Dangerous Liaisons: Dyadic Power

Transitions and the Risk of Militarized

Disputes and Wars

DAVID SOBEK
JEREMY WELLS

Louisiana State University

Louisiana State University

According to power transition theory, hegemons occasionally face a major

power challenger who feels that the benefits accrued from the status
quo do not match their rising position in the power hierarchy. This gap
can generate, or exacerbate, grievances that encourage the challenger to
seek changes to the status quo just as their growing power gives them
the capacity to modify the status quo. As this dynamic continues and
the challenger approaches the power of the hegemon, the risk of hegemonic war becomes acute. While power transition theory was originally developed to describe this major power dynamic, Lemke ~2002!
expands the logic to regional hierarchies and found similar effects.
The underlying logic of power transition, however, does not necessarily
apply only to hierarchies. The logic that details the dangers of power
transitions within a hierarchy can equally apply to power transitions within
a dyad. In other words, when a power transition occurs between a
pair of states, the risk of conflict should increase. In fact, whether
the theory had been previously applied to global or regional hierarchies, the theory itself was couched in the dyadic interactions between
the hegemon and challenger. As such, we would argue that power transition theory is, at its core, a dyadic phenomenon, and the previous
research that looked at power transitions within global or regional hierarchies are actually just special cases of the more general dyadic power
transition phenomenon.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Joe Clare and Douglas Lemke for looking at an earlier version of the manuscript.
David Sobek and Jeremy Wells, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433, dsobek@lsu.edu and
jwell33@tigers.lsu.edu
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique
46:1 (March/mars 2013) 6992
doi:10.10170S0008423913000218
2013 Canadian Political Science Association ~lAssociation canadienne de science politique!
and0et la Socit qubcoise de science politique

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While the stakes involved in a dyadic power transition may be lower

than those that involve global or regional hegemons, the basic logic of
power transition theory should still apply. If one assumes that most pairs
of states have some equilibrium distribution of benefits from their shared
interactions that is correlated with the distribution of power within the
dyad, then changes in that power distribution should either lead to changes
in the distribution of benefits or increase the level of dissatisfaction of
the rising state. Of course, there does not need to be a relationship between
a change in the distribution of power and the generation of a grievance
because there may already be a set of preexisting grievances that become
more salient. Regardless, a dissatisfied rising state has both the willingness ~grievance! and opportunity ~rising power! to change the status quo,
so the risk of conflict should increase under these conditions. In fact,
DiCicco and Levy have already noted that the nature of a distribution
of benefits at the level of the international system is hardly equivalent to
the nature of the benefits at stake between two states in a dyad, and, in
fact, it is likely that some states will be satisfied with the systemic status
quo but dissatisfied with the status quo of a particular bilateral relationship ~1999: 690!. As such, it may be more fruitful to examine bilateral
power transitions.
To test the effects of dyadic power transitions we examine all nondirected dyads from 1816 to 2001. In general, the results confirm that
dyadic power transitions increase the risk of militarized conflicts. In addition, this effect seems strongest in the years preceding the actual power
transition. We also find that the effect is not conditional on the dyad
containing powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences. As such,
we conclude that dyadic power transitions represent a critical explanation for the onset of conflict. In addition, our results indicate that a theory
of dyadic power transition can subsume both global and regional hierarchy power transition theories in that they are both special cases of the
dyadic effect.

Understanding the Logic of Power Transitions

In the original presentation of power transition theory Organski ~1968!
and Organski and Kugler ~1980! argue that international politics is
hierarchical with a global hegemon atop a power pyramid, great powers
below the hegemon, and minor and small powers below them. Major
wars occur when a dissatisfied major power reaches parity with the
hegemon and seeks to either reap the benefits of the current international structure or redesign the system in its favour. This limits the
applicability of the theory to major wars fought between only the strongest few states in the system, that is, power transitions occur at the top

Abstract. Power transition theory has been both theoretically and empirically developed in
the context of a hierarchy ~both global and regional!. Yet the logic of the theory describes the
interactions of a hegemon in relation to a rising challenger, which is essentially a dyadic interaction. As a result, we argue that power transition theory is a dyadic theory that can be examined across all dyads. We test power transition in a data set of all non-directed dyads from 1816
to 2001. Our results find robust evidence that dyadic power transitions increase the risk of
militarized disputes. In addition, this result is not actually contingent on the dyad containing
either powerful states or those with dissimilar preferences.
Rsum. La thorie de la transition du pouvoir a t la fois thorique et empirique dveloppe dans le cadre dune hirarchie ~ la fois mondial et rgional!. Pourtant, la logique de la
thorie dcrit les interactions dune puissance hgmonique par rapport un challenger en hausse,
qui est essentiellement une interaction dyadique. En consquence, nous soutenons que la thorie de la transition du pouvoir est une thorie dyadique qui peut tre examin travers toutes
les dyades. Nous testons transition de puissance dans un ensemble de toutes les dyades nondirectifs 18162001 donnes. Nos rsultats trouvent des preuves solides que les transitions de
pouvoir dyadique augmentent le risque de conflits militariss. En outre, ce rsultat nest pas
rellement subordonne la dyade contenant soit des Etats puissants ou ceux qui ont des
prfrences diffrentes.

of the power pyramid with the control of the international system the
prize.
This narrow scope became one of the most substantial criticisms
of power transition theory, that is, it only explains major wars fought
among the half-dozen or so major and hegemonic powers of the system
~Geller, 1992; Gochman, 1990though he also separately analyzes
Latin American rivalries; Lemke, 1996; Lemke and Werner, 1996; Siverson and Miller, 1996; Vasquez, 1996!. In particular, Vasquez notes that
it is
curious that the power transition effect would turn out to be so limited, given
the great theoretical emphasis placed in realist analysis on the role of power
and changes in power for shaping behavior ... As a result, while Organski and
Kuglers findings lend some support to their proposition, the findings also make
it evident that the power transition is an inadequate explanation for most of
the interstate wars that have been fought in human history. In this sense, the
empirical findings can be seen as indicating a deficiency in the explanatory
power of the proposition. ~1996: 39!

Siverson and Miller expand this critique by challenging studies that are
limited by the inclusion of only dyads that comprise at least one major
power for major powers are introduced on an ex post facto basis. That
is, the major powers are selected on the basis of what we now know
~1996, 6364!.
This is not to say that scholars completely ignored the implications
of power transition for minor powers, although this was often done by
looking at parity within a dyad. Garnham ~1976! finds that violent conflict is more likely between contiguous states of approximately equal

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power and less likely between contiguous states of asymmetric power.

Likewise, Weede ~1976! finds that war is less likely in dyads where one
state had at least a ten-to-one advantage in military power, although his
sample was limited to East Asia. Despite these early efforts, power transition theory maintained its early focus on major powers. One possible
exception is Bremer, who offers the closest approach to an analysis of
power transition theory involving all dyads: he contrasts seven theories
of war and peace and finds that although it is not as strong as others
considered here, and certainly weaker than hard-core realists would have
us believe, the existence of overwhelming preponderance is, ceteris paribus, a pacifying condition ~1992: 337!. His analysis, however, only
covers from 1816 to 1965.
More recently scholars have made efforts to increase the generalizability of the theory by adding more contenders or looking at international subsystems. Houweling and Siccama ~1988! reject Organski
and Kuglers ~1980! finding that power transitions only among the
top three or four powers in the system matter; they find them to be
significant predictors of wars among an entire subset of major powers.
Lemke ~1996, 2002! and Lemke and Werner ~1996! focus on regional
hegemons within the global system. The multiple hierarchy perspective posits that the international system comprises several hierarchic
subsystems, each with its own hegemon and set of potential challengers. Within their sample of South American states, Lemke ~1996! and
Lemke and Werner ~1996! show that minor-power wars can be
explained in terms of regional power transitions, all occurring within a
subsystem of the global order. In addition, Lemke ~2002! expands his
multiple hierarchy perspective to include a more global sample of regional
hierarchies.
Researchers have also tried to broaden power transition theory by
extending the conception of power. Kim ~1989! extends the measure
of a major powers capabilities to include those of its allies and finds
that this measure was significant and Organski and Kuglers measure
of capabilities ~1980! loses statistical significance. Alliances are also of
importance for Bussman and Oneal ~2007!, who test power transition
theory at the dyadic level by focusing on the single global hegemon
Great Britain until 1945 and the US after 1946and its ability to
distribute private goods to major power allies. While their findings at
the systemic level present challenges for power transition theory in
general, they conclude that power preponderance at the dyadic level
maintains peace. This conclusion supports the assertion that dyadic
power parity may be destabilizing, regardless of power status. Gellers
work ~1993, 1998, 2000! similarly finds that unstable, equal power
distributions increase the probability of war within major power rival
dyads.

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Generalizing Power Transition

The previous literature leaves two questions unanswered. First, how far
can one generalize power transition theory? Second, is it a useful exercise to even attempt to further generalize power transition theory? In
answer to the second question Lemke reasonably argues that when one
considers that roughly twenty-two million people have been killed in wars
since World War II and that all of these were minor-power wars, an exclusive focus on the conflict behaviour of the major powers must be questioned ~1996: 77!. So how far can one expand power transition and not
lose its central argument? We argue that power transition can be used all
the way down to dyadic interactions because, at its core, it is a dyadic
theory. In particular, power transition theory describes a lack of agreement about the relative balance of power between two states ~similar in
many ways to Blainey, 1988, and Reed, 2003, among others!. This disagreement arises from a change in the distribution of power combined
with dissatisfaction. As such, a dyad that has a power transition is more
likely to contain states with both the willingness and opportunity to engage
in conflict. Note that this can occur in any interacting pair of states; major
power status is not a prerequisite.1
The source of the disagreement about relative power is the subject
of a large literature on the relationship between information and war.
Blaineys thesis that war is usually the outcome of a diplomatic crisis
which cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of
their bargaining power ~1988: 114! is the foundation upon which these
studies are established. Fearon ~1995! expands upon Blaineys thesis by
arguing that private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, which would produce a rational miscalculation of relative capabilities and resolve to fight, is a rational mechanism that can lead to war.
Because war is costly and risky, states should consider themselves better
off by striking a deal without fighting; thus, Fearon argues that states
cannot always use quiet diplomatic conversations to discover mutually
preferable settlements ~1995: 400! to their bargaining problems due to
private information about capabilities and resolve. States can use misinformation or withhold information to influence the likelihood of war.
This is easier to accomplish as the observable ratio of capabilities reaches
parity, for even the slightest advantage unknown to a states potential
adversary could tip the balance in its favour.
Wagner additionally argues that war is not the end or failure of bargaining; war is part of the bargaining process, or a competitive struggle
to determine the disagreement outcome in a bargaining game in which
states use force and the threat of force to influence other states ~2000:
481!. Thus, whereas Fearon argues that war is the result of the failure to
reach an ex ante bargain, Wagner considers war to be a means of refin-

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ing the relative positions of each state in setting the terms of the bargain.
Slantchev ~2003! adds that, even under conditional assumptions stacked
in favour of peace, war remains a viable, rational outcome as a means to
exercise the power to hurt, or to inflict costs on the opponent and reduce
its ability to inflict costs, thus affecting the relative balance of bargaining positions. By extending the bargainingwar argument, these works
have greatly added to understanding the relationship between information and war.
The relationship between war and information is especially critical
for the logic behind power transition theory. While power transition theorists have explained how parity makes war likely, they have generally
failed to explain why this is the case. Tammen and colleagues come closest to making a case: Power transition anticipates that war is likely to
be waged when differences in perceptions about the status quo exist
that is, war will likely occur when the challenger is dissatisfied ~2000,
22!. The dissatisfaction is the product of a failure to reach a resolution
of the challengers grievances; in other words, they fight because they
fail to reach an ex ante bargain. We argue that this is a plausible explanation for all wars, not simply those between dominant powers and
challengers.
In fact, Huth and colleagues ~1992! show that the dyadic approach
we advocate here stands up in tests that focus on systemic variables. Focusing on systemic factors, they find the likelihood of war increases when
the ratio of military capabilities between challenger and rival is between
3:4 and 4:3, and either the challengers or rivals military expenditures are
growing 10 per cent faster than its opponents. Bennett and Stam ~2004!
measure the rate of change in the distribution of capabilitiesa critical
power transition variablein a dyad, assuming that as the rate of change
increases the risk of conflict increases as well. Although Bennett and Stam
~2004:113! offer little support for our thesis,2 they do not actually code
dyadic power transitions; rather, they measure the rate of change in the
balance of power in a dyad and assume that high rates of change are correlated with power transitions. As such, the validity of their test is contingent on this assumption.
These studies are indicative of a recurring pattern of methodological problems that power transition theorists have faced in terms of measuring its two critical variables: power and satisfaction. Organski and
Kugler ~1980! employ gross national product as a proxy for national capabilities and find that transitions mattered only for the top three or four
powers. Houweling and Siccama ~1988! use the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities ~at the time referred to as the Composite Potential Index! and find that transitions matter for all major
powers, not just the top dogs. This issue is summarized and dealt with
by de Soysa and colleagues. They compare the designs of these two stud-

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ies, including the operationalization of power and the cases included and
conclude that support for the power transition theory depends on both
the measure of power and the set of cases chosen for analysis ~1997: 526!.
A major difficulty within studies of power transition theory is measuring status quo satisfaction. Powell ~1996: 263! insists that the probability of war depends on both the distribution of power and the status
quo distribution. Thus, any attempt to assess the relation between the
probability of war and the distribution of power should control for the
status quo. Failing to do so will generally lead to biased estimates if, as
might be expected, the distribution of power and the status quo distribution are correlated. Powell ~1996, fn. 50! suggests Bueno de Mesquita
and Lalmans ~1992! measure of a states utility for the status quo is a
start in this direction, but inadequate because it reduces to assuming
that the status quo distribution is constant in all cases. Regional interests, including measures of alliances, trade, colonies and diplomatic
exchanges, serve as Danilovic and Clares ~2007! operationalization of
status quo satisfaction among great powers.
Separating power and satisfaction is the subject of an extended debate
between scholars beginning with de Soysa and colleagues ~1997!. Lemke
and Reed ~1998! rebut their claim that power transition theory suffers
from two contradictory logical inconsistencies: all rising powers are at
least somewhat dissatisfied because they do not enjoy the benefits of
hegemony and all rising powers are satisfied because their absolute economic positions are increasing. Lemke and Reed ~1998! use Granger causality tests to show that national capabilities do not determine status quo
satisfaction, supporting Organskis position ~1968! that states can be powerful and satisfied or powerful and dissatisfied. Oneal and colleagues
~1998! counter with two points: first, power transition theorists are not
clear on what the benefits afforded by the hegemon are, and if they are
not wealth and power, as measured by GNP, then what are they? And
second, they assume that hegemons grant to themselves and their major
allies disproportionate benefits.
Since our own extension of power transition theory toward a general
dyadic theory, it is critical to resolve the issue between distributions of
power and benefits. In the original formulation, the distribution of benefits is determined by the hegemon; therefore, a states satisfaction is a
function of its access to those benefits. In a dyadic formulation, the relationship between systemic benefits and satisfaction becomes less clear.
A state may be content with the level of benefits it receives yet simultaneously be dissatisfied within one or more of its dyadic relationships.
An example of this occurred in the Seven Weeks War between Prussia
and Austria in 1866 where neither state disagreed as to the construct of
the system yet disagreed over the dyadic distribution of benefits ~Bueno
de Mesquita, 1990: 40!. Power transition theorists note that territorial

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disputes, like the Seven Weeks War, remain important generators of

conflict. They have the potential to create long-lasting polarization often
characterized by intractable positions colored by ideological or nationalist rhetoric. This is the breeding ground of national dissatisfaction ~Tammen et al., 2000: 3637!. Vasquez adds that, while not deterministic,
states satisfaction depends primarily on whether they have resolved all
border questions and territorial claims that they have with their neighbours ~1996: 51!.
Dissatisfaction is not only important for providing casus belli but
also for determining how states behave within the international system.
Satisfied states are constrained by the status quo, but dissatisfied states
are unconstrained and act as though anarchy prevails. Among satisfied
states absolute gains may be pursued, but between dissatisfied states or
within mixed dyads of satisfied and dissatisfied states, relative gain concerns pre-dominate ~Lemke and Reed, 1998: 512!. Bargaining based
upon concerns for relative gains in a world of asymmetric information is
complicated ~Blainey, 1988; Powell, 1999; Waltz, 1979!. The effects of
asymmetric information would be exacerbated in a dyad characterized
by the kind of polarized rhetoric of which Tammen and colleagues ~2000!
write. It is thus not difficult to theoretically link the balance of power
and satisfaction within a dyad where a transition in power favouring a
dissatisfied state would propel it towards adjusting the balance of benefits within the dyad. This drive to renegotiate the balance of benefits
within the dyad would increase the risk of armed violence between those
states.
While satisfaction makes theoretical sense, scholars have had more
difficulty generating a separate, objective measure of satisfaction. Despite
Organski and Kuglers note that their model does not require that the
dissatisfaction felt by the challenger be judged valid by an objective
observer ~1980: 23!, the lack of a strong operationalization of satisfaction, as Vasquez laments, is unfortunate because focusing on what makes
states satisfied or dissatisfied is probably the key to explaining why some
power transitions end in war and others do not ~1996: 50!. Power transition theorists have employed several measures of satisfaction independent of power of national capabilities. Anderson and McKeown ~1987!,
using national capabilities data, offer that when a state is dissatisfied
that is, when its projected level of its share of global capabilities exceeds
its aspired levelits government is activated and seeks to attend to
the external environment. Kim ~1989, 1992, 1996! and Kim and Morrow ~1992! draw on the logic of Bueno de Mesquitas use of alliance
portfolio similarity to measure satisfaction. Parity ~Geller, 1993! and transitions ~Wayman, 1996! among rivals are particularly likely to lead to
war.3 Although not yet used in a test of power transition theory, probably
due to its limited temporal reach of about fifty years, Gartzkes ~1998,

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2000! affinity score measures similarity of United Nations General Assembly votes. Powell ~1999! formally defines a state as dissatisfied when its
expected utility of fighting exceeds that of the status quo; thus, satisfaction is a function of the distribution of power, status quo benefits, and
the cost of fighting. These measures share two qualities with respect to
our contribution to power transition theory: each is a questionable measure of satisfaction and each is a dyadic measure.
In summary, our dyadic version of the power transition theory can
be distilled into a fairly simple hypothesis and is essentially the dyadic
logic of the power transition theory. In particular, when a power transition occurs within a dyad, it creates an ambiguity in terms of the outcome of a potential conflict. This disagreement over the outcome of a
possible conflict decreases the likelihood of a negotiate settlement over
the issues of contention, which essentially increases the likelihood that
the two sides would rationally enter into a conflict. In many ways, hypotheses 1 and 2 can be differentiated by who one expects to initiate the conflict on which power transition theory is ambiguous. If one believes that
the rising state will initiate, then it is rational for the challenger to wait
until after the transition to fight. The declining state ~that is, the one
being passed!, however, has an incentive to fight before the transition.
Since we are not necessarily interested in differentiating these explanations at this time, we concentrate simply on the increased risk of conflict.
Hypothesis 1: Dyads that have experienced a power transition are more
likely to have a militarized conflict.
Since power transition theory is dynamic in the sense that it talks
about changes across time, we can refine the hypothesis. In particular,
the states in the dyad are not necessarily myopic and have the capacity to
anticipate future changes in the balance of power. As such, the militarized
conflict may actually occur before the power transition.
Hypothesis 2: Dyads that are about to experience a power transition are
more likely to have a militarized conflict.
Since power transition has generally been applied to major powers,
it is appropriate to test the conditionality of the relationship. In other
words, are power transitions between powerful states more dangerous than
those between weaker states? If so, then the concentration on the global
and regional hegemons might be vindicated. This leads to the third hypothesis that we test.
Hypothesis 3: A power transition in a dyad with powerful states has a
higher risk of militarized conflict than a power transition in a dyad with
weaker states.

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Finally, power transition has emphasized the role that preferences

play in the process. In particular, it is the dissatisfied challenger that wants
to fight. As such, we would expect the relationship between power transition and conflict to be conditioned by the similarity0dissimilarity of
preferences between the states, and this generates our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: A power transition in a dyad in which the states have dissimilar preferences has a higher risk of militarized conflict than a power
transition in a dyad where the states have similar preferences.

Research Design
To examine the effects of dyadic power transitions, we use a dataset of
all non-directed dyads from 1816 to 2001.4 While it may be the case that
politically relevant dyads would be more likely to show a power transition effect, we believe that is better viewed as a testable hypothesis as
opposed to a sampling technique. As such, we prefer to use all nondirected dyads as opposed to only political relevant dyads. The dependent variable for the analysis is the onset of a new militarized interstate
dispute with the dyad-years containing an ongoing dispute dropped from
the analysis ~Ghosn et al., 2004!. In addition, we have a series of tests of
robustness that use the onset of a new interstate war as the dependent
variable with the dyadyears having an ongoing war dropped from the
analysis. Since both dependent variables that we use are dichotomous,
we estimate our models with a logit. In addition, to account for the temporal dependence all of our models include peace years and three cubic
splines ~Beck et al., 1998!, but we do not report the coefficients of the
splines in Table 1 for ease of presentation. Finally, in all models we use
robust standard errors and cluster on the dyad.

Coding Dyadic Power Transitions

Coding dyadic power transitions poses two main difficulties. First, the
measure needs to be sensitive enough to capture power transition but not
so sensitive that minor year-over-year noise creates false power transitions. Second, the measure needs to account for the possibility that the
states will not act contemporaneous with a measured transition, so there
needs to be a window of time in which a power transition occurs. While
there is no ideal solution to these issues, the measure of dyadic power transition used in our analysis seems have both face validity and provides consistent results that do not change with minor changes in the measurement.
To derive the power of a state we rely on the composite index of
national capabilities ~CINC! ~Singer et al., 1972! coded by the Corre-

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lates of War ~COW! project.5 This measures six components of state power
~energy use per capita, iron0steel production, military personnel, military spending, total population, and urban population!. For each year, a
states share of each of these power components are calculated ~states
value for component X divided by the sum of all states values for component X!. Each of these shares are then summed for each state and
divided by six. From this, the CINC score represents the states share of
global power resources in a given year.
For each dyad in each year, we subtract state As CINC score from
state Bs CINC score to get a measure of the difference in power between
the two states. We additionally assume that states that are within one
standard deviation ~calculated using the complete set of cases! of complete parity ~power difference equals zero! are in rough parity.6 With
these data we create a tri-chotomous variable that is 1 if state A has a
power advantage ~power difference is greater than one standard deviation from the mean difference seen in dyads and side A has the advantage!, 0 if the power is in rough parity, and 1 if state B has a power
advantage ~power difference is greater than one standard deviation from
the mean difference seen in dyads and side B has the advantage!. From
that variable we calculate a variable that measures if there was a change
in the tri-chotomous variable between the current year and five years
earlier. So the dyadic power transition in the past five years ~testing
hypothesis 1! variable is coded as 1 in the cases where the past five
years saw a shift from A advantage to parity, A advantage to B advantage, parity to B advantage, parity to A advantage, B advantage to parity, or B advantage to A advantage, and 0 otherwise. In addition, the
power transition in the next five years variable is simply coded 1 if a
dyadic power transition occurs in the following 5 years ~testing hypothesis 2!, and 0 otherwise.
This measure has a number of potential problems, but we believe
that is still represents an adequate measure of dyadic power transitions.
The first problem is that we may not be capturing power transition, that
is, a movement from A advantage to B advantage or from B advantage to
A advantage. The problem is that using that stricter definition of power
transition leads to so few cases of dyadic power transitions that analysis
is virtually impossible ~21 cases out of roughly 580,000 dyadyears!. A
second issue is that you may have a situation where state A has an advantage just slightly less than one standard deviation and then it switches to
state Bs advantage just slightly less than one standard deviation and this
case would be coded as no transition. While this seems like a large move
and a power transition, it is not clear how precisely states measure power.
In other words, can states really discern that sort of change? Our dataset
can, after the fact, but states may not be able to do the same at the time
of the change. As such, we wanted to make sure that the dyadic power

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transitions captured by our dataset will be visible to the states because if

the states cannot sense the change, then there is little reason for them to
act. In addition, what seems most important to the power transition literature is the movement from one states obvious advantage to rough parity between the states, and this is what our measure captures.
We believe that this variable passes our criteria in that it is sensitive
enough to capture power transition, not so sensitive to pick up numerous
false signals, and captures a wide enough time span to allow states to act.7
The power transition in the past five-years variable codes 4,643 dyadic
power transitions over 578,017 dyad years, or about 0.8 per cent of the
cases. As such, power transitions are a relative rare phenomenon, which
is to be expected. By looking at changes over a five-year time span, we
additionally avoided smaller year over year transitions. For instance, if
we looked at year-over-year changes, then dyadic power transitions jump
to 5.89 per cent of the cases. In general, we do not believe that transitions are nearly that frequent and do not use such a short time period. To
test the robustness of our results, however, we also used a ten-year period
to create the dyadic power transition variables and found no changes in
the results ~this is discussed in more detail in the results section!.
Our coding of dyadic power transitions is different from Bennett and
Stam ~2004!, who measure power transitions with the rate of change ~averaged over five years! of the balance of power within a dyad.8 So if state
As power was growing at 6 per cent and state Bs power was growing at
2 per cent, then Bennett and Stam would code that as four-point gap.
The assumption behind their measure is that a higher rate of change correlates with transitions, so they expect a positive coefficient. What their
measure fails to capture, however, are the actual dyadic power transitions. As such, we believe that our measure is better at seeing whether
dyadic power transitions are periods of increased risk.

Control Variables
All of our models include a series of control variables to account for any
confounding relationships. Given that we are interested in the effects of
power transitions, we need to control for other effects of power. Balance
of capabilities is simply the higher CINC score of the two states in a
dyad divided by the lower CINC score. In addition, it has been argued
that powerful states have more to gain ~lose! in the international system,
so they tend to be more conflict prone ~Hegre, 2008!. To account for this
effect, the power of dyad variable is the sum of the two states individual CINC scores.
Power transition theory ~Organski, 1968; Organski and Kugler, 1980!
also implies that preferences matter and play a critical role in the onset

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of conflicts. To measure preferences we rely on the S-score ~Signorino

and Ritter, 1999!, which uses alliance patterns of the two states in the
dyad to determine preference similarity. Theoretically, the S-score can
range from 1 ~completely dissimilar preferences! to 1 ~completely
similar preferences!. While there are alternative measures of preference
similarity, the advantage of the S-score is that it allows us to go further
back in time and have a larger sample. The models also include a measure of alliance ties, which is simply a dichotomous variable ~allies! coded
as 1 if the two states in the dyad have a formal alliance ~alliance data
comes from Gibler and Sarkees, 2004!, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, our models control for the well documented effect of regime
type ~see Russett and Oneal, 2001, for an overview of this theory and literature!. We use Polity IV to measure democracy.9 The Polity measure of
democracy is based on six separate institutional characteristics. Each state
has a regime type score ~democracy characteristics minus autocracy characteristics! that can range from 10 ~complete autocracy! to 10 ~complete democracy!. To capture the level of democracy of a dyad we use two
measures that are common in the literature ~Russett and Oneal, 2001!.
First, low democracy is the lower of the two regime-type scores of the
states in the dyad. As the value of low democracy increases, it is indicative of a dyad with more democratic states. Second, high democracy is
the higher of the two regime-type scores of the states in the dyad. As high
democracy decreases, it is showing a dyad with more autocratic states.

Results
Table 1 provides the results of our analysis of the effects of dyadic power
transitions on the risk of dispute onset. In general, the results confirm our
expectation that dyadic power transitions represent periods of risk. In particular, the years preceding a power transition have a higher probability
of militarized dispute onset. In addition, the effect is not contingent on
the dyad containing powerful states or that the states have dissimilar preferences. In fact, it appears that dyads with weaker states have power transitions that are more dangerous than dyads with powerful states.
Model 1 simply contains the control variables as a check of the dataset. In general, the control variables have the expected effects, in that
dyads with powerful states and those that are at parity have higher risks
of dispute onset.10 In addition, jointly democratic dyads, jointly autocratic dyads and dyads that contain states with similar preferences are
all more peaceful.11 Strangely, dyads that contain states with a formal
alliance are more likely to have disputes, although this is consistent with
Bueno de Mesquita ~1981!. This could relate to the inclusion of the S-score
which is based on alliance patterns, although the correlation between the

Low democracy

0.45
~2.79!***

6.20
~10.46!***
0.0001
~1.38!
0.31
~2.30!**
0.03
~5.72!***

1.27
~8.07!***

7.08
~9.57!***
0.0002
~1.76!*
0.27
~1.85!*
0.05
~7.53!***

Model 3
~MID!

0.09
~0.52!
1.02
~6.66!***

6.05
~9.99!***
0.00005
~1.11!
0.23
~1.66!*
0.04
~5.91!***

Model 4
~MID!

1.18
~9.03!***
4.32
~2.62!***

7.33
~9.54!***
0.0002
~1.75!*
0.25
~1.74!*
0.05
~7.55!***

Model 5
~MID!

1.50
~5.48!***

0.54
~1.22!
7.11
~9.61!***
0.0002
~1.76!*
0.24
~1.76!*
0.05
~7.54!***

Model 6
~MID!

AND JEREMY

Preference similarity

Balance of capabilities

Power of dyad

7.20
~9.88!***
0.0003
~2.01!**
0.37
~2.61!***
0.05
~7.06!***

Model 2
~MID!

DAVID SOBEK

Power transition in the next 5 years preference similiarity

Power transition in the next 5 years power of dyad

Power transition in the next 5 years

Power transition in the past 5 years

Model 1
~MID!

TABLE 1
Dyadic Power Transitions and the Risk of Militarized Conflicts

82
WELLS

648944
11387.59
2500.47
0.00

0.05
~7.70!***
0.27
~2.21!**
3.04
~28.95!***
0.28
~17.71!***
5.15
~37.30!***
555576
9761.51
3491.43
0.00

0.03
~5.79!***
0.22
~2.25!**
2.38
~24.96!***
0.42
~21.49!***
3.67
~23.24!***
572611
10369.06
2231.49
0.00

0.05
~7.64!***
0.21
~1.70!*
3.02
~27.37!***
0.28
~16.17!***
5.31
~37.01!***

Note: *p , 0.10; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.01 ~two-tailed tests with robust standard errors clustered on the state!.
The coefficients are in the top cell with the standard errors below.
All models contain three cubic splines.

Number of observations
Log likelihood
Chi-squared
P-value for chi squared

Constant

Peace years

Contiguity

Allies

High democracy

481685
8821.58
3019.23
0.00

0.04
~5.79!***
0.18
~1.75!*
2.36
~24.12!***
0.420
~20.23!***
3.77
~22.96!***
572611
10360.95
2493.00
0.00

0.05
~7.62!***
0.21
~1.69!*
3.01
~27.20!***
0.28
~16.38!***
5.33
~36.79!***

572611
10367.13
2284.98
0.00

0.05
~7.66!***
0.21
~1.71!*
3.02
~27.38!***
0.28
~16.19!***
5.34
~36.68!***

Dangerous Liaisons
83

84

DAVID SOBEK

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measures is only 0.23. When model 1 excludes the measure of preference similarity, the coefficient on allies remains positive but is no longer
statistically significant. Despite this result, the results from model 1 appear
fairly consistent with previous research.
Models 2 and 3 separately test the effects of power transitions, where
model 2 looks at the risk of conflict after a transition and model 3 examines the risk before the transition. In both models, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant indicating that the years before and after
a dyadic power transition have increased risks of militarized interstate
disputes, which provides preliminary support to hypotheses 1 and 2. When
both variables ~model 4! are including in the same model, however, the
post-transition years are no more likely to have a dispute, although the
years before the transition still have a higher risk of dispute onset. So, of
the two main hypotheses, it appears that hypothesis 2 is more robust.12
Models 5 and 6 test to see if the risk of dyadic power transitions are
contingent on either the dyad containing powerful states ~model 5! or the
states in the dyad having dissimilar preferences ~model 6!. While it seems
intuitive that dyads with powerful states would have more dangerous transitions, this is simply not the case and so is not supportive of hypothesis
3. In fact, the opposite is true in that the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term in model 5 shows that a power
transition in a strong dyad actually leads to reduced likelihood of
militarized conflict compared to an equally powerful dyad with no transition. Not only is this counter to previous research on power transition
theory, it highlights why it is so important to move beyond hierarchies
and major powers when looking at the effects of power transitions.13
Model 6 also shows counterintuitive results in that dyadic power transitions are just as dangerous when the states have dissimilar as similar
preferences. Of course, this result is contingent on the ability of the
S-score to measure preferences, but, with that being said, the results are
fairly clear. The similarity of preferences in a dyad has no statistically
significant effect on the risk inherent in a power transition, which is
counter to hypothesis 4. In fact, this result is counter to a lot of theory of
power transition, that is, power transitions are only dangerous with a dissimilarity of preferences. There are three possible explanations for the
results. First, as noted above, the measure of preferences is not accurate.
Second, power transitions and preference similarity are not as connected
as previously thought. Third, MIDs are not the appropriate measure of
conflict given the importance that the literature places on wars. The first
two possibilities are not completely addressable in the context of these
analyses but the third can easily be examined.
All of the models in Table 1 use militarized interstate disputes as
the dependent variable, where the power transition literature tends to look
at the onset of wars. To ensure the reliability of our results, we also exam-

Dangerous Liaisons

85

ined the effect of dyadic power transitions on the risk of war onset in
Table 2. Switching to wars had virtually no effect on the dyadic power
transition results except in two cases. First, in model 2 of Table 2, the
coefficient on power transition in the past five years is no longer significant, although the p-value was 0.105 so the change was not that great
from model 2 of Table 1. The second change was the effect of the preference similarity in model 6 of Table 2. When looking at wars the similarity of preferences is an important contextual variable. In particular,
dyadic power transitions are more dangerous when the states have dissimilar preferences ~a confirmation of hypothesis 4!. While not decisive,
this also helps explain the preference similarity results in Table 1 as not
being completely anomalous with regard to the previous literature. It may
just be the case that at lower levels of conflict, preference dissimilarity
does not play as important a role. Despite these two differences, the results
appear fairly consistent between militarized dispute or interstate wars.
As a final check of the robustness of our results, we changed the
time frame of the power transition and looked at the 10 years before a
power transition and the 10 years after a power transition. In addition,
we used this new measure with both the onset of militarized disputes
and the onset of war as the dependent variable. For the models that did
not contain the interaction terms the results are virtually identical with
one exception. With the onset of war as the dependent variable the effect
of a power transition in the past 10 years is positive but statistically insignificant. The four models that contained the interaction terms the results
were exactly the same as reported with the five-year window.
The effects of dyadic power transitions are not only statistically significant but they also have large substantive effects as well. For instance,
holding all variables in model 3 to their mean the risk of a militarized
dispute onset when there is not an approaching power transition is 0.14
per cent. If that same dyad had an approaching power transition, however, the risk of a militarized dispute jumps to 0.38 per cent, which is a
171 per cent increase. The substantive effects are equally large when
looking at the risk of war. In the average dyad when no power transition is imminent the risk of war is only 0.03 per cent, but rises to 0.13
per cent ~a 333 per cent increase! in the years preceding a power transition. So, not only are the effects of dyadic power transitions statistically robust, but they have quite large effects on the real world risk of
armed conflict.

Conclusions
Power transition theory has traditionally been applied to the interaction
between the hegemon ~global and0or regional! and a rising challenger.

Low democracy

0.31
~1.62!

6.90
~12.01!***
0.01
~5.01!***
0.29
~1.94!*
0.04
~3.75!***

1.99
~9.94!***

9.69
~14.16!***
0.01
~5.73!***
0.71
~4.26!***
0.06
~5.30!***

Model 3
~War!

Model 5
~War!

2.57
~9.05!***
4.49
~2.21!**

10.09
~14.63!***
0.01
~5.79!***
0.68
~4.05!***
0.06
~5.48!***

Model 4
~War!
0.23
~1.12!
1.56
~7.43!***

6.11
~11.28!***
0.01
~4.94!***
0.30
~1.91!*
0.04
~3.62!***

2.06
~4.54!***
9.57
~14.10!***
0.01
~5.79!***
0.89
~5.16!***
0.07
~5.48!***

1.10
~4.12!***

Model 6
~War!

AND JEREMY

Preference similarity

Balance of capabilities

Power of dyad

10.23
~14.29!***
0.01
~5.94!***
0.79
~4.88!***
0.06
~5.18!***

Model 2
~War!

DAVID SOBEK

Power transition in the next 5 years preference similarity

Power transition in the next 5 years power of dyad

Power transition in the next 5 years

Power transition in the past 5 years

Model 1
~War!

TABLE 2
Dyadic Power Transitions and the Risk of Interstate Wars

86
WELLS

648944
5884.05
3307.60
0.00

0.04
~3.95!***
0.00
~0.02!
1.89
~12.81!***
0.90
~27.12!***
3.69
~22.34!***
555576
4064.63
5197.24
0.00

0.00
~0.25!
0.18
~1.04!
0.90
~8.43!***
1.18
~40.35!***
0.72
~4.45!***
572611
5250.77
2940.61
0.00

0.05
~4.46!***
0.06
~0.28!
1.81
~11.34!***
0.87
~26.32!***
3.94
~22.57!***

Note: *p , 0.10; **p , 0.05; ***p , 0.01 ~two-tailed tests with robust standard errors clustered on the state!.
The coefficients are in the top cell with the standard errors below.
All models contain three cubic splines.

Number of observations
Log likelihood
Chi-squared
P-value for chi squared

Constant

Peace years

Contiguity

Allies

High democracy

481685
3608.09
4668.78
0.00

0.01
~1.44!
0.19
~1.09!
0.88
~7.87!***
1.15
~38.07!***
0.83
~4.66!***
572611
5243.55
3126.27
0.00

0.05
~4.56!***
0.09
~0.41!
1.80
~11.37!***
0.87
~26.41!***
3.98
~22.68!***

572611
5227.94
3218.52
0.00

0.05
~4.50!***
0.11
~0.51!
1.81
~11.40!***
0.87
~26.36!***
3.83
~21.74!***

Dangerous Liaisons
87

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DAVID SOBEK

AND JEREMY

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Despite this focus, the basic logic of the argument is described in the
context of a dyad, that is, the interaction between the hegemon and rising challenger. As such, there is little theoretical reason to believe that
the theory should only apply to top two states in the international system. Why would minor powers not pay attention to a rival state rising up
and passing their level of power? Why would a minor power that is growing in power not want to seek changes to the status quo to reflect their
new position? We argue that there is no reason to expect a difference and
in fact the empirical results confirm our expectations.
In general, dyads where a power transition is about to occur are more
likely to experience militarized disputes and international wars, which is
more supportive of the preventive war logic. Our results support the formalized arguments that preventive wars are the product of the inability
of rational states to commit to a stable peace agreement ~ Fearon, 1995:
404408; Powell, 2006!. By taking power shifts within the next five years
into account, we capture the preventive motivation that compels states
to take preventive action that is a response to a threat that will generally
take several years to develop ~Levy, 1987: 91!. This relationship is robust
across models and is, unexpectedly, not conditional on the dyad containing powerful states, contiguous states or states with dissimilar preferences. As such, it seems clear that dyadic power transitions represent a
general effect that alters the risk of militarized disputes. Of course, this
study is only a first cut at understanding how power transition works at
the dyadic level of analysis and so there are a number of additional questions that are left unanswered.
Perhaps the most important question left unanswered with our analysis deals with the actual initiation of the dispute. In other words, are
these disputes initiated by the rising challenger or the declining state?
In addition, if the challenger is attacking do they do so after the transition and if the declining state initiates is it done before the transition?
Since our models use a non-directed data set, there is no way to address
these questions but clearly the theory behind dyadic power transitions
can be extended generate directional hypotheses which can then be tested
on a directed dyadic data set. Of course, since our results find a stronger
relationship before the transition, it seems plausible to hypothesize that
the more powerful state is attacking before the transition to maintain
their superiority but this is only a supposition.
Power transition also makes predictions as to the outcome of the
conflicts between the hegemon and rising challenger that can be more
comprehensively examined at the dyadic level. In other words, who is
more likely to win conflicts that arise because of power transitions? Does
the outcome depend on when the conflict is initiated and who initiated
it? Again, these are questions that cannot be answer within this article,
but would be logical extensions.

Dangerous Liaisons

89

In general, we have developed a logical extension of power transition down to the dyad. Even in its original formulation, the theory
described the actions of a dyad within the context of the major power
system. When Lemke ~2002! looked at regional hierarchies, he was still
describing the relationship of a dyad within the context of a regional
system. Since the theory itself has been consistently used to detail the
interaction of a dyad, it only makes sense to test the theory among all
dyads. Unsurprisingly, our results confirm our belief that power transition theory is best thought of as a dyadic theory and should be developed further at the dyadic level of analysis.

Notes
1 It is important to note that disagreements arise in the power transition theory because
dominating a hierarchy provides tremendous benefits, so it is a battle worth fighting
~so to speak!. By eliminating the hierarchy, we are implicitly arguing that disagreements come from another source. We do not specifically point to a new source because
we believe that it is dependent on the dyad. For instance, for some contiguous states
it may develop from border issues or water rights. For noncontiguous states it may
derive from differences over policy or regime change, so when we talk about the
development of grievances we are purposively vague because we do not think there
is a single source of grievances and we do not want to tie our theory into a single
source of grievances.
2 Bennett and Stam find that transitions have little estimated effect on war, and transitions slightly reduce disputes of all levels when estimated along the all dyad set
~2004:113!.
3 Geller ~2000! finds that status quo challengers in rival dyads are more likely to initiate wars, whether they are superior or inferior in power to status quo defenders;
moreover, defenders initiate wars almost solely under unstable power balances.
4 As a first look at the effects of dyadic power transitions, we felt more comfortable
looking at non-directed dyads as opposed to directed dyads. While power transition
theory can certainly make predictions as to which side in a dyad attacks, it seems
more appropriate to first establish a basic relationship. As such, we make no distinction as to which side is attacking. In addition, using the directed dyads would require
an operationalization of initiation, which is not always clear.
5 The Correlates of War data are available online at http:00www.correlatesofwar.org0.
6 We are assuming that states do not necessarily have the ability to make fine grain
analysis of the balance of power. As such, there is the large group of rough parity,
where states are not going to believe one side or the other has a distinct advantage.
7 By using standard deviations, it is possible that we may be coding pairs of states,
particularly ones with very low levels of capability, as at parity despite considerable
difference between them. Because we are testing power transition theory in terms of
all dyads, we must bear in mind that most states are small states, so the standard
deviation will be biased towards them. The fact of the matter is that because the
majority of CINC scores are so low, most dyads have very large differences but in
reality the differences are not meaningful. This is why we are using standard deviations, to get away from our biases as to what would be a meaningful difference and
let the data set show us the meaningful differences. For instance, if in one dyad one
state was over 12,000 times more powerful than the other, it would seem to be mean-

90

8
9
10

11

12

13

DAVID SOBEK

AND JEREMY

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ingful. In reality, however, it often is not meaningful, for that is how much more
powerful Nepal was over Vanuatu in 2001.
Kim and Morrow ~1992! find that the rate of change in the rising states capabilities
does not have a significant effect on whether a power transition leads to war.
For more information on Polity 4e and to download the data see: http:00www
.cidcm.umd.edu0inscr0polity0.
A measure of parity is often used as control variable in quantitative research, so it
should be included. Unfortunately, any measure of parity would also be related to a
measure of power transitions because these occur at parity. This correlation implies
that we should drop parity from our models, but we decided to include it. When we
run the models without our measure of parity the results do not change, so any correlation between parity and power transition are not affecting the results.
Sweeney ~2003! also finds that preference similarity generates peace within dyads.
He also uses the S score, except for the years since 1946, where he averages the S
score with Gartzkes alternative preference similarity measure based on United Nations
General Assembly voting.
One possible problem with the years preceding a power transition is that there may
exist endogeniety, that is, states believe that a conflict is coming so they build out
their army. While this may be the case, we do not find the issue too problematic.
First, the years preceding a power transition have a similar effect. Second, and perhaps more compelling, this process should not affect balance of power. If both sides
see the war coming then both should build up their power and the balance should not
change. Third, even if only one side built out, the CINC score is unlike to change
dramatically because two-thirds of the measure are demographic and economic variables which are quite difficult to drastically change in the short run. Finally, endogeniety assumes that any conflict will substantially change the amount of power. This
is highly unlikely with militarized interstate disputes, that is, how is a show of force
going to change the total population, for instance, of a state. Wars are certainly more
likely to do this but wars larger enough to radically change a states power are relatively rare as such while we acknowledge the possibility of an endogeniety issue with
wars it seems unlikely that it would dramatically affect the results. In addition, it is
unlikely to have any effect on the militarized interstate disputes.
We also tested to see if dyads with contiguous states had more dangerous power transitions, but the results showed the opposite, the interaction of power transition and
contiguity was negative and statistically significant.

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