Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 6

1

Topic 2: Huygens and Newton walk into a Bar. . .


This essay aims to compare the hypothesis as it was used by both Newton and Huygens. The
analysis comprises three sections: the first two are a general overview of each authors method for
scientific reasoning, particularly, the role played by the hypothesis; the third is a comparison between
these methods, focused on how and to what extent these roles differed. Ultimately, the intent is
to underline the rationalist traits that Huygens embracesevidenced mainly through his use of the
hypothesisand how Newtons rejection of these is a critical step in sciences branching off from
philosophy.
Huygens propounds his method of inquiry in the preface to his Treatise on Light, where he
presents the arguments that justify such a process. The first of these arguments is that scientific
investigation does not enjoy the (mathematical) certainty of geometry, where one begins with fixed
and incontestable Principles (namely, postulates) [Huygens, 163], from which one can prove equally
incontestable propositions (theorems). Instead, in natural philosophy, hypotheses serve as the principles that can only be verified by the conclusions drawn from them (the conclusions being the
experiments, together with the observations)[Huygens, 163]. Such that [when things . . . demonstrated by the Principles that have been assumed correspond perfectly [to the phenomena under
observation] [Huygens, 163, my bold], we can attribute a higher probability to truth of said Principles. As Huygens notes, this often is scarcely less than complete proof [163], but it is the best that
can be achieved. Further, the greater the number of observed phenomena that match the derived
conclusions, the higher the degree of certainty of the Principle, more so when one can imagine
and foresee new phenomena which ought to follow from the hypothesis . . . [and these in fact do]
[Huygens, 163]. It is worth noting the significance of the bolded text above: for Huygens, hypotheses
(or Principles) are first assumed a priori (colloquially, in armchair philosophy fashion); that is, before carrying out any experiments or observations, the hypothesis is grounded purely in intellectual
processes.1 In doing so, Huygens is relying on a less ambitious variation of a core rationalist [tenet],
1
While this is the closer reading (given what is available in the passage), it would seem a bit farfetched to suppose
that he somehow abstracts from ALL previous experience and observations before formulating a hypothesis (more
so when hes formulating a new hypothesis after observations contradicted previous ones). Based on the distinction
between what scientists do, and what they say they do, a more charitable interpretation would be that he doesnt
design experiments or record observations (in rigorous, scientific fashion) to arrive at the Principles initially, but
rather, only to confirm or reject them (again, with the apparent caveat that, after rejecting the first hypothesis through
experimentation, it would seem self-defeating to somehow try to discard these observations before formulating a new
one).

namely, that the world is fully accessible (epistemologically) to the intellect [Heide]. In other words,
while he is not committed to the claim that the world can be known only through the intellect,
his method suggests that the intellect can serve as the starting point for our enquiries about the
world. Stated more figuratively, the hypothesis is the intellectually-erected scaffolding of Huygens
process, serving both as starting point of the inquiry, and as a frameworkexperiments, then, test
for weaknesses, either demolishing a bad hypothesis, or building on top of a good one, to advance
our understanding of the world. In sum, Huygens assumes the hypothesis at the beginning of the
scientific processexclusively or almost exclusively as an intellectual exercisein order to frame the
investigation: once experiments and observations come into play, this hypothesis is either accorded
a greater degree of certaintybased on many confirmed observationsor it is rejected, based on contradictory observations. If it is confirmed by many observations, then he derives new predictions
that ought to follow as well, and if these are also confirmed, Huygens affords it the highest certainty
achievable (according to him) in natural philosophy. With this in mind, Newtons primary criticism,
then, pertains the notion of a hypothesis that is assumed prior to experimentation and observation,
and somehow serves as a starting point/framework for the inquiry.
Newtons method of inquiry is not found in a single text, rather, it must be gleaned from the
Optiks and his correspondence. Because he is rejecting a specific method, and advancing his own,
his account is lengthier and more systematic than Huygens. In general, he conceives of scientific
inquiry as a two step process : first, the method of analysis, and second, the method of composition
[Newton, 164]. This method of analysis also comprises various steps, the first of which consists of
making experiments and observations, and . . . drawing general conclusions from them by induction
[Newton, 164], such that, contra Huygens, the starting point of the inquiry is strictly empirical.
However, like Huygens, Newton acknowledges that these observations by induction [are not] demonstrations of general conclusions, yet [are] the highest evidence that a proposition can have in natural
philosophy [Newton, 164]that is, scientific inquiry cannot achieve a greater degree of certainty
than what is afforded by both repeated experimentation and induction. Similarly, he acknowledges
that this certainty increases by how much the induction is more general, that is, by how many
cases it covers or explains [Newton, 164]. Newton then singles out the hypothesis, which he defines
as a proposition [that is not] a phenomenon, nor deduced from [one], but assumed . . . without
. . . experimental proof [Newton, 165], by affirming that it has no place in experimental philosophy

[Newton, 164]; for him, the concept can only be applied . . . in the explanation of the properties
of things, and not . . . in determining them, since ultimately no [certainty] can be determined . . .
[from the mere possibility of hypotheses] [Newton, 165]. Further, he affirms that no objections can
be admitted but from experiments, or other certain truths [Newton, 164], such that a hypothesis
can never overturn an empirical finding [Newton, 165]. Therefore, in the last step of the method
of analysis (the synthesis), Newton [assumes] the causes discovered [through experimentation and
observation] . . . as principles [the hypothesis], [and from these] [explains] the phenomena proceeding
from them, [thereby] proving [or confirming] the explanations [Newton, 165]. In other words, what
Newton assumes as the Principle is essentially an empirically-derived hypothesis, from which he
posits universal explanations that match the observations. Finally, Newton summarizes this process
in his correspondence to Oldenburg: the best and safest method for philosophizing: inquire diligently into the properties of things, . . . establish those properties by experiments . . . and proceed
. . . to hypotheses for the [explanations] [Newton, 165].
Having laid out both authors methods, one can compare in greater detail how each of them
employs the hypothesis. Before that, however, it is worth sketching out some general contrasts
between them, in order to better frame the comparison. First, the similarities: as seen earlier, both
Newton and Huygens recognize the limitations of empirical endeavorsthat is, they both accept that
in natural philosophy, one does not start with certain principles from which to derive incontestable
truths, like in geometry, for example. Further, they both accord a higher degree of certainty to a
theory that produces numerous confirmed observations, and if any exceptions arise, both accept the
need to revise the original theory (as stated colloquially in class, if any exceptions arise, both of
them go back to the drawing board, rather than make up ad-hoc provisos). Finally, neither of
them take the hypothesis as to include axioms or postulates (a position more clearly expressed by
Newton, but which can be extrapolated from Huygens preface), since such a move would not afford
any explanatory power, nor advance the process of inquiry. Having shown this, however, there are
manifest differences between them, which are nuanced when one considers what takes place beyond
what is in the passages (or, in other words, when one again takes into account the distinction
between what scientists do, and what they say they do). The first and most obvious distinction
is that, for Huygens, hypotheses are simply assumed prior to experimentation and observations
(that is, supported only by the intellect), an action that Newton clearly rebuffs. In Huygens,

then, we see a hybrid rationalist-empiricist approach to natural philosophy, where he derives the
hypothesis or guiding principle a priori (pure rational exercise), but then looks for verification
through experimentation (and, therefore, the senses). As stated earlier, he clings to a more modest
version of the rationalist precept that we can access the world epistemically through the intellect2 ,
specifically, that it can serve as the starting point for our inquiry. Newton rejects this idea, affirming
on several occasions that such an act has no place in natural philosophy, and that we must rely on
the senses and experimentation to even begin to posit hypotheses. However, the distinctions begin
to blur when we consider a typical round (for lack of a better word) of experimentation for either
of them:
Huygens
1. Posits his hypothesis prior to observations or experiments
2. Designs and performs the experiments
(a) If these contradict the hypothesis, he reconsiders it, either modifying or discarding
it completely.
(b) If these confirm the hypothesis, then makes risky predictions (to use the anachronistic
term mentioned in class),
i. If these are also confirmed, then he concludes that the hypothesis is true (or as
true as can be appraised in natural philosophy), and that the hypothesis serves
to explain the phenomena being considered.
3. Repeat as necessary (incorporating in step 1 the lessons from step 2) until he obtains a
working (empirically-verified) hypothesis.
Newton:
1. Designs and performs experiments (recording observations)
2. From these observations, posit a possible explanation (hypothesis)
(a) Carry out more experiments and observations
i. If exceptions arise, then the hypothesis must be modified or rejected
2

Modest in the sense that he clearly doesnt think we can understand the world only through the intellect.

ii. If the hypothesis is further confirmed, then assume that this is the underlying
principle
A. With this assumption, appraise whether it correctly explains the phenomena
under observation (confirming the explanation)
3. Repeat as necessary (incorporating in step 2 the lessons from step 2.i) until he obtains a
working (empirically-verified) hypothesis.

Therefore, it would seem that their methods are not as different as Newton would suggest (when
he rejects the hypothesis so categorically): both processes involve a repeated cycle of comparing
the proposed theory (hypothesis) to the observations, and modifying the former until it corresponds
with, and explains, the latter. They clearly differ in the order in which they carry out their inquiry,
but more fundamentally, in where the hypothesis comes fromthe intellect or the sensesand what
role it plays: whether it frames the starting point of the inquiry, or whether it is limited to explaining
phenomena according to the recorded experiments and observations. In doing so, Newton is drawing
a sharp line between traditional philosophy and natural philosophy, thereby setting the latter on its
way to becoming sciencethat is, a discrete field from philosophy.3

12-02-22

Philosophy of Science

Dr. Holly Andersen

Wilfredo Contreras

301176666
3

The punchline: Huygens and Newton walk into a bar; Huygens says to Newton: I assumed you werent coming.
To which Newton replies: Well, I proved you wrong.

References

References
[Heide]

Heide, Dai. "Class Lecture." 18th Century Philosophy. Simon Fraser University, Burnaby.
20-Feb-2012. Lecture.

[Huygens] Huygens, Christiaan. "Treatise on Light." Trans. Sylvanus P. Thompson Philosophy of


Science: An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc Alspector-Kelly and
Ed. Fritz Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 162-163. Print.
[Newton] Newton, Isaac. "Optiks, 4th edn." Trans. Sylvanus P. Thompson Philosophy of Science:
An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc Alspector-Kelly and Ed. Fritz
Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 164-165. Print.
[Newton] Newton, Isaac. "The Correspondence of Isaac Newton." Trans. Sylvanus P. Thompson Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc
Alspector-Kelly and Ed. Fritz Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 165166. Print.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi