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SANLAKAS V.

Executive Secretary (Tinga, 2004)


421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities

have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to
challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.

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