4.

Contemporary rational actor

theories
Interest in the rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour
was revived both in the UK and the USA during the rise of the
political new right or populist conservatives during the 1970s
and 1980s. The second decade of that time period was to see the
influential emergence of the nothing works (Martinson, 1974)
agenda at the British Home Office which seriously questioned the
effectiveness of rehabilitation proposed by the then dominant
paradigmatic orthodoxy of the predestined actor model of crime
and criminal behaviour as a crime control strategy. This chapter
considers three groups of contemporary rational choice theories that
have come very much to prominence with that revival: (i)
contemporary deterrence theories
(ii) rational choice theories and (iii) routine activities theory.
Contemporary deterrence theories
At the core of contemporary deterrence theories are the principles
of certainty, severity and celerity of punishment, proportionality,
specific and general deterrence (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs,
1975; Wright, 1993). The deterrence doctrine proposes that in order
to deter, punishment must be both swift and certain, the notion of
celerity concerns the swiftness with which sanctions are applied after
the commission of a crime, while certainty refers to the probability
of apprehension and punishment. If the punishment is severe,
certain and swift, people will, it is proposed, rationally calculate
that there is more to be lost than there is to be gained from
committing crime. Moreover, it is argued that certainty is more
effective in deterring crime than severity of punishment. The more
severe the available punishment, the less likely it is to be
applied. On the other hand, the less certain the punishment, the
more severe it will need to be to deter crime (Akers, 1997).
Nucleul teoriilor contemporane ale descurajarii este format din
principiile
certitudinii,
severitatii
si
rapiditatii
pedepsei,
proportionalitatii si descurajarii specific si generale. (Zimring and
Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs, 1975; Wright, 1993)doctrina descurajarii
ppropune ca pentru a descuraja, pedeapsa trebuie sa fie atat rapida si
sigura, notiunea de rapiditate priveste viteza cu care sanctiunile sunt
applicate dupa comiterea unei crime, in timp ce certitudinea se refera
la probailitatea detentiei si pedepsei. Daca pedeapsa este severa,
sigura si rapida, oamenii vor calcula ca au mai multe de pierdut de pe
urma comiterii unei crime. Adesea, este sustinut ca certitudinea este
mai eficienta in descurajarea criminalitatii decat severitatea
pedepsei. Cu cat mai severa este pedeapsa disponibila, cu atat este
mai putin probabil ca fie aplicata. Pe de alta parte, cu cat mai putin

sigura pedeapsa, cu atat mai sever ava trebui sa fie pentru a

descuraja crima. (Akers, 1997)
Deterrence is said to operate in one of two ways. First, in the case
of general deterrence the punishment of offenders by the state is
seen to serve as an example to the general population who will be
frightened into non- participation in criminal behaviour (Zimring
and Hawkins, 1973). Second, in the case of specific deterrence,
it is proposed that the apprehended and punished offender will
refrain from repeat offending because they realise that they are
certain to be caught and severely punished. The ultimate form of
individual deterrence is considered to be the death penalty,
although research evidence on the deterrent effectiveness of
capital punishment has remained ambiguous.
Descurajarea opereaza in doua moduri. Primul, in cazul descurajarii
generale, pedeapsa infractorilor de catre stat este vazuta ca oferind
un exemplu populatiei generale care va speriata si nu va participa la
comportamente criminale. (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973. al doilea,
in cazul descurajarii specific, propune ca infractorul arestat si
pedepsit se va abtine de la a repeat infractiunea pentru ca va realiza
ca este sigur sa fie prins si pedepsit sever. Forma suprema de
descurajare individuala este considerata a fi pedeapsa cu moartea,
desi cerceterile asupra eficientei in prevenirea criminalitatii au avut
rezultate ambigue.
Among the earliest studies of deterrence were examinations of
murder rates in various geographical localities before and after the
abolition of capital punishment. Ehrlich (1975) used a subsequently
much criticised econometric version of rational choice theory to
propose that every execution carried out in the USA deterred seven
or eight other murders. His findings were nevertheless in contrast to
those of studies previously conducted in that country and which had
found that the availability of the death penalty in state legislation
had no effect on the murder rate (Sellin, 1959; Bedau, 1964).
Moreover, following the abolition of capital punishment for murder in
England and Wales in 1965, research suggested no identifiable
impact on the rate of homicide (Beyleveld, 1979; Morris and Blom
Cooper, 1979).
Printre cele mai timpurii studii ale descurajarii s-au gasit
examinarile ratelor omuciderilor in variate zone dupa si inainte de
abolirea pedepsei capitale Ehrlich -1975 a folosit o metoda
econometrica ulterior criticata a teoriei alegerii rationale care a
propus ca pentru fiecare executie sunt prevenite sapte sau opt
omucideri in Statele Unite. Rezultatele sale au fost opuse celor ale
studiilor anterioare si care au descoperit ca prezenta pedepsei
capitale in codurile penale nu are niciun efect asupra ratei
omuciderilor. (Sellin, 1959; Bedau, 1964) mai mult, dupa abolirea
pedepsei capitale in Anglia si Wales, cercetarile nu au identificat
niciun impact asupra ratei omuciderilor. Beyleveld, 1979; Morris and
Blom Cooper, 1979).

It has often been suggested that murder particularly in a

domestic context
is a crime where the offender is highly unlikely to make a rational
choice before committing the act. If that is the case, the potential
consequences will be irrelevant and deterrence is unlikely. In this
context Walker (1985) argues that capital punishment is no more
effective a deterrent than a sentence of life imprisonment.1
We have seen that proponents of the rational actor model assume
that potential offenders calculate the rewards and risks associated
with crime and research supports the suppositions of the right
realists discussed in the previous chapter which suggest that
the likelihood of detection is a more important part of that
calculus than the potential level of punishment (Beyleveld, 1978,
1979). Certainly the chances of being caught in the commission of an
offence by a passing police patrol have been found to be
extremely low in the UK (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981) while the
detection rates for burglary, for example, vary between 9 per cent
and 46 per cent depending on the locality. The extent to which
people believe that they might be caught is therefore probably a
more important variable. Gill and Matthews (1994, see also
Matthews, 1996) conducted a study of convicted bank robbers
and interestingly found that none of their research subjects had
even considered the possibility that they would be caught before
setting out on their criminal enterprises even though all had
previous criminal convictions.
Even if punishment does deter effectively, a number of ethical
objections can be raised to the use of sentences for this purpose.
Beyleveld (1978) suggests that the types of punishment needed to
deter a potential offender will vary substantially between different
people, different crimes and different circumstances. Therefore, in
order to deter crime, it might well be necessary to set sentences at
a level totally out of all proportion to the seriousness of the
offence (Wright, 1982). This is rather at odds with the central
rational choice actor model concept that the punishment should fit
the crime. Moreover, when a particular offender has not been
deterred then he or she must receive the
threatened punishment. The consequences of such punishment may
be simply counterproductive (Wright, 1982).
Chiar daca pedeapsa descurajeaza in mod efficient, numeroase
obiectii etice pot fi ridicate la folosirea sentintelor in acest scop.
Beyleveld 1978 sugereaza ca tipurile de pedepse ce ar trebui sa
descurajeze o infractiune potentiala variaza substantial la diferiti
indivizi, in cazul diferitelor crime si a circumstantelor diferite. De
aceea, pentru a descuraja crimele, ar trebui impuse pedepse la un
nivel total disproportionat cu cel al gravitatii crimei. (Wright, 1982)
aceasta gandire este in contradictie cu conceptul de model al
actorului care face o alegere rationala potrivit caruia pedeapsa ar
trebui sa fie pe masura crimei savarsite. Mai mult, cand un infractor
specific nu a fost descurajat, atunci el sau ea va trebui sa primeasca
pedepasa cu care a fost amenintat. Consecinta unei astfel de pedepse
poate fi foarte usor contraproductiva. (Wright, 1982)

Martin and Webster (1971) have argued that conviction

and
punishment may simply push an individual into a situation where
he or she
has
little to lose from further offending. The
opportunity to live by legitimate means may be reduced and the
individual with previous convictions is pushed towards further
illegitimate activity regardless of the consequences. This is an
argument similar to that proposed by the labelling theorists
working in the victimised actor model tradition that we will
encounter in the third part of this book. Central to that
perspective is the notion that being caught and stigmatised may
lead to an offender becoming committed to further offending
behaviour.
Martin si Webster au sustinut ca o condamnare si pedeapsa asociata
pot impinge individual intr-o situatie in care mai are foarte putine de
pierdut daca va comite alte infractiuni. Oportunitatea de a trai prin
mijloace legitime poate fi redusa si individual cu condamanri anterioare
este impins spre activitati viitoare ilicite, indifferent de consecinte.
Essential pentru aceasta perspectiva este notiunea ca prinderea si
stigmatizarea pot face ca un infractor sa devina implicat in diverse
comportamente criminale pe viitor.
Wright (1982) suggests that the possibility of severe punishment
encourages offenders to try harder to avoid detection and
conviction and this can lead to violent escapes and to time being
wasted by not guilty pleas in court that have no realistic chance of
success. Moreover, child sex offenders who could benefit from
treatment might be deterred from seeking it.
Wright 1982 a sugerat ca posibilitatea pedepsei severe incurajeaza
infractorii sa incerce mai mult sa evite depistarea si condamnarea si
astfel pot sa apara incercari violente de a scapa de urmare si in timp
irosit in curti pentru judecarea recursurilor care nu au sanse realiste
de reusita. Mai mult, pedofilii care ar putea beneficia de tratament
pot fi descurajati de a-l cauta.
The use of punishment as a deterrent is based on the core
rational actor model assumption that people choose to commit
crime. Imposing deterrent sentences on those individuals who
have little or no control over their impulses or who break the law
unwittingly would appear to be morally indefensible although it can
be legitimately argued that deterrence remains a valid option in the
case of intentional calculating offenders (Walker, 1980) although
there remains considerable debate as to the existence of such
individuals. Critics of contemporary deterrence theories focus on
this limited conception of human action on which this perspective
is founded and argue the need to develop a considerably more
sophisticated theory of human behaviour which explores the
external and internal constraints on why people do or do not
engage in criminal activity (see Piliavin et al., 1986; Klepper and
Nagin, 1989; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Matravers, 1999).
folosirea pedepsei ca descurajant este bazata pe
p re s u p un e re a ca o a me ni i a le g co mi te re a u ne i c ri me

mo d e l ul ac to r ul ui ra ti o n al . I m p u ne re a u n e i p e d e p se
nu ar avea niciun efect asupra acestor indivizi care
au prea putin control asupra propiriilor impulsuri sau
ca re in ca lc a le g e a f ar a v oi a lo r s i c a re p a r mo r al
imposibil de apparat desi se poate sugera in mod
legitim ca descurajarea ramane o optiune valida in
c a z u l i n f r a c t o r i l o r c u i n t e n t i i c a l c u l a t e Wa l k e r 1 9 8 0 ,
desi exista o dezbatere considerabila privind existent
unor astfel de indivizi.