Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity)
embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26,
1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is
claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a person
in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in
the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of
the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person.
Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along
with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action
thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of
Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned
petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated
19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did
not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the
COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th
Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so
desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this
petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of
Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission,
as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of
whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for
reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292)
operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the
"whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter.
Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees'
Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of
the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites
the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others
are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new
Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a
general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a
repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the
old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same
from the time of the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be
given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of
the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions
on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being

claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider
that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been
repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues
against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which
incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is
untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old
one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the
whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a
complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former
revises the whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal,
then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore,
before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be
the substitute to the prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects
of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight
that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the
implementation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law
enunciated in the case of Sison vs.Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement
and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may
be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that
Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be
decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to
interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence,
every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act
will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II
(dealing on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921,
expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or
by other agencies of the government."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course
to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2044

August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of
Manila,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-2756

August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3054

August 26, 1949

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3055

August 26, 1949

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3056

August 26, 1949

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P.
Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio
Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
TUASON, J.:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as
all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the
same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical
benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'
cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above
all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the
validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this
Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055
is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ
of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the
exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No.
225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from
July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing
this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the
expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The
petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing,
spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point
in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is
to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only,
the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary
to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves
the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized,
during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry
out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer
the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities;
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of
the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or
abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the
expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur
in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the
payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in
force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for
in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences
of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has
been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or
scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used
in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation
of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of
Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would
make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not
be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period
for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might
not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might
not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers
by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin,
President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that
the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays,
is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers
recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . .

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal
of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that
there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers
Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for
the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and
regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only
make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of
its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be
suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress
by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the
President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a
fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the
country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a
bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after
Congress had refused to approve the measure.
Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National
Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding
sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines
report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an
account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the
intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671
would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive
orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and
should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the
National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not
its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight,"
that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote
automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a
different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the
answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the
conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National
Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to
amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of
the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete
disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act
on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the
period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what
we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of
Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.
In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think
giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which department of
government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or
another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the
will of the National Assemblycall that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power and, once ascertained, to
apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their
constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that
war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have
construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has
independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it that the respondents, in
sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth
and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense
political or directly derived from the Constitution.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25,
1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision
the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19,
1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this
provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the
rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was
predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would
arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and
regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones
independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite
continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant.
If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After
the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them,
was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that
the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and
occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the
impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which
the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have
necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains
that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the
commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given
notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is,
under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in
ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless
we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that
Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the
vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and
other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in
the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the
period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from
the date of the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35.
No costs will be charged.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003]
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION DALISAY, PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision [1] dated September 14, 1999 of the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the resolution of
COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong dated March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the opinion dated October 19, 1993 of
the Provincial Auditor of Oriental Mindoro, Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the grant of P1,600 monthly allowance to
petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge
of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such, his salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn
from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds[2] of
the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.[3]
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial
Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the
municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution No. 101
increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993.[4] By virtue of
said resolution, the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) approved a supplemental
budget which was likewise approved by the SangguniangPanlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of
Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judgesP1,600 monthly allowance
in its annual budget which was again approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro.[5]
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner
judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that
theMunicipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving
from the Supreme Court. Her directive was based on the following:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be determined by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective functions are hereby
granted monthly commutable representation and transportation allowances payable from the programmed appropriations
provided for their respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below . . .
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of Budget and Management
Subject: Representation and Transportation Allowances of National Government Officials and Employees

xxxxxxxxx
4. Funding Source: In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the
purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under
this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.[6] (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial
Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply
with Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to
judges and other national officials or employees by the local government units (LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget circular
provides that:
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national government officials/employees
assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified by the Accountant concerned
will allow the grant of the allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758 have
been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in
the LGU concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions of RA
7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160; and
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU. [7]
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit. In the
meantime, a disallowance of the payment of theP1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he received
his P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January 1994.
On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong:
The main issue . . . is whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its Municipal
Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
Generally, the grant of (RATA) [sic] to qualified national government officials and employees pursuant to Section 36 of R.A.
7645 [General Appropriations Act of 1993] and NCC No. 67 dated 01 January 1992 is subject to the following conditions to wit:
1. Payable from the programmed /appropriated amount and others from personal services savings of the respective
offices where the officials or employees draw their salaries;
2. Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act;
3. Officials /employees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall be paid from
their parent agencies;
4. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
On the other hand, the municipal government may provide additional allowances and other benefits to judges and other
national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances of the
municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 (xi), R.A. 7160, and provided further, that similar
allowance/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the official/employee assigned to the local
government unit as provided under Section 3(e) of Local Budget Circular No. 53, dated 01 September 1993.
The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 36 of the General
Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] have been harmonized by the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01 September 1993,
issued by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25 and Section 327 of the Local
Government Code. The said circular must be adhered to by the local government units particularly Section 3 thereof which
provides the implementing guidelines of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in the grant of
allowances to national government officials/employees assigned or stationed in their respective local government units.
Consequently, the subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,
having failed to comply with the inherent precondition as defined in Section 3 (e). . . is null and void. Furthermore, the
Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local
government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act (R.A. 7645 for 1993) and National Compensation
Circular No. 67 dated 1 January 1992.[8] (emphasis ours)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied by the Commission in a
resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following assignments of error for
our consideration:
I

WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 1O1, SERIES OF 1993 OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO, WHICH GRANTED ADDITIONAL
ALLOWANCE TO THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND INCREASING HIS CURRENT
REPRESENTATION AND TRAVELLING ALLOWANCE (RATA) TO AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THAT RECEIVED MONTHLY BY
SANGGUNIANG MEMBERS IN PESOS: ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P1,600.00) EFFECTIVE 1993, IS VALID.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO GRANT ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS
TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES STATIONED IN THEIR MUNICIPALITY IS VERY EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL UNDER THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 IN RELATION TO SECTIONS 17 AND 22 THEREOF.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) CAN, BY THE ISSUANCE OF BUDGET CIRCULARS,
RESTRICT A MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FROM EXERCISING ITS GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STATIONED OR ASSIGNED TO THEIR MUNICIPALITY FOR AS
LONG AS THEIR FINANCES SO ALLOW.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 (a) (1) (xi) WAS EXPRESSLY OR
IMPLIEDLY REPEALED OR MODIFIED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7645 AND THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1993.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES GRANTED TO HIM BY THE
MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO BY VIRTUE OF ITS RESOLUTION NO. 101, SERIES OF 1993.
POSITION OF COA
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the grant by the Municipality of Naujan of the P1,600 monthly allowance to
petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason that the municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already
received from the Supreme Court. [9] Respondent bases its contention on the following:
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 (hereafter NCC No. 67) dated January 1, 1992 of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) which provides that (a) the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from the
programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or employees draw
their salary and (b) no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source;
2. the General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which provided that the RATA of national officials shall be payable
from the programmed appropriations of their respective offices and
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 (hereafter LBC No. 53) dated September 1, 1993 of the DBM which prohibits local
government units from granting allowances to national government officials or employees stationed in their
localities when such allowances are also granted by the national government or are similar to the allowances
granted by the national government to such officials or employees. [10]
POSITION OF PETITIONER
Petitioner judge, on the other hand, asserts that the municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA 7160
(the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to judges
stationed in its territory. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 imposes only one condition, that is,
when the finances of the municipal government allow. The Code does not impose any other restrictions in the exercise of such
power by the municipality. Petitioner also asserts that the DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the Local
Government Code of 1991 through mere budget circulars. Petitioner emphasizes that budget circulars must conform to, not
modify or amend, the provisions of the law it seeks to implement. [11]
HISTORY OF GRANT OF
ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances to judges stationed in their respective territories was
originally provided by Letter of Instruction No. 1418 dated July 18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
WHEREAS, the State is cognizant of the need to maintain the independence of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, the budgetary allotment of the Judiciary constitutes only a small percentage of the national budget;
WHEREAS, present economic conditions adversely affected the livelihood of the members of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing and able to pay additional allowances to Judges of various
courts within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby direct:
1. Section 3 of Letter of Implementation No. 96 is hereby amended to read as follows:
3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne exclusively by the National Government. However,
provincial, city and municipal governments may pay additional allowances to the members and
personnel of the Judiciary assigned in their respective areas out of available local funds but not to
exceed P1,500.00; Provided, that in Metropolitan Manila, the city and municipal governments
therein may pay additional allowances not exceeding P3,000.00. (emphasis ours)[12]

On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7 outlining the guidelines for the continued receipt of allowances by
judges from LGUs:
Consistent with the constitutional provision on the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary and the policy of the National Government
of allowing greater autonomy to local government units,judges of the Judiciary are hereby allowed to continue to receive
allowances at the same rates which they have been receiving from the Local Government Units as of June 30, 1989, subject
to the following guidelines:
1. That the continuance of payment of subject allowance to the recipient judge shall be entirely voluntary and noncompulsory on the part of the Local Government Units;
2. That payment of the above shall always be subject to the availability of local funds;
3. That it shall be made only in compliance with the policy of non-diminution of compensation received by the
recipient judge before the implementation of the salary standardization;
4. That the subject allowance shall be given only to judges who were receiving the same as of June 30, 1989 and
shall be co-terminous with the incumbent judges; and
5. That the subject allowance shall automatically terminate upon transfer of a judge from one local government unit
to another local government unit. (emphasis ours)
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. [13] The power
of the LGUs to grant allowances and other benefits to judges and other national officials stationed in their respective
territories was expressly provided in Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of the Code.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (hereafter LBC No. 55) setting out the maximum
amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to judges. For provinces and cities, the amount should not exceed P1,000 and for
municipalities, P700.
On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular in Dadole, et al. vs. COA.[14] We ruled there that the Local
Government Code of 1991 clearly provided thatLGUs could grant allowances to judges, subject only to the condition that the
finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that setting a uniform amount for the grant of allowances (was) an inappropriate way
of enforcing said criterion. Accordingly, we declared that the DBM exceeded its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a
prohibition that did not jibe with the Local Government Code of 1991. [15]
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges, the following principles should be noted:
1. the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges has long been recognized (since 1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418) and,
at present, it is expressly and unequivocally provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code
of 1991;
2. the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55 dated March 15, 1994 indicates that the
national government recognizes the power ofLGUs to grant such allowances to judges;
3. in Circular No. 91-7, the national government merely provides the guidelines for the continued receipt of allowances
by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the national government merely tries to limit the amount of
allowances LGUs may grant to judges and
4. in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally enshrined autonomy of LGUs to
grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance
with the Local Government Code of 1991.
OUR RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the P1,600 monthly allowance by
the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner JudgeLeynes.
DISCUSSION OF OUR RULING
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective municipal government, and in this
connection shall:
xxxxxxxxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges,
prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to
the municipality; (emphasis ours)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been repealed, modified or amended by NCC No. 67
dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645 (the General Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September 1, 1993.[16]
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a
statute. A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it. [17] In the present case,
NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.

It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction that repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it
is manifest that the legislature so intended. The legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and cannot
be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. [18] Respondent COA alleges that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the
GAA of 1993) repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991). A review of the two laws, however, shows that this
was not so.Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided for the different rates of RATA payable to national government officials or
employees, depending on their position, and stated that these amounts were payable from the programmed appropriations of
the parent agencies to which the concerned national officials or employees belonged. Furthermore, there was no other
provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence, therefore, of
any clear repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, we cannot presume such intention on the part of the legislature.
Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when, as in this case, one law is special and the
other is general.[19] The principle is expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, a general law does not nullify
a specific or special law. The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character, considers and makes
special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the legislature, by adopting a
general law containing provisions repugnant to those of the special law and without making any mention of its intention to
amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter. [20]
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law [21] which exclusively deals with local government units (LGUs),
outlining their powers and functions in consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy. RA 7645 (the
GAA of 1993), on the other hand, was a general law [22] which outlined the share in the national fund of all branches of the
national government. RA 7645 therefore, being a general law, could not have, by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather,
RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. [23]
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly sweeping provision in NCC No. 67 which states that no one shall be
allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. Does this mean that judges cannot receive allowances from LGUs in
addition to the RATA from the Supreme Court? For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed, we answer in the negative.
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:
3. Rules and Regulations:
3.1.1 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
for each of the following officials and employees and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions
enumerated under the pertinent sections of the General Provisions of the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA):
xxxxxxxxx
4. Funding Source:
In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and other
personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under this Circular draw
their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. (emphasis ours)
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that force and effect should not be narrowly
given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one rational view.
[24]
Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as important as the others, the
statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified by
reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. [25]
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of RATA by a national official from the
budgets of more than one national agency. We emphasize that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another
national agency. This can be gleaned from the fact that the sentence no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source (the controversial prohibition) immediately follows the sentence that RATA shall be paid from the budget of the
national agency where the concerned national officials and employees draw their salaries. The fact that the other source is
another national agency is supported by RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in fact, by all
subsequent GAAs for that matter, because the GAAs all essentially provide that (1) the RATA of national officials shall be
payable from the budgets of their respective national agencies and (2) those officials on detail with other national agencies
shall be paid their RATA only from the budget of their parent national agency:
Section 36, RA 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993:
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be determined by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective functions are hereby
granted monthly commutable representation and transportation allowances payable from the programmed appropriations
provided for their respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below, which shall apply to each type of allowance:
xxxxxxxxx
Officials on detail with other offices, including officials of the Commission of Audit assigned to serve other offices or agencies,
shall be paid the allowance herein authorized from the appropriations of their parent agencies. (emphasis ours)
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of two or more national agencies. Stated otherwise, when a national official is on detail with another
national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other national agency he is
detailed to.
Since the other source referred in the controversial prohibition is another national agency, said prohibition clearly does
not apply to LGUs like the Municipality ofNaujan. National agency of course refers to the different offices, bureaus and

departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these departments or offices are fixed annually by
Congress in the General Appropriations Act. [26] An LGU is obviously not a national agency. Its annual budget is fixed by its own
legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod or Panlalawigan), not by Congress. Without doubt, NCC No. 67 does not
apply to LGUs.
The prohibition in NCC No. 67 is in fact an administrative tool of the DBM to prevent the much-abused practice of
multiple allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. Thus, the purpose clause of NCC No. 67 reads:
This Circular is being issued to ensure uniformity and consistency of actions on claims for representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) which is primarily granted by law to national government officials and employees to cover expenses
incurred in the discharge or performance of their duties and responsibilities.
By no stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the power of LGUs to grant allowances to
judges under the Local Government Code of 1991. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to national officials under
the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds
of LGUs.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent COA would like us to do will subvert
the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. [27] The Local Government Code of 1991 was
specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution. By
upholding, in the present case, the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of
allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, we ensure the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA: that the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting
the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge was null and void because it failed to comply with LBC No. 53
dated September 1, 1993:
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national government officials/employees
assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations and subject to the following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified by the Accountant
concerned will allow the grant of the allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the
general limitations for personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full requirement of RA 6758
have been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA
representative in the LGU concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in accordance with the provisions
of RA 7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160.
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of the President's power of general supervision
over LGUs,[28] we rule that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly
provides that provincial, city and municipal governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances
allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges whenever
such allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the national
government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. [29] As already stated, a circular must
conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or amend it. [30]
Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted by the national government,
Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibitsLGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their
statutory power to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and
being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared
null and void.
Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid as they are in accordance with Sections 324 [31] and 325[32] of the
Local Government Code of 1991; these respectively provide for the budgetary requirements and general limitations on the
use of provincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs (a) to (d) are proper guidelines for the condition provided in Sections
447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that LGUs may grant allowances to judges if their funds allow. [33]
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and void.
The argument is misplaced.
Guidelines (a) to (d) were met when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro approved Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge as well as the corresponding
budgets of the municipality providing for the said monthly allowance to petitioner judge.Under Section 327 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to review the appropriation ordinances of
its component municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code. Considering said duty of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Oriental Mindoro performed what the law required it to do, that is, review the resolution and the corresponding budgets of the

Municipality of Naujan to make sure that they complied with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code. [34] We presume the regularity
of the SangguniangPanlalawigans official act.
Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.[35] Respondent COA had the burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan did not comply with the condition provided in Section 447 of the Code, the budgetary
requirements and general limitations on the use of municipal funds provided in Sections 324 and 325 of the Code and the
implementing guidelines issued by the DBM, i.e., paragraphs (a) to (d), Section 3 of LBC No. 53. Respondent COA also had the
burden of showing that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoroerroneously approved said resolution despite its
non-compliance with the requirements of the law. It failed to discharge such burden. On the contrary, we find that the
resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with the law.
Thus, we uphold its validity.
In sum, we hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned allowance to petitioner
Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy and the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991. We also sustain the validity of Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993, of
theSangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 14, 1999 of the Commission of
Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147904. October 4, 2002]
NESTOR B. MAGNO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CARLOS C. MONTES, respondents.
DECISION

CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and set aside the resolution dated May 7,
2001 of the Commission on Elections as well as the resolution dated May 12, 2001 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the disqualification of petitioner
Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that
petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3
months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for
each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998
upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent
and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In ruling
against petitioner, the COMELEC cited Section 12 of the BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
The above provision explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude after five (5) years from the service of sentence. According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner
was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will end only on
March 5, 2003.
On May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution
dated May 12, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of RA 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at bar, not BP 881
or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
xxxx
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from
probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code
expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
Meanwhile, Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Thus,
on June 19, 2001, petitioner filed a supplemental petition which this Court merely noted in its resolution dated June 26,
2001. In his supplemental petition, petitioner assailed the proclamation of Sonia Lorenzo on the ground that the propriety of
his disqualification was still under review by this Court. Petitioner likewise asked this Court to declare him as the duly elected
municipal mayor instead of Sonia Lorenzo.
On July 18, 2001, the Solicitor-General filed his manifestation and agreed with petitioner that COMELEC should have
applied Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

The main issue is whether or not petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections. In resolving this, two
sub-issues need to be threshed out, namely: (1) whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude and (2) whether
it is the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government Code that should apply in this situation.
Regarding the first sub-issue, the Court has consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary of moral
turpitude as:
x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[1]
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the law.[2]
In this case, we need not review the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the crime considering that
petitioner did not assail his conviction. By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and [Italics supplied]
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his
official duties.[3]
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a
malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also,
the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It
is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
It is the second sub-issue which is problematical. There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year
disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification period in Section
40 of the Local Government Code.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. [4] Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older
law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code
states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of
the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent
law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
In David vs. COMELEC[5], we declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government
units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is
applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public
office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of
candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.
The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years
is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. [6] The
reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified
from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioners disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was therefore under no such
disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzos
proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been
proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated May 7, 2001 and May 12, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside. The petitioners prayer in his supplemental
petition for his proclamation as the winner in the May 14, 2001 mayoralty elections in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, not being
within our jurisdiction, is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAGLALA MACATANDA, defendant-appellant.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for
the crime of cattle rustling, Saglala Macatanda was sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, this court finds the accused Saglala Macatanda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533 and as described in the
information filed against him. Crediting in his favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
extreme poverty without any attendant aggravating circumstances, and after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum .

The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor in accordance with the terms and
conditions provided by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The amount of One Hundred Fifty (P150.00) Pesos is hereby ordered paid to Atty. Reynaldo Echavez for his
services as counsel de oficio in this case in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, the amount
to be taken from the funds appropriated by the Government for the purpose.
With costs against the accused. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 1- 2)
From the judgment of conviction, Saglala Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this Court,
raising purely legal questions, to wit: whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction, and (2) being a member
of a cultural minority, being a Moslem, should be appreciated in his favor, which the court a quo refused to consider in the
imposition of the penalty, and also disputing the correctness of the trial court's computation of the proper penalty.
Before going into a discussion of the legal questions, the facts may be recited, quoting from the People's Brief, the following:
In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad,
Lanao del Norte. the following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the
loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined
the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the barangay captain to search for the missing
Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw Macabaas, Mangigya,
Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered
engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions
fled, leaving him and the carabaos behind. (Rec. pp. 3- 7).
Appellant was taken into custody and was charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly. (People's Brief, pp. 2-3).
Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 1 appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education and his being a Moslem
belonging to a cultural minority should mitigate his liability, and the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced
accordingly. He also cites the fact that the prosecution did not object to his being credited with the aforesaid mitigating
circumstances.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent. In the first place, in that
case, the Supreme Court found indication in the record which tends to show that Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot. In the
present case, owing to appellant's plea of guilty, the records discloses no evidence presented to prove the mitigating
circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven, as all circumstances modifying criminal liability should be
proved directly and positively. 2
Likewise, nowhere in the Maqui case was it disclosed that his being a member of a cultural minority, being an Igorot, sufficed
to mitigate his liability on that circumstance alone. What the Court considered mitigating was his being an uncivilized Igorot
which amounted to more than just lack of instruction. Again, there is no proof on record that appellant herein may be similarly
described. In any case, mere membership in a cultural minority is not expressly mentioned by the Revised Penal Code among
the mitigating circumstances 3 nor would it come under paragraph 10, Art. 3 of said Code, which speaks of ''any other
circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. "
Appellant, however, prays for a lenient approach in consideration of his being an ignorant and semi-uncivilized offender,
belonging to a cultural minority, the two separate circumstances to be joined together to constitute the alternative
circumstance of lack of instruction to mitigate his liability, 4 relying on the Maqui case from which he quotes the following:
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142, (now Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code) the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into
consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender where it appears that under all the
circumstances attending, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility prescribed in the code
for the ordinary offender. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5)
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of
theft and robbery 5 leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per
se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme
Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle.
Incidentally, the Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to mitigate liability for theft, for even
long before it, in U.S. vs. Pascual, 6 a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of theft or
robbery. The Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in

reaching its present state since recent years, when it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in
the country that he is uncivilized or semi-uncivilized.
But more than what has just been observed. a legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant
invokes in his appeal. It is that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of
the appellant, no evidence having been taken relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment
provided by P.D. 533 for the crime charged with a more severe penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply
said law with leniency.
Appellant, finally, contends that in the computation of the penalty the rules prescribed under Article 64, paragraph 5 should
be applied. To this argument, the Solicitor General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not
apply to penalties prescribed by special laws. He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of 1974"
as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8 the penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, his recommendation as to the proper penalty to be imposed and pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which provides:
... if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) (Appellee's
Brief, p. 7)
is a minimum of not less than 10 years and 1 day and the maximum, not more than 17 years and 4 months, the penalty
imposed under P.D. 533.
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems
clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on
civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be
discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence
of two mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any
aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which
under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary medium.
Appellant's computation would be to lower the aforesaid penalty to prision correccional maximum, to prision mayor,medium
period, in view of the presence of the two mitigating circumstances as appreciated by the court a quo, with no aggravating
circumstance attendant. For the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should be one
degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision correccional in its medium period, or from 4 months and
1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and not less than 4 years, 2 months and
1 day of prision correccional nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range, as to its maximum period, but is beyond the range, as to its
minimum period, which should be not more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to 4
years of prision correccional and maintaining the maximum at 8 years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court. With
the modification as indicated, the appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52306 October 12, 1981
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 2809, dated November
29, 1979, which affirmed the assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, dated April 16, 1971, of a deficiency
withholding income tax against petitioner, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 in
the respective amounts of P75,895.24, P99,239.18, P128,502.00 and P222, 260.64, or a total of P525,897.06.
During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as
foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner
paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals.
In so far as the income tax on non-resident corporations is concerned, section 24 (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 2343 dated June 20, 1959, used to provide:
(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations. There shall be levied, collected, and paid
for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by
every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from an sources within the
Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a
tax equal to thirty per centum of such amount. (Emphasis supplied)
On April 12, 1961, in implementation of the aforequoted provision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued General
Circular No. V-334 reading thus:
In connection with Section 24 (b) of Tax Code, the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 2343, under
which an income tax equal to 30% is levied upon the amount received by every foreign corporation not
engaged in trade or business within the Philippines from all sources within this country as interest, dividends,
rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, it has been determined that the tax is still
imposed on income derived from capital, or labor, or both combined, in accordance with the basic principle
of income taxation (Sec. 39, Income Tax Regulations), and that a mere return of capital or investment is not
income (Par. 5,06, 1 Mertens Law of Federal 'Taxation). Since according to the findings of the Special Team
who inquired into business of the non-resident foreign film distributors, the distribution or exhibition right on
a film is invariably acquired for a consideration, either for a lump sum or a percentage of the film rentals,
whether from a parent company or an independent outside producer, apart of the receipts of a non-resident
foreign film distributor derived from said film represents, therefore, a return of investment.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The local distributor should withhold 30% of one-half of the film rentals paid to the non-resident foreign
film distributor and pay the same to this office in accordance with law unless the non- resident foreign film
distributor makes a prior settlement of its income tax liability. (Emphasis ours).
Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner dutifully withheld and turned over to the Bureau of Internal Revenue the amount of 30%
of one-half of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. The
last year that petitioner withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing Circular was in 1968.
On June 27, 1968, Republic Act No. 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30 % to 35 %
and revising the tax basis from "such amount" referring to rents, etc. to "gross income," as follows:

(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.A foreign corporation not engaged in trade
or business in the Philippines including a foreign life insurance company not engaged in the life insurance
business in the Philippines shall pay a tax equal to thirty-five per cent of the gross income received during
each taxable year from all sources within the Philippines, as interests, dividends, rents, royalties, salaries,
wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations for technical services or otherwise, emoluments
or other fixed or determinable annual, periodical or casual gains, profits, and income, and capital
gains, Provided however, That premiums shah not include reinsurance premiums. (Emphasis supplied)
On February 8, 1971, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 4-71, revoking
General Circular No. V-334, and holding that the latter was "erroneous for lack of legal basis," because "the tax therein
prescribed should be based on gross income without deduction whatever," thus:
After a restudy and analysis of Section 24 (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 5431, and guided by the interpretation given by tax authorities to a similar provision in the Internal
Revenue Code of the United States, on which the aforementioned provision of our Tax Code was patterned,
this Office has come to the conclusion that the tax therein prescribed should be based on gross income
without t deduction whatever. Consequently, the ruling in General Circular No. V-334, dated April 12, 1961,
allowing the deduction of the proportionate cost of production or exhibition of motion picture films from the
rental income of non- resident foreign corporations, is erroneous for lack of legal basis.
In view thereof, General Circular No. V-334, dated April 12, 1961, is hereby revoked and henceforth, local
films distributors and exhibitors shall deduct and withhold 35% of the entire amount payable by them to nonresident foreign corporations, as film rental or royalty, or whatever such payment may be denominated,
without any deduction whatever, pursuant to Section 24 (b), and pay the withheld taxes in accordance with
Section 54 of the Tax Code, as amended.
All rulings inconsistent with this Circular is likewise revoked. (Emphasis ours)
On the basis of this new Circular, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued against petitioner a letter of
assessment and demand dated April 15, 1971, but allegedly released by it and received by petitioner on April 12, 1971,
requiring them to pay deficiency withholding income tax on the remitted film rentals for the years 1965 through 1968 and
film royalty as of the end of 1968 in the total amount of P525,897.06 computed as follows:
1965
Total amount remitted

P 511,059.48

Withholding tax due thereon

153,318.00

Less: Amount already

assessed

89,000.00

Balance

P64,318.00

Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 4-1666 to 4-16-69

11,577.24

Total amount due &

collectible

P 75,895.24

1966
Total amount remitted

P373,492.24

Withholding tax due

thereon

112,048.00

Less: Amount already

assessed

27,947.00

Balance

84,101.00

Add: 11/2%mo. int. fr. 416-67 to 4-116-70

15,138.18

Total amount due &

collectible

P99,239.18

1967
Total amount remitted

P601,160.
65

Withholding tax due

thereon

180,348.
00

Less: Amount already

assessed

71,448.0
0

Balance

108,900.
00

Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 416-68 to 4-16-71

19,602.0
0

Total amount due &

collectible

P128,502.
00

1968
Total amount remitted

P881,816.92

Withholding tax due

thereon

291,283.00

Less: Amount already

assessed

92,886.00

Balance

P198,447.00

Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 416-69 to 4-29-71

23,813.64

Total amount due &

collectible

P222,260.44

On May 5, 1971, petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the assessment. However, without acting
thereon, respondent, on April 6, 1976, issued a warrant of distraint and levy over petitioner's personal as well as real
properties. The petitioner then filed its Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals whose Decision, dated November 29,
1979, is, in turn, the subject of this review. The Tax Court held:
For the reasons given, the Court finds the assessment issued by respondent on April 16, 1971 against
petitioner in the amounts of P75,895.24, P 99,239.18, P128,502.00 and P222,260.64 or a total of
P525,897.06 as deficiency withholding income tax for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, respectively, in
accordance with law. As prayed for, the petition for review filed in this case is dismissed, and petitioner ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the sum of P525,897.06 to respondent Commissioner

of Internal Revenue as deficiency withholding income tax for the taxable years 1965 thru 1968, plus the
surcharge and interest which have accrued thereon incident to delinquency pursuant to Section 51 (e) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed at petitioner's cost.
SO ORDERED.

The issues raised are two-fold:

I. Whether or not respondent can apply General Circular No. 4-71 retroactively and issue a deficiency
assessment against petitioner in the amount of P 525,897.06 as deficiency withholding income tax for the
years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968.
II. Whether or not the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the deficiency withholding
income tax for the year 196,5 has prescribed. 3
Upon the facts and circumstances of the case, review is warranted.
In point is Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code. As inserted by Republic Act No. 6110 on August 9, 1969, it provides:
Sec. 338-A. Non-retroactivity of rulings. Any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rules and
regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if the
relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases: (a)
where the taxpayer deliberately mis-states or omits material facts from his return or any document required
of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue: (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the
taxpayer acted in bad faith. (italics for emphasis)
It is clear from the foregoing that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no
retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to petitioner of the retroactive
application of Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the
last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to
pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965.
Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film
rentals and no longer had any control over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so far as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.
Respondent claims, however, that the provision on non-retroactivity is inapplicable in the present case in that General Circular
No. V-334 is a nullity because in effect, it changed the law on the matter. The Court of Tax Appeals sustained this position
holding that: "Deductions are wholly and exclusively within the power of Congress or the law-making body to grant, condition
or deny; and where the statute imposes a tax equal to a specified rate or percentage of the gross or entire amount received
by the taxpayer, the authority of some administrative officials to modify or change, much less reduce, the basis or measure of
the tax should not be read into law." 4 Therefore, the Tax Court concluded, petitioner did not acquire any vested right
thereunder as the same was a nullity.
The rationale behind General Circular No. V-334 was clearly stated therein, however: "It ha(d) been determined that the tax is
still imposed on income derived from capital, or labor, or both combined, in accordance with the basic principle of income
taxation ...and that a mere return of capital or investment is not income ... ." "A part of the receipts of a non-resident foreign
film distributor derived from said film represents, therefore, a return of investment." The Circular thus fixed the return of
capital at 50% to simplify the administrative chore of determining the portion of the rentals covering the return of capital." 5
Were the "gross income" base clear from Sec. 24 (b), perhaps, the ratiocination of the Tax Court could be upheld. It should be
noted, however, that said Section was not too plain and simple to understand. The fact that the issuance of the General
Circular in question was rendered necessary leads to no other conclusion than that it was not easy of comprehension and
could be subjected to different interpretations.
In fact, Republic Act No. 2343, dated June 20, 1959, supra, which was the basis of General Circular No. V-334, was just one in
a series of enactments regarding Sec. 24 (b) of the Tax Code. Republic Act No. 3825 came next on June 22, 1963 without
changing the basis but merely adding a proviso (in bold letters).
(b) Tax on foreign corporation.(1) Non-resident corporations. There shall be levied, collected and paid for
each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by
every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from all sources within the
Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a
tax equal to thirty per centum of such amount: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT PREMIUMS SHALL NOT INCLUDE
REINSURANCE PREMIUMS. (double emphasis ours).
Republic Act No. 3841, dated likewise on June 22, 1963, followed after, omitting the proviso and inserting some words (also in
bold letters).
(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.There shall be levied, collected and paid for
each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by
every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from all sources within the
Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical OR CASUAL gains, profits

and income, AND CAPITAL GAINS, a tax equal to thirty per centum of such amount.
supplied)

(double emphasis

The principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment clearly obtains in this case. It provides
that "the re-enactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior
executive construction. 7 Note should be taken of the fact that this case involves not a mere opinion of the Commissioner or
ruling rendered on a mere query, but a Circular formally issued to "all internal revenue officials" by the then Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
It was only on June 27, 1968 under Republic Act No. 5431, supra, which became the basis of Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 4-71, that Sec. 24 (b) was amended to refer specifically to 35% of the "gross income."
This Court is not unaware of the well-entrenched principle that the Government is never estopped from collecting taxes
because of mistakes or errors on the part of its
agents. 8 In fact, utmost caution should be taken in this regard. 9 But, like other principles of law, this also admits of
exceptions in the interest of justice and fairplay. The insertion of Sec. 338-A into the National Internal Revenue Code, as held
in the case of Tuason, Jr. vs. Lingad, 10 is indicative of legislative intention to support the principle of good faith. In fact, in the
United States, from where Sec. 24 (b) was patterned, it has been held that the Commissioner of Collector is precluded from
adopting a position inconsistent with one previously taken where injustice would result therefrom, 11 or where there has been
a misrepresentation to the taxpayer. 12
We have also noted that in its Decision, the Court of Tax Appeals further required the petitioner to pay interest and surcharge
as provided for in Sec. 51 (e) of the Tax Code in addition to the deficiency withholding tax of P 525,897.06. This additional
requirement is much less called for because the petitioner relied in good faith and religiously complied with no less than a
Circular issued "to all internal revenue officials" by the highest official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and approved by the
then Secretary of Finance. 13
With the foregoing conclusions arrived at, resolution of the issue of prescription becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby reversed, and the questioned assessment set aside. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124360. November 5, 1997]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127867. November 5, 1997]
EDCEL

C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN
TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL
Corporation, respondents.
DECISION

PUNO, J.:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." [1] R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the
downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the
upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.
First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than
those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government
interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6)
petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country. [2]

In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its
products are vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare,
enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act. [3] It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of
importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling
crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the
operations and trade practices of the industry. [4]
In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil
industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies . All
the oil refineries and marketing companies were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide
with the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was
done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets. On
November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the
control by foreigners of our oil industry. [5] PNOC engaged in the business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and
storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling
shares of Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country. [6] PNOC later put up its own marketing subsidiary -Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first time, there was a Filipino presence in
the Philippine oil market.
In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in
the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for
cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world
market prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:
1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to
tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,
2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may
be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy,
3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund through an
appropriate order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies
engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products, or
4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of
crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange
rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.[7]
By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country -- Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.
In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to
regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and
distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." The Board had the following powers
and functions:
1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas companies which
distribute gas by means of underground pipe system;
3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended x x x;
4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license refineries that
may be organized after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions as are consistent with
the national interest; and
5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when public interest
so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the
levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilizaton Fund x x x by persons or
entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may be determined by the Board, which may
enable the importer to recover its cost of importation. [8]
On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare,
integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to
energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. [9] The thrust of the Philippine energy program
under the law was toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy
industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants. [10] The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and
investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from
the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of
deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry."
Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of Petron
Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas
Company.

In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A.
No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person
or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. [11]
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the
transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be
accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation
of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of
haulers, water transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full
deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange coverwere to be lifted and the OPSF was to be
abolished.
The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry
through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5 (b)
provides:
"b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and
collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of
seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided,
That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."
The petition is anchored on three arguments:
First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates
the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries
and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will
have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls
the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude
oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects
the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly
competitive market."
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the
imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry.
In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights
Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180
and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:
"Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. -- Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the
full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:
xxx
E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:
"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992," provides that, at the end of
four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute
the programs and time table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"
WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996,"
provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable;"
WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on
or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil
had been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been
stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften for the last few days while prices of
some petroleum products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been
stable for the past twelve (12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for the administration of
the deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various government agencies;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly competitive market which
can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and
high quality petroleum products;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry."
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions:
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary
of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when
it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary
and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund -- a condition not found in R.A. No.
8180.
Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil
companies -- Petron, Caltex and Shell -- in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition,
respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the
law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury
as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered the private
respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and
other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days x x x subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."
We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a
justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and
executive order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title - one subject requirement
of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether
or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is
arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the petitioners assail
the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by
Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend
that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy.
Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. [12] The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates
the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. [13] We
held in the recent case of Tanada v. Angara:[14]
"x x x
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide."
Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the resolution of
this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly
show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the
law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be
resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now
and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not
deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its
wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too
lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.[15] In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan
ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[16] we stressed:
"x x x
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions."
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity
of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the
standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.
We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended
that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision [17] of the Constitution requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one subject rule. We have consistently ruled[18] that the title need not mirror,
fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general subject. [19] We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of
R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors
to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum. [20] We shall, however, return to the validity
of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes
the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.:
"Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation - Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable ..."
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the
peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not
provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it
illegallyconsidered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916
in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners ,[21] this Court thru, Mr.
Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as
the legal engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the
execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine whether
the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated
the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA,[22] thus:
"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference
of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative."
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation
of legislative power has become aninevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts
bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative
powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States[23] as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not
expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the
statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." [24]
Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue
delegation of legislative power cannot prosper.Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive
has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March
1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar isstable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No.
8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The
dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines
"practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as
meaning firmly established.[25] The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in
other cases.[26]
It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by
R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain
our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section
15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and
the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not
mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On
the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. [27] We therefore hold thatthe Executive department failed
to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF
fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered
anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the
dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in
R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for
it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the
principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a
mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso
to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive
department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could
have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early
deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. These provisions are:
(1) Section 5 (b) which states - "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act,
tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported
refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be
the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported
crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be
amended only by an Act of Congress."
(2) Section 6 which states - "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE
shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and
(3) Section 9 (b) which states - "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream
oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:
xxx
(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average
cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors."
On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No.
8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations
in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive
right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole
supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a
product or service.[28] On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or
more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly
restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution and
price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. [29] Combination in restraint of trade refers to
the means while monopoly refers to the end.[30]
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this constitutional policy. Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of trade, [31] while Article 28
of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for damages. [32]
Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain
that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory
requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They
also submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents manifested
to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% - 5% of the oil
market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our
Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but
it is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic
creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest. [33] Thus
too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private sector.
[34]
This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by
section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State
to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.
Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability
of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition,
and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII
of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the
objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers will
strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers
allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's opportunity costs." [35] He
adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of the `market' system (free enterprise) to decide what
shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be
distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition,
among producers to determine who will manufacture it."
Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is
competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these creative
forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few
but several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly
the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful
scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on
tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in
our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly
competitive market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other
players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the
horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil
industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new
players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing
storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a
prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their
net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by
the three (3) existing oil companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as "x x x selling or offering to sell any product at
a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of
competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The
ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180
on the entry of new players.The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil
companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer Hovenkamp,[36] gives the
authoritative answer and we quote:
"x x x
"The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The
monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful
predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant
barriers to new entry."
As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new
players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with
the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant playerto engage in predatory pricing and

succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without
reason.
Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since deregulation. A
scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON,
SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively
compete with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could have been more
in number and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.
We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff
differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on
predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can
be individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo,
[37]
viz.:
"x x x
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates
the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have
enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or
connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them."
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this
Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This
separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the
entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal
props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these
provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit
fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs
provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before
deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because
government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and
CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their
pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be
corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of our leading
legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In
the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate
Committee on Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants
in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at
unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January
1, 1998. He declared that the amendment "x x x would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there
will be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming
public." Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of theprincipal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290
increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the
present oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,:
"xxx
"Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments
made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all
petroleum products of the three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a
combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude
purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors
should have resulted in different, rather than identical prices.
The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting
to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices
of petroleum products in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.
To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream oil
industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be severely
penalized."
Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that "x x x the present set-up has

raised serious public concern over the way the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an
indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This
situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged
the entry of new players in the downstream oil industry."
In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally feverish. Representative
Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:
"x x x
As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and
eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other
players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined petroleum products and ultimately in the putting
up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the
existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law took effect,
to the great disadvantage of the consuming public.
Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing field in
the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable,
increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the country by the three existing refineries."
Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil companies by
strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the
prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:
"x x x
To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to review the
prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review
prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently
compel any entity in the industry to submit any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where
the Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it
may take any step necessary to protect the public, including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further,
the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or
entity from the oil industry who is found guilty of such prohibited acts.
By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue where their grievances can be
heard and immediately acted upon by government.
Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more transparent and making it
easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair
trade."
Representative Sergio A.F. Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where there is no agency
in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dante O. Tinga,
one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in
its explanatory note:
xxx
The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark
price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in
the United States on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads, `Predatory pricing means selling or
offering to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition,
eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market.'
The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil deregulation law are
adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law
itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of
antitrust violations. Specifically, the government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory
pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it may recover damages. Likewise, a
private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such violation which will result in damage to his business or
property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.
To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional powers to gather
information and to require reports."
Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it
completely repealed. He explained:
"x x x
Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon
in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus,
resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So
much so, that with the deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing
the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the government. In the month of

August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as
in March 1997, or a few months from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of
petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this
would make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.
The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that these
prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil companies in the country today, namely,
Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they will still have no chance to compete with
the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4%
between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate
to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil products which is
being taxed with 7% tariff rates.
So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil
products due to deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A.
8180 be repealed completely."
Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive review of R.A.
No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its illeffects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M.
Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the
Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order
to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The
Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And Benefits Of The Said
Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An
Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In
Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend Appropriate
Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:
"x x x
WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil
prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other
prime commodities to the detriment of our people, particularly the poor;
WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not
come in;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate amendments to the
existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to give the competitive market
enough time to develop;
WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the entry of new oil
companies to effect a dynamic competitive market;
WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full deregulation of the oil
industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996 x x x. "
Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on Energy and
Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices
And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock
inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going
down oil prices will rise."
Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed H.
Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And
Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180)
For the Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of The Oil
Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And What
Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit,
Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence,
And For Other Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon IIIfiled
H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T.
Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392.
In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional deformities as R.A. No.
8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the
nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the
areas most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water. [38] At a time
when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the
number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls.R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions
cannot be allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its defects.
The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining order to enable them to
adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea,
however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality

of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the former laws it repealed. [39] The length of our return to the regime of regulation depends on
Congress which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.
With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress. Such criticism
is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but
because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for
Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of
striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil
oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy
of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamentalprinciples of the
Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down
dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of
the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their
economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to
themfor they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the
Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from
the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be halfhearted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-48112 February 29, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
MARIANO B. MONTON, defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Mariano Monton was then the Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavite, when on the morning of October 29, 1966 a PC
team led by Sgt. Cagalpin raided his house and found one automatic carbine with one long magazine containing several
rounds of ammunition hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. Thus he was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm in an information that was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. After arraignment and trial on the merits a
decision was rendered on September 26, 1968 finding him guilty of the offense charged and imposing on him the penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) years and to pay the costs. The firearm and magazine and 27 rounds of ammunitions were
confiscated in favor of the government. 1
The accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, in a decision of January 12, 1978 the records of the case
were elevated to this Court as the legal issue determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused of whether a barrio
captain is a peace officer within the purview of Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempting certain peace
officers from securing a firearm license, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Sections 878 and 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
Sec. 878. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instruments or implements used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. Save as allowable under this article it shall be unlawful for any
person to import, manufacture, deal in, receive, acquire, buy, sell, dispose of, or possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition.
See. 879. Exemption as to firearms and ammunition used by military and naval forces or by peace officers.
This article shall not apply to firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines of the United States Army and Navy, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.
From the aforecited provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, it is clear that the peace officers covered by the exemption
as to firearms regularly and lawfully issued are the "Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors and guards of provincial prisoners and jails." Barrio captains are not included in the enumeration. Hence what is not
included is and should be deemed excluded. 2
There can be no question therefor that at the time of apprehension of the appellant in the possession of the firearm and
ammunitions the act was punishable under Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code.
However, under Section 88(3) of the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 which was approved on February 10,
1983 it is specifically provided as follows:
In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and
carry the necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the
possession and carrying of firearms.
From the foregoing it is clear that a barrio captain or punong barangay is now entitled to possess and carry the necessary
firearms within his territorial jurisdiction without incurring any criminal liability thereby. what before was penalized by the old
law is no longer punishable under the present law.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that when the new law repeals the existing law so that the act which was penalized under the
old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated. A new statute dealing with crimes which establishes conditions more
lenient or favorable to the accused can be given a retroactive effect. 3

In the present case, appellant presented Barrio Resolution No. 6 4 showing that the firearm and ammunitions were bought by
the barrio out of barrio funds because of the rampant cattle rustling and robbery in the area. No doubt the same was issued
to appellant by the people of the barrio as their barrio captain to be utilized in the performance of his peace and order
functions.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered Acquitting
accused-appellant of the offense charged with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070

REFORM, represented by SECRETARY
JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present:
Petitioner, Davide, C.J.,
Puno,
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario and
Garcia, JJ.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated:
HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondents. October 19, 2005
x-----------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and
calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that
lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. [3]

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and
found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted
from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of
the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. [4] Petitioner ignored their request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage
of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land
ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL. [6]

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order [7] partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner
exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. [8] They filed a notice of appeal [9] with the Office of the
President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land
and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.

On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. [10] It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain
parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left
for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary
to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the
government. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is
hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in
so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the
agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum
retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area
of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural
lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some
unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the
agrarian reform program.

Petitioners arguments fail to impress.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations.
They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by
authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. [13] The rule-making power of an
administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be
used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended . Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations. [14]

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for
their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in
the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses,
sprayers, and other technological appurtenances. [15]

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia
Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL. [17] We stressed anew
that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural
lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still
undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified
as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have
been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in
issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have
been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find
neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the

issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as
1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding
capital of the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents
have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead
one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is
the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been
no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without
substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new
law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. [19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the
terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. [21] With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought
to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution.
They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In
case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. [22] The assailed
A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond
the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157882

March 30, 2006

DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED (DESAMA), MANUEL BUTIC, CESAR

MARIANO, LAURO ABANCE, BEN TAYABAN, ANTONIO DINGCOG, TEDDY B. KIMAYONG, ALONZO ANANAYO,
ANTONIO MALAN-UYA, JOSE BAHAG, ANDRES INLAB, RUFINO LICYAYO, ALFREDO CULHI, CATALILNA INABYUHAN,
GUAY DUMMANG, GINA PULIDO, EDWIN ANSIBEY, CORAZON SICUAN, LOPEZ DUMULAG, FREDDIE AYDINON,
VILMA JOSE, FLORENTINA MADDAWAT, LINDA DINGCOG, ELMER SICUAN, GARY ANSIBEY, JIMMY MADDAWAT,
JIMMY GUAY, ALFREDO CUT-ING, ANGELINA UDAN, OSCAR INLAB, JUANITA CUT-ING, ALBERT PINKIHAN, CECILIA
TAYABAN, CRISTA BINWAK, PEDRO DUGAY, SR., EDUARDO ANANAYO, ROBIN INLAB, JR., LORENZO PULIDO,
TOMAS BINWAG, EVELYN BUYA, JAIME DINGCOG, DINAOAN CUT-ING, PEDRO DONATO, MYRNA GUAY, FLORA
ANSIBEY, GRACE DINAMLING, EDUARDO MENCIAS, ROSENDA JACOB, SIONITA DINGCOG, GLORIA JACOB, MAXIMA
GUAY, RODRIGO PAGGADUT, MARINA ANSIBEY, TOLENTINO INLAB, RUBEN DULNUAN, GERONIMO LICYAYO,
LEONCIO CUMTI, MARY DULNUAN, FELISA BALANBAN, MYRNA DUYAN, MARY MALAN-UYA, PRUDENCIO ANSIBEY,
GUILLERMO GUAY, MARGARITA CULHI, ALADIN ANSIBEY, PABLO DUYAN, PEDRO PUGUON, JULIAN INLAB, JOSEPH
NACULON, ROGER BAJITA, DINAON GUAY, JAIME ANANAYO, MARY ANSIBEY, LINA ANANAYO, MAURA DUYAPAT,
ARTEMEO ANANAYO, MARY BABLING, NORA ANSIBEY, DAVID DULNUAN, AVELINO PUGUON, LUCAS GUMAWI,
LUISA ABBAC, CATHRIN GUWAY, CLARITA TAYABAN, FLORA JAVERA, RANDY SICOAN, FELIZA PUTAKI, CORAZON P.
DULNUAN, NENA D. BULLONG, ERMELYN GUWAY, GILBERT BUTALE, JOSEPH B. BULLONG, FRANCISCO PATNAAN,
JR., SHERWIN DUGAY, TIRSO GULLINGAY, BENEDICT T. NABALLIN, RAMON PUN-ADWAN, ALFONSO DULNUAN,
CARMEN D. BUTALE, LOLITA ANSIBEY, ABRAHAM DULNUAN, ARLYNDA BUTALE, MODESTO A. ANSIBEY, EDUARDO
LUGAY, ANTONIO HUMIWAT, ALFREDO PUMIHIC, MIKE TINO, TONY CABARROGUIS, BASILIO TAMLIWOK, JR.,
NESTOR TANGID, ALEJO TUGUINAY, BENITO LORENZO, RUDY BAHIWAG, ANALIZA BUTALE, NALLEM LUBYOC,
JOSEPH DUHAYON, RAFAEL CAMPOL, MANUEL PUMALO, DELFIN AGALOOS, PABLO CAYANGA, PERFECTO SISON,
ELIAS NATAMA, LITO PUMALO, SEVERINA DUGAY, GABRIEL PAKAYAO, JEOFFREY SINDAP, FELIX TICUAN, MARIANO
S. MADDELA, MENZI TICAWA, DOMINGA DUGAY, JOE BOLINEY, JASON ASANG, TOMMY ATENYAYO, ALEJO
AGMALIW, DIZON AGMALIW, EDDIE ATOS, FELIMON BLANCO, DARRIL DIGOY, LUCAS BUAY, ARTEMIO BRAZIL,
NICANOR MODI, LUIS REDULFIN, NESTOR JUSTINO, JAIME CUMILA, BENEDICT GUINID, EDITHA ANIN, INOH-YABAN

BANDAO, LUIS BAYWONG, FELIPE DUHALNGON, PETER BENNEL, JOSEPH T. BUNGGALAN, JIMMY B. KIMAYONG,
HENRY PUGUON, PEDRO BUHONG, BUGAN NADIAHAN, SR., MARIA EDEN ORLINO, SPC, PERLA VISSORO, and
BISHOP RAMON VILLENA,Petitioners,
vs.
ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as SECRETARY of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, in his capacity as Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR),
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, RICHARD N.
FERRER, in his capacity as Acting Undersecretary of the Office of the President, IAN HEATH SANDERCOCK, in his
capacity as President of CLIMAX-ARIMCO Mining Corporation. Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO
96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the
Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its
nationals.
On 25 July 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 279 which authorized the DENR
Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On 3 March 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, "An Act Instituting A New System
of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995.
On 15 August 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995,
containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which
took effect on 23 January 1997 after due publication.
Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of
37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu,
Nueva Vizcaya.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new name of
Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
On 7 September 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for
the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional. The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said letter. There being
no response to both letters, another letter of the same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
On 12 November 2002, counsels for petitioners received a letter from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the
petitioners to comply with the Rules of the Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.
Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was again
forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.
In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC
FTAA.1avvphil.net
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They
pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.
In their memorandum petitioners pose the following issues:
I
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of
property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.
II
Whether or not the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning an
unconstitutional administrative process of determining just compensation.
III

Whether or not the State, through Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its primary responsibility to the full
control and supervision over natural resources.
IV
Whether or not the respondents interpretation of the role of wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their
involvement in mining enterprises, violates paragraph 4, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS. 1
Before going to the substantive issues, the procedural question raised by public respondents shall first be dealt with. Public
respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC
has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on
account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy
which this Court can take cognizance of.
A justiciable controversy is defined as a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. 2 Thus, courts have no judicial
power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or
hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases that have become moot. 3 The Constitution is quite explicit on this matter. 4 It
provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, courts, through the power of judicial review, are
to entertain only real disputes between conflicting parties through the application of law. For the courts to exercise the power
of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing." 5
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 6 There must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Closely related to the second requisite is that the question must be ripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 7
The third requisite is legal standing or locus standi. It is defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more
than a generalized grievance.8 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 9 Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing. 10
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted,
DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been operating in
various provinces of the country. Among them is CAMC which operates in the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino where
numerous individuals including the petitioners are imperiled of being ousted from their landholdings in view of the CAMC
FTAA. In light of this, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual
and ripe for judicial intervention.11 Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court to
intervene. As held in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre 12:
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. 13
Petitioners embrace various segments of the society. These include Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an
organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected
by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These
petitioners have the standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial
injury.14 They assert that they are affected by the mining activities of CAMC. Likewise, they are under imminent threat of being
displaced from their landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned FTAA. They thus meet the appropriate
case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other hand, claim the validity of the
assailed statute and the FTAA of CAMC.
Besides, the transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved will have a
bearing on the countrys economy which is to a greater extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by the
resolution of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining contract areas as well as the social
existence of indigenous peoples which are threatened. Based on these considerations, this Court deems it proper to take
cognizance of the instant petition.
Having resolved the procedural question, the constitutionality of the law under attack must be addressed squarely.
First Substantive Issue: Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust "taking" of
private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that
public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry
into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Interpreting Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40, juxtaposed with the concept of taking of property
for purposes of eminent domain in the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, 15 petitioners assert that there is indeed a "taking"
upon entry into private lands and concession areas.
Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi defines "taking" under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
From the criteria set forth in the cited case, petitioners claim that the entry into a private property by CAMC, pursuant to its
FTAA, is for more than a momentary period, i.e., for 25 years, and renewable for another 25 years; that the entry into the
property is under the warrant or color of legal authority pursuant to the FTAA executed between the government and CAMC;
and that the entry substantially ousts the owner or possessor and deprives him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
These facts, according to the petitioners, amount to taking. As such, petitioners question the exercise of the power of eminent
domain as unwarranted because respondents failed to prove that the entry into private property is devoted for public use.
Petitioners also stress that even without the doctrine in the Castellvi case, the nature of the mining activity, the extent of the
land area covered by the CAMC FTAA and the various rights granted to the proponent or the FTAA holder, such as (a) the right
of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, with full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same; (b) the
right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners and/or occupants thereof when prospecting,
exploring and exploiting for minerals therein; (c) the right to enjoy easement rights, the use of timber, water and other
natural resources in the Exploration Contract Area; (d) the right of possession of the Mining Area, with full right of ingress and
egress and the right to occupy the same; and (e) the right to enjoy easement rights, water and other natural resources in the
Mining Area, result in a taking of private property.
Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very least, Section 76
establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area sufficient to
deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls within the
purview of eminent domain.
To further bolster their claim that the legal easement established is equivalent to taking, petitioners cite the case of National
Power Corporation v. Gutierrez16 holding that the easement of right-of-way imposed against the use of the land for an
indefinite period is a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the
police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public
respondents concluded that "to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by
purchase."
Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA holders do not oust the
owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal
easement upon surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area.
Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. 17 On the other hand, police power
is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. 18 Although
both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a
mingling19 of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between
the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall
be paid.20 Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters
from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners)
was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers. 21 In U.S. v. Toribio,22 the court
upheld the provisions of Act No. 1147, a statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the purpose of conserving an
adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid exercise of police power, notwithstanding the property rights impairment that the
ordinance imposed on cattle owners. A zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard within certain areas was
assailed as unconstitutional in that it was an invasion of the property rights of the lumber yard owners in People v. de
Guzman.23 The Court nonetheless ruled that the regulation was a valid exercise of police power. A similar ruling was arrived at
in Seng Kee S Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt24 where an ordinance divided the City of Manila into industrial and residential areas.
A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted
because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued
existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. 25However, when a property interest is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking. 26
According to noted constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the
use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated
for use by or for the benefit of the public.27 Use of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect of the property is
used by or for the public.28 The deprivation of use can in fact be total and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody
else acquires use of the property or any interest therein. 29

If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such restriction
constitutes compensable taking. Thus, in City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 30 it was argued by the local government
that an ordinance requiring private cemeteries to reserve 6% of their total areas for the burial of paupers was a valid exercise
of the police power under the general welfare clause. This court did not agree in the contention, ruling that property taken
under the police power is sought to be destroyed and not, as in this case, to be devoted to a public use. It further declared
that the ordinance in question was actually a taking of private property without just compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the local government. Being an exercise of eminent domain without
provision for the payment of just compensation, the same was rendered invalid as it violated the principles governing eminent
domain.
In People v. Fajardo,31 the municipal mayor refused Fajardo permission to build a house on his own land on the ground that the
proposed structure would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. The ordinance relied upon by the mayor prohibited
the construction of any building that would destroy the view of the plaza from the highway. The court ruled that the municipal
ordinance under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property for the benefit of
the public; hence, considered as a taking under the power of eminent domain that could not be countenanced without
payment of just compensation to the affected owners. In this case, what the municipality wanted was to impose an easement
on the property in order to preserve the view or beauty of the public plaza, which was a form of utilization of Fajardos
property for public benefit.32
While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not always
be the case. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the establishment of an
easement.33 In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila,34 it was held that the imposition of burden over a private property through
easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right
that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating
it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be
previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is
only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary
restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested.
And in the case of National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 35 despite the NPCs protestation that the owners were not totally
deprived of the use of the land and could still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires,
the Court nevertheless held that the easement of right-of-way was a taking under the power of eminent domain. The Court
said:
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use
of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
A case exemplifying an instance of compensable taking which does not entail transfer of title is Republic v. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co.36 Here, the Bureau of Telecommunications, a government instrumentality, had contracted with the
PLDT for the interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, so that the former could make
use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. In its desire to expand services to government offices, the Bureau of
Telecommunications demanded to expand its use of the PLDT lines. Disagreement ensued on the terms of the contract for the
use of the PLDT facilities. The Court ruminated:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way. 37
In Republic v. Castellvi,38 this Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
As shown by the foregoing jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights and
restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking. In the case under consideration, the
entry referred to in Section 76 and the easement rights under Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 7942 as well as the various rights to
CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the deprivation of proprietary rights in the cases discussed which this Court
considered as taking. Section 75 of the law in question reads:
Easement Rights. - When mining areas are so situated that for purposes of more convenient mining operations it is necessary
to build, construct or install on the mining areas or lands owned, occupied or leased by other persons, such infrastructure as
roads, railroads, mills, waste dump sites, tailing ponds, warehouses, staging or storage areas and port facilities, tramways,
runways, airports, electric transmission, telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal flood and catchment areas, sites
for water wells, ditches, canals, new river beds, pipelines, flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or mills, the contractor, upon payment
of just compensation, shall be entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas or lands.

Section 76 provides:
Entry into private lands and concession areas Subject to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be prevented
from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires when conducting mining
operations therein.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and
egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by
surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil
Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration,
extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels,
prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems. On top of
this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric
transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or
occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining
operations commence.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a Taking Provision
Moreover, it would not be amiss to revisit the history of mining laws of this country which would help us understand Section
76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.
This provision is first found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 which took effect on 7 November 1936, viz:
Before entering private lands the prospector shall first apply in writing for written permission of the private owner, claimant,
or holder thereof, and in case of refusal by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or in case of
disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of such
compensation shall be fixed by agreement among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the surface owner,
and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to the amount of compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined
by the Court of First Instance.
Similarly, the pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known as "The Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974," provides:
SECTION 12. Entry to Public and Private Lands. A person who desires to conduct prospecting or other mining operations
within public lands covered by concessions or rights other than mining shall first obtain the written permission of the
government official concerned before entering such lands. In the case of private lands, the written permission of the owner or
possessor of the land must be obtained before entering such lands. In either case, if said permission is denied, the Director, at
the request of the interested person may intercede with the owner or possessor of the land. If the intercession fails, the
interested person may bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated. If the court finds the
request justified, it shall issue an order granting the permission after fixing the amount of compensation and/or rental due the
owner or possessor: Provided, That pending final adjudication of such amount, the court shall upon recommendation of the
Director permit the interested person to enter, prospect and/or undertake other mining operations on the disputed land upon
posting by such interested person of a bond with the court which the latter shall consider adequate to answer for any damage
to the owner or possessor of the land resulting from such entry, prospecting or any other mining operations.
Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface rights for the entry into private lands for purposes of mining
operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974 was passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated
mineral resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition by
mining prospectors and claimants. Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain
may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and
other facilities, this time, the power of eminent domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition
and use of private lands, viz:
SECTION 1. Mineral prospecting, location, exploration, development and exploitation is hereby declared of public use and
benefit, and for which the power of eminent domain may be invoked and exercised for the entry, acquisition and use of
private lands. x x x.
The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who are qualified to own lands were granted the
authority to exercise eminent domain for the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining operations.
This grant of authority extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly repealed by Section 76 of Rep. Act
No. 7942; and neither are the former statutes impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can stand together even
if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the grant of the privilege to exercise eminent domain which was present
in the old law.
It is an established rule in statutory construction that in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws
must be inconsistent.39 The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. Simply because a latter
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. As has been the ruled, repeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. 40 As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same
matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason

for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. 41 Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the latter act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise
eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision.
While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the
ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just
compensation.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. 42 Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. 43 It includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public" has
already been abandoned.44
Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the governments thrust
of accelerated recovery.45 The importance of the mining industry for national development is expressed in Presidential Decree
No. 463:
WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the national economy, and therefore the intensified discovery,
exploration, development and wise utilization of the countrys mineral resources are urgently needed for national
development.
Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit.
That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit of private mining firms
or mining contractors is not at all true. In Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 46 petitioners therein contended that the promotion
of tourism is not for public use because private concessionaires would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as
restaurants, hotels, stores, etc., inside the tourist area. The Court thus contemplated:
The rule in Berman v. Parker [348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27] of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean
taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as well in the Philippines.
". . . Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to
determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been established. x x
x"47
Petitioners further maintain that the states discretion to decide when to take private property is reduced contractually by
Section 13.5 of the CAMC FTAA, which reads:
If the CONTRACTOR so requests at its option, the GOVERNMENT shall use its offices and legal powers to assist in the
acquisition at reasonable cost of any surface areas or rights required by the CONTRACTOR at the CONTRACTORs cost to carry
out the Mineral Exploration and the Mining Operations herein.
All obligations, payments and expenses arising from, or incident to, such agreements or acquisition of right shall be for the
account of the CONTRACTOR and shall be recoverable as Operating Expense.
According to petitioners, the government is reduced to a sub-contractor upon the request of the private respondent, and on
account of the foregoing provision, the contractor can compel the government to exercise its power of eminent domain
thereby derogating the latters power to expropriate property.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to
own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure.48 The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a
voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called
for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The
FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the
Anti-Dummy Law. Hence, when confronted with the same question in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 49 the
Court answered:
Clearly, petitioners have needlessly jumped to unwarranted conclusions, without being aware of the rationale for the said
provision. That provision does not call for the exercise of the power of eminent domain -- and determination of just
compensation is not an issue -- as much as it calls for a qualified party to acquire the surface rights on behalf of a foreignowned contractor.
Rather than having the foreign contractor act through a dummy corporation, having the State do the purchasing is a better
alternative. This will at least cause the government to be aware of such transaction/s and foster transparency in the
contractors dealings with the local property owners. The government, then, will not act as a subcontractor of the
contractor; rather, it will facilitate the transaction and enable the parties to avoid a technical violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for just
compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for
the payment of just compensation:

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface owners,
occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or
installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Such compensation shall be based on the agreement entered into between the holder of mining rights and the surface owner,
occupant or concessionaire thereof, where appropriate, in accordance with P.D. No. 512. (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Substantive Issue: Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation
Closely-knit to the issue of taking is the determination of just compensation. It is contended that Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 encroach on the power of the trial courts to determine just compensation in eminent domain cases
inasmuch as the same determination of proper compensation are cognizable only by the Panel of Arbitrators.
The question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been settled in the case of Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay50 wherein the court declared that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. Even as the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot
prevail over the courts findings.
Implementing Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, Section 105 of DAO 96-40 states that holder(s) of mining right(s) shall not be
prevented from entry into its/their contract/mining areas for the purpose of exploration, development, and/or utilization. That
in cases where surface owners of the lands, occupants or concessionaires refuse to allow the permit holder or contractor
entry, the latter shall bring the matter before the Panel of Arbitrators for proper disposition. Section 106 states that voluntary
agreements between the two parties permitting the mining right holders to enter and use the surface owners lands shall be
registered with the Regional Office of the MGB. In connection with Section 106, Section 107 provides that the compensation
for the damage done to the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire as a consequence of mining operations or as a result
of the construction or installation of the infrastructure shall be properly and justly compensated and that such compensation
shall be based on the agreement between the holder of mining rights and surface owner, occupant or concessionaire, or
where appropriate, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 512. In cases where there is disagreement to the
compensation or where there is no agreement, the matter shall be brought before the Panel of Arbitrators. Section 206 of the
implementing rules and regulations provides an aggrieved party the remedy to appeal the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators
to the Mines Adjudication Board, and the latters decision may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
review on certiorari.51
An examination of the foregoing provisions gives no indication that the courts are excluded from taking cognizance of
expropriation cases under the mining law. The disagreement referred to in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of
eminent domain, rather it contemplates of a situation wherein the permit holders are allowed by the surface owners entry
into the latters lands and disagreement ensues as regarding the proper compensation for the allowed entry and use of the
private lands. Noticeably, the provision points to a voluntary sale or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale.
The legislature, in enacting the mining act, is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and
jurisprudence on the subject. Thus, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing such statute it was in accord with the
existing laws and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of courts in the determination of just compensation and that it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter. Indeed, there is nothing in the provisions of
the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations. Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of
Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus,
necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of the just compensation by the Panel of
Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by
all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or
occupants.52 The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact
despite the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals53:
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon
by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
Third Substantive Issue: Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining Operations
Anent the third issue, petitioners charge that Rep. Act No. 7942, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations, makes it
possible for FTAA contracts to cede over to a fully foreign-owned corporation full control and management of mining
enterprises, with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and
reports, with weak review and audit powers. The State is not acting as the supposed owner of the natural resources for and on
behalf of the Filipino people; it practically has little effective say in the decisions made by the enterprise. In effect, petitioners
asserted that the law, the implementing regulations, and the CAMC FTAA cede beneficial ownership of the mineral resources
to the foreign contractor.
It must be noted that this argument was already raised in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 54where the Court
answered in the following manner:
RA 7942 provides for the states control and supervision over mining operations. The following provisions thereof establish the
mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial requirements in this manner:

1. Sec. 8 which provides for the DENRs power of over-all supervision and periodic review for "the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the States mineral resources";
2. Sec. 9 which authorizes the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) under the DENR to exercise "direct charge in the
administration and disposition of mineral resources", and empowers the MGB to "monitor the compliance by the
contractor of the terms and conditions of the mineral agreements", "confiscate surety and performance bonds", and
deputize whenever necessary any member or unit of the Phil. National Police, barangay, duly registered nongovernmental organization (NGO) or any qualified person to police mining activities;
3. Sec. 66 which vests in the Regional Director "exclusive jurisdiction over safety inspections of all installations,
whether surface or underground", utilized in mining operations.
4. Sec. 35, which incorporates into all FTAAs the following terms, conditions and warranties:
"(g) Mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and its IRR.
"(h) Work programs and minimum expenditures commitments.
xxxx
"(k) Requiring proponent to effectively use appropriate anti-pollution technology and facilities to protect the environment and
restore or rehabilitate mined-out areas.
"(l) The contractors shall furnish the Government records of geologic, accounting and other relevant data for its mining
operation, and that books of accounts and records shall be open for inspection by the government. x x x.
"(m) Requiring the proponent to dispose of the minerals at the highest price and more advantageous terms and conditions.
xxxx
"(o) Such other terms and conditions consistent with the Constitution and with this Act as the Secretary may deem to be for
the best interest of the State and the welfare of the Filipino people."
The foregoing provisions of Section 35 of RA 7942 are also reflected and implemented in Section 56 (g), (h), (l), (m) and (n) of
the Implementing Rules, DAO 96-40.
Moreover, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 also provide various stipulations confirming the governments control over mining
enterprises:
o

The contractor is to relinquish to the government those portions of the contract area not needed for mining
operations and not covered by any declaration of mining feasibility (Section 35-e, RA 7942; Section 60, DAO 96-40).

The contractor must comply with the provisions pertaining to mine safety, health and environmental protection
(Chapter XI, RA 7942; Chapters XV and XVI, DAO 96-40).

For violation of any of its terms and conditions, government may cancel an FTAA. (Chapter XVII, RA 7942; Chapter
XXIV, DAO 96-40).

An FTAA contractor is obliged to open its books of accounts and records for 0inspection by the government (Section
56-m, DAO 96-40).

An FTAA contractor has to dispose of the minerals and by-products at the highest market price and register with the
MGB a copy of the sales agreement (Section 56-n, DAO 96-40).

MGB is mandated to monitor the contractors compliance with the terms and conditions of the FTAA; and to deputize,
when necessary, any member or unit of the Philippine National Police, the barangay or a DENR-accredited
nongovernmental organization to police mining activities (Section 7-d and -f, DAO 96-40).

An FTAA cannot be transferred or assigned without prior approval by the President (Section 40, RA 7942; Section 66,
DAO 96-40).

A mining project under an FTAA cannot proceed to the construction/development/utilization stage, unless its
Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility has been approved by government (Section 24, RA 7942).

The Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility filed by the contractor cannot be approved without submission of the
following documents:
1. Approved mining project feasibility study (Section 53-d, DAO 96-40)
2. Approved three-year work program (Section 53-a-4, DAO 96-40)
3. Environmental compliance certificate (Section 70, RA 7942)
4. Approved environmental protection and enhancement program (Section 69, RA 7942)
5. Approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Bayan/Barangay (Section 70, RA 7942; Section 27, RA 7160)
6. Free and prior informed consent by the indigenous peoples concerned, including payment of royalties
through a Memorandum of Agreement (Section 16, RA 7942; Section 59, RA 8371)

The FTAA contractor is obliged to assist in the development of its mining community, promotion of the general
welfare of its inhabitants, and development of science and mining technology (Section 57, RA 7942).

The FTAA contractor is obliged to submit reports (on quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis as the case may be; per
Section 270, DAO 96-40), pertaining to the following:
1. Exploration
2. Drilling
3. Mineral resources and reserves
4. Energy consumption
5. Production
6. Sales and marketing
7. Employment
8. Payment of taxes, royalties, fees and other Government Shares
9. Mine safety, health and environment
10. Land use
11. Social development
12. Explosives consumption

An FTAA pertaining to areas within government reservations cannot be granted without a written clearance from the
government agencies concerned (Section 19, RA 7942; Section 54, DAO 96-40).

An FTAA contractor is required to post a financial guarantee bond in favor of the government in an amount equivalent
to its expenditures obligations for any particular year. This requirement is apart from the representations and
warranties of the contractor that it has access to all the financing, managerial and technical expertise and technology
necessary to carry out the objectives of the FTAA (Section 35-b, -e, and -f, RA 7942).

Other reports to be submitted by the contractor, as required under DAO 96-40, are as follows: an environmental
report on the rehabilitation of the mined-out area and/or mine waste/tailing covered area, and anti-pollution
measures undertaken (Section 35-a-2); annual reports of the mining operations and records of geologic accounting
(Section 56-m); annual progress reports and final report of exploration activities (Section 56-2).

Other programs required to be submitted by the contractor, pursuant to DAO 96-40, are the following: a safety and
health program (Section 144); an environmental work program (Section 168); an annual environmental protection
and enhancement program (Section 171).

The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the
statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners contention. The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the
State to the role of a "passive regulator" dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government
agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work
programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization
phases of the mining enterprise.
Once these plans and reports are approved, the contractor is bound to comply with its commitments therein. Figures for
mineral production and sales are regularly monitored and subjected to government review, in order to ensure that the
products and by-products are disposed of at the best prices possible; even copies of sales agreements have to be submitted
to and registered with MGB. And the contractor is mandated to open its books of accounts and records for scrutiny, so as to
enable the State to determine if the government share has been fully paid.
The State may likewise compel the contractors compliance with mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and
environmental protection, and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. Moreover, the contractor is also obligated to
assist in the development of the mining community and to pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned.
Cancellation of the FTAA may be the penalty for violation of any of its terms and conditions and/or noncompliance with
statutes or regulations. This general, all-around, multipurpose sanction is no trifling matter, especially to a contractor who
may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars sunk into a mining project.
Overall, considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just discussed, we believe that the State definitely
possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives,
and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor; likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to
impose sanctions, should the occasion therefor arise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to
follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the
government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
Fourth Substantive Issue: The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase "Agreements Involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance
In interpreting the first and fourth paragraphs of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners set forth the argument
that foreign corporations are barred from making decisions on the conduct of operations and the management of the mining
project. The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII reads:

x x x The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty percentum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty five years, renewable for not more than twenty five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law x x x.
The fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII provides:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country x x x.
Petitioners maintain that the first paragraph bars aliens and foreign-owned corporations from entering into any direct
arrangement with the government including those which involve co-production, joint venture or production sharing
agreements. They likewise insist that the fourth paragraph allows foreign-owned corporations to participate in the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but such participation, however, is merely limited to an
agreement for either financial or technical assistance only.
Again, this issue has already been succinctly passed upon by this Court in La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos.55 In discrediting such argument, the Court ratiocinated:
Petitioners claim that the phrase "agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance" simply meanstechnical
assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more and nothing else. They insist that there is no ambiguity in the
phrase, and that a plain reading of paragraph 4 quoted above leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a foreign-owned
corporation may enter into with the government is merely an agreement foreither financial or technical assistance only, for
the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils; such a limitation, they
argue, excludes foreign management and operation of a mining enterprise.
This restrictive interpretation, petitioners believe, is in line with the general policy enunciated by the Constitution reserving to
Filipino citizens and corporations the use and enjoyment of the countrys natural resources. They maintain that this Courts
Decision of January 27, 2004 correctly declared the WMCP FTAA, along with pertinent provisions of RA 7942, void for allowing
a foreign contractor to have direct and exclusive management of a mining enterprise. Allowing such a privilege not only runs
counter to the "full control and supervision" that the State is constitutionally mandated to exercise over the exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural resources; doing so also vests in the foreign company "beneficial
ownership" of our mineral resources. It will be recalled that the Decision of January 27, 2004 zeroed in on "management or
other forms of assistance" or other activities associated with the "service contracts" of the martial law regime, since "the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was
precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate."
xxxx
We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the
conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters choice of words -- their use of the phrase agreements x x
x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The
drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was
their intention to begin with. In this case, the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.
In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word "involving" as
used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do
with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or
"comprising."
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when understood in the
sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other
than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart
from such assistance -- something else already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement.
Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when
we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or financial
assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance and nothing
more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyones
mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited
from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such
stringent wording yields negative results. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and
deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression
"agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
Fifth Substantive Issue: Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized
Lastly, petitioners stress that the service contract regime under the 1973 Constitution is expressly prohibited under the 1987
Constitution as the term service contracts found in the former was deleted in the latter to avoid the circumvention of
constitutional prohibitions that were prevalent in the 1987 Constitution. According to them, the framers of the 1987

Constitution only intended for foreign-owned corporations to provide either technical assistance or financial assistance. Upon
perusal of the CAMC FTAA, petitioners are of the opinion that the same is a replica of the service contract agreements that the
present constitution allegedly prohibit.
Again, this contention is not well-taken. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not
carried over to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service contracts in mining activities, does
not mean that service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution. 56 The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however, safety
measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime. 57 We ruled, thus:
To our mind, however, such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively established from the mere failure to carry the same
expression or term over to the new Constitution, absent a more specific, explicit and unequivocal statement to that effect.
What petitioners seek (a complete ban on foreign participation in the management of mining operations, as previously
allowed by the earlier Constitutions) is nothing short of bringing about a momentous sea change in the economic and
developmental policies; and the fundamentally capitalist, free-enterprise philosophy of our government. We cannot imagine
such a radical shift being undertaken by our government, to the great prejudice of the mining sector in particular and our
economy in general, merely on the basis of the omission of the terms service contract from or the failure to carry them over
to the new Constitution. There has to be a much more definite and even unarguable basis for such a drastic reversal of
policies.
xxxx
The foregoing are mere fragments of the framers lengthy discussions of the provision dealing with agreements x x x
involving either technical or financial assistance, which ultimately became paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution. Beyond any doubt, the members of the ConCom were actually debating about the martial-law-era service
contracts for which they were crafting appropriate safeguards.
In the voting that led to the approval of Article XII by the ConCom, the explanations given by Commissioners Gascon, Garcia
and Tadeo indicated that they had voted to reject this provision on account of their objections to the "constitutionalization" of
the "service contract" concept.
Mr. Gascon said, "I felt that if we would constitutionalize any provision on service contracts, this should always be with the
concurrence of Congress and not guided only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress." Mr. Garcia
explained, "Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Sec. 3, even when they have been proven to be
inimical to the interests of the nation, providing, as they do, the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural resources for
the benefit of foreign interests." Likewise, Mr. Tadeo cited inter alia the fact that service contracts continued to subsist,
enabling foreign interests to benefit from our natural resources. It was hardly likely that these gentlemen would have
objected so strenuously, had the provision called for mere technical or financial assistance and nothing more.
The deliberations of the ConCom and some commissioners explanation of their votes leave no room for doubt that the
service contract concept precisely underpinned the commissioners understanding of the "agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance."
xxxx
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
"owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical knowhow, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
xxxx
It is therefore reasonable and unavoidable to make the following conclusion, based on the above arguments. As written by the
framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations -- as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control
and supervision of the State -- sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and utilize our mineral,
petroleum and other resources on a large scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people. 58
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942
and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40
insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo
Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that
score, we affirm. As a consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in
both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution,1 we now find it necessary to determine whether the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on
appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The
proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be
two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA 3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older
brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was
accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G. 5 All these cases were consolidated for
trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
2

Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them. During
trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them
were entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with
her grandmother.6 She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant
touched her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and
her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by
appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of her
grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she
was raped in an outdoor clearing9 after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing,
appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant
allegedly stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC, 11 the brutish acts appellant had done to her. 12 Her
mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary
evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988. 13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the
house appellant shared with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She
did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her. 14 BBB further testified that in
1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon,
and regardless of the time of day. 15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000. 16 On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA
in the house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her
three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert
her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant
placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her
clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had
molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again. 17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already
revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the
police station and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB
explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she
was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family. 18

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her
daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing
clothes for a game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter and
the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB.
However, it was only five months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC
lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it
was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested. 19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she was afraid that her husband
might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of
appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then. 20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of
Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical
certificates for each child. These medical certificates were presented in court. 21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical injury found
on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was
admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock"
which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual
penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times. 22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries apparent on her
body. AAA's labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas
said that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic
hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign
body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. 23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000,
he lived in the house of his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He
denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away
from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the
following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors.
He further asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces
and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored illfeelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members. 25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. 26 The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial and alibi as
unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant
failed to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's
relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were automatically elevated to this
Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo27 the present case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death
sentences imposed on appellant.28 The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of
the trial court except in at least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies
of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward.
Like the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was established with certitude that
the accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship
were proved by the victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the
same fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the
witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to her and her sister. 29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2)
cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate
court, it could not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished the
slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral
certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the
stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and she
answered in the negative.30 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape
from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief 31 before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in
the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6
June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. However, when
BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their
room at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's), the accused passed through a window, entered their room and
raped her again.32 Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape

on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July
2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies,
which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our
observations in People v. Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen
to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear
no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted.[34] As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by
confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect
her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too
painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate
matter, which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising
that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[35] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known
fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers
questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of her two
testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the People 38 filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the
inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the
last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or house of accused; and
the length of time he stayed on her top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration
that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she
felt something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed
weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first
rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she was first
raped by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and
1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own house. These
noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission accused's house or victim's house is not an essential
element of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are
inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over
the positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place
on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have
easily left his sister's house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house without much
difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. 41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant
consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. 42 In
this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The
lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to
counteract the accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did
not know anything about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father.
It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the
court and narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's
father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to
retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of
a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such
accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed. 43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the
wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 44 The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical
evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of
such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the
victims and their relationship with appellant were aptly established

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages of the victims when they were
raped but the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove
that they were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of
both victims being the brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of
consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering
that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been
held time and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. 45 Such
intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the
perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is
threatened with death if she would report the incident. 46
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts
but does not perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or any
indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the
hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]
Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last
time that this sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]
Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]
Q And what did you do when you feel painful?
A I cried, Mam. [sic]
Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.49 [sic]

In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from the
sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that
complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the
slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the term "slightest
penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at
the very least the labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the
victim's vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes
the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration,
more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated. We, therefore,
take exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's
vagina, the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act. From the
testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond
any shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no
basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby touching
the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an
essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced
the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. 51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of
death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death
sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.
Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such
as People v. Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be the more
challenging but interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each
count of attempted rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an
attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. 54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, which incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of
the victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to
have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two
degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the
provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. 56
xxxx

Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question.
The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more
degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the
maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty
comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have served the
minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence. 58 Thus, convicts
sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods. 59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the
range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act
No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment
of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term
within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty,
does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision
mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several
classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following
qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two different frames of reference. This
was especially made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death
Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as the
maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the
automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or
present;"60 kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;" 61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several crimes, including
murder,63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion
perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in
Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was
death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies
which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies.
Such situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if
consummated, of course would have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not "reclusion
perpetua to death."

The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that
based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion
perpetua to death" is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage,
"the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion
temporal."67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the
Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been
consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, since [RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last
paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees than death.
However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate
imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. 70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are
indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed
of two indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which
warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two
degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is
the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71".
Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of
Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetua to death," a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to
consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659,
passed in 1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized
with the single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the
sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of felonies for which the
imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated
beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear
statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or
attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No.
9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders
and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may,
given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause.
Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely
such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.

Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they impose
the death penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist
interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among
many examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through
the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for
attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for
the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that
Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape
of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper
graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it
would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or
a conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is
seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,72 a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in
the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions, this
could have been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an
accused to death," there would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions
would have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does
leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions
only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the
prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits
its effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the
crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for
having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had
no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death
penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower
in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of
penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account
the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same
penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We
do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic
effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal
law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to
have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the
provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices
are equalized in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that
they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the
death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the
penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y
would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since
Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord
with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in
kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the
principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no
legal justification other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were
punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable
by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this
section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the
same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the
anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of
commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death,"73 such as murder,
which may be frustrated.

Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their attempted
stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the
penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have
warranted the death penalty.74 If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted
felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even
though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would now be prision
mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted
felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the
Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to
designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different
attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect.
Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from
deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated
and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue
should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a means of
depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties
for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale
for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately
downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level
consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for
ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear
(reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as
amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the
principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in
sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple
kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the reference to "death" in
Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted
of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346,
for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be
so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to
form a complete, coherent and intelligible systema uniform system of jurisprudence. 75 "Interpreting and harmonizing laws
with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is
construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in
that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies,
and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused.77 If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice. 78The law is tender in favor of
the rights of an individual.79 It is this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that
animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346
ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death, dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act
No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the
case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent.
It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet
ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading
that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that
does not defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death
in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled
in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding modification in the other

periods [in penalties]", there being no expression of "such a requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or
indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing
in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty." 82
It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muozas
precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any
modifying circumstance, and thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muoz held that the
proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion temporalmaximum," with reclusion
temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that
ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination
of Muoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now befacing us, as the legal premises
behind Muoz are different from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the
proper penalty for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper penalty for
attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty,
but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now being whether Congress has
banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise framed, Muozdoes not preclude the Court
from concluding that with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has
unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided that "[n]either shall death penalty
be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muoz and its
progenies, have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting
an amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be
understood and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal
pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that
Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as
Congress very well did just four (4) years afterMuoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature
has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit
Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express
stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and
there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of
the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding
modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such
corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as
expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in
relation to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but
the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within
which the concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the
Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the
imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent to
retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of
"imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied in Article
71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have
been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness
sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on
life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard
characterized as "nothing but blather in search of meaning." 84 In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical
liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for both terms embody the operation in
law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no
question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the
extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death
penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect
necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not
swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress empowered by the
Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within
the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of

the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as
a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death
penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty
during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in a state of
hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the
death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft
of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muozlacked legal
justification when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous
sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as the governing precedent in the
matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines
entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes
listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was
accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines
attached to certain heinous crimes.86 The categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does official
recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary
indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of
damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify
those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application
of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been
downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their
abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the
reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding
modification of penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized
in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example,
in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer
be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized
in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal
Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of
an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible
penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees
lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons
previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary
penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that
"[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit
of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly
recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences
were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be
convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be
understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be
other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain
the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations
that frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death
sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from
two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2)
counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages andP10,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent
case of People v. Miranda.89
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence 90 in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six
(6) counts of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case
Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated
rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify
AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115824. January 28, 2000]
HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, COMMISSIONERS GUILLERMO P. ENRIQUEZ, JR.,
EDGAR DULA TORRE, FEDERICO S. COMANDANTE, ALEXIS CANONIZADO, PNP CHIEF SUPTS. ANSELMO AVENIDO,
JR., EFREN FERNANDEZ and RUFINO G. IBAY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City, and CIS Agents and the Regular
Employees Association, Inc., respondents. Sj cj
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant Petition seeks a review of the June 2, 1994 Judgment [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18393 for Prohibition and Mandamus.
Subject of the controversy is Resolution No. 93-032[2] issued by petitioner National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), through
its Chairman, petitioner Rafael Alunan III and its four Commissioners, Guillermo P. Enriquez, Jr., Edgar Dula Torre, Federico S.
Comandante and Alexis Canonizado. The Resolution provides, as follows
"NOW THEREFORE, the Commission, in the exercise of its power to administer and control the PNP under Sec.
6, Art. XVI, of the Constitution, in relation with (sic) Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6975, has resolved, as it hereby
resolves, to issue the following clarificatory guidelines regarding the application of Board of Officers
Resolution No. 5, dated 2 January 1992, as amended by Resolution No. 10, dated June 19, 1992:
1. That CIS Agents, including the NAPOLCOM operatives, who opted to be absorbed as nonuniformed personnel of the PNP and who were appointed to plantilla positions thereof, shall
be considered as civilian personnel of the PNP and covered by existing civil service laws,
rules and regulations affecting government employees in general;
2. That not being a part of the uniformed personnel of the PNP, such CIS Agents and
NAPOLCOM operatives are not empowered to exercise the powers of peace officers vested
by law to the PNP; such as (a) enforcement of laws; (b) effecting arrest, search and seizures;
and (c) investigation of the commission of crimes and offenses;
3. That as civilian personnel of the PNP, they shall be utilized mainly in purely
administrative, technical, monitoring or research work;
4. That the assignment of equivalent ranks to the aforementioned PNP non-uniformed
personnel should not be construed as an investiture of any command authority over the
lower level PNP uniformed personnel."[3]
This Resolution became the subject of a Prohibition and Mandamus suit filed with respondent court by private respondents in
their capacity as agents and regular employees of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS). [4] Private respondents complained
that the Resolution violates provisions of R.A. No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP) and R.A. No. 5750, the
law governing CIS agents. According to private respondents, R.A. No. 5750, which granted CIS agents, including civilian
operatives, police powers, has not been repealed by R.A. No. 6975, such that the CIS agents absorbed into the PNP, including
civilian operatives, still enjoy the police powers granted to them by R.A. No. 5750.
On November 25, 1993, respondent court issued a Temporary Restraining Order [5] against petitioners, followed by a writ of
preliminary injunction[6] enjoining the implementation of the Resolution. Following hearing on the merits of the case,
respondent Court rendered the Judgment subject of the instant Petition, granting the Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus filed by private respondents; thereby permanently enjoining the implementation of the subject Resolution and
any plans to phase out the CIS civilian operatives or deprive them of their police functions.
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following lone ground Supreme
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESOLUTION NO. 92-032 DOES NOT VIOLATE R.A. NO.
6975 BUT ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTS IT."[7]
It is not disputed that the questioned Resolution strips members of the CIS with police power and instead, classifies them as
civilian personnel of the PNP. This does not hold true for all former members of the CIS, but only applies to those who opted to
be absorbed as non-uniformed personnel of the PNP.
Does this violate R.A. No. 6975? We find that it does not.

Urged by the Constitutional mandate for the establishment and maintenance of one police force, [8] R.A. No. 6975 was
promulgated creating the Philippine National Police. The new police force absorbed the members of the former National Police
Commission, Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police, all three of which were accordingly abolished. [9]
R.A. No. 6975, therefore, had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substituting a new unified one in its
place. This, alone, proves that R.A. No. 5750 has already been repealed because a subsequent statute revising the whole
subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the earlier statute. The
revising statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever
is excluded therefrom is discarded. [10]
Further, with the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary, including, necessarily, its Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), R.A.
No. 5750, which provides for the qualifications, selection and appointment of civilian investigation agents of the CIS as well as
their powers as peace officers, has been rendered inutile. Indeed, considering that CIS members have been absorbed by the
new PNP, R.A. No. 5750 has lost its function.
Not only has R.A. No. 5750 lost its raison detre by reason of the abolition of the CIS which is its sole subject matter. A point by
point analysis of the law itself will readily show that it has, indeed, been superseded by R.A. No. 6975, the PNP law. Court
To start off, Section 30 of R.A. No. 6975 lists down the qualifications for appointment to the PNP, thus
superseding Section 1 of R.A. No. 5750. Then, too, the position of Deputy Chief as provided for under Section 2 no longer
exists inasmuch as the head of the equivalent Criminal Investigation Unit is now, under Section 35(b)(4), a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent. Neither is the period within which to comply with qualification requirements provided for
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 5750, still available under the PNP law, which only concedes alternative requirements insofar
as educational requirements are concerned for those already in the service upon its effectivity. Finally, the police powers
provided for underSection 5, as well as the oath and subpoena powers under Section 6, of R.A. No. 5750 are also
provided for under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975.
In light of the foregoing, it stands clear that respondent court was in error in holding that "(W)ithout an express provision in
the PNP Law which states clearly and explicitly that RA 5750 has been modified or repealed, such repeal or modification
cannot be assumed."
At any rate, it is beyond dispute that the police powers provided for under R.A. No. 5750 are also provided for under the PNP
law. The issue lies in the question as to who can exercise such police powers. We must stress that the questioned Resolution
does not strip all former CIS agents of police powers. As clarified above, only those who opted not to join the uniformed
personnel of the PNP are effectively denied such powers.
In effect, therefore, what is being introduced by the questioned Resolution is the concept that CIS civilian operatives may no
longer, under the PNP structure, enjoy police powers. As stated in the questioned Resolution, "R.A. No. 6975 envisioned the
PNP as a single national police organization, composed entirely of uniformed personnel who are to be appointed to their
respective police ranks, governed by one set of standards and covered by its own retirement and disciplinary systems."
Accordingly, police powers have been reserved for such uniformed personnel of the PNP.
That it is futile for private respondents to insist that they have a vested right to such powers may be demonstrated. Section
88 of R.A. No. 6975 provides, as follows
"SEC. 88. Transfer, Merger and Absorption of Offices and Personnel. - All properties, equipment and finances
of the transferred and absorbed agencies, including their respective financial accountabilities, are hereby
transferred to the Department.
The transfer, merger and/or absorption of any government office/unit concerned shall include the functions,
appropriations, funds, records, equipment, facilities, choses in action, rights, other assets and liabilities, if
any, of the transferred office/unit as well as the personnel thereof, who shall, unless removed for cause and
after due process, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities
and receive their corresponding salaries and benefits. Those personnel of the transferred, merged and/or
absorbed office/unit whose positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern
approved by the Department or who are not reappointed shall be given preference to join the Department or
any of the offices thereunder or shall be allowed to retire under existing laws, rules and regulations. x x x."
(underscoring, Ours) J lexj
It is clear from the aforequoted provision that the personnel of the absorbed office or unit, such as private respondents, shall
continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities only in a hold-over capacity. This necessarily implies that such
duties and responsibilities may very well be modified, changed or completely removed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 1994 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 in Civil Case No. Q-93-18393 is SET ASIDE. Let new judgment issue dismissing Civil Case No.
Q-93-18393 for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123850. January 5, 2001]
SPOUSES TIMOTEO RECAA, JR. and ESTER RECAA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA PADPAD,
LUCILA ARBOLEDA, ENRIQUE ARBOLEDA, AGUSTIN, REYNALDO, RODOLFO and ROLANDO all surnamed
ARBOLEDA in representation of their father ERNESTO ARBOLEDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to set aside the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on October 13, 1995 and its resolution[2] dated February 7, 1996, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
decision of the respondent court affirmed with modification the decision [3]of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 03, in
Civil Case No. 91-56327.
The subject of this case is Lot 6 of Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land which the Land Tenure Administration, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 1597,[4] sold to Macario Arboleda, petitioner-spouses predecessor-in-interest. The lot was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 7676 issued on February 1, 1962 in the name of Arboleda. Petitioner Ester Recaa and private
respondents are the children and heirs of Macario Arboleda. [5]
For many years, realty taxes on the lot had not been paid both before and after the death of Arboleda. Thus, on August
26, 1980, the City Treasurer of Manila auctioned the lot for sale due to tax delinquency, under Presidential Decree No. 464.
[6]
Spouses Cirilo and Miguela Montejo purchased the lot at a public auction and were issued a transfer certificate of title. [7]
On April 25, 1984, the Montejos sold the property to petitioner spouses, who also refunded the amount equivalent to the
delinquent taxes paid and other expenses entailed. Petitioners thus became the owners of the subject lot, evinced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1464015.[8]
On March 5, 1991, private respondents Aurora Padpad et al. filed Civil Case No. 91-56327 for declaration of co-ownership
and partition against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [9] They claimed co-ownership of the subject lot with
petitioners, asserting that the repurchase by the latter of the lot redounded to their benefit as co-heirs and now as coowners.In their complaint, they based their claim of co-ownership on the conditions of transfer in the deed of sale executed
between Macario Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration providing, inter alia, as follows:
2. Every conveyance shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal (heirs) within a period of five years
from the date of the conveyance;
5. That this contract shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective
parties thereof; and
6. That the condition contained in paragraph 2 hereof shall be annotated as encumbrance on the certificate of title to be
issued in favor of the VENDEE and/or his successor-in-interest.[10]
Private respondents also invoked the rule that redemption by a co-owner of auctioned property arising from foreclosure
redounds to the benefit of all co-owners. [11]
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents, then plaintiffs. It disposed
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiffs:
1) Declaring Lot 6, Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land, covered now by TCT No. 1464015, of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
in the name of Ester A. Recaa and Timoteo Recaa, as owned-in-common with equal shares by the plaintiffs and defendants

Aurora A. Padpad; Lucila Arboleda, Enrique Arboleda; the deceased Ernesto Arboleda, represented by his legal heir, Nenita
Agustin, Reynaldo, Rodolfo and Rolando; Ester Recaa; and Milagros A. Clar[a]val;
2) Ordering Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 1464014 in the name of Timoteo and Ester Recaa, and to issue in
lieu thereof a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the names of all the aforementioned co-owners with equal pro-indiviso shares
thereon;
3) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit, and
4) Dismissing the defendants counterclaim for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the lower court with modification and judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring Lot 6, Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land, covered now by TCT No. 164015 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, in
the name of Ester A. Recaa and Timoteo Recaa, as owned-in-common with equal shares by the plaintiffs and defendants
Aurora A. Padpad; Lucila Arboleda, Enrique Arboleda; the deceased Ernesto Arboleda, represented by his legal heirs, Nenita
Agustin, Reynaldo, Rodolfo and Rolando; Ester Recaa; and Milagros A. Clar[a]val;
2) Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 164015 in the name of Timoteo and Ester Recaa, and to issue in
lieu thereof a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the names of all the aforementioned co-owners with equal pro-indiviso shares
thereon;
3) Ordering the appellees to reimburse appellants for the expenses incurred by appellants in the repurchase of the land
proportionate to their respective pro-indiviso shares.
4) Ordering appellants to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, the present petition.
It is petitioners contention that the last paragraph of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1597, substantially reproduced in the
deed of sale between the Land Tenure Administration and Macario Arboleda, does not apply to the attendant facts and
circumstances in this case. Instead, they insist that it is Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 which is applicable. Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 1597, the law governing the subdivision of the Tondo Foreshore Lands from which the subject property emanated,
provides
Sec. 4. Lands acquired under this Act shall not, except in favor of the Government or any of its branches or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, be subject to encumbrance or alienation within 15 years after the date of the
issuance of the transfer certificate of title to the purchaser, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; Provided, however, that such lands may be mortgaged even before said
period has expired.
Every conveyance shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within a period of 5 years from
the date of conveyance.
Private respondents argue that since petitioners repurchased the property from the Montejo spouses well within the fiveyear period specified in the deed of sale and in Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, they are deemed to have redeemed the property
for all the co-owners, themselves including.
Petitioners, however, insist that it is Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 which should apply. This Section provides for a one-year
redemption period for properties foreclosed due to tax delinquency, thus:
Sec. 78. Redemption of real property after sale. - Within the term of one year from the date of the registration of the sale of
the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his representative, or in his absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the
property, shall have the right to redeem the same by paying the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy the total amount of
taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the costs of sale and the interest at the rate of twenty per centum on
the purchase price, and such payment shall invalidate the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall entitle the person
making the same to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or his deputy, stating that he had redeemed the
property.
xxx
Thus, according to petitioners, their repurchase of the property beyond the one-year redemption period under P.D. No.
464 was outside the ambit of a redemption of foreclosed property, hence, not for the benefit of all co-owners.
In addition, petitioners assert that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 does not apply to the present case because it refers to an
alienation outside the purview of foreclosure due to tax delinquency. They aver that Section 4 refers to a voluntary alienation,
conveyance and encumbrance made in favor of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities within 15 years from the
date the certificate of title was issued to the purchaser. These conveyances, they add, are subject to repurchase within five
years from the date of conveyance. In contrast, they allege that the conveyance involved in this case is an involuntary
conveyance, not covered by Section 4.
Petitioners also stress that R.A. No. 1597 is a special law enacted to apply to the Tondo Foreshore Lands. They further
point out that P.D. No. 464 is likewise a special law governing the collection of real property tax, regardless of whether the
owner acquired the property from a private person or from a government entity. They claim that no distinction whatsoever is
found in the decree on the nature and source of the tax delinquent property, whether express or implied.

Lastly, petitioners claim that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 has been expressly repealed and abrogated by P.D. No. 464, by
virtue of the following provision:
Sec. 111. Repealing Clause. Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Seventy, as amended; the pertinent provisions of
the charters of all cities; Section two thousand ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code; and all acts, laws or decrees or
parts of acts, laws or decrees inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Consequently, petitioners maintain that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, being inconsistent with Section 78 of P.D. No. 464,
was abrogated and repealed by the latter law, which took effect later on June 1, 1974.
In our view, the issue in this case is which of the two laws should apply in so far as the redemption period of the subject
property is concerned? More specifically, is Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 already repealed by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, such
that the latter provision governs the redemption period?
On one hand, we note that R.A. No. 1597 is a special law enacted specifically to govern all incidents of the subdivision of
the Tondo Foreshore Land. On the other hand, P.D. No. 464 covers all real property titled to individuals who become
delinquents in paying real estate tax. P.D. 464 is a law of general application. Its provisions have substantially been adopted
by the Local Government Code of 1991, a general statute. [14]
Basic in statutory construction is the rule that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law unless expressly so stated.Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that a
special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. [15]
We find no such intent to expressly repeal R.A. No. 1597 in the provisions of P.D. 464. Its repealing clause, Section 111,
specifically mentions Commonwealth Act No. 470; the pertinent provisions of the charters of all cities; Section 2092 of the
Revised Administrative Code; and all acts, laws or decrees or parts thereof inconsistent with P.D. 464, as having been
repealed or modified accordingly. However, it is settled that a declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number and title is repealed, is an express repeal; all other repeals are implied
repeals.[16] R.A. No. 1597 was not specifically mentioned in the repealing clause, Section 111 of P.D. 464.
Neither can Section 4, R.A. No. 1597 be considered to have been repealed impliedly. Repeal of laws should be made clear
and expressed.[17] Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. [18] Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is
clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. [19] The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent
was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws.[20] We find no such inconsistency or repugnancy between Section 4 of R.A. 1597 and Section 78 of P.D. No. 464.The
former law is of special and exclusive application to lots acquired from the Tondo Foreshore Land only. The latter is a law or
decree of general application. We concur in the view of the trial court and the respondent court that R.A. No. 1597 has not
been repealed.[21]
Petitioners insist that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 refers to voluntary conveyances, while Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 refers
to involuntary conveyances. This distinction is of no moment. Concerning encumbrances and alienations therein mentioned,
Section 4 makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances. There should also be no distinction in the
application of the law where none is indicated. [22] Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.[23]
The deed of sale between the then Land Tenure Administration and Macario Arboleda contains provisions which preclude
the application of Section 78, P.D. 464. As raised by private respondents in their complaint before the trial court, Paragraph 2
of the Deed of Sale contains the proviso of Section 4, R.A. 1597, that every conveyance of the lot shall be subject to
repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Paragraph 5 thereof also provides that the contract shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors,
and assigns of the respective parties thereof. [24] Even assuming for the sake of argument that Section 4 should be deemed
superseded, we have held that where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the
repeal or amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract, nor impair the right of the parties thereunder.
[25]
This rule applies even if one of the contracting parties is the government. [26] The stipulations in Paragraph 2 and Paragraph
5 being integral parts of the original contract between Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration, the five-year redemption
period in Section 4, R.A. 1597 becomes all the more pertinent and decisive of the controversy in the present case.
In the light of Section 4 of R.A. 1597, we hold that the respondent court committed no reversible error when it affirmed
the trial courts judgment. Petitioners repurchase of the subject lot within the five-year redemption period of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 1597 is within the purview of a redemption by a co-owner which inures to the benefit of all other co-owners of the
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 13, 1995, and its
resolution dated February 7, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 37751 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141211. August 31, 2001]
CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL, petitioner, vs. RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, RONEL N. AMPARO, ALFRED F.
LEHNER, RONALD C. RODRIGO, ANTHONY G. MUNSAYAC, ARIEL A. DEL ROSARIO, ORLANDO D. DEL
ROSARIO, VICTOR B. SAMSON, RICHARD S. NACUA, ALFONSO B. RELLOSO, ARMANDO A. REYES, MARY
GRACE H. TANUSAN, GARY ZALDE C. VELARDE, ELISEO G. PEREZ, FEDERICO P. MALONZO, ROMEO D.
DAPAT, LETICIA M. SANTOS, NAGAMURA A. MACABUAT, SULAIMAN M. MACALIM, RENATO S. MANLAPIG,
JOSE P. REYES, JOCELYN V. IBAEZ, JOEL D. AGUILAR, ISAGANI R. MANZO, MARVIN Q. PADRONES, CHARLIE
Q. QUIRMIT, ANDREW A. SALCEDO, EDUARDO E. GINETA, EDUARDO S. MARTINEZ, MOLLY G. LALIK,
GERARDO
J.
MALOGA, HENRY
B.
MANCILLA,
ARMANDO
C.
BUELAS,
and
RICHARD
C.
MAGALLON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order, dated November 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Manila,
directing by writ of habeas corpus the release from confinement of herein respondents.
The antecedents are as follows:
In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited various jails in Metro Manila. In the
City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four (34) prisoners, herein respondents, whom they believed were entitled to be released
after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences. The thirty-four (34) prisoners
and their sentences are the following:
1. Raymond Estrella y Serdan six (6) years for carnapping [1]
2. Ronel[2] Amparo y Nuez six (6) years for carnapping

[3]

3 Alfred Lehner y Feichti six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, for serious physical
injuries[4]
two sentences of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year of prision correccional, as
maximum, for illegal possession of drugs [5]
4. Ronald C. Rodrigo two (2) years imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [6]
5. Anthony Munsayac y Gonzales six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years for illegal possession of drugs [7]
6. Ariel del Rosario y Aguilar one (1) year imprisonment for illegal possession of fire-arms [8]
7. Orlando Del Rosario y Dela Cruz one (1) year imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [9]
8. Victor Samson y Bustos six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay the costs.[10]
9. Richard Nacua y Sanchez one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year of prision
correccional, as maximum, for illegal possession of drugs[11]
10. Alfonso Relloso y Barrantes[12] two (2) years and six (6) months of prision correccional for illegal possession of
drugs[13]
11. Armando Reyes y Alvarez two (2) years imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [14]
12. Mary Grace Tanusan y Habaro one (1) year of prision correccional minimum for illegal possession of drugs[15]
13. Gary Zalde Velarde y Concepcion two (2) months for theft[16] seven (7) months imprisonment for theft[17]
14. Eliseo Perez y Gutierrez eight (8) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [18]
15. Federico Malonzo y Perez six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [19]
16. Romeo Dapat y David six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [20]
17. Leticia Santos y Malorina six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [21]
18. Nagamura Macabuat y Ali six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [22]
19. Sulaiman Macaalin y Malawani[23] six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [24]
20. Renato Manlapig y Saulo six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs. [25]
21. Jose Reyes y Punzalan six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [26]
22. Jocelyn Ibaez[27] y Villejo three (3) months of arresto mayor for theft[28]
23. Joel Aguilar y Dagalan three (3) months imprisonment for violation of P.D. No. 9, par. 3 as amended by B.P. Blg.
6[29]
24. Isagani Manzo y Rio six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [30]
25. Marvin Padrones y Quintana six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [31]
26. Charlie Quirmit y Quintana six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs. [32]
27. Andrew Salcedo y Arcega six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [33]
28. Eduardo Gineta y Embuedo one (1) year imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [34]
29. Eduardo Martinez y Salva six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [35]
30. Molly Lalik y Gabunada six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [36]
31. Gerado Maloga y Jacinto six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [37]
32. Henry Mancilla y Barquin six (6) months and one (1) day of imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs. [38]
33. Armando Buelas y Clares six (6) months and one (1) day of imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [39]
34. Richard Magallon y Clarito six (6) months imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs [40]
Respondents asked herein petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the
ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97
and 99 of the Revised Penal Code which provide:
Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the
following deduction from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good
behavior;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each
month of good behavior;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days
for each month of good behavior; and
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each
month of good behavior.
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good
conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
However, petitioner City Warden denied respondents request on the ground that only the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections can grant them allowances for good conduct under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code. Nonetheless, on October
11, 1999, petitioner City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to respondents stating that had respondents been
credited time allowances for good conduct, they should have been released on the following dates indicated opposite their
names:
Date of Date of Date of Release
Confinement Decision after Deducting
Good Conduct
Time
Allowances
1. Raymond S. Estrella March 28, 1994 April 19, 1999 Feb. 22, 1999[41]
2. Ronel N. Amparo March 29, 1994 June 27, 1994 Feb. 23, 1999[42]
3. Alfred F. Lehner June 21, 1996 Aug. 26, 1998 April 16, 1999[43]
4. Ronald C. Rodrigo Oct. 28, 1997 Dec. 10, 1997 June 28, 1999[44]
5. Anthony G. Munsayac Oct. 12, 1997 Feb. 20, 1998 Aug. 2, 1999[45]
6. Ariel A. Del Rosario Oct. 2, 1998 April 7, 1999 Aug. 2, 1999[46]
7. Orlando D. Del Rosario Oct. 31, 1998 Feb. 9, 1999 Aug. 2, 1999[47]
8. Victor B. Samson Oct. 16, 1998 Nov. 17, 1998 Aug. 8, 1999[48]
9. Richard S. Nacua Oct. 15, 1998 Jan. 27, 1999 Aug. 15, 1999[49]
10. Alfonso B. Relloso May 23, 1997 Aug. 24, 1999 Aug. 23, 1999[50]
11. Armando A. Reyes Oct. 25, 1997 Aug. 4, 1999 Aug. 25, 1999[51]
12. Mary Grace H. Tanauan Oct. 10, 1998 Feb. 8, 1999 Aug. 30, 1999[52]
13. Gary Zalde C. Velarde Jan. 21, 1999 Feb. 9, 1999 Sept. 6, 1999[53]
14. Eliseo G. Perez Feb. 22. 1999 June 25, 1999 Sept. 12, 1999[54]
15. Federico G. Malonzo April 18, 1999 Sept. 1, 1999 Sept. 18, 1999[55]
16. Romeo D. Dapat April 18, 1999 Sept. 1, 1999 Sept. 18, 1999[56]
17. Leticia M. Santos April 30, 1999 Sept. 1, 1999 Sept. 30, 1999[57]
18. Nagamura A. Macabuat May 4, 1999 Sept. 9, 1999 Oct. 4, 1999[58]
19. Sulaiman M. Macalim May 4, 1999 Sept. 9, 1999 Oct. 4, 1999[59]
20. Renato S. Manlupig May 5, 1999 Sept. 2, 1999 Oct. 5, 1999[60]
21. Jose P. Reyes May 10, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Oct. 10, 1999[61]
22. Jocelyn V. Ibaez July 28, 1999 Aug. 20, 1999 Oct. 13, 1999[62]
23. Joel D. Aguilar Aug. 29, 1999 Sept. 16, 1999 Oct. 14, 1999[63]
24. Isagani R. Manzo May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, 1999 Oct. 21, 1999[64]
25. Marvin Q. Padrones May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, 1999 Oct. 21, 1999[65]
26. Charlie Q. Quirmit May 21, 1999 Aug. 25, 1999 Oct. 21, 1999[66]
27. Andrew A. Salcedo June 1, 1999 Sept. 1, 1999 Nov. 1, 1999[67]
28. Eduardo E. Gineta June 17, 1998 March 15, 1999 Nov. 17, 1999[68]
29. Eduardo S. Martinez June 20, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Nov. 20, 1999[69]
30. Molly G. Lalik June 21, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Nov. 21, 1999[70]
31. Gerardo J. Maloga June 26, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Nov. 26, 1999[71]
32. Henry B. Mancilla June 24, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Nov. 26, 1999[72]

33. Armando C. Buelas June 24, 1999 Aug. 26, 1999 Nov. 26, 1999[73]
34. Richard C. Magallon June 29, 1999 Aug. 25, 1999 Nov. 29, 1999[74]
On October 15, 1999, respondents, represented by the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid, filed in this Court a petition
for habeas corpus, alleging that
4.4 [Petitioner] Manila City Jail Warden has issued verified certifications to the effect that the [respondents] have exhibited
good behavior and exemplary conduct in the service of their sentences. These grant [respondents] an irrevocable good
conduct time allowance pursuant to Article 99 of the same Code.
4.5. By virtue of the good behavior and exemplary conduct of the [respondents] as duly recognized by the [petitioner], the
former are now entitled to demand as a matter of right, and the latter is justified in granting, their release from their present
confinement considering the fact that they are deemed to have fully served the period of their respective sentences.
4.6 [Respondents], however, remain in confinement at the MCJ and are continually deprived of their liberty because of the
refusal of the [petitioner] Manila City Jail Warden, or other wardens other than the Director of Prisons, to grant their release;
4.7 [Petitioner] justifies his refusal to release the prisoners from confinement with this Honorable Courts ruling in the case of
People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 1-21805, February 25, 1967, a pertinent portion of which reads:
There is no justification in the provincial wardens usurping the authority of the Director of Prisons in crediting the
prisoner with good conduct time allowance. Such authority is exclusively vested in the Director.
4.8. Under the present organization of the jail system, all city, provincial, and municipal jails are now under the Bureau of Jail
Management, which in turn is under the supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). On the other
hand, the Director of Prisons (now the Director of the National Bureau of Corrections) is under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and has no authority over jail wardens in the cities, provinces, and municipalities;
4.9 It appears that the provisions of Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of a concurrent change in
the designation of the officer authorized to grant the time allowance from the National Director (formerly the Director of
Prisons) to the Jail Wardens, was rendered ineffective and inapplicable as far as the prisoners confined in the city, provincial,
and municipal jails are concerned.
4.10 The above interpretation, if sustained, would favor some prisoners to the detriment and prejudice of [respondents], who
are detained at the Manila City Jail, clearly a palpable violation of the constitutional mandate to equal protection of the law.
4.11 On the other hand, Articles 97 and 99 should be construed in a manner consistent with the Constitution and favorable to
herein [respondents] to the effect that the authority to grant the good conduct allowances has been shifted to the respective
jail wardens, who, despite the different nomenclature of their position, perform the same function and responsibility as
custodians of the [respondents] while in the service of their respective sentences.
4.12 It is most respectfully submitted that the above provisions shall be construed in a manner that would not lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684). In
one case, it was held by this Honorable Supreme Court that a Legal provision being susceptible of two interpretations, the
Supreme Court adopts the one in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most
reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and harmonious with other
provisions of law (Sesbreno vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360).
4.13 Thus, [respondents] cannot be deprived of their liberty simply because Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code
were rendered obscure, silent, and insufficient by the reorganization of the jail management without the correlative revisions
on the title or name of the proper officer to be vested with the authority to grant the mandated allowance for good
behavior. Verily, it was never intended in the reorganization to deny the grant of good conduct allowance as an incentive to
hasten the reformation and rehabilitation of the [respondents];
4.14 Pending remedial legislation to address the resulting violation of the constitutional right of [respondents] and those
similarly affected, [respondents] seek their release by praying that this Honorable Court order the [petitioner] Chief Inspector
Rosendo M. Dial, in his capacity as City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to release herein [respondents], in the exercise of its
judicial power and pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code which states:
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. [75]
In the resolution of November 15, 1999, [76] the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus which it made returnable to the
Regional Trial Court, Manila. The case was eventually raffled to Branch 52 of that court. In his return, [77] petitioner City
Warden, through the Solicitor General, opposed the release of respondents, arguing that while the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections no longer exercises authority over city and municipal prisoners, he remains the sole authority under Art. 99 of the
Revised Penal Code who can grant time allowances for good conduct to prisoners.
It turned out that 22 of the 34 respondents had already been released. [78] These were Ronald C. Rodrigo, Anthony G.
Munsayac, Ariel A. Del Rosario, Orlando D. Del Rosario, Victor B. Samson, Richard S. Nacua, Armando A. Reyes, Mary Grace H.
Tanusan, Gary Zalde C. Velarde, Eliseo G. Perez, Federico P. Malonzo, Romeo D. Dapat, Leticia M. Santos, Nagamura A.
Macabuat, Sulaiman M. Macalim, Renato S. Manlapig, Jose P. Reyes, Jocelyn V. Ibaez, Joel D. Aguilar, Charlie Q. Quirmit,
Andrew A. Salcedo, and Molly G. Lalik. On November 22, 1999, the trial court issued its challenged order directing petitioner
City Warden to release from confinement respondents Raymond S. Estrella, Ronel N. Amparo, Alfred F. Lehner, Alfonso B.
Relloso, Isagani R. Manzo, Marvin Q. Padrones, Eduardo E. Gineta, and Eduardo S. Martinez, while deferring the release of
respondents Gerardo J. Maloga, Henry B. Mancilla, and Armando C. Buelas until November 26, 1999 and respondent Richard
C. Magallon until November 29, 1999.[79]

The trial court held that (1) the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer has jurisdiction over city and municipal
jails, and it is thus legally impossible for him to grant time allowances for good conduct to herein respondents who are
inmates of the Manila City Jail; (2) respondents had been denied the equal protection of the laws because national prisoners,
who are still under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, may be dispensed benefits by him under Art. 97,
whereas local prisoners, over whom he lost authority, control, and supervision, are left with no one to dispense benefits under
Art. 97;[80] and (3) that the certifications issued by petitioner City Warden constituted sufficient basis to grant respondents
release under Art. 97. It held that in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction under Art. 9 of the Civil Code, it could fill in
the hiatus or gap [in the law] on who is to grant local prisoners good conduct time allowance under Art. 97.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General.
I.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first deal with the technical objections raised by respondents.
First. Respondents contend that the petition was filed late on December 2, 1999 because both petitioner City Warden
and the Office of the Solicitor General received the questioned release order on November 22, 1999. [81]
The contention is without merit. Under B.P. Blg. 129, 39, the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight
(48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. [82]Petitioner thus had until November 24, 1999 to appeal. However,
on November 23, 1999, prior to the expiration of the period to appeal, the Solicitor General asked for an extension of fifteen
(15) days from November 24, 1999, or until December 9, 1999, within which to file the present petition. The Court having
granted the motion,[83] the instant petition was timely filed on December 2, 1999.
Second. Respondents contend that the City Warden did not authorize the filing of the present petition, and that the City
Warden in fact ordered the release of all of the respondents a few days after the issuance of the assailed order of November
22, 1999. Corollary to this, they contend that the petition should be verified by the City Warden, who is the real party in
interest, and not by the Solicitor General or the latters assistants.
This contention likewise lacks merit. Under P.D. No. 78, 1, [84] the Office of the Solicitor General is the legal representative
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer, excepting only as may otherwise be
provided by law. That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release order of the trial court by his compliance
therewith does not preclude the Solicitor General from taking a contrary position and appealing the same. The Solicitor
Generals duty is to present what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the Government. [85]
With respect to respondents objection to the verification of the petition for review filed in this case, Rule 7, 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.[86]
The verification in this case, by Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag, states:
2. I was involved in the preparation of the foregoing Petition For Review on Certiorari.
3. I have read the same, the contents of which are true and correct based on my knowledge and belief. [87]
This complies with the requirement of Rule 7, 4 as above quoted.
II.
With respect to the merits, the Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred
IN RULING THAT CITY WARDENS MAY GRANT GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE UNDER ARTICLES 97 AND 99 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
The Solicitor General contends that despite changes in the organizational structure of the prison system, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive authority for granting good conduct time allowances and, therefore, it was
error for the lower court to order the release of respondents on the basis of certifications issued by the City Warden as to time
allowances for good conduct that respondents are entitled to.
Respondents argue that the trial court did not actually rule that the City Warden can grant good conduct time allowances
under Art. 97 but merely relied on the City Wardens certifications regarding the prison records of respondent, thus:
While it appears that the recent reorganization in the structure and management of the jail system created a hiatus or
gap on who is to grant local prisoners good conduct time allowance under Art. 97, however, this Court opines and must
hold that does not stop, deter, prevent this Court from extending reliefs to petitioners on their benefits under Art. 97,
since after all, they became and remained entitled thereto. In his certifications (Exhs. A to A-33) issued, respondent
Warden confirmed that petitioners behaved properly and exhibited conduct during their entire incarceration in the jail
and that if Art. 97 be applied in their favor, they are already eligible for release. Considering the clear pronouncement of
the Warden himself, who has immediate control and supervision over petitioners, this Court, thus, sees no valid and
justifiable reason/ground why such certifications would not be enough, under the present circumstances, to grant
petitioners their entitled benefits under Art. 97, ergo, their immediate release, even in the absence of a new law or rule
designating the authority which shall determine and grant such benefits on good conduct time allowance on local
prisoner. Parenthetically, it cannot be denied that the Warden is in a better position than the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to determine who among the prisoners behaved well to be entitled under Art. 97. Obviously, the Director, in
performing his tasks under Art. 99, has to refer, rely and depend on the report and recommendations of the warden of
subject prisoners.[88]

We hold that the trial court erred in ordering the release of respondents before full service of their sentences without the
certification at least of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections as to their good conduct time allowances.
First. The trial court held that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, now the Bureau of Corrections, [89] no longer has the
authority to grant good conduct time allowances to inmates in the provincial, city, and municipal jails in view of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which
places provincial, city, and municipal jails under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Jail Management. [90]
The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that the authority to grant good conduct time allowances flows from the
grant of the power of supervision and control, so that only those vested with this power can grant good conduct time
allowances to prisoners. But this is not so. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of
Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It was the Chief of Police of Manila who under 34 of the
Charter shall exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners. And yet, the Director
of Prisons was acknowledged as the authority for granting good conduct time allowances to all prisoners regardless of their
place of detention.
Neither is there any inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No. 6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the
contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi.[91] For there to be an implied repeal, there must
be a clear showing of repugnance. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what
has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. [92]
Second. Nor is there any basis for the conclusion of the trial court that it could rely on the certifications issued by the
City Warden as to the good conduct time allowances ofrespondents because the Director of the Bureau of Corrections would
also have to depend on the same anyway as respondents are not under his control and supervision. The question here is who
has authority to grant good conduct time allowances, not on what basis such allowances should be made.
In Kabigting v. Director of Prisons, [93] it was held that in habeas corpus proceedings, the trial court has no power to grant
the petitioner time allowances for good conduct [because] in accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code it is the
Director of the Prisons who shall grant allowances for good conduct if such good conduct has been observed by the prisoner
concerned. In People v. Tan,[94] it was emphatically held that a provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a
prisoner and order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners good conduct
time allowances exclusively in the Director and [in] no one else. In that case, the prisoner was under the supervision and
control of the provincial warden, but the authority of the Director to grant good conduct time allowances was upheld. Indeed,
there is nothing in R.A. No. 6975 which repeals Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, there are good reasons for holding in this case that the trial court could not rely on the certifications issued by
the City Warden in crediting respondents with time allowances for good conduct. In the first place, the certifications issued by
the City Warden lacked data on the dates when respondents started serving sentence. [95] Such data are important because, as
has been observed, good conduct time allowances under Art. 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their
sentence.[96] While Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
full or four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that the prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Art. 97
during such period of preventive detention.
In the second place, the certifications issued by the City Warden contain errors. Some of the data stated therein are
contrary to those stated in the documents submitted by respondents in support of their petition for habeas corpus. For
example, in the case of respondent Alfred F. Lehner, the City Wardens certification states that he was sentenced on August
26, 1998 to imprisonment for three (3) years to four (4) months and one (1) day in Criminal Case Nos. 96-150703-04.
However, Lehners sentence in each of those cases was actually a prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year of prision correccional, as maximum,[97] and the decision was rendered on August 30, 1996, not
August 26, 1998 as stated in the certification. In the case of Gary Zalde Velarde y Concepcion, the City Wardens certification
erroneously states Velardes sentence in Criminal Case No. 314691-SA to be for seven (7) months to two (2) months
imprisonment[98] when his sentence was actually two (2) months. [99] He was sentenced to seven (7) months for theft in
another case,[100] which fact was not disclosed in the certification.
Needless to say, the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the authority granted by
Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of Prisons, but that is altogether a different kettle of fish from the question
posed in this case. Here, the question is whether a court may rely on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct
time allowances in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus. We hold that it cannot, in view of Art. 99 of the
Revised Penal Code vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances solely in the Director of Prisons.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to order the re-arrest of all of respondents. This can be done without placing
them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the
penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances in their favor. [101]
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is SET ASIDE and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial judge for further
proceedings, taking into account the certification of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections as to the good conduct time
allowances to which respondents may be entitled, by either granting the writ of habeas corpus with respect to some of the
respondents or ordering the re-arrest of others, as the facts may warrant.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 106560. August 23, 1996]
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS and SALVADOR BIJIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Provincial Board
of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning
elected candidate. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision [1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 09689 reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in that the actual damages of P50,000.00 are
hereby reduced to P40,000.00 and the moral damages P100,000.00 awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Costs de officio.
"SO ORDERED."
The antecedents:
In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental,
composed of 1.) the Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as
Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, [2] as member, proclaimed
the winners for Governor, Vice-Governor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988
election. The candidates proclaimed were:
PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
Name No. of Votes
For Governor:
Leopoldo Lopez 59,309 votes
Francisco Rabat 51,191 votes
For Vice-Governor:
Modesto Avellanosa 46,353 votes
Josefina Sibala 54,083 votes
For Provincial Board Members
1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes
2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes
3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes
4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes
5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes
6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes
7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes
8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes
The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate for the Board, Erlinda
Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena.
Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and proclamation statements of winning candidates
were finished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated
representative during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the Tabulation Committee.
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session and undertook the following activities:
"1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at exactly 10:25 a.m.
"2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional Office and Manila.
"3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers during official session, the same was not given appropriate official recognition. (Exh. "7-B", p. 2, Minutes of
Provincial Board of Canvassers, January 21, 1988)
The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written protests [3] with the Board
of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")

Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the COMELEC a complaint
against the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of
1987). After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board
Members. The pertinent portions of the information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231 in
Relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:
"That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively,
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections, conspiring with, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda Irigo as
elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth highest number of votes cast in
said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes."
"CONTRARY TO LAW"[4]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos. 1885 and 1887 are hereby DISMISSED, with
costs de oficio, and the accused considered acquitted. Their bail bonds are ordered canceled and released.
"In Criminal Case No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador Bijis and Benjamin Miano GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principals for violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", and hereby sentences each of them to ONE (1) YEAR
IMPRISONMENT which shall not be subject to probation. In addition, they are sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Said accused are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Erlinda Irigo the amounts
of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs
of the proceedings.
"Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections, and the Honorable Secretaries of Justice
and Education, Culture and Sports.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 43-44, Decision)
The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in this petition.
Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:
a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass, and not mere erroneous
proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the Board of Canvassers
itself.
c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged protest to the Board of
Canvassers.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case.
We find the petition without merit.
On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the pertinent provision of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue that they are not liable under the said law because they complied with all the
requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code - 1. a certificate of canvass was prepared, 2. the same was duly
supported by a statement of votes of each of the candidates, and 3. it was on the basis of the certificate of canvass that the
winners were proclaimed. Only, the certificate was erroneous.
According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect certificate of
canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the
corresponding certificate, the board for some reason fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof.
On the other hand, the People's counsel maintains that petitioners' challenges on this particular issue is a question of
semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there was a failure to proclaim the winning
candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing candidate;
that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this
case, Erlinda Irigo.Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from
criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing
candidate or failure to proclaim the winning candidate, the result is the same - the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and
hence, injustice is the end result.
We agree with the respondents.
The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the
thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each
polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes
cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election
offense."
To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing boards of
canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by just putting up the inexcusable defense that the
"foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" [5] in one municipality or that "the basis of their
proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation committee." That would be a neat apology for allowing the
board to be careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their "duty" of
proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass - even "erroneous" certificates - which they
made.
At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case No. 88-100, disposing of the
complaint filed with the COMELEC issued by Regional Election Director Resurreccion Borra of Region XI, in relation to the
preliminary investigation conducted by him on said case. Director Borra testified on this resolution [6] (Exh. Z) under crossexamination by the prosecution, certain portions of which are material to the case:
"But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to dispute. This undeniable fact is conveniently
ignored by Respondents' Memorandum. In the exhibits of the complainant, the computerized tabulation of votes based from
the statements of votes by precinct in each of the 121 Municipalities of Davao Oriental for all of the 600 precincts and even
admitted by the Respondents that there was no error in the tabulation of votes in CA 26-A. Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes
and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes by Irigo over Pena. From the ranking, Irigo would have been
ahead of Pena, and she should have been No. 8 in the winning list of 8 candidates instead of Pena. But in the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices, Pedro T. Pena was included as No. 8 in the
winning list and proclaimed as No. 8 Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for each precinct per municipality of the
Province, admitted that the PBC prepared the statements of votes. x x x The statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been
the basis for the proclamation of the winning candidates for Provincial Offices. Complainant's documentary and testimonial
evidences showed that the PBC proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those candidates who obtained the 8 highest
number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which violated the legal requirement of the 2nd paragraph
of Section 231 of BP No. 881 as amended.
"The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement that (sic) the basis for the
proclamation of Pena when he was not among the eight candidates who obtained the highest number of votes as evidenced
by the statements of votes. In fact they admitted that the basis was not the statement of votes but the erroneous ranking by
the Tabulators. x x x"[7]
It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make a mistake in selecting the 8
candidates with the highes votes for purposes of making the certificate of canvass because there was no error in the
tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and
Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if not made deliberately. This
situation only illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners for it
would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez,[8] the court observed:
"Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly contested election, the partisan spirit
of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will lead them beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery,
fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has led
the legislature to adopt very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his
ballot to guard the purity of elections." "The infinite ingenuity of violent spirit in evading the rules and regulations of elections
and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the
conduct of elections. The very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the
courts are replete with cases in which the result of an election has been attacked on the ground that some provisions of the
law have not been complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a purpose and should be observed.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the protest made by
candidate Irigo's daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the Board of Canvassers itself; and that the failure of
the member of the verification/tabulation committee concerned to apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be
taken against the members of the Board.
We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned resolution:
"The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board
of Canvassers) the responsible action of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to
the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members themselves were the ones who certified under
oath the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under their direct supervision
and control."
Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the Board was informed of
the fact that an error may have been committed in the tabulation; and that however, having discharged its function of making

the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers becamefunctus oficio and could no longer
correct the erroneous proclamation.
As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio" after it
proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point.What matters is whether or not petitioners committed an election
offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo's watcher made a timely verbal protest to the Tabulation Committee.
Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated
representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a witness; that Erlinda Irigo, upon whose
testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of protest, was not present during the canvassing proceedings;
that Mrs. Irigo's testimony on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial
court; that no other evidence having been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Irigo's representative, such
fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that there was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court
of Appeals to hold that the Board was deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the
members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo's testimony is hearsay evidence, there is still ample
evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have been informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof
were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
The resolution[9] of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary investigation. The import of
those deliberations show that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the
tabulation committee was under the supervision of the Board. [10] As regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he
admitted that he signed the minutes of the Board to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in the morning after the
proclamation, the Board's business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," [11] thus showing that the proclamation in
question had been made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the
Board, he admitted having stated in the minutes [12] that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative of
Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with the tabulation committee and not with the Board; and that he did not
care to examine the partial results for each provincial candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena. [13]
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof.[14]
On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing
gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any
stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to
Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners' allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically provides the
contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. [15] The Omnibus Election
Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco
Rabat is valid.
The counsel for the people points out and we agree"Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability during the trial if he has not waived it.
[16]

"In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose rights were trampled upon, by the
indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
"The persistence of Erlinda Irigo's lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated, in the proceedings a quo as private
prosecutors over the vehement objections of petitioners' counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim
damages from petitioners."[17]
In U.S. v. Heery,[18] this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil liability of the accused nor
reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the
course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages. Thus, the arguments of the petitioners
notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo.
After the People's counsel has filed respondents' comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein they raised for the first
time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the crime under which petitioners were convicted no longer exists because
Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1991) were subsequently
approved on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991, respectively; that these two laws amended the Omnibus Election Code
by deleting certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that among those amended was Section 231, which was
modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by
the Board of Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of the old
Omnibus Election Code under which Petitioners had been convicted.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [19] However, since
RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had rendered its decision, and while the case was already pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals, and in order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the issue.
Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by R.A. 7166 because said
Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166 which we quote:

"Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. - Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus Election Code are hereby repealed.
Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111 and 112 as among election offenses is also hereby repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive effect.
"Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and 157 and all other laws, orders, decrees, rules
and regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or
repealed accordingly."
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly," certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it. [20]
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166.
While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the Canvassing by the Boards
of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act. [21] The provisions of the subject
laws are quoted below for comparison:
"Sec. 231. - Canvass by the board. - The board of canvassers shall meet not later than six o'clock in the afternoon of election
day at the place designated by the Commission to receive the election returns and to immediately canvass those that may
have already been received. It shall meet continuously from day to day until the canvass is completed, and may adjourn but
only for the purpose of awaiting the other election returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board
adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each candidate for each office, furnishing the Commission
in Manila by the fastest means of communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained therein to
the mass media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall immediately
resume canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed.
"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the
thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each
polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes
cast in the province, city municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election
offense.
"Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their canvass within thirty-six hours in
municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation hereof shall be an election offense
punishable under Section 264 hereof.
"With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of canvassers shall prepare in
quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and
transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa. The second copy shall be transmitted to the
Commission, the third copy shall be kept by the provincial election supervisor or city election registrar; the fourth and the fifth
copies to each of the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)." [22]
"Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. - (a) The city or municipal board of
canvassers shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the
certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and elective
provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.
"(b) The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall canvass the election returns for
President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective city officials. Upon completion of
the canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of House of Representatives and city officials.
"(c) (1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a district board of canvassers
which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of representatives and
elective municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, VicePresident, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and municipal
officials.
"(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area shall have a municipal hoard of canvassers
which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, xxx
"(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President, xxx
"(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials as well as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is
conducted simultaneously with the same election, as submitted by the board of canvassers of municipalities and component
cities.Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators
and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and provincial officials as well as the plebiscite
results, if any."[23]
While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In order to effect a repeal by
implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. [24] "It is necessary, says the court in a case, [25] before such repeal is deemed to
exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be

inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in
the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice." [26] For it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. [27] The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied
repeal.[28] For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.[29]
In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present. Neither is there any
inconsistency between the two subject provisions.The explanation of a legal scholar [30] on the subject, particularly on Section
1 of BP 881 is enlightening:
"The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines is Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which was enacted into law on December 3,
1985. It codified all previous election laws. It has undergone some amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic
Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reform Law of 1987," and Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized
national and local elections on May 11, 1992.
"The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have been enacted every time an election for
elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election Code remains the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of
legislations are designed to improve the law and to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections."
Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony xxx, this provision cannot be applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of
BP 881[31] was not repealed by subsequent legislations, contrary to petitioners contention that Section 231 was so repealed by
R.A. Nos. 6646 and 7166.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97356. September 30, 1992.]
HON. ARTURO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority, and EUFRACIO SEGUNDO C. PAGUNURAN, in his capacity as Chairman of the Department of
Transportation and Communications Administrative Action Board, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG and CRISTETO E. DINOPOL, Respondents.
Abad, Bautista & Associates for respondent Dinopol.
Jose F. Miravite for respondent Bungubung.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY;

GENERAL MANAGER WITH AUTHORITY TO REMOVE PERSONNEL BELOW THE RANK OF ASSISTANT MANAGER. The issue of

the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager of the PPA has been raised and settled in Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals. The Court, after discussing
the nature of an attached agency and its relationship with the Department to which it is attached, held: "Hence, the
inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free
from Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides: . . . (d) The General
Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO INVESTIGATE PERSONNEL, IMPLIEDLY GRANTED. Although the foregoing section does not
expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the
power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant (General) Manager who may be charged with an administrative
offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No.
807. Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It
is the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
3. ID.; ID.; SECRETARY OF THE DOTC; ONLY WITH APPELLATE JURISDICTION. The DOTC Secretarys jurisdiction is
circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the
power to initiate proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd spectacle of the
DOTC Secretary acting as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him to review.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINTS INITIATED BY PROPER OFFICIAL OR ANY AGGRIEVED PARTY; SECRETARY SHOULD INHIBIT
HIMSELF FROM FILING COMPLAINT. What is prescribed by the law and the Beja case is that all complaints against a PPA
official or employee below the rank of Assistant General Manager shall be filed before the PPA General Manager by the proper
officials, such as the PPA police or any aggrieved party. The aggrieved party should not, however, be one and the same official
upon whose lap the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex. No man can
be at once a litigant and judge. Unless, of course, in an exceptional case, such official inhibits himself or expresses his
willingness at the outset to waive his right to review the case on appeal.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHERE A LATER SPECIAL LAW IS REPUGNANT TO A PRIOR GENERAL
LAW, A PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE LATTER WILL BE IMPLIED. The Court, however, agrees with the Court of Appeals
ratiocination in arriving at the conclusion that Sec. 8, Art. V of the PPA Charter should prevail over Sec. 37(b) of the Civil
Service Law, considering that where a later special law on a particular subject is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, a prior
general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter will be implied to the extent of the inconsistency, or an
exception grafted upon the general law. Since, in a sense, the two laws are in pari materia, both should be construed as to
harmonize with each other. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
6. ID.; ID.; REASON. For the assumption is that whenever the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed
enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; ISSUE THEREON MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL; REQUISITE; CASE AT BAR. While it
is true that a party may be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction on appeal, such estoppel may be invoked
successfully only if the party failed to raise such question in the early stages of the proceedings. The records show that
Bungubung did not wait for the rendition of an AAB decision before he questioned its jurisdiction. After filing his answer, he
filed a motion to dismiss on the issue of jurisdiction and even went to the extent of elevating the issue to this Court. For his
part, Dinopol also filed a motion to dismiss the case against him and, upon its denial, filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
absence of proof of laches on the part of the private respondents, the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA
29) upon which petitioners rely, is inapplicable. As correctly pointed out by counsel for respondent Dinopol, it has been clearly
held in People v. Eduarte (182 SCRA 750) that the ruling in the Tijam case is but an exception to the general rule that the lack
of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE ISSUE INVOLVES A
QUESTION OF LAW. Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable in this case. Besides the fact
that the AAB was patently without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed against respondents Dinopol and
Bungubung, the instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the exceptions to the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Most enlightening is the following portion of the decision in Quisumbing v. Gumban: ". . . The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the principle
requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is a purely legal one;
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in
disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim
being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy."

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari once again puts in issue the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) Secretarys power to discipline employees of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) below the rank of Assistant General
Manager in his capacity as alter ego of the President.
On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25 creating a Presidential Committee on Public
Ethics and Accountability, Sec. 1 of which declares as a policy that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Department Secretary shall be directly responsible to the President in eradicating graft and corruption in his Department
and the offices, agencies, government-owned or controlled corporations attached to or under his Department. The
Department Secretary shall likewise be responsible to the President for the implementation of policies and programs to
minimize or prevent graft and corruption and to promote the ethical standards of public service."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pursuant to the mandate of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating the
Administrative Action Board (AAB) "to act, decide and recommend to the Secretary appropriate measures on cases of
administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 26, 1988, two PPA police officers, Rosmelito del Mundo and Geronimo Gorospe, filed in the AAB which was then
presided by Chairman Onofre Villaluz, a complaint for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
against Leopoldo Bungubung, District Manager of the Port of Manila (AAB-031-88).
Bungubung filed his answer but later, he filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the
ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA who had jurisdiction over the case. AAB denied the motion to dismiss in a
written order which was issued by Secretary Reyes himself upon the recommendation of the AAB.
Subsequently, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed another "formal charge" against Bungubung and one Mario
Tan for dishonesty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, willful violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Docketed as Adm. Case No. 11-01-88, the
case was indorsed to the AAB for appropriate action.
Questioning the jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrative cases against him, Bungubung filed a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with this Court (G.R. Nos. 86468-69). In the
resolution of January 26, 1989, the Court required the respondents to file their comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the AAB from further acting on the administrative cases.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Meanwhile, on August 26, 1988 or on the same date that the first administrative case against Bungubung was filed, Secretary
Reyes also filed a complaint with the AAB against Cristeto Dinopol, then Manager of the Port of Davao, for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Adm. Case NO. AAB006-88). PPA General Manager Dayan then issued a preventive suspension order against Dinopol. On September 19, 1988,
said PPA General Manager also filed Adm. Case No. AAB-016-88 against Dinopol for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
At the hearings conducted by AAB, Dinopol actively participated. He presented his evidence therein although he asserted that
the PPA General Manager, not the AAB, had jurisdiction to initiate and conduct an administrative investigation under Sec. 8 of
P.D. No. 857, the PPA Charter.
On October 27, 1988, the AAB rendered a decision in Adm. Case AAB-006-88 finding Dinopol guilty as charged and imposed
on him the penalty of dismissal from the service with cause plus the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government service. On
November 23, 1988, AAB rendered its decision in Adm. Case AAB-016-88 also finding Dinopol guilty as charged. He was also
meted the same penalty and its accessories as those imposed on him in Adm. Case AAB-006-88.
Copies of said decisions were mailed to Dinopol on December 6, 1988 but on that day, Dinopol filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, 1 a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB over the administrative cases against him. The following day, said
court issued an order directing the respondents therein (petitioners herein) "to desist from continuing the proceedings of the
Administrative Action Board" and "to observe the status quo on the situation prior to (Dinopols) suspension."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Respondents therein opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but on January 9, 1988, the
court issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of Dinopol to his former position of Port Manager of Davao and the
payment to him of back salaries and other emoluments during his preventive suspension. The court also issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by Dinopol.
A motion praying for the reconsideration of the said resolution and for the dissolution of the writ was filed by the respondent
officials therein. On the other hand, Dinopol filed a motion to cite the PPA General Manager in contempt of court for failing to

reinstate him and pay his back salaries. On January 26, 1989, the court denied the motion and directed the immediate
implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction with a warning that in case of non-compliance therewith, respondent
officials therein shall be fined P1,000.00 and imprisoned for a period not exceeding one month.
This prompted the said respondents to file with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Acting on the petition which was captioned as
"Hon. Rainerio O. Reyes, etc., Et. Al. v. Engr. Cristeto E. Dinopol, Et. Al." and docketed as G.R. No. 86646, on February 2, 1989,
this Court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for and enjoined the lower court to cease and desist from
implementing the resolution and writ of preliminary injunction both dated January 9, 1989 as well as the order of January 26,
1989.
G.R. Nos. 86468-69 (the Bungubung case) and G.R. No. 86646 (the Dinopol case) were later consolidated upon the submission
of the petitioners in the latter case that the two petitions present the common issue of whether or not the Secretary of the
DOTC and/or the AAB have jurisdiction to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel whose rank are below
that of an assistant general manager. After their consolidation, the two cases were referred to the Court of Appeals "for
appropriate action." chanrobles law library
The cases were docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. SP-17195. Asserting that the periods of their preventive
suspension had been unduly extended, Bungubung and Dinopol moved for their immediate reinstatement pendente lite. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of July 5 and 20, 1989. Hence, the DOTC Secretary Oscar Orbos, PPA
General Manager Dayan and then AAB Chairman Villaluz interposed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court, submitting the issue of
whether or not Dinopol and Bungubung were entitled to immediate reinstatement and payment of backwages pending
adjudication on the merits of their cases by the Court of Appeals.
Acting on said petition which was docketed as G.R. No. 92358, on March 20, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the Court of Appeals from implementing its resolutions of July 5, 1989, July 20, 1989 and January 19, 1990. In
due course, on November 21, 1990, the Court En Banc rendered a decision granting the petition. 2
On December 17, 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP-17195. 3 In substance, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the DOTC Secretary is without jurisdiction over the administrative cases against Bungubung and Dinopol
for two reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. While the Civil Service Law vests upon the Department heads "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction," 4 said law cannot prevail over Sec. 8, Art. V of the
PPA Charter (P.D. No. 857) which states that" (t)he General Manager (of the PPA) shall, subject to the approval of the Board,
appoint and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager." The Court of Appeals
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The above-quoted provision is in the nature of a special law while the present Civil Service Law granting jurisdiction to
department heads, is in the nature of a general law. Special law prevails over general law. Being a special rule limited to the
creation and functions of the Philippine Ports Authority, PD No. 857 prevails over the Civil Service Law, insofar as it involves
jurisdiction to remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager as specifically lodged in the PPA General
Manager. The Civil Service Law authorizes a department head to commence and try administrative cases, but this general
provision must yield to the specific provision found in the PPA Charter. The particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the
particular enactment (25 R.C.L., p. 1010, citing numerous cases)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The appellate court also stressed that, not only is the PPA Charter a particular law said Charter, having been enacted on
December 23, 1975, is a more recent enactment than P.D. No. 807 which was issued on October 6, 1975.
Second. The power of review by the Office of the President has been repealed by P.D. 1409. The DOTC Secretary, acting as
the alter ego of the President, can no longer exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over PPA personnel:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Further, the power of review by the Office of the President under P.D. No. 807 was repealed by P.D. 1409 creating the
Merit Systems Board in the Civil Service Commission (Meram v. Edralin, 154 SCRA 235). The theory that Secretary Reyes,
acting as alter ego of the President, can no longer be sustained. The Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the DOTC must
yield to the jurisdiction of the PPA General Manager." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the motion was denied. Hence, the instant
recourse through a petition for review on certiorari submitting that the Court of Appeals decision is contrary to law and
settled jurisprudence because: (a) it effectively deprived the DOTC Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, of the
authority to control and/or supervise personnel actions involving employees of the PPA; (b) it nullified the proceedings of the
AAB for want of jurisdiction, notwithstanding that respondent Dinopol submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the body, and (c)
it granted writs of certiorari in favor of respondents who, on the other hand, failed to exhaust available and adequate
remedies. 5
The issue of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB over administrative cases involving personnel below
the rank of Assistant General Manager of the PPA has been raised and settled in Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals. 6 The Court,
after discussing the nature of an attached agency and its relationship with the Department to which it is attached,
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain
extent, free from Departmental interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 8. Management and Staff .
a) The President shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and the Assistant General
Managers.
b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed on the basis of merit and fitness based
on a comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the Authority immediately upon its organization and
consistent with Civil Service rules and regulations. The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the
Authority, including temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of
personnel of the Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For professional and
technical positions, the General Manager shall recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar
positions in other government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and position
classification notwithstanding.
d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager.
x

x.

(Emphasis supplied)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel,
by vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors,
the law impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant (General) Manager
who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated,
may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with
the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose
the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the
matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The
permissive recourse to the Department Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807) under the following
provisions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency
or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
department head.
x

x.

(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA
General Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty
and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the
case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioners contention, therefore, that the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC Secretarys jurisdiction is
circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary matters involving personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the
power to initiate proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the absurd spectacle of the
DOTC Secretary acting as complainant-initiator of an administrative case which later falls upon him to review.

What is prescribed by the law and the Beja case is that all complaints against a PPA official or employee below the rank of
Assistant General Manager shall be filed before the PPA General Manager by the proper officials, such as the PPA police or any
aggrieved party. The aggrieved party should not, however, be one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint he has
filed may eventually fall on appeal. Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex. No man can be at once a litigant and judge.
Unless, of course, in an exceptional case, such official inhibits himself or expresses his willingness at the outset to waive his
right to review the case on appeal.
Moreover, the fact that the PPA is a government agency "attached" to the DOTC extensively affects the extent of whatever
control and supervision the said Departments Secretary may exercise. In Beja, the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control, and administrative supervision.Attachment is
defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member,
with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board,
which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency;
x

x.

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is
under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship
between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination. with
respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is
further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of
Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, while PPA personnel are, as mandated by P.D. 868, "embraced in the Civil Service," the DOTC may not "act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate." 7
It should be noted that in AAB-031-88, the complaint against Bungubung was erroneously filed directly with the AAB and it
was no less than DOTC Secretary Reyes who, upon the recommendation of the AAB, denied Bungubungs motion to dismiss.
The PPA General Manager also erroneously indorsed to the AAB Adm. Case No. 11-01-88, the complaint he himself filed
against Bungubung, without having conducted an investigation and recommending the appropriate penalty as required by the
facts found at said investigation.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
With regard to Adm. Case No. AAB-006-88 against Dinopol, it was filed with the AAB by Secretary Reyes himself while the
other case against Dinopol, Adm. Case No. 016-88, was filed by the PPA General Manager directly with the AAB without said
PPA officials appropriate investigation and corresponding recommendation. Under these circumstances, the absurd situation
mentioned above could ensue: the DOTC Secretary deciding on appeal his own complaint. On the other hand, in Adm. Case
No. 016-88, the PPA General Manager abdicated his duty of conducting an investigation and submitting his recommendation,
as demanded by his factual findings.
Filing a case directly with the AAB may be a shortcut to accomplish the laudable purpose of A.O. No. 25. However, whatever
advantage may accrue therefrom in terms of time element, may be offset by the denial of the right to a fair and unbiased
proceeding insofar as the personnel complained against is concerned. At the very least, he should be afforded the opportunity
of confronting the charges against him in the forum where the law requires that they should be ventilated. If at all, this
procedure may deprive the DOTC Secretary of control and supervision over personnel of the PPA below the rank of Assistant
General Manager but only at the initial stage of an administrative proceeding. Should the defendant employee be dissatisfied
with the ruling of the PPA General Manager, he can always elevate his case to the DOTC Secretary wherein the AAB will play a
pivotal role or, at his option, go directly to the Civil Service Commission. Hence, the Court of Appeals is less than accurate in
its sweeping statement that the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, has completely lost control and supervision
over disciplinary matters involving the PPA employees concerned. In fact, in the administrative hierarchy set up under both
the PPA Charter and the Civil Service Law, the DOTC Secretary has the ultimate say before recourse to the courts may be
made.
The Court, however, agrees with the Court of Appeals ratiocination in arriving at the conclusion that Sec. 8, Art. V of the PPA
Charter should prevail over Sec. 37(b) of the Civil Service Law, considering that where a later special law on a particular
subject is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, a prior general law on the same subject, a partial repeal of the latter will be
implied to the extent of the inconsistency, or an exception grafted upon the general law. 8 Since, in a sense, the two laws are
in pari materia, both should be construed as to harmonize with each other. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi. Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 9
For the assumption is that whenever the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same

subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed enacted in accordance
with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. 10
Applying the foregoing rules on statutory construction, the DOTC Secretary has not entirely relinquished his power of control
and supervision over an attached agency, such as the PPA. The PPA Charter merely defined and, to a certain extent, delimited
such power which, under the Civil Service law is of general application.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioners claim that the private respondents are estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the AAB as they actively
participated in the proceedings therein deserves scant consideration. While it is true that a party may be estopped from
raising the question of jurisdiction on appeal, 11 such estoppel may be invoked successfully only if the party failed to raise
such question in the early stages of the proceedings. The records show that Bungubung did not wait for the rendition of an
AAB decision before he questioned its jurisdiction. After filing his answer, he filed a motion to dismiss on the issue of
jurisdiction and even went to the extent of elevating the issue to this Court. For his part, Dinopol also filed a motion to dismiss
the case against him and, upon its denial, filed a motion for reconsideration. 12 In the absence of proof of laches on the part
of the private respondents, the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 13 upon which petitioners rely, is inapplicable. As
correctly pointed out by counsel for respondent Dinopol, it has been clearly held in People v. Eduarte 14 that the ruling in the
Tijam case is but an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.
Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable in this case. Besides the fact that the AAB was
patently without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed against respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the
instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the exceptions to the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Most enlightening is the following portion of the decision in Quisumbing v. Gumban: 15
". . . The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been repeatedly held that the
principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is a purely
legal one; where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent
has acted in disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in nullification
of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy." (Emphasis
supplied.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The decisions of the Administrative Action Board in AAB006-88 and AAB-016-88 against Cristeto E. Dinopol are hereby declared NULL AND VOID and, together with the cases against
Leopoldo F. Bungubung, AAB-031-88 and Adm. Case No. 11-01-88, they shall be REMANDED to the General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority for immediate reinvestigation.
SO ORDERED.