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savematrix
ALDmatrix setmatrix
} bind def
/InALD {
restorematrix
} bind def
/DoneALD {
ALDsave restore
} bind def
%%EndProlog
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612 792 0 FMBEGINPAGE
90 9 522 720 R
7 X
0 K
V
0 14 Q
0 X
(Secur) 134.14 710.67 T
(e RPC Authentication \050SRA\051 for TELNET and FTP) 168.09 710.67 T
1 12 Q
(David R. Safford, David K. Hess, and Douglas Lee Schales) 163.92 680 T
(Supercomputer Center) 251.54 666 T
(Texas A&M University) 250.7 652 T
(College Station, TX 77843-3363) 226.87 638 T
0 F
(1.) 90 610 T
(Abstract) 104.4 610 T
2 11 Q
-0.51 (TELNET and FTP currently exchange user authentication \050passwords\051 in
plain text, which is easily) 90 591.67 P
-0.53 (eavesdropped. Several techniques, such as Kerberos and SPX, have been
proposed in draft RFCs to) 90 578.67 P
(implement secure authentication. These techniques, however) 90 565.67 T
(, have several drawbacks, including) 357.14 565.67 T
-0.39 (technical complexity) 90 552.67 P
-0.39 (, poor vendor support, and or) 180.74 552.67 P
-0.39 (ganizational problems. This paper presents SRA,) 306.46 552.67 P
(a very simple and tested technique based on Secure RPC which, while certainly not
as strong as) 90 539.67 T
(RSA, is reasonably strong, fast, and trivial to implement immediately for both
inter and intra-) 90 526.67 T
(domain communication.) 90 513.67 T
0 12 Q
(2.) 90 486 T
(Backgr) 104.4 486 T
(ound) 141.5 486 T
2 11 Q
-0.54 (TELNET and FTP currently pass the user authentication across the network in
the form of plaintext) 90 467.67 P
-0.16 (passwords. These passwords can trivially be eavesdropped with such simple
tools as ether\336nd and) 90 454.67 P
(tcpdump. During intrusions at T) 90 441.67 T
(exas A&M University in August 1992, signi\336cant amounts of the) 230.53 441.67 T
(tools used by the crackers were captured. They had much better tools than simple
ones such as) 90 428.67 T
-0.38 (these, and they used them to capture passwords. It is absolutely essential
that TELNET and FTP be) 90 415.67 P
(extended to provide con\336dential user authentication to prevent such simple
password grabbing.) 90 402.67 T
(Several RFCs and draft RFCs address this issue, including:) 90 384.67 T
(1409 \050TELNET Authentication\051) 180 371.67 T
(141) 180 358.67 T
(1 \050Kerberos Authentication\051) 196.07 358.67 T
(draft-ietf-telnet-authspx-00.txt) 180 345.67 T
(draft-ietf-cat-ftpsec-01.txt) 180 332.67 T
-0.13 (These drafts outline proposed designs for the use of Kerberos, RSA, SPX, and
gssapi for con\336den-) 90 314.67 P
(tial authentication. While these proposed techniques af) 90 301.67 T
(ford excellent security) 330.55 301.67 T
(, they suf) 428.07 301.67 T
(fer from) 468.46 301.67 T
(some drawbacks which have kept them from widespread use so far) 90 288.67 T
(. Kerberos is dif) 383.51 288.67 T
(\336cult to imple-) 454.1 288.67 T
-0.29 (ment and requires centralized ticket servers with copies of all user
passwords in plaintext, which is) 90 275.67 P
(possibly undesirable in lar) 90 262.67 T
(ge or) 205.46 262.67 T
(ganizations with relatively autonomous subgroups. Inter) 227.53 262.67 T
(-domain) 474.48 262.67 T
(kerberos is particularly complex. Also, vendors have been extremely slow to
provide commercial) 90 249.67 T
-0.16 (support for kerberos. V) 90 236.67 P
-0.16 (arious public key methods can eliminate the need for centralized secret key)
190.8 236.67 P
-0.39 (storage and can solve inter) 90 223.67 P
-0.39 (-domain issues very nicely) 205.38 223.67 P
-0.39 (, but need a secure public key distribution sys-) 320.98 223.67 P
(tem, which will take time to popularize. This paper proposes a simple
con\336dential authentication) 90 210.67 T
(system for TELNET and FTP based on Secure RPC techniques.) 90 197.67 T
(The proposed method has several advantages:) 90 179.67 T
2 12 Q
(1.) 111.6 161 T
0.06 (The user authentication information is sent encrypted with a one-time DES
key) 126 161 P
0.06 (.) 504.6 161 P
(2.) 111.6 147 T
0.99 (The method uses one-time random Secure RPC keys and, therefore, needs no) 126
147 P
(external keyservers or complex key protection.) 126 133 T
(3.) 111.6 119 T
0.08 (The method is compatible with all existing and draft authentication methods,
so) 126 119 P
1.37 (it can take advantage of the method, if supported, transparently on the
user's) 126 105 P
(behalf.) 126 91 T
3 F
(\203) 111.6 77 T
2 F
(_____________________) 90 63 T
2 8 Q
-0.37 (Copyright) 90 51.67 P
3 F
-0.37 (\343) 124.06 51.67 P
2 F
-0.37 ( 1993 USENIX Association. Reprinted with permission from Proceedings of the
Fourth USENIX Security Symposium.) 130.37 51.67 P
FMENDPAGE
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%%Page: "2" 2
612 792 0 FMBEGINPAGE
90 72 522 720 R
7 X
0 K
V
2 12 Q
0 X
(4.) 111.6 712 T
-0.52 (The method is reasonably fast \050it adds about 1 second to a connection on
a sparc-) 126 712 P
(station 1 class machine\051.) 126 698 T
(5.) 111.6 684 T
0.07 (The method is easily implemented entirely within the client and server
binaries,) 126 684 P
1.56 (so drop-in installation is very simple. No external key distribution service
is) 126 670 P
(needed.) 126 656 T
(6.) 111.6 642 T
1.02 (All source code is publicly available, making support available for most
plat-) 126 642 P
(forms, independent of vendor support.) 126 628 T
2 11 Q
-0.62 (One disadvantage of the method is that, unlike more comprehensive public key
methods, it does not) 90 609.67 P
-0.15 (provide mutual repudiation. The server does validate the user's identity) 90
596.67 P
-0.15 (, but the client does not per-) 399.93 596.67 P
(form server authentication. A second weakness is that Secure RPC is subject to
logarithm attacks) 90 583.67 T
-0.53 ([1], although such attacks are not trivial. The proposed design for T) 90
570.67 P
-0.53 (elnet and FTP reduces this expo-) 380.31 570.67 P
0.09 (sure by computing a new random secret/public key pair for each connection. A
third possible limi-) 90 557.67 P
0.04 (tation is that the underlying Dif) 90 544.67 P
0.04 (\336e-Hellman algorithm is patented. As most vendors already of) 227.86
544.67 P
0.04 (fer) 507.1 544.67 P
-0.52 (Secure RPC as part of Secure NFS implementations, they have already made
the necessary key ser-) 90 531.67 P
(vice available.) 90 518.67 T
-0.62 (The bottom line is that the method is signi\336cantly more secure than
sending passwords in plain text,) 90 500.67 P
(while of) 90 487.67 T
(fering greater ease of implementation than other) 126.11 487.67 T
(, more secure, alternatives.) 337.41 487.67 T
0 12 Q
(3.) 90 460 T
(Design) 104.4 460 T
2 11 Q
-0.51 (Secure RPC uses a simple version of the Dif) 90 441.67 P
-0.51 (\336e-Hellman exponential based method for determining) 280.98 441.67 P
-0.49 (a common DES key) 90 428.67 P
-0.49 (. This algorithm and its speci\336c implementation parameters for Secure RPC
are) 176.01 428.67 P
-0.23 (given in the RFC for RPC \050RFC 1057\051. Normally Secure RPC stores a
user's key in the keyserver) 90 415.67 P
-0.23 (,) 516.74 415.67 P
-0.62 (encrypted with the user) 90 402.67 P
-0.62 (\325) 191.37 402.67 P
-0.62 (s password, and uses it as necessary to calculate common keys for each con-)
194.43 402.67 P
-0.17 (nection. In the proposed method, this is greatly simpli\336ed by calculating
a new random key set for) 90 389.67 P
-0.59 (each TELNET or FTP authentication, which eliminates the need for any
keyserver) 90 376.67 P
-0.59 (. Thus the Secure) 445.35 376.67 P
(RPC code is used only for performing basic key calculations, not for key storage
or management.) 90 363.67 T
-0.39 (The basic data \337ow is shown in \336gure 1. The functions performed by the
Secure RPC code are indi-) 90 350.67 P
(cated by brackets, and the parentheses indicate DES encryption or decryption.) 90
337.67 T
(From the public Secure RPC code, the keys are 192 bit integers calculated as:) 90
114.31 T
(SK \050secret key\051 = random 192 bit number) 90 96.31 T
90 72 522 720 C
118.38 131.64 493.62 320 C
4 10 Q
0 X
0 K
(Client) 199.57 297.16 T
258.49 127.29 353.51 143.29 R
7 X
V
5 8 Q
0 X
(Figure 1.) 258.49 137.95 T
( SRA data \337ow) 298.09 137.95 T
(.) 350.53 137.95 T
4 10 Q
(Server) 383.74 297.15 T
5 9 Q
([Calculate PKA, SKA]) 169.38 279.18 T
([Calculate PKB, SKB]) 355.5 279.18 T
(PKA) 297.67 265.91 T
(PKB) 297.67 247.91 T
([Calculate KAB]) 180.87 225.18 T
([Calculate KAB]) 366.99 225.18 T
(KAB\050U,P\051) 193.96 208.72 T
(KAB\325\050U, P\051) 376.74 171.68 T
333.86 265.26 339.06 262.26 333.86 259.26 333.86 262.26 4 Y
V
271.38 262.26 333.86 262.26 2 L
0.5 H
2 Z
N
276.58 241.26 271.38 244.26 276.58 247.26 276.58 244.26 4 Y
V
276.58 244.26 339.06 244.26 2 L
N
333.86 194.41 339.06 191.41 333.86 188.41 333.86 191.41 4 Y
V
271.38 191.41 333.86 191.41 2 L
N
152.94 163.34 271.74 292.65 R
N
339.06 163.33 457.86 292.64 R
N
(KAB\050U, P\051) 283.19 195.72 T
90 72 522 720 C
118.38 131.64 493.62 320 R
0.25 H
0 Z
0 X
0 K
N
0 0 612 792 C
FMENDPAGE
%%EndPage: "2" 3
%%Page: "3" 3
612 792 0 FMBEGINPAGE
90 72 522 720 R
7 X
0 K
V
2 11 Q
0 X
(PK \050public key\051 = \050base) 90 712.67 T
2 9 Q
(SK) 197.8 717.07 T
2 11 Q
(\051 mod modulus) 209.28 712.67 T
(where base = 3) 125 699.67 T
(modulus =) 125 686.67 T
6 F
(d4a0ba0250b6fd2ec626e7efd637df76c716e22d0944b88b) 174.54 686.67 T
2 F
-0.56 (Since exponentiation is commutative, given the key pairs \050PKA, SKA\051
and \050PKB, SKB\051, both sides) 90 668.67 P
(can con\336dentially calculate KAB as:) 90 655.67 T
(Server: KAB = \050PKA) 144 637.67 T
2 9 Q
(SKB) 241.73 642.07 T
2 11 Q
(\051 mod modulus) 259.21 637.67 T
(or) 144 619.67 T
(Client: KAB = \050PKB) 144 601.67 T
2 9 Q
(SKA) 239.32 606.07 T
2 11 Q
(\051 mod modulus) 257.29 601.67 T
(For purposes of the DES encryption, Secure RPC uses the middle 64 bits of the 192
bit common) 90 583.67 T
(key \050KAB\051. The calculation of KAB is reasonably secure, as it requires at
least one of the secret) 90 570.67 T
(keys, which are not put on the network, or calculating the logarithm of lar) 90
557.67 T
(ge numbers.) 414.15 557.67 T
0 12 Q
(4.) 90 530 T
(Incorporation into TELNET) 104.4 530 T
2 11 Q
-0.27 (The design for incorporation into TELNET followed exactly the design
speci\336ed by the respective) 90 511.67 P
-0.73 (RFC for Kerberos, which is already implemented in the Network Release 2
code. The RFC speci\336es) 90 498.67 P
-0.16 (the necessary option negotiation \050WILL, WONT) 90 485.67 P
-0.16 (, DO, DONT\051 to ensure that both sides are able to) 302.57 485.67 P
(handle the authentication method. If not, the exchange reverts to the default
unencrypted transfer) 90 472.67 T
(.) 515.02 472.67 T
(SRA has \336ve suboption commands: KEY) 90 454.67 T
(, USER, P) 271.38 454.67 T
(ASS, ACCEPT) 315.55 454.67 T
(, and REJECT) 382.5 454.67 T
(, which are dem-) 444.86 454.67 T
(onstrated in the \336gure 2.) 90 441.67 T
0 12 Q
(5.) 90 115.86 T
(Incorporation into FTP) 104.4 115.86 T
2 11 Q
-0.53 (The FTP incorporation similarly follows the draft RFC speci\336cation for
the kerberos exchange \050see) 90 97.52 P
(\336gure 3\051, although in this case, the kerberos code was not already
implemented in the Network) 90 84.52 T
90 72 522 720 C
90.21 137.86 521.79 424 C
4 10 Q
0 X
0 K
(Client) 118.83 405.28 T
212.38 136 399.62 150 R
7 X
V
5 8 Q
0 X
(Figure 2.) 212.38 144.67 T
(Sample nominal authentication data \337ow) 251.98 144.67 T
(.) 395.09 144.67 T
4 10 Q
(Server) 466.69 405.28 T
5 9 Q
(Calculate) 111.11 331.57 T
5 8 Q
(IAC DO AUTHENTICA) 258.82 391.6 T
(TION) 339.08 391.6 T
167.2 385 162 388 167.2 391 167.2 388 4 Y
V
167.2 388 450 388 2 L
0.5 H
2 Z
N
101 162.29 162.2 400.89 R
N
450.8 162.29 512 400.89 R
N
5 9 Q
(key pairs) 111.86 321.57 T
444.8 369.4 450 366.4 444.8 363.4 444.8 366.4 4 Y
V
162 366.4 444.8 366.4 2 L
N
5 8 Q
(IAC WILL AUTHENTICA) 255.49 370 T
(TION) 342.41 370 T
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 222.6 348.4 T
(TION SEND SRA IAC SE) 301.54 348.4 T
167.2 341.8 162 344.8 167.2 347.8 167.2 344.8 4 Y
V
167.2 344.8 450 344.8 2 L
N
5 9 Q
(Calculate) 462.67 332.05 T
(key pairs) 464.05 321.33 T
444.8 311.8 450 308.8 444.8 305.8 444.8 308.8 4 Y
V
162 308.8 444.8 308.8 2 L
N
5 8 Q
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 207.04 312.4 T
(TION IS SRA KEY <PKA> IAC SE) 285.97 312.4 T
167.2 284.2 162 287.2 167.2 290.2 167.2 287.2 4 Y
V
167.2 287.2 450 287.2 2 L
N
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 198.01 290.8 T
(TION REPL) 276.94 290.8 T
(Y SRA KEY <PKB> IAC SE) 318.55 290.8 T
5 9 Q
(Calculate) 462.89 274.01 T
(common keys) 453.9 264.01 T
(Calculate) 112.87 274.89 T
(common keys) 103.88 264.89 T
444.8 253.77 450 250.77 444.8 247.77 444.8 250.77 4 Y
V
162 250.77 444.8 250.77 2 L
N
5 8 Q
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 197.27 254.35 T
(TION IS SRA USER <KAB\050U\051> IAC SE) 276.21 254.35 T
167.2 169 162 172 167.2 175 167.2 172 4 Y
V
167.2 172 450 172 2 L
N
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 182.85 175.6 T
(TION REPL) 261.79 175.6 T
(Y SRA [ACCEPT | REJECT] IAC SE) 303.4 175.6 T
167.2 222.57 162 225.57 167.2 228.57 167.2 225.57 4 Y
V
167.2 225.57 450 225.57 2 L
N
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 196 229.17 T
(TION REPL) 274.93 229.17 T
(Y SRA CONTINUE IAC SE) 316.55 229.17 T
444.8 197.97 450 194.97 444.8 191.97 444.8 194.97 4 Y
V
162 194.97 444.8 194.97 2 L
N
(IAC SB AUTHENTICA) 197.43 198.6 T
(TION IS SRA P) 276.36 198.6 T
(ASS <KAB\050P\051> IAC SE) 333.09 198.6 T
90 72 522 720 C
90.21 137.86 521.79 424 R
0.25 H
0 Z
0 X
0 K
N
0 0 612 792 C
FMENDPAGE
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612 792 0 FMBEGINPAGE
90 72 522 720 R
7 X
0 K
V
2 11 Q
0 X
(Release-2.) 90 712.67 T
0 12 Q
(6.) 90 410.99 T
(Pr) 104.4 410.99 T
(eliminary Results) 116.84 410.99 T
2 11 Q
(Implementations for both TELNET \050telnet and telnetd\051 and FTP \050ftp and
ftpd\051 have been incorpo-) 90 392.66 T
(rated into the baseline BSD Network Release-2 code and tested on various
sparcstation machines) 90 379.66 T
(running SunOS 4.1.2. The programs have been found to interact well with every
existing ftp and) 90 366.66 T
(telnet service tried, including the major ftp sites, which use experimental
servers. T) 90 353.66 T
(wo interesting) 455.08 353.66 T
(things have been noticed, which point to further work.) 90 340.66 T
(First, this encryption prevents network monitoring programs, such as) 90 322.66 T
1 F
(Etherscan) 396.07 322.66 T
2 F
(, from observing) 440.62 322.66 T
(root logins, ftp\325) 90 309.66 T
(s and other knob-turning. Overall, this is not too signi\336cant a problem, as
these) 158.06 309.66 T
(events can still be logged by the tar) 90 296.66 T
(get service.) 245.12 296.66 T
(A second observation concerns the unnecessary tendency of existing telnet and ftp
server code to) 90 278.66 T
0.08 (echo back the user name in plain text following successful authentication,
such as in the ftp return) 90 265.66 P
(message ") 90 252.66 T
6 F
(230 User smith logged in) 134.45 252.66 T
2 F
(". In our implementation we deleted all such direct) 292.65 252.66 T
-0.52 (user identi\336cation, although the user) 90 239.66 P
-0.52 (\325) 248.54 239.66 P
-0.52 (s identity will probably still be available through other means,) 251.6
239.66 P
0.05 (such as rwho and \336nger) 90 226.66 P
0.05 (. It would be a signi\336cant increase in security) 193.54 226.66 P
0.05 (, regardless of what authenti-) 394.37 226.66 P
-0.22 (cation mechanism is used, to dif) 90 213.66 P
-0.22 (ferentiate between a secret login ID and the public user name. The) 230.27
213.66 P
-0.18 (login ID would only be used for authentication purposes \050along with the
password\051, while the user) 90 200.66 P
(name would be used to identify a user publicly) 90 187.66 T
(. This would be a trivial extension to the shadow) 294.95 187.66 T
(password concept, and would be easily implemented on top of the SRA
implementation.) 90 174.66 T
0 12 Q
(7.) 90 146.99 T
(A) 104.4 146.99 T
(vailability) 112.17 146.99 T
2 11 Q
-0.53 (The complete source packages for both TELNET and FTP) 90 128.66 P
-0.53 (, including all necessary client and server) 341.43 128.66 P
(code, \050but not including the Secure RPC code\051, is available on:) 90 115.66 T
(sc.tamu.edu:pub/security/SRA.) 143.57 97.66 T
90 72 522 720 C
108.11 432.99 503.89 695 C
4 10 Q
0 X
0 K
(Client) 179.76 675.3 T
248.9 432.39 363.1 446.39 R
7 X
V
5 8 Q
0 X
(Figure 3.) 248.9 441.05 T
(Basic FTP data \337ow) 288.51 441.05 T
(.) 359.16 441.05 T
4 10 Q
(Server) 405.04 675.36 T
5 9 Q
(Calculate) 172.05 623.65 T
(AUTH SRA) 283.28 662.6 T
383.6 662 388.8 659 383.6 656 383.6 659 4 Y
V
223.2 659 383.6 659 2 L
0.5 H
2 Z
N
161.93 465.79 223.13 670.44 R
N
389.16 467.79 450.36 670.57 R
N
(key pairs) 172.8 611.8 T
228.4 634.4 223.2 637.4 228.4 640.4 228.4 637.4 4 Y
V
228.4 637.4 388.8 637.4 2 L
N
(334 AUTH SRA OK) 266.79 641 T
(Calculate) 401.65 623.59 T
(key pairs) 402.4 611.86 T
383.6 608.63 388.8 605.63 383.6 602.63 383.6 605.63 4 Y
V
223.2 605.63 383.6 605.63 2 L
N
(ADA) 278.86 609.25 T
(T <PKA>) 296.67 609.25 T
228.4 576.3 223.2 579.3 228.4 582.3 228.4 579.3 4 Y
V
228.4 579.3 388.8 579.3 2 L
N
(335 <PKB>) 283.02 582.91 T
(Calculate) 401.82 564.61 T
(common keys) 392.83 554.61 T
(Calculate) 174.34 564.61 T
(common keys) 165.35 552.77 T
383.57 547.42 388.77 544.42 383.57 541.42 383.57 544.42 4 Y
V
223.17 544.42 383.57 544.42 2 L
N
(ADA) 277.84 548.05 T
(T KAB\050U\051) 295.65 548.05 T
228.4 481.3 223.2 484.3 228.4 487.3 228.4 484.3 4 Y
V
228.4 484.3 388.8 484.3 2 L
N
(235 ACCEPT | 535 REJECT) 249.14 487.91 T
383.6 518.61 388.8 515.61 383.6 512.61 383.6 515.61 4 Y
V
223.2 515.61 383.6 515.61 2 L
N
(ADA) 278.12 519.24 T
(T KAB\050P\051) 295.93 519.24 T
90 72 522 720 C
108.11 432.99 503.89 695 R
0.25 H
0 Z
0 X
0 K
N
0 0 612 792 C
FMENDPAGE
%%EndPage: "4" 5
%%Page: "5" 5
612 792 0 FMBEGINPAGE
90 72 522 720 R
7 X
0 K
V
2 11 Q
0 X
(The relevant Secure RPC code is available in:) 90 712.67 T
(ftp.uu.net:networking/rpc/tirpcsrc.tar) 143.57 694.67 T
(.Z,) 305.6 694.67 T
(keyserv/setkey) 144.29 676.67 T
(.c \050routines to calculate common key\051) 208.86 676.67 T
(keyserv/generic.c \050routines to generate public/secret key pair\051) 145 658.67
T
0 12 Q
(8.) 90 631 T
(Refer) 104.4 631 T
(ences) 132.81 631 T
2 11 Q
([1]) 90 612.67 T
-0.56 (Brian A. LaMacchia and Andrew M. Odlyzko. "Computation of Discrete
Logarithms in Prime) 111.6 612.67 P
(Fields", Designs, Codes, and Cryptography) 111.6 599.67 T
(, volume 1, 1991, pp46-62.) 301.21 599.67 T
([2]) 90 581.67 T
(RFC 1057 "RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Speci\336cation, V) 111.6 581.67 T
(ersion 2.",) 405.7 581.67 T
(ftp.uu.net:/inet/rfc/rfc1057.Z) 111.6 568.67 T
FMENDPAGE
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