explain the assumptions that led to their calculation of risk (R) mitigated by
pre-boarding security measures (efforts that may go beyond checkpoint security). The extra and more vigilant intelligence, immigration and passport control, airport screening, and other
pre-boarding security measures implemented since 9/11 as arrayed in the TSAs 14 layers of security should result in an increased likelihood of detection and apprehension of terrorists.
Increased public awareness is also of significant benefit to aviation security. Added to this are the much-enhanced preventative policing and investigatory efforts that have caught
potential terrorists including, in the U.K. in 2006, some planning to blow up airliners. Combined, we suggest, these measure by themselves reduce the risk of a replication of 9/11 by at
least 50%, and this is likely to be a lower bound value. There has been no successful hijacking anywhere in the world since 9/11 and very few attempts at blowing up airlinersand none
of these in the United States. In consequence, we suspect, R(pre-boarding security) is likely to be much greater than 50%. Nonetheless, for the present analysis assume R(preboarding
security)=50%. To calculate R(security checkpoints), I used R(pre-boarding security) x Pr(checkpoint efficiency) = 50.00 x 0.05 = 2.5 percent. If TSA agents caught every threat, then
checkpoint efficiency (Pr) would be 1.0. Since they failed to catch 95 percent of threats in recent tests, the rate falls to 0.05. Those are the soft variables it takes to estimate the annual
The TSA spends $5.3 billion on aviation security annually,

about 70 percent of its budget. Lets say $5 billion, since presumably not all of those funds are directly tied to checkpoint security. Heres the
cost per life saved. The final variable is a hard number:
equation that Stewart and Mueller use: (Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability) Plugging in the variables for security checkpoints comes out to an annual cost per life
saved of $667,000,000. Now, its only reasonable to toggle the variables. My assumptions might not be correct, after all. Lets say everyone at TSA performed admirably. If agents caught
every single explosive or weapon at every airport checkpoint, then the annual cost per life saved would still be $33 million: still excessive, at least in terms of federal tolerances. Cut
down the cost of checkpoint security from an estimated $5 billion to $1 billionand assume also perfect checkpoint performanceand the annual cost per life saved is $7 million. Finally,
Just not close to reality by any measure involved. Airport

security is especially expensive when it doesnt work at all. Theres no good reason
to think that TSA security is going to get cheaper or more efficient any time soon. As
within the appropriate costbenefit range!
Shirley Ybarra explains in a 2013 report for the Reason Foundation, the agency suffers from a fundamental conflict of interest. All other aspects of airport securityaccess control,
for screening, TSA regulates

itself , Ybarra writes. Arms-length regulation is a basic good-government principle; self-regulation is inherently problematic.
perimeter control, lobby control, etc.are the responsibility of the airport, under TSAs regulatory supervision. But
The Heritage Foundation would like to solve the problem by expanding trusted-traveler programs and engaging private airport screeners. Maybe TSA checkpoint alternatives could bring
the costs down a ways. Better technology could also potentially save money. There are a range of possibilities worth considering. In another study, Stewart and Mueller estimate that
expanding the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and cutting the Federal Air Marshal Service would potentially [save] hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for
eliminating the risk presented by every single

passenger on every single flight is always going to be expensive. Especially when
the threats that the TSA does detect take a look at the agencys Instagram account for a broad sampleare nowhere
near a 9/11 in scale. Factor in the loss of productivity associated with securitycheckpoint bottlenecks and flight delays, and the cost of total airport security grows
even higher. Its especially expensive when it doesnt work at all. To be sure, a 9/11 attack every decade
security that are, at most, negligible. No matter what, though,
would not be an acceptable price to pay for getting to leave my shoes on at the airport. Its hardly certain that this is the price wed actually pay, though. Its time to consider the real
costs and the real risks of flyingand what were getting for what were spending.
In particular, the TSAs Screening Passengers by Observation

Techniques program is completely unsuccessful and should be
abolished
Dickerson 15
(Kelly Dickerson . Kelly is a science reporter at Business Insider, covering space and physics. She
graduated from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism with an M.A. in science and health reporting.
She received at B.S. degree in biology and a B.A. degree in communication from Berry College. Kelly
has previously written for Live Science, Space.com, and Psychology Today. "Yes, the TSA is probably
profiling you and it's scientifically bogus," Business Insider. 5-6-2015.
http://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-spot-program-is-scientifically-bogus-2015-5//ghs-kw)
According to a document leaked to The Intercept on March 27, this point system is part of the TSA's Screening
Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. TSA employees have used it since 2007 as a
way to identify potential terrorists. How many terrorists have they caught using this
program? Zero. Critics and scientists say that's because it's based on flawed science
and almost certainly leads to racial profiling. The SPOT program The TSA has thousands of what it calls
"behavior detection" officers deployed at more than one-third of US airports. They scan security lines for
suspicious looking people and behavior . There are 92 possible points on the check
list leaked to The Intercept, and certain behaviors get you more points than others.
Things like too much fidgeting gets you a point. A cold stare gets you two points. But if you're woman over the
age of 55, you get a point taken off. Despite years of criticism from airport employees and scientists who
say this is just an excuse to yank whoever they want out of line , the TSA has spent nearly $1
billion on the program, and it has repeatedly denied that SPOT leads to racial profiling. However, back in 2012, employees from the
80% of the passengers being pulled

from security lines were minorities. The problem is that the TSA does not keep a
record of the racial background of people that they stop. "They are able to
plead ignorance of those statistics," Handeyside told Buzzfeed News. "We find that incredibly
problematic." Reviews of SPOT have shown that only 1% of the 30,000 people stopped every year
are ever arrested. And the arrests are for things like drug possession or traveling with
undeclared items never for terrorism. The documents describing this controversial program are
Logan airport in Boston came forward and said they estimated
not classified, but the TSA has refused to share them. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request last year for information on the training, methods, and scientific validity of the SPOT program. The TSA did not respond to
the request, and now the ACLU has filed a lawsuit, because it is illegal for a government agency to ignore a FOIA request. Flawed
science Much of the SPOT program is based on research that began in the 1970s by psychologist Paul Ekman.
Ekman's work hypothesized that subtle facial expressions, called microexpressions, can tell you a lot about a person, and someone
trained to read those microexpressions could guess someone's intentions. However, it's never been proven in any experiment that
someone can glance through faces in a crowded place like an airport and tell if someone is being deceptive or lying, according to
Charles Honts, a lie detection expert at Boise State University. There are few (if any) behaviors that are clearly linked to lying,
scientists say. And it's impossible to tell from observing someone for a few seconds in a security line if they're keeping some kind of
secret. Sure, someone might look a little nervous or scared because they're about to commit a horrifying crime. But they may just
be nervous about flying or antsy that they're having to wait in line when they're already running late for their flight. In 2013, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined over 400 studies on lie detection. From that huge survey, the organization
concluded that the average person can only tell if someone is lying 54% of the time. That's
barely better than
pure chance.
From the survey, the GAO concluded there's not any scientific evidence that someone can learn to spot
who's keeping a secret and who's not, so it recommended that funding for the SPOT program be limited until the TSA could provide
some real evidence that it's useful. The GAO report was just a recommendation though, and the SPOT program is still up and
running. If we consider what behavioral science tells us (or can't tell us), it looks like we really need a new method for airport
"What we know about SPOT suggests it wastes taxpayer money,

leads to racial profiling, and should be scrapped," ACLU's staff attorney Hugh Handeyside
security checks.
said in the lawsuit announcement.
Moreover, SPOT is a sure path to racial profiling the TSA has

done nothing to prevent this, resulting in criminal justice
inequities
Love 13
(David A. Love, . "Report: TSA screening is a magnet for racial profiling," theGrio, 6-6-2013.
http://thegrio.com/2013/06/06/report-tsa-screening-is-a-magnet-for-racial-profiling///ghs-kw)
The TSAs Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program, also known

as SPOT or behavioral detection program which costs the taxpayers nearly $1 billionis
designed to screen passengers and identify high-risk travelers based on their behavior. Under the program, which
is based on the model used by Israeli security forces, airport security officers are supposed to look for behavior that
indicates signs of stress, fear or deception. But the inspector generals report said it cannot ensure that
passengers at U.S. airports are screened objectively. Latinos and African-Americans targeted Airport officers have
African-Americans wearing baseball caps backward and Latinos

traveling to Florida are profiled. And these passengers are profiled,
sometimes arrested by officers at the insistence of their superiors, in the
hopes of uncovering arrest warrants, immigration violations or drugs. Under
the SPOT program, 644 Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) are deployed in 42 airports. Working in
claimed
pairs, BDOs conduct brief conversations with passengers waiting in line and observe their actions. Based on the
identify passengers for further screening, and possibly a referral to

law enforcement. A law enforcement officer (LEO) may interact with the traveler to
determine if further steps are necessary. Sometimes it could mean a passenger is
not allowed to board the flight. The report found that TSA cannot demonstrate that
BDOs are screening passengers in a uniform manner to identify
potentially high-risk individuals. In addition, the TSA has not developed
performance measures to determine the programs effectiveness, does not collect
accurate or complete data, and has not developed refresher training for BDOs.
observations, BDOs
Homeland Security makes six recommendations to the TSA, such as developing a strategic plan for SPOT, ensuring
accurate data entry, providing continuing training to BDOs and instructors, and identifying issues that affect SPOTs
success. The TSA, which screens 1.8 million passengers each day in over 450 TSA-regulated airports, falls under the
Department of Homeland Security. It is illegal to target travelers based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. But
apparently, this racial profiling is happening every day. Racial profiling as a way of life News of the report comes as
the TSA recently pulled its naked-image body scanners, which critics have found humiliating and a health risk.
The agency has also come under fire in recent years for intrusive pat-downs and excessive body searches, including
a lawsuit challenging the scanners and pat-downs. And in April, Congressman Bennie Thompson (D-MS), ranking
member of the Committee on Homeland Security, introduced a bill to reform the TSAs contract screener program.
The legislation increases standards for hiring and training screeners and for handling security breaches and
sensitive security information. Many of us are no strangers to racial profiling at the airport ,
whether through firsthand experience or personal observation of the treatment of other passengers who fit the
Why are the black and brown folks always singled out for special
treatment, that annoying, extra step that few others seem to get ? One at the
airport, as I was about to board a plane for London, I recall the screeners
harassing a South Asian familywomen and children included with a
description.
long, drawn out search process. There was a sense the humiliating
exercise had more to do with the race of the passengers than any
suspicious activity or perceived threat. For people of color, racial profiling
takes place in the airport and in the streets under the guise of observing suspicious behavior. Last week in
Florida, a Miami Dade police officer chased a 14-year-old boy, threw him to the ground and put him in a chokehold
for playing with a puppy while black. According to police, the boy, Tremaine McMillian, exhibited demunanizing
stares and clenched fists. The boy wet his pants as a result of the ordeal. Moreover, according to a new report from
the American Civil Liberties Union, blacks are four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than
whites, typically for small amounts. In Washington, DC, Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois, the arrest rate for blacks is 7.5
to 8.5 times higher. In the war on drugs, not unlike the case of the TSA, billions of dollars are spent to boost some
so many
people of color victimized over stereotypes. Racial profiling creates losers in the
criminal justice system, causing people to lose their freedom and even their lives. In
agencys reputation as crime fighters. So much wasted in time and resources, so little achieved, and
remarks made at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, federal Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 5th Circuit said that racial groups like African-Americans and Hispanics are predisposed to crime, are
prone to commit acts of violence, and more likely than people of other ethnicities to be involved in heinous
acts. Jones also said the death penalty allows prisoners to make peace with God, and dismissed as red herrings
any arguments that the death penalty is discriminatory, is imposed arbitrarily and violates international law. The
judges statements are the subject of a lawsuit by the NAACP, the Texas Civil Rights Project and the Mexican Capital
criminalizing people for flying while black or

brown does not make anyone safer. It puts everyone at risk. Plus, it wastes lots of
money and only humiliates people in the process. TSA should find the real threats
to public safety in the skies, not those innocent people who are guilty of having
darker skin or a certain ethnic or religious background. Until then, SPOT should be
grounded.
Legal Assistance Program. In the meantime,
These policies are a form of political control that perpetuates

whitenessthe Otherization of blacks and browns generates
racial violence directly rooted in slavery and the KKK
Jones 12
(Jones, Imara. Imara Jones is the economic justice contributor for Colorlines.com. He served in the
Clinton White House, where he worked on international trade policy; he was also an executive at
Viacom. "If the TSA's 'natural hair patdown' practice is not racial profiling, what is?," Guardian, 12-202012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/20/tsa-natural-hair-patdown-racialprofiling//ghs-kw)
What does America's Transportation Security Agency (TSA) believe that black
people are holding in our hair before we board planes? I was forced to ask myself this question
just days ago when two TSA agents halted the security line at Los Angeles International Airport to search my
countless
more black and brown Americans with natural hair will be forced to query the same.
Over the past year, "natural hair pat downs" have taken place with greater
reported frequency. The fact that they occur at all underscores that
America's post-racial future still has roots in its racist past . With a twice-elected
shoulder-length curls for weapons of war. As the country moves into the busy holiday travel season,
black man as the country's chief executive, how could the TSA get it so wrong? In the case of people of color v the
TSA, it's man v the machine, apparently. "I have to do what the machine says," declared one of the TSA agents as
he pointed wanly to the full-body scanner behind me. "When the machine can't read through your hair, we have to
search it." The machine to which he was referring is the $170,000 per unit x-rays devices that can penetrate clothes
and certain types of body tissue in order to highlight hidden weapons and objects. The scanners were so effective,
in fact, that they raised privacy concerns in the US regarding nudity, which the TSA was forced to address. Citing
health concerns, the European Commission effectively banned their use in the European Union just months ago.
Still, these machines, which have cost the US government almost $150m, reveal almost everything except what
might be hidden in black hair. By the results of the TSA scanners, kinky black hair barely registers as human tissue.
The unknowing nature of our heads gives the TSA license to violate our bodies. I wasn't the first to have a TSA
agent search my hair and I won't be the last. Actor Gabrielle Union and pop star Solange Knowles Beyonce's
sister have both experienced it. Since I posted my patdown on Twitter, imarajones (@imarajones) December 18,
2012 @dhsgov @civilrights What exactly does @tsa believe black people are holding in our naturally curly hair
before getting on planes? professors, executives, and even aides to members of Congress have all told me their
TSA stories. Most far worse than mine. One declared, "I thought it was just me." Clearly, it's not. Both mainstream
and niche media outlets have reported on this phenomenon, which has mushroomed in the last 12 months. Type in
"natural hair patdowns" in any search engine and you can spend the better part of an afternoon reading
In response to complaints of
its citizens, the response is silence. The TSA failed to answer a request by me for comment on the
issue. The fact that "natural hair patdowns" have reached a fever pitch
recently, four years after the machines were introduced, suggests that
there's something else at work. The machines didn't just stop working on
black hair all at once. The problem may not lie with machines, but with
the men and women running the TSA. It wouldn't be the first time. Hastily put
together after 9/11, the TSA has struggled with charges of racial bias from the beginning.
Many Arab-American groups filed formal complaints of racial profiling by the TSA in
the immediate years after the attack. Civil liberties group, such as the ACLU,
reported receiving up to 1,000 complaints a month about invasive TSA searches . Just
last year, TSA agents in Boston cited their colleagues for zeroing in on people of color. A key part of the
TSA's response to 9/11 seems to be the identification of certain groups as
the "other", followed by a systematic targeting of that group for physical
scrutiny. The "otherization" of black people by the TSA is nothing new in
America. Classifying black physical characteristics as alien and subhuman was
essential to European rationalization of the brutality meted out to people of African
descent during slavery. Torture and sexual assault were all excused because of the
"otherness" of the black body. But slavery was only a precursor to the violence
directed against blacks during the years after Emancipation and Reconstruction.
Once blacks gained freedom, whites in the South became obsessed with new ways to
control the black body. The largest homegrown terrorist organization of its day the Klu Klux Klan
emerged to create a climate a fear among African Americans through the public
mutilation of black bodies. The goal was to spur mass migration of blacks out of the South and to
intimidate those who remained into political, as well as economic, subservience. It worked. Formerly proslavery whites regained political control of the South by using these tactics. TSA
actions connect directly with this past. At precisely the time when people of color in
America have greater political authority than ever, the TSA along with the New York Police
testimonials and watching video of black people's encounters with the TSA.
Department through "stop-and-frisk" harassment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and local law
have targeted black and brown bodies for intrusive and

demeaning treatment.
enforcement agencies
Airport surveillance has become the administrator of white

Judeo-Christian security, providing a shield from perceived
Islamic terrorists at the expense of Muslim Otherization
Bicili 10 (Mucahit Bilici, Assistant Professor of Sociology at John Jay College and
CUNY, Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Muslim
Ethnic Comedy:
Inversions of Islamophobia, 2010, pages 198-199) //mL
perfect illustration of the Muslim airport experience, where the
negative charisma of being Muslim assumes full transparency. At the airport , those
who have so far (in the city, at the ticket counter, and so on) been treated equally suddenly
become suspect. At the internal borders of the nation, they suddenly feel their
protected status begin to evaporate. Even those Muslims who do not consider
themselves particularly profiled or discriminated against in everyday life suddenly
begin to feel uneasy. Strip search and other security rites of passage through the
border show them the hard edge of the nation . Here Muslim otherness is revealed in
the most conspicuous way. Despite official efforts to present searches at the airports as random,
This routine provides a
comedians like Dean Obeidallah skeptically ask their Muslim audiences: Are you selected for random search even
The fear a Muslim inspires is associated with the

unpredictability of his behavior. What if he is a terrorist? What if he hijacks the
plane? What if he is only pretending to be normal? All these questions that airport
authorities ask citizens to consider transform the Muslim passenger in the eyes of
his fellow travelers into a source of unpredictability and danger. When a Muslim like
Azhar Usman gets onto the plane, faces fall. Danger is imminent . The anxiety ends only
when the plane lands. People are almost thankful to the Muslim passenger for not
doing what they feared he might. Flying-while-Muslim thus becomes an extremely public event. A
crucial point here is that the airport is where Muslim experience and American
mainstream experience meet. Jokes about aviation thus have a remarkable degree of transparency and
when you are dropping a friend at the airport?
universality. Muslims and non-Muslims alike can understand and laugh at airport and airplane jokes. They are at
once ethnic and national, particular and universal. These jokes represent the comic surface where Muslim and
American perspectives intersect most dangerously and with full intelligibility. Jokes about the airport experience
thus constitute a significant portion of the repertoire of Muslim comedians today.
[Insert dehumanization/other impact cards here]

Modern Islamophobic policies create a state of bare life and
wage a perpetual war on difference
Wise 1
(Tim Wise, Writer, lecturer, antiracism activist, author, and was an adjunct professor at the Smith
College School of Social Work and was an advisor to the Fisk University Race Relations Institute,
Rationalizing Racism: Panic and Profiling After 9/11, December 10 2001,
http://www.alternet.org/story/12065/rationalizing_racism%3A_panic_and_profiling_after_9_11?
paging=off#bookmark) //mL
complaints about such measures may seem trivial. 'What's the big deal?' ask
some. Isn't security worth the mild inconvenience to those singled out? But as with all
other racial profiling, the present incarnation is every bit as unjust and irrational.
Despite calls from many quarters for more profiling, under the rubric of good "common sense," the fact
remains that it is not sensible at all. To single out persons of a particular nationality
or ethnicity, or to heighten one's suspicion of such a group is blatantly unjust. It is in
fact plainly racist, as such generalized suspicion, fear, and mistreatment never
seem to attach to white folks, no matter what profile we may fit. After the Oklahoma
City bombing, white men were not singled out , held incommunicado, rounded up for
questioning, nor quizzed when trying to rent moving vans. Indeed, I rented a Ryder truck
To many,
shortly after McVeigh blew one of their fleet sky-high, along with the Murrah Building. And despite being a white
guy, with short hair, no one said a word to me, nor asked for a deposit up front, just in case I decided to load it up
with fertilizer and ammonium nitrate and take out a city block. Although white supremacist and militia groups most
notice the
difference between that response and what is happening now : in the former
instance, only very specific kinds of white people became possible suspects. In the
latter case, there is a general response of fear towards all persons fitting the
physical, ethnic, and religious description of the terrorists. Even the bombing of
Afghanistan can be viewed as racially selective . After all, if the attackers of 9/11 had
been members of the Irish Republican Army, it is simply inconceivable that we
would have ripped up the real estate of Dublin as punishment. So despite the
cavalier claims by many whites that anti-Arab profiling is no big deal, and that they
would be happy to be profiled if white guys had been behind the attacks in
September, the fact remains, whether willing or not, they would never have had to
worry about such a response. And that's the point.
certainly came in for additional scrutiny in the aftermath of McVeigh's act of mass murder,
Without absolute side constraints against violating human

dignity such as the affirmative, utilitarianism becomes a
justification for slavery, torture, and murder.
Clifford, 11 (Professor of Philosophy @ Mississippi State University, Michael,
Spring, MORAL LITERACY, Volume 11, Issue 2,
https://webprod1.uvu.edu/ethics/seac/Clifford_Moral_Literacy.pdf, Accessed 7-6-13,
TB)
utilitarianism prides itself on
fairness, since everyones happiness (i.e. pleasure/pain) must be taken into account
As for fairness of application, here the waters are muddy. On the one hand,
when determining what will produce the gr eatest happiness. Fairness is part of the very justification of
utilitarianism in that it assumes, correctly I think, that everyone wants to be happy; thus it is incumbent upon any
ethics to promote this, as far as is possible. In fact, it was this democratic aspect of utilitarianism which prompted
On the other hand, one of the most

enduring criticisms of utilitarianism , especially the sort advocated by Bentham, is
that it may require us to trample upon individual rights if it will increase the
pleasure of the majority. An example I like to use in my courses to illustrate this is
black slavery in Mississippi. There was a time when Mississippi had more
millionaires per capita than any other state in the union. Of course, it achieved th at
distinction through the institution of slavery, the evidence of which can still be seen in Rhode
Island, where the estates of former cotton barons line the shores of Newport. Now Mississippi is among
the poorest state in the nation. Suppose some savvy economic consultant
suggested that we could bring prosperity back to the South by reinstating the
institution of slavery. The population of African-Americans being only about th irty
percent, the majority would certainly have their happiness increased. Of course, we
James Mill to champion it as a model for political and social reform.
would immediately object that such happiness would be achieved by the most atrocious violation of individual
rights. What can the utilitarian say to this? Even Ja mes Mills son, John Stuart, was very concerned about this
He advocated a form of utilitarianism in which we are obligated to

promote the higher pleasures of justice and equality. However, Mill would not
allow an appeal to individual rights, because he did not believe that such rights
exist. His defense of individual freedoms in On Liberty is not based on the idea that
human beings have rights, but because of the good consequences for society that
comes from such a recognition. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
troublesome possibility.
questions, says Mill. 14 If this is the case, then a utilitarian, even one as enlightened as Mill, must entertain the
possibility that the greatest happiness could only be bought at the expense of individual freedoms. 15 Whether
or not you believe in individual rights, whether or not you are convinced by
arguments one way or another about the metaphysical grounds of rights, we can all
appreciate the idea that any ethics should recognize the fundamental dignity of
human|||s||| beings. This is precisely what worries critics of utilitarianism, that it
may require us to violate that dignity, for some at least, if doin g so will promote the
greatest happiness. But to violate human dignity is to ignore or to misunderstand
the very point of ethics. For the deontologist, such as Kant, we have a duty not to violate human dignity,
even if it causes us pain, even if the consequences fail to maximize the overall happiness. The inviolate character of
human dignity is expressed most practically by the idea that we have certain basic rights (whatever the source of
rights are, whether natural or by convention). John Locke defined rights as prima facie entitlements, which means
that anyone who would restrict my rights bears the burden of proving that there are good reasons for doing so. For
example, the right to private property is sometimes trumped by the principle of eminent domain, provided that I too
sta nd to gain by seizure of my land. My right to free speech is limited by the harm it might cause by, say, shouting
There are times when we feel justified in limiting or abrogating

certain positive rights for the common good, but even here no social outcome
justifies torture, slavery, murder, or any action which violates my fundamental
human dignity. Deontological ethics assumes there to be a line that cannot be
crossed, regardless of the consequences. Thus, Kants type of ethics would seem to fair best with
fire! in a crowded theatre.
respect to the fairness of application criterion beca use it requires, as intrinsic to the Categorical Imperative itself,
that we treat all persons, at all times, as ends and not merely as means to an end.
This is not due to any good benefits that may stem from doing so; in fact, respecting the dignity of others may
actually diminish overall pleasure. But
demands it.
we have a duty to do so, regardless, because reason
It demands it because to do otherwise is irrational given the requirements of the Categorical

Imperative, which are (arguably) three:
Trans Preface
Pronouns
The preferred pronouns for trans people vary from person to person. What one
person may find fitting may not resonate the same way with another person. Some
trans people may prefer pronouns that correctly portray gender fluidity. Thus, we
have this explanation of different pronouns
These are some explanations of pronouns that trans people

may use
Gender Neutral Pronoun Blog, 01-24-2014, "Gender Neutral Pronoun Blog,"
https://genderneutralpronoun.wordpress.com/
1. Ne/nem/nir/nirs/nemself
Ease of pronunciation: 4/5
Distinction from other pronouns: 4/5
Gender neutrality: 4.5/5
Although relatively obscure, this has become my favorite contender. It follows the
formats of existing pronouns while staying more gender-neutral than any but Spivak
you could call it gender-balanced. Ne is n+(he or she), nem is n+her+him,
nir is n+him+her. Because it has a different form for each declension, it doesnt
lean towards following male or female patterns patterns made very obvious when
you read works about obviously male characters with female-patterned pronoun
forms. The letter n itself can stand for neutral a property we are searching for.
A reader may be uncertain how to pronounce ne at first glance, but pronunciation
of the other forms is relatively obvious. One problem when reading aloud is that the
n sometimes blends with words ending in n or m, but it didnt occur as often
and wasnt as problematic as zir with words ending in an s or z sound (see
entry #4).
2. Ve/ver/vis/vis/verself
Gender neutrality: 4/5
Ve is another good option, found in some science fiction, without a specific bias
towards either gender. The declension is again gender-balanced, being evenly split
between forms that resemble he and she. But it does feel a bit more genderheavy than ne since ver and vis directly derive from her and his, readers
are more easily reminded of the gendered forms. There are some cases where ve
will bleed with words ending in f or v sounds, like of or if, but this wasnt a
problem very often maybe about as often as with ne.
3. Spivak (ey/em/eir/eirs/eirself)
Distinction from other pronouns:2/5
Spivak is the most gender-free pronoun that parses well in English (as opposed to
ta or thon, which are also gender-free but simply dont work in the English
language), since it derives from they rather than from a mix of he and she.
The problem is, not only does it remove the th from they, it also changes its
grammatical structure. Even singular they is grammatically plural (i.e. you would
say they were in the building rather than they was in the building), while Spivak
is grammatically singular. The claim that the Spivak pronoun is more natural to
say than other neologisms is undercut by the fact that it doesnt actually have the
same structure as the already-existing forms.
Furthermore, when spoken aloud, not only does em sound like him in speech,
but people already write a plural them as em or em in informal writing, making
the Spivak pronoun more ambiguous.
4. Ze/Hir and its derivatives

(ze/hir/hir/hirs/hirself)
(zie/hir/hir/hirs/hirself)
(ze/zir/zir/zirs/zirself)
(zie/zir/zir/zirs/zirself)

Gender neutrality: 2.5/5
Ze and hir is the most popular form of gender-free pronoun in the online
genderqueer community, derived from the earlier sie and hir, which were
considered too feminine/female-sounding since sie is German for she (among
other things), and hir was a feminine pronoun in Middle English. The current forms
are still leaning on feminine, by using the same declensions as she. Hir,
although its supposed to be pronounced here, is read as her by many people
unfamiliar with the term, and the less-gendered alternative, zir, along with ze
itself, often runs into problems when it follows a word ending in an s or z (or
th) sound, sometimes sounding just like her and he. For example, read this
sentence aloud: As ze looked up at the stars, ze realized that this was zir favorite
moment of them all. This isnt as much of a problem with ze, which doesnt
follow words ending in s/z terribly often, but the problem occurs much more often
with zir than it did with any of the declensions of ne or ve.
5. Xe/xem/xyr/xyrs/xemself
Distinction from other pronouns: 2.5/5
Xe, it turns out, is supposed to be pronounced the same as ze apparently it

was an aesthetic change in order to distance the pronoun from its sie/hir roots
one step further. It also balances the genders in the way ze does not but it runs
into the same pronunciation problems when following words ending in s or z
sounds, and the pronunciation is much more difficult to guess at I assumed the x
would be pronounced sh or ks, which would be either much too gendered or
much too unpronounceable to even be considered. All in all, it has slight advantages
over zie/hir in its gender-neutrality, but it keeps the same difficulties in
pronunciation and is even more difficult to read than the original.
Trans 1AC
Plan
The United States Federal Government should prohibit the
Transportation Security Administration from using all body
imaging technology and conducting pat downs on transindividuals.
The United States Federal Government should domestic curtail
surveillance involving the Transportation Security
Administrations use of body imaging technology and
conduction of pat downs on transindividuals
1AC Gender Policing

Transgendered bodies are policed by scanning technology
despite so-called TSA acceptance policy, transbodies are
subject to harassment and discrimination
Magnet, Shoshana, Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa, 3-12012, "Stripping For The State Whole Body Imaging Technologies And The
Surveillance Of Othered," Feminist Media Studies Vol. 12, Issue 1, Pg. 101-118 //MV
Backscatter and millimeter wave technologies have significant consequences for
transgender bodies and mobilities . Whole body imaging technologies can reveal
breasts, genitals, prostheses, and binding materials . These technologies also have
the ability to zoom in on a particular area, including genitalia (National Center for Transgender
Equality 2009). As a result, bodies that do not fit normative gender identities may be
singled out by the TSA for special scrutiny, providing the possibility that
transgender individuals may be outed to TSA personnel, or that they may have their
bodily privacy further invaded. Here, bodies rendered as matter out of place are policed. This has
especially devastating consequences for transgender individuals who are closeted
and live in small towns, in which case being outed at the local airport could have
broader consequences, such as implications for their job security or for their relationships with friends and relatives.
Moreover, a transphobic screener could easily cause a transgender person to miss their
flight by detaining them for special screening or could subject them to new forms of
humiliation and harassment. Given the potential consequences of whole body imaging
technologies, Mara Kiesling, the executive director of the National Center for Transgender
Equality, identified whole body imaging technologies as one of the most pressing
issues facing transgender communities.
Scanners force the visibility of transbodies to be pronounced

and contested this creates discursive violence that reinforces
cisprivelege
Redden, Stephanie M., Carleton University, Canada and London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK, 6-1-2013, "The End Of The Line Feminist
Understandings Of Resistance To Full-Body Scanning Technology," International
Feminist Journal Of Politics Issn: 1461-6742 Date: 06/2013 Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Page:
234-253 //MV
Magnet and Rodgers (2011: 1; see also Johnson 2006: 6) also make clear that it is essential to consider how this technology not only
transgender
individuals, people with disabilities, and those with particular religious affiliations
are rendered newly or differently legible . As such, their application to airport
security generates new implications for who are allowed to move through , and who
are afforded justice within, contemporary cultural and transnational spaces. (Magnet and
Rodgers 2011: 7) This differentiated legibility of bodies is nowhere more visible than in the
interactions between gender and identity at border security points. As Currah and Mulqueen
(2011: 559) have recently highlighted, the classification of individuals by the State according to
gender metrics produces less certainty for queer, transgender and other bodies
differently affects women, but also how other marginalized subjects are affected. They note that: ...
whose realities do not map onto the States dichotomous understandings of gender,
as securitizing gender does not necessarily secure identity, and may indeed
destabilize it. The intense gender-based interrogations and pat downs that these
individuals often undergo as their bodies are seen as threatening suggest the
deeply problematic and essentializing nature of full-body scanner technologies and
other security practices, whereby a clear gender marker is understood to be a sign of positive identification. Shepherd
and Sjoberg (2012: 15) importantly argue that both the introduction of WBI scanners in airports and
the ways in which this technology has been linked to transbodies are forms of
discursive violence. They explain that with the use of these scanners: the visibility of transbodies has become both pronounced and contested, arguing that this is in itself a
form of discursive violence and, further, that such strategies are productive of
cisprivilege, which functions to position transbodies as different, deviant and
dangerous and simultaneously as vulnerable and in need of protection. (Shepherd and
Sjoberg 2012: 13)
There are three examples of the manifestation of cisprivelege

within the TSA---First, this violates the rights of transpeople through invasive
interrogation and outing
Shepherd & Sjoberg 12 (Laura J Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, Associate
Professor of International Relations at the School of Social Sciences at UNSW and a
feminist scholar of international relations and international security, 7-1-2012,
"Feminist Review," Feminist Review (2012) 101, 523., http://www.palgravejournals.com/fr/journal/v101/n1/full/fr201153a.html //MV)
In a blog post titled 'On Trans Rights and Full-Body Scanners', the author recounts a
discussion with Jackson Brown, a 'tran about town', who admitted that 'he's afraid
that someone will accuse him of being "inauthentic", or "hiding the truth" ... if the
TSA [Transportation Security Administration] accuses him of being inauthentic or hiding
something, then they may search further' (Omniphilia n.d. 21 ). Bettcher notes that the
construction of 'really an X ', to which the above comment regarding authenticity
refers, 'reinscribes the position that genitalia are the essential determinants of sex'
(2007: 50). At the same time, 'fundamental to transphobic representations of transpeople as deceivers is an
appearance-reality contrast between gender presentation and the sexed body' (Bettcher, 2007: 48). In other words ,
transpeople are often labelled as dishonest if they are not 'out' as trans-, because
they are 'really an X ' but presenting as the 'other' sex. This , in Bettcher's
understanding, presents a double bind for transpeople: 'disclose "who one is" and
come out as a pretender or masquerader, or refuse to disclose (be a deceiver) and
run the risk of forced disclosure, the effect of which is exposure as a liar' (Bettcher,
2007: 50). In this construction , both being 'in' and being 'out' render the transperson dishonest--the 'out' trans person is pretending while the 'in' trans
person is lying. In these terms, 'visibility yields a position in which what one is doing is represented as
make-believe, pretending, or playing dress up', while 'to opt for invisibility is to remove one's life
from the domain of masquerade into actual reality ... [which] generates the effect of revelation,
exposure, or hidden truth' (Bettcher, 2007: 50). Whether a transperson is read as inadvertantly deceptive or
explicitly described as a liar, the implication for security discourses seems to be the same: someone who would
This question of
authenticity relates directly to the existence of cisprivilege. The assumption that the
gender read off the social body maps to the 'authentic' or biological sex of the
person in question is indicative of a set of gender discourses that both demand
fidelity to a regulative ideal of gender as binary and derived from 'sex' and reinforce
the conceptual--and ontological--primacy of materiality. That is, we persist in imagining that
misrepresent themselves (to security personnel) is a risk for (committing terrorist) violence.
bodies derive their meaning from their inherent materiality and the only acceptable bodies are those that 'in some
sense institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice and desire'
Bodies that trans gress the boundaries of 'coherence and continuity'

are, by definition according to this schema, deviant, inappropriate and threatening.
(Butler, 1999: 23).
Trans theorists have explained this in terms of the violent enforcement of gender certainty; the punishments for the
'deceptions' of 'in-ness' and 'out-ness' are actually punishments for non-conformity with settled ideas of what ought
to be, phrased and understood in terms of dishonesty to hide that it is not honesty, but in reality, being policed.
That policing takes place not only by silencing, but also by drawing attention to,
difference.
Rights violations cascade to create spaces of silence that deny

transindividuals from society; we have a moral obligation to
reject human rights violations
Ochoa 8 (Marcia Ochoa, is assistant professor of community studies at the
University of California, Santa Cruz, 2008, "Perverse Citizenship: Divas, Marginality,
And Participation In Loca-Lization," Wsq: Women'S Studies Quarterly Volume 36,
Numbers 3 & 4 //MV)
These kinds of things happen all the time on Libertador, not just with the Guardia (in fact, this was the first time I had seen them
These things happen because there

are silences in which they can happen people who are not subjects of rights are
regularly subject to violations of their integrity as human beings and citizens . No
complaints are filed because the complaint is not a useful tool for them. At that
moment they are really, irreverently, screwed . So at any moment, some men with guns can do what they
please, and if there is silence, they can continue to do so . In Venezuela I learned that this problem has a
name: impunity. There are few negative consequences for these actions (which are presumably
worth the risk for a free blow job). If one were to try to produce an utterance that brought
consequencesa sound in the night or a complaint filed and prosecuted the
morning afterone would be attempting to intervene in the situation . But the
problem is that the situation works within its spaces of silence and that the same
people who are subject to its abuses have learned to take advantage of these
silences. If they wanted to fight for their rights they would be doing so already
because they already know how to fight. While there is no such discourse that
makes explicit the terms of interaction within what is now a space of silence, the
parties coexist in a daily negotiation, lubricated by that very silence . The problem is
that sometimes they dont coexist, and one of them ends up dead under a bridge . For
those of us who, coming from another place, happen upon these realities and want to intervene, the task is not to
bring light or voice somehow, presuming there was none before; it is
to use the social mobility of our bodies and our language to transform
relationsto treat people as legitimate subjects of rights, to mobilize the
take transformistas in custody), but also with the Polica Metropolitana.
resources necessary for an intervention that makes sense to the people

directly involved.
Second, scanning marginalizes the genderqueer bodies and

subjects them to dehumanization within contemporary culture
that the invisibility of genderqueer bodies in security studies is a function of
cisprivilege, but queer and feminist accounts of (how) gender matters in and to
security studies enable us to begin thinking about how we might move towards a
theory of cisprivilege in this disciplinary sub-field . First, we return to the claim that [d]iscrete
genders are part of what humanizes individuals within contemporary culture ;
indeed, we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right (Butler, 1999: 178).
The essential separation of bodies into two categories (M and F)
informs the ways in which we think about the body and also the ways in which we think
We suggest
about a host of social and political events and relationships that we conceive of as being to do with the body; for this ordering to
we must first commit to the categories of F and M, just as we commit to

other organisational categories that help us make sense of, and feel secure in, our
worlds (day/night, inside/outside, friend/foe). In this way, idea(l)s about gender/sex are
ontopolitical claims, as making a statement about what is is always already to find
oneself within an understanding of the is, as such (Dillon, 1999: 112). This results in the
rendering invisible of queer bodies in representational practices as it discomforts us
to think differently about gender/sex and to question the categories that structure
our conceptual frameworks. While to conceive of the body as an event is to recognise its incompletenessto
occur,
recognise the body as always in the process of becomingand therefore to recognise the impossibility of gender security whatever
there is, we think, a degree of cisprivilege inherent in the notion

that the categories of M and F can be assumed stable. Second, and related to the above, we
suggest that trans-/queer bodies are also rendered invisible, and cisprivilege reproduced ,
through the implicit or explicit historical treatment of those bodies as incidental, or,
in the alternative, as trickery. Just as orthodoxies of security insisted on the peripheral relevance of gender to
one's gender performance,
security (see, for example, Adam Jones (1996: 427), who once described certain feminist scholarship as marginal, if that word still
trans- and
genderqueer bodies are assumed to be chimerical to central concerns
about the realities of suffering, deprivation and violence that security
studies seeks to illuminate . Due to the dominance of the dimorphic structuring
of gender/sex in Western discourse, it is assumed that genderqueer bodies are
of marginal importance and can therefore legitimately be written out of
war stories and high politics . When genderqueer bodies are recognised, it is
often as fakes, as games and as pretensionsa woman pretended to be a man to
get involved in a battle, or some such story that focuses on the genderqueer person's dishonesty. Gender
ambiguity, insomuch as it actually exists, is assumed to reside in, or be inscribed
retains its pejorative connotations), even in feminist scholarship on security, as discussed above,
on, a minority of bodies, and security theories and practices have historically ,
traditionally, taken as their referent object the majority, usually the state ;
This further Otherizes transindividuals and renders them

completely unrecognized within society
Sanger 10 (Tam Sanger, fellow in gender and sociology at the Queens University of Belfast, 2010, Beyond
Gender and Sexuality Binaries p.268-269 //MV)
Binary thinking and theorising have serious political, social and personal
consequences, as they lead to a lack of recognition of anyone who does not adhere
to accepted binary norms, as evidenced in the examples discussed previously.
Exploration of the identities and relational lives of trans people sheds a great deal of light
upon the norms by which societies are governed . This is the case for those who adhere to gender
and sexuality norms as well as those who reject them, as Hird explains : Intersexuals and transsexuals
who attempt to fit into a sexually divided world reveal the regulatory mechanisms
through which sexual difference is enforced; whereas intersexuals and
transsexuals who refuse an either/or sexed identity disturb the infallibility of the
binary (2000: 359). Lorber has also argued for the expansion of sociological thinking, stating: Data that
undermine the supposed natural dichotomies on which the social orders of most
modern societies are still based could radically alter political discourses that
valorize biological causes, essential heterosexuality, and traditional gender roles in
families and workplaces (1996: 155). If we limit our studies to only those who
live within the norms of society, or remove studies of others to the
margins of sociology, we reinforce societal norms and do not open up
space for either recognition and acceptance, or for change.
Even a single instance of Otherization against a transindividual can become a lifelong conflict
Girshick 2009 (Lori, Transgender Voices: Beyond Women and Men, pg.157-158 , 915-2009)
Shame is a very painful emotion that can result from feeling of guilt, unworthiness,
a sense of being wrong, and embarrassment. Chronic shame often results in
internalized transphobiathe belief that to be trans is wrong, sick, and perverted .
Even after people transition, they may spend years dealing with internalized
transphobia. As Tina (MtF) mentioned, Feeling ashamed of who you are is incredibly difficult to overcome, and
yet, most of us do. That is the amazing part. FtMs and transmen are often viewed as failed heterosexuals or failed
butch lesbians (Cromwell 1999). They failed because they didnt make it as women, since they were too masculine
either to be seen as women or to attract men. Even as lesbians they may be too masculine. Sadly, every identity
category adds to shaming when people within that category claim others are not trans enough, not really a
lesbian, or too feminine to be a man. Max (transgender stone butch), for example, stated: I spent my childhood
and teenage years feeling ashamed about how butch I was, because everything and everyone (in the lesbian and
straight worlds) told me that was bad, that I was a sellout, a self-hating woman, a pervert. But, Ive gotten over that
for the most part.
Other peoples reactions can undermine even fairly secure
people . November (genderqueer) said, I occasionally feel ashamed when I am stared at on the street, or given
looks of disgust for holding hands in public, or glared at in a public bathroom. B ecause of societal
shaming, trans-identified people often feel isolated and confused . Lydia (MtP) had no
information on gender dysphoria so thought she must be gay-meaning that she
was perverted, a probable child-molester, insane, going to hell, going to jail, going
to a mental institution. Raven (transgendered FtlVl intersexual) felt shame: [Intersex]
children are taught never to talk about their conditions, because its freakish and
shameful. Now I know that I am not just a freak, Im a sacred being. Jeremy (PtM) brought up a different
issue, that of the need to legitimize himself as a transperson: I feel shame sometimes, and
it usually manifests in either self-loathing or the intense and irrational need to explainand justify my
existence. Jeremy also is sight-impaired and finds overlap between how people treat those with disabilities and
how they treat trans identified people. For instance, when people assume that Jeremys dog is leading him, they
conclude that Jeremy is impaired to the point where he doesnt know where he is going. He has to explain what the
dog actually does. When people assume Jeremy is confused about his gender they question his desire to transition,
he feels that he needs to justify himself and and explain it isnt all about his genitals. Sometimes, he said, l just
dont have the energy to do all that [and] thats when the selflloathing comes in, This is compounded by the fact
that people dont tend to think those with disabilities as even having gender identities or sexual orientations to
begin with. Males who want to express their feminine side are particularly likely to suffer from the judgment and
scorn of others. The collective message about what was generally understood that a man is and that I was not and
about what a woman is and that I was, Jennifer (MtF) recalledit was very clear that to feel and want what I did
was a shameful thing for a man but normal for a woman. Leslie (male cross-dresser) felt shame for decades for
taking some pleasure in being seen as like a girl and the shame for feeling that way. My mother and my aunt
shamed me verbally. Look at the little girl! when they saw how much I was attracted to my mothers clothes and
they were trying to get me to stop dressing up (about 5 or 6 years old). Many people I spoke with came from a
religious upbringing, and this was mentioned quite often as a shaming influence, particularly if it was in the Catholic
Church. Catholic guilt, Marlene (male cross-dressing wroteI didnt believe the doctrine, but the culture
smothers you. Theresa (MtF) stated: Until my mid-life crisis, I cannot remember a time when I did Not feel great
shame about being queerly gendered. For me, the focal point of my shame was religious. I had strongly internalized
the conservative Christian values that ranked male higher than female and implicitly blamed female-ness for
Original Sin and most moral error since. After all God was a male and He valued first-born sons over daughters.
messages of disgust that came

from family members, peers, and friends had a profound, shame-inducing impact .
Lynnea (MtF) said she grew up with shame and my father was ashamed of me when
he died. I was called pansy and faggot, and beaten, bound and tortured before I
knew what those names meant. Parents and teachers said I deserved it. I did not
recover for many years. Julian (ungendered) recalled being systematically shamed and
ridiculed in my childhood. I felt shamed by the ridiculers. I was also hit, and due to all
that, and other abuse, I am prone to feeling unsafe, and conflicted about my own
ambivalent gender presentation.
Females were clearly subordinate and inherently shameful. For others,
Third, scanners subject transbodies to constant discipline at

the hands of the state creating discursive and structural
violence
However, even these nuanced accounts of the immanence of gender in global
politics as a noun, a verb and an organisational logic do not explicitly interrogate
transgender and genderqueer logics of security. In fact, frequently they focus on a
dichotomous or binary understanding of sex/gender to read gendered logics of
security. This is not to deride or dismiss the important and varied contributions of these scholars, but rather to suggest a way in
which we might contribute in this article to the literature on which we draw, and in relation to which we wish to situate ourselves .
Feminist scholars of security have emphasised the analytical salience of gender and ,
in doing so, raised questions about the possibility of security /ies of the self, particularly in
reference both to (corpo)realities of gendered violence (see, for example, Bracewell, 2000; Hansen,
2001; Alison, 2007) and to the ontological security of gender identity itself (see, for example, Browne, 2004; Shepherd, 2008;
Opening to critical scrutiny, however, the practices through which

gender uncertainty is erased and gender certainty inscribedthe practices through
which the ontological presumption of gender difference is maintained and gender
fluidity deniedallows scholars to develop different understandings of the ways in which in/security is not only written on
MacKenzie, 2010).
the body but is performative of corporeality. We coin the neologism genderinsecurity to emphasise the multiple dynamics of
gendering security, understanding gender in security and interrogating gender insecurity, all of which animate in various ways the
scholarship we discuss here. In different ways, these accounts of gender insecurity engage a politics of corporeality, asking under
what circumstances, in what ways and with what effects subjects embody different gendered ideas and ideals. On this view,
the
body is not an object but an event (Budgeon, 2003: 36; see also Wilton, 2000: 251), an
ongoing event that is culturally produced, mediated and disciplined (Grosz, 1994: 23).
Bodies are disciplined in part through security practices : those practices that speak
to and of the physical security of the state or individual subject (such as immigration policies);
and those practices that aim to order physical beings in the world (such
as surveillance techniques, or the WBI scanning we discuss below). In both
cases, the gendered logics that (re)produce regulatory and disciplinary techniques
are firmly grounded in the idea and ideal of gender/sex as a binary construct . Queer
bodies upset this binary logic in mundane ways (detention facilities, for example, holding
those pending immigration review are divided into male and female
accommodations, which led in the USA to a blanket policy of placing transgender
immigrant detainees in restrictive segregation, according to a complaint filed against the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) on behalf of thirteen immigrants by Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights on 13 April
and in ways that are less immediately apparent and less frequently considered,
at least in the realm of security studies (such as the trauma experienced when travelling with identity papers
20114)
that do not fit the assumed gender of the bearer, see Coyote, 2010;5 TransGriot, 20116).
This violence manifests itself not only physically but within the
mind of a transindividual sacrificing them to the illusion of binary
genders
Rudacille 6 (Deborah Rudacille, a science writer at John Hopkins University.
February 2006, The Riddle of Gender, Anchor Books, pg. 275-276 //MV)
Many young trans people especially question why they should be forced to choose a
boxmale or femalegiven that making such a choice feels like self-betrayal. In
a world that separates gender, I have found the ability to balance the blending of
supposed opposites. In a world that demonizes non-conformity, I have found the purest spiritual expression in celebrating
my otherness. In a world that exterminates the heretic, I have embraced the danger inherent in holding a belief not shared by the
majority of people in my society,"
writes Alexander John Goodrum, an African-American transman, in an

essay published in the program for the True Spirit Conference in 2002. Goodrum, who served as director of TGNet Arizona, a
transgender advocacy and education organization, committed suicide in 2002 while
being treated for depression. He was a gentle soul, who conceived of his transgenderness as a spiritual act, an
offering of the highest kind. It is a sacrifice of the pre-defined self created by societal doctrine.
It is the act of laying that pre-defined self upon the altar, ready to be sacri- fied in a
supreme act of faith. And it is that act of faith , to whomever or whatever one
perceives as god, in which lies the ability to express the infinite . Some might call Alexander
Goodrum a victimof s0cietys prejudices or of his own conflicted nature. I prefer to think of him as a prophet. If the stories
gender variance is neither a fad nor a revolution. It

is a biological fact. Our continuing failure to acknowledge this fact virtually
ensures that there will be more Alexanders and Tacys and Gwens, individuals whose pain
cannot be assuaged by a syringe or a scalpel and who die violent and premature
deaths. Whether dying by their own hands or at the hands of
uncomprehending others, these individuals have been sacrificed to an
illusion, the belief that the spectrum of gender contains only two colors,
black and white, and nothing in between.
contained in this book teach us anything it is that
The law has empirically encouraged people to commit similar

instances of structural violence and discrimination
challenging the system is key
Gilreath 14 Gilreath, associate professor of womens gender and sexuality
studies, 2014 (Shannon, associate professor of law as well, Wake Forest University
THE INTERNET AND INEQUALITY: A COMMENT ON THE NSA SPYING SCANDAL
August 15 2014, https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/handle/10339/39364)
one struggling against the surveillance State feels as if he is in the
position of "shouting against the wind." The sense of futility is often as great as the sense of urgency. How
does one, in the face of seemingly overwhelming governmental power, do anything?
At the most basic level, this Essay is one form of resistance. Speaking out in protest is
resistance that is real. From this perspective, Edward Snowden is a hero. Given the blas attitude of many Americans
To some extent,
toward the government's ever-expanding powers in the name of national security, and given the government's unquestionable
Edward Snowden was shouting against the wind and

knew it. Why do not more people speak up? Why do not more people resist the "turnkey tyranny" Snowden
exposed? One reason is that much of the population does not believe that they are
affected by it in any significant way. Beyond that, the ways in which those of us in
the "Land of the Free" are conditioned to obey authority become palpable and
important. Lawyers, as a group, seem to me particularly brainwashed by the thing they call, with all of the majesty they can
muster, "the rule of law." Too often the "rule of law" is simply the metaphor used to explain
allegiance to power without the burden of a guilty conscience. Blind adherence to
the rule of law meant that lawyers and judges could make the Nazi tyranny seem,
well, legal. And American lawyers and jurists are certainly not immune from the seductiveness of the rule of law. U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has cited, as evidence of the magnificence of
the rule of law, the reaction to the decision in Bush v. Gore , the 2000 decision in
which a 5-4 vote of the Supreme Court, along ideological lines, handed the
presidency to a man who had not actually been elected. There was no resistance,
no rioting, no blood in the streets. Contrasting this with the 1958 Supreme Court decision of Cooper v. Aaron, in
which the Court's integration decision had to be enforced in Arkansas by federal troops, Justice Breyer concludes
that the system works. But is the fact that Americans have had the will to protest bled out of us really a good thing? We
are, after all, a country born from revolution. At the moment Bush v. Gore came down , a moment as notorious
as any in Supreme Court history-a moment in which the Supreme Court effectively appointed a
ability to annihilate the individual protestor,
president of its choosing-there was no resistance. That is a rather remarkable thing, really. As Professor
Ann Scales once observed, "Perhaps we should worry about how little it takes for the legal system to command so much ...
the seeming inevitability of authority can

convince people to accept much more than a judicial decision. The "rule of law,"
understood simply as an uncritical obedience to authority, has chilling implications for the reality of
power and its abuses. In Stanley Milgram's now classic work, Obedience to Authority, college students,
assigned the role of "teacher," in an experiment on learning, administered massive amounts of
electroshock to other students, assigned the role of "student," simply because a scientist told
them to do it. In a 1973 article about his study, Milgram said that most of the subjects delivering
the shocks to fellow students did so out of a "sense of obligation." This observation led
Milgram to agree with Hannah Arendt's characterization of evil as "banal," meaning that the capacity for evil does
not require any special personal predisposition. "That is perhaps the most fundamental lesson of our
study," Milgram wrote, "ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular
hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process.
Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear,
and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of
morality, relatively few people have the resources to resist authority." It is
absolutely critical, then, that we have those resources-that we work to develop
them.
dedication. Perhaps we have been bamboozled." Of course,
1AC Solvency
Restrictions on screening and increased training solve
National Center for Transgender Equality 15 (NCTE, the prime
advocates for transequality, June 29th, 2015, A Blueprint for Equality: The Right to
Travel (2015),
http://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_2015_Trav
el.pdf //MV)
In recent years, many Americans have been disturbed by the decision of the Transportation
Security Agency (TSA) to implement airport screening procedures that are far more
intrusive than anything previously seen in the United States. These techniqueswhich
often include intrusive body searches of passengerspresent especially serious concerns for
transgender people, who can be outed against their will only to face bias and
harassment. These screening procedures can be especially traumatic for
transgender children. In the National Transgender Discrimination Surveywhich includes data collected
before these more intrusive techniques were introducednearly one in five transgender travelers
reported having been harassed or disrespected by airport security screeners or
other airport workers.1 In 2011, the TSA began phasing in new screening technology that replaces
electronic viewing of images of passengers unclothed bodies with automated detection of potentially hazardous
This technology mitigates some privacy concerns but has not changed the
frequent use of intrusive pat-downs. NCTE continues to hear troubling stories from
transgender travelers about their treatment by TSA , as well as by officials at U.S. border
objects.
crossings. While NCTE has long worked with TSA to promote better staff training, respond to individual complaints,
and educate the trans traveling public, the agencys lack of transparency and persistent use of invasive and
unproven security procedures are a continuing cause for concern. Policy Advances The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) updated all scanners to show only a generic body outline rather than images of passengers
The Transportation Security Administration

should adopt more effective and less intrusive airport screening protocols
that reduce the frequency of pat-downs and do not require additional
screening of transgender travelers based solely on their personal
characteristics, prosthetics, or clothing. The Transportation Security
Administration should include transgender competence in its basic
training curriculum for airport security screeners and other Transportation
Security Officers. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should include transgender competence in
actual bodies. (2013) Needed Policy Changes
its basic training curriculum for CBP agents. See Immigration Reform for more on border enforcement and other
immigration policies
TSA scanning 95% ineffective, failing to detect a majority of

Capps 15

But
TSA:




Race/Ethnicity Advantage
TSA Bad
Privacy
TSAs AIT scanning and pat-downs violate passengers privacy
Hoff 14
(Jessica Hoff Managing Editor, Michigan State Law Review; J.D. 2015, Michigan State University College
of Law; B.A. 2011, Cedarville University, ENHANCING SECURITY WHILE PROTECTING PRIVACY: THE RIGHTS
IMPLICATED BY SUPPOSEDLY HEIGHTENED AIRPORT SECURITY)
WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT? ALOOK AT DIFFERENT SECURITY MEASURES Airports and the TSA have used a
variety of security measures to screen passengers over the years, each met with varying levels of resistance. n14 In
particular, the TSA has used magnetometers , n15 pat-downs, n16 and body scanners. n17
Before evaluating the rights that these measures implicate and the powers that the TSA has, it is helpful to
understand what each security measure actually entails. One of the older techniques for airport security is the
magnetometer, also known as a walk-through metal detector (WTMD), which is activated when a passenger who
walks through it has metal on his or her person. n18 Magnetometers were originally only set off by ferrous metals,
but the newer models also detect non-ferrous metals. n19 Once someone activates a WTMD, security [*1615]
personnel often either use a portable magnetometer to wand over the passenger and find the metal object or ask
the passenger to remove metal objects and walk through the magnetometer a second time. n20 In some cases,
activating the magnetometer once or twice could result in a frisk. n21 Regarding frisks and pat-downs, in 1974, the
Second Circuit in United States v. Albarado explained that "the typical airport frisk may be more in the nature of a
'pat-down,' involving only the patting of external clothing in the vicinity of pockets, belts or shoulders where a
the court described a full frisk as where

an officer feels "'with sensitive fingers every portion of the [person's] body '" and makes
weapon such as a gun might be secreted." n22 In contrast,
a thorough search "'of the [person's] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles,
In the past, the TSA only permitted its agents

to perform pat-downs with the back of their hands as a secondary form of
screening. n24 In 2004, the TSA implemented procedures that made pat-downs more
thorough in response to female passengers in Russia who concealed explosives on their torsos when boarding a
plane. n25 Further, since 2010, the TSA has allowed its agents conducting secondary
screenings to use the front of their hands to pat-down [*1616] passengers of the same
gender as the inspecting agent. n26 This policy changed when the TSA issued new standard operating
and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" n23
procedures (SOPs) that included the use of body scanners and full-body patdowns. n27 Explaining its change of
These enhanced
pat-downs "allow an officer to feel the whole body and under clothes ." n29 While
policy, the TSA stated that patdowns assist the TSA in detecting concealed explosives. n28
this is a dramatic change in policy, "[t]he TSA issued the [new] SOP without any public comment or input" and
without making the SOP available to the public. n30 In addition to using pat-downs as a secondary form of
passengers opting out of body scanners must also submit to a pat-down . n31
many passengers are still
uncomfortable with the level of intrusion and "have complained that their private
areas, such as breasts and genitals, have been touched ." n32 Indeed, the experience of former
screening,
Although [*1617] passengers are allowed to request a pat-down in private,
Miss USA Susie Castillo sounds much more like the full frisk described in Albarado than the light pat-down that used
to be more typical in an airport. n33 In addition to more intrusive pat-downs, much of the recent controversy over
the TSA's security measures has involved body scanners, also referred to as whole body imaging (WBI) or advanced
The two types of technologies used in body scanners are

backscatter technology and millimeter-wave technology . n35 AIT with backscatter
technology delivers a "low intensity x-ray" onto a passenger's body and takes a
picture of the photon pattern "bouncing off of certain materials, revealing its shape"
on the TSA monitor. n36 Similarly, AIT with millimeter-wave technology "uses nonionizing radiation in the radio wavelength area to bombard the body and record the
bouncing of the waves from [*1618] materials or objects on the body." n37 While AIT used to
generate detailed, passenger-specific pictures, the TSA presently utilizes millimeter-wave AIT with
imaging technology (AIT). n34
automated target recognition software (ATR), n38 which removes passenger-specific images and instead displays
the same generic outline for all passengers, automatically highlighting possible threats on that outline.
n39 Although the AIT at airports used to save detailed images of passengers, the TSA has since disabled this
capacity in its AIT units, and the TSA agents are not allowed to bring photographic devices, including phones, with
them into the screening room. n40 Under the TSA's procedures, a passenger steps into the AIT machine and raises
her hands above her head as the machine generates a generic image and points out areas for further search. n41
a TSA agent in a different room views the image and

indicates whether there is a need to pat-down, question, or further screen the
passenger. n42 However, if a passenger refuses to go through the body scanner, she will
be patted down in the manner previously described
According to current protocols,
Race
The TSA has no defense for the programs objectivity
Schmidt 13
(Michael S. Schmidt, . "Report Says T.S.A. Screening Program Not Objective," New York Times, 6-42013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/report-says-tsa-screening-program-notobjective.html//ghs-kw)
The Transportation Security Administration has little evidence that an airport

passenger screening program, which some employees believe is a magnet for racial profiling and has
cost taxpayers nearly one billion dollars, screens passengers objectively, according to a report by
the inspector general for the Homeland Security Department . The T.S.A.s behavioral
detection program is supposed to rely on security officers who pull aside
passengers who exhibit what are considered telltale signs of terrorists for additional
screening and questioning. It is illegal to screen passengers because of their
nationality, race, ethnicity or religion. According to the report, the T.S.A. has
not assessed the effectiveness of the program, which has 2,800 employees and
does not have a comprehensive training program. The T.S.A. cannot
show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the
programs expansion, the report said. As a result of the T.S.A. s ineffective oversight of the
program, it cannot ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened
objectively, the report said.
TSA officers concede programs are racist prefer our ev

Rockler 12
(Harmen Rockler, . "Report of TSA behavior shows racist
tendencies," No Publication, xx-xx-xxxx.
http://dailyorange.com/2012/08/report-of-tsa-behavior-showsracist-tendencies///ghs-kw)
The Transportation Security Administrations attempt to observe airline passengers
behaviors while going through airport security was revealed to be a cause for racial
profiling this week. TSA officers at Logan Airport in Boston told the New York Times
the program has increasingly targeted minorities to search instead of
actual passengers who pose a threat. Racial profiling is not a solution to
the security threat the United States faces. A security officer at the
airport told the Times, They just pull aside anyone who they dont like
the way they look if they are black and have expensive clothes or
jewelry, or if they are Hispanic. This is not what the intended goal of the
program was. The program was launched in 2011 as a trial, though behavior detection has been used at
Logan since 2003. TSA officers were supposed to have a casual conversation with passengers after providing a
boarding pass and ID, according to TSA spokesman Greg Soule in the Times article. At the start of the program,
Soule said, Officers are specifically trained to keep questions purposeful and related to detecting a passengers
What was found at Logan

suggests the program has not been about passengers behavior but their race.
Some think we need to profile. Supporters of racial profiling proclaim we shouldnt
sacrifice our security for political correctness. Because the 9/11 hijackers looked
Middle Eastern, we need to heavily screen those who look similar. Law enforcement
officers instincts should be pursued so we can be safer. Not all terrorists who attack
the United States have been Muslim or even look Middle Eastern. White and
nonwhite individuals have committed acts of terrorism on U.S. soil. All individuals
should be equally, fairly scrutinized at airport security because anyone could pose a
threat no matter his or her race. Trying to more heavily screen people who
look Arabic is not only a poor response to the actual threat posed, but it
may do further damage to the ability of law enforcement to protect us
from actual threats. We risk alienating the people we need to help us.
There is already a culture of suspicion of Middle Easterners and Muslims caused by
the way law enforcement behaves. Earlier this year, the New York Police Department was found to be
intent. This program is in no way related to passengers race or ethnicity.
spying on Muslim student associations in U.S. colleges (including Syracuse University) and cataloging mosques in
New Jersey. This is one part of the law enforcement system that may not be treating all citizens as equals.
TSAs extra-screening policy is not objective nor cost-effective

Washington Times, 6-5-2013, "TSA screenings lack objectivity, probe finds,"
Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/5/audit-findstsa-screening-lacks-objectivity/
The TSAs program to let agents pick out people for closer screening based on the agents
observation fails to meet basic standards of training of objectivity , according to a report
released Wednesday by the agencys auditor. More than 3,000 Transportation Security
Administration agents have been hired and authorized to conduct behavioral
detection, which involves watching or chatting up passengers and trying to pick
out clues that would suggest they are security risks. But the Homeland Security
Departments inspector general said the agency is running the program without
bothering to check to see if it is cost-effective, and without any sense that agents
are exercising good judgment in deciding which travelers they screen . TSA cannot
demonstrate that [officers] are screening passengers in a uniform manner to
identify potentially high-risk individuals , the auditor said. The inspector general recommended that
TSA come up with a strategic plan; do a better job collecting data on whos getting screened; provide better training
for officers and instructors; and figure out a way to assess whether instructors are doing a good job. In fiscal 2011,
more than 650 million passengers went through airports, and the behavioral detection program referred 2,214 of
them to law enforcement, producing 199 arrests for outstanding warrants, suspected drug possession or being
illegal immigrants. In his official response to the audit, TSA Administrator John S. Pistole said the agency has
completed a strategic plan, but it accepted most of the auditors recommendations and has finished or is working
on completing the changes. TSA believes that passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective manner;
[the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program] is effective and has been validated and determined
to identify substantially more high-risk travelers than a random screening protocol and the program is executed in
an efficient manner, Mr. Pistole said. TSA said the behavior program adds a needed layer of security to airport
checks, saying that the behavioral cues their officers look for have been honed through decades of research and
experience by other law enforcement branches. The agency said the program is nine times more likely to identify a
high-risk traveler than random screening. The audit report came on the same day that TSA officials announced
they were abandoning a plan to allow passengers to carry small knives, souvenir bats, golf clubs and other sports
equipment onto planes in the face of fierce congressional and industry opposition, the head of the agency said
Wednesday. Last month, 145 House members signed a letter to Mr. Pistole urging him not to ease the ban, and a
coalition of major airlines also opposed the policy change.
Islam
TSAs policies discriminate against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and
South Asians
TLC 11
(The Leadership Conference, Civil/human rights coalition, The Reality of Racial Profiling, 3/2011,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf)
In response to the
attacks, the federal government immediately engaged in a sweeping counterterrorism
campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims, and in some cases on persons who were
perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs and other South Asians.
That focus continues to this day. The federal government claims that its anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to racial profiling,
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries.
but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, as well as selective application of the immigration laws to
nationals of Arab and Muslim countries, belie this claim. A prime example of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS requires certain individuals from predominantly Muslim countries to register
with the federal government, as well as to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated. A report issued in 2009 by the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the Rights Working Group had this to say about NSEERS: More than seven years after its implementation, NSEERS continues to impact the
lives of those individuals and communities subjected to it. It has led to the prevention of naturalization and to the deportation of individuals who failed to
register, either because they were unaware of the registration requirement or because they were afraid to register after hearing stories of interrogations,
detentions and deportations of friends, family and community members. As a result, well-intentioned individuals who failed to comply with NSEERS due to
a lack of knowledge or fear have been denied "adjustment of status" (green cards), and in some cases have been placed in removal proceedings for
willfully" failing to register."45 Despite NSEERS' near explicit profiling based on religion and national origin, federal courts have held that the program
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced to participate in the program have not suffered violations of their
rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which protect against unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process,
respectively.46 Another example of a federal program that involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was
instituted just prior to the November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt terror operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the
existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Yale
Law School National Litigation Project.49 According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of
Homeland Security show that: an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim majority countries.
Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other
countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews conducted under this program. What did result, however, was
an intense chilling effect on the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities targeted in advance of an already
contentious presidential election.50 Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select candidates for investigation in
OFL.51 Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling.
Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law
Arabs and Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims

based on their appearance, have since 9/11 been targeted by law enforcement authorities in their homes, at
work, and while driving or walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting. One reason for this is a
enforcement resources yet fails to make our nation safer.52 Although
wide-ranging and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states, "in the course of a border search, and absent
individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter . the United
States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a person seeking to enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable
cause" to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians for extensive questioning about their families, faith, political opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to intrusive searches.
Often, their cell phones, laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed. The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every
person who, according to the U.S. government, has "any nexus" to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed
this defective
"watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians seeking to
enter the United States, including those who are U.S. citizens. The case of Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen, Gulf War veteran, 20-year
persons) and over-classification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes them appear dangerous when they are not),
member of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the problem. Trying to reenter the U.S. from Canada where he travels to visit family, Reed is
frequently detained, searched, and interrogated about his friends, politics, and reasons for converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of
his children, pointed weapons at him, and denied him counsel.57 In 2005, a lawsuitRahman v. Chertoffwas filed in federal district court in Illinois by
nine U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection to terrorist activity.58 The plaintiffsall of whom are of South
Asian or Middle Eastern descent alleged that they were repeatedly detained, interrogated, and humiliated when attempting to re-enter the U.S. because
their names were wrongly on the watch-list, despite the fact that they were law abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S. after
these recurring and punitive detentions.59 In May 2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the disputed detentions were "routine,"
meaning that border guards needed no suspicion at all to undertake various intrusions such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief time.60 Further,
the court held that where the stops were not routine, the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings were justified by the placement of the individuals on the
TSC's databaseeven when the listing may have been a mistake.61 Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and the continuation of
these practices on a national level, it is important to note that there have been certain positive changes in government policy since 2005. Specifically, a
standard of "reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added to the TSCs database, which marks a sharp departure from the essentially
Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings

are also profiled for higher scrutiny at airports. In response to criticism from Sikh organizations, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating procedure for screening head coverings at
"standardless" policy previously in effect.62
airports. The current procedure provides that: All members of the traveling public are permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not)
procedures subject all persons wearing head coverings

to the possibility of additional security screening, which may include a patdown search of the head covering.
through the security checkpoints. The new standard
Individuals may be referred for additional screening if the security officer cannot
reasonably determine that the head area is free of a detectable threat item. If the
issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down search, the individual will be offered
the opportunity to remove the head covering in a private screening area .63 Despite this new
procedure, and TSA's assurance that in implementing it "TSA does not conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and balances to
Sikh travelers report that they continue to be profiled and

subject to abuse at airports.65 Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh Coalition and a second-generation
American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee: Two months ago, my family and I were coming back to the
United States from a family vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I
subjected to extra screening, but so was [my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to
take my son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so that he could [be] patted down . He
cried while I held him. He did not know who that stranger was who was patting him down . His bag
ensure profiling does not happen,"64
was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number one was searched. His Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The
I am not sure what

I am going to tell him when he is old enough and asks why his father and
grandfather and soon himAmericans all threeare constantly stopped by the TSA
100% of the time at some airports.66
time spent waiting for me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time.
TSAs security procedures are a direct violation of Islamic

principle opt out exemptions arent enough
CS Monitor 10
("Do airport full body scanners violate Islam?," Christian Science Monitor, 3/15/2010.
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0315/Do-airport-full-body-scanners-violate-Islam)
two American Muslim groups have

suggested that the technology violates the teachings of Islam. The comments are just the
latest controversy surrounding full-body scanners, which some critics call a virtual strip search because the
technology sees through clothing to show the contours of a passengers body in
detail. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed 150 scanners across 21 US airports this
As full body scanners debut at OHare International Airport Monday,
month, partly in response to the failed Christmas Day bombing of a Detroit-bound jetliner, where bombmaking
materials were hidden in a passengers underwear something full-body scanners would have seen. The TSA
expects to install an additional 300 scanners in nine additional airports by the end of this year. But
security officials say they will be able to accommodate the wishes of passengers Muslim or otherwise who object
to the full-body screener. TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE Could you pass a US citizenship test? PHOTOS OF THE DAY
Photos of the day 02/08 The technology is completely optional for all passengers, says Jim Fotenos, a TSA
spokesman, and those who choose not to participate get an equal level of screening, which includes a walk
through a metal detector and a physical pat-down by an officer of the same sex. Islamic objections
The
screening imagery is a violation of Islam , says The Fiqh Council of North America, a body of
Islamic scholars located in Plainfield, Ind. Last month the council issued a statement that said the full body
imagery is against the teachings of Islam, natural law, and all religions and cultures
that stand for decency and modesty. It is a violation of clear Islamic teachings
that men or women be seen naked by other men and women , the statement continued.
There must be a compelling case for the necessity and the exemption to this rule
must be proportional to the demonstrated need . The Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR), a Washington-based civil rights advocacy group, agrees with the Fiqh Council and, according to National
Communications Director Ibrahim Hooper, it plans to track Muslims concerns with the scanners before deciding
what actions to take next. Modesty is a basic principal of the Islamic faith, its very important and always has
been, says Mr. Hooper. People say, Ill do anything for safety, but thats not the question. Everybody wants to be
Muslims fly like anybody else you can be safe and secure and still maintain
your privacy rights. 'A fuzzy photo negative' To stress the anonymity of the process, the TSA says officers
safe.
review the images in a remote location and never see the actual passengers. What they do see via their monitors is
automatically deleted from the system once the passenger passes review. According to the TSA website, what
officers see of a passengers body either resembles a chalk drawing or a fuzzy photo negative, depending on
the machine, therefore suggesting passenger privacy is ensured. The Fiqh Council, however, is urging followers to
request pat-down searches as an alternative. CAIRs Mr. Hooper also advocates an increase in federal funding for
alternate screening technologies that do not require visual screening, such as the "Puffer, a machine that can
identify chemical particles a person may have on their body and analyze whether or not they are harmful. The
TSAs Fotenos says the current options shouldnt substantially impact operations at checkpoints, saying TSA
research at 19 US airports shows gate delays are primarily caused by carry-on baggage checks.
Trans Advantage
2AC Stuff
Trans- is a Good Term

Trans- is the choice broad term used in discussion--- its the
most open-ended and yes, the hyphen matters
we feel it important to
acknowledge the multiple different ways in which the word can be written (as trans-,
trans, trans* , 'trans' and so on) and its multiple uses as a modifier, an identity, a
referent and modality of being. We use the written forms 'trans-' when discussing
self-identified transbodies and/or concepts and issues raised by those individuals , for
the same reasons as those eloquently expressed by Susan Stryker: 'we think the hyphen matters a great deal,
precisely because it marks the difference between the implied nominalism of "trans"
and the explicit relationality of "trans-", which remains open-ended and resists premature
Although we only engage with trans- insofar as to contextualise the theoretical discussion of cis-,
foreclosure by attachment to any single suffix' (2008: 11). We do, however, use trans- as a prefix without hyphenation, resisting the implication of
Following the same logic, we write cis- and cis in the

same way. In order to avoid reproducing an unhelpful and problematic binary
structure through juxtaposing cis- with trans- in our writing, we also employ the
term genderqueer to refer to those performances of gender that are not socially
validated. This term owes an obvious debt to queer theory, which 'opposes those who would regulate identities or establish epistemological claims
separation and/or otherness suggested by its inclusion.
of priority for those who seek to make claims to certain kinds of identities' (Butler, 2004: 7, emphasis added).
Human Rights
Human Rights violations cascade to create spaces of silence
that deny transindividuals from society; we have a moral
obligation to reject human rights violations
Ochoa 8 (Marcia Ochoa, is assistant professor of community studies at the
University of California, Santa Cruz, 2008, "Perverse Citizenship: Divas, Marginality,
And Participation In Loca-Lization," Wsq: Women'S Studies Quarterly Volume 36,
Numbers 3 & 4 //MV)
These kinds of things happen all the time on Libertador, not just with the Guardia (in fact, this was the first time I had seen them
These things happen because there

are silences in which they can happen people who are not subjects of rights are
regularly subject to violations of their integrity as human beings and citizens . No
complaints are filed because the complaint is not a useful tool for them. At that
moment they are really, irreverently, screwed . So at any moment, some men with guns can do what they
please, and if there is silence, they can continue to do so . In Venezuela I learned that this problem has a
name: impunity. There are few negative consequences for these actions (which are presumably
worth the risk for a free blow job). If one were to try to produce an utterance that brought
consequencesa sound in the night or a complaint filed and prosecuted the
morning afterone would be attempting to intervene in the situation. But the
problem is that the situation works within its spaces of silence and that the same
people who are subject to its abuses have learned to take advantage of these
silences. If they wanted to fight for their rights they would be doing so already
because they already know how to fight. While there is no such discourse that
makes explicit the terms of interaction within what is now a space of silence, the
parties coexist in a daily negotiation, lubricated by that very silence . The problem is
that sometimes they dont coexist, and one of them ends up dead under a bridge. For
those of us who, coming from another place, happen upon these realities and want to intervene, the task is not to
bring light or voice somehow, presuming there was none before; it is
to use the social mobility of our bodies and our language to transform
relationsto treat people as legitimate subjects of rights, to mobilize the
resources necessary for an intervention that makes sense to the people
directly involved.
take transformistas in custody), but also with the Polica Metropolitana.
Dehumanization
Dehumanization destroys value to life
Bain et al. 13 (Paul G. Bain, Jeroen Vaes, Jacques Philippe Leyens, School of
Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia, October 2013 Humanness and
Dehumanization, pg. 89-90 //MV)
we place considerable emphasis on the value of,
and premium afforded to, humanness {and thus human likes and needs). Outgroup
dehumanization matters because humans are highly valued relative to other
species, as we outline subsequently (see lnterspecies Model of Prejudice"). Moreover, the value
of worth assigned a social target theoretically influences the degree of humanness
ascribed, the implications of which are qualified by the threat potentially posed by
the target (see Value K Threat Model of I-lumanness Representations, subsequently]. One need not look fat for
In our overall approach to dehumanization,
evidence on the decreased value of human outgroups. For example, Pratto and Glasford (2008) found that
Americans markedly value American lives over Iraqi lives, particularly in competitive contexts, and that this relative
Put simply, people

become oblivious to mass losses of others live s. Consistent with these laboratory findings, the
disregard for outgroup life is considerably insensitive to scale or magnitude of loss.
U.S. military, in its operations in the Middle East, engages a macabre calculus: In high-priority strikes, up to 29
non-American lives can be squandered without authorization from superiors (Bombing Afglianistan, 2009).
Donald Rums feld (then U.S. secretary of defense) epitomized this cavalier approach to outgroup casualties in his
Despite modern norms and

laws governing the ethics of warfare, the lives of others are generally considered
less valuable than those of the ingroup. This differential value attributed to the
ingroup versus outgroup cuts to the core of outgroup dehumanization. In everyday
life, we degrade the humanness in others for a variety of cognitive and motivational
reasons, each, we argue, stemming from the inherent value 90 Gordon Hodson, Cara C. Maclmris, and Kirnberiy
Costello seen in humanity (especially us }. In short, the premium afforded to being human
impacts our cognitive processes and motivations with regard to out relations with
both animals and human outgroups.
quip, Well, we dont do body counts on other people. (Transcript, 2003).
This creates a deeper level of Otherization that forces transindividuals into social invisibility and denies them from society
Fee 10 (Angie Fee, Ph. D. in gender studies, 2010, Transgender Identities pg. 218-219 //MV)
ln this chapter l have attempted to illuminate the ways in which non-trans privilege operates in sexualised spacesin this case, two
Queer is employed in these spaces to signify a sex-positive/

sex radical philosophy, celebration of difference and non-normative gender/ sex
configurations, and a resistance to heteropatriarchal forces that belittle and
degrade womens and queers sexualities and desire . The objectives are twofold: to
explore and resuscitate those libidinal and bodily desires that are suppressed or
stigmatised in societythus, facilitating bodily empow- erment and recognition; and
inclusivity, where neither overt nor tacit exclusions operate. This latter obiective
inclusivityis a necessary and critical precondition for the former. In other
words, these public and sexual events, unlike gay male sexual zones, would simply
not work without this inclusion (queer) criterion an understanding not lost on the organisers.
Canadian lesbian queer bathhouses.
Lesbian/queer spaces have their own logic that emerges out of a social structure that is homophobic, misogynist, and patriarchal.
Moreover, because there are so few lesbian/queer public sexual spaces, such spaces cater and attract a broad array of sexualities
and sexual interestsas opposed to particular sexual niches (e.g., SM/leather). This dearth of public space, coupled with the sexual
politics that such spaces engender, translates into events that, unlike most gay male sexual zones, contain low levels of both
vertical differentiation as it relates to tiers of desirability and horizontal differentiation as it relates to social/sexual types and ones
erotic capital (Green 2008). In other words, within this one available space multiple fields of sexual interest and desire converge,
such that no one prevailing aesthetic standard of desirability exists. While such a plurality induces a democratis- ing field of
relations, it does not eradicate privilege. Bodies circulate in these spaces with different degrees of bodily capital. By bodily capital I
refer not to aesthetic standards of attraction and eroti- cism per se (although this has linkages t_o my larger meaning), so much as a
particular corporeality that exposes the fears of the sexual centre and the operative exclusionary mechanisms that prevail. For one,
queers of colour and trans-folk are underrepresented in such spaces, both in terms of sheer participation, their inclusion on the
organising committee, and as staff and volunteers. Other mechanisms curtail bodily and sexual expression such as (actual or
perceived) discrimination, in the form of trans/racial eroticisa- tion -and transphobia. Although some bodies actively take advantage
Those too queerand queer here means

too physically outside normative sexed/gendered bodiesare outcastes even in
spaces where queer is deployed to celebrate such configurations . Fieldwork
revealed a current of transphobia at these venues . The transmen and transwomen
were, like queers of colour, literally on the margins . Trans individuals were confined
to smaller, outer areas of the venue, and rarely intermingled with the scene . Eric, a
of these sexual opportunities, it is the least queer among them.
transman, came to the event knowing he might feel uncomfortable, but wanted to show his support. interviewee comments
suggested that unambiguous trans-bodiesthose with secondary sex characteristics and/or transitioned/ing bodies--did not
belong, since they were men with male energy. Under this logic, subjects pass (fit in) when lacking external cues of (real)
masculinity (a phallus or a hirsute body), while maintaining a body-sex-gender disjuncture. Given the bathhouses philosophy, this
heteronormative and reductive assortment of bodiesthe very thing it is purportedly contestingis ironic to say the least.
Trans-masculinities violate womens space, while other masculinitiesthose not

yoked to male bodiesare accepted and even encouraged, even if the
subjectivities/behaviours attached to these non-trans bodies are objectionable and
misogynist. Conversely, transmens subjectivitieseven those closely tied to and
affiliated with feminist, queer and lesbian communitiesare evacuated when
automatically flagged as contaminating. The politics of belonging debate has had a
long and check- ered past within the lesbian-feminist community (the Michigan \X/omyns
Music Festivals womynborn-womyn policy is a case in point). Yet, some quarters of the
lesbian/feminist/queer pro-sex communities have attempted to overcome these
border wars, seeing queer and its philosophy as an effective strategy to extricate
womens space from political immobilisation, by refashioning, expanding and decentring womens space to forge coali- tional alliances . Although queer seemed to wield much
promise, as the bathhouses illuminate, queer is a limited, if not ineffectual, strategy for such change. The salience of some bodies
over others suggests that other bodies will continue to be marked, even in purportedly democratic and queer spaces. In spaces
Despite a celebration of difference and

non-norma- tivity, Other bodies do not possess the bodily capital necessary to fully
access the sexual opportunities that are available. As I have tried to show, these
sexual spaces reproduce and replicate certain privilegesin this case, non-trans
privilege-thus, revealing their own normative and disciplining processes.
that are sexually charged, this visibility becomes ever more intensified.
The shameful feeling of otherness in the system of transphobia perpetrates violence against trans people
Spade, Dean (2010) "Introduction: Transgender Issues and the Law," Seattle
Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol8/iss2/1)
Eli Clare provides a moving and beautiful exploration of how
shame shapes the lives of people living
in bodies marked "wrong." n4 With the arresting prose and incisive analysis he is known for, Clare opens
up the topic of shame through both his own experiences and his observations of [*446] how shame is produced and
circulated in certain spaces--in clinics, hospitals, and communities divided by judgment and hierarchy. Clare
exposes how
trans politics and identity are not just intellectual or political disruptions,
not just projects of resistance, and not just metaphors for alterity. Trans experiences
of being "excessive" and "outside" are produced and reproduced as sites of harm
and violence; trans people simultaneously live with vulnerability to violence and
struggle with our internalization of the norms that define our otherness . In Clare's
articulation, this shame requires constant negotiation; healing from shame is a process and never a place of
arrival. Masen Davis and Kristina Wertz provide a snapshot of the impact of systemic trans phobia in
their article, When Laws are Not Enough: A Study of the Economic Health of Transgender People and the Need for a
Multidisciplinary Approach to Economic Justice. n5 The recent studies they cite measure trans people's experiences
discrimination and poverty and demonstrate the significant economic marginalization of trans
populations. Twenty-five percent of trans Californians, Davis and Wertz tell us, report that they are, or have
of
been, homeless. Ninety-seven percent of respondents in a national study of trans people report having experienced
some form of workplace harassment or discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression. The California
survey found that less than half of trans respondents are employed full-time. These statistics reveal what advocates
that trans people face severe economic insecurity, exclusion

from social services, high rates of imprisonment, and high rates of violence . Trans
and activists have long known:
people of color, trans people with disabilities, trans people who are poor or homeless, trans youth, and trans
the systems that target those groups for

policing and detention of various kinds are organized through gender segregation,
and gender-nonconforming people face severe violence in those systems . n6 [*447] As
immigrants are particularly vulnerable, especially because
the interview included in this cluster demonstrates, n7 Medicaid is one area of law and policy where these
conditions may even be worsening. In recent years, Medicaid has increased coverage exclusions of gender-
those who are already

experiencing the many dangers of economic insecurity may be facing increased
harm. A key challenge facing trans politics, like other social movements, is how to properly account for the
confirming healthcare for trans people. This disturbing trend suggests that
uneven distribution of vulnerability and violence across trans populations. Not all trans people are equally
vulnerable, yet the framework of studying, describing, and addressing these harms through the single vector of
transphobia often causes the erasure of the reality of conditions facing those most vulnerable. Countless scholars
who have taken up Crenshaw's call for intersectional analysis--as well as the tools of queer theory, n8 women of
color feminism, n9 Critical Race Theory, n10 critical disability studies, n11 queer of color critique, n12 and other
critical analytical frameworks and resistance practices--problematize political responses that focus on a single
vector of subjection. Their work shows that when a single identity category is the focus, narratives of subjection
through that identity category end up erasing the other factors that participate in producing vulnerability. The
strategies for change that emerge tend to only serve those who have privilege in all other realms. Thus, a
domestic violence response framed around a falsely universalized women's

experience comes to actually frame white, able-bodied, nonimmigrant, straight,
class-privileged, non-trans women's experience. n13 The strategies that emerge for addressing
domestic violence, such as increased criminal prosecution of batterers, are actually harmful to women whose other
identity categories make them targets of criminalization. n14 Similarly, a response to the control of reproduction
framed by white, able-bodied, class-privileged, nonimmigrant, straight, non-trans women's experience becomes
focused on abortion rights but fails to address forced sterilization; vulnerability to family dissolution by child welfare
systems; [*448] the impacts of criminalization of both youth and adults on families; genocidal practices targeting
native families; and access to reproductive technologies for public benefits recipients. n15 Similarly, a response to
homophobia that centers white, nonimmigrant, able-bodied, wealthy gay men becomes centered on access to
private property rights through marriage rather than the abuses faced by queer prisoners and immigration
detainees, the harms experienced by queer low-income and homeless people in shelters and foster care systems,
the child welfare battles of lesbian mothers of color, or other urgent sites of vulnerability. n16
The othering impact against trans people forces them into a

never ending feeling of silence within themselves.
Girshick 2009 (Lori, Transgender Voices: Beyond Women and Men, pg.155-156 , 915-2009)
Individuals Wlll use strategies of disconnection in order to maintain their relationships by denying parts of
trans-identified people
often have to abandon their true selves or hide parts of themselves in order to stay
themselves that others may find objectionable or unacceptable. In other words,
connected to people they care about. They are forced to silence themselves to avoid the
pain of losing relationships. Jean Baker Miller (1988) calls this condemned isolation
being locked out of authentic human connection . ~ -Members of marginalized groups
often are silenced and isolated as a result of dominant groups defining what is
acceptable. In the case of trans-identified individuals, the policing of dominant gender norms
force those who are variant to hide their authentic self and try to make their gender nonconformity invisible; their
feelings of shame lead to self-doubts and a sense of unworthiness (Jordan 1989). If they
internalize the cultures transphobia, these individuals may also go through periods
of selfloathing and even self-inflicted punishment for their supposed perversion or
abnormality. Stigma of Difference The experience of being different very much defines the notion of abnormal.
Ones status as someone abnormal manifests itself in how others treat you and also in how you feel about yourself.
Transman IT touched in both of these issues: Well, according to the dominant culture I dont even exist. There isnt
for years I thought I was simply sick, a failed person. . . .

The issue of gender in social interaction is so large (at least in my experience) that if you
arent properly gendered or dont adhere to the rules accordingly every single
interaction from conversations to eating to simply walking down the street can become negative or
create insecurity. For example, throughout school many other student: wouldnt interact with me or were rude
even a transman stereotype (yet). So
to be because I was very masculine (by US standards) and they thought that was weird. People wouldn't eat lunch
with me in jr high and high school because I was that weird girl or that lesbian, and of course they would say
mean things about my appearance behind my back. And from grade school until the start of my transition, every
other time I walked somewhere people would commentWhat are you? Are you a boy or a girl? or simply stare.
Many people I talked with spoke about not fitting in and being unusual. Dawn (hermaphrodite) said, Ive always
felt like a freak. Being made fun of by other kids. My mother telling me how much she was ashamed of me. The fact
that there is very, very rarely and discussion or recognition that hermaphrodites exist. Such freak observations
were not uncommon. Our society definitely has portrayed those who transgress genders as being sick freaks, Abe
(FtM) commented. And Ted, a masculine woman, shared that when she goes swimming, her short hair, unshaved
legs, and broad shoulders attract attention: Sometimes
people just stare at my body like Im

some sort of freak. Dustin (FtM) points out that if youre not gendernormal you are crazy, which
means you are unstable, undesirable, and a failure .
Privacy
Scanning violates the privacy of all individuals specifically
targeting those deemed abnormal
Yofi Tirosh 13, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, 3-17-2013, "Naked In Front Of
The Machine: Does Airport Scanning Violate Privacy?," 74 Ohio State Law Journal
1263 (2013 ), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234476 //MV
A parallel argument can be made for people with disabilities, people of color,
transgender people, or fat people. Members of these groups have an intensified
experience of their corporeality, and have more exposed psychological membranes
to having their bodies subjected to inspection. Thus, body scanning technology has
a disparate impact on those whose bodies are socially classified as normal and
those who are considered abnormal. Bodily privacy could have equalized the
diversity of bodies and reinstalled the States required indifference to
such differences . However, the scanners frustrate these reasonable expectations and this equalizing potential. The
burden, and hence the privacy violation, on people whose bodies are tagged abnormal is
greater than on the former.187 In other words, when it comes to the stigmatized
groups we mentioned here, the right to privacy is allocated unequally . This is quite
paradoxical, as body scanning has been presented as an equalizing technology,
which successfully replaces human profiling .188 C. Privacy and Shame The discussion thus far has
suggested that when passengers are scanned, the governmental gaze at the naked body
contradicts its routine messages, about the social norms of dressing, and about the
irrelevance of bodily differences. How does this conclusion fit within privacy theory?
This section ties the two dissonances to privacy scholarship, and then presentsand respondsto a possible critique. 1. Privacy?
Most scholars, and as we saw above, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, too, have assumed that body scanners harm privacy, but
have not articulated the harm. The close reading of the courts opinion revealed that the assumed harm is related to the production
of the image: when the TSA agent sees what she sees, and whether the State maintains a database of the images (it does not).
The production of the image and its storage could indeed have a harmful potential,
as the agent may have associated an image with a person, and may reveal intimate
personal data. A database, if there were one, would be extremely sensitive, and the
potential harm would obviously be staggering. Many of these concerns can be diffused by the
technological design (blurring faces, using generic figures, not storing the images even momentarily), and by administrative means
the discussion of the two dissonances

indicates that there is more at stake. It is not only the outcome of the search that
raises concerns; it is the search itself. One way to phrase the privacy harm is to
locate the dissonances within Fourth Amendment doctrine, and specifically, the
reasonable expectations test.189 There is ample critique of this test as both tautological and too malleable, and for
(locating the agents so they cannot see the passengers). But
its shortcomings in handling new technologies,190 but for the time being we accept it, as it governs privacy doctrine. The two
our old expectations about the privacy of our bodies

(dress/undress) and about its social and self-acceptability (normal/abnormal) are
reasonable. The reasonableness is established and constantly reinforced through social and legal norms. The two
dissonances further establish that current expectations as to bodily privacy are
unlikely to change any time soon. This is an important point, as in other contexts, it seems that the Supreme
dissonances we presented above mean that
Court portrayed the reasonableness element of the test as a descriptive matter rather than a normative position. Thus, according to
this construction of the test, if a certain practice seems at one point reasonable (having privacy), but circumstances change so that
it is no longer experienced as the common situationthe judicial conclusion might change. An example is the case of privacy in the
workplace. In a 1987 case, the Court ruled that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk drawers. But the
Court offered employers an escape route: Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by
legitimate regulation.191 To the extent that the test is based on a descriptive element,
passengers might get used
to not having bodily privacy in the specific airport context, but this will not be a
result of changing expectations about bodily privacy in general , but onlyif it so
turns outas to the specific situation. In fact, the TSAs announcement about
eliminating the naked backscatter scanners reinforces current privacy expectations.
If the government will again change its mind , and attempt to reintroduce the
backscatters, such a hypothetical move is likely to meet much stronger privacy
sentiments. If, however, reasonableness is best understood as containing a normative element, i.e., a value judgment of the
expectations, then we need an external yardstick, according to which we can evaluate passengers expectations.
Neolib
TSA Scanning perpetuates neoliberal rhetoric of consumerist
choice when in fact nothing is being chosen from at all (?)
In this way, whole body imaging technologies are also marketed using a rhetoric of
choice. As the TSA asserts: The passenger has the option of receiving a full pat
down or going through the Whole Body Imaging system (National Center for
Transgender Equality 2009). Here, we see how the need for a strip search is
naturalized as the question becomes, instead of Why must I submit to a strip
search? a matter of What kind of strip search would I prefer? As such, the
deployment of whole body scanners through a rhetoric of choice manifests a logic of
neoliberal governmentality. Inderpal Grewal notes that, by the early twenty-first
century, consumer culture has become central to neoliberalism, promoting
endlessly the idea of choice as central to a liberal subject and enabling the
hegemony of both capitalist democracy, American style, and the selfactualizing and
identity-producing possibilities of consumption (2005, pp. 219220). A rhetoric of
consumerist choice and concomitant freedoms is everywhere in a US
citizen/consumers experience of air travel, from Southwest Airlines promise that
low fares mean You are now free to move about the country, to flight attendants
stoking customer loyalty with the familiar phrase: We know you have a choice of
carriers when you fly, and thank you for choosing our airline (Southwest 2010). In
airport security contexts, such neoliberal discourses position individual travelers as
having agency to choose which option, scanner or pat-down, best suits their travel
schedule (e.g., Is there enough time for a pat-down or would the scanner be more
efficient?) or their personal preferences (e.g., Id rather not have a strangers
hands on my body so Ill choose the scanner)when in fact the subject can only
choose between slightly different expressions of the states interests in bodily
surveillance.
Rights
Transgendered bodies are policed by scanning technology
which can have broader consequences on their rights
Backscatter and millimeter wave technologies have significant consequences for
transgender bodies and mobilities . Whole body imaging technologies can reveal
breasts, genitals, prostheses, and binding materials . These technologies also have
the ability to zoom in on a particular area, including genitalia (National Center for Transgender
Equality 2009). As a result, bodies that do not fit normative gender identities may be
singled out by the TSA for special scrutiny, providing the possibility that
transgender individuals may be outed to TSA personnel , or that they may have their
bodily privacy further invaded. Here, bodies rendered as matter out of place are policed. This has
especially devastating consequences for transgender individuals who are closeted
and live in small towns, in which case being outed at the local airport could have
broader consequences, such as implications for their job security or for their relationships with friends and relatives.
Moreover, a transphobic screener could easily cause a transgender person to miss their
flight by detaining them for special screening or could subject them to new forms of
humiliation and harassment. Given the potential consequences of whole body imaging
technologies, Mara Kiesling, the executive director of the National Center for Transgender
Equality, identified whole body imaging technologies as one of the most pressing
issues facing transgender communities.
Full body scanning subjects transgender bodies to

constitutional rights violations and privacy violations every
time they pass through the airport
Abini, D. B., 2014, "TRAVELING TRANSGENDER: HOW AIRPORT SCREENING
PROCEDURES THREATEN THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY," Southern
California Law Review Volume 78, pg. 120A //MV
Full-body scanning and other airport screening procedures have provoked outcry
from the transgender community because of how they force transgender individuals
going through airport security to disclose intimate details about their bodies,
invading their privacy and making travel stressful and sometimes even dangerous.
n2 In addition, the United States Transportation Security Administration (" TSA") has been under
increased scrutiny, both for its departure from a risk-based screening system as well as for the weaknesses
in its current screening system. While the TSA has taken some action to ameliorate privacy
concerns by decommissioning one type of whole-body scanner, n3 such action only reflects a
change in agency policy, which does not prevent the TSA from reverting back to its
old ways. The right to informational privacy has only been directly addressed in
three Supreme Court cases, all of which found that , on balance, no constitutionally
impermissible privacy intrusion occurred . However, the Court reached these decisions without
explicitly indicating that the right to informational privacy existed, leaving circuit courts to define the contours of
the right. Relying on the guidelines set out by circuit courts that best comport with Supreme Court informational
the constitutional right to informational privacy is

seriously intruded upon when transgender travelers pass through airport security
checkpoints. Although others have addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of full-body scanning in
privacy jurisprudence, this Note contends that
preflight screening, n4 this Note is the first to do so from the informational privacy perspective.
TSA scanning virtually strips the body to nudity and in doing

so strips the rights from those bodies
Standing outside her place of work in Baghdads Green Zone, an Iraqi woman holds
up an image of a naked womans body taken by a backscatter camera. Farah alJaberi is protesting that she must consent to be scanned by this type of technology
as a condition of her employment (Corey Flintoff 2008). Noting that male guards can see
these images, and could conceivably photograph and save them to view later, alJaberi highlights the ways that these technologies violate both her bodily privacy
and her religious beliefs. At the same time, vendors of whole body imaging scanners such as
backscatter X-rays market them as objective and able to eliminate systemic forms of
discrimination since To them, everyone is the same color (William Saletan 2007). We live
in a virtual world, it is said, where bodies no longer matter. Yet the
material body is central to modern forms of power and thus also key to
state policies, borders, media, and technologies. As a result, new ways of
visualizing the body are central to contemporary regimes of governance . Since the terrorist
attacks of 11 September, 2001, we have witnessed the rise of a multitude of new identification technologies that emphasize the
Using new ways of visualizing the

body, individuals are increasingly linked through their bodies into networks as part
of what Simone Browne (2009) calls the identityindustrial complex, in which the body
itself becomes the primary object of surveillance . Whole body imaging technologies, capable of virtually
productive potential of the human body for the governance of the state.
stripping the body naked and which are becoming central to airport security, are the subject of this article.
Fem
Scanning forces the feminine body to be objectified by male
authority
Redden, Stephanie M., Carleton University, Canada and London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK, 6-1-2013, "The End Of The Line Feminist
Understandings Of Resistance To Full-Body Scanning Technology," International
Feminist Journal Of Politics Issn: 1461-6742 Date: 06/2013 Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Page:
234-253 //MV
most technologies can be seen as being both being gendered in
and of themselves and that, once in existence, they can also be used in ways that
are gendered and serve to further perpetuate an existing gendered order. She
explains that although women are active creators and users of technologies, men
have been in a position to create technologies that dominate and serve certain
masculine values and purposes (Rakow 1988: 66). Below we briefly outline the existing feminist literature which,
As Rakow (1988: 668) argues,
similar to Rakows earlier piece, has centered on exploring the complex and in some cases mutually constitutive (Wajcman 2004:
8) relationship between gender and technology. We then build on these insights in order to examine how and in what ways
full-body scanners can be seen as a gendered technology which has led to

gendered practices within the airport security screening setting (Rakow 1988: 57).
Feminist scholars writing about the relationship between technology and gender
have noted that there is a complicated and intimate connection between the two
which is reflected in both the development and utilization of most technologies (Terry
and Calvert 1997; Johnson 2006; Rosser 2006; Monahan 2009), with many viewing the relationship as
mutually constitutive (Wajcman 2004: 8). As mentioned previously, the backscatter technology
utilized in many airport full-body scanners was developed by American inventor
Martin Annis thirty years ago (Nickisch 2010: 1). Annis did not develop or evaluate
--------------------------------------------------- Stephanie M. Redden and Jillian Terry/The End of the Line 237 the technology in a
way that would make it gender sensitive. As he stated in a recent interview: [Annis] When I first invented the
system, people would say, Well, what would a woman look like? And everybody has not got good motives in this. [Journalist] He
asked a relative of his to test it a pretty, young woman. He says it made her less attractive. [Annis] You dont see the womans
Annis comments point

toward the obviously gendered implications of body scanning technology by
attempting to remove sexuality from the equation completely, the technology
emphasizes the physical attributes of women and men, highlighting the apparently
problematic nature of such interactions between the body and modern
technologies. The mere mention of attractiveness in Annis remarks remind us of
the continued importance of feminist scholarship examining the male gaze, and
how that gaze is mediated through a lens of technology. According to Monahan (2009: 288), these
modern technologies can betray their gendered dimensions through various forms
of discrimination. Fullbody scanner technology most clearly embodies a form of
body discrimination, as he outlines. He explains that most technologies are
designed better for use by men than women. This is in large part, a product of the
frame of reference of technology designers, software developers, and engineers,
most of whom are men designing with themselves in mind (Monahan 2009: 288). Tellingly, fullbody scanners have raised privacy-based concerns among many female passengers
because when one goes through the scanner, sanitary napkins are made visible to
those reviewing the scan, and in some cases, women wearing these items have been targeted for additional security
nipple. They look a little like Barbie dolls. So in fact, its not very sexual. (Nickisch 2010: 2)
Had this technology been designed with

both men and women in mind, this issue would have been acknowledged and
addressed by its creator. In addition, much like the forms of video surveillance discussed by Monahan, full-body
scanners require someone to be in a private viewing area separate from passengers
to analyze the images produced from the scanner. This separation can prove to be
problematic as it can serve to mask potential forms of sexual harassment being
committed by those monitoring and reviewing surveillance video, or in this case fullbody scans (Monahan 2009: 288).
screening (Daily Mail 2010: 16; Sharkey 2010: 2; Shores 2010: 3).
Econ Advantage
Delays I/L
TSA = Delays
TSA inspections cause flight delays every minute is wasted
money
Jamie Rhein, 8-20-2008, "TSA inspector damages planes and causes major flight
delays," Gadling, http://gadling.com/2008/08/20/tsa-inspector-damages-planes-andcauses-major-flight-delays/ //MV
TSA inspectors check planes for security
issues while the planes are parked. Unfortunately, knowing which parts of planes should not be
touched, and what a ladder looks like is a skill set that still needs some fine tuning. According to this ABC
News report, an inspector at Chicagos OHare Airport used sensitive instrument
probes as handholds while climbing into nine American Eagle airplanes. These TAT probes,
pictured, are important to the operation of flight computers . As a result, 40
commuter flights were delayed. At the time, the TSA agent was attempting to determine if the aircraft
could be broken into and an agency official is quoted as saying Our inspector was
following routine procedure for securing the aircraft that were on the tarmac.
As one of the duties to make sure air travel is safer,
Security procedures cost millions of hours of wasted time

Chris Edwards, director of transportation policy, Reason Foundation, 12-1-20 13,
"Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration," Downsizing the Federal
Government, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/homeland-security/tsa
Aside from invasions of privacy, the frequent congestion at U.S. airports caused by
security procedures has a large cost in terms of wasted time. There are about 740
million passenger flights a year in the United States.107 For example, if a new
security procedure adds 10 minutes to each flight, travelers would consume another
123 million hours per year. That is a lot of time that people could have used earning
money or enjoying life with their families. Policymakers need to remember that
citizens value their time and that unneeded bureaucratic procedures destroy that
precious resource.
Delays Expensive
Airline delays are costly for the airline industry
Associated Press, 12-10-2014, "Flight delays are costing airlines serious
money," Mashable, http://mashable.com/2014/12/10/cost-of-delayed-flights/ //MV
"If you're late out of the driveway in the morning, you're probably going to be a little bit late to work," says Steve Hozdulick,
In the
airline world, delays build as the day wears on. This summer, for example, airlines were on-time around
Southwest's senior director of operational performance. "You're going to hit the two traffic lights that you never hit."
85% or better until mid-morning. By mid-afternoon, the rate dropped into the low 70s, then plunged into the 60s by dinner time.
Delays are costly for airlines and their passengers . A 2010 study commissioned by the Federal Aviation
Administration estimated that flight delays cost the airline industry $8 billion a year flight delays cost
the airline industry $8 billion a year, much of it due to increased spending on crews, fuel and maintenance. Delays cost passengers
In the first nine months of the year, more than 1 million U.S.
airline flights arrived late about one in five. According to the Department of Transportation, delays were slightly up
in October compared to September. Tardiness creates other problems including missed
connections, lost bags and short tempers among frustrated travelers. A little problem has a
ripple effect On a freezing morning recently at Dallas Love Field, Southwest supervisors showed up at 4 a.m., two hours
even more nearly $17 billion.
before the first flights. They assign two or more bag handlers to each flight. The last bag should be on the plane and the bin doors
closed five minutes before scheduled departure, says Dave Obeso, a Southwest ramp supervisor. The pilots for Flight 454 to Phoenix
inspected their Boeing 737 in the dark. Workers called "ops agents" calculated load weight and balance and completed paperwork. A
fueler gassed up the jet. Inside the terminal, agents at Gate 12 started boarding the 136 passengers they're supposed to close
the aircraft door five minutes before scheduled departure. And then, a snag. A broken communications radio. A replacement was
ordered and installed, a tug pushed the plane back from the gate, and the pilots taxied into position for takeoff. But the damage had
been done. Flight 454 left 29 minutes behind schedule and arrived in Phoenix 34 minutes late. Southwest's control center relayed
word of the delay to Phoenix employees, who "turned" the aircraft faster than normal before its next flight. Still, the plane remained
nine to 28 minutes behind schedule for the remaining four flights of the day, according to the tracking service FlightAware.com.
Aviation k2 Econ
Aviation is key to economic success
Teri L. Bristol is the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Association. June
2014. The Economic Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/2014-economic-impactreport.pdf //MV
Flying is an inspiring part of American life. Its a symbol of our freedom, pioneering spirit, and economic success. As the nation
In 2012,
aviation accounted for 5.4% of our gross domestic product (GDP), contributed $1.5
trillion in total economic activity, and supported 11.8 million jobs. Aviation
manufacturing also continues to be the nations top net export . The nations
economic success depends on having a vibrant civil aviation industry . To support this effort,
continues to revitalize itself following the most recent recession, civil aviation has outpaced the national economy.
the FAA remains committed to ensuring the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. Were focused on the following four
strategic priorities: making aviation safer and smarter, delivering benefits through technology and infrastructure, enhancing global
leadership, and empowering the FAAs workforce so we can innovate. Were in the process of transforming the airspace system by
deploying the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will make aviation more fuel and cost efficient, and
more environmentally friendly.
Civil aviation spurs economic growth

DRI-WEFA July 2002. The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation.
https://www.aia-aerospace.org/stats/resources/DRIWEFA_EconomicImpactStudy.pdf //MV
Civil aviation has become an integral part of the U.S. economy . It is a key catalyst
for economic growth and has a profound influence on the quality of life of
populations around the globe. It integrates the world economy and promotes the
international exchange of people, products, investment , and ideas. Indeed, to a very
large extent, civil aviation has enabled small community and rural populations to
enter the mainstream of global commerce by linking such communities with
worldwide population, manufacturing, and cultural centers . Civil aviation products
and services generate a significant surplus for the U.S. trade accounts and are in
the forefront in the development and use of advanced technologies. Fundamentally,
civil aviation touches nearly every aspect of our lives, and its success will, to a great
degree, shape American society and the U.S. economy in the coming decades.
Add-Ons
Constitutionality
2AC
TSA Security checks are a violation of privacy and human
rights and is unconstitutional
Scott Holleran, 12-10-2013,
("TSA has done nothing for air safety, should disappear," ldnews,
http://www.ldnews.com/opinion/ci_24693962/tsa-has-done-nothing-air-safety-should-disappear)
It's peak travel season, so it's a good time to examine the Transportation Security Administration, a government
agency created by former President George W. Bush to supposedly protect air passengers. As a recent government
the TSA is a failure. That's

the agency is based on a false and unconstitutional premise -- that
government's proper role, providing police and military defense, necessitates the authority
to restrict the right to travel. Leaving aside current claims against the TSA's existence, including lawsuits
asserting violation of the Fourth Amendment, the right to travel without being molested by the
state is implied in the nation's founding principles . As Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart, comparing it to the right of association, wrote in 1969: The right to travel is "guaranteed
by the Constitution to us all." Police must protect and defend commercial and passenger air travel,
accountability report and deadly attack on the Los Angeles airport suggest,
because
particularly during war, though it must be noted that none of the Islamic hijackers on 9/11 violated aviation law. But
national defense and security expressly exist to serve and protect, not systematically
breach, individual rights. The ends do not justify the means. By mandating
government inspection of each passenger's body -- regardless of context, such as a judicially
approved watch list or even targeted profiling -- as a requisite for air travel, the TSA violates
rights. What is wrong in theory is a disaster in practice. Most aviation attacks since 9/11, for example, were
discovered and/or prevented by passengers and crew, not the government, let alone the TSA. In fact , the TSA
has been useless in most major threats and attacks to U.S. air travel. This is true from the
terrorist attack at LAX in 2002 -- in which an El Al employee and a passenger were murdered and a security guard
was stabbed by an Egyptian limousine driver -- to the recent assault by an apparently anti-government shooter that
took a TSA officer's life at the same airport.
The TSA's value proposition to provide security as a

trade-off for infringing on rights is flimsy; despite years of service and billions of
dollars, the agency fails to prevent the initiation of force . As we've seen, the government
agency's existence increases the threat to today's traveler. The TSA's power is arbitrary.
Agents disrupt travel, molest passengers at random and have been accused,
charged and jailed for petty and worse crimes including sexual and
physical assault -- and acts of terrorism. One TSA agent at LAX, for instance, was arrested on
Sept. 11 year for exploding bombs underneath passenger jets. This story was greatly under-reported. Meanwhile,
numerous assaults have been initiated at airports and on airplanes across the U.S. -- including in-flight shoe- and
underwear-bombing attempts by Islamic terrorists who successfully evaded the TSA, according to the TSA's own
Web site. Whatever slips past the TSA -- and whatever the TSA slips past the public -- the individual in the United
The TSA's very existence is an inherent violation of

each American's individual rights. At best, the TSA is antagonistic toward aviation
safety. The TSA does not protect and defend Americans; it endangers Americans. In the aftermath of
States has a fundamental right to travel.
the latest attack, there is talk of providing weapons to agents of the TSA. But we should go to the root of the
we ought to abolish the TSA. We

should dismantle the failed agency, return aviation security to its proper
practitioners -- police, airports and airlines -- and begin to restore the right to travel .
problem and insist on doing the opposite. Instead of arming the TSA,
Policymakers must uphold constitutional rightsno violation is

ever legitimate
Carter, 87
(Brigham Young University Law Review No. 3, p. 751-2)
The constitution, which is after all a species of law, is thus quite naturally viewed as a
potential impediment to policy, a barrier that must be adjusted, through interpretation or amendment, more often than preservation
of government under that constitution is viewed as a desirable policy in itself. In this modern student of policy is like the modern moral philosopherand like a good number of
constitutional theorists as well---in denigrating the value of preserving any particular process and exalting the desirable result. But constitutionalism assigns enormous
importance to process, and assigns costs, albeit perhaps intangible ones, to violating the constitutional process. For the constitutionalist, as for classical liberal democratic
the autonomy of the people themselves, not the achievement of some

well-intentioned government policy, is the ultimate end for which
government exists. As a consequence, no violation of the means the
people have approved for pursuit of policy---here, the means embodied in the
structural provisions of the Constitution---can be justified through
reference to the policy itself as the end. Somewhere between the totalitarian horror of a society driven entirely by its
theory,
zeal to achieve stated ends, and Grant Kilmores Kafkaesque evocation of a society so bound up in the forms of law that it becomes a living hell, drifts the moderately
progressive American constitutional ideal. I am not at all sure that we best pursue it by freeing our legislature entirely from the bonds of constitutionalism, trusting to nothing
but the independent and largely unguided judgement of the courts to decide when the legislature goes too far.
1AR
TSA procedures are unconstitutional4th amendment
Rosen 10
(Jeffrey Rosen . "Why the TSA pat-downs and body scans are unconstitutional," Washington Post. 1128-2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112404510_pf.html//ghs-kw)
Courts evaluating airport-screening technology tend to give great deference to the government's national security interest in
the TSA's measures violate the

Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the
Supreme Court hasn't evaluated airport screening technology, lower courts have emphasized, as the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 9th Circuit ruled in 2007, that "a particular airport security screening search is
constitutionally reasonable provided that it 'is no more extensive nor intensive than
necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives.' " In a 2006 opinion for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito stressed that
screening procedures must be both "minimally intrusive" and "effective" - in other
words, they must be "well-tailored to protect personal privacy," and they must
deliver on their promise of discovering serious threats. Alito upheld the practices at an airport
preventing terrorist attacks. But in this case, there's a strong argument that
checkpoint where passengers were first screened with walk-through magnetometers and then, if they set off an alarm, with hand-
airport searches are reasonable if they escalate "in invasiveness

only after a lower level of screening disclose[s] a reason to conduct a more probing
search." As currently used in U.S. airports, the new full-body scanners fail all of Alito's
tests. First, as European regulators have recognized, they could be much less intrusive without
sacrificing effectiveness. For example, Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport, the European airport that employs bodyheld wands. He wrote that
scanning machines most extensively, has incorporated crucial privacy and safety protections. Rejecting the "backscatter" machines
used in the United States, which produce revealing images of the body and have raised concerns about radiation, the Dutch use
scanners known as ProVision ATD, which employ radio waves with far lower frequencies than those used in common hand-held
devices. If the software detects contraband or suspicious material under a passenger's clothing, it projects an outline of that area of
the body onto a gender-neutral, blob-like human image, instead of generating a virtually naked image of the passenger. The
passenger can then be taken aside for secondary screening. TSA Administrator John Pistole acknowledged in recent testimony that
these "blob" machines, as opposed to the "naked" machines, are the "next generation" of screening technology. His concern, he
said, is that "there are currently a high rate of false positives on that technology, so we're working through that." But courts might
hold that, even with false positives, "blob" imaging technology that leads to a secondary pat-down is less invasive and more
effective than imposing a choice between "naked" machines and intrusive pat-downs as primary screening for all passengers. In the
Netherlands, there's another crucial privacy protection: Images captured by the body scanners are neither stored nor transmitted.
Unfortunately, the TSA required that the machines deployed in U.S. airports be capable of recording, storing and transmitting
images when in "test" mode. The agency promised, after this capability was revealed by a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed
by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, that the test mode isn't being used in airports. But other agencies have abused the
storage capability of the machines. The U.S. Marshals Service admitted in August that it had saved more than 35,000 images from
In evaluating the constitutionality of these scanners,

machines can't be considered "minimally invasive" as long as
images can be stored and recorded. In January, the European Commission's information commissioner criticized
body scanners at the Orlando federal courthouse.
U.S. courts might hold that the
the scanners' "privacy-invasive potential" and their unproven effectiveness. And tests have shown that the machines are not good at
detecting low-density powder explosives: A member of Britain's Parliament who evaluated the scanners in his former capacity as a
defense technology company director concluded that they wouldn't have stopped the bomber who concealed the chemical powder
there's good reason to believe that the machines are not

effective in detecting the weapons they're purportedly designed to identify. For U.S.
courts, that's yet another consideration that could make them constitutionally
unreasonable. Broadly, U.S. courts have held that "routine" searches of all travelers can be conducted at airports as long as
they don't threaten serious invasions of privacy. By contrast, "non-routine" searches, such as stripsearches or body-cavity searches, require some individualized suspicion - that is,
some cause to suspect a particular traveler of wrongdoing. Neither virtual stripsearches nor intrusive pat-downs should be considered "routine," and therefore
courts should rule that neither can be used for primary screening.
PETN in his underwear last Christmas. So
Sexual Harassment
2AC
Internals
Generic TSA Bad
2AC
Status quo TSA spending is inefficient better decision making
or budget cuts need to be implemented
Charles Kenny, Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and
author of The Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Great for the West., 1118-2012, "Airport Security Is Killing Us," Businessweek,
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-11-18/how-airport-security-is-killingus //MV
The attention paid to terrorism in the U.S. is considerably out of proportion to the
relative threat it presents. Thats especially true when it comes to Islamic-extremist terror. Of the 150,000
murders in the U.S. between 9/11 and the end of 2010, Islamic extremism accounted for fewer
than three dozen. Since 2000, the chance that a resident of the U.S. would die in a terrorist attack was one in 3.5 million,
according to John Mueller and Mark Stewart of Ohio State and the University of Newcastle, respectively. In fact, extremist Islamic
terrorism resulted in just 200 to 400 deaths worldwide outside the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraqthe same number, Mueller
Yet the TSA still commands a

budget of nearly $8 billionwhich is why the agency is left with too many officers
and not enough to do. The TSAs Top Good Catches of 2011, reported on its blog, did include 1,200 firearms and
noted in a 2011 report (PDF), as die in bathtubs in the U.S. alone each year.
their top finda single batch of C4 explosives (though those were discovered only on the return flight). A longer list of TSAs
the
TSA didnt spot a single terrorist trying to board an airline in the U.S ., notes Bruce Schneier.
confiscations would include a G.I. Joe action dolls 4-inch plastic rifle (its a replica) and a light saber. And needless to say,
According to one estimate of direct and indirect costs borne by the U.S. as a result of 9/11, the New York Times suggested the
attacks themselves caused $55 billion in toll and physical damage, while the economic impact was $123 billion. But costs related
to increased homeland security and counterterrorism spending, as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, totaled $3,105 billion.
government spending on homeland security over the 2002-11

period accounted for around $580 billion of that total. The researchers quote Rand
Corp. President James Thomson, who noted most of that expenditure was implemented with
little or no evaluation. In 2010, the National Academy of Science reported the lack of any
Department of Homeland Security risk analysis capabilities and methods that are
yet adequate for supporting [department] decision making. In short, DHS (and the TSA
in particular) is firing huge bundles of large denomination bills completely blindly .
Mueller and Stewart estimate that
There is lethal collateral damage associated with all this spending on airline securitynamely, the inconvenience of air travel is
pushing more people onto the roads. Compare the dangers of air travel to those of driving. To make flying as dangerous as using a
car, a four-plane disaster on the scale of 9/11 would have to occur every month, according to analysis published in the American
Scientist.
TSA profiling practices are inefficient and counterproductive

the plan solves best
Bruce Schneier, 5-9-2012
(My current position is at BT as its Chief Security Technology Officer, "The

Trouble with Airport Profiling," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2012/05/09/the-trouble-withairport-profiling/)
Why do otherwise rational people think its a good idea to profile people at airports? Recently, neuroscientist and
Harris related a story of an elderly couple being given the twice-over by the TSA, pointed
recommended that the TSA focus on the
actual threat: Muslims, or anyone who looks like he or she could conceivably be
Muslim. This is a bad idea . It doesnt make us any safer and it actually puts us
all at risk. The right way to look at security is in terms of cost-benefit trade-offs. If
adding profiling to airport checkpoints allowed us to detect more threats at a lower
cost, than we should implement it. If it didnt, wed be foolish to do so . Sometimes
best-selling author Sam
out how these two were obviously not a threat, and
profiling works. Consider a sheep in a meadow, happily munching on grass. When he spies a wolf, hes going to
judge that individual wolf based on a bunch of assumptions related to the past behavior of its species. In short, that
sheep is going to profileand then run away. This makes perfect sense, and is why evolution produced sheep
and other animals that react this way. But
this sort of profiling doesnt work with humans at
airports, for several reasons. First, in the sheeps case the profile is accurate, in that all wolves are out to eat
sheep. Maybe a particular wolf isnt hungry at the moment, but enough wolves are hungry enough of the time to
justify the occasional false alarm. However,
it isnt true that almost all Muslims are out to blow

up airplanes. In fact, almost none of them are. Post 9/11, weve had 2 Muslim
terrorists on U.S airplanes: the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber. If you assume 0.8%
(thats one estimate of the percentage of Muslim Americans) of the 630 million annual airplane fliers
are Muslim and triple it to account for others who look Semitic, then the chances
any profiled flier will be a Muslim terrorist is 1 in 80 million . Add the 19 9/11 terrorists
arguably a singular event that number drops to 1 in 8 million. Either way, because the number of
actual terrorists is so low, almost everyone selected by the profile will be innocent .
This is called the base rate fallacy, and dooms any type of broad terrorist profiling, including
the TSAs behavioral profiling. Second, sheep can safely ignore animals that dont look like the few
predators they know. On the other hand, to assume that only Arab-appearing people are
terrorists is dangerously naive. Muslims are black, white, Asian, and everything else
most Muslims are not Arab. Recent terrorists have been European, Asian, African,
Hispanic, and Middle Eastern; male and female; young and old . Underwear bomber Umar
Farouk Abdul Mutallab was Nigerian. Shoe bomber Richard Reid was British with a Jamaican father. One of the
London subway bombers, Germaine Lindsay, was Afro-Caribbean. Dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla was HispanicAmerican. The 2002 Bali terrorists were Indonesian. Both Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber were white
Focusing on a
profile increases the risk that TSA agents will miss those who dont match it . Third,
Americans. The Chechen terrorists who blew up two Russian planes in 2004 were female.
wolves cant deliberately try to evade the profile. A wolf in sheeps clothing is just a story, but humans are smart
Once the TSA establishes a profile,

terrorists will take steps to avoid it. The Chechens deliberately chose female suicide bombers because
and adaptable enough to put the concept into practice.
Russian security was less thorough with women. Al Qaeda has tried to recruit non-Muslims. And terrorists have
given bombs to innocent and innocent-looking travelers. Randomized secondary screening is more effective,
especially since the goal isnt to catch every plot but to create enough uncertainty that terrorists dont even try.
And fourth, sheep dont care if they offend innocent wolves; the two species are never going to be friends .
At
airports, though, there is an enormous social and political cost to the millions of false
alarms. Beyond the societal harms of deliberately harassing a minority group,
singling out Muslims alienates the very people who are in the best position to
discover and alert authorities about Muslim plots before the terrorists even get to
the airport. This alone is reason enough not to profile. I too am incensed but not surprised when the TSA
manhandles four-year old girls, children with cerebral palsy, pretty women, the elderly, and wheelchair users for
humiliation, abuse, and sometimes theft. Any bureaucracy that processes 630 million people per year will generate
stories like this. When people propose profiling, they are really asking for a security system that can apply
judgment. Unfortunately, thats really hard. Rules are easier to explain and train. Zero tolerance is easier to justify
and defend. Judgment requires better-educated, more expert, and much-higher-paid screeners. And the personal
career risks to a TSA agent of being wrong when exercising judgment far outweigh any benefits from being
The proper reaction to screening horror stories isnt to subject only those
people to it; its to subject no one to it. (Can anyone even explain what hypothetical terrorist plot
could successfully evade normal security, but would be discovered during secondary screening?) Invasive TSA
screening is nothing more than security theater. It doesnt make us safer, and its
not worth the cost. Even more strongly, security isnt our societys only value. Do we really
sensible.
want the full power of government to act out our stereotypes and prejudices? Have we Americans ever done
we have a Constitution for: to help us

live up to our values and not down to our fears .
something like this and not been ashamed later? This is what
TSA is plagued by employee misconduct and a lackluster

workforceits only getting worse
Pearson et al 13
(Michael Pearson. Ed Payne and Rene Marsh, Cnn "Government
report: TSA employee misconduct up 26% in 3 years," CNN. 81-2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/travel/tsamisconduct///ghs-kw)
Let's get this out of the way straight off: The Transportation Security Administration is probably not going to top anyone's list of
TSA officers
stealing money from luggage, taking bribes from drug dealers, sleeping on the job.
So it shouldn't come as any surprise that a new Government Accountability Office report,
citing a 26% increase in misconduct among TSA employees between 2010
and 2012, is striking a nerve with some travelers who've had to endure the shoeless, beltless shuffle on the
Favorite Federal Government Agencies. And the stories of its failures spread faster than a speeding jetliner:
trip through security. "Whenever you get an organization that has to be there, sometimes it just starts to take on a weight of its
own," traveler Chris Simon said Wednesday at San Francisco International Airport. "So maybe it's just not being managed." "This
makes me never want to check my bag," Twitter user KathrynPowers1 posted Wednesday in response to the news. "That's
Misconduct cases involving TSA

employees -- everything from being late to skipping crucial security protocols -- rose from 2,691 a year in
2010 to 3,408 in 2012. -- About a third of the cases involved being late or not
reporting for work, the largest single category of offenses. -- 10% of offenses
involved inappropriate comments or abusive behavior . -- About a quarter involved
screening and security failures -- including sleeping on the job -- or neglect of duty offenses that
resulted in losses or careless inspections. Photos: 20 odd items confiscated by the TSA Examples of
violations The report details one case of a TSA agent suspended for seven days after
trying to carry a relative's bag past security without screening. A supervisor
interceded and the bag was found to contain "numerous prohibited items,"
according to the GAO report. It didn't say what the items were. In another case, a TSA agent was suspended for 30
disgusting, " tweeted user RidockKing. Among the report's findings: --
days after a closed-circuit camera caught the officer failing to individually examine X-ray images of passenger items, as required by
Among the 9,622 offenses cataloged in the report, the GAO also found 384
ethics and integrity violations, 155 "appearance and hygiene" complaints and 56
cases of theft. While not specifically mentioned in the report, notable cases of theft by TSA agents
include a 2012 case in which two former employees pleaded guilty to stealing
$40,000 from a checked bag at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, and a 2011
guilty plea from an officer who admitted stealing between $10,000 and $30,000
from travelers at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey. The officer in the 2011
agency policy.
case, Al Raimi, admitted he would "kick up" some of that money to a supervisor, who in turn allowed him to keep stealing. The
supervisor, Michael Arato, also pleaded guilty to accepting kickbacks and bribes. Airport officer claims he was fired for exposing
sleeping guards Taking it seriously Overall, 47% of the offenses detailed in the report resulted in a letter of reprimand, at least 17%
cost the employees their jobs and 31% ended with a suspension. "If they're stealing, they're doing drugs or breaching the security
system intentionally and I can prove it, they're out," TSA Deputy Administrator John W. Halinski told a joint hearing of two House
Homeland Security subcommittees on Wednesday. But he said, even the letters of reprimand handed out in nearly half of the cases
are serious punishment. Such letters can block employees from receiving a bonus or promotion, and stay with them their entire
career, he told Rep. Richard Hudson, R-North Carolina, chair of the Transportation Security subcommittee. "It's a serious thing, sir,"
Halinksi said. He also defended his agency's 56,000 employee workforce as overwhelmingly upright. But Rep. John Mica, a Florida
the report shows the

TSA is not doing enough to respond to and prevent misconduct. "There's not even a
way to properly report some of the offenses, so this may be just the tip of the
iceberg of some of the offenses," he said. TSA agents at Newark spared from firings after violations Some other lawmakers
Republican and longtime critic of the TSA who requested the audit, is skeptical. He told CNN that
stood by the agency Wednesday, saying the offenses represent a small percentage of TSA's 56,000 employees. "Transportation
security officers have an undeniably hard job and the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves honorably and in
accordance with TSA protocols," Rep. Cedric Richardson, D-Louisiana, said during Wednesday's hearing. Analyst: Turn the tables on
the report isn't particularly surprising.

The TSA has been plagued by uneven training for years , he said, resulting in a work
force that isn't always properly educated about how to do their jobs.
TSA Frost and Sullivan airport security analyst John Hernandez said
TSA is an ineffective government bureaucracy that has

resulted in billions of wasteful spending insiders concur
Edwards 14
(Chris Edwards. Edwards holds a BA and MA in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future
Commission of the National Academy of Sciences. Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at
Cato. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was
a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to
Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. "End the TSA," Cato Institute,
May 2014. http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-tsa//ghs-kw)
is a giant industry that serves 740

million travelers every year and provides a crucial service to every other industry.
Aviation will keep on growing, but it will need ever more complex systems to keep up with
rising demands and increased international competition. Our government
aviation bureaucracies are not up to the challenge. A Bureaucratic Nightmare Lets
look at TSA. The agency was created in a rush after the terrorist attacks in 2001.
Congress and the George W. Bush administration moved rashly to nationalize airport
But U.S. aviation is too important to leave to government. It
security screening without appreciating the downsides of a government takeover. TSAs main activity is operating
passenger and baggage screening at the nations 450 or so commercial airports. It has an annual budget of $8
About 85 percent of the employees are airport

screeners. Nationalizing U.S. airport screening was a mistake. One of the principal architects of
the 2001 TSA legislation, Rep. John Mica (R-FL), has called the agency a bureaucratic
nightmare with a track record of security failures. He says that TSA has a
penchant for bungling aviation security and wasting taxpayers money. Even
former TSA chief Kip Hawley has called TSA hopelessly bureaucratic.
billion and more than 60,000 employees.
TSAs huge, and now unionized, labor force has been one source of problems. The Government Accountability Office
found in 2012 that TSA ranked 232 out of 240 federal agencies in terms of employee satisfaction. The GAO reported
there has been a large increase in TSA employee misconduct in recent

years. One workforce problem has been substantial employee theft from passenger
baggage. Another problem has been a rash of incidents at airports where workers are found not following
in 2013 that
security procedures. Mica calls these episodes TSA meltdowns. Billions Wasted The TSA is no better at managing
TSA has spent billions of dollars on programs

that have shown few benefits: TSA spent $30 million on 207 puffer machines to
detect explosives. But the machines did not work and had to be shelved. TSA spends
more than $200 million a year on the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques program to catch terrorists from suspicious behaviors in airports. But
TSA has not caught any terrorists with SPOT, and the GAO found in 2013 that there
was no scientifically validated evidence for the program. TSA spends more than
$240 million a year to operate Advanced Imaging Technology or full- body scanning
machines at major airports. The machines are costly, cause airport congestion, and
have dubious detection benefits. They can detect high-density objects, but are less effective with lowdensity materials such as gels, powders, and liquids. Another problem is that terrorists could evade the
machines by boarding planes at smaller U.S. airports or foreign airports. TSA spends
investments than it is at managing its workforce.
about $1 billion a year on the Federal Air Marshal Service, which places about 5,000
armed agents on about 5 percent of all U.S. flights. The program has resulted in
relatively few arrests usually for minor offences, and no arrests related to terrorism.
Security experts, such as Mark Stewart and John Mueller, have criticized
TSA for not allocating its resources based on detailed risk assessments.
And TSA tends to proceed with expensive projects, such as the AIT
machines and the SPOT program, before it even completes cost-benefit
analyses to see whether they are worthwhile.
AT Terror
2AC
The TSAs security practices dont solve for the problems they
were created fortheir uselessness creates a theater of
security which causes other, hidden forms of violence
Jason Harrington, 10-1-2014, ("Ebola Security Theater Isnt Going to Make You Any Safer," Vanity
Fair, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/10/ebola-security-tsa-airport?mbid=social_twitter, Jason Edward
Harrington is a former TSA agent)
Christie defended his decision to detain health-care

worker Kaci Hickox under a New Jersey Ebola quarantine policy similar to ones adopted by
On Monday, New Jersey governor Chris
several states with this cheerful quote: Any of us have seen people who are traveling and theyve been stopped,
whether they are late for a plane or whatever they are doing, they get upset and angry. Thats fine. I have
absolutely nothing but good will for [Hickox] going forward. Shes a good person and went over and was doing good
I was one of the Transportation Security

Administration agents who stopped airline passengers at checkpoints, regularly making
work over in West Africa. For six years,
them both upset and angry. Often, as Christie suggested, they were late for their planes. Usually, I was stopping
them from doing important things for very stupid, federally mandated reasons. For instance ,
over the course

of my duty I sometimes had to look airline pilots in the eye and tell them , with a straight
face, that it was necessary to confiscate items from their carry-ons due to the
possibility that the items could potentially be used to hijack their own planes. I did
this supposedly in the interest of the safety of the American public. After such
confiscations, I used to turn to my fellow T.S.A. agents and speculate about the chances the pilot would swing the
The nail-clipper confiscations, as with most

official actions on airport checkpoints, were security theater, much like the
quarantine measures that health-care workers such as Hickox are now being subjected
to at some entry points around the United States. If I were a federal agent at a U.S.
airport tasked with enforcing some of the recently implemented policies that travelers arriving from Ebola hot
zones be checked for Ebola-like symptoms, the first thing I would wonder is if my job even made
any sense. We know that Ebola is not terribly contagious until the patient is quite ill.
A passenger like Thomas Eric Duncan, who flew to Dallas with Ebola incubating in his body and lied
about his close contact with a dying Ebola patient just days before, could not have been singled out by
any kind of Ebola spot-check : the infected exhibit virtually no symptoms when the virus is incubating. In
yet another example of an airport security measure straight out of Catch-22,the fact of the matter is that a
traveler carrying the Ebola virus in its early stages cannot be identified by
superficial security checks (and is not much of a threat to the general population) ,
plane around and crash it into the airport for revenge.
while a person carrying the Ebola virus in its advanced, contagious stage can be detected by travel security
All of this would perhaps be less absurd if the

tools with which officials were attempting to detect the virus at airports werent
completely useless . Much like the largely ineffective full-body scanners we
employ at T.S.A. to attempt to detect concealed weapons on passengers, finding
incubation-stage Ebola in a crowded airport amounts to a taxpayer-funded search
for fleas conducted through a shattered magnifying glass . The thermal no-contact fever
detectors in place at a lot of airports report an alarmingly number of false positives, as one
2011 scientific study reported. The scanners do not measure body core temperature, the
essential indicator of a febrile response to infectious disease ; rather, they detect
skin-surface temperature, which can change based on many factors unrelated to illness
such as sunburn, room temperature, and even emotional states, as an enraged Hickox claimed when
her skin temperature reportedly rose, right along with her temper, as the wheels of
checkpoints (but is often too sick to travel anyway).
bureaucracy creaked into motion and deposited her into a quarantine. Back in 2010, we
at the T.S.A. quietly used thermal imagers on crowds at OHare airport. Agents I spoke to who were in charge
of running the scanners at the time used to say that thermal-imaging duty was a joke: they
claimed the technology was so poor as to make it all but a complete waste of time.
Governments have tried in the past to utilize airport security as a means by which to
contain viral outbreaks, and we have studies to prove how ineffective those
efforts were. A 2003 Canadian report on the SARS outbreak and the accompanying
airport-screening measures put in place to stop the contagion showed that the extra
security didnt detect a single case of the virus . At best, the Ebola spot-check would work if all
passengers behaved honestly at all times. As soon as someone hides or chooses to opt-out of
disclosing the fact that he or she was recently in the vicinity of a potentially Ebolainfected area or person, the integrity of the security system collapses (fevers controlled
through the use of medication could similarly foil these efforts). In essence, Ebola interrogations amount to a new
iteration of, Did you pack your own bags? And have you been in possession of your bags at all times?, asked of
No one is likely to want to admit to

having been near an Ebola hot zone at an airport security checkpoint knowing that
such a disclosure might lead to a three-week quarantine . The only thing that such honorsystem questioning really accomplishes is hassling people and causing delays. And the biggest problem
with quarantine measures, like the grandma and grandpa full-body pat-downs mindlessly administered
day in and day out by the T.S.A., is that we are hassling and delaying precisely the wrong
people. The one problem Ive always had with the term security theater is the connotation of playhouse
harmlessness. We all have to put up with a little annoying bureaucracy in times of
national danger. So goes the typical rationalization offered by politicians. But, as any cost-benefit
analyst will tell you, the bureaucratic tangles that result from such security theater
can have very real, even deadly effects. A study in Applied Economics on the unintended
consequences of post-9/11 airport security found that the substitution of driving for flying by those
seeking to avoid the ever-increasing security inconveniences likely resulted in more
than 2,000 road fatalities from 2001 to 2005. Senseless attempts to make air travel
safer by confiscating the carry-on items and bottled water only gave people incentive to road-trip to
their destinations, greatly increasing their chances of death. Security theater isnt
just some harmless bureaucratic placebo and fact of modern-day life: it can discourage
activities and behavior in such a way as to have real, pernicious effects upon
society. The health-care workers upon whom the senseless quarantine measures have fallen the hardest are
angry, and rightfully so. The measures will do nothing to secure the U.S. from the threat of
an Ebola outbreak; they will, in fact, only hamper the very real efforts of the people
were depending on to quell the outbreak . Like telling a pilot she cant be trusted to safely maintain
passengers by airline security since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.
control over a pocket knife while she flies a 747, whisking courageous health-care workers away into quarantine on
the pretense that they are incapable of monitoring their own health is not only absurd, it is downright insulting, and
possibly even dangerous.
Framing
2AC Util Bad

Without absolute side constraints against violating human
dignity such as the affirmative, utilitarianism becomes a
justification for slavery, torture, and murder.
Clifford, 11 (Professor of Philosophy @ Mississippi State University, Michael,
Spring, MORAL LITERACY, Volume 11, Issue 2,
https://webprod1.uvu.edu/ethics/seac/Clifford_Moral_Literacy.pdf, Accessed 7-6-13,
TB)
utilitarianism prides itself on
fairness, since everyones happiness (i.e. pleasure/pain) must be taken into account
As for fairness of application, here the waters are muddy. On the one hand,
when determining what will produce the gr eatest happiness. Fairness is part of the very justification of
utilitarianism in that it assumes, correctly I think, that everyone wants to be happy; thus it is incumbent upon any
ethics to promote this, as far as is possible. In fact, it was this democratic aspect of utilitarianism which prompted
On the other hand, one of the most

enduring criticisms of utilitarianism , especially the sort advocated by Bentham, is
that it may require us to trample upon individual rights if it will increase the
pleasure of the majority. An example I like to use in my courses to illustrate this is
black slavery in Mississippi. There was a time when Mississippi had more
millionaires per capita than any other state in the union. Of course, it achieved th at
distinction through the institution of slavery, the evidence of which can still be seen in Rhode
Island, where the estates of former cotton barons line the shores of Newport. Now Mississippi is among
the poorest state in the nation. Suppose some savvy economic consultant
suggested that we could bring prosperity back to the South by reinstating the
institution of slavery. The population of African-Americans being only about th irty
percent, the majority would certainly have their happiness increased. Of course, we
James Mill to champion it as a model for political and social reform.
would immediately object that such happiness would be achieved by the most atrocious violation of individual
rights. What can the utilitarian say to this? Even Ja mes Mills son, John Stuart, was very concerned about this
He advocated a form of utilitarianism in which we are obligated to

promote the higher pleasures of justice and equality. However, Mill would not
allow an appeal to individual rights, because he did not believe that such rights
exist. His defense of individual freedoms in On Liberty is not based on the idea that
human beings have rights, but because of the good consequences for society that
comes from such a recognition. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions, says Mill. 14 If this is the case, then a utilitarian, even one as enlightened as Mill, must entertain the
possibility that the greatest happiness could only be bought at the expense of individual freedoms. 15 Whether
or not you believe in individual rights, whether or not you are convinced by
arguments one way or another about the metaphysical grounds of rights, we can all
appreciate the idea that any ethics should recognize the fundamental dignity of
human|||s||| beings. This is precisely what worries critics of utilitarianism, that it
may require us to violate that dignity, for some at least, if doin g so will promote the
greatest happiness. But to violate human dignity is to ignore or to misunderstand
the very point of ethics. For the deontologist, such as Kant, we have a duty not to violate human dignity,
troublesome possibility.
even if it causes us pain, even if the consequences fail to maximize the overall happiness. The inviolate character of
human dignity is expressed most practically by the idea that we have certain basic rights (whatever the source of
rights are, whether natural or by convention). John Locke defined rights as prima facie entitlements, which means
that anyone who would restrict my rights bears the burden of proving that there are good reasons for doing so. For
example, the right to private property is sometimes trumped by the principle of eminent domain, provided that I too
sta nd to gain by seizure of my land. My right to free speech is limited by the harm it might cause by, say, shouting
There are times when we feel justified in limiting or abrogating

certain positive rights for the common good, but even here no social outcome
justifies torture, slavery, murder, or any action which violates my fundamental
human dignity. Deontological ethics assumes there to be a line that cannot be
crossed, regardless of the consequences. Thus, Kants type of ethics would seem to fair best with
fire! in a crowded theatre.
respect to the fairness of application criterion beca use it requires, as intrinsic to the Categorical Imperative itself,
that we treat all persons, at all times, as ends and not merely as means to an end.
This is not due to any good benefits that may stem from doing so; in fact, respecting the dignity of others may
actually diminish overall pleasure. But
demands it.
we have a duty to do so, regardless, because reason
It demands it because to do otherwise is irrational given the requirements of the Categorical

Imperative, which are (arguably) three:
2AC Structural Violence O/W

Structural violence outweighs
Taylor 09
(Janelle S. , Prof. of Anthropology, Univ. of Washington, http://depts.washing...er/taylor.shtml,
Explaining Difference: Culture, Structural Violence, and Medical Anthropology)
Structure sounds like a neutral term it sounds like something that is just there,
unquestionable, part of the way the world is. By juxtaposing this with the word
violence, however, Farmers concept of structural violence forces our attention to the
forms of suffering and injustice that are deeply embedded in the ordinary, taken-forgranted patterns of the way the world is. From this follow some important and very challenging
insights. First, the same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable and
pleasant for some of us, also mar the lives of others through poverty, insecurity, ill-health
and violence. Second, these structures are neither natural nor neutral, but are instead
the outcome of long histories of political, economic, and social struggle. Third, being
nothing more (and nothing less!) than patterns of collective social action, these
structures can and should be changed. Structural violence thus encourages us to
look for differences within large-scale social structures differences of power,
wealth, privilege and health that are unjust and unacceptable. By the same token, structural
violence encourages us to look for connections between what might be falsely perceived separate and distinct
Structural violence also encourages an attitude of moral outrage and

critical engagement, in situations where the automatic response might be to
passively accept systematic inequalities.
social worlds.
Jurisdiction Debate
Fed Gov Has Jurisdiction

The federal government has jurisdiction over safety at airports
Rhyne, 1946
(Charles S. Rhyne, George Washington University. National Chairman, Junior Bar
Conference and member of Section of International and Comparative Law of the
American Bar Association, 1946, FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTION OVER
CIVIL AVIATION, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2259&context=lcp, Date Accessed 8/1/15, JL @ DDI)
Federal legislation in the aviation field took the form of appropriations for air mail
service9 up until the adoption of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.10 By this Act,
jurisdiction was assumed over safety matters in the field of civil aviation. These
covered examination and licensing of pilots and mechanics, registering and
licensing of airplanes, issuance of certificates of airworthiness for airplanes,
inspection of aircraft, air traffic rules and rating of airports.Y1' The Congress had
amended the Air Commerce Act slightly' 2 and adopted more air mail legislation,
with some of the latter containing various economic regulations applicable to air
mail carriers,"3 before 1938 when it adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act' 4 to
supersede all the air mail legislation and most of the Air Commerce Act.Y The
jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government over aviation in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 is twofold in its coverage. First, the Act provides for the
regulation of certain economic aspects'" of air services, such as the issuance of
certificates of public convenience and necessity, the supervision of rates,
consolidations of air services, and interlocking relationships. In other words, the
economic regulatory aspects of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 deal with
governmental control and supervision over the business activities of air
transportation. The safety regulations17 provided for in the Act are concerned with
such measures as the airworthiness of airplanes, the competency of airmen, safety
at airports, and control over airplanes while engaging in flight. The Act also gives
the President, the Secretary of State, and the Civil Aeronautics Board jurisdiction
over international aviation matters0 8
Fed Gov Has Pre-emption

The federal government has pre-emption over the state in
cases of federal law
Pounian and Green, 2014
(Steven R. Pounian and Justin T. Green, Mar 21, 2014, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Aviation Case, New York Law Journal, http://www.kreindler.com/Publications/NYLJ032114-Federal-Jurisdiction-and-the-Aviation-Case.pdf, Date Accessed 8/1/15, JL @
DDI)
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that while "federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint,"1
there is an exception where "a federal statute wholly displaces the state law cause
of action through complete pre-emption."2 While federal question jurisdiction does
not always require a federal cause of action,3 the exercise of such jurisdiction is
"rare"4 and limited to those situations where the case centers on a substantial,
dispositive and controlling issue of federal law.5
SPP
Screening Partnership Program (SPP) Solvency

SPP screening is more efficient than the TSA
The Hill, 7-29-2014,( "Lawmakers spar with TSA union over private airport security,"
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/213673-lawmakers-tsa-union-spar-over-private-airport-security)
The chairman of the House panel that oversees transportation security issues accused the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) on Tuesday of blocking efforts to privatize airport security checkpoints. Under the FAA
unless an airport's participation in [Screening

Partnership Program] would hurt security or drive up costs, TSA must approve all
new applications, Rep. Richard Hudson (R-N.C.) said during a hearing of the House Homeland Security
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,
Committees Transportation Security Subcommittee.
While I have great respect for [TSA] Administrator [John]
there will always be at least three clear and substantial

advantages to privatized screening, Hudson continued. Number one, the private sector
operates more efficiently than the federal government and can save precious
taxpayer dollars. Number two, the private sector provides better customer service,
which is severely lacking at many of our nation's screening checkpoints. And
number three.with private screening, TSA can stop dealing with the timeconsuming human resources issues that come with managing a workforce of over
50,000 screeners. The SPP program is designed to allow airports to opt-out of
utilizing TSA security personnel if they can prove they can provide the same level of
protection with private workers at lower costs . The requests have to be approved by TSA, however,
which has led to friction between GOP lawmakers and the TSA. Republicans have championed the
effort to privatize airport security for several years because they argue that many of
the TSAs techniques, including its pat down hand searches and X-ray scanners,
invade the privacy of airline passengers. The TSA has come under fire often in recent
year for its treatment of elderly and child passengers . Pistole was not there Tuesday to defend
Pistole, as far as I am concerned,
the TSAs position on the privatization program, but the union that represents TSA workers argued that the agencys
workers were better trained to meet federal standards for airport security that have been in place since the Sept.
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It is clear that the screening partnership program, SPP, does not improve aviation
security and it does not save the taxpayers money, American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE)
President J. David Cox Sr. told the panel. Rather, SPP harms security, costs more, and hurts the TSOs who bear
the brunt of the outsourcing program, Cox continued. Only security contractors benefit. Cox said Republicans
were overstating the desire for airports to opt-out of TSA security. There is no demand for airports to privatize the
work of our nation's [Transportation Security Officers], he said. Although the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform
Act made it easy for airports to apply to privatize their TSA workforce, only a handful have done so. With the
exception of the Montana airports, over the past two years, only three airports have asked TSA for permission to
switch to private screeners. Hudson said privatization program did not allow airports to skimp on security. To
this does not mean airports that participate in SPP are opting out of robust
federal oversight and regulations, which were severely lacking before 9/11, he said. It means
opting to use qualified private vendors to carry out day-to-day screening functions,
which lets TSA concentrate on setting and enforcing security standards . The North
be clear,
Carolina lawmaker said he was open to simple but crucial changes to the program, such as increasing outreach to
But he added that the only barrier to action is
TSA's well-known resistance to expanding SPP. TSAs Screening Partnership Program Director
airports about their ability to request to participate.
William Benner disputed the idea that the agency has blocked the expansion of the privatization program, saying
the agency has allowed 31 airports to opt-out of using its personnel, however. The SPP is a voluntary program
whereby airports may apply for SPP status and employ private security companies to conduct airport screening
according to TSA standards, Benner said. Participation depends on interest from airport operators, he
continued. Since the program began in 2004, 31 airports have applied, including the original statutory five pilot
18 are currently participating in the SPP program, and either have

private contract screeners in place or are in the process of transitioning to contract
airports. Of those 31,
screeners. Benner added that even airports that successfully opt-out of using TSA personnel still had to meet
the agencys standards for protecting U.S. airline passengers. Regardless of whether an airport has private or
federal employees conducting passenger screening operations, TSA maintains overall responsibility for
transportation security, he said. As new and emerging threats are identified, we must be able to adapt and modify
our procedures quickly to protect the traveling public. Federal Security Directors oversee the contracted security
screening operations to ensure compliance with Federal security standards throughout the aviation network.
Plan solves, airport security gets better with SPP

David Inserra, 10-1-2014, "19th Airport Joins Screening Partnership Program,"
Daily Signal, http://dailysignal.com/2014/10/01/dropping-tsa-19th-airport-joinsefficient-private-screening-program/ David Inserra specializes in cyber and
homeland security policy, including protection of critical infrastructure, as research
assistant in The Heritage Foundations Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies
Tired of long lines at TSA airport checkpoints? Today, the Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB) began a
transition to private security screeners rather than Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners in a
Screening Partnership
Program (SPP) that allows airports to replace TSA screeners with more flexible and
cost-effective screening services provided by private companies and overseen by
the TSA. While this may seem strange to many Americans who have grown accustomed to TSA-manned
checkpoints, it really isnt abnormal for airports to manage their own security with
government regulation and oversight. After all, most European airports are run this way, and now 19
airports in the U.S. are as well. The main benefits of the SPP are enhanced productivity and
lower costs, while maintaining equal or greater levels of security . How can this be? One
major reason is that the private sector can be far more efficient and flexible in hiring and
training employees than the government, reducing employee turnover, increasing
productivity, and lowering personnel costs even though salaries and benefits are
identical to TSA agents. A study by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure found that
taxpayers could save $1 billion over five years if the Nations top 35 airports
operated as efficiently as [San Francisco International Airport] does under the SPP model. With
TSA managers still overseeing screening operations at SPP airports, security is not
endangered. In fact, when the workforce is better managed under the SPP , other benefits
including better security and better customer service, naturally follow. The TSA, however, has been
change that promises more efficient security measures. SFB just joined the TSAs
loath to get out of frontline screening. The TSA started rejecting all requests for SPP expansion in 2011 until
Congress acted in 2012 to reverse the TSA. The TSA has been slow to approve SPP requests as it has held that the
SPP is actually more expensive, even though various government and nongovernment studies have criticized its
findings. As SFB joins the list of SPP-administered airports, the TSA should do more to get out of the personnel
The existing SPP

framework should be reformed to allow more airports to easily join SPP and to
choose their own contractors from a list of TSA-approved screeners. The SPP offers
better, more efficient, and friendlier screening for less money . SFB and 18 other airports are
management game and return its focus to overseeing security at U.S. airports.
reaping these benefitsisnt it about time the SPP came to the airport nearest you?
SPP is cost-effective and increases airport security efficiencytheir studies are wrong
David Inserra, 3-3-2015, "Congress Should Expand Trusted Traveler Programs and
Private Airport Screeners," Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/congress-should-expand-trustedtraveler-programs-and-private-airport-screeners David Inserra specializes in cyber
and homeland security policy, including protection of critical infrastructure, as
research assistant in The Heritage Foundations Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies
Several months ago, President Obama announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would provide
work authorization and protection from deportation to as many as 5 million unlawful immigrants. A serious side
effect of this action is the harmful redirection of attention and resources away from other pressing homeland
security issues ranging from terrorism to institutional reform at the DHS. The demands of implementing the
Presidents sweeping order are such that Secretary Jeh Johnson and other leaders at the DHS will not have the time,
money, manpower, or trust of Congress to make needed reforms to these other critically important areas. It falls to
Congress to correct these misplaced priorities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) could benefit from
significant changes and reforms. Continuing to expand and strengthen trusted traveler programs, such as PreCheck,
the TSA
should be forced to expand the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) that saves the
government money and enhances productivity by allowing airports to use private
screeners with TSA oversight in place of TSA screeners . Trusted Travelers DHS has several
will increase the focus that TSA screeners spend on travelers of higher or unknown risk. Additionally,
trusted traveler programs that provide participating low-risk travelers with access to streamlined security, customs,
and immigration screening. These programs, including TSA PreCheck and Customs and Border Protections (CBP)
Global Entry and NEXUS, are all predicated on the concept of risk-based security. The U.S. could treat every
individual who enters the U.S. as an equal potential threat to U.S. security, or it could differentiate between lowerrisk individuals and those who are greater risks or simply unknown. This risk-based security allows the U.S. to use
its limited security resources more efficiently, focusing security on individuals who are higher risks or unknown
risks. TSA PreCheck ensures participants usually receive an expedited screening process, including the ability to
keep on shoes, belts, and light jackets and to keep computers and liquids in their bags at around 124 participating
airports. To join PreCheck, individuals must apply at a TSA application center and undergo a background check, be
part of other trusted traveler programs, or be a member of the military or military academies. Additionally,
PreCheck occasionally includes frequent travelers as well as randomly included individuals through a process known
as managed inclusion.[1] TSA PreCheck has grown from around 4,000 travelers in December 2013 to just over
800,000 as of December 2014.[2] While TSA is continuing to seek to grow TSA PreCheck, concerns regarding
security have been raised by the Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others.[3]
Security assessments should be undertaken and heeded if PreCheck is to remain a beneficial tool to the TSA. The
other trusted traveler programs run by CBP also require a background check and include PreCheck benefits for U.S.
citizens and permanent residents but also provide expedited immigration and customs processing at airports or
land borders depending on the specific program.[4] Global Entry is open to U.S. citizens and permanent residents as
well as citizens from several other nations including Germany and South Korea, which allow U.S. citizens to join an
equivalent program. The NEXUS program provides U.S. and Canadian citizens and residents with expedited
processing when travelling between the two countries, while the SENTRI program expedites processing through
land ports of entry on the U.S. southern border.[5] Reciprocal agreements, such as those through the Global Entry
program, should be expanded to provide both the U.S. and other allies with the security and convenience benefits
of trusted traveler programs.[6] Congress and the DHS should: Improve security assessments. In order to continue
the judicious growth of TSA PreCheck and risk-based security, the TSA must conduct proper security assessments
and refine the screening and vetting process to minimize security risks. Expand Global Entry reciprocity
agreements. The U.S. should look to build on existing partnerships, not only among nations already participating in
Global Entry, but also with Visa Waiver Program member countries, thus creating a trusted travel superhighway that
While the DHS has advanced trusted

traveler programs, the same cannot be said of the Screening Partnership Program
(SPP) that substitutes private screeners with TSA oversight in place of TSA
screeners. Created as a result of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, SPP allows airports
to opt out of federal screening so long as they can show that private screening will
enhances security and facilitates travel Private Screeners
not be more costly, compromise security, or harm the effectiveness of screening. [7]
Despite its potential benefits, SPP has had a rocky implementation, being suspended by the Obama Administration
There are
multiple reasons that an increasing number of U.S. airports are using SPP, including
productivity, cost, and security. In terms of productivity, a case study undertaken by the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 2011 found that SPP screening was as much as 65
percent more efficient than federal screeners .[10] One reason for this productivity gap could be
before Congress restored it.[8] As of January 2015, 21 airports were participating in SPP.[9]
the higher level of attrition in the TSA than private screening. A related factor in productivity could be better
staffing measures ranging from day-to-day scheduling to more efficient hiring and union practices. Beyond just pure
SPP airports also report improved customer service from their private-sector
screeners. Productivity also bleeds over into considerations of cost. A more
productive workforce with less attrition is less expensive to maintain and operate.
Although TSA studies found SPP programs to be more costly than government screening, they were widely
criticized, including by the GAO, for flawed methodologies. When some of these flaws were corrected,
the TSA found SPP and government screening to be nearly equal in cost .[11]
efficiency,
Furthermore, the Transportation Committee study found that when considerations such as increases in productivity
were accounted for, the cost of the program fell dramatically. Together with smaller overhead costs and lower levels
of attrition, the SPP program is likely a financial boon for most airports. Importantly, cost and
productivity is not harming security. Nearly every study undertaken, whether by the TSA or others, has found that
private screening is at least as good as, if not better than, government screeners in
finding security threats.[12] It is for all these reasons that the vast majority of European countries allow
airports to provide their own screening force or have a contractor provide it.[13] Sadly, the process to join
and renew an SPP contract remains mired in bureaucracy, taking as long as four
years.[14] Rather than allow an airport to determine the best way to provide screening, the SPP program is
micromanaged by the TSA, with the TSA selecting a screening contractor for each
SPP airport. Furthermore, the TSA has given its workforce collective bargaining rights, pitting security and costeffectiveness against labor demands.[15] Rather than allow the TSA to continue to make
bureaucratic and union-focused decisions, Congress should: Simplify the SPP
approval and contracting process. The process for joining SPP should be streamlined
to make it easier for airports to apply and TSA adjudication faster, fairer, and more
consistent. Airports joining SPP should also be allowed to select and manage their
own screening contractors from a list of TSA-approved companies rather than
continue the TSAs micromanaging of the program. Limit collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining in the screening line is harming security and costing taxpayers and travelers. Congress should expressly
The TSAs near complete

control of transportation security, from top-level regulations to everyday screening,
is an overly bureaucratic mistake that increases airport screening costs and harms
efficiency and even security. The SPP program answers this problem by unravelling
government inefficiencies and substituting private-sector productivity and costeffectiveness. In combination with judiciously expanding risk-based trusted traveler programs that also
forbid the TSA from collective bargaining. Restoring Transportation Security
promote security, Congress and the TSA can improve airport screening and security.
SPP Inherency
Inherency- SPP reform still needed
Bart Jansen,, 7-29-2014, "Airports: Privatizing TSA security remains challenging,"
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/29/tsaairports-privatize-montana-kansas-city/13316121/
As Congress seeks to privatize more aviation security, airport officials described their
difficulties Tuesday in getting the Transportation Security Administration to hire
contractors. A small airport in Montana is about to get screeners after a four-year
application process, the House Homeland Security subcommittee on transportation heard Tuesday. And
the Kansas City airport director told lawmakers he is worried about a roughly four-yearlong contract dispute that prevented a contract extension . The question for airports
seeking private screening and the lawmakers who advocate it is how to improve
TSA's application process to work faster and easier. The TSA was created to standardize and
improve airport security after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But the agency has the Screening Partnership Program for
airports that prefer to hire private contractors, so long as they maintain the same level of security as the TSA.
Congress would like to expand the program beyond the current 18 airports the largest in San
Francisco and Kansas City that handle a combined 4.5% of all passengers nationwide. But after a 2012 law
made the application process easier so more airports could participate, lawmakers say the results are still balky.
A2 Alt Causes
Private Screening Alt Cause

TSA regulations still apply to private screening companies
Burns, 2010
(Bob Burns, 11-19-2010, "The TSA Blog: Airports Who Opt out of TSA Screening are
Still Regulated by TSA, The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/11/airports-who-optout-of-tsa-screening.html, Date Accessed 8/1/15, JL @ DDI)
Any commercial airport can apply to TSAs Screening Partnership Program (SPP),
which has been around since the inception of TSA. After approval from TSA and a
competitive bidding process, SPP allows airports to transition to private screeners
while maintaining TSA oversight and the corresponding increased level of security
implemented since 9/11. So if an airport applies and is accepted into the SPP
program, they receive the same screening from a private company instead of TSA
officers. Thats the only difference. All commercial airports are regulated by TSA
whether the actual screening is performed by TSA or private companies. So TSAs
policies including advanced imaging technology and pat downs are in place at all
domestic airports.
Off-Case Answers
Courts CP
2AC
No solvency:
Both SCOTUS and DC Court of Appeals agree TSA scans
are constitutional
Laing 11
(Laing, Keith. Court: TSA's full-body scanners do not violate the Constitution, The Hill.
7/15/2011. http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/171819-court-tsa-body-scanners-areconstitutional//ghs-kw)
airport security checkpoints by the

Transportation Security Administration do not violate the U.S. Constitution, a
court ruled Friday. The Electronic Privacy Information Center and a pair of
individual citizens had argued before the Washington, D.C., circuit of the U.S.
Court of Appeals that the TSA's "advanced imaging technology" was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the court ruled Friday that technology is
legal. "In view of the Supreme Courts 'repeated refusal to declare
that only the least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment,' and considering the measures taken
by the TSA to safeguard personal privacy, we hold AIT screening
does not violate the Fourth Amendment," the court said its 18-page ruling released
Friday. "As other circuits have held, and as the Supreme Court has
strongly suggested, screening passengers at an airport is an
administrative search because the primary goal is not to
determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather
to protect the public from a terrorist attack," the ruling continued.
The controversial full-body scanning machines used at
No solvency advocate means reject the CPits their burden to

prove SCOTUS would take on a TSA case:
1. Kills advocacy skillsallows them to fiat past solvency
deficits and invent illegitimate CPs, also kills clash

2. Kills research skills and topic specific education
incentivizes a model of debate in which they just
recycle the same generic every year
3. Kills policymaking educationits not real world
because SCOTUS wouldnt get involvedheres some
ev:
The Supreme Court and other courts refused to get
involved in 2012
Johanson 12
(Johanson, Mark. Supreme Court Wont Get Involved In TSA Body Scanner Debate,
International Business Times. 10/1/2012. http://www.ibtimes.com/supreme-court-wont-getinvolved-tsa-body-scanner-debate-798577//ghs-kw)
The U.S. Supreme Court declined Monday to hear a case on the

contentious full-body scanners and comprehensive patdowns at airport
checkpoints. Federal courts in Florida and the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Atlanta had previously rejected the case , which was filed by Floridabased blogger Jonathan Corbett, who maintains the website TSA Out of Our Pants! Corbett
believes the Transportation Security Administrations use of advanced imaging technology and
invasive patdowns violates passengers protection against illegal searches under the Fourth
argued in court papers that the TSA has no

unilateral authority to adopt such procedures. The Supreme Court, however,
refused to take up his case, offering no comment on the matter.
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He
AND, it just denied cert to hear the same case again

SCOTUS 15
(Supreme Court of the United States, 6/22/2015.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-1263.htm//ghs-kw)
No. 14-1263 Title: Jonathan Corbett, Petitioner v. Transportation Security Administration Docketed:
April 22, 2015 Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Case Nos.: (12-15893RR) Decision Date: September 19, 2014 Rehearing Denied: December 5, 2014 ~~~Date~~~
~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mar 4 2015 Petition for a writ of
certiorari filed. (Response due May 22, 2015) May 1 2015 Brief amicus curiae of Freedom to Travel USA
filed. May 22 2015 Waiver of right of respondent Transportation Security Administration to respond
filed. Jun 2 2015 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of June 18, 2015.
DENIED.
Jun 22 2015 Petition
XO CP
2AC
AT Terror DA
2AC
No terroristsweve been at risk for a decade due to TSA
maintenance policies
Kimery 15
(Anthony Kimery. Editor-in-Chief Anthony "Tony" Kimery is one of the founding editors of Homeland
Security Today in 2004. A respected award-winning editor and journalist, he's covered homeland,
national and global security, intelligence and defense issues for more than three decades. He was
founding Washington bureau chief of Money Laundering Alert; an editor of three B2B newsletters on
financial institution regulation; and Washington editor of Financial Planning and Trader's magazines.
Kimery also was a Washington correspondent for the Paris-based Intelligence Newsletter; a columnist
for The Veteran; and managing editor of Kerrigan Media International, a Washington publisher of
magazines covering military and defense. Kimery also served as managing editor of SOURCES, a San
Francisco-based security intelligence news service; a founding contributing writer for Homeland
Defense Journal; and a contributing writer for Insight, a weekly current affairs magazine that was
published by The Washington Times Co. He's also written for The Washington Post, Wired, Vietnam,
Common Cause, SAGA, and the Investigative Reporters & Editors Journal, to name a few. "Homeland
Security Today: TSA Fails to Properly Manage Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program," No
Publication, 5-11-2015. http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/tsa-fails-toproperly-manage-airport-screening-equipment-maintenanceprogram/46616b11285a46d761439081bc03cd62.html//ghs-kw)
US airline passengers appear to have been in potential jeopardy to

terrorist attacks for nearly a decade because the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has not properly been managing the maintenance of
its airport screening equipment, said a new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) audit report. Consequently, the IG stated, TSA
may have to be using other screening measures that may be less effective at detecting
dangerous items. The screening equipment the IG investigated proper
maintenance of included Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines, Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) machines, Bottled Liquid Scanners, X-ray machines and
walkthrough metal detectors. The IG also reviewed maintenance data for Explosives
Detection System (EDS) and EDT checked baggage screening equipment. The IG
reported that TSA has not issued adequate policies and procedures to airports for
carrying out equipment maintenance-related responsibilities. And because TSA
hasnt been adequately overseeing its equipment maintenance, it cannot
be assured that routine preventative maintenance is performed or that
equipment is repaired and ready for operational use, the IG said. Without
diligent oversight, including implementing adequate policies and procedures and
ensuring it has complete, accurate and timely maintenance data for thousands of
screening equipment units, the IGs audit report said, TSA risks shortening the life span
of equipment and incurring unnecessary costs to replace the equipment. And if the
equipment is not fully operational, TSA may have to use other screening measures,
which could result in longer wait times and delays in passenger and baggage
screening, the IG said. But more importantly, the IG emphasized, our prior work on
airport passenger and baggage screening demonstrated that these other measures
may be less effective in detecting concealed weapons and other dangerous items.
Correctly maintaining sensitive screening equipment at our nations airports is critical to both protecting the flying
public and preserving this taxpayer-funded investment," Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.), ranking member of
the House Committee on Homeland Security, responded to the audit. "With hundreds of millions spent on this
critical function every year, TSA must ensure maintenance contractors are in compliance and do the work they are
paid for. I hope TSA quickly implements the Inspector Generals recommendations to ensure security gaps, cost
overruns and longer wait times are not needlessly created. TSA relies on its passenger and baggage screening
equipment to prevent dangerous items from being carried onboard aircraft. The agency screens nearly 2 million
passengers and more than 1 million checked bags at roughly 450 domestic airports across the nation. TSAs four
maintenance contracts that are supposed to cover both preventative and corrective maintenance for out of
warranty equipment the IG said are valued at about $1.2 billion. The Inspector General reported that there were two
levels of preventative maintenance contracts in place at the time of our review Level I maintenance performed by
local TSA personnel daily or weekly which does not require opening a machine to inspect mechanical operations;
and Level II maintenance primarily performed monthly, quarterly or annually by trained maintenance technicians.
As part of Level II maintenance, contractors are supposed to verify TSA personnels performance of Level I
TSA has not provided

sufficient guidance to local TSA personnel on procedures to properly document,
track and maintain Level I preventative maintenance actions, the IGs audit found, noting, For
the nine airports we reviewed, we noted that some maintenance logs contained incomplete or
inconsistent data. Continuing, the IG determined TSA personnel at seven of the nine airports we
reviewed could not provide any documentary evidence that contractors were verifying
Level I maintenance. Without accurate and complete maintenance logs for all equipment, TSA cannot
ensure that airport personnel are performing Level I preventative maintenance, the IG said,
adding, TSA also cannot be certain contractors are complying with the requirement
to verify performance of Level I preventative maintenance actions.
preventative maintenance. Other than a calibration test for EDT machines,
Airlines and local police will prevent attacksmore effective

than the TSA
Veronique De Rugy, 12-5-2013,
("Time to get rid of the TSA," Washington Examiner,

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/time-to-get-rid-of-the-tsa/article/2540280)
Federal airline security oversight has a long track record of failure. Few people know that prior to Sept. 11, 2001,
four different federal agencies -- the FBI, CIA, FAA and INS -- were entrusted to protect commercial airlines. They
clearly did not do their jobs. Why, then, has the federal government further nationalized the process? After the
2001 terrorist attacks, Congress rushed to create a new agency to protect America's planes, trains and trucks. The
Transportation Security Administration enabled the federal government to control the screening of passengers and
baggage at all but five of the 429 U.S. commercial airports. Eleven years and billions of dollars later,
the TSA
has mastered the art of the grope but falls short on increasing security . Throughout the
TSA's existence, the 62,000-employee bureaucracy has been constantly inundated with complaints about its
performance. Several reports from support travelers' concerns. In July, the Government Accountability Office
reported almost 10,000 cases of employee misconduct at the TSA between 2010 and 2012. Outrageous anecdotal
tales of TSA agents frisking teary-eyed children, forcing travelers to

remove prosthetic limbs, and even interfering with elderly passengers' feeding
tubes -- fuel discontent among jet-setters. But do the TSA's invasive methods even make
us safer? Many analyses suggest that the TSA provides security theater instead of
security. another recent GAO report assessed a program intended to identify and apprehend terrorists based on
stories -- like
behavioral patterns and concluded that the $200-million-a-year program isn't working and should be ended. So
what is the TSA good at? In 2011, the TSA proudly thwarted birds, turtles, science projects, and Chinese throwing
Research from the RAND Corp.

suggests that cockpit security, passenger vigilance and passport verification are the
most effective security procedures. Given that the TSA spends two-thirds of its
budget on ineffective, expensive passenger- and baggage-screening procedures, it
is easy to see why the agency is better at catching turtles than terrorists. TSA
incompetency is an easy target for late-night talk shows but the agency's troubles are no laughing matter.
Not only is it ineffective, it is incredibly wasteful and expensive. Since its creation, TSA's budget
stars -- but no terrorists. Embarrassing, but perhaps not surprising:
increased from $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $7.9 billion in fiscal year 2013. To that amount, we need to add the
$606 billion in estimated lost tourism revenue from unreasonable procedures over past decade. What's more, many
TSA agents have been caught stealing travelers' personal items and squandering budget money. Waste is rampant:
another GAO report shows that agents intentionally lower productivity to raise wages -- and ultimately increase
costs on taxpayers.
It is also a lot of money for an agency whose main role -- preventing

has already been generally accomplished. Cockpit
barricades, passenger vigilance, and passport screening are already implemented
and effective at lower cost. What about baggage screening? If the TSA prevents terrorists
from bringing explosives onto planes, wouldn't this be worth the cost? Even here, the TSA fails; there is
evidence TSA agents do not systematically check bags for explosives.
attacks in the style of Sept. 11 --
TSAs counterterrorism strategies are ineffective beyond

increasing other forms of terror
Dylan Matthews, 9-11-2013,( "Twelve years after 9/11, we still have no idea how to fight terrorism.,"
Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/11/twelve-years-after-911-we-stillhave-no-idea-how-to-fight-terrorism-2/)
Counterterrorism may be the most significant area of government policy where we

still have no idea what the hell we're doing. Everywhere else, policymakers are at least trying to
know what they're doing. Development researchers and education wonks have become obsessive about running
randomized controlled trials to evaluate interventions. Indeed, the popularity of charter schools is due in part to the
fact that their frequent use of lottery-based admission makes them good ways to randomly test different school
designs. Criminologists have run experiments on a variety of police tactics, probation designs, anti-gang initiatives,
approaches to domestic violence, and more. And While there's still plenty we don't know about what health
measures work, the Affordable Care Act is devoting millions to building up more evidence, and big-deal health
policy experiments like the Oregon Medical Study receive the attention they deserve. But terrorism? We have no
we spend $17.2 billion in classified funds a

year fighting terrorism through the intelligence community, and the Department of
Homeland Security spent another $47.4 billion last year. And we have very little
idea whether any of it is preventing terrorist attacks . Some of this is just that it's harder to
idea. The Afghanistan war has cost $657.5 billion so far,
collect good evidence than it is in other policy areas. You can't randomly select some airports to have security
screenings and some to not and measure how many hijacking occur at the ones with or without them or, at least,
you can't do that and conform to anything remotely resembling research ethics. But merely because true
experiments are often impossible doesn't mean that you can't evaluate policy interventions using other means. And
It's just that nothing seems to have any significant effect

one way or another. The Campbell Collaboration, an organization that publishes peer-reviewed
systematic reviews of the evidence on various policy topics, first released its review of the literature
on counterterrorism, written by criminologists Cynthia Lum (George Mason), Leslie Kennedy and Alison
Sherley (both at Rutgers), in 2006 (it's been updated since). The first problem the review identifies is that barely
any of the terrorism literature even tries to answer questions about effective
counterterrorism. "Of the over 20,000 reports regarding terrorism that we located," the
authors write, "only about 1.5 percent of this massive literature even remotely discussed the
idea that an evaluation had been conducted of counter-terrorism strategies. " They
people have tried those experiments.
found 354 studies that did, however. Further culling left them 80 studies that could be reasonably said to evaluate
only 21 of those 80 studies "appeared to at

least attempt to connect an outcome or effect with a program through a minimally
rigorous scientific test." Of those 21, only 10 met the Campbell review's methodological standards. Three of
the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Of these,
those were medical studies dealing with the effects of bioterrorism, leaving seven for the review to consider. It's
In 2009, eight years after 9/11, and after decades of work on terrorist groups
only seven studies, or
0.035 percent of all terrorism studies, evaluated the effectiveness of
counterterrorism measures. By comparison, a Campbell Systematic Review of anti-bullying programs in
worth dwelling on that number.
ranging from the IRA to ETA in Spain to Palestinian groups to the Tamil Tigers,
schools found 622 reports "concerned with interventions to prevent school bullying," of which 89 were rigorous
enough to include. Stopping bullying is vitally important and I don't mean to trivialize that cause, but it's more than
a little concerning that we have almost 13 times as many studies on how to stop bullying as we do on how to stop
terrorism. Anyway, back to the seven measly studies. For one thing, they are mostly done by the same handful of
people. Three were coauthored by Walter Enders (at the University of Alabama) and Todd Sandler (at University of
Texas Dallas), two by Enders and Sandler alone and the other one with Jon Cauley (at the University of Hawaii
Hilo). Cauley did another study with Eric Iksoon Im (also at Hilo). So over half of the studies included were
coauthored by one of Enders, Sandler, or Cauley. They're all excellent researchers, and one should not discount
their work because of their higher output, but generally we want a range of studies from a range of sources when
building a literature like this. The seven studies include among them 86 findings about the effectiveness of
Lum, Kennedy and Sherley report that

the average effect of the programs examined was negative. That is, the intervention
was found to increase terrorist incidents rather than reduce them . The results varied by the
type of intervention, but not in a way that should give us any comfort about our strategy: Metal detectors
reduce hijackings, but terrorist just do other stuff instead . The studies find that, on
average, adding metal detectors and security screenings at airports leads to about
6.3 fewer airplane hijackings in the years examined. But they also find that those policies
lead to significant increases in "miscellaneous bombings, armed attacks, hostage
taking, and events which included death or wounded individuals (as opposed to noncasualty incidents) in both the short and long run." In fact, metal detectors and security
screenings at airports lead to about 6.8 more of these substitute events . "When
calculating the overall weighted mean effect size for all of the findings examining the
effectiveness of metal detectors, the positive and harmful effects cancel each other
out," the review's authors conclude. Fortifying embassies and protecting diplomats doesn't appear to reduce
counterterrorism programs, and those findings are startling.
attacks. Most of the results here are not statistically significant. "In total, the findings do not indicate that the
fortification of embassies and efforts to protect diplomats have been effective in reducing terrorist attacks on these
targets," the review authors conclude. More on this issue here. There's no evidence harsher penalties reduce
hijackings. Only one study looked at what increasing penalties for plane hijackers did to hijacking rates, and that
one found no effect. That doesn't mean that it doesn't work, just that we shouldn't reject our original assumption
that it's not effective. Strongly written letters from the U.N. don't help much. One U.N. resolution, which included
a recommendation that airports use metal detectors, was associated with a significant reduction in hijackings. But
that could just mean that the metal detectors, rather than the U.N. resolution, caused the reduction, and the same
substitution issues explained above hold
TSAs policies are ineffective

Eric Bradner and Rene Marsh, Cnn, 6-2-2015,
("TSA screeners failed tests to detect explosives,

weapons," CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/tsa-failed-undercover-airport-screening-tests/)
Washington (CNN) The Department of Homeland Security said Monday that the acting administrator for the
airport screeners failed

to detect explosives and weapons in nearly every test that an undercover team
conducted at dozens of airports. According to a report based on an internal investigation, "red
teams" with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General were able to get
banned items through the screening process in 67 out of 70 tests it conducted
across the nation. The test results were first reported by ABC News, and government officials confirmed
Transportation Security Administration would be reassigned, following a report that
them to CNN. Mark Hatfield, acting deputy director, will take over for Melvin Carraway until a new acting
administrator is appointed. It was not immediately clear Tuesday where Carraway would be reassigned. RELATED:
Despite security gaps, no full screening for airport workers Late Monday, Johnson issued a statement announcing
Carraway's reassignment. "Today,
all air travelers are subject to a robust security system

that employs multiple layers of protection, both seen and unseen, including:
intelligence gathering and analysis, cross-checking passenger manifests against watchlists, screening
at checkpoints, random canine team screening at airports, reinforced cockpit doors, Federal Air Marshals, armed
pilots and a vigilant public," the spokesperson said. "In combination, these layers provide enhanced security
creating a much stronger and protected transportation system for the traveling public." RELATED: Report says U.S.
airport security equipment improperly managed Homeland Security's report on the tests is set to be issued later
this summer and is still being written. A Homeland Security spokesperson said that "the numbers in these reports
never look good out of context, but they are a critical element in the continual evolution of our aviation security."
Rep. Jason Chaffetz, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, called the
failure rate "deeply alarming." "Over the past six years, we have seen TSA
consume an enormous amount of government resources, but I'm not convinced we
have much to show for it," he said in a statement. "After spending over $540 million on baggage screening
equipment and millions more on training, the failure rate today is higher than it was in 2007 .
Something is not working." "I have long been a proponent of using low-tech bomb-sniffing dogs to detect weapons
and explosives," he said. "Government needs to recognize that the most effective solution is not always the most
expensive one." The spokesperson said DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed TSA to take "a series of actions,
several of which are now in place," to address the issues the red team tests identified -- but didn't identify what
those actions are.
T-Surveillance
2AC
TSA programs such as SPOT are forms of surveillance
Frank 08
(Thomas Carr Frank is an American political analyst, historian, journalist and columnist for Harper's
Magazine, TSA's 'behavior detection' draws scrutiny in light of few arrests
Counterterrorism effort is crucial, agency says, 11-18-2008,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20081118/1a_offlede18_dom.art.htm)
WASHINGTON -- Fewer than 1% of airline passengers singled out at airports for suspicious behavior are arrested,
Transportation Security Administration figures show, raising complaints that too many innocent people are
A TSA program launched in early 2006 that looks for terrorists using a
controversial surveillance method has led to more than 160,000 people in airports receiving scrutiny,
such as a pat-down search or a brief interview. That has resulted in 1,266 arrests, often on charges of
carrying drugs or fake IDs, the TSA said. The TSA program trains screeners to become
"behavior detection officers" who patrol terminals and checkpoints looking for travelers who act oddly or
stopped.
appear to answer questions suspiciously.
T-Domestic
2AC
TSA screening programs are domestic
Michael J. Sniffen, Associated Press, 12-23-2006, "Agency admits violating
privacy," Boston.com,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/12/23/agency_admits
_violating_privacy/
Instead, the privacy office said: "TSA announced one testing program but conducted an entirely different one." In a
40-word, separate sentence, the report noted U.S. government programs that collect personal data that can identify
Americans "are required to be announced in Privacy Act system notices and privacy impact assessments." TSA
spokesman Christopher White noted the GAO's earlier conclusions and said: " TSA
has already
implemented or is in the process of implementing each of the DHS privacy office
recommendations." Congress has been unhappy with TSA's domestic airline
screening program for years - since it was called CAPPS II before it was tweaked and renamed Secure
Flight. U.S. law now bars TSA from implementing a domestic screening system until
the GAO is satisfied it can meet 10 standards of privacy-protection, accuracy and
security. Secure Flight has never passed all those tests and White said there is no target date for implementing
it. Yesterday's report reinforced concerns on Capitol Hill. "This further documents the cavalier way the Bush
administration treats Americans' privacy," said U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, the Democrat who is to become Senate
judiciary committee chairman in January. "With this database program, first they ignored the Privacy Act and now,
two years later, they still have a hard time admitting it." Leahy promised the new Congress will try to learn more
about how the administration uses such databases. Characterizing the Secure Flight problems as "largely
unintentional," Homeland Security's privacy office attributed them to TSA's failure to revise the public
announcement after the test changed. The privacy office said TSA announced in fall 2004 it would acquire
passenger name records of people who flew domestically in June 2004. Airline passenger name records include the
flyer's name, address, itinerary, form of payment, history of one-way travel, contact phone number, seating location
and even requests for special meals. The public notices said TSA would try to match the passenger names with
names on watch lists of terrorists and criminals. But they also said the passenger records would be compared with
unspecified commercial data about Americans in an effort to see if the passenger data was accurate. It assured the
public TSA would not receive commercial data used by contractors to conduct that part of the tests. But the
contractor, EagleForce, used data obtained from commercial data-collection companies Acxiom, Insight America
and Qsent to fill in missing information in the passenger records and then sent the enhanced records back to TSA
on CDs for comparison with watch lists. This was "contrary to the express statements in the fall privacy notices
about the Secure Flight program," Homeland Security's privacy office concluded.
Security Theater - WIP
WIP
Richard Jackson
Critical Studies on Terrorism
David Campbell
Plan: The United States federal government should

substantially curtail its domestic surveillance conducted by the
Transportation Security Administration.
TSA surveillance is security theater that does nothing but
provide the illusion of safetyonly curtailing TSA activity
provides the first step in a paradigm shift that allows us to
effectively resist being terrorized
Schneier 09
(Bruce Schneier. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law
School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology. He is an American
cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the author of several books
on general security topics, computer security and cryptography. He is also a contributing writer for
The Guardian news organization.[3] "Essays: Beyond Security Theater," New Internationalist.
November 2009. https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html//ghskw)
Terrorism is rare, far rarer than many people think .
It's rare because very few people want to

comm it acts of terrorism, and executing a terrorist plot is much harder than television makes it appear. The best
defences against terrorism are largely invisible: investigation, intelligence, and emergency response. But even
these are less effective at keeping us safe than our social and political policies, both at home and abroad. However,
elected leaders don't think this way: they are far more likely to implement security
theater against movie-plot threats. A movie-plot threat is an overly specific attack scenario.
our
Whether it's terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists contaminating the milk supply, or terrorists attacking the
Stories are what we

fear. It's not just hypothetical stories: terrorists flying planes into buildings, terrorists
with bombs in their shoes or in their water bottles , and terrorists with guns and
bombs waging a co-ordinated attack against a city are even scarier movie-plot
threats because they actually happened. Security theater refers to security
measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to
actually improve their security. An example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office
Olympics, specific stories affect our emotions more intensely than mere data does.
buildings. No-one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it
looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards. Airport-security examples include the
National Guard troops stationed at US airports in the months after 9/11 -- their guns had no bullets. The US colour-
the metal detectors that

are increasingly common in hotels and office buildings since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, are additional
examples . To be sure, reasonable arguments can be made that some terrorist targets are more attractive
coded system of threat levels, the pervasive harassment of photographers, and
than others: aeroplanes because a small bomb can result in the death of everyone aboard, monuments because of
their national significance, national events because of television coverage, and transportation because of the
numbers of people who commute daily. But
there are literally millions of potential targets in any
large country (there are five million commercial buildings alone in the US), and hundreds of potential terrorist
tactics; it's impossible to defend every place against everything, and it's impossible to predict which tactic and
Security is both a feeling and a reality. The

When people are
scared, they need something done that will make them feel safe, even if it doesn't
truly make them safer. Politicians naturally want to do something in response to crisis, even if that
target terrorists will try next. Feeling and Reality
propensity for security theater comes from the interplay between the public and its leaders.
something doesn't make any sense. Often, this "something" is directly related to the details of a recent event: we
confiscate liquids, screen shoes, and ban box cutters on aeroplanes. But it's not the target and tactics of the last
attack that are important, but the next attack. These measures are only effective if we happen to guess what the
next terrorists are planning. If we spend billions defending our rail systems, and the terrorists bomb a shopping mall
instead, we've wasted our money. If we concentrate airport security on screening shoes and confiscating liquids,
Terrorists don't
care what they blow up and it shouldn't be our goal merely to force the terrorists to
make a minor change in their tactics or targets. Our penchant for movie plots blinds
us to the broader threats. And security theater consumes resources that could
better be spent elsewhere. Any terrorist attack is a series of events: something like planning, recruiting,
and the terrorists hide explosives in their brassieres and use solids, we've wasted our money.
funding, practising, executing, aftermath. Our most effective defences are at the beginning and end of that process
-- intelligence, investigation, and emergency response -- and least effective when they require us to guess the plot
correctly. By intelligence and investigation, I don't mean the broad data-mining or eavesdropping systems that have
been proposed and in some cases implemented -- those are also movie-plot stories without much basis in actual
effectiveness -- but instead the traditional "follow the evidence" type of investigation that has worked for decades.
Unfortunately for politicians, the security measures that work are largely invisible. Such measures include
enhancing the intelligence-gathering abilities of the secret services, hiring cultural experts and Arabic translators,
building bridges with Islamic communities both nationally and internationally, funding police capabilities -- both
investigative arms to prevent terrorist attacks, and emergency communications systems for after attacks occur -and arresting terrorist plotters without media fanfare. They do not include expansive new police or spying laws. Our
police don't need any new laws to deal with terrorism; rather, they need apolitical funding. These security measures
don't make good television, and they don't help, come re-election time. But they work, addressing the reality of
security instead of the feeling. The arrest of the "liquid bombers" in London is an example: they were caught
through old-fashioned intelligence and police work. Their choice of target (aeroplanes) and tactic (liquid explosives)
But even as we do all of this we

cannot neglect the feeling of security, because it's how we collectively
overcome the psychological damage that terrorism causes. It's not
security theater we need, it's direct appeals to our feelings. The best way
to help people feel secure is by acting secure around them. Instead of
reacting to terrorism with fear, we -- and our leaders -- need to react with
indomitability. Refuse to Be Terrorized By not overreacting, by not responding to
movie-plot threats, and by not becoming defensive, we demonstrate the resilience
of our society, in our laws, our culture, our freedoms. There is a difference between
indomitability and arrogant "bring 'em on" rhetoric. There's a difference between
accepting the inherent risk that comes with a free and open society, and hyping the
threats. We should treat terrorists like common criminals and give them all the
benefits of true and open justice -- not merely because it demonstrates our
indomitability, but because it makes us all safer. Once a society starts
circumventing its own laws, the risks to its future stability are much greater than
terrorism. Supporting real security even though it's invisible, and demonstrating indomitability even
though fear is more politically expedient, requires real courage. Demagoguery is easy. What we need is
leaders willing both to do what's right and to speak the truth. Despite fearful rhetoric to the
contrary, terrorism is not a transcendent threat. A terrorist attack cannot
possibly destroy a country's way of life; it's only our reaction to that
attack that can do that kind of damage. The more we undermine our own
laws, the more we convert our buildings into fortresses, the more we
didn't matter; they would have been arrested regardless.
reduce the freedoms and liberties at the foundation of our societies, the
more we're doing the terrorists' job for them. We saw some of this in the
Londoners' reaction to the 2005 transport bombings. Among the political and media hype and
fearmongering, there was a thread of firm resolve. People didn't fall victim to fear. They
rode the trains and buses the next day and continued their lives. Terrorism's goal isn't murder;
terrorism attacks the mind, using victims as a prop. By refusing to be
terrorized, we deny the terrorists their primary weapon: our own fear .
Today, we can project indomitability by rolling back all the fear-based post-9/11
security measures. Our leaders have lost credibility; getting it back requires a
decrease in hyperbole . Ditch the invasive mass surveillance systems and new
police state-like powers. Return airport security to pre-9/11 levels. Remove swagger from
our foreign policies. Show the world that our legal system is up to the challenge of terrorism. Stop telling people to
report all suspicious activity; it does little but make us suspicious of each other, increasing both fear and
Terrorism has always been rare, and for all we've heard about 9/11
changing the world, it's still rare. Even 9/11 failed to kill as many people as
automobiles do in the US every single month. But there's a pervasive myth that
terrorism is easy. It's easy to imagine terrorist plots, both large-scale "poison the food supply" and small-scale
helplessness.
"10 guys with guns and cars." Movies and television bolster this myth, so many people are surprised that there
Certainly intelligence and investigation

successes have made it harder, but mostly it's because terrorist attacks are actually
hard. It's hard to find willing recruits, to co-ordinate plans, and to execute those
plans -- and it's easy to make mistakes. Counterterrorism is also hard, especially when
we're psychologically prone to muck it up. Since 9/11, we've embarked on strategies of defending
specific targets against specific tactics, overreacting to every terrorist video, stoking
fear, demonizing ethnic groups, and treating the terrorists as if they were
legitimate military opponents who could actually destroy a country or a
way of life -- all of this plays into the hands of terrorists. We'd do much
better by leveraging the inherent strengths of our modern democracies and the natural advantages we have
over the terrorists: our adaptability and survivability, our international network of laws and law
enforcement, and the freedoms and liberties that make our society so enviable .
The way we live is open enough to make terrorists rare; we are observant enough to
prevent most of the terrorist plots that exist, and indomitable enough to survive the
even fewer terrorist plots that actually succeed. We don't need to pretend
otherwise.
have been so few attacks in Western cities since 9/11.
Security theater makes everyone a suspect and kills privacy

and civil rights while simultaneously perpetuating itself
Tiessen 2011
(Matthew Tiessen. PhD, Interdisciplinary Studies in Visual Culture and Critical Theory from University
of Alberta. Assistant Professor, School of Professional Communication, Ryerson University. Research
Associate, Infoscape Research Lab: Centre for the Study of Social Media. Being Watched Watching
Watchers Watch: Determining the Digitized Future While Profitably Modulating Preemption (at the
Airport). Surveillance & Society 9(1/2): 167-184. http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillanceand-society/article/viewFile/modulating/modulating//ghs-kw)
Gilles Deleuze once wrote in, Postscript on the Societies of Control (1992), that in the future (our present)
societies would be controlled or disciplined using subtly unobtrusive and strategically applied forms of
modulation. That is,
what were once the rigid physical enclosures of Foucaults
disciplinary society would inevitably yield to more flexible, immaterial, and

imperceptible forms of modulation that continually respond to, adapt to, and even
predetermine lifes unpredictability. In todays post-Deleuzean world, naked body scanners
are a suitably ambiguous expression of this dematerialized form of discipline , seeming
at the same moment to both threaten and protect privacy, to be both non-intrusive and outrageously invasive, to
both preempt and determine unknowable but inevitable futures. The flying public, then, is caught in the confusing
middle of these paradoxes of preemption, not knowing what to believe or what to think. They find themselves
trapped in an undefined surveillance grid that at once actively threatens and protects their freedoms. They are left
wondering: Will the scanners see through clothing and catch underwear-bombs, or wont they? Will security agents
scan, save, and distribute their naked images or wont they? Is having their naked picture taken a good thing, or
does it cross the lines of decency and their expectations for privacy? Are the interests being served by these
The public is too often left with more

questions than answers, more ambiguities and anxieties than understanding. In the
case of naked body scanners and other technologies of surveilling the whole (visual)
apparatus seems opaque. Indeed, the implementation of surveillance/security protocols are themselves
surveillance technologies their own or someone elses?
modulated and constantly changing, often leaving scholars, policy makers, and commentators trailing behind in
their efforts to describe and critique new ways todays disciplined subjects are being formed. In light of these
the opacity both of the issues at stake as well as of the scanned

images of our naked bodies confounds our categories and challenges long taken for
granted social conventions about, for example, habeas corpus, privacy, security , the
present, the future, potentiality, etc. I suggest, also, that this confounding of categories routinely
contributes to a generalized increase in insecurity : airport environments become
infused with anxiety; air passengers are made to prove their innocence by
submitting to surveillance regimes that degrade and harass; citizens rights are
removed as security protocols are intensified , etc. This increase in insecurity, as I will describe,
is seized upon by those demanding increases in security. Most troubling,
perhaps, is that increases in insecurity become profit making opportunities at , literally,
citizens expense. Indeed, surveillance products like naked body scanners become
solutions that get trotted out for problems that may or may not exist as profitseeking security contractors learn to conceive of insecurities and unknown futures
as opportunities for the creation of profitable, new markets. Appearances , it seems, are
still deceiving even if whats being made to appear are high-resolution scans of
our naked bodies. Preemptive exposure November 24th, 2010, was declared National Opt-Out Day for
developments, I argue that
anyone selected to undergo naked body scanning on their way through airport security in the United States. A
protest website was created (http://www.optoutday.com/) and Twitter feeds were initiated and continue to be
updated (http://twitter.com/#!/nationaloptout); at the same time, YouTube videos of scanners in action and
enhanced pat-down procedures went viral. The day of protest was organized to confront ongoing processes of
increasingly invasive security/surveillance creep at airports in the United States and around the world (Lyon 2006;
Marx 2005; Salter 2007). What travelers were opting-out of was the opportunity to have their bodies zapped by
either radiation-emitting backscatter X-ray machines or, alternatively, DNA-unzipping millimetre-wave scanners
(Alexandrov et al. 2009). At the time the Atlantic Monthly magazine described naked body scanning as securitizing
stupidity (Goldberg 2010). Passengers were also opting-out of having their naked image viewed by an unseen
security-officer seated alone in a room with a computer monitor and an exposure of their nakedness, genitals,
scars, and surgeries in full view. National Opt-Out Day was prompted in part by the exposure given to naked body
scanners by alarmist alternative online media outlets like Matt Drudges The Drudge Report and Alex Jones
Infowars.com, both of which began aggressively linking to grainy home videos of Transport Security Officials (TSA)
in the United States scanning and groping children, people with disabilities, and the elderly. These videos, having
gone viral on YouTube, stoked burgeoning outrage at the security and surveillance practices that were read by the
public as having gone one step too far. The emergence of online outrage, in turn, drew the attention of the
mainstream media, culminating in Washington officials having to defend or modify the latest airport security
protocols (Parker 2010). L-3 Millimetre-Wave Scanners (photo by author). Civil liberties organizations also joined the
fray, with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) urging the US Congress to prohibit this technology, stating that
[p]assengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not be required to display highly personal details
of their bodies such as evidence of mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the
size of their breasts or genitals as a prerequisite to boarding a plane (ACLU 2008). As Van Munster and others
requiring civilians to pass through strip-searches (whether digitized or

not) and groping procedures previously reserved for criminal suspects and convicts
implies that everybody is a suspect (2004: 151). And as Aradau and Van Munster repeatedly point
out, while profiling remains a necessary part of combating what gets defined as
terrorism, the targets of profiling are increasingly becoming arbitrary and
blurred; as they explain, today anyone can qualify as a potential terrorist:
Terrorists can be unemployed or employed, poor or not so poor, young or old, legal
residents or citizens, illegal migrants or tourists. Uncertainty slowly extends profiling
to the entirety of the population (2007: 104). Since the uproar surrounding National Opt-Out Day
scholars and theorists have responded to the naked body scanners by suggesting, for instance, that these
allegedly noninvasive virtual strip searches represent a troubling trend that finds
the states disciplinary powers being consolidated , as Magnet and Rodgers suggest, through
increasingly covert and concealed surveillance practices (2011: 2). But by opting out of the
have pointed out,
naked scanner option, travellers found themselves jumping from the frying pan into the fire. On August 27th, 2010
the TSA began implementing enhanced pat down procedures designed, according to online speculation, to be so
invasive that they effectively function as punishment or discipline for those who choose to opt out of the
scanners. While the TSA coyly avoids the issue, the internet is abuzz with reports that TSA officials use open-palmed
groping of testicles, buttocks, and breasts on adults and children in their effort to create safety through officially
sanctioned forms of what in any other circumstance would qualify as sexual assault. The Atlantic Monthlys Jeffrey
Goldberg recently reported on his experience of the enhanced pat-down as follows: At [the airport], I told the officer
who directed me to the back-scatter that I preferred a pat-down. When I made this request, a number of TSA
officers, to my surprise, began laughing. I asked why. One of them said that the rules were changing shortly, and
that I would soon understand why the back-scatter was preferable to the manual search. [T]omorrow, [the TSA
officer giggled,] we're going to start searching your crotchal area and you're not going to like it. What am I not
going to like? I asked. We have to search up your thighs and between your legs until we meet resistance, he
A similar story is that of an

American news reporter whose three-year-old daughter can be seen on YouTube
kicking and screaming Dont touch me as TSA officers squeeze and frisk her
flailing arms and legs (Alberts 2010). When questioned about the practice of
inappropriately touching small children James Marchand, TSA Regional Security
Director, sounds shockingly inappropriate by describing how TSA officials trick the
child into complying with the inappropriate touching by fooling them into thinking
theyre playing a game: You try to make it as best you can for that child to come through. You ask the
explained. Resistance? I asked. Your testicles, he explained. (2010)
child to put their arms up in some way, and if you can come up with some kind of game that youre trying to play
with the child then it makes it a lot easier (YouTube 2010). The sexual molestation implications of the enhanced
pat-downs are also highlighted by the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) who have issued a travel
advisory declaring that they have nothing to do with security and are about ritualizing the process of making
Americans submit to complete degradation at the hands of authority figures, no matter what level of humiliation
that process encompasses; the advisory concludes by stating that if we allow the government to get away with
groping your childrens genitals theres no limit to the abuse they will subsequently engage in (2010). In response
to the Opt-Out movement, the TSA went into damage control, with TSA Administrator John Pistole declaring: On the
eve of a major national holiday and less than one year after Al Qaida's failed attack last Christmas Day, it is
irresponsible for a group to suggest travelers opt out of the very screening that could prevent an attack (Knox
2010). At least in the United States, opting-out remains an option passengers in the UK have the choice either to
get irradiated and digitally-nude or to miss their flight (Travis & Milmo 2010). Creating appearances Naked body
scanners what the United States Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) call whole body imaging or
advanced imaging technology (TSA.gov) and what the online community has cheekily called nude-o-scopes
are, according to the TSA website, blog, and Twitter account, safe for all passengers, including children, pregnant
women, and individuals with medical implants (TSA.gov). As Blogger Bob an official TSA blogger explained in
April, 2008: These images are friendly enough to post in a preschool. Heck, he goes on [they] could even make
the cover of Readers Digest and not offend anybody (TSA Blog 2008). The UKs Guardian took quite a different
view, reporting that naked body scanners break child pornography laws, or the Protection of Children Act of 1978,
under which it is illegal to create an indecent image or a pseudo-image of a child (Travis 2010). In addition to the
pornographic potential of naked body scanners, many argue that their
themselves are basically ineffective.
surveillance abilities
Israeli security expert Rafi Sela, for example, suggests
naked body scanners are useless (Schmidt 2010). In Selas view, North Americans are
content with high-tech security theatre (Schneier 2003) that effectively enhances the
status quo because, as he sees things: Americans and Canadians are nice people and they
will do anything because they were told to do so and because they don't know any
different (Kelly 2009). The ineffectiveness of the naked scanning machines was again confirmed when, on
November 16th, 2010 German airports began reporting that their newly acquired naked body
scanners couldnt even see through folds and pleats in clothing (The Local 2010). Such
that
allegations have been more recently supported by research that suggests that backscatter machines are close to
useless when faced with, for example, large objects with tapered edges (which are rendered by the scanners as
bodily contours), wires (which are too narrow to be picked up), or sharp objects placed on the side of the scanned
body (which effectively disappear). Indeed, as researchers Kaufman and Carlson argue, even if X-ray exposure were
to be increased significantly, normal anatomy would make a dangerous amount of plastic explosive with tapered
edges difficult if not impossible to detect (2010: 73). And as I will discuss later on, the effectiveness of
biometrically-driven surveillance technologies is further brought into question by the degree to which the potential
for outsized financial profits are driving the implementation of contemporary or experimental surveillance
technologies as much as, or in coordination with, government policy. As David Lyon explains: Combined with the
quest of governments, especially the United States, to find new means of amassing personal information, and
technology companies urgently seeking new markets, the prospects are poor for carefully assessing the promise of
biometrics to increase national security (2008: 40). The widespread use of naked body scanners was ushered in
following the alleged attack on the United States by the underwear bomber on Christmas Day, 2009 (Shachtman
2009). As former Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff argued to the Washington Post, as he made the rounds
of major television networks: Youve got to find some way of detecting things in parts of the body that arent easy
to get at. Its either pat-downs or imaging (Eggen et al. 2009). Of course, as already discussed, the scanners are
unable to see under skin folds or into body cavities. Something else Chertoff failed to mention at the time was that
one of the two firms who had been authorized to provide the TSA with naked body scanners Rapiscan was a
client of his own security consulting firm the Chertoff Group (Kindy 2010). Prior to the underwear bomber event
Rapiscan was awarded an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contract by the TSA worth $173 million. L-3, the
other naked body scanner manufacturer the seventh-largest defense contractor in the United States was
awarded a $165 million contract four days after the failed Christmas Day event. Canadas response to the
underwear bomber incident was to follow the lead of the United States and install millimetre-wave scanners.
Canadian transport Minister John Baird announced on January 5, 2010 that the Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority (CATSA) would install 44 millimetre-wave scanners in Canadian airports and Canadian Privacy
Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart assured Canadians that appropriate safety and privacy measures had been taken
(Stoddart 2010). The Canadian publics reaction to the naked body scanners was comparatively muted and was
even initially positive. Indeed, shortly after the news that widespread naked scanner implementation was
forthcoming, Angus Reid did a poll of Canadians in January, 2010, just weeks after the underwear bomber incident.
The pollsters asked Canadians: From what you have seen, read or heard, do you support or oppose the use of
these airport scanners to screen all passengers flying to and from Canada? (Angus Reid 2010: 2). Overwhelmingly,
Canadians were supportive, with 74% of Canadians being at least moderately supportive of being photographed
naked. Of course, the question posed by Angus Reid does not provide those polled with any information about
radiation, image retention, cost, photographing children, effectiveness, and so on. Rather, Canadian respondents to
this poll were likely basing their answers on the seemingly innocuous, low resolution, and grainy images of naked
bodies being circulated by the media images provided by the TSA and the naked body scanner manufacturers
themselves. So while having the right to vote on whether or not they think the naked scanners are a good idea
created the appearance of democratic choice, the reality is that in both the United States and Canada the
governments corporate-friendly decision to deploy these scanners had already occurred without public
creating appearances are what the naked body scanners are all about.
Appearances of security, appearances of bold and decisive action , appearances of
risk, appearances of for your own good-ness, appearances of rights being
protected. It is, however, the deceiving nature of these appearances that is most
alarming, particularly the deceiving nature of the images being made to appear by
the layers of security bent on revealing images and knowledges about us that we
ourselves likely have never seen and that we, under any other circumstances, would
never desire to be revealed. Alarming also is how the logics of preemption
used to support the implementation of outrageously invasive surveillance
regimes can be leveraged by politicians and corporations in pursuit of
consultation. But
profit and as a means of manufacturing new markets for enabling capital

expansion.
TSA scanners construct us as bare life, rendering us

hypervisible and invisiblevote AFF to stop the logic of
preemption and submissiveness perpetuated by scanners
Tiessen 2011
Looking at people looking at people looking So
how, then, do the naked body scanners instantiate
a logic of preemption? How do airline passengers get inculcated into the naked body scanner-based
perpetual state of exception? In the rest of the article I will deal more specifically with these questions by focusing
on the securitized and coercive environments created once naked body scanners begin to be present, installed, and
the installation of naked body scanners

another layer is added to the performative space of the security staging area.
Moreover, my argument will be that naked body scanners compel passengers to perform
submissiveness through gestures, movement, self-exposure in the face of authority, to
perform non-resistance in the face of outrageous and exceptional demands (demands that
used in todays airports. My suggestion is that with
find passengers having to reveal their genitals and bodily dismorphoses or that require that they allow themselves
to be physically accosted in ways that would be unacceptable in any less exceptional circumstance). I suggest,
the scanner staging area creates a performance space of multiple forms of

securitization (of both bodies and profits), a space that weaves together an
interdependent and mutually reinforcing web of securitized visuality . As Ive been arguing,
the naked body scanners (and accompanying enhanced pat-downs) are currently the apogee of a
particular logic of securitization and airport spectatorship (Adey 2007) premised upon
pre-emptive intervention (de Goede and Randall 2009), the assumed sovereignty of the visual sense
then, that
(Amoore 2007), biometrically and algorithmically mediated data mining (Lyon 2009), remote sensing (Adey 2009),
This is a logic designed to

delegitimize concepts like privacy, liberty, or dignity. The naked body scanner phenomenon,
then, is motivated by an effort not only to make risks visible through an aesthetics of
transparency (Hall 2009) but by an effort to compel everyone citizen and security agent alike to
submit willingly to a logic of absolute exposure , a logic enacted already through the use of clear,
sealable bags into which passengers must place their flight-appropriate vials of liquids and gels. That is,
complete visibility and transparency demanded by the variegated components of
the distributed panopticon (Crandall 2005) is achieved by participants acting in concert
towards a greater good a total security system designed, at all costs, to abolish hints of threats before
they become whispers (let alone reality). The airport and body scanner environment, as Barad would say,
intra-act (Aradau 2010; Barad 2007) with dominant narratives about security and
preemption to produce a necessary response to a potential, and seemingly
inevitable, catastrophe. Indeed, the mere presence of the scanners during the security check endows them
confessionary complexes (Salter 2007), and absolute safety through security.
with legitimacy as they participate in actively reshaping the whole security environment the anxieties of the
travelers, the apparent expertise and power of the security staff, the apparent efficacy of the security measures,
material objects such as body scanners need to be reconceived

as being co-constitutive of reality rather than as a distinct form. [ Things] are
etc. As Aradau has suggested,
themselves agential and emerge in relation with material-discursive practices (2010: 494); she goes on to observe
Subject and object, matter and meaning do not exist separately and do
not come to inter-act, but are both formed and transformed through intraaction
(2010: 498). The security environment, then, intra-acts to construct and reinforce
passenger subjectivities and systems of belief, requiring , for instance, that passengers
submit to authority in the presence of new and imposing technology. This environment,
in turn, renders the potential airline passengers collectively guilty until they
are allowed to perform their innocence for the naked body scanners that
reconstruct them as bare life (Agamben 1998; Aradau 2009). Upon entering the screening area,
with Barad that:
airline passengers are in the process of attempting to pass through yet another layer of security in the ever-more-
The screening area a sort of milder version of

zone of indistinction (Aradau & Van Munster 2009: 693) is also a social space
wherein the act of looking and being looked at, the act of looking at others looking,
and the act of looking for lookers who are looking from concealed rooms creates a
space where passengers and TSA officials are together relying on what is seen to
define what is normal. The screening area operationalizes the opportunity to
generate interdependent and reciprocal relationships of visibility : we and the security
intrusive surveillant assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).
Agambens
agents must negotiate a continuous feedback loop of exposure and disclosure, we become both voyeur and
The experience is one of being watched, watching, watching watchers

watch, and watching watchers watch watchers. We are compelled, at once to conceal and to
exhibitionist.
expose, to become both visible and invisible in an effort to pass through the process with our dwindling rights and
diminished dignity intact. So while TSA officials stare and scan, stare and scan in search of anomalies, we stare out
both at those doing the staring and those being stared at in an attempt to discern especially prior to the naked
our
willingness to comply with the scanning regimen is, in part, consistent with the gee
whiz sort of cultural associations we have with X-ray vision. In their view there is a neato factor and a sense of
body scan how to render ourselves invisible, unnoticed, imperceptible. Magnet and Rodgers point out that
familiarity (and inevitability?) about our future-infused present being one where submission to see-through vision
machines almost seems natural. As Magnet and Rodgers explain, naked body scanners reference
longstanding cultural and science fictional preoccupations with X-ray eyes; this
preoccupation with X-ray eyes requires, in turn, that security personnel obscure the:
pleasure taken in rendering [] bodies visible as well as mystifying the
process by which particular bodies are made hypervisible and others
made invisible . This is a process that we have elsewhere termed surveillant scopophilia; that
is, new technologies provide opportunities for pleasure in looking in ways connected to their surveillance. (2011: 3)
The feedback loops of looking, exposure, surveillance, concealing, imagery, and anxiety present within the
scanning screening area operate together to create a sort of stable environment one where all
activities reciprocally support one another that, if disturbed, reacts decisively to quell the
disruption. Moreover, the move to maximize reciprocal visualizations in the airport screening process
particularly visualizations of the human body, of flesh itself overturns the previous set of airport security protocols
that focused discretely on metallic object sensors and baggage inspection. Today, in addition to our luggage being
inspected as it passes through a concealed chamber full of X-rays, our bodies are on display as being on display
when we step into the glassed-in space of the transparency machines on display for both security personal, who
gaze at our nakedness, and for other passengers, who witness us spread our legs and raise our arms above our
head in a performative pose only recently reserved for those under arrest or surrendering to authority. Todays
The
performative nature of looking and being looked at is not lost on TSA central
planners who, in an online article entitled Building Security Force Multipliers describe how visually
performing and staging security theater serves to create the impression that safety
and security are being maintained by the TSAs deployment of Visible Intermodal Protection
and Response (VIPR) teams whose raison dtre is to be publicly visible by providing random, announced, highsecurity protocols have shifted from scanning the metalscape to performatively probing the meatscape.
visibility surge[s] into a transit agency, in addition to enhancing agency resources during special events (TSA n.d.).
As the TSA explains: More than 50 mass transit deployments have occurred since the program was initiated in
December 2005. Regional planning and execution is increasing the frequency of deployments and enhancing local
expertise, thereby increasing the terrorism deterrent effect (TSA n.d.). As the TSA explains, VIPR teams use
surprise and sudden visual appearances to introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist
what is similarly disrupted are the normal patterns of

people going about their everyday lives since with the sudden appearance of VIPR teams they
instantly find their day to day routines becoming extraordinary as the securitized
states of exception infiltrate the public sphere and everyday schedules
planning activities (TSA 2007). Of course,
Preemptive logics further state power, stifle political action,

and preclude social transformation (get rid of D&G stuff)
Tiessen 2011
Naked body scanners and the security environments

they express and produce can be understood as yet another permutation of the
politics and strategies of preemption (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Anderson 2010; de Goede and
Randalls 2009). As research in this area has revealed, preemptive strategies of
governance as initiated by the state and the security apparatus that they support
(and that supports them) paves the way for the implementation of new and unproven
security imperatives. Additionally, however, the politics of preemption unwittingly relies on
an ontological commitment to a misreading of what Deleuze would describe as
virtualities (1994), or what can more practically be understood as the potentialities that
condition and give rise to actual events (Massumi 2010, 2009, 2007, 2005a, 2005b). That is,
without realizing it todays state/security apparatus operates according to what Deleuze
would regard as an ontologically impossible logic of clairvoyance, a logic that requires
citizens to trust that our politicians and security experts can see the future and that
the future is knowable. Of course, the future they envision is a dangerous one. By decreeing that
it can know the unknowable, the state/security apparatus enacts a set of
security protocols premised on the coercive power that comes from being
able to mandate preemptive action in response to unknowable futures.
Moreover, these protocols gain legitimacy based on particular ontological
commitments about the nature of reality for instance, the relationship of the present to
Preempting dissent by disavowing Deleuze
potentiality and to the future. I want to point out too that these ontological commitments are in direct conflict with
those of Deleuze whose ontological commitments can be and were used to expose the tactics of power and
coercion deployed by state/security assemblages to modulate citizens and other dividuals (Deleuze 1992: 5). So
the state/security apparatus isnt at all interested in the finer points of DeleuzoGuattarian philosophy, its unwitting reversal of Deleuzean ontological logic contributes to a
popular image of the world that understands the future to be something that can be
controlled, managed, identified, inevitable, and pre-determined. This ontological
reversal contributes to the consolidation of state/security assemblage power
structures whose legitimacy derives from creating narratives that unwittingly
completely misread and disavow the emancipatory potential of the ontological
commitment to virtuality as outlined by Deleuze (and Guattari) (1987). Of course, as
while it may be true that
the state/security apparatus logic of preemption

should be regarded with suspicion and must be regarded as a sort of technology in
its own right, one designed to produce prescribed social, political, and marketdriven ends. That is, rather than encouraging and enabling the emergence of novel
futures and creative responses to those futures contemporary security logics
premised upon initiating preemptive action in fact work to disable potentials and
variables by determining, in advance and by decree, what the future will become and how
we must prepare for its inevitability (2006). As Aradau puts it, preparedness exercises
premised on clairvoyant logics of preemption do not create something new, they
do not organize subjects with a view to radical change, but rehearse in a ritual play
that which has already been set out as inevitable: the next terrorist attack (2010: 4).
This attempt to determine the future by the state/security apparatus also works to stifle protest by
leapfrogging it, by rendering controversies moot since the future has been
foreclosed. Moreover, the inevitability of catastrophic futures operates retroactively on
the present (but without actually existing) to necessitate that we commit our
energies and efforts to preparing for them today. As Elmer and Opel explain, logics of
preemption allow state and security actors to invoke a predetermined inevitable
future that requires military and police action; moreover, this requirement renders
dissenting opinion irrelevant and deviant since, after all, the future (and what is needed to
prepare for it) is a foregone conclusion: Through the preemptive lens the future becomes an
inevitable series of events, elevating fate to an agent of historical evolution.
Rational free will, as a motivating factor in social and political change, by
comparison, is not only futile, it becomes potentially life threatening .
theorists such as Elmer and Opel (2006) have warned,
Preemptive politics thus raises serious questions about the power of political leaders (as visionaries of publicly
unforeseeable dangers) and political protest as an indefinite form of collusion or appeasement. (2006: 47980)
For
Deleuze (and Guattari), on the other hand, the future is much less knowable: it
discloses what it can do after the fact. For them the future is an open, unknowable, and unactualized
zone of pure potential that, in time, generates the conditions necessary for actualization. For Deleuze the
virtual realm exists in a sort of feedback-loop-relationship with the actual: the
virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object as though the object
had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged (1994: 209). As Deleuze explains:
The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual (1994: 209).
So for Deleuze, the virtual is like the actual fully real but not knowable in
advance. The virtual, then, can be understood as the engine of the actual (and vice versa) and the actual and
virtual realms can be thought of as responding to one another in a problem/solution sort of way, such that the
virtual realm responds to and creates the problems that define the actual (and vice versa). Deleuze explains that
the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which
orientates, conditions, and engenders solutions but that these solutions do not resemble the conditions of the
problem (1994: 212). For Deleuze (and Guattari although Im not quoting from their collaborative works here),
it is unknowable virtual forces that generate or make possible both the

problems and the solutions that compose our everyday lives. Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari
recognize that the actualizations that virtualities condition not only cannot be predicted
in advance, but do not even resemble the virtualities that contribute to their
emergence. Indeed, according to Deleuze and Guattaris ontological commitments, to suggest that
actualizations can be known in advance is the height of folly since actualizations
(virtualizations effects) can only be recognized as having been possible (as opposed to their
having been potential) after they have occurred. In fact, to suggest otherwise would be
dangerous. As Deleuze explains, there is a danger that the virtual could be confused with
then,
the possible: The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the
possible is therefore a realization. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it
possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization. It would be
wrong to see only a verbal dispute here: it is a question of existence
itself. (1994: 211) My point, then, is that policies of preemption policies that provide the
ontological impetus for, amongst other things, the publics accepting and footing the bill
for the implementation of naked body scanners must be understood as part of an
ontologically-based system of beliefs and actions that can be used to serve the
purposes of those in position to declare what is being preempted . That is, policies and
practices of preemption function to foreclose potential and determine becomings not by securing or
predicting the future, but by securing and defining the present . So while The Critical
Approaches to Security in Europe Collective (C.A.S.E.) admirably contests the idea that scholarly research on these
matters can be detached from political contingency and action, and challenge the illusion that the critique of
it is equally important to contest

in my view the notion that preemptive security practices can be separated from the
machinations of sovereign sources of power (and, as I will be arguing: credit, finance, and
neoliberalism) intent, not only, on securing the future from catastrophe, but on securing
the present from pursuing or acting on any subversive or undesirable powerresisting potentials. As de Goede and Randalls argue, the idea that sovereigns (or anyone
else) have access to accurate imaginations of actionable futures (Aradau,
LoboGuerrero, Van Munster 2008: 152) must be questioned since the preemptive
actions that get imposed on populations work to depoliticize and
delegitimate debate; this delegitimation of debate and corresponding
preempting of dissent has, they argue, the potential to bring the
unimaginable into being (2009: 859). For de Goede and Randalls, [r]econceiving
precautionary politics is thus vital if we are to engage ethically with the
world (2009: 859). In other words, the onus falls on scholars of surveillance and security to
foreground the fallacies of preemptive logics designed to depoliticize the present.
texts does not produce [] political effects or resistance (2006: 445),
When isnt the exception? Surveillance and security policies premised on preemption require the imposition of
security protocols designed to prevent catastrophic futures that seem probable given the less than stable
circumstances of the present. That being the case, preventing the threats of tomorrow requires that todays and
Practices of preemption, then, can be seen as

working as much to maintain the status quo as they do to prevent inevitable
futures, since for the inevitable to remain inevitable over time the present must
remain effectively constant (or at least the variables that currently condition the inevitability of imminent
catastrophe must be made stable). Preemptive logics also compel us to spend our
passing present attempting to solve or prevent unknown future which , in
turn, shortcircuits our ability to engage in transformative politics today (i.e. by
tomorrows presents remain impossibly constant.
focusing on preparing for future catastrophes we are unable to transform current conditions that may be
contributing to the alleged inevitabilities of tomorrow). Aradau and Van Munster describe the situation as follows:
When allied with precautionary risk management, exceptionalism

reinforces the status quo and the continuity of the present against
struggles for transformation and social justice (2009: 697). That being the case, the
inevitability of catastrophes necessitates that extraordinary security practices that were initially
described as exceptions (Agamben 1998) become, instead, everyday security practices
that remain constant in order to secure the present from the inevitable. The
apparatus ability to transform exceptions into norms or at least to transform

the norm into a permanently modulated state of exception begs the question: When isnt the
exception? Or, at what point did the churning of states of exception become the norm? Furthermore, when
state/security
does the normalization of exception-making become an outrage? And when does the normalization of outrage
at what state of the process do we (citizens, policy makers, academics,

begin engaging in some preemptive prognosticating and connecting-of-thedots of our own by asking questions like: What other interests are at play beyond
security interests? Where are these processes of preemption and production of
exceptions leading? Who benefits? What is the endgame? Is there an endgame? Do
perpetual preemptions and exceptions contribute to our collective ability to pursue
freedom or emancipatory projects? Do they contribute to our ability to promote
diversity (Pugliese 2011)? Justice? Equality? Democracy? Sustainability? Security? What
surveillance technique will be cause for alarm? When does the preparation for
catastrophe itself become catastrophic?
demand resistance? Moreover,
theorists)
Lodato 11
(Lodato, Thomas James. PhD in Digital Media from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Naked sight
for naked sites: The production of aesthetic mechanical objectivity by Advanced Imaging Technology.
CoDesign: International Journal of CoCreation in Design and the Arts Volume 7, Issue 3-4, 2011.
https://www.academia.edu/934963/Naked_sight_for_naked_sites_The_production_of_aesthetic_mechanical_objectivit
y_by_Advanced_Imaging_Technology//ghs-kw)
*AIT = Advanced Imaging Technology = those body scanners we have now
AIT secures most

primarily at the emotional level; that is, AIT is Security theater , a term used by Bruce Schneier
How does AIT, as a system and device of image-making, secure? In short, the answer is that
to describe the (over-)enactment of the mannerisms of security without the underlying functions (Schneier 2009).
AIT accomplishes this through an aesthetic form of an epistemic virtue called

mechanical objectivity (Daston & Galison 2007: 371), which is outwardly characterized by a
particular type of image and image-making accompanied by the severe repression
of the viewing subject. The result is a seamless un-spectacle of ahistoricized
security. What AIT is not: the misleading path of panopticism According to the TSA website (TSA 2010a), AIT "is
an integral part of TSA's effort to continually look for new technologies that help ensure travel remains safe and
secure by staying ahead of evolving threats." Oddly, nowhere on the website, nor in recent open letter penned by
TSA chief administrator John Pistole, is there any explicit mention of how AIT actually accomplishes its goal. At first
pass, one might attest to the obviousness of AIT's contribution to security. Such a response may go something like
this: AIT more objectively visualizes those places previously unseen, thereby securing travelers by being more
thorough with regards to known problem areas and literal blind spots. Moreover, AIT makes screening easier by
eliminating human error in identifying threats. 3 Even though this appears to be solid logic to support AIT,
practice and implementation reveal notable discrepancies, if not blatant falsehoods, about
the technology. Even more, as much as this path is a dead end, it is important to spend time debunking its
appropriateness to AIT as it tends to be the default notion of how security works (Lyon 2001: 143) First, and
beginning with the last point, the current arrangement of the advanced imaging system relies on a remote observer
someone unseen by, and physically-removed from, the observed person who reviews the images captured by the
device. Additionally, pre-screeners, such as those officials that review identification and boarding passes, channel
travelers into the device That is to say, human judgment bookends AIT, and is in no way a non-factor in how it
screens (though, as it will be argued later, human judgment Appears to be removed, which is vital to AIT functioning
as security theater).The system certainly tries to dampen this. The reviewer, who is sealed within a remote room,
is(sometimes) partially aided by automated threat detection software that identifies potential areas of interest 4 . In
the more recent generation of AIT where the body image is no longer seen, the reviewer only sees that there are
areas of interest, resulting in more secondary inspections than deemed necessary (i.e. a flood of false positives)
(CNN 2010b). The pre-screeners are helped by automatically generated codes printed on the ticket; these are codes
secondarily verified at the gate, and overridden by staff upon proper handwritten approval. Where AIT seemingly
limits the imprecision of human judgment, it only actually limits human sight in, and so leaves humane judgment
intact. These human components seems to be a unavoidable (even necessary in the case of
overzealous
software as Pistole attested before Congress (CNN 2010b)). To this portion of the first-pass logic, AIT fails. Second,
security and surveillance are not tantamount within AIT; this point requires more consideration than the previous
one. The palpability of surveillance-as-security comes from Bentham via Foucault (its cultural popularity probably is
more indebted, however, to George Orwell's 1984 (Lyon 2001: 143)than either theorizing party). Despite the clear
flaws to this concept, it nonetheless gets considerable practical application, such as . In this model, to secure
peoplethat is, to secure people against their own misbehaviorone needs to surveil wholly, immediately, and
openly. In other words, those observed persons need to know that they are being watched. "Under the watchful
gaze, criminals [in Bentham's Panopticon] would gradually mend their ways and, supported by the admonition of
the 'invisible' supervisor, internalize the feelings of being observed, finally leaving [...] as a 'civilized' person"
(Kaschadt 2002: 116). Bentham designed the subject of the gaze to be criminals; Foucault extends this outward to
govermentality as a whole (Bajc 2007: 1576-1577). In other words, all people within the organization of social
space [] regulate their own behavior and discipline themselves according to what they understand are [societal]
expectations of normality. (Bajc 2007: 1576-1577) So, the process of being observed and knowing it changes
behavior. There are certainly comparisons between broader panopticism and the formulation of AIThowever it
functions differently than notions of panopticism in two significant ways. Founding the success of panopticism is
that both the observed and the observer share the same knowledge of what is being seen. The prison designed by
Jeremy Bentham lays everything bear nothing is hidden or hide-able. The prisoners themselves are able to even
congregate and intermingle in common space (Kaschadt 2002: 116) to expose the relational space between people.
The generalization of Bentham by Foucault supports a similar concept of shared belief, namely that of normality.
AIT, however, does not reveal what, any more than how, it sees. The images are locked behind a door, then
(supposedly) deletedthe observed person is always denied the ability to see the self, as much as other observed
persons are denied the ability to become observers. While panopticism never guarantees that the observer and the
observed can be interchanged (it seems unlikely that a democratic or rhizomatic panopticism would work at all), it
is explicit that the knowledge of all parties is equivalent. This equivalency is what makes panopticism effective at
AIT
opposes any equivalency however. Instead the device asserts that epistemic sight is
proprietary, and implicitly devaluing common, uncertified sight as non-epistemic.
David Lyon states that this type of security (which I group, as discussed in the
following section, with dataveillance) depends on hidden knowledge (Lyon 2001:
143-144); this can be seen in how threat is assessed. Knowledge secures in AIT through a
governancethe observed become malleable to what they believe is a shared mental model of their behavior.
criteria of imposed discernmentthat is, selection between nonobservable options. Here, and only through AIT, do
these distinctions become selectively observable and can decisions be made. Simply, the privileged observer
becomes an expert through informational access. Daniel Solove by way of Lyon refers to this model "Kafkaesque" as
it is more akin to "being in a maze" and reliant on "a constant state of anxiety" within the observed persons (Lyon
2007: 144). Consider the protocols associated with AIT. A person who enters the device is scanned, either passing
without anomaly or being diverted with an anomaly. If an anomaly is detected, the person is subjected to a pat
down to confirm or absolve the anomaly. At no point is the scanned person able to know what is known. In contrast
to other security practices (such as walk-through metal detectors) where all people must pass through measures to
AIT is framed within a different rhetoric. In AIT, persons

are subject to "beauracratic indifference [...] and dehumanization" (Lyon 2007: 144) in as
reconfirm their status of non-threat,
far as these new measures move beyond the potential of a threat (Everyone must be checked just to be sure.), and
where systems of
panoptic control have been delegated the responsibility of reform through subject
awareness (a system that potentiates goodness), AIT, in removing this awareness
by splitting act of observation from its content, inherently distrusts the power of
self-reforming control (a system that potentiates terrorism). Moreover, the implied
systemic distrust removes subject agency, from the act of adherence to passenger
protocol; specifically, abiding by the rules of the machine are never rewarded and can
only be punished. So, as AIT potentiates terrorism, it also engenders
noncompliance amongst all parties since there is no reward for nonthreats other than non-punishment. In turn, these measures label all observed persons guilty
assume the inevitability of a threat (Someone here is a threat.). In other words,
until they pass into the "sterile area" (TSA 2008: 11) where they are then absolved. Additionally, AIT fails the
criteria for panopticism in how it treats looking. Panopticism is characterized by constant seeing. To gaze is to be
watchful of all things and at all moments to control all things and all moments. Panopticism secures through strong
or brute force induction. To clarify, as a theoretical stance on security, panopticism secures by constantly enacting a
methodology that has (seemingly) secured. If this methodology is usednot just now but always from nowa state
of security is maintained.
AIT, on the other hand, is weakly inductive, if at all. AIT treats a single
moment in time as an accurate sampling of all future moments in time, and to

guarantee security in this moment is extensible to these later moments. Finally, even in
gross abstractions of panopticism where there is little discussion of awareness and self reform (it is implicitly
assumed but has been normalized within daily practices), there still is a heavy handed reliance on centralized
surveillance and power (Lyon 2001: 74-75, 143-145). In these models, the power of centralized collection is the
cross-referencing of a person's body of information, often called called dataveillance (Lyon 2001: 74). AIT, on the
contrary, cannot store, export, print, or transmit images. (Pistole 2010) Therefore, AIT's images are not
associated, in a relational database sense necessary for dataveillance, with any other personal data. That is to say,
the images do not contribute to any centralized data snapshot. As much as AIT does not function panoptically in a
technical nor in a philosophic sense, it also fails to fulfill other models of security through looking such an
synopticism5 . The discussion of why the label of panopticism (as well as other labels) cannot be slapped on AIT
hopefully served two purposes. First and foremost, the discussion aims to debunk any application here and to
rigorous rethink the applicability more generally what commonly and all-too quickly becomes the prevailing notion
of security. Secondarily, the discussion is designed to provoke and fully frame a question: what does AIT really do
Security
theater, as Bruce Schneier explains, "refers to security measures that make people feel
more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security." (Schneier 2009)
Schneier states that "[s]ecurity is both a reality and a feeling. [...] When people are scared, they need
something done that will make them feel safe, even if it doesn't truly make them
safer." (Schneier 2009) The former category, security-as-reality, can be substantiated
through a binary question, such as have there been incidents? This portion of
security is what many, from media correspondents to TSA officials, seem to be
speaking about when they refer to AIT: the actual means of keeping air travelers
safe from terrorist attacks. Schneier, in analyzing AIT and referring back to his own writing, claims
otherwise: These programs [such as Trusted Traveler and now AIT] are based on the
dangerous myth that terrorists match a particular profile and that we can somehow
pick terrorists out of a crowd if we only can identify everyone. That's simply not
true. [...] Exactly two things have made airline travel safer since 9/11: reinforcement
of cockpit doors, and passengers who now know that they may have to fight back.
Everything elseSecure Flight and Trusted Traveler includedis security theater.
(Schneier 2005b, Schneier 2010) The latter type of security, i.e. security-as-feeling or
security theater, is a phenomenological affect (not an epistemological quality) of
devices, practices, policies, and social norms that have been deemed part of
security. For instance, National Guard troops were stationed "in airports right after the [9/11] terrorist attacks
for security? This question will be subsequently addressed. What AIT is: more feeling than reality
[with] no bullets in their guns." Schneier continues: As a security countermeasure, it made little sense for them to
be there. They didn't have the training necessary to improve security at the checkpoints, or even to be another
useful pair of eyes. [Instead what they did was] reassure a jittery public that it's OK to fly. (Schneier 2007) Important
to understand in the birth of security theater is that "the security measures that work are largely invisible"
(Schneier 2009) and is often deliberately unseen (Ball & Webster 2003, Lyon 2001, Lyon 2007). The security typemethod of dataveillance (Lyon 2001: 74) exemplifies this invisibility. More like an act of collecting, dataveillance
slowly and secretly gathers a model of a person by compiling and cross-checking all available (largely electronic)
The act of
observing, unlike panoptic or synoptic methods, is not made tantamount to security; there
must always be a secondary intervention to stop any illegal act, viz. an act of
securing. More in accord with the discussion here, dataveillance acts passively and predominantly before any
behavior, from credit card purchases to government documentation. (Lyon 2001: 74-75)
incident occurs. The data collected gains value through mass rather than any single datum that alludes to a
potential for crime. It is this invisibility that makes dataveillance work since it relies on observing relativistic normal
behavior rather than behavior that is self-aware like in panopticism. The problem with invisible methods is that
people who desire security have no feedback. This is where security-as-feeling becomes useful. Even in his
hypercritical stance on security theater, Schneier admits "we cannot neglect the feeling of security, because it's
how we collectively overcome the psychological damage that terrorism causes." (Schneier 2009) Instead of security
theater as the only type of securityas-feeling, Schneier suggests "direct appeals to our feelings" (Schneier 2009) as
a more appropriate method since security theater reflects and constitutes reactions of fear. Even though
Schneier initially speaks about AIT as security theater and implies a lack of actual
protection because of ontological conditions (namely the faulty hope of total

surveillance as security; Schneier 2010), he never outlines how AIT manifests a theater of security-asreality. In the dyad Schneier establishes, the aesthetics of security theater rely on the cultural
perceptions of security-as-reality. While it may be enough to limit certain critiques to
exposing the hollow body behind the facade, on another level one must wonder how
security theater can so convincingly deceive so many. Simply and generally answered, the
facade is often very well made. Investigating further, as will be done subsequently, one
realizes AIT as security theater is a carefully designed illusion that invokes complex
epistemic ideas. Now, let us amend the simplistic statement of how AIT works at the beginning the previous
section. In light of Schneier's critique of AIT as security theater, and his failure to elaborate how such an
extravagant device might function as a facade, we will flesh out a (partial) list of the main issues that underscore
it is not whether AIT more objectively visualizes those places

previously unseen, but instead that AIT presents itself and is present as capable of a
particular "epistemic virtue" called mechanical objectivity (Daston & Galison 2007: 371).
Subsequently, AIT relies on more thorough mannerismsas opposed to more thorough
meansof representation with regards to known problem areas and literal blind
spots. These mannerisms produce and present the vulnerabilities of travel as
"ahistorical objects" (Latour 2000: 265) viz-a-viz the body. Lastly, the automation of AIT
divorces human error and emotion from judgment, thereby producing the observeras-worker (Daston & Galison 2007: 371). As TSA officials are seemingly supplanted by their device, decision
making is delegated to the machine, in turn producing the first effect of the episteme. Resolving AIT: aesthetic
mechanical objectivity and ahistorical vulnerabilities To begin, a further unwrapping of this
the debate over AIT. First,
approach to security theater is necessary. Schneier's definition of security theater states that security theater is
composed of empty gestures of security (Schneier 2009) more akin to Jean Baudrillard's notion of simulation. Like
simulation, security theater, to Schneier, exists as the feigning "to have what one hasn't" (Baudrillard 1994: 3), that
is, actual security where there is none. And, just as Baudrillard, Schneier concerns himself with the residual effects
on society this may have, such as confusing real security and imaginary security (Baudrillard 1994: 3; Schneier
2005). The problem with this rigid definition of security theater is it implies that the usefulness of security is simply
located in functioning systems. Security objects, on the other hand, whether they be fake cameras or bulletless
guns, are not reducible to hollow concretizations only for show since their perceived use ripples into the
environment in substantive ways. Secondarily and more importantly, Schneier positions security theater as
diametrically opposed to real security as if real security does not rely on outward aesthetics to help produce a
security theater is not treated as cynically here, nor is it treat as

mutual opposite to real security. Instead, security theater and real security are
mutually arising and distinct gradients, where all things deemed security are to
some extent theater and to some extent real (this accounts for Schneier's more extreme
viewpoint). Therefore security theater is the negotiated aesthetics of security, where real
security is simply the functional components. The necessity of this revised definition is that it
includes a notion of inconsistency. The rigid definition demands that either security does what
is seems to do or is simply for show. The liberal definition leaves room for another case: security that
feeling. In contrast,
does something, but produces a different affect (something easily accomplished with the plasticity and disconnect
whether AIT does or does not secure should

not be decided by exploring those ways it act as security theater ; such a deductive
of digital technology and physical form). That is to say,
indictment of its shallowness is no better than simply assuming it is panoptic because it includes sight. Instead, I
propose, a duality of security that allows for disjunction and divergence between layers. The following takes this
definition of security theater and expounds upon the affectations of AIT with regards to culturally defined tropes
about knowledge-making. Representing mechanical objectivity and repressing officials. The core function of AIT is
the rapid visualization of the human body: in its simplest description, AIT is a tool for seeing.
Even though AIT does not see in a traditional manner (more accurately it senses the body), it produces a visual
to speak of AIT means to speak of a particular type of

vision that unveils some realitya "right depiction" ( Daston & Galison 2007: 371) about
the human body. In other words, the genesis of the aesthetics of AIT as security theater
record of what is within its field. Hence,
is the notion of objectivity. Objectivity is not a static or even singular idea however. Objectivity is, in
fact, "epistemologically saturated" (Daston & Galison 2007: 368) and has changed over
time. In a similar way to the shifting relationships between Nature and Society (Latour 1993: 49-90), objectivity
(the concept) and objective vision (the practice) co-determine each other by and through philosophic underpinnings
and materially embodied realities. As much as scientists and philosophers attest otherwise, humanity cannot
objectivity is one of these models

Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison identify in their survey of objectivity in the
sciences. Coinciding with the creation of mechanical means of representation, viz. photography,
mechanical objectivity historically rebelled against the presiding notion (truth-tonature) that scientists ordered nature by discovering "types" (Daston & Galison 2007: 370).
untangle how we see from how we think we see. Mechanical
Until this point, scientists had to rely on hand-drawn representations that naturally relies on subjective
proponents of mechanical
objectivity sought to remove the human impulse to create "symmetry" (Daston & Galison
2007: 161) and instead relay the "unimproved, unidealized" instances of a thing (Daston
& Galison 2007: 160). The result is a form of vision that suppresses the knower "at the
expense of readmitting the variability of nature: this [thing], formed at this place, at
this time, in all its accidental uniqueness." (Daston & Galison 2007: 370; original emphasis) This
is not without a systemic caveat of considerable self-restraint: "[t]he observer had
to hold back, rather than yield to the temptation to excise defects, shadows, or
distortioneven when the scientist or artist knew these intrusions to be artifacts [of
the instrument or environment]." (Daston & Galison 2007: 161). That is, the scientist of mechanical
interpretations in creation (Daston & Galison 2007: 369). In response,
objectivity must be isolated from intervention. In the context of two other notionsnamely truth-to-nature and
trained judgmentmechanical
objectivity stands in stark contrast in how a

representation is created viz-a-viz the observer. Truth-to-nature , as was previously
mentioned, requires scientists to actively interpret-through-representing what they are
seeing, as is exemplified by Ernst Haeckel's self-admission of his "subjective views" in creating images for
Kunstformen der Natur (Daston & Galison 2007: 189). Trained judgment, a more contemporary notion that arose as
a response mechanical objective, demands a process of pattern recognition to uncover "Wittgensteinian family
resemblances" (Daston & Galison 2007: 370). Unlike the typing of objects or particulars of things, trained judgment
requires the scientist to interpret mechanically-produced images through expert knowledge (Daston & Galison
Where these other objectivities position the scientist as fundamental to

uncovering reality, mechanical objectivity does not. Instead the observer in
mechanical objectivity is a response to "the excesses of a dynamic, will-centered
self that threatened to remake the world in its own reflection" (Daston & Galison 2007: 375).
Hence, more overwhelmingly than any other model, mechanical subjectivity removes all possible
delegate power from the observer who is transformed into a "worker" (Daston & Galison
2007: 371) that is trained in operating a machine. Accordingly, observational and
judgmental power are redistributed onto the observational machineeither the
machine sees something and it is obvious or it does not. One can clearly place
these tropes of mechanical objectivity in how AIT is designed and its images
represent As has been touched on previously, the images produced by AIT revel in
the machine process of capture. As can be seen in those released by the TSA (see appendix), the
images are riddled with the artifacts of production: amorphous masses, shadows,
and contour lines; even the machine itself can be made out at times as a blocky,
faint mass. As these images are compiled and displayed via a computer, the
artifacts could simply and algorithmically be dampened or removed. Instead, they
remain. In this, the images and the visualized body are left nakedlaid bear with all
of the imperfections of things and beings in-the-world. The result is an uninterpretation, a
representation that, more than anything else, exposes in its own exposure. One could certainly rebut
2007: 370-371).
that the process is closer to trained judgment as the reviewer locked away must sift
through contours and fuzzy masses to find patterns that are threats. If we revisit the
arrangement of the AIT system, we see even more indicators of the aesthetics of
mechanical objectivity in how people are stripped of agency. Even though the
image is inevitably sent to a TSA official for review, the future generations
of AIT seek to eliminate this person altogether. This trajectory speaks
volumes about the current role of people with regards to the machine. As much as
the reviewer must parse through visual information for threat patterns, the reviewer
is never in the position to act as expert, a fundamental principle of trained
judgment. When an anomaly is found, the reviewer can only divert a person to secondary screening procedures
such as thorough pat downs and additional baggage searches. In trained judgment, the observer's vision is the final
say on what is and is not in the image; TSA officials are not granted this much power (maybe for obvious reasons).
Instead veracity comes from another source, that is, material discovery and
adherence to protocol. The same as the scientist-as-worker, TSA officials are no
more expert interpreter than the precipitated ions of backscatter imaging actually
understands a shape is something threatening. In abstract terms, the underlying
visual episteme of AIT is flat while its ontology is not; knowledge is made by
privileging certain constituent parts of image-making and not privileging any
resultant information without outside means of verification. This plays out concretely: the
machine has the ability to expose truth (i.e. make expert discoveries), while TSA officials simply act upon it (i.e. fact
The consequence is that travelers are send the message that automation is
the solution to security. While such a rhetoric of "technological determinism is
misleading and unhelpful [as] it deflects attention from the real world of material
bodies and active selves" (Lyon 2001: 24), AIT is purposefully doing so for two
reasons. First, it is simple. Security theater is all about a solitary message: "You are
secure." Embodying the message in a single object streamlines where people locate their feeling of security (this
is no different than a child's blanket). Having said this, AIT produces an undesired message
because of its systemic formula; that is, it secures at the cost of privacy. This is nothing new many
check).
security systems, such as those collected in dataveillance, depend on a notion of privacy, and without it these
systems breakdown. The true novelty, and thus the massive negative response, is one-to-one correspondence of
the site of invasion and subject of invasion, namely the body. Without further investigation, one can only speculate
on what it is about the images and the body that is so unsettling for so many. In part, I would hypothesize, much of
the American public response stems from particularly American notions of how the body and the images of the
body are taboo objects; this should be researched and developed elsewhere. Certainly, and without speculation, the
visualized bodies in their perceived fidelity evoke something that visualizations from the body, but not of the body,
The second reason for employing a technological

determinist rhetoric is to dehistoricize vulnerabilities. Ahistorical vulnerabilities Before
explaining why this is important in terms of security theater, we should begin by
understanding the term. In discussing the difference between artifacts and facts,
Bruno Latour comments: "For [a material] technology, objects never escape the
conditions if their productions. [...] Thus it always remains tied to a circumstanced
and well-defined spatiotemporal envelope." (Latour 2000: 250) By this, Latour means that
we as people refer to technological artifacts as having a lifespan and ancestry an
object comes into being because of a set of various conditions, exists and impacts a
particular time and place, and then is followed by objects because of a new set of
conditions. For example, the computer mouse came out of a necessity to select items on a screen and was
would not so strongly evoke (CNN 2010b).
followed by other types of selection devices, such as trackpads. These objects have a history. On the other hand,
"[u]nlike technological artifacts, scientific facts seem, once we wander away from
the local conditions of production in the past as well as in the future, to free
themselves of their spatiotemporal envelope." (Latour 2000: 250) Latour explains further by
examining what was at stake during the debate between Louis Pasteur and Flix-Archimde Pouchet about
spontaneous generation: [If he was wrong and he was,] Pouchet's spontaneous generation will have never been
there anywhere in the world; it was an illusion all along; it is not allowed to have been part of the population of
entities making up space and time. Pasteur's ferments carried by the air, however, have always been there, all
Latour points out that (scientific) facts are treated

as being either true or false outside of their context, and therefore applicable to all
time and all space. Even though Latour advocates a "generalization of historicity"
(Latour 2000: 253), most people do not think along these lines. As a result, popular opinion
about facts is that they can rewrite history in the way Latour cautions. Appealing to this popular notion
of facts is precisely the aim of AIT. AIT demonstrates a massive power to reveal that
which has previously been unseen. In doing just that, coupled with a technological
determinist viewpoint, AIT presents a world that is now better off; but "now better
off" can be deceiving. The revelation is that now seeable areastechnologically
grounded and so fleetingare part of those sites have always been the threats. In
other words, while the technology of AIT will be replaced, its mannerisms embed it
within an ahistorical logic of vulnerability; viz. logic that appeals to statement like If
we had then what we have now and simultaneously deny the how context produced
those things. TSA chief administrator John Pistole even substantiates this appeal in an open letter by repeated
along, everywhere. (Latour 2000: 252) By this,
referring to failures of previous technology and recently avoided threats because of technology. Pistole writes, these
procedures and protocols help us find possible explosives, chemical weapons, and other dangerous items that
the
use of the phrases that otherwise go undetected and constantly evolving,
Pistole appeals to some popular notion of justifiably right paranoia and fear that
only now do we realize has always been there in substance. In this last contribution,
AIT is not claiming that security is tantamount to surveillance, but security strives
for omniscience and omnipotencean omniscience that is more than seeing, but
knowing everything inside and out; an omnipotence that can ignore space and time
in critique. Conclusion: what is left to be desired? [D]uring the busiest travel time of the year, 99% of travelers
otherwise go undetected [because] [o]ur enemies are creative and constantly evolving. (Pistole 2010) In
are opting to go through these full-body scanning machines. And in recent public opinion surveys, four out of five
people approve of the machines and seven in 10 frequent fliers support the use of these machines and pat-downs.
No matter its actual ability to secure, AIT functions as a feeling of

security. By appropriating an aesthetic form of a scientific episteme, AIT is selflegitimating through a semiotic game (Lyotard 1979: 31-37). Paradoxically, and
appropriately so, AIT also functions through a feeling of insecurity by being
decontextualized within the history of attacks through the ahistorical logic of
terrorism. In these ways, AIT has served as the focus of this paper. Tangentially, AIT raises a more general issue
(Pistole 2010)
about media studies, and how they get appropriated by popular culture. AIT exemplifies a larger current that
increasingly abstracts the notion of vision to encompass sensing and visualizations. In this vein, more precision
needs to be devoted in theory to properly analyze and accurately classify such distinctions. Maybe trivial in terms of
the critique of visual information, the conflation of representational and presentational modes is critical to how
reasoning subjects and scripted subjectivities reify and constitute power structures. Moreover, the backlash against
AIT demonstrates this confusion in a legal sensein particular, the invocation of the 4 th amendment and Video
Voyeurism Prevent Act to an issue of representation rather than process or sight (Kravets 2010). Unless theorists
knowledgeable in the area speak up, the largely confusing world of digital media, where such conflations are easy,
will be overtaken by popular rather than critical theories.
Capitalism is the root cause: Post-9/11 security policies are the

manifestation of preemptive logic that creates a cycle of selfreplicating neoliberal profit-making and makes terrorism
inevitable
Tiessen 2011
One of the effects of on-again-off-again security

extremes, states of exception, and politics of preemption is that they create
innumerable new openings for new capital markets to leverage instability and
infinitely imaginable potential catastrophes to their advantage. We saw this already with
Chertoffs involvement with, and promotion of, Rapiscan. Indeed, financial actors whether those actors are
Futures markets and the selling of surveillance
politicians with an eye on post-political career opportunities or defense contractors seeking to create and then
are in position to manipulate instability, catastrophe, exceptions,

and preemptions to open up arbitrage opportunities where profits can be made on
the spreads (even if the spreads existence are functions of managed beliefs rather than facts). Terror
and securitization, then, can be very good for business. The state/security
apparatus commitment to preemptive action to securing an unknown
future brings new financial markets into being . These markets create
conditions ripe for financial actors to profit from the infinite potential to concoct
solutions to the not-necessarily-actualizable risks of the future, not to mention the
arbitrage opportunities generated by instability (risk-on, risk-off). By investing in insecurity,
exploit new markets
market actors in the security/surveillance sector secure investment. Perversely, in the case of state-funded security
contracts, citizens both pay for the expansion of the surveillance state while also being constituted as its targets.
What, then, is being secured if not marketing opportunities, profits, and the apparent need for ever more security
and surveillance contracts going to the private sector? As Klauser, Ruegg, and November point out in Mark Salters
the question at stake is not simply whether to choose between

security or privacy. The question, in fact, comes from a different direction. It is
deeply embedded in the process of global security politics recalibration, which
reveals itself as having put in place a series of mechanisms that reorder security
politics toward economic goals. (2005: 123) The reordering of security politics as a
market-making mechanism, as a pretext for the pursuit of economic goals leads
Klauser, Ruegg, and November to argue that security practices cant only be
evaluated or described as being designed for protection, preemption, and
catastrophe prevention, but must be understood also as being the constitutive
building blocks of new markets and outsized profits. This reality compels them to ask: How
are security strategies embedded within and co-produced through a complex
network of local; national; international; and public and private actors, interests,
and domains of expertise? How are these networks developing and circulating
across diverse private and public spheres, resulting in the production of security
models as expert exemplars for more general use, which are increasingly
influencing local decisions? In which ways, and to what degree, are trends of
commercialization subtly pushed forward beneath these developments, associated
with specific discourses and measures of security politics? (2005: 123) The
extension of the security market and the marketing of (in)security
necessitates that all civilians be re-cast as potential suspects and
potential victims. In so doing, the entirety of the public is transformed into a
target market for surveillance and security products . That the security
market is being promoted as necessary, as good for us, and as protection from
Politics at the Airport (2005):
unrealized but inevitable futures to populations weaned on over a decade of post9/11 terror, demonstrates the lack of compunction of security and defence
contractors in their pursuit of profit and shareholder value. As Muller explains: As this
collection [Salters Politics at the Airport] attests, the politics of/at the airport, though cloaked in
the discourse of the war on terror and related risks, dangers and insecurities, tends to take
shape along the lines of more stable and long-standing trends associated with
market imperatives, capital flows, social sorting, and related aesthetics. (2008: 138) The idea that the
emergence of our current risk society, bent as it is on preemption for our own protection, can also
be understood as an extension of neoliberalisms penchant for securitization and
market-making is perhaps most strongly articulated by Melinda Cooper who, in 2004, made the case that
the war on terror was in fact a profit-driven reallocation of capital away
from the speculative profits made during the techboom of the 1990s to
the emerging area of post-9/11 techno-surveillance. Cooper argues that: in retrospect ,
it seems clear that the war on terror was as much a political response to
the downturn of the new economy as to the terrorist attacks of September
11. Bush's answer to the technophilic optimism of the Clinton era was an
equally megalomaniac plan for indefinite war, encompassing the whole
globe within his strategic vision. As the economist Christian Marazzi (2002: 154) has put it,
the war against terrorism represents the continuation of the New
Economy by other means. (2004: 2-3)1 Viewed through a financial rather than a political or security
lens the war on terrors imposition on civilian populations of never-ending
technologies and techniques of surveillance that until recently (post-9/11) would
have seemed outrageous, begins to take on a different and more ominous hue. Cooper
pursues the economic logic of the war on terror by suggesting that perhaps whats at stake in the neoliberal model of risk is precisely not prediction as such (which implies some kind of ability to
predetermine and therefore prevent or at least insure against the advent of the future) but preemption, where the point is precisely to continually generate the
conditions of emergent catastrophe, in order to profit fro m it (2004: 8).
Assuming that to be the case it follows that the strategic goal of the politics of
preemption and risk from a disciplinary and neoliberal perspective is
no longer to protect the present from the future, but rather to respond
preemptively to the unpredictable risk, even if this means willing it to
happen ; Cooper calls this model the venture capital model of war, since the greater the risks
taken, the higher the profit to be made (2004: 13). In other words, our potential to prepare
preemptively for risks (and for some to profit from our preparedness) is only limited
by our ability to imagine risks that are adequately convincing. According to Coopers venture
capital model of war, in a time of terror unscrupulous profit seekers take advantage of
apparently exceptional circumstance in order to extract profit from markets that
they create, that they sell to the public as desirable and necessary, and that they
get the taxpayer to pay for . Terror, indefinite war, and imminent catastrophe
are transformed into an inexhaustible source of speculative profits; as she
explains: When the threat of terrorism is established as a tradeable high-
risk investment, we know that it has indeed become inevitable, however

uncertain its time and place (2004: 14).
Cutting
Tiessen 2011
Scanners, storage, and security: He-said-she-said As the naked scanners were being rolled out in the United States
the TSA attempted to calm the public by stating that whole body imaging is not equivalent to photography and
does not present sufficient details that the image could be used for personal identification (TSA 2008, 3). They
insisted also that the machines could not save, store, transmit, or print the apparently innocuous images they
generated. This, it turns out, does not seem to be the case. Indeed, according to the procurement specifications for
naked body scanners they have been designed from the beginning with both of these very capabilities built in.
Since the TSAs early statements statements that attempted to make these visioning machines
appear unproblematically benign they have changed their story, admitting that the ability to
save and send images exists for test purposes only and is disabled once sent to customers. This, of
course, was also revealed in one well known instance to be false when 35,000 images were saved in
a machine at a Florida courthouse (these images were shown to the public on
November 16th by the website Gizmodo, who requested the images using the
Freedom of Information Act) (Gizmodo 2010). Indeed, in the procurement specifications for whole body
imaging devices for checkpoint operations the U.S. Department of Homeland Security itself
requires that, in test mode, naked scanning machines be capable of exporting
image data in real time and of providing a mechanism for high-speed transfer of
image data over computer networks (TSA 2008a: 5). Allegedly, test mode is deactivated when the
machines are used on the public. Privacy protection and making illusions visible The deceiving
appearances systematically produced by these machines and their procurers a re,
perhaps, secondary to these machines ability to transform inconvenient things like
civil rights and personal privacy protection into illusions. Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment in the American Constitution reads like a quaint ideal in our era of
voyeuristic violation; it states that the right of American citizens to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; similarly, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that
Canadian citizens have the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure and must not be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned. While the American border search exception does exempt the search of travellers and
their possessions from many Fourth Amendment criteria, border security officers are only permitted to conduct
searches of peoples bodies strip and cavity searches and involuntary X-ray scans, for example if there is
reasonable suspicion that the traveller is concealing restricted items contraband. That is, body searches of any
sort at the border must still abide by the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment, requirements
that balance the searched individuals privacy and dignity interests against the governments search interests. In
light of naked body scanners and enhanced pat-down procedures transforming privacy rights into illusions, a
the routine use of

naked body scanners at airports violates the Fourth Amendment, the Privacy Act,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act
(Meserve and Ahlers 2010). Freedom, as the ACLU reminds us on their homepage, isnt able to protect
itself. These days, however, freedom appears to be the proverbial frog in a
pot of water, a pot which the security/surveillant assemblage is bringing
number of groups, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, have stated that
slowly to a boil so the frog doesnt get wise and jump out of the pot while
it can. In other words, while people assume, or are told, their submission to
authority contributes to their own security, public safety, and best
interests, they too easily forget that the road to a surveillance police
state is paved with minute acts of complicity, and obedient, if delusional,
good intentions. As history has shown time and again, civilians become slave-ilians,
and democracies become police states when rights and freedoms are
slowly chipped away in the name of a common good or a security concern.
One element is introduced at a time, allowed to become the new normal, before
the experts demand that further intrusions, restrictions, and punishments be added
to the mix.
Tiessen 2011
the naked body

scanner regime is grounded and enabled by a belief in the sovereign power of the
visual, a belief in the power, accuracy, and truth-telling ability of visuality and
visualization itself (Bal 2003; Mitchell 1994). The vigilant visuality (Amoore 2007) of this scopic
regime is paradoxically sold to the public as both all-seeing and privacy-enhancing.
Looking is not touching and participating in full dis-clothes-sure As alluded to earlier,
This achievement is met, in part, by the belief that looking is the opposite of touching and, especially, that remote
looking can at once enhance the security of the public and protect the privacy of the individual. As the TSA
explains, Whole Body Imaging (WBI) creates an image of the full body , showing the surface
of the skin and revealing objects that are on the body, not in the body; the revealing nature of this invasion of
privacy, they argue, is mitigated by the remoteness of the voyeur who, isolated in an unseen chamber, is not able
to interact directly with the individual (TSA 2008b: 2). The TSA goes on: remote viewing and no image retention
are strong privacy protections that permit security benefits to be achieved before adding that the TSA will update
this directive as needed if there is a decision to utilize one or both of these WBI technologies beyond pilot
operations in several airports (TSA 2008b: 9). The assumption here is that having our naked bodies irradiated,
scanned, photographed, digitally enhanced, and looked at remotely by an unseen security operative is not only
more effective, but less invasive, than face-to-face and body-to-body contact with an actual human: By using
passenger imaging technology, TSA expects to be able to [inspect the individual] quickly, and without physical
contact (TSA 2008b: 3). This line of reasoning is further bolstered by TSA claims that faces and genitals will be
blurred using digital algorithms to further enhance passenger privacy (whether or not this is the case remains
the publics ability to know what is known

about them is itself blurred, perpetuating the ambiguity surrounding these issues,
the anxiety they experience, and the sovereign authority of those doing the
surveilling and securing. While it is true that some may find the remoteness of the TSAs
voyeurism (relatively) comforting, the implications of acquiescing to an unseen and
remote surveillance and scanning regime are profound. Indeed, submitting to an
invisible and all-seeing security system is , effectively, to facilitate progress
toward an ever more invasive and pervasive surveillance state. Towards a
new normal perpetual state of exception where total exposure and total
submission to the security and governing apparatus is the only way to satiate the
state/security assemblages desire for omniscopic power . That is, by capitulating to
unclear in practice). In the final instance, of course,
the argument that unseen, remote surveillance technologies are privacy enhancing
we allow ourselves to go along with what this scopic regime demanded all along
that we willingly expose ourselves, that we willingly raise our arms in order to
submit to a regime of power whose desires are most comprehensively achieved by
allowing us to grant it permission to pursue or achieve totalizing control. Indeed,
perhaps those who are subject to the invisible gaze of security find themselves
clamouring to expose themselves in order to remain invisible, in order to reveal that
they are not a threat, that they are not a risk, that they are not an anomaly, that
they are not worthy of attention or further inspection. Complete exposure, then,
becomes the only way to reveal innocence. Of course, the whole naked scanner surveillance
assemblage seduces us into believing that we can pass below the surveillance radar by allegedly anonymizing us,
digitally altering us, transforming our bodies into representational bits and bytes. But regardless of whether digitally
the surveillance event comes

only after we choose to expose ourselves, after weve acquiesced to powers
conditions. So as the process operates according to its own logic our ability to reveal
our anonymity and transparency seems to become a way for us to protect ourselves
from the risks posed by the security system itself. We expose ourselves participating in full disaltering our identities anonymizes us or merely digitizes our identities,
clothes-sure not to demonstrate that we pose no risk to the flying public, but to avoid the risk posed by the forces
We are
complicit, then, in the production of our own invisibility, in our becoming
digitally dematerialized, and in facilitating powers desire for mastery by
allowing it to carve us up and expose us to digital probes. As Amoore and Hall
explain, the deconstruction and digitization of our physical, emotional, and affective
selves is par for the course for regimes intent on effectively actualizing the
imposition of power and subjugation, they write: the process of rendering visible and
capturing that visibility is never wholly separate from the desire to master, or
humiliate, or make vulnerable. [Scanning naked bodies], then, is a form of
technological vivisection, a digitised dismembering, through which bodies are
somatically opened and subjects erased simultaneously; the person is reduced to
a transparency, like baggage, evacuated of vitality and materiality. Put simply,
dissections have always ambivalently combined seduction with revulsion,
violence with the promise of safety; and these aporia continue to haunt
contemporary digitised dissections. (2009: 452)
doing the scanning, groping, frisking, and interrogating the forces allegedly employed to keep us safe.
Tiessen 2011
Surveilling the (guilty) future What, then, does the future hold for these processes of digitized dissection? According
to a recent conversation I had with a security agent at Schiphol, its only a matter of time before the well-worn
metal detectors at airport security gates are removed, leaving naked body scanners as the only option for
unless travellers and citizens refuse

these security measures, one thing the body scanners will have revealed will be the
existence of millions of docile, malleable, and submissive subjects; they will have
revealed the successful completion of an experiment in human behaviour; they will
overwhelmingly compliant airline passengers. It seems, then, that
have provided an answer to the question: Will the vast majority of people willingly
line up to be digitally stripped in front of government security officers? The answer,
worryingly, will be an unequivocal Yes. Of course, the logic at work through these
behavioural experiments will not be finished; full transparency, after all, has yet to
be achieved. Indeed, what we could term Operation Transparency is already moving
beyond our material bodies to the immaterial world of our thoughts, affects, ideas,
intentions, and finally our affects of affects our feelings about our feelings, our
thoughts about our thoughts. As mobility theorist Peter Adey explains: the TSA has recently
launched its working project Hostile Intent, [recently renamed FAST Future
Attribute Screening Technology] the current zenith of behavioural monitoring and profiling, under the
remit and development of the Science and Technology Directorate, whose ultimate aim is to develop a noninvasive, remote, culturally independent, automated intent and deception detection system (King 2007: 1). The
TSA's calls for manufacturer, industry, and academic solutions suggests a new reach of behaviour detection
Our bodies capacity to

reveal intent the future! complements the state/security apparatus desire to
pursue security logics bent on pre-emption. Having revealed our bodies, our bodies
will now be called upon to reveal our thoughts about the future. Adey points to Frank and
observation, sometimes referred to as suspicious behaviour detection. (2009: 282)
Ekman who describe the body as being viewed as a kind of vessel over which the owner occasionally relinquishes
control of the contents, disclosed through nonverbal behaviours such as facial expression (Frank and Ekman 1997).
According to this emergent form of pre-emptive securitization, remote sensing equipment and algorithmic
calculation will be trained on somatic cues and affective dispositions in order to scan in real time things like:
pulse rate, temperature, anxiety, restlessness, and even brain activity. These technologies will inevitably be sold to
the public merely as non-invasive extensions of remote, privacy-enhancing surveillance systems that, reassuringly,
Once these mind- and body-reading scanning

systems are up and running their very automation will ensure that our guilt and
penchant for confession will have been projected into the future, secured for use by
the authorities of tomorrow. Indeed, the focus on guilt and bad conscience will only
have been intensified in so far as these somatically-focused machines will be
trained directly on our guilty thoughts (and their somatic expression). Gilles Deleuze
once wrote in, Postscript on the Societies of Control (1992), that in the future (our present) our
societies would be controlled or disciplined using subtly unobtrusive and
strategically applied forms of modulation. Foucaults disciplinary society, Deleuze
predicted, would yield to more flexible, immaterial, and imperceptible forms of
modulation that continually respond and adapt to lifes unpredictability. While fullbody scanners are a most suitable expression of this dematerialized form of
disciplining, seeming at the same moment both to threaten and protect privacy, to be both non-intrusive and
invasive, they do not, in fact, modulate lifes unpredictability; rather, present and
future surveillance assemblages depend far more on lifes predictability , on peoples
wont even have human operators on the other end.
penchant to acquiesce to powers demands and genuflect to those who claim authority. Deleuzes society of
control, then, does not adjust itself modulate itself after the fact modulation is not done in response to the
Deleuzes society of control modulates the future in the present in order

to preempt dissent by determining the futures direction. Surveillance machines of
the future will not so much be called upon to modulate complexity but, I would like
to suggest, will themselves be technologically complex in order to attend to lifes
simplicity, to the predictable ways life affects and is affected, to the minimal inputs needed for life to be
modulated and directed. Regardless, powers desire for absolute visibility and total
transparency will continue to be limitless, and the propensity for unscrupulous
individuals to go to any lengths to secure profit will go on in perpetuity. Having
surveilled the present and emergent landscape of visualization, appearances,
illusion, and exposure it doesnt seem a stretch to conclude, in light of the
past; rather,
transparent trajectory of todays technologies of preemption, that we can see the

future after all.
Jakes Work
1AC
SOLVENCY? - The security theater provides only the illusion of
safety, using stories of terror to create its necessity- we reject
this logic and instead act indomitably, presenting acts of terror
as common crimes
*not a lot of terror, just stories; no large scale attack
*security theater = illusion of safety
*key is to be indomitable = dont amp up security
*solves terror eventually
*hurts freedoms and liberties that are key to change
Schneier 09
(Bruce Schneier. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law
School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology. He is an American
cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the author of several books
on general security topics, computer security and cryptography. He is also a contributing writer for
The Guardian news organization.[3] "Essays: Beyond Security Theater," New Internationalist.
November 2009. https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html//ghskw)
Terrorism is rare, far rarer than many people think .
It's rare because very few people want to

comm it acts of terrorism, and executing a terrorist plot is much harder than television makes it appear. The best
defences against terrorism are largely invisible: investigation, intelligence, and emergency response. But even
these are less effective at keeping us safe than our social and political policies, both at home and abroad. However,
elected leaders don't think this way: they are far more likely to implement security
theater against movie-plot threats. A movie-plot threat is an overly specific attack scenario.
our
Whether it's terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists contaminating the milk supply, or terrorists attacking the
Stories are what we

fear. It's not just hypothetical stories: terrorists flying planes into buildings, terrorists
with bombs in their shoes or in their water bottles , and terrorists with guns and
bombs waging a co-ordinated attack against a city are even scarier movie-plot
threats because they actually happened. Security theater refers to security
measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to
actually improve their security. An example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office
Olympics, specific stories affect our emotions more intensely than mere data does.
buildings. No-one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it
looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards. Airport-security examples include the
National Guard troops stationed at US airports in the months after 9/11 -- their guns had no bullets. The US colour-
the metal detectors that

are increasingly common in hotels and office buildings since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, are additional
examples . To be sure, reasonable arguments can be made that some terrorist targets are more attractive
coded system of threat levels, the pervasive harassment of photographers, and
than others: aeroplanes because a small bomb can result in the death of everyone aboard, monuments because of
their national significance, national events because of television coverage, and transportation because of the
there are literally millions of potential targets in any

large country (there are five million commercial buildings alone in the US), and hundreds of potential terrorist
numbers of people who commute daily. But
tactics; it's impossible to defend every place against everything, and it's impossible to predict which tactic and
Security is both a feeling and a reality. The

propensity for security theater comes from the interplay between the public and its leaders. When people are
target terrorists will try next. Feeling and Reality
scared, they need something done that will make them feel safe, even if it doesn't
truly make them safer. Politicians naturally want to do something in response to crisis, even if that
something doesn't make any sense. Often, this "something" is directly related to the details of a recent event: we
confiscate liquids, screen shoes, and ban box cutters on aeroplanes. But it's not the target and tactics of the last
attack that are important, but the next attack. These measures are only effective if we happen to guess what the
next terrorists are planning. If we spend billions defending our rail systems, and the terrorists bomb a shopping mall
instead, we've wasted our money. If we concentrate airport security on screening shoes and confiscating liquids,
Terrorists don't
care what they blow up and it shouldn't be our goal merely to force the terrorists to
make a minor change in their tactics or targets. Our penchant for movie plots blinds
us to the broader threats. And security theater consumes resources that could
better be spent elsewhere. Any terrorist attack is a series of events: something like planning, recruiting,
and the terrorists hide explosives in their brassieres and use solids, we've wasted our money.
funding, practising, executing, aftermath. Our most effective defences are at the beginning and end of that process
-- intelligence, investigation, and emergency response -- and least effective when they require us to guess the plot
correctly. By intelligence and investigation, I don't mean the broad data-mining or eavesdropping systems that have
been proposed and in some cases implemented -- those are also movie-plot stories without much basis in actual
effectiveness -- but instead the traditional "follow the evidence" type of investigation that has worked for decades.
Unfortunately for politicians, the security measures that work are largely invisible. Such measures include
enhancing the intelligence-gathering abilities of the secret services, hiring cultural experts and Arabic translators,
building bridges with Islamic communities both nationally and internationally, funding police capabilities -- both
investigative arms to prevent terrorist attacks, and emergency communications systems for after attacks occur -and arresting terrorist plotters without media fanfare. They do not include expansive new police or spying laws. Our
police don't need any new laws to deal with terrorism; rather, they need apolitical funding. These security measures
don't make good television, and they don't help, come re-election time. But they work, addressing the reality of
security instead of the feeling. The arrest of the "liquid bombers" in London is an example: they were caught
through old-fashioned intelligence and police work. Their choice of target (aeroplanes) and tactic (liquid explosives)
But even as we do all of this we

cannot neglect the feeling of security, because it's how we collectively
overcome the psychological damage that terrorism causes. It's not
security theater we need, it's direct appeals to our feelings. The best way
to help people feel secure is by acting secure around them. Instead of
reacting to terrorism with fear, we -- and our leaders -- need to react with
indomitability. Refuse to Be Terrorized By not overreacting, by not responding to
movie-plot threats, and by not becoming defensive, we demonstrate the resilience
of our society, in our laws, our culture, our freedoms. There is a difference between
indomitability and arrogant "bring 'em on" rhetoric. There's a difference between
accepting the inherent risk that comes with a free and open society, and hyping the
threats. We should treat terrorists like common criminals and give them all the
benefits of true and open justice -- not merely because it demonstrates our
indomitability, but because it makes us all safer. Once a society starts
circumventing its own laws, the risks to its future stability are much greater than
terrorism. Supporting real security even though it's invisible, and demonstrating indomitability even
though fear is more politically expedient, requires real courage. Demagoguery is easy. What we need is
leaders willing both to do what's right and to speak the truth. Despite fearful rhetoric to the
contrary, terrorism is not a transcendent threat. A terrorist attack cannot
possibly destroy a country's way of life; it's only our reaction to that
attack that can do that kind of damage. The more we undermine our own
laws, the more we convert our buildings into fortresses, the more we
reduce the freedoms and liberties at the foundation of our societies, the
more we're doing the terrorists' job for them. We saw some of this in the
didn't matter; they would have been arrested regardless.
Londoners' reaction to the 2005 transport bombings. Among the political and media hype and
fearmongering, there was a thread of firm resolve. People didn't fall victim to fear. They
rode the trains and buses the next day and continued their lives. Terrorism's goal isn't murder;
terrorism attacks the mind, using victims as a prop. By refusing to be
terrorized, we deny the terrorists their primary weapon: our own fear .
Today, we can project indomitability by rolling back all the fear-based post-9/11
security measures. Our leaders have lost credibility; getting it back requires a
decrease in hyperbole . Ditch the invasive mass surveillance systems and new
police state-like powers. Return airport security to pre-9/11 levels. Remove swagger from
our foreign policies. Show the world that our legal system is up to the challenge of terrorism. Stop telling people to
report all suspicious activity; it does little but make us suspicious of each other, increasing both fear and
Terrorism has always been rare, and for all we've heard about 9/11
changing the world, it's still rare. Even 9/11 failed to kill as many people as
automobiles do in the US every single month. But there's a pervasive myth that
terrorism is easy. It's easy to imagine terrorist plots, both large-scale "poison the food supply" and small-scale
helplessness.
"10 guys with guns and cars." Movies and television bolster this myth, so many people are surprised that there
Certainly intelligence and investigation

successes have made it harder, but mostly it's because terrorist attacks are actually
hard. It's hard to find willing recruits, to co-ordinate plans, and to execute those
plans -- and it's easy to make mistakes. Counterterrorism is also hard, especially when
we're psychologically prone to muck it up. Since 9/11, we've embarked on strategies of defending
specific targets against specific tactics, overreacting to every terrorist video, stoking
fear, demonizing ethnic groups, and treating the terrorists as if they were
legitimate military opponents who could actually destroy a country or a
way of life -- all of this plays into the hands of terrorists. We'd do much
better by leveraging the inherent strengths of our modern democracies and the natural advantages we have
over the terrorists: our adaptability and survivability, our international network of laws and law
enforcement, and the freedoms and liberties that make our society so enviable .
The way we live is open enough to make terrorists rare; we are observant enough to
prevent most of the terrorist plots that exist, and indomitable enough to survive the
even fewer terrorist plots that actually succeed. We don't need to pretend
otherwise.
have been so few attacks in Western cities since 9/11.
LINK/INTERNAL LINK - The security theaters perception of

safety furthers state discipline through increasingly irrelevant
surveillance, creating logics of preemption
*creating perception of safety
*furthers capital and state discipline
*logics of preemption used to implement
Tiessen 2011
Gilles Deleuze once wrote in, Postscript on the Societies of Control (1992), that in the future (our present)
societies would be controlled or disciplined using subtly unobtrusive and strategically applied forms of
what were once the rigid physical enclosures of Foucaults

disciplinary society would inevitably yield to more flexible, immaterial, and
imperceptible forms of modulation that continually respond to, adapt to, and even
predetermine lifes unpredictability. In todays post-Deleuzean world, naked body scanners
are a suitably ambiguous expression of this dematerialized form of discipline , seeming
modulation. That is,
at the same moment to both threaten and protect privacy, to be both non-intrusive and outrageously invasive, to
both preempt and determine unknowable but inevitable futures. The flying public, then, is caught in the confusing
middle of these paradoxes of preemption, not knowing what to believe or what to think. They find themselves
trapped in an undefined surveillance grid that at once actively threatens and protects their freedoms. They are left
wondering: Will the scanners see through clothing and catch underwear-bombs, or wont they? Will security agents
scan, save, and distribute their naked images or wont they? Is having their naked picture taken a good thing, or
does it cross the lines of decency and their expectations for privacy? Are the interests being served by these
The public is too often left with more

questions than answers, more ambiguities and anxieties than understanding. In the
case of naked body scanners and other technologies of surveilling the whole (visual)
apparatus seems opaque. Indeed, the implementation of surveillance/security protocols are themselves
surveillance technologies their own or someone elses?
modulated and constantly changing, often leaving scholars, policy makers, and commentators trailing behind in
their efforts to describe and critique new ways todays disciplined subjects are being formed. In light of these
the opacity both of the issues at stake as well as of the scanned

images of our naked bodies confounds our categories and challenges long taken for
granted social conventions about, for example, habeas corpus, privacy, security , the
present, the future, potentiality, etc. I suggest, also, that this confounding of categories routinely
contributes to a generalized increase in insecurity : airport environments become
infused with anxiety; air passengers are made to prove their innocence by
submitting to surveillance regimes that degrade and harass; citizens rights are
removed as security protocols are intensified , etc. This increase in insecurity, as I will describe,
is seized upon by those demanding increases in security. Most troubling,
perhaps, is that increases in insecurity become profit making opportunities at , literally,
citizens expense. Indeed, surveillance products like naked body scanners become
solutions that get trotted out for problems that may or may not exist as profitseeking security contractors learn to conceive of insecurities and unknown futures
as opportunities for the creation of profitable, new markets. Appearances , it seems, are
still deceiving even if whats being made to appear are high-resolution scans of
our naked bodies. Preemptive exposure November 24th, 2010, was declared National Opt-Out Day for
developments, I argue that
anyone selected to undergo naked body scanning on their way through airport security in the United States. A
protest website was created (http://www.optoutday.com/) and Twitter feeds were initiated and continue to be
updated (http://twitter.com/#!/nationaloptout); at the same time, YouTube videos of scanners in action and
enhanced pat-down procedures went viral. The day of protest was organized to confront ongoing processes of
increasingly invasive security/surveillance creep at airports in the United States and around the world (Lyon 2006;
Marx 2005; Salter 2007). What travelers were opting-out of was the opportunity to have their bodies zapped by
either radiation-emitting backscatter X-ray machines or, alternatively, DNA-unzipping millimetre-wave scanners
(Alexandrov et al. 2009). At the time the Atlantic Monthly magazine described naked body scanning as securitizing
stupidity (Goldberg 2010). Passengers were also opting-out of having their naked image viewed by an unseen
security-officer seated alone in a room with a computer monitor and an exposure of their nakedness, genitals,
scars, and surgeries in full view. National Opt-Out Day was prompted in part by the exposure given to naked body
scanners by alarmist alternative online media outlets like Matt Drudges The Drudge Report and Alex Jones
Infowars.com, both of which began aggressively linking to grainy home videos of Transport Security Officials (TSA)
in the United States scanning and groping children, people with disabilities, and the elderly. These videos, having
gone viral on YouTube, stoked burgeoning outrage at the security and surveillance practices that were read by the
public as having gone one step too far. The emergence of online outrage, in turn, drew the attention of the
mainstream media, culminating in Washington officials having to defend or modify the latest airport security
protocols (Parker 2010). L-3 Millimetre-Wave Scanners (photo by author). Civil liberties organizations also joined the
fray, with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) urging the US Congress to prohibit this technology, stating that
[p]assengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not be required to display highly personal details
of their bodies such as evidence of mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the
size of their breasts or genitals as a prerequisite to boarding a plane (ACLU 2008). As Van Munster and others
requiring civilians to pass through strip-searches (whether digitized or

not) and groping procedures previously reserved for criminal suspects and convicts
implies that everybody is a suspect (2004: 151). And as Aradau and Van Munster repeatedly point
out, while profiling remains a necessary part of combating what gets defined as
terrorism, the targets of profiling are increasingly becoming arbitrary and
blurred; as they explain, today anyone can qualify as a potential terrorist:
Terrorists can be unemployed or employed, poor or not so poor, young or old, legal
residents or citizens, illegal migrants or tourists. Uncertainty slowly extends profiling
to the entirety of the population (2007: 104). Since the uproar surrounding National Opt-Out Day
scholars and theorists have responded to the naked body scanners by suggesting, for instance, that these
allegedly noninvasive virtual strip searches represent a troubling trend that finds
the states disciplinary powers being consolidated , as Magnet and Rodgers suggest, through
increasingly covert and concealed surveillance practices (2011: 2). But by opting out of the
have pointed out,
naked scanner option, travellers found themselves jumping from the frying pan into the fire. On August 27th, 2010
the TSA began implementing enhanced pat down procedures designed, according to online speculation, to be so
invasive that they effectively function as punishment or discipline for those who choose to opt out of the
scanners. While the TSA coyly avoids the issue, the internet is abuzz with reports that TSA officials use open-palmed
groping of testicles, buttocks, and breasts on adults and children in their effort to create safety through officially
sanctioned forms of what in any other circumstance would qualify as sexual assault. The Atlantic Monthlys Jeffrey
Goldberg recently reported on his experience of the enhanced pat-down as follows: At [the airport], I told the officer
who directed me to the back-scatter that I preferred a pat-down. When I made this request, a number of TSA
officers, to my surprise, began laughing. I asked why. One of them said that the rules were changing shortly, and
that I would soon understand why the back-scatter was preferable to the manual search. [T]omorrow, [the TSA
officer giggled,] we're going to start searching your crotchal area and you're not going to like it. What am I not
going to like? I asked. We have to search up your thighs and between your legs until we meet resistance, he
A similar story is that of an

American news reporter whose three-year-old daughter can be seen on YouTube
kicking and screaming Dont touch me as TSA officers squeeze and frisk her
flailing arms and legs (Alberts 2010). When questioned about the practice of
inappropriately touching small children James Marchand, TSA Regional Security
Director, sounds shockingly inappropriate by describing how TSA officials trick the
child into complying with the inappropriate touching by fooling them into thinking
theyre playing a game: You try to make it as best you can for that child to come through. You ask the
explained. Resistance? I asked. Your testicles, he explained. (2010)
child to put their arms up in some way, and if you can come up with some kind of game that youre trying to play
with the child then it makes it a lot easier (YouTube 2010). The sexual molestation implications of the enhanced
pat-downs are also highlighted by the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) who have issued a travel
advisory declaring that they have nothing to do with security and are about ritualizing the process of making
Americans submit to complete degradation at the hands of authority figures, no matter what level of humiliation
that process encompasses; the advisory concludes by stating that if we allow the government to get away with
groping your childrens genitals theres no limit to the abuse they will subsequently engage in (2010). In response
to the Opt-Out movement, the TSA went into damage control, with TSA Administrator John Pistole declaring: On the
eve of a major national holiday and less than one year after Al Qaida's failed attack last Christmas Day, it is
irresponsible for a group to suggest travelers opt out of the very screening that could prevent an attack (Knox
2010). At least in the United States, opting-out remains an option passengers in the UK have the choice either to
get irradiated and digitally-nude or to miss their flight (Travis & Milmo 2010). Creating appearances Naked body
scanners what the United States Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) call whole body imaging or
advanced imaging technology (TSA.gov) and what the online community has cheekily called nude-o-scopes
are, according to the TSA website, blog, and Twitter account, safe for all passengers, including children, pregnant
women, and individuals with medical implants (TSA.gov). As Blogger Bob an official TSA blogger explained in
April, 2008: These images are friendly enough to post in a preschool. Heck, he goes on [they] could even make
the cover of Readers Digest and not offend anybody (TSA Blog 2008). The UKs Guardian took quite a different
view, reporting that naked body scanners break child pornography laws, or the Protection of Children Act of 1978,
under which it is illegal to create an indecent image or a pseudo-image of a child (Travis 2010). In addition to the
pornographic potential of naked body scanners, many argue that their
surveillance abilities
themselves are basically ineffective. Israeli security expert Rafi Sela, for example, suggests
that naked body scanners are useless (Schmidt 2010). In Selas view, North Americans are
content with high-tech security theatre (Schneier 2003) that effectively enhances the
status quo because, as he sees things: Americans and Canadians are nice people and they
will do anything because they were told to do so and because they don't know any
different (Kelly 2009). The ineffectiveness of the naked scanning machines was again confirmed when, on
November 16th, 2010 German airports began reporting that their newly acquired naked body
scanners couldnt even see through folds and pleats in clothing (The Local 2010). Such
allegations have been more recently supported by research that suggests that backscatter machines are close to
useless when faced with, for example, large objects with tapered edges (which are rendered by the scanners as
bodily contours), wires (which are too narrow to be picked up), or sharp objects placed on the side of the scanned
body (which effectively disappear). Indeed, as researchers Kaufman and Carlson argue, even if X-ray exposure were
to be increased significantly, normal anatomy would make a dangerous amount of plastic explosive with tapered
edges difficult if not impossible to detect (2010: 73). And as I will discuss later on, the effectiveness of
biometrically-driven surveillance technologies is further brought into question by the degree to which the potential
for outsized financial profits are driving the implementation of contemporary or experimental surveillance
technologies as much as, or in coordination with, government policy. As David Lyon explains: Combined with the
quest of governments, especially the United States, to find new means of amassing personal information, and
technology companies urgently seeking new markets, the prospects are poor for carefully assessing the promise of
biometrics to increase national security (2008: 40). The widespread use of naked body scanners was ushered in
following the alleged attack on the United States by the underwear bomber on Christmas Day, 2009 (Shachtman
2009). As former Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff argued to the Washington Post, as he made the rounds
of major television networks: Youve got to find some way of detecting things in parts of the body that arent easy
to get at. Its either pat-downs or imaging (Eggen et al. 2009). Of course, as already discussed, the scanners are
unable to see under skin folds or into body cavities. Something else Chertoff failed to mention at the time was that
one of the two firms who had been authorized to provide the TSA with naked body scanners Rapiscan was a
client of his own security consulting firm the Chertoff Group (Kindy 2010). Prior to the underwear bomber event
Rapiscan was awarded an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity contract by the TSA worth $173 million. L-3, the
other naked body scanner manufacturer the seventh-largest defense contractor in the United States was
awarded a $165 million contract four days after the failed Christmas Day event. Canadas response to the
underwear bomber incident was to follow the lead of the United States and install millimetre-wave scanners.
Canadian transport Minister John Baird announced on January 5, 2010 that the Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority (CATSA) would install 44 millimetre-wave scanners in Canadian airports and Canadian Privacy
Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart assured Canadians that appropriate safety and privacy measures had been taken
(Stoddart 2010). The Canadian publics reaction to the naked body scanners was comparatively muted and was
even initially positive. Indeed, shortly after the news that widespread naked scanner implementation was
forthcoming, Angus Reid did a poll of Canadians in January, 2010, just weeks after the underwear bomber incident.
The pollsters asked Canadians: From what you have seen, read or heard, do you support or oppose the use of
these airport scanners to screen all passengers flying to and from Canada? (Angus Reid 2010: 2). Overwhelmingly,
Canadians were supportive, with 74% of Canadians being at least moderately supportive of being photographed
naked. Of course, the question posed by Angus Reid does not provide those polled with any information about
radiation, image retention, cost, photographing children, effectiveness, and so on. Rather, Canadian respondents to
this poll were likely basing their answers on the seemingly innocuous, low resolution, and grainy images of naked
bodies being circulated by the media images provided by the TSA and the naked body scanner manufacturers
themselves. So while having the right to vote on whether or not they think the naked scanners are a good idea
created the appearance of democratic choice, the reality is that in both the United States and Canada the
governments corporate-friendly decision to deploy these scanners had already occurred without public
creating appearances are what the naked body scanners are all about.
Appearances of security, appearances of bold and decisive action , appearances of
risk, appearances of for your own good-ness, appearances of rights being
protected. It is, however, the deceiving nature of these appearances that is most
alarming, particularly the deceiving nature of the images being made to appear by
the layers of security bent on revealing images and knowledges about us that we
ourselves likely have never seen and that we, under any other circumstances, would
consultation. But
never desire to be revealed. Alarming also is how the logics of preemption

used to support the implementation of outrageously invasive surveillance
regimes can be leveraged by politicians and corporations in pursuit of
profit and as a means of manufacturing new markets for enabling capital
expansion.
INTERNAL LINK/IMPACT The TSAs logic of preemption

constructs us as bare life by presuming everyone guilty, spills
over into other areas
*presumed guilty -> bare life
*will further infiltrate the public sphere
*zones of indestinction
Tiessen 2011
how, then, do the naked body scanners instantiate

a logic of preemption? How do airline passengers get inculcated into the naked body scanner-based
Looking at people looking at people looking So
perpetual state of exception? In the rest of the article I will deal more specifically with these questions by focusing
on the securitized and coercive environments created once naked body scanners begin to be present, installed, and
the installation of naked body scanners

another layer is added to the performative space of the security staging area.
Moreover, my argument will be that naked body scanners compel passengers to perform
submissiveness through gestures, movement, self-exposure in the face of authority, to
perform non-resistance in the face of outrageous and exceptional demands (demands that
used in todays airports. My suggestion is that with
find passengers having to reveal their genitals and bodily dismorphoses or that require that they allow themselves
to be physically accosted in ways that would be unacceptable in any less exceptional circumstance). I suggest,
the scanner staging area creates a performance space of multiple forms of

securitization (of both bodies and profits), a space that weaves together an
interdependent and mutually reinforcing web of securitized visuality . As Ive been arguing,
the naked body scanners (and accompanying enhanced pat-downs) are currently the apogee of a
particular logic of securitization and airport spectatorship (Adey 2007) premised upon
pre-emptive intervention (de Goede and Randall 2009), the assumed sovereignty of the visual sense
then, that
(Amoore 2007), biometrically and algorithmically mediated data mining (Lyon 2009), remote sensing (Adey 2009),
This is a logic designed to

delegitimize concepts like privacy, liberty, or dignity. The naked body scanner phenomenon,
then, is motivated by an effort not only to make risks visible through an aesthetics of
transparency (Hall 2009) but by an effort to compel everyone citizen and security agent alike to
submit willingly to a logic of absolute exposure , a logic enacted already through the use of clear,
sealable bags into which passengers must place their flight-appropriate vials of liquids and gels. That is,
complete visibility and transparency demanded by the variegated components of
confessionary complexes (Salter 2007), and absolute safety through security.
the distributed panopticon (Crandall 2005) is achieved by participants acting in concert

towards a greater good a total security system designed, at all costs, to abolish hints of threats before
they become whispers (let alone reality). The airport and body scanner environment, as Barad would say,
intra-act (Aradau 2010; Barad 2007) with dominant narratives about security and
preemption to produce a necessary response to a potential, and seemingly
inevitable, catastrophe. Indeed, the mere presence of the scanners during the security check endows them
with legitimacy as they participate in actively reshaping the whole security environment the anxieties of the
travelers, the apparent expertise and power of the security staff, the apparent efficacy of the security measures,
material objects such as body scanners need to be reconceived

as being co-constitutive of reality rather than as a distinct form. [ Things] are
etc. As Aradau has suggested,
themselves agential and emerge in relation with material-discursive practices (2010: 494); she goes on to observe
Subject and object, matter and meaning do not exist separately and do
not come to inter-act, but are both formed and transformed through intraaction
(2010: 498). The security environment, then, intra-acts to construct and reinforce
passenger subjectivities and systems of belief, requiring , for instance, that passengers
submit to authority in the presence of new and imposing technology. This environment,
in turn, renders the potential airline passengers collectively guilty until they
are allowed to perform their innocence for the naked body scanners that
reconstruct them as bare life (Agamben 1998; Aradau 2009). Upon entering the screening area,
with Barad that:
airline passengers are in the process of attempting to pass through yet another layer of security in the ever-more-
The screening area a sort of milder version of

zone of indistinction (Aradau & Van Munster 2009: 693) is also a social space
wherein the act of looking and being looked at, the act of looking at others looking,
and the act of looking for lookers who are looking from concealed rooms creates a
space where passengers and TSA officials are together relying on what is seen to
define what is normal. The screening area operationalizes the opportunity to
generate interdependent and reciprocal relationships of visibility : we and the security
intrusive surveillant assemblage (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).
Agambens
agents must negotiate a continuous feedback loop of exposure and disclosure, we become both voyeur and
The experience is one of being watched, watching, watching watchers

watch, and watching watchers watch watchers. We are compelled, at once to conceal and to
exhibitionist.
expose, to become both visible and invisible in an effort to pass through the process with our dwindling rights and
diminished dignity intact. So while TSA officials stare and scan, stare and scan in search of anomalies, we stare out
both at those doing the staring and those being stared at in an attempt to discern especially prior to the naked
our
willingness to comply with the scanning regimen is, in part, consistent with the gee
whiz sort of cultural associations we have with X-ray vision. In their view there is a neato factor and a sense of
body scan how to render ourselves invisible, unnoticed, imperceptible. Magnet and Rodgers point out that
familiarity (and inevitability?) about our future-infused present being one where submission to see-through vision
machines almost seems natural. As Magnet and Rodgers explain, naked body scanners reference
longstanding cultural and science fictional preoccupations with X-ray eyes; this
preoccupation with X-ray eyes requires, in turn, that security personnel obscure the:
pleasure taken in rendering [] bodies visible as well as mystifying the
process by which particular bodies are made hypervisible and others
made invisible . This is a process that we have elsewhere termed surveillant scopophilia; that
is, new technologies provide opportunities for pleasure in looking in ways connected to their surveillance. (2011: 3)
The feedback loops of looking, exposure, surveillance, concealing, imagery, and anxiety present within the
scanning screening area operate together to create a sort of stable environment one where all
activities reciprocally support one another that, if disturbed, reacts decisively to quell the
disruption. Moreover, the move to maximize reciprocal visualizations in the airport screening process
particularly visualizations of the human body, of flesh itself overturns the previous set of airport security protocols
that focused discretely on metallic object sensors and baggage inspection. Today, in addition to our luggage being
inspected as it passes through a concealed chamber full of X-rays, our bodies are on display as being on display
when we step into the glassed-in space of the transparency machines on display for both security personal, who
gaze at our nakedness, and for other passengers, who witness us spread our legs and raise our arms above our
head in a performative pose only recently reserved for those under arrest or surrendering to authority. Todays
The
performative nature of looking and being looked at is not lost on TSA central
planners who, in an online article entitled Building Security Force Multipliers describe how visually
performing and staging security theater serves to create the impression that safety
and security are being maintained by the TSAs deployment of Visible Intermodal Protection
and Response (VIPR) teams whose raison dtre is to be publicly visible by providing random, announced, highsecurity protocols have shifted from scanning the metalscape to performatively probing the meatscape.
visibility surge[s] into a transit agency, in addition to enhancing agency resources during special events (TSA n.d.).
As the TSA explains: More than 50 mass transit deployments have occurred since the program was initiated in
December 2005. Regional planning and execution is increasing the frequency of deployments and enhancing local
expertise, thereby increasing the terrorism deterrent effect (TSA n.d.). As the TSA explains, VIPR teams use
surprise and sudden visual appearances to introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist
what is similarly disrupted are the normal patterns of

people going about their everyday lives since with the sudden appearance of VIPR teams they
instantly find their day to day routines becoming extraordinary as the securitized
states of exception infiltrate the public sphere and everyday schedules
planning activities (TSA 2007). Of course,
ANOTHER IMPACT - Preemptive logics further state power,

stifle political action, and preclude social transformation by
focusing on future securitized events
Tiessen 2011
Naked body scanners and the security environments

they express and produce can be understood as yet another permutation of the
politics and strategies of preemption (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Anderson 2010; de Goede and
Randalls 2009). As research in this area has revealed, preemptive strategies of
governance as initiated by the state and the security apparatus that they support
(and that supports them) paves the way for the implementation of new and unproven
security imperatives. Additionally, however, the politics of preemption unwittingly relies on
an ontological commitment to a misreading of what Deleuze would describe as
virtualities (1994), or what can more practically be understood as the potentialities that
condition and give rise to actual events (Massumi 2010, 2009, 2007, 2005a, 2005b). That is,
without realizing it todays state/security apparatus operates according to what Deleuze
would regard as an ontologically impossible logic of clairvoyance, a logic that requires
citizens to trust that our politicians and security experts can see the future and that
the future is knowable. Of course, the future they envision is a dangerous one. By decreeing that
it can know the unknowable, the state/security apparatus enacts a set of
security protocols premised on the coercive power that comes from being
able to mandate preemptive action in response to unknowable futures.
Moreover, these protocols gain legitimacy based on particular ontological
Preempting dissent by disavowing Deleuze
commitments about the nature of reality for instance, the relationship of the present to
potentiality and to the future. I want to point out too that these ontological commitments are in direct conflict with
those of Deleuze whose ontological commitments can be and were used to expose the tactics of power and
coercion deployed by state/security assemblages to modulate citizens and other dividuals (Deleuze 1992: 5). So
the state/security apparatus isnt at all interested in the finer points of DeleuzoGuattarian philosophy, its unwitting reversal of Deleuzean ontological logic contributes to a
popular image of the world that understands the future to be something that can be
controlled, managed, identified, inevitable, and pre-determined. This ontological
reversal contributes to the consolidation of state/security assemblage power
structures whose legitimacy derives from creating narratives that unwittingly
completely misread and disavow the emancipatory potential of the ontological
commitment to virtuality as outlined by Deleuze (and Guattari) (1987). Of course, as
theorists such as Elmer and Opel (2006) have warned, the state/security apparatus logic of preemption
should be regarded with suspicion and must be regarded as a sort of technology in
its own right, one designed to produce prescribed social, political, and marketdriven ends. That is, rather than encouraging and enabling the emergence of novel
futures and creative responses to those futures contemporary security logics
premised upon initiating preemptive action in fact work to disable potentials and
variables by determining, in advance and by decree, what the future will become and how
we must prepare for its inevitability (2006). As Aradau puts it, preparedness exercises
premised on clairvoyant logics of preemption do not create something new, they
do not organize subjects with a view to radical change, but rehearse in a ritual play
that which has already been set out as inevitable: the next terrorist attack (2010: 4).
This attempt to determine the future by the state/security apparatus also works to stifle protest by
leapfrogging it, by rendering controversies moot since the future has been
foreclosed. Moreover, the inevitability of catastrophic futures operates retroactively on
the present (but without actually existing) to necessitate that we commit our
energies and efforts to preparing for them today. As Elmer and Opel explain, logics of
preemption allow state and security actors to invoke a predetermined inevitable
future that requires military and police action; moreover, this requirement renders
dissenting opinion irrelevant and deviant since, after all, the future (and what is needed to
prepare for it) is a foregone conclusion: Through the preemptive lens the future becomes an
inevitable series of events, elevating fate to an agent of historical evolution.
Rational free will, as a motivating factor in social and political change, by
comparison, is not only futile, it becomes potentially life threatening .
while it may be true that
Preemptive politics thus raises serious questions about the power of political leaders (as visionaries of publicly
For
Deleuze (and Guattari), on the other hand, the future is much less knowable: it
discloses what it can do after the fact. For them the future is an open, unknowable, and unactualized
zone of pure potential that, in time, generates the conditions necessary for actualization. For Deleuze the
virtual realm exists in a sort of feedback-loop-relationship with the actual: the
virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object as though the object
had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged (1994: 209). As Deleuze explains:
unforeseeable dangers) and political protest as an indefinite form of collusion or appeasement. (2006: 47980)
The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual (1994: 209).
So for Deleuze, the virtual is like the actual fully real but not knowable in
advance. The virtual, then, can be understood as the engine of the actual (and vice versa) and the actual and
virtual realms can be thought of as responding to one another in a problem/solution sort of way, such that the
virtual realm responds to and creates the problems that define the actual (and vice versa). Deleuze explains that
the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which
orientates, conditions, and engenders solutions but that these solutions do not resemble the conditions of the
problem (1994: 212). For Deleuze (and Guattari although Im not quoting from their collaborative works here),
it is unknowable virtual forces that generate or make possible both the

problems and the solutions that compose our everyday lives. Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari
recognize that the actualizations that virtualities condition not only cannot be predicted
in advance, but do not even resemble the virtualities that contribute to their
emergence. Indeed, according to Deleuze and Guattaris ontological commitments, to suggest that
actualizations can be known in advance is the height of folly since actualizations
(virtualizations effects) can only be recognized as having been possible (as opposed to their
having been potential) after they have occurred. In fact, to suggest otherwise would be
dangerous. As Deleuze explains, there is a danger that the virtual could be confused with
the possible: The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the
possible is therefore a realization. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it
possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization. It would be
wrong to see only a verbal dispute here: it is a question of existence
itself. (1994: 211) My point, then, is that policies of preemption policies that provide the
ontological impetus for, amongst other things, the publics accepting and footing the bill
for the implementation of naked body scanners must be understood as part of an
ontologically-based system of beliefs and actions that can be used to serve the
purposes of those in position to declare what is being preempted . That is, policies and
practices of preemption function to foreclose potential and determine becomings not by securing or
predicting the future, but by securing and defining the present . So while The Critical
then,
Approaches to Security in Europe Collective (C.A.S.E.) admirably contests the idea that scholarly research on these
matters can be detached from political contingency and action, and challenge the illusion that the critique of
it is equally important to contest

the notion that preemptive security practices can be separated from the
machinations of sovereign sources of power (and, as I will be arguing: credit, finance, and
neoliberalism) intent, not only, on securing the future from catastrophe, but on securing
the present from pursuing or acting on any subversive or undesirable powerresisting potentials. As de Goede and Randalls argue, the idea that sovereigns (or anyone
else) have access to accurate imaginations of actionable futures (Aradau,
LoboGuerrero, Van Munster 2008: 152) must be questioned since the preemptive
actions that get imposed on populations work to depoliticize and
delegitimate debate; this delegitimation of debate and corresponding
preempting of dissent has, they argue, the potential to bring the
unimaginable into being (2009: 859). For de Goede and Randalls, [r]econceiving
precautionary politics is thus vital if we are to engage ethically with the
world (2009: 859). In other words, the onus falls on scholars of surveillance and security to
foreground the fallacies of preemptive logics designed to depoliticize the present.
texts does not produce [] political effects or resistance (2006: 445),
in my view
When isnt the exception? Surveillance and security policies premised on preemption require the imposition of
security protocols designed to prevent catastrophic futures that seem probable given the less than stable
circumstances of the present. That being the case, preventing the threats of tomorrow requires that todays and
Practices of preemption, then, can be seen as

working as much to maintain the status quo as they do to prevent inevitable
futures, since for the inevitable to remain inevitable over time the present must
remain effectively constant (or at least the variables that currently condition the inevitability of imminent
catastrophe must be made stable). Preemptive logics also compel us to spend our
tomorrows presents remain impossibly constant.
passing present attempting to solve or prevent unknown future which , in

turn, shortcircuits our ability to engage in transformative politics today (i.e. by
focusing on preparing for future catastrophes we are unable to transform current conditions that may be
contributing to the alleged inevitabilities of tomorrow). Aradau and Van Munster describe the situation as follows:
When allied with precautionary risk management, exceptionalism

reinforces the status quo and the continuity of the present against
struggles for transformation and social justice (2009: 697). That being the case, the
inevitability of catastrophes necessitates that extraordinary security practices that were initially
described as exceptions (Agamben 1998) become, instead, everyday security practices
that remain constant in order to secure the present from the inevitable. The
state/security apparatus ability to transform exceptions into norms or at least to transform
the norm into a permanently modulated state of exception begs the question: When isnt the
exception? Or, at what point did the churning of states of exception become the norm? Furthermore, when
does the normalization of exception-making become an outrage? And when does the normalization of outrage
at what state of the process do we (citizens, policy makers, academics,

begin engaging in some preemptive prognosticating and connecting-of-thedots of our own by asking questions like: What other interests are at play beyond
security interests? Where are these processes of preemption and production of
exceptions leading? Who benefits? What is the endgame? Is there an endgame? Do
perpetual preemptions and exceptions contribute to our collective ability to pursue
freedom or emancipatory projects? Do they contribute to our ability to promote
diversity (Pugliese 2011)? Justice? Equality? Democracy? Sustainability? Security? What
surveillance technique will be cause for alarm? When does the preparation for
catastrophe itself become catastrophic?
demand resistance? Moreover,
theorists)
Others
TSA scanning 95% ineffective, failing to detect a majority of
Capps 15

But
TSA:




Yes, it is still the same intrusive scanners just different images

TSA, 9-3-2014, "Advanced Imaging Technology," Transportation Security
Administration, https://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imagingtechnology
TSA began testing state-of-the-art Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) in 2007 and
began deploying units to airports in 2008. This technology can detect a wide range
of threats to transportation security in a matter of seconds to protect passengers
and crews. Imaging technology is an integral part of TSA's effort to continually look
for new technologies that help ensure travel remains safe and secure by staying
ahead of evolving threats.
TSA currently uses millimeter wave AIT to safely screen passengers for metallic and
nonmetallic threats, including weapons and explosives, which may be concealed
under clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.
There are close to 740 AIT units deployed at nearly 160 airports nationwide.

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Notes from Lab

TSA = important b/c its visible?

thanks to a leaked report on the Transportation Security Administration, we

The TSA spends $5.3 billion on aviation security annually,

Just not close to reality by any measure involved. Airport

for screening, TSA regulates

eliminating the risk presented by every single

In particular, the TSAs Screening Passengers by Observation

80% of the passengers being pulled

barely better than

"What we know about SPOT suggests it wastes taxpayer money,

said in the lawsuit announcement.

Moreover, SPOT is a sure path to racial profiling the TSA has

The TSAs Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program, also known

African-Americans wearing baseball caps backward and Latinos

identify passengers for further screening, and possibly a referral to

criminalizing people for flying while black or

These policies are a form of political control that perpetuates

have targeted black and brown bodies for intrusive and

Airport surveillance has become the administrator of white

The fear a Muslim inspires is associated with the

[Insert dehumanization/other impact cards here]

Without absolute side constraints against violating human

On the other hand, one of the most

He advocated a form of utilitarianism in which we are obligated to

There are times when we feel justified in limiting or abrogating

we have a duty to do so, regardless, because reason

It demands it because to do otherwise is irrational given the requirements of the Categorical

These are some explanations of pronouns that trans people

4. Ze/Hir and its derivatives

Ease of pronunciation: 3/5

Xe, it turns out, is supposed to be pronounced the same as ze apparently it

1AC Gender Policing

Scanners force the visibility of trans- bodies to be pronounced

There are three examples of the manifestation of cisprivelege

Bodies that trans gress the boundaries of 'coherence and continuity'

Rights violations cascade to create spaces of silence that deny

These things happen because there

resources necessary for an intervention that makes sense to the people

Second, scanning marginalizes the genderqueer bodies and

we must first commit to the categories of F and M, just as we commit to

there is, we think, a degree of cisprivilege inherent in the notion

This further Otherizes trans- individuals and renders them

Other peoples reactions can undermine even fairly secure

messages of disgust that came

Third, scanners subject trans- bodies to constant discipline at

Opening to critical scrutiny, however, the practices through which

writes Alexander John Goodrum, an African-American transman, in an

gender variance is neither a fad nor a revolution. It

The law has empirically encouraged people to commit similar

Edward Snowden was shouting against the wind and

the seeming inevitability of authority can

The Transportation Security Administration

actual bodies. (2013) Needed Policy Changes

TSA scanning 95% ineffective, failing to detect a majority of

thanks to a leaked report on the Transportation Security Administration, we

The TSA spends $5.3 billion on aviation security annually,

Just not close to reality by any measure involved. Airport

for screening, TSA regulates

eliminating the risk presented by every single

the court described a full frisk as where

In the past, the TSA only permitted its agents

Although [*1617] passengers are allowed to request a pat-down in private,

The two types of technologies used in body scanners are