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How does a left hand differ from a right hand?

By Douglas Grecian
Although simple at first glance, determining the differences between hands is a more
complex problem than we think, since in metaphysics it is common practise to use
these sorts of questions to illustrate more abstract concepts, such as metaphysical
notions of space. So how does one go about answering a question such as this?
For this essay, I will focus on discussing the topic in terms of Absolute and Relational
theories of space. In particular, I will focus on the notion of incongruent counterparts,
as put forward by Kant to advocate Absolute space, and the various responses to his
problem of objects that are mirror images of each, as he used the example of the left
and right hands in his thought experiment. My aim will be to show that while Kant
makes a good case for differences being in terms of Absolute space, his theory is by
no means infallible. In order to do so, I will briefly examine the background behind
Kants arguments and then look at the responses that those who hold that space is
Relational have made.
Before we can properly answer the title question, it would be best to clarify the two
views of space that are involved in this discussion. An absolutist, such as Kant, holds
that space is a real entity in its own right, though imperceptible and immaterial. It is
independent of all objects within it, and will continue to exist even when all objects
within it are removed. Relational theories, on the other hand, maintain that there are
only objects that stand in various relations to each other, nothing else. Space is only
an expression of these relations and does not exist apart from properties and their
relations.
The next point would be to explain what we mean by incongruent counterparts. Kant
uses these to try and prove the validity of Absolute space. They are asymmetrical
objects which are mirror images of each other, hence using hands as an example.
Most importantly for Kant is the fact that the left hand cannot be enclosed in the
same boundaries as the right hand. . .the glove of the one hand cannot be used on the
other (Kant, 1953: 42). The problem for relationists, according to Kant, is that they
are unable to explain how this can occur. Incongruent counterparts have exactly the
same internal spatial relations between their constituent parts and yet remain nontransposable (Casey, 1997: 206). To him, this shows that the real difference between
hands is in their relation to Absolute space, since that is the only way such objects can
exist in space. While this does seem to be a reasonable claim, it would be unwise to
make any conclusion without first looking at the way Kant justifies his challenge to
relationalism.
E.J. Lowe says that a possible counter is that one of the facts of these spatial relations
is certain objects, such as a left hand and an otherwise exactly similar right hand,
cannot be made to coincide simply by moving one of them relative to the other and
without distorting the shape of either- and that is why space can contain incongruent
counterparts (Lowe, 2002: 274). Like him, I think that this is a circular argument that
does not explain anything, though you could argue that this is simply a poor example
of a response.

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A further response along these lines could be that the existence of incongruent
counterparts is one of those facts that do not submit to any explanation since we do
not, and probably never will, have a complete understanding of the way things work
(Lowe, 2002: 274). The assertion is that its questionable whether the arguments put
forward by Kant and other absolutists are able to provide a credible reason where
relationalists cannot. To me, this actually gives credit to Kant since he is trying to
show that the Absolute view is correct because it can explain this problem. However,
that does not automatically mean that it is right, since we have yet to fully examine
his theory for any possible holes.
While the defences that we have just looked at are do not make a good case, neither
do they seem to be attempting to use relationist theory to try and come up with an
explanation. It should be noted that these were conjectured by Lowe, and are not the
main counters that can be used, at least in the context of examining Kant as far as I
can see.
The two main relationist solutions to the problem of left & right hands are divided by
what kind of spatial relations they focus on, being either Externalists or Internalists.
Externalists would contend that the property of handness deals with its relationships
with other objects. Whether a hand is left or right depends on its relationship to these
external properties. If this is the case, then incongruent counterparts exist because of
their particular relationships. This seems to be a reasonable argument in that it gives a
possible explanation for their existence, though it overlooks why there are such
relationships in the first place. Kant disputes this, however, by using a thought
experiment to try and show that a hand is left or right irrespective of the objects
around it.
We might first be asked to first imagine a possible world where the only objects that
exist are two disembodied hands. Here the only way that you would be able to tell one
hand from the other is if there was an actual space they existed in, since the only
spatial relation would be between the two hands. Although at this point you could
counter by saying that if the only two objects that existed were the hands themselves
then it would be hard to judge if there was actual space, this is not the point that Kant
wants to make. In order to illustrate his argument, he proposes that we envisage a
world whose sole material occupant is a single hand which, we suppose, must either
be a left hand or a right hand (Lowe, 2002: 274). At this point we cannot tell which
hand it is since we have no point of reference, but we can suppose that it must be
either a left or right hand. After this has been established, if we imagine that a second
hand is created, then both would either have the same handness or the opposite of it.
The point of this that even a solitary hand, regardless of whether it is left or right,
would seem to be an intrinsic property. Now, we might imagine another possible
world where there is a handless body. When this handless body goes to the other
possible world, it tries to attach to the hand with its right arm. This hand will have
thus always been the right hand, presumably because our right hand is always on our
right arm. For an externalist argument, the problem seems to be that the hand
possesses the property of handness regardless of its relations to other objects. Since
we accept that a hand is either left or right there must be something else to
differentiate them. At the same time, there is some vagueness of whether if you
change the hand from one arm to the other that you change the hand itself, since prior
to being attached it is neither left nor right.

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The other main response from relationists is known as Internalism. This states that the
difference between a left hand and a right hand is due to some difference in the
relations between their internal parts. Kants response to this is that there is no such
difference. The parts of each hand would stand in exactly similar geometrical relations
to one another, such as the relative lengths of thumb and forefinger being the same
length (Lowe, 2002: 275). If we go back to the example of the solitary hand, then we
would be unable to tell its orientation as it were. Here, I must add that I think that
Kant might be starting to overstate his criticism to validate his position, since he
appears to be relying on a very abstract thought experiment to get his point across,
and appears to almost dismiss internal relations as unimportant. On the hand, it does
highlight an issue that relationists seem unable to explain. I should also mention that
internalism faces other problems, such as mobius motion (where space could have a
form of topology), but I do not have the room to discuss them.
Having looked at the two arguments that have been put forward in response to Kants
position, we should now more closely examine what exactly he is saying. Going back
to what has been stated before, he states that hands differ based on their relation to
absolute space. He uses the supposed fact that this is the only proper way to explain
the existence of things like incongruent counterparts. Because space exists as an
independent entity, it is possible to speak of relationships that do not reduce to those
between one material object and another. In this case, handness is not strictly an
intrinsic property since it is one that is in virtue of its orientation to space itself and
at the same time is not a property which something has in virtue of any relation that it
bears to others objects which occupy space (Lowe, 2002: 276). On the basis of this
and his previous denunciations, Kant seems to make a good case for this being the
way to differ a left and right hand. However, there are some issues that have to be
raised.
One is that Kant himself admits that the relation to absolute space that is the sought
for ground of directionality cannot itself be immediately perceived (Casey, 1997:
206). This seems to throw into question some of his validity, since how can he be so
sure of the relation to absolute space if he cannot perceive it. While you can argue that
metaphysics is all about things we cannot perceive, Kant bases his argument on
objects which are visible to our perception (hands) suggesting that there is perhaps a
gap between objects and absolute space, maybe due to the fact it seems to visualise it
in two-dimensions. It also begs the question of whether objects need absolute space to
exist.
The final point that can be made against Kants argument is that he himself does not
seem to stick to it. Much of his later writings focus on presenting space as a
transcendental ideal, where space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer
sense the subjective condition of sensibility (Smart, 1964: 107). The fact that he
switches his position arguably shows that he thought his original stance was flawed.
In conclusion, the way in which a left hand differs from a right hand seems to be best
explained in terms of an absolutist view, if only for the reason that I havent come
across any detailed thought experiments designed to disprove it. I cannot make any
proper comment on transcendental idealism, since I have not familiarised myself with
the theory, though it is a clear indication that this view is not perfect. That is perhaps a
subject best covered in a separate essay.

Bibliography

Casey, E.S., The Fate of Place, (University of California Press, 1997)

Kant, I., Prolegomena, (Manchester University Press, 1953)
Lowe, E.J., A Survey of Metaphysics, (OUP, 2002)
Smart, J.C. (ed), Problems of Space and Time, (Macmillan, 1964)