1. Republic v.

Ayala
Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines sought the annulment of titles
allegedly obtained by the defendant over portions of the territorial waters of the
public domain. It was alleged that the defendant company caused the survey and
preparation of a composite plan of Hacienda Calatagan, increasing its area from
9,652.583 hectares (as evidenced by TCT No. 722) to 12,000 hectares, by taking or
including therein lands of public dominion. Miguel Tolentino and 22 others alleged
holders of fishpond permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries over the areas
supposedly outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, were allowed to intervene
in the case and make demand for recovery of possession of said areas, and claim for
damages for the deprivation of possession thereof allegedly by the illegal acts of
defendants.
The court rendered judgment annulling TCT No. T-9550 of the Register of
Deeds of Batangas issued to defendants Dizons covering Lots 360, 362, 363 and
182, as well as other subdivision titles issued to Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de
Calatagan over the areas outside its private property covered by TCT No. 722. This
ruling was based upon the finding that the disputed areas form part of the navigable
water, or are portions of the sea, beach and foreshores of the bay.
Defendants claim that the trial court was in error in finding that Lots 360, 362,
363, and 182 of Psd-40891 are outside the boundaries of Hacienda Calatagan, as
delimited in TCT No. 722.
It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable
water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by
defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact that
the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certificate of
title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore
areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants-appellants do not deny
that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda
in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified
by claiming that it could have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in
the preparation of the original titles, and, anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares,
according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to a magnetic survey.
Ruling: The areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of
Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable
water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable
of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into
properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. 1 In the present case,
as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons
(and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia., and/or
Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters,
the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants
and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion.
2. Hilario v. City of Manila
Facts: Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49
hectares in area located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal.1 Upon his
death, this property was inherited by his son, herein plaintiff-appellant Jose Hilario,
Jr., to whom a new certificate of title2 was issued.

During the lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the
western side by the San Mateo River.3To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo
and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was
further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards
served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred
which inundated the entire place including the neighboring barrios and
municipalities. The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed
and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular
place of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular strip which
now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course.
In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a sand and gravel plant within the
premises5 and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from
the nearby areas the River. The operations eventually extended northward into this
strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed with the U.S. War
Department by Luis Hilario, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario's estate. The U.S.
Army paid.6 In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and
appellee who took over its operations and continued the extractions and excavations
of gravel and sand from the strip of land along an area near the River.
On October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint7 for injunction and damages
against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the
Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant.
It was prayed that the latter be restrained from excavating, bulldozing and extracting
gravel, sand and soil from his property and that they solidarily pay to him P5,000.00
as damages. Defendants' answer alleged, in affirmative defense, that the extractions
were made from the riverbed while counterclaiming with a prayer for injunction
against plaintiffwho, it was claimed, was preventing them from their operations.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before
the present Civil Code took effect,19 the question before Us should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866.
On May 13, 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint. Impleaded as additional
defendants were the City of Manila,10the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal,11 and Engr.
Eugenio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his
claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director
of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials
taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop
their operations.
Came the separate amended answers of the several defendants. Manila City denied
ownership of the plant and claimed that the City Engineer, acted merely as a deputy
of the Public Works Director. The other defendants12 put up, as special defense, the
agreement between plaintiff and the Public Works Director, and asserted a P1.2
million counterclaim for damages against plaintiff. The rest13 renewed the same
defense; that the disputed area was part of the public domain, since it was situated
on the riverbanks.
Still unsatisfied, plaintiff and intervenor Calalang filed a second motion for
reconsideration. The lower court stood firm on its ruling of August 30, 1957.16

Hence, this appeal.17 The defendants Director of Public Works, City Engineer of
Manila, and Engrs. Busuego and Sese have also appealed from the declaration made
by the lower court that the northern two-fifths of the disputed area belongs to
plaintiff Hilario.
The defendants answer in the affirmative. They claim that under the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866, the riverbanks are, by definition, considered part of the
riverbed which is always of public ownership. On the other hand, plaintiff would
have the question resolved in the negative. He maintains that not all riverbanks are
of public ownership because: (1) Art. 372 of the old Civil Code, which governs this
particular case, speaks only of the new bed; nothing is said about the new banks; (2)
Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river" cannot be
applied in the case at bar in conjunction with the other articles cited by defendants
since that article applies only to banks of natural riverbeds and the present, River is
not in its natural bed; and (3) if all banks were of public ownership, then Art. 553 of
the old Civil Code and the second sentence, first paragraph of Art. 73 of the Law of
Waters can never have any application.
Since the change in the course of the River took place in 1937, long before
the present Civil Code took effect,19 the question before Us should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code and those of the Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866.
Held: We agree with defendants that under the cited laws, all riverbanks are of
public ownership including those formed when a river leaves its old bed and
opens a new course through a private estate. Art. 339 of the old Civil Code is very
clear.
Moreover, as correctly contended by defendants, the riverbank is part of the
riverbed. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the phrase "banks of a river"
provides:
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of
its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not
cause inundations. ...
Art. 70, which defines beds of rivers and creeks, provides:
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its
waters during the highest [ordinary] floods.
A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements: (1) the running
waters, (2) the bed and (3) the banks. Since a river is but one compound concept,
it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely
private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three
component elements be of the same nature also.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their
banks. Plaintiff now equates the term "natural" with the word "original" so that a
change in the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However,
the premise is incorrect. "Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or
"prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so
long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the
scope of the definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word
"natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river
always to have a bed and banks.

Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible
to acquire private ownership of banks under Art. 553 of the old Civil Code. A study
of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize
the private acquisition of riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in
view of the legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all
riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved
the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were able
to acquire ownership over the banks. By the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
riverbanks became of public ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered
part of the bed which was public by statutory definition.31 But this law, while
expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then
existing.32 So privately owned banks then continued to be so under the new law, but
they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use. Since the change in
the course of the River took place in 1937, the new banks which were formed could
not have been subjected to the provisions of the Siete Partidas which had already
been superseded by then.
Plaintiff's theory is that the disputed area, although covered at times by flood
waters, cannot be considered as within the banks of the River because: (1) such
floods are only accidental, and (2) even if they are regular, the flooding of the area
is due to the excavations and extractions made by defendants which have caused the
widening of the channel.40 Defendants claim, however, that the area is always
covered by the normal yearly floods and that the widening of the channel is due to
natural causes.
This increasing width of the disputed area could be attributed to the gradual
movement of the River to the east. Since it entered into the Hilario estate, the River
has not stayed put.46 Vicente Vicente, plaintiff's witness declared47that after the
River changed its course in 1937, the distance between the old and the new river
sites was about 100 meters.
Art. 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers
By the phrase "banks of a river" is understood those lateral strips or zones of
its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not
cause in inundations. .. - In other words, the extent reached by the waters
when the River is at high tide.
Thus, on the east, the water would rise vertically, until the top of the "primary
bank" is reached, but on the west, there would be a low-angled inclined rise, the
water covering more ground until the "secondary bank" line is reached. In other
words, while the water expansion on the east is vertical, that on the west is more or
less lateral, or horizontal.
From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded: (1) that from 1945 to 1949,
the west bank of the River extended westward up to the "secondary bank" line; (2)
that from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River, to the east its lateral
borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the camachile tree; and (3) that
from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further receded eastward beyond
the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters east of said tree.
Also untenable is plaintiff's contention that the regular flooding of the
disputed area was due to the continuous extraction of materials by defendants which
had lowered the level of said area and caused the consequent widening of the channel
and the river itself. The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the
American period, have been made only on the strip of land west of the River. 74 Under

the "following-the-nature-of-things" argument advanced by plaintiff, the River

should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered. But
the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore, it cannot be
attributed to defendants' operation. Moreover, plaintiff's own evidence indicates that
the movement eastward was all due to natural causes.
It is not correct to say that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without
any compensation at all. Under Art. 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed
of the old river belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other
riparian owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the
area he has lost.
3. Republic v. Sioson
Facts: Spouses Segundo Sioson Pascuala Bautista filed an application for
registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San Roque, municipality of
Paombong, province of Bulacan.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the
registration which was applied for stating (a) that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors in interest had sufficient title to the said parcel of land, the same not
having been a acquired either by composicion title from the Spanish Government or
by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; (b)
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possesses the land
openly, continuously, publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894; all (e) that the said parcel of land sought to be registered is a
part of the public domain and as such belong to the Republic of the Philippines.
On 25 April 1956, the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, filed in the same Court a petition for review of the decree of registration
and cancellation of title to a parcel of land (Pesqueria) in the name of the spouses
Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic
fraud practiced by the herein respondents, then applicants, by intentional and
deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the herein
respondents and the land inspector.
On 2 May 1956, the respondents Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed
an opposition and alleged, among other things, that they had not practiced any actual
fraud; that the said Lot No. 4 was and still is in truth and in fact an accretion to a
titled parcel of land.
On 18 September 1956 without hearing and presentation of evidence the lower court
entered an order denying the petition. The Republic of the Philippines has appealed.
Held: The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed
by the respondents, then applicant, and was filed within a year from the entry of the
decree. Without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that
actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents the Court below
denied the petition. This is an error. There being an allegation of actual and
extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to
prove it. Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or forms part of the bed of a navigable
stream, creek or river the decree and title to it in the name of the respondents would
not give them any right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and
registered under the Land Registration Act.

The order appealed from is set aside remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accord with law, without pronouncement as to costs.
4. Mateo v. Moreno
POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC DOMAIN; NAVIGABLE RIVER, TITLE THERETO
DOES NOT RENDER PROPERTY PRIVATE. Although it is true that
Encarnacion Jacobo was able to get her free patent application approved in 1955 and
to secure the corresponding certificate of title covering the property in question,
Sapang Cabay, a public navigable stream, said title did not change the public
character of said property, the same being covered by one of the exceptions
mentioned in Sec. 39 of Act. No. 496.
Facts: Sometime in 1959 a number of residents of Guiguinto, Bulacan, sent a lettercomplaint to the Highway District Engineer of that province asking that the Sapang
Cabay, a public navigable stream, which had been blocked by means of dikes and
dams and converted into fishponds, be ordered reopened and restored to its original
condition. Acting on the report which the investigator submitted to him, the
Secretary rendered his decision on August 10, 1959, finding that the Sapang Cabay
was a public navigable stream and ordering Cenon Mateo, the herein petitionerappellant, who had in the meantime acquired the property inside which the said creek
is situated, to remove the dikes and dams therein constructed within thirty days from
notice.
Issues: (1) whether Sapang Cabay is a public navigable waterway belonging to the
public domain.
(2) whether the Torrens title can change the public character of the property.
Held: "Ocular inspection of the entire length of the creek up to Guiguinto, shows
that portions of the creek are closed by dikes (pp. 85, 92, 93 Exh. 1, Def.); that traces
of the path of the Cabay Creek within petitioner-appellants fishpond are still visible
by the nature of the mud; that a man-made canal detours the creek from its original
path.
The documentary evidence shows that as long ago as 1941 there were already
complaints against the closure of the Sapang Cabay by the petitioner-appellants
predecessor-in-interest, Modesto Pascual; that the municipal council of Guiguinto
passed a resolution on November 22 of the same year, requesting the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications to order the removal of the obstruction; that the
administrative proceedings for that purpose were interrupted by the war, but
reopened in 1948, and again in 1952, pursuant to similar resolutions of the same
municipal council; and that in 1954 the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications rendered a decision ordering Encarnacion Jacobo, who was then
the owner from whom the petitioner-appellant subsequently bought the property, to
remove the dikes she had constructed. It is true that Encarnacion Jacobo was able to
get her free patent application approved in 1953 and to secure the corresponding
certificate of title, but said title did not change the public character of the Sapang
Cabay, the same being covered by one of the exceptions mentioned in Section 39 of
Act No. 496
5. Republic v. Ca 132 SCRA 514
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that

Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of the
private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be
"Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the
application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the
recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on
the finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court
of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the
New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents
simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River,
and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not
the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
Held: Article 457 NCC requires the concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant
case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property
was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial
and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole
effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards
the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry
land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining
it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that
the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river.
Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the
private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were
meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive
force of the waters of the river.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the
names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the
Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under
Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.
Maneclang v. IAC
Facts: Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain
fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in
Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated August 15, 1975
upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is
a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. The lower court likewise held that Resolution No.
38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios
Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public
bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond
under consideration, were passed by respondents herein as members of the
Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of their legislative
powers.
IAC affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the
ownership of petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled
properties.
Held: The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the
nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond
in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally
a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the case
of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek,
defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot
be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual [Diego v. Court
of Appeals, 102 Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 4551; and considering
further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the
subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the
creek as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise
Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and
public policy.
FORESTS OR TIMBERLANDS
Dir. Of Lands v. Aquino
Facts: The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on Certiorari is a
limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are, according

to petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Private respondent Abra
Industrial, a duly registered corporation established for the purpose of setting up a
cement factory, claims on the other hand, to be the owner in fee simple of the whole
70-hectare area. Thus, on September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First
Instance of Abra an application for registration in its name of said parcels of land
under the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under Sec. 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 1 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as
its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof since July 26,
1894. Except for the Director of Lands, nobody appeared to oppose the application.
On July 22, 1966, the lower court favorably acted on the application and
ordered the registration of the parcels of land under the Land Registration Act. It
ruled that although said land was within the forest zone, the opposition of the
Director of Lands was not well-taken because the Bureau of Forestry, thru the
District Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to exclude the same area from the
forest reserve." It found that the parcels of land had been acquired by purchase and
AIC's possession thereof, including that of its predecessors-in-interest, had been for
forty-nine (49) years.
The Director of Lands filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
but the same was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 7 Hence, on December
22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198,
118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of
AIC.
Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting the
application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they
are within the forest zone. The District Forester's failure to object to the exclusion
of the area sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not enough
justification for registration because under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power
to exclude an area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
and not the District Forester or even the Director of Forestry.
Held: We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again, we reiterate the rule
enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Muoz 18 and consistently
adhered to in a long line of cases 19 the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 20 that forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into
private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined not
only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987 Constitution Article
XIII.
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must first be released from
its classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in accordance
with the certification issued by the Director of Forestry. This is because the
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department
of the government and not of the courts. Moreover, a positive act of the government
is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. It should be emphasized, however, that the classification of the
land as forest land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Hence, the fact that the contested
parcels of land have long been denuded and actually contains rich limestone deposits
does not in any way affect its present classification as forest land.:

AIC therefore, should prove first of all that the lands it claims for registration
are alienable or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not only failed to prove that it has
a registerable title but more important]y, it failed to show that the lands are no longer
a part of the public domain.
Republic v. Animas
Facts: Petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I, General Santos City, dated June 22, 1973, dismissing the complaint in its
Civil Case No. 1253, entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du
Timbol and the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Defendants", instituted by
the plaintiff to declare null and void Free Patent No. V-466102 and Original
Certificate of Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 .
On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President
of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of
the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of
Title (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 was issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol.
On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the
Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint to declare free patent No. V-466102 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol
null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass
of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is
a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that in a
reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is
situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted
on Bureau of Forestry map L.C. 700 to be inside the area which was reverted to the
category of public forest.
The complaint was dismissed. Republic of the Philippines has appealed to the
Supreme Court for review.
Held: After careful deliberation, this Court grants the petition on the ground that the
area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of
the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.
The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free
patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered
thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation. As a
general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands
has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or
alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the
administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his
jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public
forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of
products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code).
When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent
over the land in question on June 3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable
or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the
Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but
forest land are void ab initio.

If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or
when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a
public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become
the owner of the land illegally included.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. In the case of
disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the
conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. Registration
should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Considering that it is the state is seeking the cancellation of the title of
respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription
cannot be invoked against the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled,
notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition
filed in court by the Solicitor General.
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be
recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act (Director of Lands vs. Jugado et al., G.R. No. L-14707, May 23, 1961).
Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitations
does not run against the state (Article 1108, paragraph 4 of the New Civil Code).
The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred prescription.
Heirs of Amunategui vs Director of Forestry
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT
LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS
RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS,
RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify
land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for
agricultural
or
other
purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF

PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET,

RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his
name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or
that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
Facts: The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of
the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to
titling
in
favor
of
private
persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect
title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of
land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.crala
The heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui.
Republic v. Sps. Maxino
Facts: This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public
forestal land located in Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca,
Quezon, Judge Vicente del Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision, ordering
the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang),
Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less
200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo
Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision became final and executory. A
decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the
Philippines filed with the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision,
decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was
still a part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information
title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not
885 hectares.
Judge Agana denied the petition in his order of September 8, 1970.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court through Justices
Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970
order had allegedly long become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General
appealed to this Court.
Held: It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos,
is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private
appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry
Florencio Tamesis on July 6, 1940, as per Land Classification Map No. 1386,

Tayabas Project No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit C-Annulment, and as shown in the
report and testimony of Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden (Exh. B-Annulment;
7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses
be annulled.
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous
composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio
Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares
of pasture land (pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks.
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy between the area of 29
hectares and the actual area of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959 (Exh. D). We have no hesitation
in saying that the composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The trial court
grievously erred in applying to this case the rule that the area comprised in the
boundaries should prevail over that stated in the moniments of title.
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the
sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana MoralesMaxino (Exh. F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by his two children Maria and
Lucila. On September 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an extrajudicial
settlement of Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to
themselves, executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana MoralesMaxino (Exh. F), the wife of applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and
the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a
title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens
system, nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs.
Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Director of
Lands vs. Salazar, G. R. No. 50340, December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183,
1199; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, supra).
Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p.
1198). The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs.
Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held
to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject
to registration. As to void composition or patent issued in 1898, see Testagorda vs.
Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective
February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.
DIAZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City
in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12,
1976.[2] She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and
harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly
and adversely for more or less 26 years. The Republic of the Philippines, represented

by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the
land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)[3] in 1955. Thus,
it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of
Lands v. Reyes[4] that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as
it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory
Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio
Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven.
Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void.
CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was
substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the
Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly
outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion
of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of
the amicable settlement in the CA.
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.[11] On
January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.
The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
Held: The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this
case.
We ruled there (Aquino v. Director of Lands), and we so rule now, that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an
application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its
decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an
earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it
formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings
of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle
that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this
Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Courts ruling inReyes, and not the other way around.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the
decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of
discretion.[29] Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void
and does not exist in legal contemplation.
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the
military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the
time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares
of said land consist of public forest. x x x
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands
are not registrable under CA 141.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon
the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands)[34] coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce
such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is
because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land
Act.
Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the
property, meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier
stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the
FMMR was established.