ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v.

COMELEC and JOSEPH ESTRADA

GR No. 206666, 21 January 2015

Facts:
On September 12, 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada of
Plunder. He was sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua and accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of the sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
A month after, former President GMA extended executive clemency to former
President Estrada by way of pardon. The pardon states:

MALACAAN PALACE MANILA

By the President of the Philippines

PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of
seventy (70),

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office,

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby
grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan
of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights.

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and
processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he
owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take
effect.

On 30 November 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position

of President. During that time, his candidacy had three oppositions in the
COMELEC.
However, all the petitions were dismissed on the following grounds:
(1) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president
(2) The pardon granted to Estrada restored his right to vote and be voted
for a public office.
After the elections, Estrada only managed to get the second highest number of
votes.
On 2 October 2012, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
the Mayor of the City of Manila.
On 24 January 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification on the
ground that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for Plunder which sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with absolute disqualification.
Risos-Vidal relied on Sec. 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which state respectively:

Former President Estrada received and accepted the pardon by affixing his
signature.

COMELEC Second division dismissed the petition on the ground that RisosVidal failed to present proof to reverse the previous pronouncement of the
COMELEC declaring that former President Estradas right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon granted by former President
GMA.
Risos-Vidal filed the case with the SC and while the case was pending, Estrada

was voted into office.

Alfredo Lim also filed his motion to intervene in the case and was granted.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal

Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that
of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphases supplied.)

RISOS-VIDALs arguments

Risos-Vidal claims that the pardon granted to Estrada was conditional as

evidenced by Estradas acceptance. That such acceptance was an indication
of the conditional nature of the pardon.
The condition, according to Risos-Vidal is embodied in the WHEREAS clause,
which states: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to
no longer seek any elective position or office.
Such commitment was what impelled former Pres. GMA to grant the pardon.
And Estrada breached the condition when he filed his COC for President and
Mayor of Manila.
In addition, RisosVidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which
EstradashouldbedisqualifiedisactuallytheproscriptioninSec.40ofthe
LGC,inrelationtoSec.12oftheOEC.
She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonmentofoneyearormoreandinvolvingmoralturpitude.
Shealsoinsiststhatevenwiththegrantofpardon,thisdidnotoperatetomake
availabletheexceptionintheOECbecausethepardonwasmerelyconditional.
Moreover, RisosVidal argues that it is not enough that a pardon makes a
generalstatementthatsuchpardoncarrieswithittherestorationofciviland
politicalrights.
ShecontendsthatbyvirtueofArticle36and41oftheRPC,apardonrestoring
civilandpoliticalrightswithoutcategoricallymakingmentionofwhatspecific
civilandpoliticalrightsarerestoredshallnotrestoretherighttoholdpublic
office,ortherightofsuffragenorshallitremittheaccessorypenalties.
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
xxx x

She also cites the concurring opinions of Justice Padilla and Feliciano in
Monsantov.Factoran,whichstatethattherestorationoftherighttohold
public office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a
criminal case,but subsequentlypardoned,cannot beleft tointerference,no
matterhowintenselyarguable,butmustbestatedinexpress,explicit,positive,
specificlanguage.

OSGs arguments

The issue of whether or not the pardon granted to former Pres. Estrada restored
his right to run for public office had already been passed upon by COMELEC
in 2010 and there is no reason to reverse the same in the absence of any new
argument.
While at first glance, Estradas conviction for plunder disqualifies him from
running as Mayor under Sec. 40 of the LGC, the subsequent grant of pardon
effectively restored his right to run for public office. Such is an exception
provided for under Sec. 12 of the OEC.
As to the requirements under Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC, the express restoration
of particular rights to be stated in the pardon is a rigid interpretation and would
be stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the same.
Finally, the third WHEREAS clause of the pardon is not an integral part of the
decree and cannot serve to restrict its effectivity.

Estradas arguments

The factual findings of COMELEC are binding and conclusive on the SC.
He was granted an absolute pardon and was restored to his full civil and
political rights, including the right to seek public office. That his expressed
acceptance is not proof that the pardon extended to him was conditional.
Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of
the President as expressly granted by the Constitution.

Issues:(1)W/NthegrantofpardonwasconditionalNO,itwasabsolute.

(2)W/NEstradaisdisqualifiedtorunasmayorunderSec.40oftheLGCforhaving
beenconvictedofplunder,anoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeNO,wasgranted
absolutepardonwhichrestoredhimhiscivilandpoliticalrights.
Held: Petition lacks merit.

Article 36 and 41 of the RPC should be construed in a way that will give full effect
to the executive clemency granted by the President.

Ratio:
Estrada was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON

Former President Estrada was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON that fully

restored ALL his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office.
The wording of the pardon is complete, unambiguous and unqualified. The
only reasonable, objective and constitutional interpretation of the language of
the pardon is that it conforms to Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only

instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of

Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency.
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
xxx x
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension
of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

The phrase in the presidential pardon, which declares that former President
Estrada is hereby restored to his civil and political rights substantially complies
with the requirement of express restoration.
The form or manner by which the President or Congress should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with
unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle
of separation of powers.
This principle must be observed if non-compliance with the form imposed by
one branch on a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the diminution
of an exclusive constitutional prerogative.
The provisions in the RPC must be construed to harmonize the power of the
President to grant executive clemency.
The pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the
accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes the same in the
pardon.
The pardon granted to Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon.

Right to seek public elective office is recognized as falling under civil and political
rights

The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 [RA 9225] provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those
who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must

meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other
existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;

International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the

operative act that restores their right to run for public office.
The petitioners failure to comply therewith in accordance
with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to
regain her political right to seek elective office.

The disqualification of Estrada under the LGC in relation to OEC was removed by
his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.

The OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition in the LGC a plenary
pardon or amnesty. It allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon
or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:
xxx x
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective
office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their

The third whereas clause did not operate to make the pardon conditional
The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation
considering the unqualified use of the term civil and political rights as being
restored.
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because strictly speaking they are
not part of the operative language of the statute.
In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon and therefore does not by itself operate to make the pardon
conditional.
Also, PGMA did not oppose Estradas decision to run for President in the May
2010 elections, this shows her intention to restore him to his rights of suffrage
and to hold public office.
The whereas clause was simply a statement of fact of the prevailing situation at
the time the pardon was granted