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mean that Augustine views the sinful man as culpable before God
primarily because of what he is in his essence, due to his participation
in original sin, not chiefly because of what he has done by volitional
acts of the will (though ultimately for Augustine the two are not
separated). Sins of volition, though significant, only serve to deepen
the divine displeasure.
Though Augustine does not develop a systematic doctrine of
culpability, delineating between original sin as an act versus original
sin as a condition, his frequent comments about the guilt of original
sin demonstrate that he views culpability as primarily an
essential/ontological affair. He writes, "God therefore condemns
man because of the fault wherewithal his nature is disgraced/'7 and
again, "The fault of our nature remains in our offspring so deeply
impressed as to make it guilty/'8 and again "The guilt, therefore, of
that corruption [of nature] of which we are speaking . . . etc.,
(emphasis added)."9 Though it is true for Augustine that the
corruption of original sin itself was, in the first place, a form of
punishment meted out in response to Adam's sin, Augustine saw it
as locking humanity in bondage to the divine displeasure.10
This distinction between essential and volitional culpability
becomes particularly crucial in light of the current conversation on
justification, which often overlooks this foundational element. My
intent here is not to make a biblical or theological defense for
Augustine's understanding of culpability but to demonstrate the
way in which one's doctrine of culpability guides and directs one's
understanding of justification. In my estimation, many participants
in the justification debates, particularly Reformed theologians, have
not adequately explored this crucial subject, and are unconsciously
building a doctrine of justification solely upon a notion of volitional
culpability. The resulting articulation of justification, I will argue,
has in many respects overemphasized judicial cleansing and lost an
important ontological component, particularly as it is distilled down
to a popular level. Augustine's doctrine of culpability maintains the
7
On Original Sin, 11.46.254. Note: For ease of accessibility, all references to
Augustine's writings (unless otherwise indicated) will include Augustine's English
book titles and chapter numbers, and will include page numbers that correspond to
Philip Schaffs A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene FatJiers of the Christian
Church, Vol. V: Saint Augustine: Writings Against tie Pelagians (Edinburgh/Grand
Rapids: & Clark/Eerdmans, 1997).
8
Ibid., II.44.253.
9
Ibid., 11.45.253. By way of illustration, let us consider the ground of culpability in
a rabid dog. On what basis is the animal put down? A rabid dog is destroyed not
simply based upon its behavior (i.e., that it attacked a person). Rather its culpability is
grounded even more fundamentally in its corrupted condition. A rabid dog is worthy
of destruction by nature of its ruined ontology, apart from any act of volition.
Likewise for Augustine, it is primarily original sin as a condition of essential
corruption (rather than simply an act) that invokes the wrath of God and marks sinful
humanity for destruction.
10
This is in contrast to Reformed thought, which though not denying essential
corruption, tends to define the culpability of humanity as primarily a volitional, legal
affair regarding our failure to uphold the divine Law.
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16
17
Ibid,I37278
Enchiridion, ch 26, as quoted in Philip Schaff, A Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers oftlie Christian Church, Vol 111 Saint Augustine On tlie Holy Trinity,
Doctrinal Treatises, Moral Treatises (Edinburgh/Grand Rapids & Clark/Eerdmans,
1997) Here Augustine clearly explains original sin to be both act and consequence, the
consequence summed up succinctly as "death "
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philosophy into his Christianity (or the reverse). Augustine does not
appeal to philosophy in defense of his position, but rather the
Apostle Paul, particularly the apostle's comments found in Romans
5. In his treatise On Forgiveness of Sins, And Baptism, Augustine
makes extensive use of Paul's comments in Rom 5:12-21 to
demonstrate that sin is passed from parent to child through natural
generation rather than imitation. Because all of humanity was
substantially present in Adam when Adam sinned, all of humanity is
implicated in that one original sin. The Pauline expressions "for in
Adam all die" (1 Cor 15:22) and "because all sinned [in Adam]"
(Rom 5:12) are significant expressions for Augustine.28 That
Augustine sees his view of original sin as consistent with Pauline
teachings is evident from his writings.29
Eugene Portalie captures well the effect that this ontological
union between Adam and his descendants has on Adam's posterity.
Noting that Augustine was the first to use the word (Rom
11:16) in the pejorative sense of dough or mass, Portalie helpfully
captures some of Augustine's more vivid descriptors regarding
original sin: "[Augustine] calls the line of Adam a mass of slime; a
mass of sin, of sins, of iniquity; a mass of wrath, of death, of
damnation, of offense; a mass totally vitiated, damnable, damned."30
So then, Augustine's realism provides the philosophical/
theological foundation for his understanding of the culpability of all
people, but most significantly infants. Like a stream which flows out
of a body of water that has been polluted, so too every soul which
flows out of Adam is contaminated by original sin, for all were in
Adam when he was corrupted. Augustine's realism would be
adopted (though less significantly utilized) by the Reformers, but it
is not perhaps until Jonathan Edwards that a Protestant theologian
would once again incorporate such a strong realism into the
foundation of his soteriology.31
^See On Forgiveness of Sins, And Baptism, chs. 8-20,18-22, for Augustine's use of
Rom 5:12-21 in his treatment of original sin. Clearly from these chapters we can see
that Augustine's realism is being sourced in his interpretation of Paul, regardless of
his past attraction to neo-Platonism.
29
Though it is fashionable in philosophical/theological circles to reject
ontological realism, I believe there is merit in maintaining a biblically based, nuanced
realism that is able to serve as an interpretive grid through which to think about
original sin (and justification). That Augustine, Luther, Edwards, and to a lesser extent
Calvin (theologians who have contributed mightily to evangelical piety) find a use for
some sort of realism should give us pause before we too quickly dismiss it as
unwarranted.
30
Portalie, St Augustine, 212.
31
See Edwards's treatment of imputation in his Original Sin, ch. 3, which treats
the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity in an almost identical manner as
Augustine. For Edwards, imputation follows essential corruption, rather than precedes
it. Adam's descendants are imputed sinners only because they have actually sinned in
Adam due to their natural, moral union.
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C. Culpability and Concupiscence
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punishment the loss of control over the members of his body (i.e., his
sexual organs). Prior to the fall, Augustine believed that sexual
reproduction could have taken place by an act of the will, a man
moving his members without passion much like he moves an arm or
leg, and would have been devoid of sexual desire (natural
concupiscence) as we presently experience it.35 But with these
members no longer in subjection, it became necessary for man to
wait upon lust (sexual concupiscence) in order to set these members
in motion. So though procreation was good and holy, through the
fall it had become intricately linked to carnal desire and could not
take place apart from it. (Augustine even considered marital
intercourse done for mere pleasure a venial sin, for it too could not
take place apart from carnal desire, but saw it as a necessary evil to
help safeguard against grosser immorality.)
Thus for Augustine, concupiscence is intricately and necessarily
connected to sexual reproduction, for it is only through carnal
concupiscence that sexual reproduction is even possible. This logic
then leads to his notorious connection regarding sex and original sin.
He writes, "Now from this concupiscence whatever comes into being
by natural birth is bound by original sin"36 and again, "the fault of
the first birth (that original sin which has been derived and
contracted from the concupiscence of the flesh) . . . etc."37 Infants,
born out of the union of shameful desire, are themselves infected by
the same shameful concupiscence, and thus by reason of the
concupiscence which is now inseparably bound to their very nature,
are an object of God's wrath.
This particular method by which Augustine explains how
infants came to be infected with original sin was not easily defended
against the Pelagians, who insisted that the Scriptures in no way
condemn sexual desire within the confines of marriage. Thus for the
Pelagian, since the sexual desire of procreation was not sinful, the
child was born free from the stain of original sin. It is unfortunate
that Augustine attempted to defend his understanding of original sin
by insisting that sexual relations within marriage could not occur
without sin, for he found himself in the awkward position of trying
to affirm that sex within marriage for the purpose of procreation was
both good and not good.
It is surprising that Augustine claims ignorance of the soul's
beginnings, since a view of traducianism would have lent support to
his view of original sin without relying so heavily upon such a
negative view of sexuality. Further, it would have been highly
consistent with his realism. It is in fact difficult to understand how
Augustine can maintain ignorance of the soul's origin, while also
appealing to a philosophical realism as a cause of original sin. The
latter seems quite dependent upon the former. Though Augustine
35
Ibid., 1.7.266.
Ibid 1.27.275.
37
Ibid., 1.37.278.
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126
Ibid., 1.28.275.
Ibid., 1.29.275.
127
I think that before all other things we have to inquire what sin is,
some substance or wholly a name without substance, whereby is
expressed not a thing, not an existence, not some sort of body, but
the doing of a wrongful deed . . . how could that which lacks all
substance have possibly weakened or changed human nature? 40
That Augustine commonly refers to original sin as a condition
which is "transmitted," "inherited," and "contracted," by the infant
from the parent, lends itself to this Pelagian critique. But Augustine
is careful to explain that though original sin has no ontological
reality in and of itself, it is nonetheless intrinsically related to human
nature. Though perhaps not properly called a disease (as though it
were a substance) it can still be called a disease in that it refers to the
effects of a disease. Augustine agrees that sin is an act rather than a
substance.41 It does not exist as a thing, but rather can only be spoken
of as an act, or the absence of righteousness. Yet his agreement that
sin is not a substance, but rather an act, did not prevent him from
concluding that the act of sin had indeed mortally wounded human
nature. Using the analogy of eating, Augustine shows how it is
possible that an act (such as not eating) can change one's substance.
He writes,
Since then we have already learned that sin is not a substance, do
we not consider, not to mention any other example, that not to eat
is also not a substance? . . . to abstain then from food is not a
substance; and yet the substance of our body, if it does altogether
abstain from food, so languishes, that even if it be in any way able
to continue alive, it is hardly capable of being restored to the use of
that food.42
Though he grants to the Pelagians that the act of sin itself has
passed away, he insists that the effects of the act have not. Just as a
person can become so weak through lack of food that even the
presence of food avails him not, so too the soul has become too weak
through the loss of original righteousness to make use of God's
commands, which apart from grace serve only as reminders of
human sinfulness and inability.43 This one act of original sin has
resulted in a universal condition of essential depravity out of which
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129
though infants are not capable of volitional sins, they remain under
the just wrath of God until such time as they are baptized for the
remission of that "original corruption." It is the state of spiritual
death, a consequence of original sin, which brings about the just
wrath of God.
It might be argued that Augustine views the wrath of God as
kindled against man in regard to an act of the willAdam's one act
of disobedience (as opposed to essence strictly)since all of
humanity sinned volitionally in Adam. But this is true only insofar
as it relates to the first sin of Adam whereby all sinned. It is clear
from Augustine's stance on the necessity of infant baptism that
active, volitional sins after birth are not a necessary element of
culpability.48 And now we arrive at the crux of our paper.
//. AUGUSTINE, CALVIN, AND THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION
As stated at the outset, one's understanding of culpability drives
one's articulation of justification. The connection between culpability
and justification will be examined below, demonstrating the
inseparable link that exists between the two. To this end, the
soteriology of Augustine, Calvin, and Hodge will be briefly
examined.
A. Augustine and Justification
Essential justification becomes for Augustine the solution to the
essential culpability of original sin. Just as man sins himself into a
depraved condition, and is thus condemned, he is justified through
faith in Christ into a righteous condition, and thus inherits eternal
life. Essential healing is not simply necessary as a corollary of
48
I have not attempted a detailed exploration of the philosophical framework
within which Augustine constructed his theology and the influence it had upon his
doctrine of sin, but some prekirtinary comments are in order. First, the overarching
backdrop of neo-Platonism's depiction of the fall of humanity away from the true
celestial forms must surely play some role in Augustine's thought (if even
unconsciously). In Platonic thought, the souls of men are tainted because they have
fallen away from, and lost sight of, the true ideal heavenly forms. In falling out of the
heavens, humanity has "congealed" and become encrusted in physical, carnal bodies.
Salvation then, in Platonic thought, is the reunification of the soul to the ideal forms,
whereby the soul gains freedom from the limitations of the physical existence. It is an
essential salvation, a transcending of the earthly sphere into the heavenly sphere.
Similarly for Augustine, humanity's final salvation is found in its eternal and
uninhibited union with the divine nature. In Adam, humanity fell away from this
union into death. Much like the separation of food from the body results in physical
corruption, so too the separation of God from humanity resulted in spiritual
corruption. For Augustine then, reunion with the divine nature becomes as much a
means as an end, for it is only in our reunion with God via the Holy Spirit that we are
healed from our moral depravity and thus made capable of enjoying complete and
eternal union with God in the blessed realm. Those who refuse to be cured from this
essential corruption will forever endure that condition (in all of its consummated
fullness) in the eternal judgment of the lost.
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56
Hodge writes, "The reformers maintained that by justification the Scriptures
mean something different from sanctification. . . . justification, instead of being an
efficient act ciianging tlie inward ciiaracter of the sinner is a declarative act. . . . that the
sinner is just, i.e., that the law no longer condemns him, but acquits and pronounces him
to be entitled to eternal life" (emphasis added) (Systematic Tlieology [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1973], 3:119). See also Calvin who writes, "In Christ we have boldness and
access with confidence through . . . faith in him. This surely does not take place
through the gift of regeneration, which, as it is always imperfect in this flesh, so
contains in itself manifold grounds for doubt. Therefore we come to this remedy: that
believers should be convinced that their only ground of hope for inheritance of a Heavenly
Kingdom lies in tiie fact that, being engrafted in the body of Christ, tliey are freely accounted
righteous" (emphasis added) (Institutes of the Christian Religion [ed. John T. McNeill;
Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster], III.13.5.768).
57
Ibid., 729.
133
as both David and Paul affirm, either they remain unpleasing and
hateful to God, or they must be justified. And what further do we
seek, when the judge plainly declares that entry into heavenly life
opens only to men who are born anew? (emphasis added)60
Here Calvin seems to make justification synonymous with
regeneration! Or at the very least he ascribes the blessedness of
heaven to spiritual regenerationsomething that he clearly and
often denies in his formal treatment of justification. Yet in my mind
this inconsistency is almost mandated by his affirmation of essential
culpability. And again, discussing the corruption of original sin he
describes righteousness as being "transfused" by the Spirit. He
writes,
The hope of life is restored in Christ. But it is well known that this
occurs in no other way than that wonderful communication
whereby Christ transfuses into us the power of his righteousness.
As it is written elsewhere, "'his Spirit is life to us because of
righteousness."61
Again it seems that the tight logic of essential culpability
necessitating essential justification is too evident for even Calvin to
ignore. Though Calvin formally denies that justification entails any
essential element, his treatment of the topic in light of the ontological
culpability of original sin inadvertently forces him to counteract this
position. Whether Calvin is conscious of this discontinuity is unclear.
58
Ibid., 739.
McCormack likewise argues for discontinuity between Calvin's sacramental
theology and his formal treatment of justification (Justification, Wliat's at Stake in the
Current Debates, 81-117).
60
Calvin, Institutes, IV.l 6.17.1340.
61
Ibid v IL1.6.248-49.
59
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135
The Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on tlie Baptism of Infants, III.11.73.
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139
70
The legacy of the Reformed doctrine of justification is a major theme of my
thesis (see 49 above), particularly ch 7, where I detail the progression of Reformed
thought from Calvin to Charles Ryne It is my contention that Calvin's movement
away from Augustine's doctrine of justification laid the foundation for the Free Grace
movement of dispensationalism and the anunomianism that so often accompanies it
See Hiestand, Augustine and Justification, 114-33
71
In my estimation, the New Perspective, though offermg a relatively fresh
understanding of Pauline soteriology, goes too far m its recontextualization of first
century Judaism The msistence of Sanders, Tom Wright, James Dunn, and others
that Paul was not contending against a proto-Pelagianism does not, m my mind, stand
the exegetical test I believe Augustine's paradigm, provides an alternative to both the
New Perspective as well as the more traditional Reformed interpretation of Pauline
thought For an introduction to the New Perspective debates from a Lutheran
perspective, see Westerholm's Perspectives Old and New on Paul Tlie Lutheran Paul and
his Critics (Grand Rapids Eerdmans, 2004 For a shorter critique of Wright's assertion
that Paul was contending against racial/social legalism, rather than worksrighteousness, see James Hamilton's article, " Wright and Saul's Moral
Bootstraps Newer Light on 'The New Perspective,'" TJ 25/2 (Fall 2004) 139-55 For an
in-depth book-length treatment see Justification and Variegated Nomism, Vol 1 (ed D
A Carson, Peter O'Brien, and Mark Seifrid, Grand Rapids Baker, 2001), and the
recently published vol 2
^ s
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