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UST Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (CIVIL LAW)


PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
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Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)

If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said date, subject to the
requirement of publication. The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted.

LA BUAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882, January


27, 2004

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for
its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Taada held,
mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section
1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, finds suppletory application. It is significant
to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988

The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the active
practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in advanced reports and the SCRA.

Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000

The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of the New Civil
Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.

Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985

The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the law as of
the date of its enactment since the courts application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad,

RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)

Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the defamatory words on the
telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment
and affected his business as well as because other people have come to know of said defamatory
words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela.

Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993)

Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to article 21 of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter.

University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000

A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but was later on
prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who fails to
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a students grade, is not
only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.

SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of anothers residence,
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right
to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
only to residences.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING


CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

The concept of unfair competition under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961

It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the abortion of appellees wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code.

Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of marriage license is
enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA 446

Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a non-resident invalidates


the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage

Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day
because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated
under said provisions must be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract and characterized by
exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that
is unbroken.

Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958

The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the marriage license.
Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit,
such irregularity will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the
parties.

Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780. October


16, 2013

A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely
given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA 637

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989

Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001

Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in the Philippines.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005

Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995)

The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as a
ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997)

In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their marriage on May 22,
1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517

In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many military officials. In
view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual
infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577,


February 12, 2014

Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family


Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16

Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less
prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine
Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection
and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause
of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological
incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)

If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,


then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ


G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272

Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a valid defense for the
crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity.

Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code
of the Philippines] shall apply. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parkers whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monicas departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seamans contract and went to London,
a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646

Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of
her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.

Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code

CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08 OCTOBER 2014

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year.

Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321

Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal separation case amounts to
grave abuse of discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is
no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the
husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption.

BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No.
171904 August 7, 2013

The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during
marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged
to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the
property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively
to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63

Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property.
All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of
redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by
right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property.

Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570

The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is
vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is
sold by the owner- spouse.

Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687 SCRA 414

Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior liquidation of
those assets is required.

MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246

Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal
Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired
before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation
and partition of the partnership.

Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1

Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case. The Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay
has no legal effect and is against public policy.

Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.

JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property
acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples
joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut
this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221

Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages
(in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the coownership that exists between common-law spouses.

Cario v. Cario, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license

San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code

SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN


G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014

As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision
governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. In
Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal
partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court
further ruled that the view that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the
husbands consent is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required
are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September
22, 1986, one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986, Leonardo died. Aurora as one
of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate, had the right therefore to
seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of
Leonardo of their hereditary rights.

Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666

Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to
the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,
applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back

Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.

There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code.
If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law

Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40

The family homes exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the same.
Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997)

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT


G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code;
by itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360

A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof.

Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
on the information of a third person.

DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014

An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly recognized their
filiation. However, the child is under no compulsion to use his fathers surname. When Antonio
recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the
surname of Antonio. However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to use the same. The
law uses the word may, which dictates that it is merely permissive.

Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523

In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.

Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447

Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal impediment to marry
each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite
his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,


A.K.A. MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO AND JAYROSE M. CASTRO vs JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO
G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.)

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children
to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.

In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA
98

The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a

judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage
still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.

Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357

A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency of appeal.

De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176

Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and the putative father,
made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity
must first be shown between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to
declare its existence or absence.

Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296

It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the
wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to
the parents say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be
assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this
matter, becomes imperative.

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473

The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident.

Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA 253

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits
according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a
father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.

FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN


D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO
BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.)

The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband
and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man.
However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the
purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by
law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of
burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be
no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

1. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, 14


April 2014

There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.