EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18008. October 30, 1962.]

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
Martin B. Laurea and Associates, for petitioner.
Solicitor General for oppositor.
SYLLABUS
1. CHANGE OF NAME; LEGAL SEPARATION ALONE
NOT GROUND FOR WIFE'S CHANGE OF NAME;
MANDATORY LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 372, NEW
CIVIL CODE. A woman's married status is not
affected by a decree of legal separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum, and under
Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must
continue using the name and surname employed
by her before the separation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY OF RULE 103,
RULES OF COURT, DOUBTFUL. It is doubtful
whether Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which
refers to change of name in general, may prevail
over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the
New Civil Code with regard to married women
legally separated from their husbands. Even,
however, applying Rule 103, the fact of legal
separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify
a change of name, because to hold otherwise,
would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of said Article 372.
DECISION
BARRERA, J p:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court
of First Instance of Baguio (Sp. Proc. No. 433) a
petition which reads:
"1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident
of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior
to the date of the filing of this petition;
"2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA
LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married
Mr. Enrique B. Santamaria; that in a partial
decision entered on this Honorable Court on
January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this
Court, entitled 'Enrique B. Santamaria vs. Elisea
L. Santamaria,' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given
a decree of legal separation from her; that the
said partial decision is now final;
"3. That during her marriage to Enrique B.
Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that
aside from her legal separation from Enrique R.
Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him
for many years now;
"4. That in view of the fact that she has been
legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria
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and has likewise ceased to live with him for many

years, it is desirable that she be allowed to
change her name and/or be permitted to resume
using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
"WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that
after the necessary proceedings are had, she be
allowed to resume using her maiden name of
Elisea Laperal."
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of
Baguio on the ground that the same violates the
provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the
Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court
denied the petition for the reason that Article 372
of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she
is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she
employed before the legal separation. Upon
petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating
the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition
on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from
her husband, to continue using her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and
the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Hence, this appeal by the State.
The contention of the Republic finds support in
the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
which reads:.
"ART. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal
separation". (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the language of the statute is
mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue
using her name and surname employed before
the legal separation. This is so because her
married status is unaffected by the separation,
there being no severance of the vinculum. It
seems to be the policy of the law that the wife
should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
The appellee contends, however, that the petition
is substantially for change of her name from
Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using,
since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden
name, giving as reason or cause therefor her
being legally separated from the husband,
Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they
have ceased to live together for many years.

There seems to be no dispute that in the

institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for
change of name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of this
opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is
legally separated from her husband and has, in
fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is
doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103
which refers to change of name in general, may
prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372
of the New Civil Code with regards to married
women legally separated from their husbands.
Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case,
the fact of legal separation alone which is the
only basis for the petition at bar is, in our
opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a
change of the name of herein petitioner, for to
hold otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of the
said Article 372.
It is true that in the second decision which
reconsidered the first it is stated that as
petitioner owns extensive business interests, the
continued use of her husband's surname may
cause undue confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This
finding is however without basis. In the first
place, these were not the causes upon which the
petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence
to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with
the issuance of the decree of legal separation in
1958,
the
conjugal
partnership
between
petitioner and her husband had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil
Code.) Consequently, there could be no more
occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of
December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is
hereby set aside and the petition dismissed.
Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
||| (Laperal v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18008, October
30, 1962)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32054. May 15, 1974.]

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364-380

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TERESITA LLANETA (known also as TERESITA

LLANETA FERRER and TERESITA FERRER),
petitioner, vs. The Honorable CORAZON JULIANO
AGRAVA, as Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, respondent.
Pascual G. Mier for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant
Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial
Attorney Quirino B. Maglente, Jr. for respondent.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its special
proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of
name, Teresita Llaneta has come to this Court on
appeal by certiorari.
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once
married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but
one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin
Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia
had relations with another man out of which
Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth,
Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila
where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-inlaw, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in
the household of the Ferrers, using the surname
of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her
schooling. When she was about twenty years old,
she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in
Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was
required to present it in connection with a
scholarship granted to her by the Catholic
Charities. It was then that she discovered that her
registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and
that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and
an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the
surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had
been using since she acquired reason, would
cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita
petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for
change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the
respondent judge denied her petition; hence the
present recourse.
The petitioner has established that she has been
using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can
remember; that all her records, in school and
elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer;
that her friends and associates know her only as
Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin
Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept
Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have
tolerated and still approve of her use of the
surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this
time by the petitioner to the name Teresita

Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in

her birth certificate) would result in confusion
among the persons and entities she deals with
and entail endless and vexatious explanations of
the circumstances of her new surname. 1 In her
official dealings, this would likewise mean a
lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits.
Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow
Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry
on in society without her unfortunate status being
bandied about at every turn. 2
The respondent court places reliance on the
doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this
Court, 3 that disallows such change of name as
would give the false impression of family
relationship. The principle remains valid but only
to the extent that the proposed change of name
would in great probability cause prejudice or
future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. In
the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's
widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining
brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come
forward in earnest support of the petition.
Adequate publication of the proceeding has not
elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives
and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances
from various Government agencies show that

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Teresita has a spotless record. And the State

(represented by the Solicitor General's Office),
which has an interest in the name borne by every
citizen within its realm for purposes of
identification, interposed no opposition at the trial
after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita
and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin
Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita
was born, would have consented or objected to
her use of his surname is open to speculation.
One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living
who possess the right of action to prevent the
surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to
share it with her.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed,
and the petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of
her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby
granted. Let a copy of this decision be forwarded
to the civil registrar of Irosin, Sorsogon, for his
information and proper action. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Esguerra and Muoz
Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
||| (Llaneta v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, May 15,
1974)