To What Extent is Positive Liberty Dangerous?

Isaiah Berlin famously set out two conceptions of liberty: negative and positive.
Negative liberty is primarily concerned with an individuals area of control and
ensures freedom from coercion (Berlin, 1969: 122). Positive freedom concerns the
question of who is to say what I am to do or be, and takes the form of freedom to be
ones own master (Berlin, 1969: 131). Having introduced this distinction between
conceptions of liberty, Berlin went further and outlined the potential dangers of the
positive conception of liberty. This essay will argue that the dangers highlighted by
Berlin are not inherent in the notion of positive liberty as (a) the dangers warned of,
stem from individual philosophers conceptions of the self which can apply to the
negative conception as well as others, (b) that there are inherent benefits in the
notion of positive liberty which are indispensable and (c) that numerous
philosophers have formulated a positive conception of liberty which does not reach
the authoritarian conclusions Berlin feared. Having shown that the dangers predicted
by Berlin are not inherent in the positive conception of liberty, this essay will argue
that there are nevertheless trends, which indicate that positive liberty more often
than not seems to justify coercion. Finally this essay will argue that rationalism or
value monism points positive liberty towards authoritarian conclusions, using the
example of the veil ban in France, but also that a similar conclusion is also possible
under value pluralism.
One could argue that Berlins notion of positive freedom is dangerous, as the concept
of self-mastery has led many philosophers such as Plato and Hegel to conceive of a
higher self that is identified with reason, and a lower self identified with
uncontrolled desires and immediate pleasures (Berlin, 1969: 132). Moreover, Berlin
points out that conceptions of the self can also be conceptually separated into the
individual self, who then constitutes part of the social whole, which is identified as
the true self. Berlin points out that by conceptually defining the self as part of a
collective whole can result in States imposing its collective conception of man on
entire populations. Furthermore, by conceiving of a higher and lower self, Berlin
highlights that it becomes possible to justify coercion when it aims towards a goal such as justice or public health which states can assume its populations would
support should they happen to be more enlightened (Berlin, 1969: 132-133).
Berlin makes it clear, however, that the dangers of positive liberty that have been
outlined are not inherent in the notion of positive liberty but are instead a result of
conceptual analysis of the self. The concept of negative liberty could pose similar
dangers where the self that is to be surrounded by an area of non-interference is no
longer the individual self whose wants and needs are internally conceived, but an
external or ideal self which is driven by reason (Berlin, 1969: 134). Moreover,
whilst the concept of the self has at times been used to justify coercion, such as in
the case of totalitarian dictators of the mid-twentieth century who sought to reform
and improve human nature (Jennings, 2009: 130) its relevance to political theory is
crucial.
W.L Weinstein argues that concept of self-realisation as embodied in the positive
conception of liberty provided a general justification for liberty which in not captured
by the negative conception namely that men are distinctive creatures in the sense
that they are capable of forming their own conceptions of the sort of life they think it

is good and supremely important for them to live. Hence they should be as free as
possible in those things which most matter to the fulfilment of their ideas of a
worthwhile life (Weinstein, 1965: 147). Weinstein captures the idea that the
positive conception of liberty allows us to see liberty as inherently good, rather than
simply instrumentally good in that it protects us from interference. Furthermore,
Weinstein in his critique of positive liberty notes that in talking about liberty in this
sense, one is able to elucidate a number of phenomena and values which surround the
concept, namely the purpose of being free, the power to use ones freedom and the
benefit of using ones freedom effectively (Weinstein, 1965: 152-153). When we talk
about liberty in this way, we avoid seeing liberty as the only value, but rather one of
many values that can lead to human flourishing. Values such as health are seen as
intrinsically connected to freedom as good health allows one to make more effective
use of their freedom, therefore coercion by the state for example in the form of
mandatory vaccinations is able to be seen as increasing freedom, rather than limiting
it.
Moreover, Liberal theorists such as Baruch Spinoza and T.H. Green have presented
versions of positive liberty, which do not reach the same totalitarian conclusions
(Gustavsson, 2014: 268). Spinoza presents a version of positive liberty in which the
concept of the self differs from the higher and lower self of Plato and Hegel. He
argues that human being are part of nature, and governed only by cause and effect.
According to Spinoza, the mind and body are equal parts of one whole, and neither
has primacy over the other. Furthermore, he argues that there is no causal connection
between the mind and the body (West, 1993: 291) He writes, the body surpasses the
knowledge that we have of it, and that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness
that we have fit (Deleuze, 1988: 18) What he means by this is that our brains
generate thoughts before our minds become conscious of them. This view is
supported by a number of neuroscientists such as Patrick Haggard, who argue that
decisions are simply the result of the firing of a nervous impulse in a neuron, which
obeys the classical laws of physics (Haggard, 2008: 938). Under this model, the
traditional theory of free will falls apart. Therefore according to Spinoza we are only
unfree when we are prevented from doing what we are causally determined to will
(West, 1993: 291).
Spinozas work confirms that the notion of positive liberty is not inherently dangerous
as his conception of the self rejects any idea of human essence as implying some
purpose of life common to all human beings (West, 1993: 292) avoiding any
totalitarian accusation. This of course does not entirely remove the danger of the
idea, as certain conceptions of the self are certainly more likely to arise than other. In
fact Berlin does concede that as a matter of history, the positive conception of
liberty has more easily lent itself to dividing man against himself, and therefore
justifying coercion towards the higher self (Berlin, 1969: 134). Gustavsson goes a
step further to argue that once we believe we must coerce others for their own sake
because they are too irrational to see their own good, psychological research suggests
that we are more likely to react to opposing moral views as not only different or
wrong, but irrational (Gustavsson, 2014, 279). One could argue that Berlin tried to
quell this tendency by rejecting the idea of blanket denunciation of values, arguing
that to do so is to deny the potential truth of the values we dismiss, as well as to deny
the dignity of the person who holds them (Gustavsson, 2014: 273). Nevertheless, if

we are to trust historical trends and psychological assessments of human nature, we

must treat the positive conception of liberty with caution.
Another danger that Berlin highlights is that when positive liberty is combined with
a rationalist view of the world and human values, tyranny can be made to look like
liberation (Berlin, 1969: 148). He points to thinkers such as Edmund Burke who have
written that individuals have a right to be restrained in their own interest as the
presumed consent of every rational creature is in unison with the predisposed order of
things (Parkin, 1968: 26) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte who wrote No one has
rights against reason Man is afraid of subordinating his subjectivity to the laws of
reason. He prefers tradition or arbitrariness (Berlin, 1969: 151). Berlin is arguing
that if one takes a rationalist view of human values, namely that reason can delineate
which values we are to consider instrumental to human flourishing, there is the risk of
forcing values on others on the basis that if they were to reason for themselves, they
would eventually reach the same conclusion and therefore it is justified coercing them
towards those values (Gustavsson, 2014: 278).
Gina Gustavsson uses the example of the burqa ban in France to explore some of
these ideas. She notices that a commission in France decided that the burqa was a
manifestation of oppression as it was a veritable denial of the person with regard
to that which makes her the most unique and should therefore be banned, as it would
increase the overall freedom of French citizens. At the same time the commission
acknowledged that the majority of women who wear the full veil assert that they want
to do so (Gustavsson, 2014, 287). This could be an example of positive liberty being
adopted, where the State is appealing to the higher self who would agree to being
coerced, should they be more enlightened. This view is endorsed by Abdennour
Bidar, a Philosopher and specialist in Islam, who when advising on this issue
recommended that only the objective perception of the non-veiled majority should
be taken into consideration, as the subjective perception of veiled woman could not
be trusted (Gustavsson, 2014, 287). In a case such as this, women in France who
wish to wear a veil are prevented from doing so by the state, and according to
philosophers such as Burke and Fichte, they are freer as a result.
This decision betrays a somewhat rationalist view of human values, as it suggests that
there is a single way to conceive of the good life. It rejects the notion that each
individual should determine his or her own values. Gustavsson also argues that
although this decision appears to be based on rational grounds, underlying the
decision is a commitment to the notion of unique self-expression and individuality as
the epitome of humanity which has its roots in German Romanticism (Gustavsson,
2014: 289). In this sense, one could argue that all decisions are made based on
preconceived norms, and therefore each individual must decide for his or her self
which values they should adopt. This is the view taken by Kant, who rejects
rationalism with regard to human values and morality. He considers knowledge to be
constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world, arguing
that it is impossible to extend knowledge to the realm of speculative metaphysics
(Iep.utm.edu). He wrote a capacity for self direction belonged to all men and
therefore there could not be experts with regard to morality. All men, as a result of
their autonomous nature must reason for themselves which values they ought to
consider superior in forming their own lives (Berlin, 1969: 152). Berlins warnings of

the authoritarian conclusions of positive liberty are clearly therefore not as easily
dismissed as some of his critics have suggested (Gustavsson, 2014: 268)
Auguste Comte replied to such criticism of rationalism by questioning why we accept
truth in the sciences, but dismiss the notion of factual claims regarding political truths
and assertions of social ends? For Comte, if science and rational thought can
determine truths about the natural world, why cannot similar reasoning be applied to
determine political truths (Berlin, 1969: 151). One response to this is that in the realm
of morality there can be multiple correct answers, which contradict each other unlike
in a state of nature. Rationalism fails as it incorrectly assumes that a correctly
planned life for all will coincide with full freedom. If however one takes the view
that there can be multiple correct answers to moral questions and that these answers
may contradict, there may be a way around the argument that we can never know
moral truths. Such a line of argument has been put forward by philosopher and
neuroscientist Sam Harris who argues that within the framework of human well being
- which is expounded in a utilitarian sense as being the increase in pleasure and
decrease in pain - science can determine a hierarchy of values (Harris, 2010: 88).
Harris argues that to dismiss the notion of moral truths is to disregard the empirical
fact that there are different levels of human flourishing across different societies.
According to Harris, there are clearly better and worse ways to increase human
flourishing. He does not claim that there is any one right answer to moral questions,
but instead that empirical reasoning can provide answers as to which of two moral
choices is better (Harris, 2010: 37). Harris argument appears to endorse the view
that even when one accepts value pluralism there can still be right and wrong answers
to moral questions. As illustrated above, once the notion of objective truth is
accepted, it becomes increasingly likely that coercion will appear justified.
In conclusion, the positive conception of liberty is not inherently dangerous. The
idea becomes dangerous when coupled with a conception of the self, which
delineates between higher and lower selves, and coercion becomes justified on the
basis that an individuals higher self would agree to such coercion should they be
more enlightened. On the other hand, the positive conception is inherently valuable
as it facilitates thinking about liberty in a way that contributes to human flourishing.
Furthermore, while the positive conception of liberty may not be inherently
dangerous, critics of Berlin have failed to take seriously the very real possible danger
associated with a flexible conception of the self, and by arguing that there are
variations of positive liberty where such outcomes do not occur, fails to take into
account the fact that historically and physiologically the concept has leant towards
coercion in favour of the higher self. Lastly, positive liberty can become
dangerous when coupled with rationalism or value monism as it assumes there to be a
single way to conceive of the good life. Again, such a view has the tendency to point
towards authoritarian conclusions, as illustrated by the case of the veil ban. A similar
outcome is however also possible when positive liberty is coupled with value
pluralism. This highlights the fact that the notion of positive liberty is not inherently
dangerous, yet differences as to the conception of the self and the metaphysical nature
of morality and values can lead to dangerous outcomes, as they provide nuanced
justifications for coercive laws which present themselves as liberating the people they
are imposed on.

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