Police Power

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POLICE POWER
on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise of the
police power of the State.
1. Amelia Cabrera vs Manuel Lapid, GR No. 129098, December 6, 2006

FACTS: Instant petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated 13 May 1996 which
dismissed the complaint-affidavit filed by petitioner against respondents and the Order dated 21 March 1997 and denied her
motion for reconsideration.
The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit filed in November 1995 by petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera where she
accused before the Office of the Ombudsman respondents: Gov. Manuel Lapid, Mayor Fernando Baltazar, Vicemayor
Reynaldo F. Cabrera and Police Superintendent Diony Ventura of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it
to fishpond operations and had spent approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations
commenced in August 1995. A month later, a demolition of her fishpond was set for being purportedly illegal and blocked the
flow of the Pasak River. Petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property but
it was demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting.
Petitioner alleged that the demolition was purposely carried out in the presence of media representatives and other
government officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and ViceMayor Cabrera in allowing the destruction of the fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the existence of the lease
agreement. She also charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable
negligence for ordering the destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.
In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera, they insisted that contrary to petitioner's
claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was erected on the seashore, at the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat
on an inalienable land. They claimed that the demolition was done by the Task Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then
President Fidel V. Ramos
Governor Lapid averred that the contract of lease between petitioner and the Municipality of Sasmuan, represented by then
Mayor Abelardo Panlaqui, was executed two weeks before respondent Mayor Baltazar took his oath of office in 1995. He
also argued that under the law, the Department of Agriculture (DA) is the government agency authorized to enter into
licensing agreements for fishpond operations, and as per certification by the DA Regional Director, petitioner's fishpond
operation was not covered by a fishpond lease agreement or application. Governor Lapid also referred to the certification by
the Municipal Health Officer of Sasmuan issued before the actual demolition of the fishpond, describing it as a nuisance per
se and recommending its abatement
13 May 1996- the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities.
Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued before the ocular
inspection of the property which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial
proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding.
Respondents filed separate oppositions to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition and
respondent Governor Lapid filed a rejoinder to the reply.
21 March 1997- the Ombudsman affirmed its 13 May 1996 Resolution in an order. It ruled that the repealing clause of R.A. No.
7160 expressly repealed only Sec. 2, 6 and 29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704 so that in harmonizing the remaining
provisions of P.D. No. 704 and the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 applicable to the grant of fishery privileges, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the government agency authorized to grant fishpond license or permit in areas not
identified as municipal waters or not declared as alienable or disposable by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Since it appears from DENR records that the subject property has not been declared disposable or
included in areas devoted for fishpond development, the Ombudsman concluded that the lease agreement entered into by
petitioner was void ab initio. In view of the illegality of the lease agreement, the Ombudsman ruled that its demolition was
justified. The Ombudsman described the demolition as a valid exercise of police power and in accordance with the provision of
Sec. 28 of P.D. No. 704 directing the removal of any fishpen or fishpond that obstructed the free navigation of a stream or lake.
It also upheld the authority of the district health officer to determine the abatement of a nuisance without need of judicial
proceedings
Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail
the 13 May 1996 Resolution and 21 March 1997 Order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended
petition for review on certiorari to implead the Ombudsman as respondent, although in a petition for review on certiorari, the
tribunal whose issuance is assailed need not be impleaded as respondent.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman exceeded its authority and erred in ruling that the demolition is a proper exercise of the police
power of the state and that the petitioner was given due hearing before the fishpond was blasted, inter alia
HELD: NO. Such direct resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of
procedure.
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989 only allows direct appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The provision does not cover resolutions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases. Insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court, this provision was declared unconstitutional
in Fabian v. Hon.
Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the
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existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of
the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of
errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed
Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong
remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless warranted
because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of
the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a
nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman,
"those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of
the general public; for the good and the highest good."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only
by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict
respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal
to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that
the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.
It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before it. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. DENIED.
2. Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs DSWD, GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

FACTS: Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003".
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG which have been specifically tasked
to monitor the drugstores' compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
February 26, 2004-- R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
it became effective on March 21, 2004.
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the
death of senior citizens;
xxx xxx xxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of
the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall
be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
May 28, 2004--- the DSWD approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257, Rule VI,
Article 8 of which states:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted under Rule V,
Section 4 Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities[,] and
Sections 10 and 11 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction
net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).
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July 10, 2004--- in reference to the query of the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines (DSAP) concerning the meaning
mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens.
of a tax deduction under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B. Recente, clarified
the difference between the Tax Credit (under the Old Senior Citizens Act) and Tax Deduction (under the Expanded Senior
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public
Citizens Act). Under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together
use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net
compensation.
Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was
deducted directly from the tax due amount.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the
October 1, 2004--- Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions
word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
of Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" was issued by the DOH, providing the
substantial, full and ample.
grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of
just compensation
On November 12, 2004---
DOH issued Administrative Order No. 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the
twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that "[t]he grant of twenty percent
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
(20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the
society.
exclusive use of the senior citizens".

The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the following grounds:
SEC. 2. Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
1) The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
2) It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our Constitution which states that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the
equal protection of the laws;" and
3) The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes "essential
goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost."
Petitioners assert that Section 4 (a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1)
drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE: whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
HELD:
YES. What petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. xxx xxx xxx

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens
and to actively seek their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services,
and diagnostic and laboratory fees etc. etc.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
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commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their
business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have
not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion,
for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be
refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction.
To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example.
According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin
of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at
P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only
P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20%
discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores.
Petitioners' computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be
deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which
will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An
income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners' sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could
have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot
substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was
erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to
be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise
of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
process.
While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good.
Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same
would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. DISMISSED.
FACTS: Petition under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court) and questioning the validity of
Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.
28 June 1993--- Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC)which is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance
No. 778[3] is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITAMALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
SECTION 1.Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft
Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed
or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to
1.Sauna Parlors 2.Massage Parlors 3.Karaoke Bars 4.Beerhouses 5.Night Clubs 6.Day Clubs
7.Super Clubs 8.Discotheques 9.Cabarets 10.Dance Halls 11.Motels 12.Inns
SEC. 2.The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from
issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of
business enumerated in the preceding section. XXXXX
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for
"amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as
"tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community."
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council
has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code)
grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns,
3. City of Manila vs Hon. Perfecto Laguio, GR. No. 118127, August 12, 2005
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) TheOrdinance is void as it is violative of Presidential
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Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel
duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance
hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to
of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor
prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.
does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the
law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. The Ordinance,
area.
the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation. The Ordinance also
did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and
In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to
real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.
"prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, which reads, thus:
28 June 1993--- respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order
against the enforcement of the Ordinance.
Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
16 July 1993--- again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: xxx xxx xxx
25 November 1994-- Judge Laguio rendered writ of preliminary injunction permanent and the said ordinance null and void.
(4)Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
11 January 1995--- petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court
general welfare and for said purpose shall: xxx xxx xxx
(vii)Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy
the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) ofRepublic Act No.
409, 1 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III THE MUNICIPAL BOARD xxx xxx xxx
in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court. They
contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the
general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.
27 May 1996---In its Memorandum private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being
repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is
violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of
the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution
Section 18.Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:xxx xxx xxx
of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
(kk)To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional; WON the requisites of exercise of
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
police powers is met
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HELD: NO. The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a
constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the
Constitution.
A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure
to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency
with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to
legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as
agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16.General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/municipality provided under the Code."
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.
The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause. The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat
"(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . . (Sec 1)" There is no controlling
and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process."
i. Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
ii. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's
action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level
of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is
met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is
used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove
that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due
to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to
his life, liberty and property.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity,
1. it must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights,
2. the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
7
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
conduct within the motel's premises be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any
less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
should be the rule and restraint the exception.
rights a violation of the due process clause.

The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no
choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
made. That, ultimately, is their choice.
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate
the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom it is the most
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
City Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of
its property.
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the
health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
premises. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the
just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction
detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government
does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes
In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the
approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in
public as a whole.
cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently." It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to
or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable
liberty and property.
economically viable use of the property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if government regulation
from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case, the rights of the
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view,
8
equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the
use prohibitable.
discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions
when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
government action.
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the
public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner.
exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the community," "annoy the
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed"
inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community."
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to
another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause.
money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent
These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping
that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an
expectations for use.
interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to
uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section
[In contrast to two relevant cases: In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance
4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.
regulating "sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets,
motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden on
ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses
the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be
that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause
borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.
by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in
increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme
exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10) hours should be
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice
included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10)
as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that the property
taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome." If it be of
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public
should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing out, is also
9
different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and
conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no
other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:
valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this
case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. ]
The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
general welfare and for said purpose shall: xxx xxx xxx
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends
(iv)Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. . . .
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, and
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as
follows:
1)It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2)It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4)It must apply equally to all members of the class.
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both
general welfare and for said purpose shall:xxx xxx xxx
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and
fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
(vii)Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement

facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such
not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted
certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity
community.
to engage in prostitution.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
C.The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
10
It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila 105 that:
thereto.
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress"
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of
or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised.
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent
of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. These powers,
, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another section of the
therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of
Code which is reproduced as follows:
regulation, suppression and prohibition.

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation
among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments
(Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
(1)Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied
(v)Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in
or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute,
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug
construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of
person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium.
obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the city; xxx xxx xxx
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code
and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. People v. Esguerra, is instructive. It held
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in
that:
Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may
prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of illThe powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised
repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an
Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can
effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment,
not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is
operation and maintenance.
granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by
section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section
Ordinance also runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. . As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted
2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power
the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds
to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have
the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised
force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant
repugnant to the general law.
11
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was
held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption
received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is
established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
21 April 1989n--- Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

24 April 1989petitioner board, in answer to Solars motion for reconsideration appeal with prayer for stay of execution,
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
allows Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR NCR to conduct the
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is thereforeultra vires, null and void. Local legislative
bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1
21 July 1989--- the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari
thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's
protection of laws not even under the guise of police power. DENIED.
subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.
4. Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93981, March 11, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board seeks the court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an
order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
22 September 1988--- petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal
leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board; and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its
plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's
non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of
pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.
Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the
trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. This decision is without prejudice to whatever action
the [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. In
addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. The Court of Appeals held that certiorari was a
proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the
case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner board in this petition for review argues that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and
were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board).
Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros
River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health; safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the
instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged
posed such a threat.
12
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process
Classification Best usage xxx xxx xxx
by the Board.
Class
HELD: YES. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the
following circumstances:
"P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged
sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or
exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing
D For
agriculture,
irrigation,
live
stock
watering
and
industrial cooling and processing xxx xxx xxx

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following identical finding:
"a. For legal action in [view of] violation of Section 103 of the implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5
of the Effluent Regulations of 1982."
the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that: Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner
person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order
continuously violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating
shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the
its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes
said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court." (Emphasis supplied).
our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the
firm . . ."
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public
The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were: ...xxx 3.) A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable
laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and
standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life,
suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory result)."
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It
is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of
discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex
parte cease and desist order when there is prima facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards.
Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the
Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or
material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the
applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind
of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health, safety or welfare, or to
it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's
plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there
was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. In fact the previous owner of the plant
facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease
and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on
13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board
refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections
were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed.
animal and plant life" remains necessary.

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed "when
discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D underSection 68 of the 1978
NPCC Rules and Regulations, which in part provides that:
"Section 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe and
satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the
following beneficial usages: (a) Fresh Surface Water.
In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards
vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in
an operating condition.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines
cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional common place that the
13
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have
compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally
entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats
and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and their
implementing regulations. C
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVER'S LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, Garin addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
12 September 1995--- Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on,
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution
may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease
Here he contended that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of
where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. A subsequent public
the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. Absent any implementing rules from the Metro
hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and
Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis. Further, the provision violates the
Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave Solar
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then
unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

MMDA, represented by the SolGen, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to
Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it
the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which are legislative and executive in nature;
dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.
the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its
MMDA directed the court's attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995 as implementing
Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22
rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 . Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum
September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby
Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of
Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
26 September 1995-- Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on, extending the validity of the
TVR as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days.
23 October 1995-- MMDA was directed to return the respondent's driver's license.
5. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Dante O. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15 2009
FACTS: At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement
of traffic laws and regulations.
05 August 1995-- Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila.The following statements were printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA
MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION
THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.
14 August 1997--- the trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of the herein respondent and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995,
hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses upon issuance of
a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard;
depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of
supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.
MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his driver's license and likewise ordered to desist from confiscating driver's
14
license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall
be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here
MMDA files this present petition contending that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property
by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed
right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare.
to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power."
That revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is
given the right to appeal the revocation.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
That a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation,
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has
administrative in nature. (Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.)
three options: (1) To voluntarily pay the imposable fine (2) To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA
Adjudication Committee, or(3) To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor's Office.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence of a quorum, that the lower
court's finding that it had not was based on a "misapprehension of facts. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or
ISSUE: WON the MMDAs power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses is an unauthorized exercise of police
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
power.
president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
HELD: YES.
12 August 2004-- MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of
lawmaking body.
2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers'
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units (def: "political subdivision of a nation or
licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." Eg: provinces, cities, municipalities,
the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.
barangays). With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development
and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a
The case has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
MMDA however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that
matter, that would entail confiscating drivers' licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner's future
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power . Even the Metro Manila
programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power .
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
It is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom
motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the
national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature
procedural due process requirements.

3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
in Commonwealth v. Funk : "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of
danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality,
Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and
but, when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the
penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate
15
and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act
June 16, 1995--- court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all
traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic
June 29, 1995-- Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion. He filed with the CA
enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom
a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in
may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was
located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise
Thus where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers
of police power
have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the MMDA is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
March 25, 1996CA granted the petition and the assailed orders are nullified.
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
Petitioner Otigas in this present petition asserts that "Mathay III lacks legal capacity to question the validity of conditions of
The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would
the deed of sale; and he is barred by estoppel or waiver to raise the same question like his principals, the owners."
entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management but
these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be
reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate
source. DISMISSED.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It avers that a
contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with police power. Petitioner submits that
the restrictive clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance. For one, according to petitioner,
the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings. Petitioner argues that even with the
6. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
FACTS: petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193,
which nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 261, in Civil Case
No. 64931. It also assails the resolution of the appellate court, dated August 13, 1996, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
August 25, 1976-- Ortigas sold to the Hermosos a parcel of land (Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737) in Greenhills Subdivision. The contract of sale provided that the
lot will be used for single-family residential building only and this was annotated at the back of the title of the lot.
zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use thereof.
Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the condition imposing exclusive residential use
was effectively nullified by the zoning ordinance.
In its turn, private respondent argues that the appellate court correctly ruled that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to subject the contract to the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. He avers that the appellate court properly
held the police power superior to the non-impairment of contract clause in the Constitution. He concludes that the appellate
court did not err in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in excess of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
apply MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 to Civil Case No. 64931.
1981-- the Metropolitan Commission enacted MMC (now MMDA) Ordinance No. 81-01 reclassifying as a commercial zone
the stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street.
June 8, 1984-- private respondent Mathay III leased the lot from Hermoso and constructed a commercial building for
Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
January 18, 1995petitioner Ortigas filed a complaint against Hermoso with the RTC Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil
HELD: NO. The trial court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was
enacted only in March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No.
81-01 had retroactive effect, said ordinance should be given prospective application. Only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contracts.
Case No. 64931, seeking thethe demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of
the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to
prohibit petitioner from constructing the commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the lot. The complaint
was later amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which has a ten percent (10%) interest
in the lot.
But a law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future
contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to
the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every
16
contract.
The trial court's reliance on the Co vs. IAC, is misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was agricultural and Ordinance No. 81-01
Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part: xxx xxx xxx
did not specifically provide that "it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands
located within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature," and stated with respect to agricultural
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in
areas covered that "the zoning ordinance should be given prospective operation only." The area in this case involves not
at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' from March 6,
agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No. 81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the zoning ordinance in
1995 in the case of candidates for senators and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said
Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.
newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.
The contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. 'Comelec Space' shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among
stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the
all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the
Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso,
candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of
limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive
government.
operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract
so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene
'Comelec Space' shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
"law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.
Respondent court correctly found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters
in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath
of office to apply the applicable law.
A real party in interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. (a) 'Comelec Space' shall be available to all candidates during the
periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all candidates for the same
office. All candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of 'Comelec Space' for their
information, guidance and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' from newspapers or publications based in the
Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee on Mass Media of the
Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' in newspapers or publications based in
the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to the Provincial Election Supervisor concerned.
Applications for availment of 'Comelec Space' may be filed at any time from the date of effectivity of this
Resolution.
private respondent in this case is clearly a real party in interest. It is not disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant
to a valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of a "holder of the thing" under Article 525 of the Civil Code. He was
impleaded as a defendant in the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further, what petitioner seeks to enjoin is the
building by respondent of a commercial structure on the lot. Clearly, it is private respondent's acts which are in issue, and his
interest in said issue cannot be a mere incidental interest. In its amended complaint, petitioner prayed for, among others,
judgment "ordering the demolition of all improvements illegally built on the lot in question." These show that it is petitioner
Mathay III, doing business as "Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.," and not only the Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the
court's decree. DENIED.
7. Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995
FACTS: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary restraining order . Philippine Press
Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for
(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors shall allocate available 'Comelec
Space' among the candidates concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be notified in advance, in
writing, to be present personally or by representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place specified in
the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the lottery may appeal to the Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or the Provincial Election
Supervisor, as the case may be, sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue and the newspaper or
publication allocated to him, and the time within which he must submit the written material for publication in the
'Comelec Space'.xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall
allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication
17
accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly
procured. Even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible
clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the
exercise of the power of supervisor or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print
newspapers or publication that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest."
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
(Emphasis supplied)
28 April 1995-- Oral arguments; Comelec thr ChairmanBernardo Pardo stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly
22 March 1995-- Comelec sent directives to thePhilippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members
Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to
of PPI. These letters read as follows:
compel those members to supply Comelec with free print space. They were merely designed to solicit from the publishers
the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to
"This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on Elections, you are directed to
the 11 May 1992 elections. the Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet and adopt an appropriate amending or clarifying
provide free print space of not less than one half () page for use as 'Comelec Space' or similar to the print
resolution, a certified true copy of which would forthwith be filed with the Court.
support which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each
political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known to their
On 5 May 1995-- the Court received from the SolGen a manifestation which attached a copy of Comelec resolution No.
qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of this Resolution follows with clarifications on Sections 2 and 8 of Res.
No. 2772 as follows:
We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to you their pictures, biographical data,
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as requiring publishers of the different mass
stand on key public issues and platforms of government, either as raw data or in the form of positives or cameraready materials.
media print publications to provide print space under pain of prosecution, whether administrative, civil or criminal,
there being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section provided for either in said Resolution or in Section
Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in your publications any day upon
90 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, on the grant of 'Comelec Space.'
receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the day for campaigning. We trust you to extend your full
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior restraint on the part of
support and cooperation in this regard."
the publishers with respect to the printing or publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or other sections
PPI asks to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
of their respective publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from the last sentence of said Section
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for
8 that the Commission shall, 'unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise . . . respect the
public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
determination by the publishers and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.'
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally
ISSUE:
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

HELD: Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A did not
20 April 1995-- this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to various print media enterprises all dated
try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 persists in its original form. Thus, we must point out
that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-
22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.
directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI
The Office of the SolGen filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772
government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do
does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any
criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. The questioned Resolution merely established
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation
of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space"
has given it. A written communication officially directing a print media company tosupply free print space, dispatched by
so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to
impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such direction, only aggravates the
constitutional difficulties inhering in the present situation.
18
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No.
In National Press Club v. Commission on Elections-- Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No.
2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2
6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for
failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or
campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid
21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or has often as Comelec may direct during the same
political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of news,
period? the extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising
which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
speech and of the press. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates. It does not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office.
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be
examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI
distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of
are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts. PPI has not claimed
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the
that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. The
legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election
Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised whether or not Section 8 of Resolution
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to
"supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of media of
Under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent Commission would be used
communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply,
not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public-information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
office but also for "dissemination of vital election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices,
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections " is not ripe for judicial review for lack
directives, etc. issued by Comelec).
of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8. In fine:
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter
compensation" (Article III, Section 9). Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis
directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers
for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
from fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be
There was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a
dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy. PETITION GRANTED, RES AND DIRECTIVES SET
power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. And while private property may
ASIDE, TRO MADE PERMANENT.
indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance
in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a
national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business
condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for
the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
8. PRC vs Arlene de Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

FACTS: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision, dated May 16,
2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of RTC
Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530 allowing respondents to take their physician's oath and to register as duly
licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
and calibrated response to such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
February 1993-- respondents who are graduates of Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila passed the
19
Physician Licensure Examination. Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
examination by the opposing counsel.
successful examinees. But the Board then observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima in the 2
most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Bio-Chem (11 scored 100%; 11 got 99%) and OB-Gyne (10 got 100%;
December 13, 1993-- petitioners' counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for
21 scored 99%) were unusually and exceptionally high. Many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better
December 15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.
in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. The unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College
examinees.
January 27, 1994-- counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and
praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for
June 7, 1993-- the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from
lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse
Fatima. PRC asked the NBI to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician
counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing .
Licensure Examination.
April 4, 1994-- lower court granted the respondents prayer for issuance of a restraining order.
June 10, 1993-- requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, who
conducted a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination submitted his report. He
reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of
examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College
examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some
unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the
normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." NBI
also found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions."
July 5, 1993-- respondents Arlene V. De Guzman et al., filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their
petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.
July 21, 1993-- the Board issued Resolution No. 26 charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and
deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima
examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.
July 28, 1993-- the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by
the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physician's oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their
names in the rolls of the PRC. The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set
August 31, 1994CA decided the petitioners prayer (p.injunction/TRO)to annul the Orders of the trial court dated November
13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 (restraining order). RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners' counsel to
cross-examine the respondents' witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter
to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties.
September 22, 1994-- petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of
the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The
petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
September 23, 1994-- the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the
proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
October 25, 1994-- CA denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
November 11, 1994-- counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the
respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents.
Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.
aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
November 25, 1994-- petitioners' counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality.
October 21, 1993-- CA decided CA-G.R. SP No. 3170, granting the petition and nullifying the mandatory injuction issued by
November 28, 1994-- the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied
the lower courts against the petitioner board.

November 22, 1993-- during the pendency of the instant petition (G.R. No. 112315. By respondent de Guzman et al which
was denied later on May 23, 1994) the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to
reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-
the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision.
December 19, 1994-- the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering the respondents to
allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the physician's oath and to register them as physicians without prejudice to
any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners
20
petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional
20 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the
Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No.
requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure
117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to
examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the
decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil
obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them.
Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another
branch.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that
respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

December 26, 1994-- the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal 11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating
the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as
physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to practice the medical profession pursuant to Section
June 7, 1995-- .R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
July 1, 1997-- the Board cancelled the respondents examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in
HELD: Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
February 1993 and further debars them from taking any licensure examination for a period of 1 year from the date of the
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
promulgation of this decision. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled examinations for physicians after the lapse
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation
of the period imposed by the BOARD.
of law. Section 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may
issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act which the
July 9, 1998-- G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and
the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals.
enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled.
May 16, 2000-- finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, CA hereby affirmed CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 and
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act
DISMISS the instant appeal. the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the statutory
No. 2382.
requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said
examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382, they should be allowed to take their oaths as
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not
physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
involving discretion. There must be statutory authority for the performance of the act, and the performance of the duty has
been refused. Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, states that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue,
Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. Thus, the petitioners "shall sign and issue certificates of
the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." But under the second paragraph
respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a
of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for
ministerial and not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283
examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 hereof. In this case,
upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No.
after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral
31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of
and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 2382. Until the moral and mental fitness of
medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the
the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the
requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this Court's Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that
administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to
there was no showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment"
compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and
executory.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the
following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation
involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the
to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section
Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in their
21
case.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Section 8 of RA No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must
There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. It should
have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be
be recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private
administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as
respondents, which decision was received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December
"sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from Board Resolution
1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of
No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations.
Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994 The petitioners have shown no cogent
The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.
reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians

Section 26 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has
to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should
been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal
the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be
right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a
unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a
license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.
rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised. On this issue, no reversible
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to
error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No.
a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
93-66530. inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate court's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
(1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially
judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
petitioners to administer the physician's oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the
appellate court, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ
the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents
of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is
in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however,
require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot
9. JMM Promotion & Management, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996
validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down
license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power.
To be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory,
then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the
courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.
FACTS: Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record
Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.
1991--former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban (subsequently rescinded) against the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The government, through the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28 creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC).
which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
January 6, 1994-- Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, issued Department Order No. 3
establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing,
certification and deployment of the former. Successful examinees were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a
necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry,
22
implementation of the process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.
instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
The Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and implementing the
Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro wrote: "The police power of the State," one court
new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:
has said . . . 'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be
said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and
welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of
deployment of performing artists.
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public
welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed
only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.
Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than
burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the
US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the
performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the
Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary
basic program) although they must pass the academic test.
of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
January 27, 1995-- In Civil No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP),
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the labor export of countries with
filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right
mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the National Statistics Office, this diasporawas augmented
to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due
annually by over 450,000 documented and clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various
process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal
destinations abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions. Of the
and "in gross violation of the constitutional right . . . to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the
hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years, women composed slightly
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of
1991, the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other countries
February 2, 1992-- JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for
as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson. A large number employed as domestic helpers and
Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse." Pursuant to the alarming
February 21, 1995-- the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government
dismissed the complaint.

On appeal from the trial court's Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed the same. Tracing the
circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the assailed Department Order, respondent court
concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the police power.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is corrct in dismissing the complaint
HELD: YES. The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws
aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of
number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom
began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as
legitimate performing artists.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16,
1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on
entertainment industry matters. Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6,
1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening,
testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were
duly represented in the EIAC, which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department
23
Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high-risk" destinations, a
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and
of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only
public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range
those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid
of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury
that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
to himself or others.
Here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
weeded out through a process which is inherently subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the
requirement goes one step further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining minimum skills
settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by
Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice
experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or performers from those
their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation
passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible
Commission has began to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they
exploitation.
had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not
claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long
Theres nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary scale
as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
(D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other
documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps
It is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their
keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or
argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.
exploitative practices. None of these issuances appears unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of
greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more
the Constitution . . . must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important, into every contract is
practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations by, and after
read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a
consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations.
subject impressed with the public welfare.
The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to
State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not
require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states:nThe State shall
and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of
classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
employment opportunities for all.
the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the
class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's
constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived
of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted
deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
DENIED.

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1

1. Amelia Cabrera vs Manuel Lapid, GR No. 129098, December 6, 2006

2. Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs DSWD, GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

substantial, full and ample.

On November 12, 2004---

exclusive use of the senior citizens".

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. xxx xxx xxx

prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.

of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

police powers is met

should be the rule and restraint the exception.

rights a violation of the due process clause.

made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.

liberty and property.

economically viable use of the property.

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.

rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.

expectations for use.

4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.

borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.

cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause

to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

1)It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2)It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

general welfare and for said purpose shall:xxx xxx xxx

(vii)Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement

operation and maintenance of such establishments.

summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Code which is reproduced as follows:

regulation, suppression and prohibition.

connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx

operation and maintenance.

to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

repugnant to the general law.

received by Solar on 31 March 1989.

partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

Classification Best usage xxx xxx xxx

industrial cooling and processing xxx xxx xxx

suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory result)."

animal and plant life" remains necessary.

another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.

development authority" referred to as the MMDA.

programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:

procedural due process requirements.

June 16, 1995--- court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

Greenhills by reclassifying certain locations therein as commercial.

of PPI. These letters read as follows:

support and cooperation in this regard."

published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.'

guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

directives, etc. issued by Comelec).

ASIDE, TRO MADE PERMANENT.

8. PRC vs Arlene de Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

examination by the opposing counsel.

aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.