Sps Abrigo v.

De Vera

Hence, this Petition.9

FACTS: Villafania sold a house and lot located

Pangasinan and Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go
covered by a tax declaration. Unknown, however
to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go, Villafania
obtained a free patent over the parcel of land
involved.The said free patent was later on
cancelled by a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go,
sold the house and lot to the Spouses Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house
and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered the sale
and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her
name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and
Damages against Spouses Abrigo before the
MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the
annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary
injunction, restraining order and damages
Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in
view of their agreement in the instant (RTC) case
that neither of them can physically take
possession of the property in question until the
instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment
case was dismissed.
The RTC rendered judgment approving the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
In the said Decision, Villafania was given one year
from the date of the Compromise Agreement to
buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so
would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and
binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate
the premises without need of any demand.
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so
the [vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding
the properties to Spouses Abrigo as well as
damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay
[petitioners and private respondent] damages
and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both
parties [appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void
title could not give rise to a valid one and hence
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de
Vera. Since Villafania had already transferred
ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita
Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.The CA also dismissed the appeal of
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient
basis to award them moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to
be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good
faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must
thus be protected.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and

respondent has a better right to the property.
HELD: DE VERA
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision
affirmed.The present case involves what in legal
contemplation was a double sale. Gloria Villafania
first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar
and Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn,
derived their right. Subsequently a second sale
was executed by Villafania with Respondent de
Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on
double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership
shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this
law with respect to lands registered under the
Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and
respondent registered the sale of the property.
Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors
(Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the
property was covered by the Torrens system, they
registered their respective sales under Act 3344
For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system because,
during the sale, Villafania had presented the
transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the
property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration
must be done in the proper registry in order to
bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the
present case was already registered under the
Torrens system, petitioners registration of the
sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank
v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right
of a party who had registered the sale of land
under the Property Registration Decree, as
opposed to another who had registered a deed of
final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case,
the priority in time principle was not applied,
because the land was already covered by the
Torrens system at the time the conveyance was
registered under Act 3344. For the same reason,

inasmuch as the registration of the sale to

Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system
was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld
over the sale registered under Act 3344 to
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.

declared the Occea spouses as buyers in good

faith and ruled that the action of the heirs was
time-barred. Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not a purchaser of a registered

land is obliged to make inquiries of any possible
defect or adverse claim which does not appear on
the Certificate of Title

Ruling: Petition dismissed.

SPOUSES TOMAS OCCEA and SILVINA

OCCEA vs. LYDIA MORALES OBSIANA
ESPONILLA
June 4, 2004
Second Division

G.R. No. 156973

PUNO, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Nicolas and Irene Tordesillas owned a
piece of land which their children Harod, Angela
and Rosario, and grandchildren Arnold and Lilia
de la Flor inherited. The heirs sold a part of the
land to Alberta Morales. Morales possessed the
lot as owner, constructed a house on it and
appointed a caretaker to oversee her property.
Arnold borrowed the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) from Alberta covering the lot. Then, he
executed an Affidavit acknowledging receipt of
the OCT in trust and undertook to return said title
free from changes, modifications or cancellations.
However, Arnold used the OCT he borrowed from
the vendee Alberta Morales, subdivided the entire
lot into three sublots, and registered them all
under his name. Arnold did not return the OCT
belonging to Alberta despite repeated requests.
Arnold subsequently sold the land to spouses
Tomas and Sylvina Occea. When the respondent
heirs of Alberta learned of the sale, they filed a
case for annulment of sale and cancellation of
titles, with damages, against the Occea spouses,
alleging bad faith since the Occeas conducted
ocular inspection of the area before the purchase
and their caretaker warned them that Arnold is no
longer the owner of the lot being sold. On the
other hand, the Occea spouses alleged that they
were buyers in good faith as the titles to the
subject lots were free from liens or encumbrances
when they purchased them, that they verified
with the Antique Registry of Deeds that Arnolds
TCTs were clean and unencumbered. Lower court

The petition at bar presents a case of

double sale of an immovable property. Article
1544 of the New Civil Code provides that in case
an immovable property is sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall belong: (1) to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) should
there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in possession; and, (3) in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
In all cases, good faith is essential. It is the
basic premise of the preferential rights granted to
the one claiming ownership over an immovable.
What is material is whether the second buyer first
registers the second sale in good faith, i.e.,
without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property sold. The defense of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who
takes the certificate of title in bad faith, with
notice of a flaw.
Indeed, the general rule is that one who
deals with property registered under the Torrens
system need not go beyond the same, but only
has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice
only of such burdens and claims as are annotated
on the title. However, this principle does not
apply when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or
the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts
to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent purchaser
for value nor a purchaser in good faith.

Isabela Colleges, Inc. vs. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino

Rivera

defeat that claim of a registered property owner despite

the long delay of 41 years.

October 20, 2000

Division
Mendoza

Ruling: Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED.

G.R. No.132677 Second

Ponente: Justice

Facts: The late Nieves Tolentino-Rivera and her

husband, Pablo Rivera, were married in 1921. Nieves,
still using her maiden name, filed an application for a
sales patent over a 13.5267-hectare land in Cauayan,
Isabela. Her application was approved and a sales
patent was issued in the name of Nieves Tolentino,
married to Pablo Rivera.
The above said spouses sold to petitioner Isabela four
hectares of their land, which was thereafter immediately
occupied by the petitioner and used the same as its new
campus. Since 1950, the Isabela Colleges declared the
land for tax purposes, but it did not immediately secure a
separate title to the property. It was only on January 13,
1970 when it secured a title to the land.
In December 1976, the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Isabela was burned. Among the titles destroyed was that
of the Isabela Colleges which was however
administratively reconstituted in 1978.
In January 1988, certain people entered the property of
Isabela Colleges, prompting the latter to bring an action
for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isablela rendered a decision ordering the intruders to
vacate the land in question.
In 1991, Nieves brought the present suit against the
Isabela Colleges for Nullity of Titles, Deeds of Sale,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Cancellation of
Titles, Damages with Preliminary Injunction. In its
Answer, the Isabela Colleges asserted that the property
in question had been sold to it with the knowledge and
consent of Nieves who in fact signed the deed of sale.
Moreover, herein petitioner contends that the complaint
was barred by prescription and/or laches.
Two complaints-in-intervention were allowed by the trial
court. The intervenors, who were the parties in the
ejectment suit, claimed to be buyers in good faith or
lessees of Nieves as to certain portions of the subject
land.
During the pendency of this case Nieves died and her
heirs substituted her. On September 30, 1994, the trial
court rendered its decision, ruling in favor of Isabela
Colleges. On Appeal, its decision was reversed. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that:
1.) the subject property is
paraphernal despite Nieves admission that it was
purchased from the government during her marriage with
Pablo Rivera out of conjugal funds;
2.)
Nieves signature in the questioned deed of sale is
forged;
3.) laches cannot

Issue 1: Both the acquisition of the 13-hectare land and

the sale of a portion thereof to petitioner in 1949 took
place when the Spanish Civil Code was still in effect.
Under Article 1407 of that code, the property of the
spouses are deemed conjugal partnership property in
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to one or
the other spouse. This presumption arises with respect
to property acquired during the marriage. It is not
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
conjugal funds.
Indeed, other than its finding that Nieves was already in
possession of the land and applied for a sales patent
before she married Pablo Rivera, the Court of Appeals
cited no other evidence to prove that the land was her
paraphernal property. On the contrary, the evidence
clearly shows that the land was acquires during her
marriage with Pablo Rivera.
Issue 2: The fact that Nieves Tolentinos signature in the
deed of sales is a forgery does not, however, render the
deed of sale void. The land was conjugal property and
under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the
sale is not required. Therefore, that her signature is a
forgery is determinative only of Nieves lack of consent
but not of the validity of the sale.
As the husband may validly sell or dispose of conjugal
property even without the wifes consent, the absence of
the wifes consent alone does not make the sale in
fraud of her.
Issue 3: Nonetheless while it is true that a Torrens title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered owner
may lose his right to recover possession of his registered
property by reason of laches.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
observance of due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert his right either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.
So it is in the present case where the complaint
questioning the validity of the sale to petitioner Isabela
Colleges was filed only after 42 years had lapsed.
Respondents could not feign ignorance of the sale
because petitioner had been in open, public, and
continuous possession of the land, which it had used as
its school campus since 1949.

Bayoca vs. Nogales

September 12, 2000

Third Division
Justice Gonzaga-Reyes

G.R.No.138201
Ponente:

Facts: Gaudioso Nogales acquired ownership over the

subject property on the basis of the Compromise
Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Julia Deocareza who had acquired of said property from
the Canino brothers and sisters. However, Preciosa
Canino subsequently sold at different times portions of
the subject property to herein petiitoners, Francisco
Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso, Erwin Bayoca, and spouses
Pio and Dolores Dichoso.
The Appellee, filed complaint against the Appellants for
Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages. He alleged in
his complaint, that he purchased the said property from
Julia Decareza and thus acquired ownership thereof and
that the Appellants respectively purchased portions of
said property in bad faith and through fraud. The
Appellants, in their Answer to the complaint, alleged that
Preciosa Canino and her siblings acquired just title over
the property when they executed their Deed of Partition
of Real Property and conveyed titles to the vendees, the
Appellants in the present recourse, as buyers in goof
faith.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Nogales and
declared that the sales of portions of said property by
Preciosa Canino were null and void. The trial court
further declared further that petitioners were purchasers
in bad faith.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall

pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
Based on the foregoing, to merit the protection under
Article 1544, second paragraph, the second buyer must
act in good faith in registering the deed. Thus, It has
been held that in cases of double sale of immovables,
what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not
the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether
or not said second buyer registers such second sale in
good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the
title of the property.
On account of the undisputed fact of registration by
respondent Nogales as the first buyer, necessarily, there
is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the
petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and
Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been issued
certificates of title in their names. As for the petitioners
Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to
register the portions of the property sold to them, and
merely rely on the fact that they declared the same in
their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it to state, that
such fact, does not, by itself, constitute evidence of
ownership and cannot likewise prevail over the title of
respondent Nograles.

Severino Baricuatro, Jr.,

On appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.

Hence this petition.

vs.

Issue: Who has the superior right to the parcel of land

sold to different buyers at different times by its former
owners?

Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, Mariano B.

Nemenio and Felisa V. Nemenio, Constantino M.
Galeos and Eugenio V. Amores

Ruling: Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

DECISION of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

February 9, 2000

There is no question from the records that respondent

Nogales was the first to buy the subject property from
Julia, who in turn bought the same from the Canino
brothers and sisters. Petitioners, however, rely on the
fact that they were the first to register the sales of the
different portions of the property resulting in the issuance
of new titles in their names.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential
rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof
in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

G.R. No. 105902

Buena, J.:
FACTS:
Baricuatro bought two lots, part of the Victoria Village, on
installments basis from Galeos on October 16, 1968.
Two months from the date of the previous sale, Galeos
sold the entire subdivision, including the two lots, to
Amores. Baricuatro was informed by Galeos about the
sale and was advised to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the two lots directly to Amores.
Amores took possession of the subdivision and
developed the same for residential purposes. He
secured the transfer of the title to the same in his name.
Afterwards, he sold the two lots of the spouses Mariano
and Felisa Nemenio. Prior to the sale, Baricuatro was
informed through a letter by Amores about the impending
sale of the two lots but the former failed to respond.
Nemenio spouses demanded from Baricuatro to vacate
the said lots but the latter refused to do so.

Trial court rendered a decision, declaring Nemenio

spouses as the owners of the disputed lot. Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the sale made to Amores by Galeos is
valid?
2. Whether the Nemenio spouses are purchasers
in good faith?
RULING:
Issue 1
Amores was in good faith when he bought the
subdivision, however, when he registered his title he
already had knowledge of the previous sale. Such
knowledge tainted his registration with bad faith. In
addition, the agreement to collect the balance of the
purchase price of the disputed lots from Baricuatro which
presupposes knowledge of the previous sale by Amores.
Under Art. 1544, the ownership of an immovable
property shall belong to the purchaser who in good faith
registers it first in the registry of property.

(Uraca vs Ca) The second buyer must show continuing

good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first
sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through
prior registration as provided by law. This means that
the good faith of the purchaser should be from the time
of the perfection of the sale until up to the time that he be
declared the sole and true owner of the property.
Issue 2
Nemenio spouses only visited the lots ten months after
the sale which was evidenced during the trial of the
case. And so, they cannot claim to be purchasers in
good faith when they registered the title. The registration
made by the spouses were done in bad faith, hence, it
amounted to no inscription at all.
Decision of CA is REVERSED.

RAUL SABERON, JOAN F. SABERON and

JACQUELINE SABERON, Petitioners,
vs.
OSCAR VENTANILLA, JR., and CARMEN
GLORIA D. VENTANILLA, Respondents.
Facts:

On March 3, 1970, Manila Remnant Co., Inc.

(MRCI) and A.U. Valencia & Co. Inc. (AUVC)
executed two (2) contracts to sell in favor of
Oscar C. Ventanilla, Jr. and Carmen Gloria D.
Ventanilla (Ventanillas).
MRCI resold the
same
property
to
Carlos
Crisostomo
(Crisostomo).
Aggrieved, the Ventanillas commenced an
action for specific performance, annulment of
deeds and damages against MRCI, AUVC, and
Crisostomo with the Court of First Instance.
The CFI Quezon City rendered a decision in
favor of the Ventanillas. The CA sustained the
CFI Quezon Citys decision in toto.
The
Ventanillas moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution. The writ was issued and served
upon MRCI.
However, MRCI alleged that the subject
properties could not longer be delivered to
the Ventanillas because they had already
been sold to Samuel Marquez (Marquez)

The case was elevated to this Court where

MRCI argued that the sale of the properties
to Marquez was valid because at the time of
the sale, the issue of the validity of the sale
to the Ventanillas had not yet been resolved.
Further, there was no specific injunction
against it re-selling the property. As a buyer
in good faith, Marquez had a right to rely on
the recitals in the certificate of title. The
subject matter of the controversy having
been passed to an innocent purchaser for
value, the execution of the absolute deed of
sale in favor of the Ventanillas could not be
ordered by the trial court. Yet the court ruled
in favor of the Vetanillas. As it turned out,
the execution of the judgment in favor of the
Ventanillas was yet far from fruition. Samuel
Cleofe, Register of Deeds for Quezon City
(ROD Cleofe) revealed to them, that on
March 11, 1992, MRCI registered a deed of
absolute sale to Marquez who eventually sold
the same property to the Saberons, which
conveyance was registered in July 1992. ROD
Cleofe opined that a judicial order for the
cancellation of the titles in the name of the
Saberons was essential before he complied
with the writ of execution in Civil Case No.
26411. Apparently, the notice of levy,
through inadvertence, was not carried over
to the title issued to Marquez, the same
being a junior encumbrance which was
entered after the contract to sell to Marquez
had already been annotated.
Once again, the Ventanillas were constrained
to go to court to seek the annulment of the
deed of sale executed between MRCI and
Marquez as well as the deed of sale between
Marquez and the Saberons, as the fruits of
void conveyances. RTC ruled in favor of the
Ventanillas
Meanwhile, the Saberons filed a case in the
CA relying on one central argumentthat
they were purchasers in good faith, having
relied on the correctness of the certificates of
title covering the lots in question; and
therefore, holders of a valid and indefeasible
title. CA ruled in favor of the Ventanillas.
The Saberons filed the present petition.
Unknown to the Saberons, the former owner
of the properties had entered into contracts
to sell with the Ventanillas, way back in
1970. It was only upon receipt of the

summons in the case filed by the Ventanillas

with the RTC that they learned of the present
controversy.
With the RTC and the CA rulings against their
title over the properties, the Saberons now
come to the Court with their vehement
insistence that they were purchasers in good
faith and for value. Before purchasing the
lots, they exercised due diligence and found
no encumbrance or annotations on the titles.
At the same time, the Ventanillas also failed
to rebut the presumption of their good faith
as there was no showing that they
confederated with MRCI and its officers to
deprive the Ventanillas of their right over the
subject properties.
According to the Saberons, the CA likewise
erred in ruling that there was no constructive
notice of the levy made upon the subject
lands.
Issue:
Whether or not there was constructive notice
of levy as an encumbrance prior to the sale
to the Saberons.
Ruling:
the Court is beckoned to rule on two
conflicting rights over the subject properties:
the right of the Ventanillas to acquire the title
to the registered land from the moment of
inscription of the notice of levy on the day
book (or entry book), on one hand; and the
right of the Saberons to rely on what appears
on the certificate of title for purposes of
voluntary dealings with the same parcel of
land, on the other.
The Saberons could not be said to have
authored the entanglement they found
themselves in. No fault can be attributed to
them for relying on the face of the title
presented by Marquez. In ultimately ruling
for the Ventanillas, the courts a quo focused
on the superiority of their notice of levy and
the constructive notice against the whole
world which it had produced and which
effectively bound third persons including the
Saberons.

This complex situation could have been

avoided if it were not for the failure of ROD
Cleofe to carry over the notice of levy to
Marquezs title, serving as a senior
encumbrance that might have dissuaded the
Saberons from purchasing the properties.
It is undeniable, therefore, that no title was
transferred to Marquez upon the annotation
of the contract to sell on MRCIs title. As
correctly found by the trial court, the
contract to sell cannot be substituted by the
Deed of Absolute Sale as a "mere conclusion"
of the previous contract since the owners of
the properties under the two instruments are
different. Considering that the deed of sale
in favor of Marquez was of later registration,
the notice of levy should have been carried
over to the title as a senior encumbrance.
The fact that the notice of levy on
attachment was not annotated on the
original title on file in the Registry of Deeds,
which resulted in its non-annotation on the
title TCT No. PT-94912, should not prejudice

petitioner. As long as the requisites required

by law in order to effect attachment are
complied with and the appropriate fees duly
paid, attachment is duly perfected. The
attachment already binds the land. This is
because what remains to be done lies not
within the petitioners power to perform but
is a duty incumbent solely on the Register of
Deeds.
In the case at bench, the notice of levy
covering the subject property was annotated
in the entry book of the ROD QC prior to the
issuance of a TCT in the name of the
Saberons. Clearly, the Ventanillas levy was
placed on record prior to the sale. This shows
the superiority and preference in rights of the
Ventanillas over the property as against the
Saberons.