The eurozone heads for break up

Nouriel Roubini, Financial Times

The muddle-through approach to the eurozone crisis has failed to resolve the
fundamental problems of economic and competitiveness divergence within the union.
If this continues the euro will move towards disorderly debt workouts, and eventually
a break-up of the monetary union itself, as some of the weaker members crash out.
The Economic and Monetary Union never fully satisfied the conditions for an optimal
currency area. Instead its leaders hoped that their lack of monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies would in turn see an acceleration of structural reforms. These,
it was hoped, would see productivity and growth rates converge.
The reality turned out to be different. Paradoxically the halo effect of early interest
rate convergence allowed a greater divergence in fiscal policies. A reckless lack of
discipline in countries such as Greece and Portugal was matched only by the buildup of asset bubbles in others like Spain and Ireland. Structural reforms were delayed,
while wage growth relative to productivity growth diverged. The result was a loss of
competitiveness on the periphery.
All successful monetary unions have eventually been associated with a political and
fiscal union. But European moves toward political union have stalled, while moves
towards fiscal union would require significant federal central revenues, and also the
widespread issuance of euro bonds where the taxes of German (and other core)
taxpayers are not backstopping only their countrys debt but also the debt of the
members of the periphery. Core taxpayers are unlikely to accept this.
Eurozone debt reduction or reprofiling will help to resolve the issue of excessive
debt in some insolvent economies. But it will do nothing to restore economic
convergence, which requires the restoration of competitiveness convergence.
Without this the periphery will simply stagnate.
Here the options are limited. The euro could fall sharply in value towards say
parity with the US dollar, to restore competitiveness to the periphery; but a sharp fall
of the euro is unlikely given the trade strength of Germany and the hawkish policies
of the European Central Bank.
The German route reforms to increase productivity growth and keep a lid on wage
growth will not work either. In the short run such reforms actually tend to reduce
growth and it took more than a decade for Germany to restore its competitiveness, a
horizon that is way too long for periphery economies that need growth soon.
Deflation is a third option, but this is also associated with persistent recession.
Argentina tried this route, but after three years of an ever deepening slump it gave

up, and decided to default and exit its currency board peg. Even if deflation was
achieved, the balance sheet effect would increase the real burden of private and
public debts. All the talk by the ECB and the European Union of an internal
depreciation is thus faulty, while the necessary fiscal austerity still has in the short
run a negative effect on growth.
So given these three options are unlikely, there is really only one other way to restore
competitiveness and growth on the periphery: leave the euro, go back to national
currencies and achieve a massive nominal and real depreciation. After all, in all those
emerging market financial crises that restored growth a move to flexible exchange
rates was necessary and unavoidable on top of official liquidity, austerity and reform
and, in some cases, debt restructuring and reduction.
Of course today the idea of leaving the euro is treated as inconceivable, even in
Athens and Lisbon. Exit would impose big trade losses on the rest of the eurozone,
via major real depreciation and capital losses on the creditor core, in much the same
way as Argentinas pesification of its dollar debt did during its last crisis.
Yet scenarios that are treated as inconceivable today may not be so far-fetched five
years from now, especially if some of the periphery economies stagnate. The
eurozone was glued together by the convergence of low real interest rates sustaining
growth, the hope that reforms could maintain convergence; and the prospect of
eventual fiscal and political union. But now convergence is gone, reform is stalled,
while fiscal and political union is a distant dream.
Debt restructuring will happen. The question is when (sooner or later) and how
(orderly or disorderly). But even debt reduction will not be sufficient to restore
competitiveness and growth. Yet if this cannot be achieved, the option of exiting the
monetary union will become dominant: the benefits of staying in will be lower than the
benefits of exiting, however bumpy or disorderly that exit may end up being.
Nouriel Roubini is chairman of Roubini Global Economics, professor of economics at
the Stern School of Business NYU and co-author of Crisis Economics that has been
recently published in its paperback edition.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011.