OSCAR MAGNO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure for the reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
22399 reversing the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Ifugao, Branch 14, in
Criminal Case No. 808.
The Indictment

The petitioner was charged with homicide in an Information, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
Thatonoraboutthe4thdayofJune,1992,intheMunicipalityofLagawe,Ifugao,andwithinthe
jurisdictionoftheHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccusedwithintenttokill,andwithoutany
justifiablereasonwhatsoeverDIDthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyinflict
physicalinjuriesonthedifferentpartsofthebodyofDovLourenzDunuanwhichdirectlycaused
thelattersdeath.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[3]
On arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution

As culled by the trial court, the case stemmed from the following facts:
IntheearlyeveningofJune4,1992,Buss,GilbertBaccayandHermanDinamlingweredrinking
liquor(beer)insidethebackroomoftherestaurantownedandmanagedbyEmeritaDanao,
knownthenastheTopSideRestaurant.Thisrestaurantfacestheconcretehouseoftheaccused
andtheirdistanceismoreorless10meterswiththenationalhighwayseparatingbothbuildings.
Therewereothercustomersalsodrinking.Whiletheliquorbingeofthethreewasongoing,Dov
arrivedandjoinedthemashewasinvited.Momentslater,Dovwenttothejukeboxandplayeda
tuneandcontinuedtakinginbeerjustastherestweredoing.Afterconsumingthebottle,he
informedthegroupthathewillgototheotherside(referringtothehouseoftheaccusedwhich
hasastoreinit),buthewasfollowedbyGilbertwhostayeduptothemaindooroftherestaurant
BussandHermanDinamlingwereleftbehinddrinking.RealizingthatGilbertwasstayingoutside
long,BusstoldHermantostayputashewasgoingouttoseethetwo.Reachingoutside,hesaw
GilbertstandingjustnearthePlatinumOffice(aninsuranceofficealsolocatedinthehouseofthe
accused)andnearhimwasDov.
Bussdecidedtojointhetwowhowerestillinfrontofthehouseoftheaccused.Gilbertthen
intimatedtoDovthatBussbehiscompaniontowhichDovagreed.SoGilbertreturnedbackto

therestaurantwhileDovandBussenteredthestoreofMr.Magno.Uponentering,Busssawthe
accusedatthecounter,themaidwassituatedatthekitchen.Meanwhile,Dovsatnearatable
whileBusswenttothecountertoorderforsomesoftdrinks(colacola).Mr.Magnodidnot
answerbutatthismoment,Olen(whoisactuallyLorraineMagno),daughteroftheaccused,
cameoutandtoldBussthattheirsoftdrinkswereconsumedbutBussretortedthatearlier,he
boughtsomesoftdrinksandhowcomesaiddrinksarenownotavailable.Withtheexchangeof
wordsbetweenOlenandBuss,accusedeyedsharplythetwointoxicatedyoungsters.Bussthen
urgedandtriedtopullDovtogetoutbutthelatterrefusedbecausetheformersawtheaccused
gettingangry.DovpersistedinstayingandinfactremovedBussholdonhim.Bythistime,
feelingthenecessityofurination,Busswentoutsidetorelievehimself.Afterthat,heturnedto
callDovbutwhenhewasinbetweenthehouseofCoraMartinandthatofthehouseofthe
accusedasbothhouseswereveryadjacentandlikewisebothfacingtheTopSideRestaurant,he
sawtheaccusedstrangleDov.Asidefromthis,hesawfurtherMr.Magnolandingmoreblowson
Dovschestandtwistedthelattershand.Whilethiswastakingplace,hesawDovwitheyesand
mouthopenedduetothestranglingandtheboxesthrownbecausehewasfourmetersmoreor
lessfromtheplacewhereaccusedinflictedtheinjurieswhichwasbesidetheaccusedsISUZU
cargotruckparkedinfrontofthesamehouseonaslopingcementedportion.
Shockedbywhathesaw,heranawayproceedingtothenearbyTopSideRestaurant,thenwentto
thedirectionoftheDonBoscoHighSchoolwhichwasalsoverynearandashewasaboutto
proceedtoLagaweProper(anearbybarangay),hethoughthiscompanionslefttherestaurant,so
hereturnedbackasfastashecould,openedthedoor,satdownandleanedhisheadonatable.As
hewastonguetied,hedidnottellanyonewhathesawbutatthisveryinstance,shoutswere
heardandthevoiceofEmeritaDanaoyellingItsDov,itsDov,itsDov,wasinparticularthe
voiceheheard.
Hearingthis,BussthenwentoutandsawhiscompanionsHermanandGilbertcarryingthebody
ofDovjustnearthestoreoftheaccused.Henoticedfurtherthattheparkedtruckofthesame
accusedwasnowheretobeseen,sohehelpedhistwofriendsholdthebodyofDovandsaw
bloodoozingfromthelattersnoseandmouth(ExhibitsA,A1,A2).
Meanwhile,GilbertBaccay,afterleavingBussandDovatthefrontageofaccusedsresidence,
returnedtotherestauranttojoinHermanDinamlinginthedrinkingandwhiletellingstoriesand
listeningtothemusic,theysuddenlyheardashoutoutside,andGilbertsawMrs.EmeritaDanao
crying.HeimmediatelywentoutoftherestaurantandsawhisfriendDovsprawledonthe
cementedportionofthefrontageofMagnoshousejustbesidethepavednationalroad.
Hurriedly,hewenttoDov,turnedandtookholdofhimandaskedDov,whathappenedtoyou?
butthelatterdidnotmoveandanswer.HesawDovseyesblanklyopenandbloodwasoozing
fromhisnose.ThenHermanDinamlingarrivedbutGilbertstillaskedDovwhathappened,but
thelittlesonofEmeritaDanaowhowaspresentpointedtotheaccused,whobythenjustarrived
stilldrivingthebigvehicle,as.Thatonewhodidittohim.Theaccusednexttoldthemto
lookforatricycletobringDovtothehospital.(ExhibitKandsubmarkings).Aftersaying
this,accuseddrovesaidtruckandproceededtowardsthedirectionoftheDonBoscoTeachers
QuarterspassingtheTopSideRestaurant.Mrs.EmeritaDanaobythencalledatricycletorush
Dovtothehospital.BussandGilbertrushedtoinformDovsparentswhattranspired.
Upontherequestoftherelativesofthevictim,coursedthroughofficialchannels(ExhibitsB,
C,D,andE),Dr.RubenAngobung,MedicoLegalOfficer,NBI,Ilagan,Isabela,

conductedanautopsyorexhumationonthebodyofDov.(ExhibitsF,G,Handitssub
markings,I,J).Hereunderarehisfindingsandtheextentoftheinjuries,towit:
PHYSICALINJURIES:
CONTUSEDABRASIONS:
1.3.0x2.0cms.,cheek,leftaspect.
2.Multilinear;irregularlydistributedinahorizontalfashion,coveringan
areaof5.0x1.0cm.,locatedmoreattheanterioraspectoftheneck
taperingirregularlyontheleftside.
3.Confluent;measuring10.0x7.5cms.,locatedattheanteriorupperhalf,
chest,betweentheanteriorfoldandthenipple,right.
4.1.0x1.0cm.,locatedattheanteriorchestwall,midline.
5.2.5x1.5cms.,anteriorupperhalf,chestleftside.
6.1.5x0.3cm.,posterioraspect,uppermidlinethorax;
7.4.5x1.0cm.,posterioraspect,medialtoinnerleftscapulamargin,left.
8.22.0x3.0cms.,posterolateralaspect,forearm,left.
CONTUSIONS:
1.10.0x1.0cm.,posterolateralaspect,externalear,right.
2.10.0x4.5cms.,posteriorproximalthird,arm,left.
3.4.0x1.0cm.,anteriorwrist,right.
HEMATOMA:
1.Subcutaneousandintramuscular,moderateinamount,anteriorchest,right
sideabove3rd,4thand5thanteriorribs.
2.Subcutaneousandintramuscular,severe,locatedattheanteriorchest,
above2ndand3rdanteriorribs,left.
FRACTURED:
1.Secondanteriorrib,completealongmidclavicularline,left.
2.Thirdanteriorrib,completeatcostochondraljunction,left.
INTERNALORGANINVOLVEMENT:
1.Lungs,leftcontusedatitsanterioraspect,upperandlowerlobes.
2.Spleen,superficialruptureswithramificationsatitsdome.
3.Brainandothervisceralorgans,pale,butotherwiseunremarkable.
HEMORRHAGE:
Intrathoracic,severe;Intraperitoneal,minimal.
Stomach,containedsmallamountofpartiallydigestedriceand
otherfoodparticles.
CAUSEOFDEATH:
Hemorrhagicshock;Traumatic.(ExhibitG)
DovsfatherManuelDunuan,Jr.,claimedthathisyoungestsondiedonJune4,1992and

FunerariaGambito,Bayombong,NuevaVizcayawascontactedforthefuneralservices.Inthe
process,thefamilypaidP30,000.00coveredbyareceiptissuedbysaidfuneralparlor(Exhibit
L).Duringthewakeandforthedurationof5days,onepigvaluedatP4,000.00wasbutchered
foradayexceptthe3rdand5thdaywhereadditionalpigsofmoreorlessthesamevaluewere
likewisebutcheredforthemanyvisitorsandmourners.Forthedurationofthenovena,onecow
worthP10,000.00andonepigworthP4,000.00werebutcheredforthepeople.Onesackofrice
valuedatP600.00perdaywasconsumedforthedurationoffivedays.
Allthemembersofthefamilysufferedheavilyandtheyexperiencedmentalanguish,sadnessand
torturedthoughts.ThelossofDov,beingtheyoungestandclosesttoallaffectedDovselder
sisterPamelasuchthatshewasreferredandconfinedattheMakatiMedicalCenterfor
psychiatriccareandthefamilyspentP60,000.00plusanotherP20,000.00forthefood,traveland
otherrelatedexpensesincurredwhilePamelawasconfined.Theothersisterhadtodropallher
subjectsattheUniversityofBaguio,BaguioCity,becauseshecantacceptthelossofherlittle
brother.
Hiswife,whohasafondnesstoDovhadtotakealeaveofabsencefromherwork.Theyhave
nowrecoveredfromthelossofhersonbuttheystillsufferwheneverDovisremembered.[4]
The Case for the Petitioner

The case for the petitioner as culled from the evidence is as follows:
Theresidenceoftheaccusedisathreestoreyhouse.Thefirstfloorcouldnotbeseenonthe
street,butthesecondfloorisonlevelwiththenationalroad(RizalAvenue).Thesecondflooris
wherethestore(sarisariandsnackhouse)islocatedandalsowherethePlatinumOfficeis
stationed.Thethirdflooriswherethefamilyoftheaccusedusedastheirresidence.

OnJune4,1992,JunMarDanaowasthen10yearsold;NerryAnnBravoanieceofMr.and
Mrs.Magno,wasalsotenyearsoldandLorraineMagno,daughteroftheaccused,wasthen12
yearsold.
Between6:00to7:00p.m.ofJune4,1992,thestoreoftheaccusedwasopenedandLorraine
MagnoandhercousinNerryAnnBravotogetherwiththeaccusedwereinsidethestore.Lorraine
andNerryweresittingjustbehindthecounterandattendingtothestoreforanycustomer.The
accusedwasreadinganewspaperatthecounter.Twopersonsenteredthestoreandtheywere
DovandBusswhoweredrunkbecauseofthesmellofliquorandtheirswayingmovements.They
seatedthemselvesbesideoneofthetables,andtheyaskedforsoftdrinks(coke)fromLorraine
butshetoldthemthattheirsoftdrinkswereconsumed.BussstoodupandcalledDovcome
nowbutDovansweredyougo,soBussleftDov.Dovstoodupandwenttothecounterand
lookedattheaccusedwhowasnearthecounterreadinganewspaper.TheaccusedadvisedDov
inasofttonetogohomebecausehewasdrunk.Dovwentout.Mr.MagnoorderedNerryand
Lorrainetoclosethestorebutitwasthelatterwhoclosedtheaccordiondoorandaspaceoftwo
feetwasleftopenedbecauseDovwasforcingthedoortobeopenedforhimtotellsomethingto

theaccused.DovwastellingLorraineCanItalktoyourpapa?towhichLorraineretorted,
Whatwillyoutalkabout?Dovturnedtoleave,soLorraineshuttheaccordiondoor.
Momentslater,theyheardbangingsoundsparticularlythesoundofstonesthrownatthe
accordiondoor.Theaccusedstoodupashewassurprisedbythestoningandopenedthesame
door.Theaccusedwentoutlookingforanybodywhostoned.HewenttothestreetwhileLorraine
followedhisfatherbutshestayedjustattheaccordiondoorwhileNerryAnnBravowasather
back.Theysawnobodyonthestreetexcepttheaccused.Thenimmediatelyaccusedpassedbythe
frontoftheIsuzutruckparkedinfrontofthestoreoftheaccusedandgottothedriversseat,
switchedonthelight,startedtheengineandproceededtotheplazaturningintherightdirection.
Beforetheaccuseddroveaway,Lorrainenoticedaboyunderthetruckcrawlingtowardsherso
shescreamedtoherfathertostopthetruckbutherfatherdidnothearandspedoff,leavingthis
boyinthesamespotwherethetruckwasparked.Lorrainewentneartheboyandnoticedhimto
beDovDunuan,asifhewassleepingandnotmoving.NerryAnnBravosawthatthepersonwas
ranoverbythelastwheelofthetruck.LorrainerantotheTopsideRestauranttocallforhelpand
shemetEmeritaDanaoonthesteps.ThelatterfollowedLorraineandbothofthemwenttothe
bodyofDovandEmeritaDanaowascrying.Mrs.Danaothenliftedtheheadofthevictimand
resteditagainontheground,whileshewaslookingforatricycletorushDovtothehospital.A
fewseconds,theaccusedridingonthesametruckarrivedandappearedsurprisedastowhat
happened.LorraineinformedhimthatDovwasranover.Theaccusedthentoldthemtolookfora
tricycleandbringhimtothehospitalwhiletheaccusedwenttoreporttheincidenttothepolice.
EmeritaDanaoandEmilioBugattibroughtDovtothehospitalbutMr.Bugattidroppedbyatthe
ProvincialHeadquarters.(Exhibits10,10A,11and11A).
NerryAnnandLorraineneversawanystrangulationmadebytheaccusedonthevictim,nordid
theyseeanymaulingorboxingnoraquarrelbetweentheaccusedandvictim.
Ataboutthistimebetween6:00to7:00p.m.ofJune4,1992,JunMarDanaowassittingatthe
steplocatedinfrontoftheirhousewhensomebodythrewastoneatthehouseoftheaccused,so
hewentinsideandpeepedthroughthewindowoftheirsalaandsawthelateDovatthefrontof
thehouseoftheaccused.ThatDovwasstandingthereandsuddenlyheranundertheIsuzutruck
parkedjustinfrontofthestoreoftheaccused.Justthen,theaccusedandhisdaughterOlenor
Lorrainecameoutfromthestore.Theaccusedwenttotheedgeoftheroadasifhewaslooking
forsomebody,thenwentandenteredthedriversseat,startedtheengineandwasgoingtothe
plaza.Whenthetruckleft,hesawDovlyingdownonthegroundwherethetruckcamefrom,so
herantohermotherandshoutedMa,DovDovwasranoverbythetruck.
Mrs.EmeritaDanao,bythattimewasbusydoingkitchenchoresandatthesametimeattending
tosomecustomerswhoweredrinkingandamongthemwereGilbertBaccay,HermanDinamling,
andDennisBalitiandhisgroup.Notlongafter,BussenteredtogetherwithDovbothusing
separatedoorsalllocatedatthebackoftherestaurantbutbeforetheirentrance,BussandDov
wereplayingthrowingstonesateachotheralsoatthebackoftherestaurant.
WhenDoventered,shecautionedhimtogohomebecausethelatterwasalittlebitdrunk.Buss
waslikewiseobservedtobeundertheinfluenceofliquor.Thesetwofriendsproceededtowhere
GilbertandHermanwereseatedandtheyorderedbeer.Therestaurant,pursuanttoanOrdinance,
wassupposedtocloseat7:00p.m.,soshetoldthegroupofBusstoleaveassoonastheyfinish

theirlastorder.Shecontinuedherworkinthekitchenwhensuddenlysheheardhersonshouting
Dovwasranoverbyavehicle.Afterhearingthis,sherushedtothefrontdoorandalsoheard
Olen(LorraineMagno)sayingyoucomeandseeDovbecausehewasranoverbymydaddy,the
truckofmyDaddy.WhenshewentdowntoseeDov,shenoticedtheparkedtrucksheusually
seesinfrontofthehouseoftheaccusedwasnotthere,sosheheldagaintheheadofDovand
triedtolookforatricycle.SheobservedDovalittlebitunconsciousandnottalkingbutshekept
lookingaroundforaride.Shereturnedbacktoherrestauranttoaskforhelp.ShefoundBuss
lyinghisheaddownonatablesosheshookhimandtoldhimthatpleasegotothehouseofDov
Dunuanandasktheparentstocome.Busswasawakenedfromhissleepandhewassurprised
andsaidNeh,andthenrantothedirectionofthehouseofDov.(ExhibitMforthe
prosecutionwhichistheAffidavitofEmeritaDanao).Justthenthetruckoftheaccusedarrived
andthelatterappearedsurprisedbuthewastoldbyhisdaughter,Dovwasranoverbythetruck.
TheaccusedtoldthemtolookforavehicletobringDovtothehospitalwhilehewillreporttothe
police.
Finally,shefoundatricycleandrushedDovtothehospitaltogetherwithsomecompanions.
SPO3AgustinNabanalanwasthenondutyintheearlyeveningofJune4,1992.Ataround7:00
p.m.,accusedOscarMagno,drivinghisIsuzutruck,appearedbeforetheLagawePNPStation
particularlyappearingbeforehimwhowasthentheassignedinvestigatingofficeratthattime.
ThelatterinquiredfromtheaccusedandhewastoldthattheaccusedaccidentallyranoverDov
LourenzDunuaninfrontofaccusedsresidence.Theaccusedstayedatthestationuntilthe
followingmorningforsecurityreasonsandtosurrenderhimself.
Basedfromhisinterviewwiththeaccusedandfromwhathegatheredatthecrimescenewhen
theylaterwentthatevening,hepreparedaspotreport(Exhibit7,8and9)whichbasically
involvedavehicularaccident.Hisfindingswere:
InitialinvestigationconductedbythisPoliceStationrevealsthatallegedlythevictimhid
himselfunderthesamevehiclewhichwasparkedandwithouttheknowledgeofthedriverofhis
presence,hedrovethevehiclethustheincidenthappened(Exhibit7A)
Hehassubmittedtohigherauthoritiesaprogressreportstatingthereinthattherelativesofthe
victimwillberesponsibleinfilingthecasedirectlyinCourtorwiththeProvincialProsecutors
Office.Butdespitethis,theycontinuedtheinvestigationforadditionalevidencebutnoone
appearedtogivehis/herstatements.Exceptforthespotreportheprepared,nothingwasdone
untiltheywerecalledbyAtty.EvelynDunuanwhointerviewedthemandthereafter,sheprepared
anaffidavitandtheyweregiventimetocorrectthesame.Aftertheymadethenecessary
corrections,theyhaditsubscribedbeforetheyaffixedtheirsignatures(Exhibit6Joint
AffidavitofGabrielGuinanoy,EdmundoPinkihan,AgustinNabanalanandOrlandoBandao).
Helikewisestatedthatwhatwasnarratedbytheaccusedwasenteredinthepoliceblotterbutthe
entryintheblotterwasmissing.Notonlythat,almostonehalfofthepageswasmissingfromthe
blotterreasonforwhichhecouldnotbringtoCourttheexcerptoftheblotterortheblotteritself.
Infact,theentriescoveringthepagesfromJanuarytoNovember,1992donotexistandhecannot
explainhowthepagescontainingtheentriesweremissing.Worse,threemonthsafterthedeath
ofDov,hewasrelievedandreassignedatthePatrolCentersothatalltherecordswereleftatthe

office.Inonewayortheother,theheadoftheirinvestigationsectionSPO3Clemencio
Kimmayongandhisfellowinvestigationofficerswerealsorelieved.SPO3OrlandoSomerawas
thereplacementasChiefofthatsection.
SPO1OrlandoBandaothenoffdutyintheearlyeveningofJune4,1992,wasathishouseat
PoblacionWest,Lagawe,Ifugao.ItwasgettingdarkandthentheirChiefInspectorLt.Pascua
droppedbyandhewastoldthatanaccidenthappened.BothofthemproceededtotheIfugao
ProvincialHospital.Reachingthehospital,theyproceededtotheemergencyroomandheardDr.
PasigondeclaringthatDovDunuanwasalreadydead.Therewereseveralpeopleinsidethe
hospitalandhejustinquiredwhowasthesuspectandsomebodymentionedthenameofOscar
Magnotheaccusedinthiscase.BothofthemimmediatelyreturnedtothePNPStationwhere
theyfoundOscarMagnoalreadyaheadofthem.Mr.Bandaocametoknowthattheaccusedwas
alreadyinterviewed,sohetookalsothechancetoconducthisinterview.Fromhisinterview,
hereinwitnessgatheredthataccusedcametoknowthatDovwasranoverfromhisdaughter
LorraineMagno,reasonforwhichhesurrenderedtothepoliceauthority.Thatthisinformation
wasgivenbytheaccusedtohereinwitnessabout20to30minutesfromthetimetheincident
occurred.
Mr.Bandao,togetherwithLt.Pascua,andsomepolicemenproceededtothesitusoftheincident,
andwhilethereacertainEmilioBugatti,acloseneighboroftheaccused,approachedthemand
relayedtheinformationthatherdaughterAbbigailthen6yearsmoreorlesshadseenthe
incident.
BandaoandthegroupthenenteredthehouseofEmilioBugattiandAbbigailwasinterviewed.
ThelattertoldthemthatthelateDovwaspeepinginsidethehouseoftheaccusedandwhen
accusedcameout,Dovhidunderthetruckwhichwasparkedinfrontofthesamehouse.The
accusedwenttothestreettolookforsomebody,thenreturnedbacktothetruckandstartedthe
engineandwhenthetruckmovedaway,shesawDovlyingatthecementedparkingspace
frontingthehouse.
BandaostilltestifiedthatBusa,whowasbroughttothepolicestationbyoneofthesonsofMr.
Gallmanandarelativeofthevictim,whenheinterviewedhim,Bussaccordinglyrelatedthathe
hadnotwitnessedtheincident.
Heaverredthathehadnohandinthepreparationofthespotreport.ItwasOfficerAgustin
Nabanalanwhopreparedsaidreport.Noformalorfinalinvestigationwasdoneonthecase
becausetheyweretoldbytheirsuperiorstodesistastheywereinformedthatthefamilyofthe
victimandoneAtty.EvelynDunuanwillbetheonetofilethecasewiththeproperagency.It
wasunusualforthePNPtodesistfromfurtherinvestigationbuthewastoldtostoptheconduct
ofinvestigationbyhissuperiors.
HewasoneofthoserelievedandtherecordsofthecasesurroundingthedeathofDovremained
intactbutwhentheywerereassigned,wheneverhewouldrequestforthedocuments,nothingis
availabletohim.
ChiefInspectorSantiagoDunuanreplacedChiefInspectorPascuaandtheformeristheuncleof
thedeceasedDov.

Dr.RonaldBandonill,MedicoLegalOfficer,NBICAR,BaguioCity,asanexpertwitness
affirmedsomefindingsofprosecutionexpertwitnessDr.RubenAngobung,NBI,Ilagan,Isabela,
specificallythefindingsoncontusedabrasionsNo.2:
Multilinear;irregularlydistributedinahorizontalfashion,coveringanareaof5.0x1.0cm.,
locatedmoreattheanterioraspectofthenecktaperingirregularlyontheleftside.
andwhichtheprosecutionclaimstobeevidenceofstrangulationbuthereinwitnessagreedwith
Dr.Angobungstatementsthattheabovementionedinjuryisnotastrangulationwound,andthat
thewordmultilinearisusuallyfoundinvictimsofvehicularaccidents.Examiningthe
exhumationreportofDr.Angobung,hedidntseeanysignswhichareattributedto
strangulation.
TheninwoundNo.3.
Confluent;measuring10.0x7.5cm.,locatedattheanteriorupperhalfchest,betweenthe
anteriorfoldandthenippleright.
saiddoctoragreeswithDr.Angobungsclaimthatsuchwoundonthechestwasnotcausedor
producedbythebarefistofahumanbeing.
TakingthetotalityoftheexhumationfindingsofDr.RubenAngobung,heagreeswiththe
statementsoftheformerthatthewounds/contusions/abrasionslistedarecompatiblewiththatof
theinjuriescausedorintroducedbyaslowmovingvehicle.[5]
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the decretal portion of which
reads:
Fromtheforegoingpremises,theCourtfindsthattheprosecutionwasabletoestablishtheguilt
oftheaccusedOscarMagnobeyondreasonabledoubtandaccordingly,heisherebysentencedto
sufferthepenaltyofreclusiontemporal.ApplyingtheIndeterminateSentenceLaw,heis
sentencedtoserveimprisonmentoffrom10yearsandonedayto12yearsand6monthsof
reclusiontemporalinitsminimumperiod.
HeisfurtherorderedtopaytheheirsofthelateDovLourenzDunuan,theindemnityof
P50,000.00.Likewise,heisalsoorderedtopaysaidheirsthefollowing:
A)P117,000.00representingtheactualdamages;
B)P50,000.00moraldamages;
C)P15,000.00exemplarydamages;and
D)topaythecosts.
SOORDERED.[6]
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) contending that he deserved
acquittal of the crime charged. The CA rendered judgment reversing the decision of the

RTC and finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion
of the decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theDecisionappealedfromisherebySETASIDEand
anewoneentered,findingtheaccusedappellantOscarMagnoGUILTYbeyondreasonable
doubtofthecrimeofRECKLESSIMPRUDENCERESULTINGINHOMICIDEpunishable
underArticle365oftheRevisedPenalCode.AccusedappellantOscarMagnoishereby
sentencedtosufferanindeterminateimprisonmentofOne(1)Year,Seven(7)monthsand
Eleven(11)daysofprisioncorreccional,asminimum,toTwo(2)years,Ten(10)monthsand
Twenty(20)daysofprisioncorreccional,asmaximum,andtopaytheheirsofthelateDov
LourenzDunuan,thesumofP75,000.00asindemnityforthedeathofthevictim.Accused
appellantislikewiseorderedtopaysaidheirsP117,000.00asactualdamagespluscosts.
SOORDERED.[7]
The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the CA.
Before this Court, the petitioner assails the decision of the CA and prays for the
reversal thereof, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide on a charge of homicide
committed with dolo or with malice.[8]
The Petitioner prays ex abundentia cautela that if this Court sustains the decision
of the Court of Appeals, he be granted probation. He appended a copy of his petition for
probation to his petition in this Court. He prays the Court that:
a.ThecaseagainstyourpetitionerOSCARMAGNObedismissedbecausehecannotbe
convictedforRecklessImprudenceresultinginHomicideasthesaidchargeisnotincludedinthe
originalchargeofHomicide;WITHOUTPREJUDICEtothefilingoftheproperchargesand
beforethepropercourtsinaccordancewiththeguidelinesimpliedbytheDecisionofthe
HonorableCOURTOFAPPEALSonwhatshouldbetheproperoffensecharged;
b.Or,inthealternative,assumingthatthisHonorableCourtshallnotlookkindlyuponhisprayer
above,thathebeallowedtoAPPLYFORPROBATIONwhetherdirectlyorderedbythis
HonorableSUPREMECOURTinthevalidexerciseofitsinherentjudicialpowers,orby
remandingtherecordsofthecasetothelowercourtforpromulgationoftheDECISIONofthe
COURTOFAPPEALSdatedApril4,2001withinstructionstoallowthepetitionertoforthwith
fileanApplicationforProbationoraccepttheApplicationforProbationattachedheretoin
cautela;
c.Itismostrespectfullyprayedthatyourpetitionerbegrantedsuchotherandfurtherreliefas
maybejustandequitableinthepremises.[9]
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC.4.Judgmentincaseofvariancebetweenallegationandproof.Whenthereisvariance

betweentheoffensechargedinthecomplaintorinformationandthatproved,andtheoffenseas
chargedisincludedinornecessarilyincludestheoffenseproved,theaccusedshallbeconvicted
oftheoffenseprovedwhichisincludedintheoffensecharged,oroftheoffensechargedwhichis
includedintheoffenseproved.(4a)
SEC.5.Whenanoffenseincludesorisincludedinanother.Anoffensechargednecessarily
includestheoffenseprovedwhensomeoftheessentialelementsoringredientsoftheformer,as
allegedinthecomplaintorinformation,constitutethelatter.Andanoffensechargedis
necessarilyincludedintheoffenseproved,whentheessentialingredientsoftheformerconstitute
orformpartofthoseconstitutingthelatter.(5a).[10]
The issue raised by the petitioner in this case is not new. In People v. De
Fernando,[11] this Court ruled that one charged with murder may be convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In People v. Carmen,[12] the Court
convicted the appellants of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide on a charge of
murder. The Court ruled that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is necessarily included in a charge of murder. The Court in Samson v. Court of
Appeals,[13] emphasized that while a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a
willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself, defined as an offense in the Revised Penal
Code, it may, however, be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that
the greater includes the lesser offense.
The Petitioners plaint that by convicting him of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide on a charge of homicide by dolo, and sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty, he is deprived of his right to file a petition for probation under P.D. 968, as
amended, and his right to the equal protection of laws, is patently without legal basis.
The conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty has nothing to do with his qualifications or
disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968. Whether or not the petitioner may still
file a petition for probation despite his appeal from the judgment of the trial court; and
whether or not he is entitled to probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended, and under
prevailing jurisprudence, will have to be ascertained by the trial court in which a petition
for probation is filed as mandated in Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended,[14] and not by
this Court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

G.R. No. 168103

[Formerly G.R. Nos. 155930-32]
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

-versus-

ALEJANDRO RELLOTA y TADEO,

Appellant.

Promulgated:
August 3, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth.[1]
For this Court's consideration is an appeal from the Decision[2] dated April 14, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00117, affirming, with modification, the
Decision[3] dated August 8, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73,
in Criminal Case Nos. 94-10812, 94-10813 and 94-10814, and finding appellant Alejandro T.
Rellota, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of consummated rape and one (1) count
of attempted rape.
The antecedent facts are the following:
AAA,[4] the offended party, was born on July 16, 1981 in XXX, Eastern Samar and was a

little over twelve (12) years old when the incidents allegedly happened.
Together with her siblings, BBB and CCC, AAA lived with her aunt, DDD, and the latter's
second husband, appellant, in Antipolo City, Rizal from September 1992 to January 1994. Also
living with them were two (2) of AAA's cousins. During that period, DDD and appellant were
sending AAA, BBB and CCC to school. At the time the incidents took place, DDD was working
overseas.
Based on the testimony of AAA, appellant had been kissing her and touching her private
parts since September 1993. She claimed that appellant raped her several times between
September 1993 and January 1994. She narrated that appellant would usually rape her at night
when the other members of the family were either out of the house or asleep. AAA stated that she
resisted the advances of appellant, but was not successful. Appellant, according to her, would
usually place a bolo beside him whenever he would rape her. She added that appellant would
threaten AAA by telling her that he would kill her brother and sister and that he would stop
sending her to school.
Around noon of December 20, 1993, AAA took a bath at an artesian well near their house
and after bathing, she wrapped her body with a towel before going inside their house. Appellant
followed her to the bedroom, pulled down her towel and laid her on the bed. He tied her hands
with a rope before forcibly inserting his penis inside her vagina. AAA fought back by kicking
and scratching appellant, but the latter was not deterred. Thereafter, appellant untied the hands of
AAA and left the room. A few moments later, appellant returned in the bedroom and raped her
again.
On January 31, 1994, the same incident happened. AAA went inside their room after taking
a bath, not knowing that appellant was inside. Upon seeing her, appellant snatched the towel
around her body and laid her down on the sofa. He kissed her and touched her private part, while
AAA kicked him and scratched his arms. She was able to push him. After which, appellant ran
out the door.
AAA, after that incident, told her older sister about the repeated deeds of the appellant.
Afterwards, her sister accompanied AAA to the police station. On February 3, 1994, three (3)
separate complaints for rape were filed against appellant with the trial court and was raffled in
different branches.[5]
The Complaints read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 94-10812
That on or about and sometime during the month of December, 1993
in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned complainant AAA, a minor 12 years of age, against the latter's
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Criminal Case No. 94-10813

That on or about the month of September, 1993 in the Municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant
AAA, a minor twelve years of age, against the latter's will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 94-10814
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1994 in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant
AAA, a minor 12 years of age, against the latter's will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
Complainant AAA filed a Motion for the Consolidation[9] of the three complaints, which
was eventually granted.[10]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecutor presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Rosaline Onggao, a medico-legal
officer.
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimony of appellant who denied the charges
against him. According to him, he could not think of any reason why the complainant filed the
complaints. He also claimed that his sister-in-law, who helped the complainant file the charges
was mad at him for not giving her a loan.
The trial court, in a Decision[11] dated August 8, 2002, found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape as alleged in the complaints, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ALEJANDRO
RELLOTA y TADEO is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each
count in Criminal Case Nos. 94-10812, 10813 and 10814.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each of the three (3) Criminal Cases, or a total of
P150,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[12]
In not imposing the penalty of death, the trial court reasoned out that AAA was
already over 12 years old at the time the incidents happened and that although she was below 18
years old, the relationship of AAA and the appellant had not been sufficiently established as the
marriage between AAA's aunt and the appellant was not supported by any documentary evidence.
A Notice of Appeal was filed and this Court accepted[13] the appeal on July 16,
2003. However, in a Resolution[14] dated September 6, 2004, this Court transferred the case to
the CA in conformity with People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[15] modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3
and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to this Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of
this Court en banc, dated September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of
procedure in all courts under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated to this Court.
In a Decision[16] dated April 14, 2005, the CA affirmed, with modification, the
Decision of the trial court, disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
in so far as appellant is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of consummated
rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count in Criminal Case
Nos. 94-10812 and 94-10813. The Decision is however MODIFIED as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 94-10814, appellant is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape and is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum. He is also
ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P15,000.00 as moral damages.
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 94-10812 and 94-10813, appellant is
ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each
count in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 already imposed as civil
indemnity for each count.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal.
In his Brief[17] dated October 24, 2003, appellant assigned this lone error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING HEREIN [APPELLANT] DESPITE THE FACT THAT
AAA'S TESTIMONY WAS INCONSISTENT AND FULL OF
FALSEHOODS.

Appellant claims that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA in September 1993
because his wife only left for Jeddah on October 21, 1993. He points out that AAA herself
testified that he only kissed her, touched her breast and private parts, but failed to mention that he
inserted his penis to her vagina. He also denied raping AAA on January 31, 1994 and December
20, 1993. He further claims that the filing of the criminal charges were instigated by AAA's aunt
for his refusal to lend her money. In short, appellant assails the credibility of AAA's testimony as
shown by its inconsistencies and falsehoods.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief[18] dated
November 27, 2003, averred that the prosecution was able to satisfactorily prove that appellant
raped the offended party in September and December 1993. It further stated that appellant used
his moral ascendancy over the victim in having carnal knowledge of her against her will. The
OSG also argued that the medical report bolsters the victim's claim that she was repeatedly raped
by appellant and that the latter's defense of denial is weak and deserves scant consideration.
In agreement with the CA Decision, the OSG posited that there is inadequate proof that the
offended party was actually raped on January 31, 1994 and that the penalties imposed by the trial
court should be adjusted in accordance with the crimes proved.
After a careful study of the arguments presented by both parties, this Court finds the appeal
bereft of any merit.
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences both for the appellant and
the complainant; hence, utmost care must be taken in the review of a decision involving
conviction of rape.[19] Thus, in the disposition and review of rape cases, the Court is guided by
these principles: first, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction;
second, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense; third, unless there are special reasons,
the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal; fourth, an accusation of rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; and, fifth, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution.
[20]
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of AAA. He
claims that he could not have possibly raped AAA in September 1993 because, first, his wife was
still in the Philippines and left for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia only on October 21, 1993; and second,
based on the testimony of AAA, appellant merely kissed and touched her breasts and private
parts, but never did she mention that he inserted his penis into her vagina.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The claim of appellant that he could not have raped AAA because his wife was still in the
country during the alleged period when the rape was committed is so flimsy that it does not
deserve even the slightest consideration from this Court. It has been oft said that lust is no
respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other people
therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter

the commission of rape.[21] There have been too many instances when rape was committed
under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family members sleeping side
by side.[22] There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.[23]
As to the contention of appellant that the testimony of AAA was barren of any statement
that the former's penis was inserted in the latter's vagina is not quite accurate. AAA categorically
stated during her testimony that she was raped, thus:
Q: On December 20, 1993, at around 12:00 o'clock noon, do you remember
where were you?
A: I was at the artisan well.
Q: Where is that artisan well located?
A: Near the house of Alejandro Rellota.
Q: What were you doing in the vicinity of the arisan well?
A: I was taking a bath.
Q: What time did you start taking a bath?
A: I started taking a bath about 12:00 o'clock and I finished at around 1:00
o'clock.
Q: After taking a bath, what did you do next?
A: I went inside the house.
Q: When you went inside the house, what happened next?
A: I covered my body with a towel and Alejandro Rellota pulled it.
Q: Where was Alejandro Rellota at that time?
A: He went inside the room.
Q: Before he went inside the house, where was Alejandro Rellota, if you
know?
A: He came from the other room.
Q: You said once inside the house, Alejandro Rellota pulled your towel,
what happened after that?
A: He raped me.
Q: When you said that Alejandro Rellota raped you, what did Alejandro
Rellota do exactly to you?
A: He laid me on the bed and he tied my hands.
Q: After he tied your hands, what did he do next?
A: He forced me and inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: After he placed his penis inside your vagina, what did he do next?
A: He left.
Q: You said he placed his penis inside your vagina, will you tell how long

was his penis inside your vagina?

A: One minute.
Q: When he placed his penis inside your vagina for around one minute,
what, if any, did you feel when he inserted his penis?
A: I felt painful. (sic)
Q: You said Alejandro Rellota pulled your towel, when he did that, what
did you do?
A: I resisted.
Q: What exactly did you do when you resisted?
A: I tried to avoid him.
Q: When you said your hands were tied while the accused Alejandro
Rellota was doing this, what were you doing?
A: I pinched his hands and tried to take the rope off my hands.
Q: Were you successful in taking the rope?
A: No.
Q: At the time Alejandro Rellota was doing this while he was tying your
hands, what was he wearing at that time?
A: Short pants and t-shirt.
Q: You said Alejandro Rellota placed his penis inside your vagina while
you were lying down and tied your hands. When Alejandro Rellota placed
his penis inside your vagina, what did he do to his clothes?
A: He took it off.[24]
xxxx
Q: You said when being asked by the Honorable Court that you were
wearing t-shirt and short, you also mentioned that at the time you entered
the house after having taken a bath that you were only wearing a towel.
Can you explain when for the first time did you wear that t-shirt and shorts
in December?
A: Because when he pulled the towel, he pulled me to the bed, he embraced
me and he left and then I immediately wear (sic) my panty and t-shirt then
he returned for the second time.
Q: When he returned, what did he do?
A: He repeated his acts.
COURT: You mean to say you were raped twice in December 1993?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: After he did that again, what happened
afterwards?
A: The incident happened inside his room and after the incident, he ordered
me to go out of his room and I went to my bed and sleep. (sic)[25]

xxxx
Q: Can you please tell the Honorable Court on December 20, how many
times did he rape you?
A: Twice.
Q: First time when after he pulled your towel?
A: Yes.
Q: When he pulled off your towel, you were not wearing anything?
A: Yes, my body was wrapped with towel only.
Q: The second time he raped you, you were wearing some clothes?
A: Yes.[26]
This Court is also not swayed by the claim of appellant that the testimony of AAA is full of
inconsistencies and falsehoods. As accurately propounded by the CA:
Appellant further contends that the testimony of AAA regarding the
rape that took place on December 20, 1993 is full of lies and falsehood. He
points out as lie and inconsistent AAA's statement that he removed her
shorts and panty when she was raped on December 20, 1993. He argues
that this could not have been possible because, as earlier testified to by
AAA, she merely wrapped her body with a towel having just taken a bath.
He also points out as lie and inconsistent AAA's statement that after he
pulled her to the bed, raped her and then left, she immediately put on her
panty and t-shirt. He argues that such putting on her panty and t-shirt could
not have been also possible because, as testified to by her, her hands were
tied with a rope.
Again, the contentions are without merit.
In her testimony, AAA narrated that she was raped twice on
December 20, 1993: the first time was when she came from her bath,
wrapped only with a towel and appellant pulled her to the bed, tied her
hands and ravished her, and the second time was when she had already
dressed up and appellant returned to the room to rape her again. When
AAA testified that appellant removed her shorts and panty before raping
her, she was referring to the second time she was raped on that day. Hence,
her statements were not inconsistent. There was a lapse of time between the
first and the second rape. Likewise, when AAA testified that she put on her
t-shirt and panty, she was referring to the first time of the rape where, after
ravishing her, appellant untied her hands and left only to return to rape her
once more. There was enough time for AAA to dress up.[27]
Nevertheless, the said inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are minor ones which do not
affect the credibility of AAA nor erase the fact that the latter was raped. The inconsistencies are
trivial and forgivable, since a victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of
the previous incidents, since these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and continuing

nightmare, a calvary she might even be struggling to forget.[28] As this Court pronounced in
People v. Delos Reyes:[29]
It is established jurisprudence that testimony must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety inclusive and not by truncated or
isolated passages thereof. Due consideration must be accorded to all the
questions propounded to the witness and her answers thereto. The whole
impression or effect of what had been said or done must be considered and
not individual words or phrases alone. Moreover, rape is a painful
experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. It causes deep
psychological wounds, often forcing the victims conscience or
subconscious to forget the traumatic experience, and casts a stigma upon the
victim, scarring her psyche for life. A rape victim cannot thus be expected
to keep an accurate account and remember every ugly detail of the
appalling and horrifying outrage perpetrated on her especially since she
might in fact have been trying not to remember them. Rape victims do not
cherish in their memories an accurate account of when and how, and the
number of times they were violated. Error-free testimony cannot be
expected most especially when a young victim of rape is recounting details
of a harrowing experience, one which even an adult would like to bury in
oblivion deep in the recesses of her mind, never to be resurrected.
Moreover, a rape victim testifying in the presence of strangers, face to face
with her tormentor and being cross-examined by his hostile and
intimidating lawyer would be benumbed with tension and nervousness and
this can affect the accuracy of her testimony. Often, the answers to longwinded and at times misleading questions propounded to her are not
responsive. However, considering her youth and her traumatic experience,
ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to a young
victim of a vicious crime like rape.[30]
Anent the other instances that appellant was able to force himself and had carnal knowledge
of AAA, the latter testified as follows:
FISCAL CLUTARIO: Miss witness, you stated during your last testimony
on September 22, 1994 that you were raped in December 1993 by the
accused. Before December 1993, what if anything did the accused do to
you?
A: Yes.
Q: What did the accused do to you?
A: Since September 1993, the accused has been kissing me and touching
my private parts.
Q: How many times did the accused do that?
A: Several times.
Q: Aside from kissing you and touching your private parts in September
1993, what else did he do to you?
A: Yes.
Q: What is that?

A: He raped me.[31]
xxxx
Q: In September 1993, did the accused placed (sic) his penis inside your
vagina?
A: Yes, September 1993.
COURT: How many times?
A: Several times in September.
COURT: In how may occasions did it happen?
A: Once almost everyday.[32]
AAA's further testimony during cross-examination and re-direct examination shows the
consistency of her allegation that she was forced against her will and was intimidated by the
appellant when the latter satisfied his lust. Thus, as testified:
Cross-examination:
Q: When you were allegedly raped, did you not fight back or shout when
these abuses were being committed?
A: I fought back but I did not shout.
Q: And your cousin, brother and sister were not awakened at the time you
were allegedly raped?
A: No, sir.
Q: But you could arose (sic) them or call them for help.
A: I was afraid during that time.
Q: Were you being threatened by the accused when these rapes were being
committed?
A: He told me that I will not be sent to school if I will shout and fight back,
and I wanted to go to school during that time.
Q: But you were not threatened with any weapon or physical harm during
the time that you were threatened?
A: He showed me a bolo.
Q: But he was not holding this bolo at the time the alleged rape was
committed?
A: It was beside him, sir.
Q: He did not even touch that bolo while the rape was being committed?
A: No, sir.
Q: And you could even grab that bolo if you wanted to during the alleged
time of rape?
A: I was afraid.

Q: As far as you can remember, how many times were you raped by the
accused?
A: Many times, I can no longer remember because he treated me as his
wife.
Q: But despite the opportunity open to you for you to escape, you did not
use them?
A: I tried to escape but I did not know where to go.[33]
xxxx

Re-direct:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: When you said a while ago that you did not
shout or asked for help from your brother and cousin and you said you were
threatened, did you believe your uncle when he threatened you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you believe him?
A: Because I was afraid.
Q: And the threat that he made, that frightened you?
A: His voice, masyadong mataas. When I was still a child he used to
spank me.
Q: What was (sic) the exact words that he said that made you frightened?
A: That I cannot go to school.
Q: That is all?
A: He also told me that he will kill my brother and sister.
Q: Did you believe him when he said he will kill your brother and sister?
A: Yes, sir, because he has a frightful face.
Q: Did you see your uncle physically harm your brother and sister even
before or after the incident?
A: Yes, sir, he had made physical harm on my brother and sister.[34]
Hence, the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of AAA. The unbroken line
of jurisprudence is that this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to observe their candor and
behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its
assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.[35] Furthermore, the above testimonies of AAA
positively identifying appellant as the one who defiled her were all the more strengthened by the
Medico-Legal Report[36] conducted by Dr. Rosaline Onggao, who also testified that:

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: Can you tell us what is in the findings which

would verify or confirm the information given to you by AAA that she was
sexually abused for several times?
A: The hymen.
Q: Where particularly in the hymen would confirm that she was sexually
abused?
A: The healed laceration in the hymen.
Q: Based on the healed laceration, would you be able to tell this Honorable
Court the time when the sexual abuse occurred?
A: Since the lacerations were healed more than 7 days or more prior to my
examination, it could be more than a month.
Q: What could be the cause of laceration in the hymen?
A: The laceration could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard object.
Q: Would you consider the penis as a hard blunt object?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
It is settled that when the victims claim of rape is corroborated by the physical findings of
penetration, there exists sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.[38]
For his defense, appellant merely denied having raped AAA. However, denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence
which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters.[39] In the present case, the records are devoid of any clear and
convincing evidence that would substantiate appellant's denial. In the same manner, appellant's
claim that the filing of the criminal charges against him was instigated by AAA's aunt because he
failed to lend the latter money is uncorroborated by any evidence. Thus, when there is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against the
accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[40]
With regard to the modification of the trial court's decision by the CA as to the latter's
findings that only an attempted rape was committed on January 31, 1994, this Court disagrees.
AAA's testimony belies the consummation, as well as the attempt to rape her on the said date.
She said that:
Q: My question is, after December 1993, what else did the accused do to
you?
A: On January 31, 1994, the accused kissed me and touched my
private parts again.
Q: Where did this happen?
A: Inside our room in our house at St. Anthony, Inarawan, Antipolo,
Rizal.
Q: Aside from kissing you and touching your private parts in your
house where you were living, what else did the accused do to you?
A: On January 31, after I took a bath when I went inside our room

wrapped in towel, I did not know that the accused was inside the room,
he removed the towel and laid me down at the sofa, tried to kiss me but
I kicked him and scratched his arms.
Q: Then what happened next?
A: Afterwards, he went out of the room, I dressed up and I was trying to
get out of the house and he was preventing me from going out. He was
blocking my way. He again wanted to rape me.
Q: What happened next?
A: I pushed him and I was able to open the door and I ran out of the house.
Q: You are telling that in January 1994, all these things the accused did
to you except inserting his penis to your vagina?
A: Yes.[41]
xxxx
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: In January 1994, did the accused raped (sic) you
by placing his penis inside your vagina?
A: Not exactly January 31, 1994, but I remember between January 1 to 5.
Q: Nothing happens on January 31, 1994?
A: I was not raped anymore on January 31, 1994, because I told my
sister about it already.[42]
Attempted rape requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.[43] The prosecution must, therefore, establish the
following elements of an attempted felony:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause
or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.[44]
The above elements are wanting in the present case. Appellants act of removing the towel
wrapped in the body of AAA, laying her on the sofa and kissing and touching her private parts
does not exactly demonstrate the intent of appellant to have carnal knowledge of AAA on that
particular date; thus, dismissing the mere opinion and speculation of AAA, based on her
testimony, that appellant wanted to rape her. Even so, the said acts should not be left unpunished
as the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5,[45] Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,[46] AAA, being a minor
when the incident happened, are present. In People v. Bon:[47]
The elements of the crime of acts lasciviousness are: (1) that the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done:
(a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is

deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party

is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of
either sex.
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 7610 or the Child Abuse Law defines lascivious conduct, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.[48]
Clearly, all the elements of the offense are present. The actions of appellant on January 31,
1994, i.e., laying AAA on the sofa and kissing and touching her private parts are, by definition,
lascivious or lewd, and based on AAA's testimony, the intimidation from appellant was in
existence and apparent. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through
coercion or intimidation.[49] As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible.
[50] It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free
exercise of the will of the offended party.[51] This is especially true in the case of young,
innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and
with nerves of steel.[52] Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same
circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.[53]
Incidentally, under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.[54] As explained by this Court in People v.
Abulon:[55]
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure,
appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included
in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included

in another. An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are
necessarily included in rape.[56]
In People v. Candaza,[57] this Court ruled that the penalty for acts of lasciviousness
performed on a child under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua; thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should thus fall within the range of prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporal minimum, as minimum, to reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
finding appellant Alejandro of Rellota y Tadeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
two (2) counts rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the same appellant
is also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; and per previous ruling[58] of this Court, must also indemnify
the victim in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a fine in the same amount.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 188560

Present:

- versus CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

RICKY ALFREDO y NORMAN,

Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ricky Alfredo y
Norman, which affirmed an earlier decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 01-CR-4213 and 01-CR4214of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62 in La Trinidad, Benguet. The RTC found
accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory
portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213

That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian,
Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA],[3] a
thirty six (36) year old woman, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214
That sometime in the period from April 28-29, 2001, at Cadian,
Topdac, Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting a
flashlight into the vagina of one [AAA], a thirty six (36) year old woman,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

On June 21, 2001, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty
to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the oral testimonies of the victim, AAA; her
10-year old son, BBB; Ernesto dela Cruz; Police Officer 3 James Ruadap; and Dr. Alma Ged-ang.
On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses accused-appellant himself; his mother,
Remina; his sister, Margaret; Hover Cotdi; Jona Canuto; and Pina Mendoza.[6]
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
In March 2001, AAA, who was six months pregnant, went home to Butiyao, Benguet,
along with her family, to harvest the peppers planted in their garden. On April 27, 2001, AAA and
her son, BBB, returned to their sayote plantation in Cadian, Topdac, Atok, Benguet to harvest
sayote. The following day, or on April 28, 2001, AAA had the harvested sayote transported to
Baguio City. Later that night, she and her son stayed at their rented shack and retired early to bed.
[7]
In the middle of the night, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the
gaps in the walls of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then inquired who the person
was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off. After a few minutes, the light was
switched on again.[8] Thereafter, a male voice shouted, Rumwar kayo ditta no saan kayo nga
rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala![9] AAA remained seated. Then, the male voice uttered,
Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan bilangan ka, maysa, duwa[10] AAA immediately
woke BBB up. Just then, the male voice said, Pabitaken kayo iti bala.[11] AAA cried out of
fear.[12]

Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp
placed on top of the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the door opened,
she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight. AAA did not immediately
recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was covering his face. She invited him to
come inside the shack, but the latter immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill.[13]
Helpless and terrified, AAA obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.[14]
Upon reaching a sloping ground, accused-appellant ordered AAA to stop. Thereafter,
accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove her clothes.
When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed her clothes. When she also
attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA
was again ordered to walk uphill.[15]
Upon reaching a grassy portion and a stump about one foot high, accused-appellant
ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant boxed her thighs.
Accused-appellant then bent down and spread open AAAs legs. After directing the beam of the
flashlight on AAAs naked body, accused-appellant removed his pants, lowered his brief to his
knees, went on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to
box her if she moves.[16]
Accused-appellant also held AAAs breast, as well as the other parts of her body. He
shifted the flashlight from one hand to another while he moved his buttocks up and down. AAA
cried as she felt severe pain in her lower abdomen. Accused-appellant stood up and directed the
beam of the flashlight on her after he was satisfied.[17]
Ten minutes later, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis
into her vagina and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant
stood up and lit a cigarette.[18]
Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and tried to insert his penis
in the latters vagina. His penis, however, has already softened. Frustrated, accused-appellant
knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina. After removing his fingers, accused-appellant held a
twig about 10 inches long and the size of a small finger in diameter which he used to pierce her
vagina. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her
vagina.[19]
After accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAAs vagina, he went on top of
her again, pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs.
Subsequently, accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident to the
authorities. Immediately after, he left her at the scene.[20]
Since she was too weak to walk, AAA rested for about 15 minutes before she got up
and went back to the shack where she immediately woke her son up. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the highway and boarded a jeep to Camp 30, Atok, Benguet. She also went to Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet the following day to report the incident to the police authorities.[21]
Upon medical examination, Dr. Ged-ang found that AAA had a subconjunctival
hemorrhage on the right eye and multiple head injuries, which may have been caused by force
such as a blow, a punch, or a hard object hitting the eye. There was also tenderness on the upper
part of the back of AAA, as well as on her left infraclavicular area below the left clavicle, left

flank area or at the left side of the waist, and medial aspect on the inner part of the thigh.
Moreover, there were also multiple linear abrasions, or minor straight open wounds on the skin of
her forearms and legs caused by sharp objects with rough surface.[22]
Apart from the external examination, Dr. Ged-ang also conducted an internal
examination of the genitalia of AAA. Dr. Ged-ang found that there was confluent abrasion on the
left and medial aspects of her labia minora about five centimeters long and a confluent circular
abrasion caused by a blunt, rough object that has been forcibly introduced into the genitalia.[23]
Version of the Defense
In the morning of April 28, 2001, accused-appellant was allegedly working in the
sayote plantation near his house. At noontime, he went home to eat his lunch. After having
lunch, his mother told him to bring the pile of sayote she harvested to the edge of the road.
Accused-appellant went to the place where the pile of harvested sayote was placed. However,
when he reached that place, he claimed that he saw AAA gathering the sayote harvested by his
mother and placing them in a sack.[24]
Upon seeing what AAA was doing, accused-appellant shouted at her, prompting AAA
to run away with her son and leave the sack of sayote. When they left, accused-appellant started
placing the harvested sayote in the sack. He was able to fill eight sacks. Remembering that his
mother told him that he would be able to fill 10 sacks all in all, accused-appellant went to the
shack of AAA after bringing the eight sacks near the road. He suspected that she and her son
were the ones who took the two missing sacks of sayote.[25]
When he arrived at the place where AAA and her son were staying, accused-appellant
allegedly saw them packing sayote, and he also supposedly saw a sack of sayote with the name of
his father printed on it. For this reason, accused-appellant got mad and told AAA to go away and
leave the place because what they were doing was wrong. AAA replied by saying that she would
wait for Hover Cotdi, the owner of the sayote plantation and the shack, to ask for permission to
leave. All this time, accused-appellant was allegedly speaking in an angry but non-threatening
voice. Nonetheless, while he was confronting AAA, her son ran into the shack and stayed there.
[26]
Before leaving the place, accused-appellant told AAA that the sacks of sayote
belonged to his family, although he decided not to take them back anymore. He supposedly left
after five oclock in the afternoon and arrived at their house at around seven oclock in the
evening. During this time, all his family members were watching television on Channel 3.
Accused-appellant joined them in watching a Tagalog movie. He then allegedly went to bed at 10
oclock in the evening, while his parents continued to watch television until 11 oclock in the
evening.[27]
The following morning, on April 29, 2001, accused-appellant woke up between six to
seven oclock in the morning. After having breakfast, he helped his mother clean the sayote farm.
At around eight oclock in the morning, he saw AAA by the road waiting for a ride with a
baggage placed in a carton box. His mother then went down the road and talked to AAA, leaving
accused-appellant behind. He claimed to pity AAA upon seeing her but could not do anything.
[28]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Between the two conflicting versions of the incident, the trial court gave credence to

the version of the prosecution and rendered its Decision dated February 17, 2006, finding
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds RICKY
ALFREDO y NORMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4213 and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua including all the accessory penalties imposed
by law.
The Court, likewise, finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape in Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214 and sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, and eight (8)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
For each count of rape, he shall pay [AAA] the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity and the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court
Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province is directed to
immediately transfer the said accused, Ricky Alfredo y Norman to the
custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after
the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless
otherwise ordered by the court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail
Warden of Benguet Province for his information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[30] modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the Regional Trial Court to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial
court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred, for appropriate
action and disposition, to the CA.
On August 17, 2006, accused-appellant filed his Brief for Accused-Appellant,[31]
while the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief for
the Plaintiff-Appellee[32] on January 18, 2007.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
As stated above, the CA, in its Decision dated September 30, 2008, affirmed the
judgment of conviction by the trial court.[33]
Undaunted, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated March 19, 2009.[34]
On April 21, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal[35] from the CA

Decision dated September 30, 2008.

In our Resolution dated September 14, 2009,[36] we notified the parties that they may
file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. On November 9, 2009, the People of
the Philippines manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it believed that all the
issues involved in the present controversy have been succinctly discussed in the Brief for the
Appellee.[37] On the other hand, on January 26, 2010, accused-appellant filed his supplemental
brief.
The Issues
Accused-appellant contends in his supplemental brief that:
I.
BY THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE TWO (2)
INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THE
LATTER HAS NO OTHER PLAUSIBLE DEFENSE EXCEPT ALIBI
THAT SHOULD NOT JUST BE BRUSHED ASIDE IF THERE ARE
MATERIAL INCONSISTENSIES IN THE CLAIMS OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION;
II.
THE DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT HEAVILY
RELIED ON THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL WHEN THE PONENTE OF THE
DECISION DID NOT HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE
WITNESSES;
III.
THE THEN AND THERE CONDUCT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
UNLIKELY TO YIELD A GUILTY VERDICT.[38]
The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense
In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that he could not offer any other
defense except denial and alibi, as he could not distort the truth that he was in his house at the
time of the alleged rape in the evening of April 28, 2001 up to the wee hours of April 29, 2001.
He contends that although denial and alibi are the weakest defenses in criminal cases,
consideration should also be given to the fact that denial becomes the most plausible line of
defense considering the nature of the crime of rape where normally only two persons are
involved.[39]

It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove
that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission.[40]
A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant failed
to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only about 150 meters
away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001. Significantly, it was also not
physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present on the mountain where he allegedly
raped AAA at the time it was said to have been committed.
Moreover, it has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak
and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.[41] It is evidence negative
in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[42] Thus, there being no strong and
credible evidence adduced to overcome the testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi
of accused-appellant.
In addition, even if the alibi of accused-appellant appears to have been corroborated by
his mother, Remina, and his sister, Margaret, said defense is unworthy of belief not only because
accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA, but also because it has been held that alibi
becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his or
her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms,[43] and not by credible persons.[44]
As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the
latter is superior
Accused-appellant contends also that there were material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in the latters respective affidavits, to wit: (1)
whether accused-appellants penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA indeed recognized
accused-appellant when they were already on the mountain or while they were still in the shack.
[45]
AAA testified in open court that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her
vagina several times but was unable to do so since his penis has already softened.[46] On the
other hand, AAA stated in her affidavit that the suspect ordered me to lay [sic] flatly on the
ground and there he started to light and view my whole naked body while removing his pant [sic]
and tried to insert his pennis [sic] on [sic] my vagina but I wonder it does not errect [sic].[47]
There is no inconsistency between AAAs testimony and her affidavit. The only difference is that
she failed to state in her affidavit that before accused-appellant unsuccessfully tried to insert his
penis into AAAs vagina, he had already succeeded twice in penetrating her private organ.
There is likewise no incompatibility between AAAs affidavit stating that she came to
know of accused-appellant as the culprit when they were on the mountain and his flashlight
illuminated his face as he lay on top of her, and her testimony that while they were still in the
shack, AAA was not then sure but already suspected that her rapist was accused-appellant
because of his hair.[48] In other words, AAA was not yet sure whether accused-appellant was
the culprit while they were still in the shack, as she only became positively certain that it was him
when the flashlight illuminated his face while they were on the mountain.[49]

Nevertheless, discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for

affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are, thus,
generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.[50]
The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses
Accused-appellant contends further that the judge who penned the appealed decision is
different from the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses and was, thus, in no position
to render a judgment, as he did not observe firsthand their demeanor during trial.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one
who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on
the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on
record is sufficient to support its conclusion.[51] As this Court held in People v. Competente:
The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment
was not the one who heard the witnesses, does not detract from the
validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the
Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during
trial and that it was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross
examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon.[52]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and
complete. Hence, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt
After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied that the
prosecutions evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[53] Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact
of forced coitus.[54]
In the instant case, accused-appellant is charged with two counts of rape one under
paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and the other under par. 2 of Art. 266A.
Pertinently, the elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are the
following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;

and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.[55]

On the other hand, the elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code are as
follows: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is
committed by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual
assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others.[56]
Notably, the prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of the foregoing
elements. When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the incident
that transpired in the evening of April 28, 2001 and early morning of April 29, 2001. AAA
categorically asserted that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her and even sexually
assaulted her against her will with the use of force, threat, or intimidation.
Particularly, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened to riddle her and her son
with bullets if they do not open the door of their shack. Accused-appellant thereafter forcibly
pulled her hair and dragged her to the mountains. AAA pleaded for her life. Nonetheless,
accused-appellant boxed her every time she did not yield to his demands. He boxed her thighs
forcing AAA to sit, and he threatened to box her if she moves while he carried out his bestial
desires.[57]
AAA testified further that after accused-appellant satisfied his lust, he sexually
assaulted her. He inserted his fingers into her vagina and then he tried to pierce the same with a
twig. Subsequently, he inserted his flashlight into her vagina.[58] AAA was too weak to stop
him. She had struggled to free herself from accused-appellant from the moment she was dragged
from the shack until they reached the mountains. However, accused-appellant still prevailed over
her. Notably, AAA was six months pregnant at that time. She was frightened and hopeless.[59]
Also, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Ged-ang
corroborated the testimony of AAA. While a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for the
successful prosecution of the case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate
issued are veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs testimony.
[60]
Moreover, the police found the red t-shirt and blue shorts of AAA in the place where
accused-appellant was said to have removed her clothes. In addition, AAAs son, BBB, testified
as to how accused-appellant threatened them in the evening of April 28, 2001, how he was able to
identify accused-appellant as the perpetrator, and what his mother looked like when she returned
home in the early morning of April 29, 2001. According to BBB, his mother was naked except for
a dirty white jacket she was wearing. He also noticed that his mother had wounds and blood all
over her body. All these are consistent with the testimony of AAA.[61]
All told, we accordingly sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Award of Damages
The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified. For rape under
Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the CA was correct in awarding PhP 50,000 as
civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral damages. However, for rape through sexual assault
under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Code, the award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil

indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.[62]

We explained in People v. Cristobal that for sexually assaulting a pregnant married
woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously
wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of
example to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good is
warranted.[63] Notably, there were instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite
the absence of an aggravating circumstance. As we held in People v. Dalisay:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases
when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had
been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same
was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid
Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts
no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in
the determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if
an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts
will not award exemplary damages. x x x
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that
courts may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned
Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so
long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity
of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned
that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely
affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,
especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in
the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an
aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the
Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v.
Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of
the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v.
Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And
in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was
instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis
for the grant of exemplary damages taking into account simply the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime,

courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the
use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being
that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant associated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice,
gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud
or gross fraud that intensifies the injury. The terms
punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter
the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore,
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the
same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages
may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis
of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting
a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v.
Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate
opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such
cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind
the award of exemplary damages to set a public example or

correction for the public good.[64] (Emphasis supplied.)

Concomitantly, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 should be awarded
for each count of rape, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[65]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated September 30, 2008
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02135 finding accused-appellant Ricky Alfredo guilty of rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant in Criminal Case
No. 01-CR-4213 is ordered to pay PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages,
and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 01-CR-4214, accused-appellant is
likewise ordered to pay PhP 30,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 30,000 as moral damages, and PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

ROSALIO L. FLORENDO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HON. JOSEFINA

CEBALLOS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Isabelo C. Salavida for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 29248, which upheld the validity
of the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 362 to 365 and 368.
We deny the petition.
I
In a decision dated March 26, 1992, petitioner, together with hisco-accused, was found
guilty of the crime of falsification of commercial documents by respondent Judge
Josephine D. Ceballos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac in Criminal
Cases Nos. 362 to 365 and 368. Thereafter, promulgation of judgment was set on June
15, 1992. On the latter date, all the accused, except petitioner, were present. However,
petitioner's counsel was present at the promulgation and he moved for the resetting of
the promulgation to June 23, 1992. Respondent Judge denied the motion, finding no
valid ground therefor. The promulgation proceeded. Petitioner's counsel was furnished a
copy of the Decision on June 15, 1992 as evidenced by his signature acknowledging
receipt at the back of the last page of the original copy thereof.
On June 16, 1992, respondent Judge issued an order, modifying her earlier decision
dated March 26, 1992 with the deletion of the name of accused Alejandro Dizon from the
decision considering that he was never arraigned.

On June 17, 1992, respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest against all the accused,
including petitioner, for their failure to renew their bail bonds.
A notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 6, 1992 was denied by respondent Judge, in
an order dated July 11, 1992, for having been filed out of time.
On August 4, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Promulgation of Judgment but the
same was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated August 14, 1992. Likewise, a
motion for the reconsideration of said order was denied on September 29, 1992.
On October 24, 1992, petitioner elevated the matter before the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus to question the orders of respondent Judge. On
June 30, 1993, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated the matter before this Court and raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PROMULGATION OF A DECISION CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED ON FOUR COUNTS, EACH A LESS GRAVE FELONY, MAY BE MADE IN
ABSENTIA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED DECISION SHOULD BE PROMULGATED
ANEW;
3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S APPEAL SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE COURSE
(Rollo, p.3)
II
The petition is devoid of merit.
The resolution of the instant petition hinges on the proper interpretation of Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Promulgation of Judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered judgment.
The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal
and to approve the bail pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the
decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in
the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served

upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure
to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the
accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or
his counsel (Emphasis supplied).
Under the first paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, the presence in person of the
accused at the promulgation of judgment is mandatory in all cases except where the
conviction is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear through counsel
or representative.
Under the third paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, all the accused, regardless of the
gravity of the offense charged against them, must be given notice of the promulgation of
judgment and the requirement of their presence. They must appear in person or in case
of those facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. If the
accused fails to appear at the arraignment, the second and third sentences of paragraph
three become operative.
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 is a new provision introduced by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the promulgation of judgment in
absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The amendment was
intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial process could be
subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. In
explaining the amendment, Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented:
. . . Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public justice would be set at naught
and, where the civil liability ex delicto was instituted with the criminal action, the offended
party could not enforce either the primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary civil
liability, where proper and involved in the case, as no judgment could be promulgated.
Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions only require prior arraignment as an
indispensable requisite and the trial may thereafter proceed in the absence of the
accused, the judgment in the case being merely the procedural culmination of the trial,
the promulgation thereof can justifiably be made in absentia in the manner set out in this
section (II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 369 [6th ed., 1989]).
The first paragraph of the Rule deals with the personal presence of the accused at the
promulgation of judgment and its exception, i.e., in the case of a light offense where his
personal presence is dispensed with. The third paragraph of the same Rule deals with
the presence of all the accused at the promulgation regardless of the penalty imposed
on them. There is no exception under this paragraph. All the accused must be present in
person or through counsel or a representative.
In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of petitioner on
June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within which to appeal. The
notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time.
It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that proceedings are made
of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of
the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner
does not question the non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the
judgment in the criminal docket.

Anent the issue on the re-promulgation of the amended decision, the Solicitor General,
in his comment, correctly observed:
. . . Petitioner cannot harp on the argument that since the Decision dated March 26,
1992 was amended by an Order dated June 16, 1992 issued by respondent Judge, then
the Decision must be re-promulgated.
The June 16, 1992 Order amending the March 26, 1992 Decision only refers to accused
Alejandro Dizon whose name should not have been included in the Decision considering
that he was never arraigned. The June 16, 1992 Order does not affect petitioner nor his
other co-accused whose conviction had already been validly promulgated on June 15,
1992 (Rollo, p. 34).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.