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Thoughtless Brutes*
NORMAN MALCOLM
I
to men . . . since it
animals 4
It is worth noting that in a letter to Henry More, Descartes
says that it cannot be proved that there is no "thought in animals," because "the human mind does not reach into their
hearts."5 This is a surprising remark, considering his view that
thoughts are noncorporeal and nonspatial. Why does he speak
as if the issue were one of what is inside the animals? Was it
a metaphor? The reference to "hearts" (corda) is certainly
metaphorical. But the idea that our minds cannot look into the
animals to determine whether or not any thoughts are there,
does not seem to be just meaphor, since it is offered as an
explanation (quia: because) of why we cannot prove that
animals do not think. In this same letter Descartes sets forth
his "main reason" for holding that animals are without
thought-namely, that they do not use "real speech." "Such
speech," he says, "is the only certain sign of thought hidden
in a body. 6 In another letter to More he expresses himself in
the same way, saying that only speech shows thought hidden
in a body (in corpore latentem).7 Previously I quoted a passage
in which he spoke of the soul as being an "interior principle.
My impression is that although Descartes' formal position is
that soul (or mind), and thought, are completely nonspatial
and so could not be inside or outside of anything, nevertheless
he was actually much influenced by the common metaphysical
picture of thought as occurring inside a person-of thought as
being something inner.
In maintaining that animals do not think, Descartes certainly
meant that they do not reflect or meditate; but did he also
mean that they do not have feelings, sensations, or any kind
of consciousness? We know from Meditation II that to feel
(sentire) is to think (cogitare).8 Thus if animals don't think
they don't feel. In his Passions of the Soul Decartes states
that nothing ought to be attributed to the soul except
thoughts, and that these are of two kinds, actions and pas4DL 245: AT 5, 278.
5DL 244: AT 5, 276-277 (quia mens humana illorum corda non pervadit).
6DL 245: AT 5, 278 (Haec enim loquela unicum est cogitationis in corpore latentis
signum certum).
7DL 251: AT 5, 345.
8E. Haldane and G. Ross (eds.), Philosophical Works of Descartes (hereafter, HR)
1, 153: AT 7, 28.
6
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
have propositional thoughts and therefore do not have sensations in the human mode.
In first reading Descartes it surprises one that he should include emotion, feeling and sensation under "thinking." But this
would be a natural employment of the word "thinking," given
his conception of the propositional nature of human emotion,
feeling and sensation.
In the Reply to Objections VI Descartes distinguishes between three "grades" of sensation:
To the first (grade) belongs the immediate affection of the bodily organ by
external objects; and this can be nothing else than the motion of the particles of the sensory organs and the change of figure and position due to that
motion. The second (grade) comprises the immediate mental results, due to
the mind's union with the corporeal organ affected; such are the perceptions
of pain, of pleasurable stimulation, of thirst, of hunger, of colours, of sound,
savour, odour, cold, heat, and the like . . . Finally the third (gTade)
10
THOUGHTLESS
BRUTES
by the phrase,
"My having
an in-my-foot
pain"),
plus
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
and consciouslyadopted the position that there is a propositional kernel in every feeling, desire, voluntaryact, emotion,
and sensation.Thisis why he could hold that his essentialnature
consists solely in being a thinking thing.30 It was not because
he employed cogitare and penser in an eccentrically broad
way that he listed imagining, sensation and emotion under
"thinking." It was because he believed that every "mental
operation" consists in taking an attitude towards a proposition.
In my opinion this is an absurdly overintellectualized view
of the life of man. It helps us to understand, however, why
Descartes thought that animals are automatons. They are
devoid of mind, of all consciousness and awareness, of real
feeling and sensation, because they do not "apprehend,"
"entertain," "contemplate," or, in plain language, think of,
propositions.
II
In real life we commonly employ the verb "think" in respect
to animals. We say, "Towser thinks he is going to be fed," just
as naturally as we say, "Towser wants to be fed." Suppose our
dog is chasing the neighbor's cat. The latter runs full tilt toward
and oak tree, but suddenly swerves at the last moment and
disappears up a nearby maple. The dog doesn't see this maneuver and on arriving at the oak tree he rears up on his hind
legs, paws the trunk as if trying to scale it, and barks excitedly
into the branches above. We who observe the whole episode
from a window say, "He thinks that the cat went up that oak
tree." We say "thinks" because he is barking up the wrong
tree. If the cat had gone up the oak tree and if the dog's performance had been the same, we could have said, "He knows
that the cat went up the oak." But let us stay with "thinks."
A million examples could be produced in which it would be a
correct way of speaking to say of an animal, something of the
form, "He thinks that p." Clearly there is an error in Descartes'
contention that animals do not think.
Let us, however, take note of a distinction. In commenting
later on the incident of the dog and the cat we could, without
any qualms, say of our dog, "He thought that the cat went up
the oak tree." We should, in contrast, feel reluctant and embarrassed to say, "He had the thought that the cat went up the
oak tree." In referring to an animal, it is natural enough to say,
30MeditationVI: HR 1, 190: AT 7, 78.
13
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
ASSOCIATION
"He thought that p," but not, "He had the thought that p.
It would sound funny to say of a dog, monkey or dolphin, that
the thought that p occurred to him, or struck him, or went
through his mind. All of us are familiar with the sort of evidence
on the basis of which we predicate of animals (or rather, of
some animals) that they think that so-and-so; but we are not
familiar with any basis for attributing thoughts to them.
Apparently Descartes did not catch this distinction between
"to think" and "to have thoughts." In his first letter to Henry
More, he says it is a prejudice to suppose that "dumb animals
think" (bruta animantia cogitare); and then he goes on to give
his reasons for holding that "beasts lack thought" (bestias
cogitatione destitutas esse).31 He is treating "to think" and "to
have thoughts" as if they are equivalent: but we have seen
that they are not.32
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
THOUGHTLESS BRUTES
dogs but still not have minds?Of some animalswe can say that
they are frightened,joyous,affectionate,-that they want, seek,
pursue,hide, lie in wait, play, tease, defend;that they see, hear,
smell, like, dislike, avoid; that they remember,recognize, realize and think. Despite all this and more, don't they have
minds?It is hardto get a gripon the question.
Descartes say that a mind is something that thinks: in this
case both I and my dog are minds, for both of us may think that
the cat went up the oak tree. I have tried to show, however,
that Descartes mistakenly equates thinking with having
thoughts.33 His view is that a "mind" is something that has
thoughts. Now, I have thoughts, but my poor doggy has none.
So I am a mind but he is not. The latter-day Cartesian, Zeno
Vendler, says that "To have a mind is to have thoughts."34
If this is true, then my dog neither is nor has a mind. But we
should understand what this comes to-just that he doesn't
have thoughts; which in turn comes to just this, that he doesn't
have a language. We can appreciate, however, that despite
this the dog isn't so badly off, since a great range of feelings,
sensations, wants, perceptions, and realizings, can be accurately
attributed to him.
What about consciousness? A dog, like a man, can be
knocked unconscious. But if a dog runs around, barks, and picks
a fight with another dog, isn't he conscious? We saw that
Descartes ties consciousness exclusively to thoughts. Although
Vendler believes Descartes was mistaken in regarding animals
as automatons, he inclines to interpret consciousness in the
same narrow way that Descartes did, namely, as consisting
solely in having thoughts. Vendler says:
If,
. . consciousness
(at a
35lbid., p. 162
20