In The Supreme Court of the United States NANINE MCCOOL, Petitioner, LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD, Respondent On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Louisiana Supreme Court PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI NANINE McCool, pro se P.O. Box 2638 Mandeville, LA 70470-2638 (985) 624-7664QUESTIONS PRESENTED In 1991, this Court decided Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, which considered whether or not an attor- ney who represents a defendant involved with the criminal justice system is entitled to the same First Amendment protections and standard of review — the clear and present danger standard — to which the press was entitled, or could the state penalize an attorney for “classic political speech” upon a lesser showing that the speech was “substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect” on an adjudica- tive proceeding.’ In Gentile, the Court was concerned with the speech of an attorney representing a defend- ant in a criminal proceeding. In upholding the consti- tutionality of the “substantial likelihood” test, the Court explained that the “limitations [on attorney speech] are aimed at two principal evils: (1) com- ments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to preju- dice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found.” The Court noted that “[flew, if any, interests under the Constitution are more funda- mental than the right to a fair trial by ‘impartial jurors,” (emphasis added). Although the Court did * 501 US. 1030 (1991), * Id, at 1076. * Id. at 1075. “Id. citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US. (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 US. 466, 473 (1965) , 350-351QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued not limit the substantial likelihood test to attorneys representing clients in criminal proceedings, the analysis of Gentile necessarily reflected the concerns inherent to criminal proceedings, particularly protect- ing the jury pool from undue influence and ensuring that the matter was resolved based only on infor- mation properly placed before a jury in the court- room. Considerations as to how the test would be applied in a bench trial were not addressed, except in passing, where the Court noted that the “test will rarely be met where the judge is the trier of fact, since trial judges often have access to inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard it.” Although the holding of Gentile found that at- torneys, due to their role as officers of the court, were subject to greater restriction on their First Amend- ment rights than private citizens or the press, Gentile still required that: “When a state regulation impli- cates First Amendment rights, the Court must bal- ance those interests against the State's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question.” The Court also saw the limitations on attorneys’ speech as protective of the justice system, rather than punitive to attorneys. Thus, Gentile stood for the proposition that an attorney's first obligation is to preserving the * Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1077. * Id, at 1075.iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued integrity of the justice system as a whole. “The role of attorneys in the criminal justice system subjects them to fiduciary obligations to the court and the par- ties.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1057. “IA lawyer] is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the ma- chinery of justice, an ‘officer of the court’ in the most compelling sense...” Gentile, id. at 1072, internal citations omitted. “As a lawyer he was an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument of justice.” Id. at 1074 (internal quotations omitted). In this case, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court (LASCT) disbarred the Petitioner, Nanine ‘McCool, based on her comments, almost all contained in social media, which were critical of two judges pre- siding over bench trials. Although the LASCT ration- alized its discipline on findings that McCool had engaged in conduct that was not entitled to First Amendment protections, there is no question that the court disciplined MeCool for speech criticizing the con- duet of specific judges, and based much of its justifica- tion for the harsh discipline on the fact that McCool had posted her comments on the internet and on social media sites while the matter was pending in court and she refused to admit wrongdoing or express remorse. There is little guidance in Gentile or existing ju- risprudence as to what principle evils the limitations on attorney speech should target when considering an attorney’s public comments regarding a pending bench trial that is closed to the public and press byiv QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued virtue of the underlying proceedings. The consideration is further complicated by Gentile’s emphasis on the attorney's role as an officer of the court who has an obligation not to remain silent, as the court below pre- sumed, but to ensure that, as an officer of the court, she acts in conformity with her role as an “instru- ment of justice.” This case presents an opportunity for this Court to address intriguing issues presented by an attorney's use of social media to fulfill her obliga- tion as fiduciary to the courts and the parties. The First Amendment lies at the heart of this case and the tensions between the parties are the same tensions that lay at the heart of this country's inception and continue to shape, for better or worse, the integrity of our republic. The questions presented are: 1, Whether the “substantial likelihood” test in Gentile can be met sufficiently to warrant disci- plining an attorney for criticizing the conduct of judges while they are presiding over bench trials in which the attorney is enrolled and which are closed to the public and the press, when the at- torney’s comments are specifically intended to draw public and peer attention to matters of im- portant public concern directly related to the judge's conduct, and the closed nature of the pro- ceedings contributes to the judges’ ability to deny litigants an opportunity to offer evidence via evi- dentiary hearings and for the judges to conduct ex-parte “conferences” which were not recorded for the record, and issue orders that are not based on proper notice or opportunity to beQUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued heard, all of which contributes to impairing the record of the proceedings in a manner that materially prejudices parties’ rights to appellate review and access to justice, without offending the most fundamental principles of the First Amendment. Whether an attorney can be found to have en- gaged in ex parte communications with judges and disbarred from the practice of law as disci- pline when the communications in question were all made on the attorneys’ social media accounts, blogs, and online petitions, and the judges volun- tarily and deliberately exposed themselves to the communications by specifically seeking them out on the web, and by deliberately eschewing their established office protocols to prevent being ex- posed to ex parte communications from the pub- lic, without violating First Amendments and due process protections per the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, Whether the Louisiana State Supreme Court can summarily hold that the “use of the internet and social media” constitutes a “means prohibited by law” to justify imposing discipline on an attorney for violating Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(a) prohibiting an attorney from seeking to “influ- ence a judge ... by means prohibited by law” without violating the First Amendment and the prohibition against overly vague and overbroad limitations on constitutionally protected conduct and offending the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Nanine McCool is an individual, acting as a pro se litigant.TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED 7 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI... OPINIONS BELOW . STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...... CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. BACKGROUND... . CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO DISCIPLINE... PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..... FINDINGS OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION. I. Review should be granted because the Louisiana Supreme Court has decided an important issue of attorney First Amend- ment rights to freedoms of speech and expression that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, and has ruled in the matter below in a way that conflicts with prior decisions of this Court related to attorney speech and serves to chill at- torney advocacy in favor of protecting the judiciary from criticism..... Page wren neen 3 16 7 17TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Page Il, This Court should grant certiorari be- cause the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ap- plication of the Rules of Professional Conduct to disbar an attorney for her use of social media is in conflict with this Court’s holding in Gentile, impermissibly restricts speech protected by the First Amendment and poses a significant im- pediment to an attorney's primary obliga- tion to act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the justice system as a whole, as explained in Gentile, rather than re- main silent in the face of abuses of power and failures of the system just to avoid criticizing the judiciary as a condition of retaining her license....... 17 IIL, This Court should grant certiorari because the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision below effects an impermissibly vague and overbroad application of Rule of Profes- sional Conduct 3.5(a) that intrudes into protections afforded by the First Amend- ment and creates a chilling effect on valu- able and essential attorney speech. ......... 24 CONCLUSION 32TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Page APPENDIX Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion. opp. 1 Supreme Court of Louisiana News Release .....App. 77 Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board Rec- ommendation....... seonnatnenenasnaneteee APP. 79 Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board Re- Port... - 1 App. 130 Louisiana Supreme Court Denial of Rehear- ing... App. 180TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)... cccon24 Costanza v. Caldwell, 167 So.3d 619 (LA 2015)... a 28, 29 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 US. 1030 (1991). ..-passim Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US. 104 (1972) 25, 26 In re McCool, 15-0284 (La.6/30/15), __ So.3d __, 2015 WL 39726844... on Inre re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) 19 Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ponder, 340 So. 24 134 (La. 1976).. vee NAACP v. Button, 371 LU, 8 415 (1963). 26 Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1732 (2018) cco 28 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 US. 402 (1918)... fee Turner v. Louisiana, 379 US 466 (1965)... ConstituTion U.S. Const. amend. I. U.S. Const. amend. V U.S. Const. amend. XIV... assim.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Srarvres 28 US.C. § 125%(a).... La. RS. 9:361, et seq. La. RS. 18:1816..ccscccccntstneetstenesesed La. RS. 46:2131, et seq eee Cope ARricLes La. C.CP, art. 3945 La. Ch. C. art. 1243, et seq...1 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioner, Joyce Nanine McCool, respectfully pe- titions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, rendered on June 30, 2015, rehearing denied on August 28, 20165. +—___ OPINIONS BELOW A copy of the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, In re McCool, 15-0284 (La.6/30/15), _ So.3d __. 2015 WL 39726844 is included in the Appendix to this Petition for Certiorari at page 1 (hereafter “App.”). A copy of the Recommendations of the Louisi- ana Attorney Disciplinary Board, dated February 10, 2015, is included at App. 79. A copy of the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Counsel Hearing Committee recommendations, dated June 24, 2014, is included at App. 130. A copy of the order of the Louisiana Su- preme Court denying Relator’s motion for rehearing, dated August 28, 2015, is included at App. 180. +. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision on June 30, 2015. Petitioner filed a timely motion for rehearing, which was denied on August 28, 2015. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(a), this Court has juris- diction to review the final decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which permanently disbarred Peti- tioner for activity that falls squarely within the2 purview of the First Amendment guarantee of protec- tion of speech and expression. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED U.S. Const. amend. I: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro- hibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition.” U.S. Const. amend. V: “No person shall be . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due proc- ess of law. ...” US. Const. amend XIV, section 1: “(No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ...” + STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner was an attorney who was admitted to the Louisiana Bar on or about October 6, 2000. The bulk of her practice was dedicated to family law mat- ters, with a particular focus on representing victims of domestic violence and handling high-conflict cus- tody cases where allegations of child abuse by a parent were an issue in the proceedings. Petitioner was disbarred by a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court (LASCT) on June 30, 2015 (rehearing denied August 28, 2015) based on her conduct arising out of3 representation of a client (Raven) in a complex cus- tody case. Prior to her disbarment, Petitioner had no prior history of discipline. BACKGROUND ‘The case that ultimately led to Petitioner's discipline spanned two jurisdictions, Louisiana and Mississippi, and involved a complex child custody case with allegations that Raven's ex-husband (Boyd), and father of their two daughters, was abusing the girls. Petitioner represented Raven in proceedings in Louisiana. Petitioner, who was not licensed to prac- tice law in Mississippi, was never attorney of record in those proceedings, and had no formal connection to the proceedings in Mississippi. Petitioner represented Raven in three distinct, but related, proceedings in Louisiana: 1) In 2008, Petitioner represented Raven in successfully obtain- ing a Protective Order directed to Boyd pursuant to Louisiana's Domestic Abuse Assistance Act, La. B.S. 46:2131, et seq.; 2) In 2011, Petitioner represented Raven and her (second) husband in a petition for intra-family adoption (seeking to adopt the girls subject of the abuse allegations) pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 1243, et seq; 3) In August 2011, Petitioner represented Raven in an “emergency ex parte” peti- tion pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945, seeking a) to have the Louisiana courts exercise temporary emer- gency jurisdiction of the girls under La. RS. 13:1816,4 ‘The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforce- ment Act (UCCJEA, as adopted by Louisiana), and b) relief pursuant to La. R.S. 9:361, et seq., the Post- Separation Family Violence Relief Act (PSFVRA). At all times during Petitioner's representation of Raven in Louisiana, Raven was simultaneously in- volved in child custody litigation with Boyd in Missis- sippi and was represented by Mississippi counsel in those proceedings. The proceedings originated in Mississippi in 2006 upon Raven and Boyd divorcing ‘The initial custody arrangement was entered into in 2006" as a consent agreement where Raven had pri- mary custody of the girls (they lived with her most of the time) and Boyd exercised physical custody with them every other weekend." During the first several months of the initial custody arrangement, the agree- ment worked well, and the parties were amicable, Then in early 2007, during Raven’s regularly sched- uled physical parenting time, the girls described to her a “secret game” they had learned from, and * Because the initial custody determination was entered into in Mississippi, Mississippi became the “home state” pursu- ant to the UCCJEA, and was entitled to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over future child custody matters. * Terminology differs among the states as to how each de- scribes child custody arrangements between parents. The same terms, such as “physical custody” and “visitation” can impute very different legal rights and obligations, depending on the jurisdiction. Terms used in this brief are not intended to be un- derstood according to any particular jurisdiction, unless expressly stated. Otherwise, terms used are intended to best deseribe the actual situation between the parties.5 played with, their father, Boyd, called “wee wees and butts.” Raven managed to record (audio only) part of the girls’ disclosure on her phone, but was unsure of what she was hearing and confused about what to do. A day or so later, the girls again spontaneously began discussing the game. Raven was again able to record most of the conversation, and shortly there- after, took both audio recordings to the police. This act triggered the complex litigation that continues to date in Mississippi and involved multiple proceedings in Louisiana Despite continuous efforts beginning in 2007, by August of 2011, Raven had still not been allowed to present her mounting evidence that Boyd was abus- ing the girls to a court for consideration that would allow her to make a proper record of the proceedings subject to an appeal. The repeated failure of the justice system as a whole to afford her the opportuni- ty to present her evidence in support of the absolutely appropriate relief she sought on behalf of herself and her very young daughters constituted a prolonged, and what appeared to be, a deliberate denial of access to justice by the very agents and officers of the courts who are sworn to provide it ‘McCool’s training and experience as an attorney, coupled with her role as Raven's attorney, provided her a perspective of the proceedings that was denied to the greater public due to the fact that there is no jury trial in custody matters, and the proceedings were sealed to the public. Because of her status as an6 attorney, McCool was particularly credible in filling the void created by the court seal, which allowed the public to assume that the courts were operating as they should, and that the important publie concern related to protecting children from abuse was being effectively served. This, however, was not the case and based on the multiple failures of the judges in both jurisdictions to afford due process and conduct statutorily guaranteed hearings, and their failure to abide by the Rule of Law, once McCool had exhausted every legal means available to have the courts afford justice, except for a pending writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, McCool joined her client in speaking out critically, and loudly, to the public to bring attention to the failure of Judge Amacker and Chancellor Gambrell to afford justice to Raven and her two young daughters.7 CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO DISCIPLINE While the writ was pending before the Louisiana Supreme Court, Petitioner assisted Raven in drafting two online petitions, one through the PetitionSite.com and the other through Change.org.” The petitions stated that Judge Amacker and Chancellor Gambrell had both failed in their duties to afford justice to the girls based on their individual decisions to refuse to consider evidence; afford evidentiary hearings; and/or for failing to adhere to the law and established prin- ciples of evidence and due process. The petition asked the public to sign the petition and invited signatories to contact the judges’ offices directly to relay his or her concern that the judges “look at the evidence and apply the law” before the judges made a decision. The petition reproduced information obtained from both judges’ public websites as to how to properly contact them. It also included the number for the clerk of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was also available through its website. To provide credibility to the pe- tition, the audio files that Raven had recorded of the girls’ initial disclosure were linked to the petition. Petitioner signed the online petitions, promoted them on her Facebook and Twitter accounts, asking others to sign them, and wrote her own article about the proceedings in Mississippi that also promoted the * These sites allow citizens to create a “petition,” which de- scribes in writing an issue or cause they feel strongly about, and then circulate the petition online, seeking signatures and some- times, other kinds of support for the petition.8 petition. Once the LASCT denied the writ application, Petitioner stopped promoting the petition and it was subsequently closed to further signatures because denial of the writ application by the LASCT closed the last opportunity for the courts in Louisiana to address the injustice and misconduct below by means that could actually afford meaningful relief to Raven and her daughters. Petitioner’s blog and the closed petitioners remain accessible online, however. Several months later, Petitioner had reason to file multiple motions to recuse Judge Amacker from specific cases in which she was counsel of record. In three of the five motions Petitioner filed between June of 2012 and January 2013, Petitioner included the same allegation: that Judge Amacker had “volun- tarily and expressly admitted [her] extreme bias and conflict in recusing [herself] in two other cases, which grounds are equally applicable in the case at bar.” ‘This allegation became the foundation for charging Petitioner with having made “false and misleading” statements about Judge Amacker in multiple motions to recuse her, in violation of 8.4(c), “engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrep- resentation.” PROCEDURAL HISTORY Chancellor Gambrell filed a formal complaint against Petitioner in September of 2011, with the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Council (ODC), al- leging that:9 Attorney McCool appears to be disclosing information from a sealed file in violation of the Court's Order. Also she may not be aware, that the signatories to the Peti- tion she is circulating are participating in a conspiracy to intimidate a judicial officer, which is a felony in this state. (Miss. Code Ann. 97-9-5). Chancellor Gambrell’s correspondence also stated that: Judge Dawn Amacker .. . contacted me after she learned of the articles and the Petition. She was upset; as I was that a practicing at- torney would attempt-to use social media in an effort to bypass the courts, The complaint filed by Chancellor Gambrell in- dicated that a copy had been provided to Judge Dawn Amacker, However, Judge Amacker was not identified as a complainant.” ™ As it came out after the formal charges were filed, Judge Amacker had initiated contact with the ODC in October of 2011 ‘and sustained that communication over the course of its investi- gation of Gambrell’s complaint. Judge Amacker's participation in helping the ODC to build a disciplinary case against McCool was never directly disclosed to McCool, in spite of McCool’s inquiries. Although Judge Amacker admitted that she initiated contact with the ODC because she felt it was her duty to provide information she thought was relevant to the ODC’s investigation of Chancel- lor Gambrell’s complaint, she denied that it was ever her intent to file her own complaint against McCool, and in fact, even though some of the formal charges that were ultimately brought against McCool originated in Judge Amacker’s “correspondence” (Continued on following page)10 Petitioner received notice of the complaint in October 2011, and responded timely. She asserted her First Amendment right to publicly criticize Chancel- lor Gambrell and Judge Amacker under the specific facts and circumstances, and denied any intent or desire to intimidate a judicial officer. She pointed out that it was Chancellor Gambrell who was attempting to intimidate and bully Petitioner, and through her, Raven, by issuing a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest in September (2011) that was still outstanding in Mis- sissippi, despite Chancellor Gambrell’s complete lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the Petitioner at any time relevant to the issuance and existence of the warrant." The basis of the warrant to the ODC, none of Judge Amacker’s correspondence was ‘treated as a complaint. It was this hidden conduct by Judge Amacker that led McCool, once she became aware of it, to file multiple motions to recuse Judge Amacker from her cases - not just Raven's — based on Judge Amacker’s apparent, if not admitted, bias, ” ‘The warrant remained outstanding for a year and was only withdrawn by Chancellor Gambrell after Petitioner filed a formal complaint against her with the Mississippi Judiciary Commission. During the year that the warrant was outstanding, Petitioner refrained from driving or visiting Mississippi, which is barely 40 miles east of her and where many aunts, uncles and cousins live. She also stayed away from a family reunion gather- ing in Mississippi that year out of trepidation about driving or being physically present in Mississippi due to the risk, no matter how remote, that she could be arrested. She also experienced some degree of anxiety whenever a deputy appeared at her office to serve her with various process as Petitioner could never be certain if the deputy was there to serve her with process on behalf of a client, or to arrest her on an out of state warrant, (Continued on following page)soe was that Petitioner had released information to the public in violation of an order issued by Chancellor Gambrell in the Mississippi proceedings, to which Petitioner was not a party or counsel of record, re- garding information that was not part of the record in those, or any, proceedings. Petitioner was not prop- erly served with the summons to appear and, in light of Chancellor Gambrell’s overt disregard for the limits of her jurisdiction and judicial authority, peti- tioner chose to not voluntarily submit to Chancellor Gambrell’s court. ‘The ODC filed formal charges against Petitioner on November 4, 2013, and Petitioner received notice of the charges on or about November 6, 2013. The formal charges covered eighteen pages and incorpo- rated numerous statements by Petitioner that had been made on her blog, Facebook, and Twitter ac- counts. It also reproduced the online petitions. The misconduct allegedly arose for having “utilized the internet and social media to disseminate false, mis- leading and/or inflammatory information about [Chan- cellor] Deborah Gambrell and Judge Dawn Amacker.” Additional allegations in the formal charges were During her disciplinary trial, Petitioner was prevented from discussing the fact that she had filed complaints against both Gambrell and Amacker, even though she maintained that the substance of both complaints was material to her defense. Both Gambrell and Amacker used confidentiality of judicial com- plaints as a shield to prevent Petitioner's testimony which Petitioner maintained was also a violation of the First Amend- ment (and likely due process clause).12 that Petitioner had “solicited and encouraged others to make direct contact with these judges in an effort to influence their decisions in pending domestic litigation,” and that Petitioner had also made false and misleading statements in multiple motions to recuse Judge Amacker. Petitioner’s conduct was charged to have violated: Rule 3.5(a) An attorney is prohibited from seeking to influence a judge by means prohibited by law; Rule 3.5(b) An attorney is prohibited from having ex parte communications with a judge during the proceedings; Rule 8.4(a) An attorney is prohibited from violating the Rules of Professional Con- duet, knowingly assisting or inducing another to do so, or doing so through the acts of an- other; Rule 8.4(c) It is misconduct for an at- torney to have engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta- tion; and Rule 8.4(@) It is misconduct for an at- torney to engage in conduct that is contrary to the administration of justice On November 20, 2013, Petitioner filed an an- swer and an exception of vagueness and motion seck- ing to have the ODC more specifically identify which of Petitioner's many statements included in the for- mal charges were alleged to violate the Rules. The13 exception and motion were subsequently denied on December 16, 2013. On February 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery Re- quest, which was also subsequently denied. The hearing on the formal charges took place before the Hearing Committee on February 27, 2014, recessed, and reconvened on March 27, 2014. Counsel Damon S. Manning appeared for the ODC and Peti- tioner was represented by Richard Ducote. There- after, the Hearing Committee issued its report on June 25, 2014, finding that the Petitioner had violat- ed RPC 3.5(a) & (b) and 8.4(a), (¢) & (4). (App. 170- 171). It recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, and that she be required to attend Ethics School. The Committee found that an aggravating factor was Petitioner's failure to express remorse, and cited the following excerpt from her testimony to support its finding: Q (Mr. Manning) Okay. Can you can you cite me a law that says you can take [to] an online campaign to try to get the Judge's to change their mind? A. (Ms. McCool) This is the United States of America. The land of the free. The home of the brave. Cite me a law that says I can't. Q (Mr. Manning) The rules that you are charged with are in the formal charges. A. (Ms. McCool) They do not say that I can't take — I cannot assist a client to craft14 an online petition seeking whatever help she can to protect her children because the legal system absolutely failed her — Q._ (Mr. Manning) Ms. McCool -— A. (Ms. McCool) ~ because the Judge's and the processes (sic) will not follow the law, will not obey the law, but hold us to the letter of the law. (App. 176-177). The Hearing Committee dismissed, without scru- tiny, Petitioner's claim that her speech and conduct were protected by the First Amendment, stating in a footnote that: “This is not a case of free speech. ...” (App. 176, n.28). Petitioner filed a brief in opposition to the Com- mittee’s report on August 4, 2014, with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board (LADB), and then filed a corrected brief in opposition on August 5, 2014, The ODC filed a reply brief on August 27, 2014. Oral argument of this matter was heard on September 4, 2014. Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Tammy Northrup appeared on behalf of the ODC. Petitioner appeared with her attorney Richard Ducote. The LADB issued recommendations to the Louisiana Supreme Court on February 10, 2015. (App. 79). The LADB agreed with the findings of the Hearing Committee in all respects except that it declined to find Petitioner violated Rule 3.5(b) (having ex parte communications with a judge during the proceeding). (App. 122-123, 177). It also gave no merit to Petitioner’s claim that her conduct fell squarely within First Amendment protections.15 Petitioner filed a timely notice of objection to the recommendations of the LADB with the LASCT, and the matter was set for oral argument before the LASCT on May 6, 2015. The court's questions to Petitioner, who appeared on her own behalf, focused primarily on Petitioner's criticisms of the judges. One of the first questions with which she was confronted (posed by Justice Knoll) was, presumably, rhetorical because it asked her to explain what she was think- ing when she criticized the judges.” The Chief Justice asked Petitioner if she planned to continue blogging and if her blogging would be about the LASCT. When Petitioner acknowledged that it was likely, the court was noticeably perturbed. She was repeatedly chas- tised by the court before the gallery and rarely given an opportunity to answer a justice's question before she was interrupted by another question. The court was particularly incensed that Petitioner would not admit that she had done anything wrong or express remorse.” ” Petitioner remembers the question to have been, “What were you thinking, criticizing judges? Don't you know how dan- gerous it is?” © See Justice Crichton's concurring opinion: “but perhaps Respondent's most astounding and egregious action is her complete and utter lack of remorse, and defiance in the face of her impending sanction.” (App. 76).16 FINDINGS OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT ‘The LASCT issued its opinion on June 30, 2015, finding that Petitioner had committed misconduct. It relied on several findings of fact that are not support- ed by the record, and dismissed Petitioner's First Amendment arguments Three justices dissented from the decision with regard to discipline. Two would have imposed a sus- pension of three years. (See Justice Guidry’s and Justice Cannella’s, separately issued opinions, con- curring in part and dissenting in part. (App. 75-76)). Justice Weimer also dissented from the imposi- tion of disbarment, and opined that the cases relied upon by the majority did not support disbarment and that “disbarment is not only disproportionate to the misconduct, but is impermissibly punitive” agreeing with the LADB's analysis. (App. 122-123). Instead, Justice Weimer would have imposed a suspension of a year and a day, all but six months deferred. (App. 73-74). Petitioner timely filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied on August 28, 2015. (App. 180). Justice Weimer would have granted the rehearing. ¢+—___17 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION I. Review should be granted because the Louisiana Supreme Court has decided an important issue of attorney First Amend- ment rights to freedoms of speech and ex- pression that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, and has ruled in the matter below in a way that conflicts with prior decisions of this Court related to attorney speech and serves to chill attorney advocacy in favor of protecting the judici- ary from criticism. Il. This Court should grant certiorari because the Louisiana Supreme Court’s application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to disbar an attorney for her use of social media is in conflict with this Court's holding in Gentile, impermissibly restricts speech protected by the First Amendment and poses a significant impediment to an attorney’s primary obligation to act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the justice system as a whole, as explained in Gen- tile, rather than remain silent in the face of abuses of power and failures of the sys- tem just to avoid criticizing the judiciary as a condition of retaining her license.18 The LASCT ostensibly disciplined McCool for conduct that it determined was not entitled to First Amendment protections, e.g., improper ex parte com- munications; conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud and misrepresentation; and conduct contrary to the administration of justice. McCool asserts howev- cr, that the conduct that the LASCT actually sought to punish was her speech, and in particular, her speech that was critical of the judiciary. McCool points to the gross disparity between the factual findings of the LASCT and the actual facts in the record as support for her contention that the LASCT was intent upon punishing her for being critical of the conduct of specific judges, rather than a concern for “the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the salutary effect it has upon other members of the bar.” Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ponder, 340 So. 2d 134, 148 (La. 1976). The LASCT’s efforts to punish MeCool’s critical speech was also remarked upon in Justice Weimer's partially dissenting opinion, where he stated, “. . . some aspects of Respondent's conduct amounted to constitutionally protected speech, for which [McCool] cannot be sanctioned. Furthermore, I find the majority's sanction of disbarment to be disproportional to Respondent’s misconduct.” (App. 62). He went on to note that “the court’s majority . sanctions the very acts of criticizing judges and inspiring public criticisms toward judges. In so doing, the majority impermissibly sanctions the Respondent19 for engaging in constitutionally protected speech.” (App. 64-65). ‘The LASCT's intent to punish McCool for criticiz- ing judges is also revealed by examining the state- ments that the LASCT found to be sanctionable (App. 139-143, 146-149). They are without exception, innocuous, and none that could remotely be consid- ered as impugning either judge’s character. See In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) It is clear from the LASCT’s opinion that it is not the content of the comments that it condemns, but the context, which is criticism of the judiciary. Justice Knoll, who delivered the opinion of the court, can barely contain her outrage that McCool not only engaged in public criticism of the judiciary, but that she refused to admit any wrong-doing: In aggravation, we found Respondent: (1) acted dishonestly and selfishly, (2) en- gaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, (3) had substantial expe- rience in the practice of law having been admitted to the practice of law since October 2000, and, most importantly, (4) absolutely refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct or show any remorse for her actions. It is this utter lack of remorse that astonished this Court when she appeared before us for oral argument. Her defiant attitude as to the rules of our profession vis-a-vis her First Amendment rights was20 clearly evident in her response to questions posed by several members of the Court. Completely unapologetic for her misconduct, respondent made it abundantly clear she would continue to use social media and blogs to effect her agenda to bring about the chang- es she sought in the underlying cases. Re- spondent will not admit to any wrong doing whatsoever." (App. 56). ™ McCool denies that she was defiant, though admits to expressing some frustration at one moment in the face of the overwhelming incivility and hostility with which the LASCT treated her during oral argument. McCool was barraged with criticisms disguised as questions, but rarely afforded an oppor- tunity to respond before she was interrupted by another Justice. ‘McCool repeatedly asked, politely, to be allowed to finish her response before being interrupted, to no avail. At one point, when McCool again pled for an opportunity to respond to one question before being interrupted by another, the Chief Justice told McCool that when one of them started speaking, she was expected to stop talking and listen. At another point, Justice Guidry likened McCool to a petulant child, and when MeCool expressed her impression, midway through her allotted time that the Court had made up its mind to disbar her, Justice Guidry lambasted her for suggesting that the court would make up its mind without first listening to what she had to say, even though McCool had hardly been allowed to complete a sentence during her allotted time. This all took place before a full gallery, consisting of McCool’s family, friends, supporters, members of the public and a high school class of about twenty teens who were apparently there specifically to hear oral argument in ‘McCool’s case.21 McCool cannot comply with her obligation to be candid with the court if she is expected to express remorse she does not feel, and admit to guilt that she does not accept in order to avoid greater discipline for conduct she does not agree deserves discipline in the first place. Such demands by the courts are antithet- ical to the high value this “sacred profession” pur- ports to place on candor to the tribunal.”® It is the easiest thing in the world for someone who cares little about candor and personal integrity to say whatever is required of her to obtain leniency or avoid punishment. It is another thing to respond with candor without regard for whether the response will be well or ill received by the tribunal before which she stands, and trust only that the tribunal will act according to the facts and evidence before it without embellishing its discipline based on its frus- tration that the candor it demands does not comport with its opinion of what the response ought to be. The LASCT’s decision to disbar McCool is improper not just because the court’s findings and conclusions are wholly unsupported by the record below and are not founded upon the appropriate legal analysis. It is doubly improper because it unjustly punishes MeCool for conforming to the Rules of Professional Conduct, not only through her efforts to expose the misconduct of judges to the public and the various other tribunals and legal professionals that otherwise could not know ™ Crichton, concurring. (App. 75).22 of the conduct of the judges involved because of the closed nature of the proceedings, and the judges’ abil- ity to prevent Raven from creating any kind of record reviewable on appeal, but because the LASCT admits that McCool's candor to the court in denying that she felt any remorse or believed she had violated the Rules was considered to be an aggravating factor in its decision to mete out the harshest punishment available to it: disbarment. The folly of the court’s decision, and further evidence that it was acting to punish McCool for criticizing judges instead of con- cerns about protecting the public, can be found in re- viewing the underlying facts of the cases it relies upon to support disbarring McCool, and comparing the punishment McCool was served with the punish- ment meted out for the misconduct described in those cases, (App. 58-60). See also Justice Weimer’s concur- ring and dissenting opinion. (App. 62-74). Although the LASCT cited extensively from select passages in Gentile, it avoided applying the “substantial likelihood’ test of Gentile, by refusing to acknowledge that the conduct it charged against was purely speech, and by relying on a wooden application of Gentile that presumed it is a per se violation of the Rules for an attorney to make public statements about a pending legal matter. By relying on a me- chanical application of Gentile, the LASCT ignored the reality that a judge presiding over a bench trial exercises significantly more control over the outcome of the proceedings, for better or worse, than she does in a jury trial. Thus, it is much more difficult for23 public comments to materially prejudice the proper administration of justice without complicity of the judge herself or because the judge fails to fulfill her obligation to remain impartial, regardless of any “highly prejudicial” information to which she cannot avoid being exposed in the course of acting in her dual capacity as an administrator of the law and as a trier of fact. This is especially true in child custody proceedings. The LASCT’s analysis also fails because it does not take into account how unlikely, if not outright impossible it would be for McCool to effect the complete suspension of the rules of procedure, which affords limited means by which a matter, previously decided, can be substantively modified by the presiding judge. Even if either or both judges had been moved to acknowledge error, neither could have sua sponte reopened the proceedings and modified their existing rulings ‘The LASCT’s finding that McCool’s “social media blitz” threatened the independence and integrity of the judiciary is pure legal fiction, and wholly shifts the judges’ obligations to be “unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism” per Judicial Canon 3(A)(1), onto McCool. Rather than protect the judiciary from public disdain, the LASCT’s determination to find that McCool’s public exhortations were capable of interfering with Judge Amacker’s and Chancellor Gambrell’s ability to effectively perform their duties imputes to them both “a lack of firmness,24 wisdom, or honor. ...”* The LASCT’s determination to relieve them both from any responsibility for their role in exposing themselves to the “media blitz”” and Judge Amacker’s and Chancellor Gambrell’s eager- ness to shift responsibility to McCool, does little to instill respect in the honor and integrity, much less the impartiality, of the justice system as a whole. See Judge Amacker's testimony. (App. 33-34). Ill. This Court should grant certiorari because the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision below effects an impermissibly vague and overbroad application of Rule of Profes- sional Conduct 3.5(a) that intrudes into protections afforded by the First Amend- ment, and creates a chilling effect on valu- able and essential attorney speech. Although it repeatedly referenced McCool’s public comments regarding a case that was “pending” as a component of the misconduct for which McCool was ™ Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), citing Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 US, 402, 424 (1918), Holmes, J., dissenting. * Chancellor Gambrell testified, and Judge Amacker ad- mitted, that it was Judge Amacker who notified Chancellor Gambrell of the existence of the online petitions, and both tes- tified that they ignored their established protocols for avoiding exposure to ex parte communications through public channels and as a result, proactively exposed themselves to the communi- cations they claimed they found “intimidating.”25 disciplined, McCool was not charged with having violated Rule 3.6 related to trial publicity. To find a basis for disciplining her for conduct that was not implicated by the charges, the LASCT had to get creative. Thus, pursuant to Rule 3.5(a), which prohib- its an attorney from secking to influence a judge by “means prohibited by law,” the LASCT found that her “use of the internet and social media” was a “means prohibited by law” which she was using to attempt to influence the judges’ decisions in the matters pending before them. The LASCT cited no Louisiana law or precedent from any jurisdiction to support its holding, and offered no discussion in support of the finding that “the use of the internet and social media” was a “means prohibited by law.” The holding, on its face, is vague and overbroad, and thus unconstitutional, because it classifies the use of social media, with no further explanation or attempt to define specific types or context of use of the various kinds of social media as “a means prohibited by law.” Instead it deems “the use of the internet and social media” as a whole, a “means prohibited by law” which touches a very broad array of speech indeed. “The overbreadth doctrine applies if an enactment prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.” Gentile, 501 US. at 1077, citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). “A statute may withstand an overbreadth attack only if, as authoritatively con- strued . .. it is not susceptible of application to speech26 that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 124, citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S 415, 433 (1963). “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. “Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor- tunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . ..” A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discrimina- tory application... [Wlhere a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment free- doms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citi- zens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone .. . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. Id. at 108-109; internal quotations and citations omitted.27 The internet and social media are forms of indi- vidual expression and inherently tools used to “influ- ence” all manner of people to do all manner of things, including to join movements for social change; to pro- mote a particular cause; to vote for, or against, a cer- tain candidate; to protest certain acts or inactions of our government; and to criticize the justice system as a whole, as well as the decisions of individual courts and judges. The internet is rich with blogs, journal articles, twitter posts and all manner of expression by the public and members of the Bar and Bench that seek to “influence” in some form or fashion, the opera tions of the justice system or that are critical of the conduct and decisions of judges and courts. The LASCT'’s holding is so vast and so vague that it blankets the entire internet in every circumstance for all time with a subzero frost on all forms of attorney speech Once the veneer of the LASCT’s rationale is peeled away, the record reveals that there is no support for its conclusions that McCool engaged in ex parte communications or made false and misleading state- ments, or engaged in conduct that was contrary to the proper administration of justice. Rather, the LASCT relies on conclusory statements and false logic to con- demn McCool for expressing opinions with which the LASCT disagrees, and used its trusted status to disparage and discredit McCool as punishment for publicly criticizing the judiciary. ‘The disservice the LASCT's decision below ef- fects, not just on McCool, but on the legal profession and the judiciary as a whole, is further demonstrated28 by Justice Knoll’s flagrant and unapologetic dem- onstration of her willingness to hold herself to a different standard that the one to which she would hold McCool. Justice Knoll’s “concurring” opinion in Costanza v. Caldwell, 167 So.3d 619, 621-622 (LA 2015) excoriates this Court for its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, __ US. __, 135 S.Ct. 1732 (2015) without any apparent reservation about the potential disrepute her criticism may cause this Court. However, what is most shocking is that she repeatedly references “attorneys” in a manner that is intended to belittle and disparage this Court by being likened to them. It is a sad day in America when five lawyers beholden to none and appointed for life can rob the people of their democratic process, forcing so-called civil liberties regarding who can marry on all Americans when the issue was decided by the states as solemn expres- sions of the will of the people. I wholeheart- edly disagree and find that, rather than a triumph of constitutionalism, the opinion of these five lawyers is an utter travesty as is my constrained adherence to their “law of the land” enacted not by the will of the American people but by five judicial activists (Id. at p. 2). Thus, barely two weeks after taking “umbrage” with McCool's “artful” and unapologetic reliance on the First Amendment as a defense to engaging in speech that was critical of specific failures of Judge29 Amacker and Chancellor Gambrell to abide by the rule of law, afford due process or consider evidence, Justice Knoll artfully and unapologetically demeans attorneys and this Court simultaneously in exercise of her First Amendment right to criticize the Court's conduct and accuse it of thievery by robbing the American people of the democratic process. Costanza, 167 So.2d 622. The impact of the LASCT’s decision on McCool is without question, profound. However, its impact on the legal profession as a whole is even more profound. ‘The effect of the LASCT’s decision below also has ominous implications for attorneys’ ability to identify what speech is advocacy, and what speech will garner discipline because it constitutes “false and mislead- ing” statements about a judge, when attorneys can be sanctioned for statements included in pleadings as innocuous as “the Court has voluntarily and express- ly admitted its extreme bias and conflict in recusing itself in two other cases,” and “look at the evidence and apply the law before making a decision.” As an email in the record below between Raven and her Mississippi attorney demonstrated, there is already a dangerous tendency for attorneys to back away from taking a stance that may prove to be unpopular with the presiding judge for fear that the judge will take her unhappiness out on the attorney by ruling against him in his other cases. There is ample evi- dence in this record below to show that attorneys have good reason to be concerned. Judicial retaliation against attorneys who resist pressure from judges to settle cases in ways that may be expedient to the30 judge’s docket, but nevertheless are not in the client's best interest, is beyond prevalent in family law cases If the LASCT’s decision in McCool is allowed to stand, it will chill even further an already reluctant Bar’s willingness to take these very difficult - and often cash deficient - cases involving those most vulnerable and deserving of fierce advocacy: victims of domestic violence and child abuse. In many ways, the case below is the perfect storm of all the ways that the justice system, and the judiciary in particular, con- tinue to fail to adequately recognize or understand how the dynamic of domestic violence presents in divorce and custody cases, and how that failure allows perpetrators to distort the judicial process into another means of abusing victims trying to escape the abuse with their children. ‘The proceedings below, starting with Raven's divorce and custody proceedings in Mississippi, to the Louisiana proceedings where she continued to seek a forum to put forth her evidence, to the concerted and calculated efforts of Judge Amacker and Chancellor Gambrell to have Petitioner disciplined, are all ex- amples of what the Louisiana legislature was refer- ring to when it stated, in the preamble to the Post- Separation Family Violence Relief Act (La. R.S. 9:361, et seq.) that: . the problems of family violence do not necessarily cease when the victimized family is legally separated or divorced. In fact, the violence often escalates, and child custody and visitation become the new forum for the continuation of the abuse, Because current31 laws relative to child custody and visitation are based on an assumption that even divore- ing parents are in relatively equal positions of power, and that such parents act in the children’s best interest, these laws often work against the protection of the children and the abused spouse in families with a his- tory of family violence. Consequently, laws designed to act in the children’s best interest, may actually effect a contrary result due to the unique dynamics of family violence. Of course, laws don't “act.” That is just a polite way of saying that police officers act; attorneys act; judges act. Indeed, from beginning to still-not-over, Raven's case is a perfect example, and an all too common one, of what it looks like when the justice system acts, and utterly fails to recognize that it’s failing. Beyond the injustice to McCool personally and professionally, and the chilling effect the decision below cannot help but have on the legal profession as a whole, allowing Petitioner’s discipline to stand un- der the particular facts and circumstances of her case will only add another hurdle that victims of domestic violence and their children face when they turn to the justice system seeking to escape abuse, +32 CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court should grant the petition for certiorari and accept the case for plenary review. Respectfully submitted, Nantne McCoo, pro se P.O, Box 2638 Mandeville, LA 70470-2638 (985) 624-7664App. 1 06/30/15 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NO, 2015-B-0284 IN RE: JOYCE NANINE MCCOOL ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING KNOLL, Justice* This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (‘ODC”) against respondent, Joyce Nanine McCool, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana. UNDERLYING FACTS The underlying facts of this case are rather com- plex. By way of background, respondent was friends with Raven Skye Boyd Maurer (“Raven”). Following Raven's divorce in 2006, she and her former husband were involved in a bitter child custody dispute. Raven accused her ex-husband of sexually abusing their two young daughters, H. and Z.,’ and unsuccessfully * Retired Judge James L. Cannella, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Hughes, J., recused. * Respondent, a Mandeville attorney, is 52 years of age and was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 2000. * The children’s names have been redacted from the record of this matter and only their initials are used to protect and maintain their privacy. All phone numbers and addresses for social media and internet sites have been redacted as well to further ensure their privacy.App. 2 sought to terminate his parental rights in proceed- ings pending in Mississippi before Judge Deborah Gambrell.’ Respondent is not admitted to the Missis- sippi Bar and was not admitted pro hac vice in Ra- ven’s Mississippi case, but she did offer assistance to Raven as a friend. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition in St. Tammany Parish on behalf of Raven's new husband, who sought to adopt H. and Z. The presiding judge, Judge Dawn Amacker, stayed the intrafamily adop- tion proceedings pending resolution of the Mississippi matter. Judge Amacker also declined to exercise sub- ject matter jurisdiction in response to a motion for emergency custody filed by respondent on Raven's behalf, After Judge Amacker issued her ruling declin- ing to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, respondent filed a writ application with the First Cireuit Court of Appeal, which was denied.‘ On August 31, 2011, this Court likewise denied writs. Maurer v. Boyd, 11-1787 (La.8/31/11), 68 So.3d 517 Unhappy with the various rulings made by Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and believing those rulings were legally wrong, respondent drafted an online petition entitled “Justice for [H] and [Z]” which * To date, no law enforcement agency or court has found any merit to the serious allegations made against Raven's former husband, * In denying Raven's writ application, the court of appeal, with a panel composed of Judges Guidry, Pettigrew, and Welch, stated: “[oln the showing made, we find no error.”App. 3 she and Raven posted on the internet at change.org, along with a photo of the two girls. With regard to the Mississippi proceeding before Judge Gambrell, the online petition stated: ‘To Judge Deborah Gambrell, we, the under- signed, ask that you renounce jurisdiction in this matter to the Louisiana court because the children have lived exclusively in Louisi- ana for the past three years. Their schools, teachers, physicians, therapists, little sister and brother and the vast majority of signiti- cant contacts are now in Louisiana. There is also an adoption proceeding pending in Loui- siana over which Louisiana has jurisdiction and in the interest of judicial economy, and the best interest of the girls, Louisiana is the more appropriate forum to oversee ensure [sic] the “best interest” of the girls are pro- tected. If you refuse to relinquish jurisdiction to Louisiana, we insist that you remove the Guardian Ad Litem currently assigned to the case, and replace him with one that has the proper training and experience in investigat- ing allegations of child sexual abuse in cus- tody proceedings. We further insist that, in keeping [with] S.G. v. D.C, 13 So.3d 269 (Miss. 2009), you specifically define the Guardian Ad Litem’s role in the suit; require the new Guardian Ad Litem [to] prepare a written report; require that the report be shared with all parties prior to a hearing; that all proceeding be conducted on the rec- ord, with advance notice and opportunity to be heard, and that an evidentiary hearing beApp. 4 conducted to review the allegations of child sexual abuse, and that no visitation be al- lowed until you have seen all of the evidence. As to Judge Amacker and the Louisiana proceed- ings, the petition stated: ‘To Judge Amacker, we, the undersigned, in- sist that you withdraw the unlawful stay of the adoption proceedings currently pend- ing in your court, and, in accordance with La.Ch.C. art. 1253, a hearing be set with all due speed to allow the girls’ stepfather to show why it is in the girls’ best interest that they be adopted by him, thereby terminating all parental rights of the girls’ biological fa- ther. Respondent re-posted the online petition on her blog site and in online articles she authored, one of which again included a photo of the two girls. She provided contact information for the judges’ offices and this Court, and added comments in which she solicited and encouraged others to express their feelings to the judges and this Court about the pend- ing cases: In spite of overwhelming evidence that the girls have been abused by their father, the judge in Mississippi, Judge Deborah Gambrell, of the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, refuses to even look at the evidence, and has now ordered the girls be sent to unsupervised visitation with their father.App. 5 Judge Dawn Amacker, in the 22nd JDC, Di- vision L, for the Parish of St. Tammany in Louisiana also refused to protect the girls, even though she has the power and authority to protect them. RM now has an application to the LA supreme court, asking that it order Judge Amacker to protect the children, Insist that Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell do their jobs! If you want more info, go to [website] and read the writ appli- cation to the LA supreme court. Please sign the petition, circulate it to all of your friends and families and call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Monday, Au- gust 15 to ask why they won't follow the law and protect these children. Let them know you're watching and expect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe! Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls [phone number]. [Alsk about the writ pend- ing that was filed by attorney Nanine ‘McCool on Friday, August 12, 2011. Let's turn this around and be [H's] hero. Please sign the Care2 petition and continue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwilling to afford (H] and [Z] simple justice. You can sign the petition and lend your voice to this cause here. Or, you can contactApp. 6 directly. Contact information is: [provided contact information for the judges]. In response to the postings made by respondent, on August 14, 2011 - two days prior to a hearing in Mississippi on Raven’s motion for contempt and to terminate her former husband's parental rights — Judge Gambrell’s staff received an e-mail from Heather Lyons, a signer of the online petition. Ms Lyons stated she lived and voted in Forrest County, Mississippi, and she would “be paying attention” to Raven's case “due to the fact that Judge Gambrell refused to hear evidence of abuse in the case of little girls who are likely being molested by their father. She has an obligation to protect our most vulnerable children. Please do not let them down judge!” A copy of the online petition and comments thereto was then filed with the Marion County Chan- cery Clerk of Court's Office (“Marion County Court”) and faxed directly to Judge Amacker’s office in Loui- siana, apparently by Raven or her mother. On August 22, 2011, Judge Amacker had her administrative as- sistant return the petition to respondent with in- structions respondent caution her client against ex parte communications with the judge. Undaunted, respondent continued her online and social media campaign, further disseminating the sexual abuse allegations and even going so far as to link the audio recordings in which Raven and herApp. 7 children discussed the alleged abuse.’ Respondent also stated (falsely) that no judge had ever heard these recordings because Judge Gambrell refused to allow the recordings into evidence and Judge Amacker refused to conduct a hearing: Listen to their 1st disclosure to Raven: [link to recording] and a day later, their second: {link to recording] Now consider that no judge has ever heard those recordings. Why? Because for 4.5 years, the judges have simply refuse [sic] to do so. On August 16, 2011, Judge Deborah Gambrell in the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, once again refused to admit all of Raven's evidence, including these recordings, and ordered that [H] and (Z| have visits with their father in the house where they both report having been molested by their father in the past. Judge Dawn Amacker in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany in Louisiana is also refusing to hear any evi- dence or to protect [H] and [Z], even though * Pursuant to a September 2, 2008 Agreed Judgment in the Mississippi case, the parties agreed and were ordered not to disclose any audio or video recordings of the minor children to anyone except counsel of record and the court, and not to make said recordings available to anyone except the appropriate in- vestigatory agencies at their request. Respondent argues the Agreed Judgment does not bind her because she is not a party to the Mississippi proceeding, or counsel in the proceeding, or even an attorney licensed to practice law in MississippiApp. 8 the law requires her to have a hearing and to take evidence. ‘Their dad keeps calling them liars and say- ing that their mom is making them say it. All their mom wants is for a judge to look at ALL the evidence and THEN decide who to be- lieve. Don’t you think Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker should look at the evidence before they make [H] and [Z] go back to their father’s house where there is no one to pro- tect them except the person they are most afraid of? [H] still loves her daddy. She just wants him to stop doing what he is doing to her. She does not feel safe with him alone. She said as much in her journal, but Judge Gambrell re~ fused to allow it as evidence and Judge Amacker just ignored her. Sign our petition telling the judges that there can be no justice for [H] and [2], or any child, if the law and evidence is ignored. Tell them they must look at the evidence before they make a decision that will affect the rest of [H] and [Z's lives. Ask yourself, what if these were your daughters? Have questions want to do more to help? Email us at [address] and someone will re- spond within 24 hours. Want to see more, go to [website] and read the writ submitted to the Louisiana Supreme Court on August 12, 2011.App. 9 Horrified? Call the judges and let them know: [contact information provided] Respondent also used her personal Twitter ac- count to promote the online petition and to otherwise draw attention to the audio recordings and the man- ner in which the judges were handling the cases. On August 16, 2011, the day of the Mississippi hearing, respondent tweeted 30 messages about the case and petition, including: I realize most of u think the courts care about kids but too often there's no walk to go with the talk: [link to online petition]. Shouldn't judges base decisions about kids on evidenee?: [link to online petition]. GIMME GIMME GIMME Evidence! Want some? I got it. Think u can convince a judge to look at it? Sign this petition: [link to online petition] Judges are supposed to know shit about the law .. . aren’t they. And like evidence and shit? Due process? [link to online petition] Tam SO going 2 have 2 change jobs after this ! I'm risking sanctions by the LA supreme court; u could be a HUGE help. The very next day, she tweeted: “Make judges protect [H] and [Z] from abuse by their father!: [link to online petition].” On August 24, 2011, respondent tweeted a local investigative news organization should “focus ur lensApp. 10 on Y Judge Amacker won't protect these girls...” and “ask Judge Amacker why she won't listen.” Re- spondent also provided links to the audio recordings and the online petition in numerous tweets, asking various national news/media outlets and celebrities from Dateline to Oprah inquire “why 2 girls can't get a judge to listen to this.” Another tweet said, “Judge Gambrell at it again - turned a 4 YO child over to a validated abuser - PLEASE TELL ME WHAT IT WILL TAKE FOR EVERYON [sic] TO SAY ‘ENOUGH’” ‘These online articles and postings by respondent contain numerous false, misleading, and inflamma- tory statements about the manner in which Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker were handling the pending cases, But respondent denies any responsi- bility for these misstatements, contending these were “Raven's perceptions of what had happened” and respondent was simply “helping [Raven] get her voice out there.” For example: + In an article entitled “Make Louisiana and Mississippi Courts Protect HB and ZBV" it is alleged the children were being sexually abused by their father and in spite of “overwhelming” evidence, Judge Gambrell “refuses to even look at the ev- idence, and has now ordered the girls be sent to unsupervised visitation with their father.” This allegation refers to journals written by H., which Judge Gambrell ex- cluded from evidence. Judge Gambrell gave reasons for her evidentiary rulings,App. 11 but in any event, she did not simply “re- fuse” to look at the evidence. As for Judge Amacker, it is alleged she “refused to protect the girls, even though she has the power and authority to protect them.” Judge Amacker did not refuse to protect the minor children, but rather, she stayed proceedings in Louisiana be- cause related proceedings were already pending in Mississippi In an article entitled “Justice for [H] and (ZI,” it was alleged the children were being sexually abused by their father, and the children's mother had evidence of the abuse, including an audio record- ing and video evidence, but this evidence “was excluded from consideration on one legal technicality or another” by Judge Gambrell. Once again, Judge Gambrell’s evidentiary rulings were not arbitrary or capricious. She gave reasons for her evi- dentiary rulings and did not simply “re- fuse” to look at the evidence. In a posting on her online blog, respon dent linked to audio recordings of the minor children speaking to their mother about alleged sexual abuse by their fa- ther, contrary to the September 2, 2008 Agreed Judgment in the Mississippi pro- ceedings. See supra, note 5. Respondent's blog stated no judge had ever heard the recordings because “for 4.5 years, the judges have simply refuse [sic] to do so, On August 16, 2011, Judge DeborahApp. 12 Gambrell in the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi once again refused to admit all of Raven's evidence, includ- ing these recordings, and ordered that (H] and [Z] have visits with their father in the house where they both report having been molested by their father in the past.” However, respondent later acknowledged the audio recordings were not offered into evidence at the August 16, 2011 hearing. In fact, the audio re- cordings were not even brought to court that day. Furthermore, the audio record- ings have never been offered into evi- dence in any proceeding before Judge Gambrell. In the same blog, respondent stated Judge Amacker “is also refusing to hear any evidence or to protect [H] and [Z], even though the law requires her to have a hearing and to take evi- dence.” However, Judge Amacker did not refuse to have a hearing; she declined to exercise jurisdiction because related do- mestic proceedings were already pending in Mississippi. Judge Amacker’s ruling was upheld when both the court of ap- peal and this Court denied writs. Maurer, supra. Subsequently, respondent filed motions to recuse Judge Amacker in two matters unrelated to Raven's case. In response, Judge Amacker signed orders stat- ing she was “voluntarily recusfing herself] due to the possibility that the judge may be called as a witness” in disciplinary proceedings against respondent, “andApp. 13 out of an abundance of caution and to avoid the ap- pearance of impropriety.” Notwithstanding the judge's stated reasons for her recusal, respondent filed two more motions for recusal in which she stated Judge Amacker had “voluntarily and expressly admitted ther] extreme bias and conflict in recusing herself] in several other cases, which grounds are equally appli- cable in the case at bar.” [Emphasis added.] Respon- dent testified this was not an untruthful statement because in her view, the mere fact Judge Amacker had voluntarily recused herself was an express ad- mission by Judge Amacker of bias against her. She also noted Judge Amacker had not denied any of the allegations respondent made in the motions to recuse, nor did Judge Amacker impose sanctions against her or file a disciplinary complaint against her. These facts further reinforced respondent's view Judge Amacker had admitted being biased against her. On September 14, 2011, Judge Gambrell signed an order commanding respondent to appear before the Marion County Court on October 5, 2011, to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court by disclosing information from a “sealed” record. Re- spondent received a copy of the notice of the contempt hearing by regular United States mail; however, she did not appear, contending she was not properly served and the Mississippi court did not have juris- diction over her. On October 6, 2011, Judge Gambrell signed an order holding respondent in contempt of court. In October 2012, Judge Gambrell rescinded the order of contempt because “service of process wasApp. 14 insufficient ... and though violations of this Court's order relating to disclosure of audio transcriptions may have taken place, the Court is without authority to hold said Joyce Nanine McCool in contempt of this Court.” In January 2013, Judge Gambrell sua sponte recused herself from further action in Raven’s case “in accordance with the Mississippi Code of Judicial Con- duet Canon 3 and to avoid the appearance of impro- priety or bias.” DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS In September 2011, Judge Gambrell filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. Judge Amacker also provided information in connection with the ODC’s investigation. In May 2014, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging her conduct as set forth above violated Rules 3.5(a) (a lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge by means prohibited by law), 3.5(b) (a lawyer shall not communicate ex parte with a judge during the pro- ceeding), 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another), 8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta- tion), and 8.4(d) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to the admin- istration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Con- duct.App. 15 Respondent answered the formal charges by de- nying any misconduct and asserting her actions are protected by the First Amendment. In her pre- hearing memorandum, respondent admitted she “did implore the electorate to communicate accountability to its elected judges” and “asked publically [sic] elected judges to ‘look at the evidence,’ ‘protect chil- dren,’ and ‘apply the law,” but she denied this con- stituted ethical misconduct. Respondent also filed an exception of vagueness and a motion for more specific allegations of misconduct. The ODC opposed the ex- ception and motion, arguing the formal charges give respondent fair and adequate notice of the alleged misconduct. Following a telephone conference con- ducted on December 11, 2013, the chair of the hearing committee denied the exception and motion On January 10, 2014, respondent directed dis- covery to the ODC seeking a listing of each and every specific act or omission, which the ODC alleged to constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the date of each and every such act or omis- sion, and the specific Rule purportedly violated by each such act or omission. The ODC responded to the discovery request, but refused to provide any addi- tional information, noting the chair’s previous ruling denying the exception of vagueness and the motion for more specific allegations of misconduct. Respond- ent then filed a motion to compel the ODC to provide the requested information. Following a telephone con- ference conducted on February 11, 2014, the chair de- nied the motion to compel. Consequently, respondentApp. 16 filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, seeking to compel the ODC to provide more specific details of the alleged misconduct set forth in the formal charges. She also sought a stay of the hearing on the formal charges set for February 27, 2014. We denied respondent's writ and her request for a stay on February 21, 2014. In re: McCool, 14-0366 (La. 2/21/14), 133 So.3d 669 (Hughes, J., recused). Formal Hearing ‘The hearing committee conducted a two-day hearing on February 27, 2014, and March 27, 2014 Therein, the ODC called Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell to testify before the committee. Respondent testified on her own behalf and was cross-examined by the ODC. During her testimony, respondent re- peatedly denied she violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Instead, she suggested her conduct was justified by what the judges had done in the under- lying cases and in the interest of protecting the minor children: Q. What does the law say, if anything, you can do after [the Supreme Court denies writs]? I mean you've exhausted what the law allows you to do. What is your recourse then under the law? A. Weep for the children, Q. Okay. Can you cite me a law that says you can take to an online campaign to try to get the Judge’s [sic] to change their mind?App. 17 A. This is the United States of America. ‘The land of the free. The home of the brave. Cite me a law that says I can't. Q. The rules that you are charged with are in the formal charges. A. They do not say that I can't take ~ I can- not assist a client to craft an online petition seeking whatever help she can to protect her children because the legal system absolutely failed her — Q_ Ms. MeCool — A. — because the Judge's [sic] and the pro- cesses will not follow the law, will not obey the law, but hold us to the letter of the law. Hearing Committee Report After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made factual findings generally consistent with the facts set forth above. Based on these facts, the com- mittee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as follows: Rules 3.5(a), 3.5(b), and 8.4(a) - Respondent used the internet, an online petition, and social media to spread information, some of which was false, mislead- ing, and inflammatory, about Judge Gambrell’s and Judge Amacker’s handling of and rulings in pending litigation. Respondent circulated contact informa- tion for Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and so- licited and encouraged others to make direct, ex parteApp. 18 contact with the judges to express their feelings about the pending cases, and attempted to influence the outcome of the pending cases. The clear intent of re- spondent’s online campaign was an attempt to influ- ence the judges’ future rulings in the respective cases, and to do so through improper ex parte communica- tion directed at the judges. Rule 8.4(c) - Respondent disseminated false, mis- leading, and inflammatory information on the inter- net and through social media about Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and their handling of these pend- ing domestic proceedings. She also instructed others to sign and circulate an online petition, and to call the judges and let them know they are “watching” them and are “horrified” by their rulings. Finally, respondent made blatantly false statements about Judge Amacker in multiple motions to recuse. Rule 8.4(d) — Respondent used the internet and social media in an effort to influence Judge Gambrell's and Judge Amacker’s future rulings in pending litigation. Respondent's conduct threatened the integrity and independence of the court and was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. Respondent also used her Twitter account to publish tweets linking the audio recordings of the minor children discussing alleged sexual abuse; to publish false, misleading, and inflammatory information about Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker; and to promote the online petition, all of which was designed to intimidate and influence the judges’ future rulings in the underlying proceedings.App. 19 The committee determined respondent violated a duty owed to the public and the legal system. She acted knowingly, if not intentionally. She caused actual and potential harm by threatening the inde- pendence and integrity of the judicial system, and causing the judges concern for their personal safety and well-being. The applicable baseline sanctions, therefore, range from suspension to disbarment. In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 2000). In mitigation, the committee found respondent has no prior disciplinary record. Considering this Court’s prior jurisprudence ad- dressing similar misconduct, the committee recom- mended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The committee fur- ther recommended respondent be required to attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School (‘Ethics School”) and assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding. Respondent filed a brief with the disciplinary board objecting to the hearing committee's report and recommendation.App. 20 Disciplinary Board Recommendation After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee's factual findings are sup- ported by the record and are not manifestly erro- neous. Based on these facts, the board agreed the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduet to the facts, except the board declined to find respondent engaged in ex parte communications with a judge, in violation of Rule 3.5(b). The board rea- soned respondent did not have direct contact with either Judge Gambrell or Judge Amacker, and thus, no violation of Rule 3.5(b) occurred. Nevertheless, by circulating contact information for the judges and soliciting non-lawyer members of the public to make direct contact with the judges regarding a matter pending before them, respondent encouraged the public to do what she is forbidden to do by Rule 3.5(b). As such, she violated Rule 8.4(a) by attempt- ing to communicate with Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker “through the acts of another.” By her own admission, respondent was unhappy with the decisions rendered in the matters she was litigating. After her legal options were exhausted, she decided to launch a social media campaign to influ- ence the presiding judges. Consequently, respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, spearheaded a social media blitz in an attempt to influence the judiciary. The board determined respondent violated duties owed to the public and the legal system by mak- ing false, misleading, and inflammatory statementsApp. 21 about two judges. She did so as part of a pattern of conduct intended to influence the judges’ future rulings in pending litigation. Considering the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), the board determined the baseline sanc- tion is suspension, In aggravation, the board found a dishonest. or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple of- fenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the prac- tice of law. In mitigation, the board found respondent has no prior disciplinary record. After further considering respondent's miscon- duet in light of this Court's prior jurisprudence, the board adopted the committee's recommendation re- spondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, required to attend Ethies School, and assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding. Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b). DISCUSSION Bar disciplinary matters come within the exclu- sive original jurisdiction of this Court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record toApp. 22 determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. La. Sup. Ct. R. XIX, §11(G); In re: Banks, 09-1212, p. 10 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57, 63. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee's factual findings. Banks, 09-1212 at p. 10, 18 So.3d at 63; see also In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714. At the outset, we note the ODC’s formal charges in this case are somewhat confusing. Rather than separating out the allegations and rule violations into multiple counts, the ODC chose to combine all the factual allegations into a single count spanning eight- een pages. In an effort to clarify the matter, we have divided the allegations into three broad categories: (1) improper ex parte communications; (2) dissemina- tion of false and misleading information; and (3) con- duct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We will address each category in turn. Improper Ex Parte Communication ‘The ODC's allegations in this area relate to respondent's use of the internet and social media to disseminate information about the manner in which Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker handled the child custody and visitation cases at issue, in an apparent attempt to marshal public opinion against these judges and attention from this Court. AccordingApp. 23 to the ODC, this conduct violated Rules 3.5(a) and (b) and Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.5 provides: A lawyer shall not: (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospec- tive juror or other official by means pro- hibited by law; (b) communicate ex parte with such a per- son during the proceeding unless autho- rized to do so by law or court order; Rule 8.4(a) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Pro- fessional Conduct, knowingly assist or in- duce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another. ‘The ODC alleges respondent violated these rules by using “the internet and social media to elicit outrage in the general public and to encourage others to make direct contact with judges in an effort to influence their handling of pending cases.” Respon- dent, however, takes the position her comments were only intended to encourage the public to remind the judges to do justice in this case by listening to the evidence and applying the law. Nonetheless, the hear- ing committee made a finding of fact that respon- dent's clear intent was to influence the judges’ future rulings in this case through ex parte communication directed specifically at the judges. In support, theApp. 24 committee cited the following examples of respon- dent’s actions: * Please sign the petition, circulate it to all of your friends and families and call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Monday, August 15 to ask why they won't follow the law and protect these children, Let them know you're watching and expect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe! * Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls? [phone number] [A]sk about the writ pending that was filed by attor- ney Nanine McCool on Friday, August 12, 2011 + Let's turn this around and be [H’s] hero Please sign the Care? petition and con- tinue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwilling to afford [H] and [Zi simple justice. * You can sign the petition and lend your voice to this cause here. Or, you can ontact directly. Contact information is: [provided contact information for the judges and their staff'] + Sign our petition telling the judges that there can be no justice for [H] and [Z, or any child, if the law and evidence is ig- nored. Tell them they must look at theApp. 25 evidence before they make a decision that will affect the rest of [H] and [Z's] lives. Ask yourself, what if these were your daughters? ... Horrified? Call the judges and let them know. We agree the examples clearly and convincingly establish respondent solicited the public to contact the presiding judges and this Court. Although re- spondent asserts “the admonitions in the petitions did nothing other than ensure that both parties would receive the same treatment — a hearing based on the law and evidence,” the evidence shows she used the internet and social media to solicit and encourage others to make direct, ex parte contact with Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker, and this Court in an effort to influence their and our decisions in sealed, pending domestic litigations. Moreover, when the petition was printed and faxed to the Marion County Court and Judge Amacker’s office, it became ex parte communication between the judiciary and all signatories just as if it were a signed letter. And the first signatory on both printed petitions was respondent: “1. Nanine MeCool Lacombe, LA.” Although not directly responsible for its delivery, respondent, by signing the petition, “lent her voice to the cause” along with the rest of the signatories, making the petition her own and, in turn, communi- cating directly to the judges and this Court, in its entirety:App. 26 LA Supreme Court; Judge Dawn Amacker; Judge Deborah Gambrell We, the undersigned, insist that you ensure that the two little girls who are the subject of the case [], pending in the 22nd JDC, St. Tammany Parish Louisiana, and the case [], pending in the Chancery Court of Marion County Mississippi, are afforded all legal protections, including a full evidentiary hear- ing, to ensure that they are protected from abuse. ‘To the Louisiana Supreme Court, we, the undersigned, ask that you issue emergency writs, ordering the courts below to exercise emergency jurisdiction over the two small girls until, based on all the evidence availa- ble, it is established by clear and convincing evidence, that the little girls subject to these proceedings are being protected from further abuse, including ordering the Hon. Dawn Amacker, Judge, Division L, 22nd JDC, Par- ish of St. Tammany, to lift the unlawful stay of the adoption proceedings and to set an ev- identiary hearing at all due speed, allowing the girls’ stepfather to show why it is in the girls’ best interest that he be allowed to adopt them. To Judge Amacker, we, the undersigned, in- sist that you withdraw the unlawful stay of the adoption proceedings currently pending in your court, and, in accordance with La.Ch.C. art. 1253, a hearing be set with all due speed to allow the girls’ stepfather toApp. 27 show why it is in the girls’ best interest that they be adopted by him, thereby terminating all parental rights of the girls’ biological fa- ther. ‘To Judge Deborah Gambrell, we, the under- signed, ask that you renounce jurisdiction in this matter to the Louisiana court because the children have lived exclusively in Louisi- ana for the past three years. Their schools, teachers, physicians, therapists, little sister and brother and the vast majority of signifi- cant contacts are now in Louisiana. There is also an adoption proceeding pending in Loui- siana over which Louisiana has jurisdiction and in the interest of judicial economy, and the best interest of the girls, Louisiana is the more appropriate forum to oversee ensure [sic] the “best interest” of the girls are pro- tected. If you refuse to relinquish jurisdiction to Louisiana, we insist that you remove the Guardian Ad Litem currently assigned to the case, and replace him with one that has the proper training and experience in investigat- ing allegations of child sexual abuse in cus- tody proceedings. We further insist that, in keeping [with] S.G. v. D.C. 13 So.3d 269 (Miss. 2009), you specifically define the Guardian Ad Litem’s role in the suit; require the new Guardian Ad Litem [to] prepare a written report; require that the report be shared with all parties prior to a hearing; that all proceedings be conducted on the rec- ord, with advance notice and opportunity to be heard, and that an evidentiary hearing be conducted to review the allegations of childApp. 28 sexual abuse, and that no visitation be al- lowed until you have seen all of the evidence. Thank you for your consideration and for protecting HB and ZB! This petition is not just a communication from the electorate to its elected judges to “look at the evidence,” “protect children,” and “apply the law,” it is a directive asking and insisting the judges and this Court: * issue emergency writs * order] lower courts below exercise emergency jurisdiction * order! ] [Judge] Amacker to lift the un- lawful stay + set... a hearing at all due speed + withdraw the unlawful stay + terminat[e] all parental rights of the girls’ biological father * renounce jurisdiction + remove the Guardian Ad Litem + replace [the Guardian Ad Litem] * define the Guardian Ad Litem’s role in the suit + require the new Guardian Ad Litem pre- pare a written report * conduct all proceedings . . . on the recordApp. 29 * conduct an evidentiary hearing ... to review the allegations of child sexual abuse + disallow visitation ... until [the judge] hals] seen all of the evidence By its very language, the petition implores the judges to review/see “ALL” the evidence irrespective of the rules of evidence and the judges’ discretionary gate- keeping function conferred therein and likewise sets forth in explicit detail the specific manner in which the petitioners want the judges and this Court to “apply” and “follow” the law - essentially a quest for mob justice or rather “trial by internet.” Respondent claims her postings are not ex parte communication because first and foremost we encourage people to draw their own conclusions. We gave them the information, we gave them the evidence and we said form your own opinion, and then if you feel strongly about it share your opin- ion, your independent opinion of that with the judge.... But I don’t consider it an ex parte communication unless I told all those people this is what you need to tell them, and I didn't. However, the postings belie her depiction and speak for themselves: * Insist that Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell do their jobs!App. 30 * Call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell to ask why they won't follow the law and protect these children. * Let them know you're watching and ex- pect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe! * Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls. * Continue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwilling to afford [H] and [Z] simple justice. * Tell] the judges that there can be no justice for [H] and [Z], or any child, if the law and evidence is ignored. + Tell them they must look at the evidence before they make a decision that will af- fect the rest of [H] and [Z's] lives. + Ask Judge Amacker why she won't listen Just as in the petition, respondent gives explicit di- rectives to the public on how to voice “concern” and “horror” to the presiding judges. As to this Court, respondent repeatedly admitted she sought to bring this case to our attention through the elicited phone calls because this Court is a “policy court”:App. 31 Q. And while the writ was pending at the Supreme Court you encouraged people to call them also? A. Yes, To let them know that they were concerned because it’s a Policy Court. Q Do you still think that’s appropriate conduct today for an attorney to encourage people to contact a Court and ask them and voice their opinions about pending cases? A. To-yes. Ido. Q. Okay. And do you think it's perfectly okay, even today, for you to encourage that and to solicit that? A. Yes. They're elected officials, They are responsible — they are responsive and re- sponsible to the people they serve, And if they don’t know that people aren't concerned = The Supreme Court is a Policy Court. It re- sponds to things that they believe are im- portant social trends. So, yes, I do believe it’s important that the Supreme Court be aware that this is an important issue for people in ‘the community. And the number that was provided is the Clerk of Court's number. We also note the petition was drafted and posted on more than one internet site when the matter was pending before this Court on writs and just days before Judge Gambrell held her first hearing in the custody matter in Mississippi on August 16, 2011. The pleas to “call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Monday,App. 32 August 15 to ask why they won't follow the law and protect these children” and “call the Louisiana Su- preme Court ... and ask about the writ pending that was filed by [respondent]” were made, therefore, for the sole purpose of improperly influencing the courts’ future rulings to gain a tactical advantage in the pending underlying litigation. In her sworn state- ment, respondent even explained: I guess I see judges as public officials. If I understand this correctly they’re elected both in Mississippi and Louisiana. They answer to the public. The public has a right to tell them how they feel. And I guess — oh boy, I'm get- ting on a soap box now, when the judicial — when it comes to the judiciary they have such incredible immunity that they somehow feel like they don't have to answer to the public. And I feel strongly that particularly when it comes to family law that hearing from people about what's going on is a part of what will make them better judges As the record reveals, one of the signatories, Heather Lyons, not only emailed Judge Gambell on August 14, 2011 — just two days before the August 16, 2011 hearing — she also apparently called Judge Gambell at home, “[alecusing [her] of being a person who supports child predators or whatever.” Judge Amacker testified her office received “hundreds” of calls regarding the petitions, while Judge Gambell testified she even mentioned on the record in the August 16, 2011 hearing “that numerous people were calling and that they should not do that.” BothApp. 33 viewed the petition as an attempt to threaten, intimi- date, and/or harass them into handling the case in the manner the petitioners wanted, and they both felt threatened. Specifically, Judge Gambell explained: Q. Judge, did you receive any calls or view anything in the petition or these comments that we've looked at already that ever gave you any cause for concern for your personal safety? A. Yes, sir. The kind of work that we do in this court places you in a situation where somebody is going to win most of time and somebody's going to lose.... So that con- cerned me that all these people are being told to call me. You could easily Google map me; find out where I am and it really — I was really concerned because I had just gotten into the case and before I could even do what I needed to do, I was being harassed by phone calls and then this Twitter and all this other stuff. It did not make sense to me, but I was concerned about my safety. When asked a similar question regarding whether she had personally received any telephone calls, Judge Amacker responded: Let me see if I can break that down just to be accurate. I - no. We have things put in place at our offices that no one ever gets to me as the Judge without it first being vetted through usually my secretary and my staff attorney. So if there's ex-parte communica- tions that come in, and we get a lot in FamilyApp. 34 Court. You get a lot of angry people and peo- ple calling in and it happens. Those never get to the Judge. So I can’t tell you who called, what they said, these types of things of who called in. I can say that hundreds of members of the public and attorneys have stopped by or called to let us know this was on the internet out of concern; out of concern for us. They just wanted to let my staff know or me know. Stop me on the street, in the hallway, what- ever, out of concern and horror - the horri- fied was the public and the attorneys that saw this. And still are. Reviewing all the evidence, we conclude the telephone calls, the email, and the faxed petitions constitute prohibited ex parte communication induced and/or encouraged by respondent. Coupled with her social media postings, we further conclude respon- dent’s online activity amounted to a viral campaign to influence and intimidate the judiciary, including this Court, in pending, sealed domestic litigations by means prohibited by law and through the actions of others. Accordingly, we find the evidence clearly and convincingly shows respondent's conduct in this regard violated Rules 3.5(a) and (b) and Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Dissemination of False and Misleading Information The ODC alleges respondent “disseminated false, misleading and/or inflammatory information throughApp. 35 the internet and social media about Judge Deborah Gambrell and Judge Dawn Amacker in pending cases wherein Respondent was counsel of record and/or had a personal interest.” It further alleges respondent “also made false and misleading statements in multi- ple motions to recuse Judge Amacker.” The ODC concludes these actions violate Rule 8.4(c). Rule 8.4(c) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (©) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. In finding respondent violated this rule, the hear- ing committee made several specific factual findings: (1) Respondent stated Judge Gambrell ig- nored “overwhelming evidence” of abuse and “refuses to even look at the evi- dence, and has now ordered the girls be sent to unsupervised visitation with their father.” The committee found re- spondent's statement was a “gross mis- characterization” of the facts. (2) Respondent stated Judge Amacker “in Louisiana also refused to protect the girls, even though she has the power and authority to protect them...” The com- mittee found this statement was false and inflammatory, as Judge Amacker did not refuse to protect the children, but in- stead stayed the Louisiana proceedings on the ground related proceedings were already pending in MississippiApp. 36 (3) Respondent posted audio recordings of the minor children purportedly talking about abuse and stated that on August 16, 2011, Judge Gambrell “once again re- fused to admit all of Raven’s evidence, including these recordings, and ordered that [H] and [Z] have visits with their father in the house where they both re- port having been molested by their fa- ther in the past.” The committee found this statement was clearly false, as the tapes were not offered into evidence on August 16, 2011; therefore, Judge Gambrell could not have “refused to ad- mit” them. (4) Respondent stated, “Judge _ Dawn Amacker in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany in Louisiana is also refusing to hear any evidence or to protect [H] and [Z], even though the law requires her to have a hearing and to take evidence.” The com- mittee found this statement was false, because Judge Amacker had stayed the Louisiana proceedings in light of the Mississippi proceeding. (5) Respondent stated the Louisiana court (Judge Amacker presiding) “has volun- tarily and expressly admitted its ex- treme bias and conflict in recusing itself in two other cases, which grounds are equally applicable in the case at bar.” ‘The committee found this statement was false, as Judge Amacker’s judgmentApp. 37 stated, “[tlhe Court hereby voluntarily recuses itself due to the possibility that the judge may be called as a witness in the proceedings referenced by counsel, and out of an abundance of caution and to avoid the appearance of impropriety.” In her brief, respondent takes the position she did not make any knowingly false statements. While respondent acknowledges she may have made some factual mistakes, such as with regard to the admis- sion of the audio tapes, she claims this does not amount to making an intentionally false statement. She further contends her characterization of the judges’ actions in this case was not false, but simply based on her subjective analysis of their actions. However, we find the record evidence supports the ODC’s charges in this regard. Respondent's online posting and twitter feeds are littered with misrepre- sentations and outright false statements. Although she claims they were not made intentionally, respon- dent even concedes to the misrepresentations. More- over, even after learning of the “mistakes” through her own review of the underlying records, respondent made no attempt to remedy them, but merely took the position they were her client's subject view of the proceedings, raising the level of her continuous posting and twitter conduct from a simple mischarac- terization into a knowing and arguably intentional dissemination of false information. This is particularly true regarding the judges’ “refusal” to “hear,” “view,” or “admit” evidence, namely the audio recordings,App. 38 which were never offered into evidence at any pro- ceeding before either Judge Gambrell or Judge Amacker. Regarding the recusal notices, the signed orders of recusal contain no express admissions of “extreme bias.” Respondent attempts to excuse her statements as merely her subjective interpretation of Judge Amacker's action in recusing herself, arguing the recusal itself is an expression of bias. Moreover, she styles her motion to recuse a pleading, casting Judge Amacker as the adverse party, and argues that by not outright denying the allegations therein, Judge Amacker essentially admitted to the extreme bias. Rather than an answer, however, Judge Amacker's recusal is an order of the court, and as well estab- lished, those matters not expressly granted in a judgment or order of a court are considered denied. M.J. Farms, Lid. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 12 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 26 (relief sought presumed denied when judgment silent as to claim or demand). Accordingly, we find the evidence clearly and convine- ingly shows respondent’s repeated false statements concerning Judge Amacker’s “expressly admitted extreme bias” were not mere misrepresentations, but false statements knowingly and intentionally made. Accordingly, we find the evidence clearly and convine- ingly shows a violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.App. 39 Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice Lastly, the ODC alleges respondent's overall conduct — utilizing the internet and social media both in an attempt to influence the judges and to expedite achievement of her goals in the case — was prejudicial to the administration of justice and violated Rule 8.4(d). Rule 8.4(d) provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In determining respondent violated this rule, the hearing committee found: Respondent used the internet and social me- dia in an effort to influence Judge Gambrell’s and Judge Amacker's future rulings in pend- ing litigation. Respondent's conduct threat- ened the independence and integrity of the court and was clearly prejudicial to the ad- ministration of justice. Respondent also used her Twitter account to publish multiple tweets linking the audio re- cordings of the minor children discussing alleged sexual abuse; to publish false, mis- leading and inflammatory information about Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker, and to promote the online petition, all of which was designed to intimidate and influence the judges’ future rulings in the underlying pro- ceedings.App. 40 Respondent knowingly if not intentionally embarked on a campaign using internet, social media and ex parte communication specifically designed to intimidate and to influence the judges’ future rulings in pend ing litigation. Her online campaign to influ- ence judges in pending litigation threatened the independence and integrity of the judici- ary. Respondent's conduct also caused the judges concern for their personal safety. In her brief, respondent asserts there is no evidence any of her statements were intended to be intimidat- ing or threatening to the judges. Rather, she claims her statements were within the scope of the First Amendment and were intended to “encourage the public, to extoll their elected judges to do justice, lis- ten to the evidence, apply the law, and protect chil- dren.” ‘We disagree and take strong exception to respon- dent's artful attempt to use the First Amendment as a shield against her clearly and convincingly proven ethical misconduct. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991): It is unquestionable that in the court- room itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to “free speech” an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal. Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1, 8, 72App. 41 S.Ct. 451, 454, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (criminal trial); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 69 S.Ct. 425, 93 L.Ed, 569 (1949) (civil trial), Even outside the courtroom, a majority of the Court in two separate opinions in the case of In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), observed that lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical re- strictions on speech to which an ordinary cit- izen would not be. There, the Court had before it an order affirming the suspension of an attorney from practice because of her at- tack on the fairness and impartiality of a judge. The plurality opinion, which found the discipline improper, concluded that the com- ments had not in fact impugned the judge's integrity. Justice Stewart, who provided the fifth vote for reversal of the sanction, said in his separate opinion that he could not join any possible “intimation that a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from even-handed dis- cipline for proven unethical conduct.” Id., at 646, 79 S.Ct., at 1388. He said that “folbedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.” Id., at 646-647, 79 S.Ct, at 1388-1389, The four dissenting Justices who would have sus- tained the discipline said: “Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too has a constitutional freedom of utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their ad- ministration of justice. But a lawyerApp. 42 actively participating in a trial, par- ticularly an emotionally charged criminal prosecution, is not merely a person and not even merely a law- yer. “He is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the court’ in the most compelling sense.” Id., at 666, 668, 79 S.Ct, at 1398, 1399 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, J.) Likewise, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, where the defendant's conviction was overturned be- cause extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity had denied the defendant a fair trial, we held that a new trial was a remedy for such pub- licity, but “we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will pre- vent the prejudice at its inception. ‘The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial out- side interferences. Neither prosecu- tors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforce- ment officers coming under the ju- risdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function.App. 43 Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U.S., at 363, 86 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasis added). We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 US. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 LEd.2d 683 (1976), and the cases which preceded it. Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that sys- tem in regulating their speech as well as their conduct. As noted by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Pres which was joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, “lals officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the ac- cused or that will obstruct the fair admin- istration of justice.” Id., at 601, n. 27, 96App. 44 S.Ct., at 2823, n, 27. Because lawyers have special access to information through dis- covery and client communications, their ex- trajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since law- yers’ statements are likely to be received as especially authoritative. See, eg., In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 627, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (1982) (statements by attorneys of record re- lating to the case “are likely to be considered knowledgeable, reliable and true” because of attorneys’ unique access to information); Jn re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 656, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J.1982) (attorneys’ role as advocates gives them “extraordinary power to under- mine or destroy the efficacy of the criminal justice system”). We agree with the majority of the States that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071-73, 111 S.Ct. at 2743-44, Applying this reasoning herein, respondent, as an officer of the court, is held to a higher standard than a non-lawyer member of the public. As we stated in the matter of In re: Thomas, 10-0593, p. 11 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d 248, 255: An attorney is trained at law, has taken an oath, assumes a position of public trust and holds himself out to the public as being fit and capable of handling its funds andApp. 45 problems. The attorney has assumed a posi- tion of responsibility to the law itself and any disregard for the law is more serious than a breach by a layman or non-lawyer. He is an officer of the Court. By holding the privilege of a law license, respon- dent, along with all members of the bar, is expected to act accordingly. This is particularly so when a lawyer is actively participating in a trial, particularly an emotionally charged child custody proceeding. Re- spondent in this instance “is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer. [She] is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the court’ in the most compelling sense.” See Gentile, supra. And as such, her “[olbedience to ethical precepts require{d| abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally pro- tected speech,” to preserve the integrity and inde- pendence of the judicial system. Id. ‘The appropriate method for challenging a judge's decisions and evidentiary rulings, as respondent even conceded, is through the writ and appeal process, not by starting a social media blitz to influence the judges’ and this Court’s rulings in pending matters and then claiming immunity from discipline through the First Amendment. Rather than protected speech, the evidence clearly and convincingly shows respondent's online and social media campaign was nothing more than an orchestrated effort to inflame the public sensibility for the sole purpose of influencing this Court and theApp. 46 judges presiding over the pending litigation. As such it most assuredly threatened the independence and integrity of the courts in the underlying sealed do- mestic matters. Moreover, the testimony irrefutably establishes both presiding judges perceived the cam- paign as a threat to their personal security and as an attempt to intimidate and harass them into ruling as the petitioners wanted. We also find the ultimate result of the viral blitz was the recusal of both judges from the underlying domestic cases as well as other cases involving re- spondent as counsel. As Judge Gambrell testified, to which Judge Amacker would agree: A Judge is a human being also and it is very difficult for me to feel that I am exercis- ing my integrity and being independent when I'm being constantly barraged by alle- gations that are just completely false. It is very difficult for a Judge to make decisions without knowing that all of this intimidation and harassment is out there. It is insulting to me as an — well, I prac- ticed law for 30 years. I'm a mother of six daughters. It would have been better for [re- spondent] just to drive across the state line and come sit in the court and actually see what was being done. As an advocate for the children or whatever as opposed to making these malicious attacks to the point — I think it was designed to run me from the case. In- timidate me to the point that I felt that there was no way to be fair or impartialApp. 47 ‘That's basically what it did. I tried - I've never been one to run away from doing what I've been called to do, but this was just more than I could bear. I have a family like every- body else and it just would not stop. My — I wanted to stop it at the Show Cause hearing so that I could just look at everybody and say look, this is not how we do this. Give me a chance to look at this and let everybody have access to the court system. But everybody just went on their own tears and it took away my ability to really do anything with the case. Though not as blatantly offensive as the blitzing itself, this result nevertheless prejudiced the admin- istration of justice by causing undue delays in nu- merous time sensitive matters, some of which these judges had presided over for a long period of time. Therefore, we find respondent's overall conduct in this regard was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(4) Accordingly, having found the ODC has proven by clear and convincing evidence respondent's con- duct violated Rule 3.5(a) and (b) and Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d), we must determine the appropriate sanc- tions. Sanctions In determining a sanction, we are mindful disci- plinary proceedings are not primarily to punish the lawyer, but rather are designed to maintain highApp. 48 standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future miscon- duct. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173, 1177-78 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seri- ousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520, 524 (La. 1984) Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(C) states, in imposing a sanction after a finding of law- yer misconduct, this Court shall consider four facto (1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the le- gal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, negligently; (3) the amount of actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or miti- gating factors. As required, we turn now to a consideration of each factor. Violated Duties As the hearing committee and disciplinary board both found, there is no question respondent’s miscon- duct violated a duty to the legal system, as well as the public. More importantly, we find her misconductApp. 49 also violated a duty to the children in the underlying domestic litigation. In child custody and abuse cases, our courts are extremely cognizant of the need to protect the identity and privacy of the children and their best interest is always at the forefront of any litigation involving their welfare. State ex rel. S.M.W., 00-327, p. 21 (La. 2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1223, 1238 (‘primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best interest for the child”); La. Civ. Code art. 131 (custody awarded “in accordance with the best interest of the child”); Kieffer v. Heriard, 221 La, 151, 160, 58 So.2d 836, 839 (1952) (“well estab- lished that the paramount consideration ... is the welfare and best interest of the child”). This is why such cases are often sealed as the litigations herein were, one of which was sealed at the request of re- spondent. With that being said, we take umbrage with respondent's online and social media activity that not only released the names of these children, but linked their audio conversations with their mother detailing their abuse allegations and posted their faces on the world wide web for anyone to see, We find very telling in this regard the following discussion respondent had with ODC counsel in her sworn statement: Q. And so part of the concern is in now in Louisiana in a knowingly sealed matter be- cause you are the one who asked it be sealed, Tassume it was granted and was sealed, that now in the public arena you're discussing and complaining about those very proceed- ings which are sealed.App. 50 A. Well, I guess my understanding of seal- ing records is that you would be sealing the sensitive evidence or information in the rec- ord, not the fact that the record exists itself. So we never and I would not allow the draw- ings that were submitted as part of that rec- ord to be made part of the social - Q Okay. A. -you know, — Q So the drawings and none of the ex- cerpts from the journal, none of that was ever — A. No. Q. - linked or attached or images uploaded and connected with any of the social media sites? A. No, absolutely not. Q Okay. A. They've very compelling images but I be- lieve they belong to H. So I wouldn't — didn't want to do that to her. We agree, but would also extend respondent's reason- ing and concerns to the children's audio recordings, their photos, and their names, some of which are still accessible even today. In her misguided attempt to protect the children, respondent intentionally facili- tated their exposure, breaching what we would con- sider one of the greatest duties owed by an attorneyApp. 51 in a domestic litigation involving minor children and allegations of sexual abuse. Intentional, Knowing, Negligent Action The ABA Standards define the terms intent, knowledge, and negligence. Intent is defined as “the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a partic- ular result.” Knowledge is “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or pur- pose to accomplish a particular result.” Whereas negligence is “the failure of a lawyer to heed a sub- stantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the stan- dard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” Both the hearing committee and disciplinary board found the evidence proved respondent acted knowingly if not intentionally. As to the internet and social media campaign, respondent repeatedly admit- ted her purpose was to increase the chance of this Court granting her writ, to “influence the judges to apply the law and look at the evidence ... through whatever means available,” and “to get local and national media attention on this particular case.” In her sworn statement, respondent explained her rea- sons for employing her social media blitz: Q ... you've afforded yourself the appeal route although we discussed at least in theApp. 52 one instance where that was not, didn’t give the results that y'all were still looking for. A. Correct. Q._ But you understand that’s how our sys- tem is set up, and you go to district court and if the ruling is wrong and or you disagree with it factually or legally and you have grounds to then you appeal and you can go up to the circuit court and to the Louisiana Supreme Court. What I don't understand is or what I’m trying to understand is why the two pronged attack. I mean you know you have access to appeal Judge Amacker — A. Uh-huh. Q._ since that’s the case you're involved in, okay, and if she’s wrong to get her ruling overturned, right? A. Right. Q._ And yall availed yourself of that? A. Correct. Q._ Why also then used the online slash so- cial media attack to effect her rulings at the district court level? A. Yeah, well, you know, my initial thing that I wanted to say was why not because we're talking about little kids here and used every available resource to try and protect them. So as a general response to your ques- tion that would be my answer as to why I would use any available and appropriateApp. 53 tactic to help these kids. Whether or not I thought - I mean at the moment the - I think the social pressure that, you know, we thought — because the appeal process is a long process, in the meantime the kids are being exposed, you know, and they're not be- ing protected. So I think maybe the better answer to your question is that our concern was that even if we were successful on the appeal or the writ it was going to take a while and in fact it did. I think it took up two months, two maybe two and a half months. And even if we had been successful that would have been two and a half months where these children were being exposed to this trauma and we were just trying to do anything we could to protect them. Q Did you ever think that this — the kind of social media approach that there was something wrong with it or that it jeopard- ized you? A. I wanted to be careful that I didn’t do anything inappropriate. I understand that Ym a lawyer and that I have to protect, you know, that my — I'm very, very, very serious about my own ethics and my own integrity. So — but, you know, I served in the military, I have a very strong sense of what it means to be a U.S. citizens [sic] and I absolutely be- lieve in being active and pro-active and just standing up and taking a voice. I'm standing up against what I do believe is wrong in an ap- propriate manner and I didn't see anything wrong with reaching out to other citizensApp. 54 and saying I have a problem with this, do you agree with me, and if you do come join me. I think that’s just, you know, inherently American, So, no, I guess the short answer is no, did I proceed with caution, yes, I did. had — I had to have a sit down with myself about whether or not how involved I wanted to be in drafting the petition. But after con- sidering it, you know, Raven needed my help. She didn’t, you know, she was too close to it emotionally to be coherent so I helped her shape her ideas. I helped her be more co- herent in what she wanted to say. And I have no — I can't regret doing that. We agree this evidence demonstrates both a level of intent and knowledge. As previously discussed, we likewise find the evidence demonstrates respondent acted knowingly, if not outright intentionally, in the dissemination of false information on social media/ internet and in her motions to recuse as well as in her request for public action in calling the presiding judges to express concern and outrage. Regarding the actual faxing of the petition to the Marion County Court and Judge Amacker's office, we find respondent's participation was knowingly made, ie., with “conscious awareness of the nature or at- tendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a par- ticular result.” Without question, once respondent knowingly and intentionally signed the petition, it was published and released to anyone with access to the internet. Her act in signing an online petitionApp. 55 directly related to a pending litigation in which she was enrolled as counsel thus rises to the level of Knowledge, because although she did not fax the petition, she, given her internet and social media suavity, clearly was aware the petition she signed could and might very well be printed and sent to the judges and courts to whom the petition was ad- dressed. Though “uncomfortable” upon learning of the fax shortly after it was sent, respondent could not admit she was surprised. And when asked if she said anything that either directed or encouraged her client to fax the petition, she conceded: I can't remember anything I said that was directly encourage [sic] her but I don't know that I did anything to discourage her, you know, honestly. You know, there is a lot of frustration with this case. Thus, we find this evidence does demonstrate knowledge on respondent's part. Actual or Potential Harm Furthermore, we find the evidence shows re- spondent’s conduct caused actual and potential harm to the independence and integrity of the judicial system and also caused the judges concern for their personal well-being. We also find her exposure of the children on the world wide web extremely harmful.App. 56 Aggravating and Mitigating Factors After reviewing the record, we adopt the hear- ing committee's and disciplinary board’s findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. In aggravation, we find respondent: (1) acted dishon- estly and selfishly, (2) engaged in a pattern of mis- conduct involving multiple offenses, (3) had substantial experience in the practice of law having been admit- ted to the practice of law since October 2000, and, most importantly, (4) absolutely refuses to acknowl- edge the wrongful nature of her conduct or show any remorse for her actions. It is this utter lack of re- morse that astonished this Court when she appeared before us for oral argument. Her defiant attitude as to the rules of our profession vis-a-vis her First Amendment rights was clearly evident in her re- sponse to questions posed by several members of the Court. Completely unapologetic for her misconduct, respondent made it abundantly clear she would con- tinue to use social media and blogs to effect her agenda to bring about the changes she sought in the underlying cases. Respondent will not admit to any wrong doing whatsoever. ‘There can be no greater professional calling than to stand as an attorney at the bar of justice and assert as well as defend the rights of citizens. With that being said, we have long recognized the utmost importance of our rules of professional conduct to maintain and preserve the dignity and integrity of our time-honored profession. Any lawyer privileged to stand at the bar and pursue this noble endeavor hasApp. 57 taken an oath to abide by those rules. This Court will not tolerate respondent's defiant attitude and unapol- ogetic actions, which make a mockery of our rules and traditions. In imposing sanctions we also look at any miti- gating factors. The only mitigating factor in this case is respondent's absence of a prior disciplinary record. While there is no Louisiana case directly on point with the manner in which respondent facilitated her misconduct, i.e., through social media and the inter- net, we do find the serious nature of her actions requires serious sanction. In these cases, we look to the ABA Standards for guidance in determining the baseline sanction. Under the standards relevant herein, disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: (1) makes an ex parte communication with a judge or juror with intent to affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the out- come of the legal proceedings; or (2) engages in any other intentional conduct, involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously ad- versely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. ABA Standards 6.31(b) and 5.11(b), respectively. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:App. 58 engages in communication with an individ- ual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or potential in- terference with the outcome of the legal pro- ceeding, ABA Standard 6.32. Accordingly, the applicable base- line sanction under the ABA Standards ranges from suspension to disbarment. Although the manner in which respondent vio- lated the applicable rules of professional conduct is novel, the misconduct — ex parte communication, dis- semination of false and misleading information, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — is hardly so. As both the hearing committee and disciplinary board properly noted, our prior jurispru- dence provides us guidance in dealing with profes- sional misconduct involving lawyers who engage in improper communications with and about judges and in conduct dishonest and prejudicial to the admin- istration of justice. For example, in the matter of In re: White, 08- 1390, p. 14 (La. 12/02/08), 996 So.2d 266, 274, this Court held “disbarment is the applicable baseline standard for respondent's conduct in engaging in ex parte communications with the trial judge presiding over his client's pending domestic litigation.” This Court disbarred attorney White for, among other things, his ex parte communication with the presidingApp. 59 judge, Ronald Bodenheimer, about seafood pricing information. In the matter of In re: Lee, 07-2061, p. 10 (La. 02/16/08), 977 So.24 852, 858, this Court stated “the language of Rule 3.5(b) clearly and broadly prohibits all ex parte communication with a judge during the course of a proceeding.” The attorney therein was suspended for six months, with all but 45 days de- ferred, subject to the condition he attend Ethies School and obtain five additional hours of continuing legal education in professionalism, for his misconduct which included extremely vile and insulting remarks to the trial court and an ex parte communication with the judge during the course of a proceeding. This Court noted his behavior presented a common theme of “lack of respect for the dignity, impartiality, and authority of the district court.” Lee, 07-2061 at p. 10, 977 So.2d at 858. And in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Harrington, 585 So.2d 514 (La. 1990), this Court found a lawyer need not represent a party in a case to be subject to the Rule 3.5(b) proscription against ex parte communication and suspended an attorney for 18 months for making false statements, engaging in conduct that unduly embarrassed, delayed or bur- dened a third person, and engaging in improper ex parte communication with a judge. Considering the attorney's conduct “caused no harm to his clients and his inexperience and remorse,” this Court reduced the suspension to nine months on rehearing. Harrington, 585 So.2d at 524,App. 60 We likewise suspended an attorney for six months, with all but 30 days deferred, for making false statements about judges in a hypothetical attached to an appellate brief in which the attorney described a judge’s ruling as having “violated not only controlling legal authority but the very principals {sic] (honesty and fundamental fairness) upon which our judicial system is based.” In re: Simon, 04-2947, p. 4 (La, 6/29/05), 913 So.2d 816, 819. In the matter of In re: Larvadain, 95-2090 (La. 12/8/95), 664 So.2d 395, 395-96, this Court suspended a lawyer for three months, fully deferred, and placed him on unsuper- vised probation for one year with special conditions, for having accused the judge of being a racist while cursing him, threatening him, and attempting to intimidate him. Notably, we also suspended an attorney for one year for accusing a judge of being “dishonest, corrupt and engaging in fraud and misconduct,” and for causing his unfounded accusations to be published in the local newspaper. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So.2d 406, 408 (1983). ‘As these cases demonstrate, the discipline for similar misconduct corresponds with the ABA recom- mended baseline sanction ranging from suspension to disbarment. Respondent's misconduct is further distinguishable because of her use of the internet and social media to facilitate her misconduct. As a result, the petition and associated offensive postings had and still have the potential to reach a large number of people world-wide and remain present and accessibleApp. 61 on the world wide web even today. Coupled with her complete lack of remorse and admitted refusal to simply allow our system of review to work without seeking outside interference, respondent's misconduct reflects a horrifying lack of respect for the dignity, impartiality, and authority of our courts and our judicial process as a whole. As noted by the United State Supreme Court: The vigorous advocacy we demand of the legal profession is accepted because it takes place under the neutral, dispassionate con- trol of the judicial system. ‘Though cost and delays undermine it in all too many cases, the American judicial trial remains one of the purest, most rational forums for the law- ful determination of disputes. A profession which takes just pride in these traditions may consider them disserved if lawyers use their skills and insight to make untested allegations in the press instead of in the courtroom. But constraints of professional responsibility and societal disapproval will act as sufficient safeguards in most cases. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058, 111 $.Ct. at 2736. Respon- dent’s social media campaign conducted outside the sealed realm of the underlying judicial proceedings constitutes, in our view, an intolerable disservice to these traditions and our judicial system, which the constraints of our rules of professional conduct seek to safeguard against. Accordingly, we find her ethical misconduct warrants the highest of sanction — dis- barment.App. 62 DECREE Upon review of the findings and recommenda- tions of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral arguments, it is ordered that Joyce Nanine McCool, Louisiana Bar Number 27026, be and hereby is disbarred. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this Court's judgment until paid. Weimer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the respondent has engaged in professional misconduct. However, I find some aspects of respondent's conduct amounted to constitutionally protected speech, for which respon- dent cannot be sanctioned. Furthermore, I find the majority's sanction of disbarment to be disproportion- al to respondent's misconduct. ‘The majority finds that the respondent's online and social media campaign was an orchestrated effort to inflame the public sensibility and to direct public criticism toward the judges presiding over child cus- tody litigation in both Louisiana and Mississippi. I do not doubt this was the respondent's motivation. I alsoApp. 63 have no doubt that the respondent was wrong on several points for which she sought to have the public become incensed. Contrary to respondent's internet postings, the Mississippi judge did not ignore audio recordings of the children. Rather, the recordings were never offered into evidence in the Mississippi proceeding. Similarly, and contrary to respondent's postings, the Louisiana judge did not ignore evidence because proceedings in Louisiana were appropriately stayed in deference to the proceedings pending in Mississippi. After the Louisiana judge realized she would likely be a witness in the respondent's discipli- nary proceedings, the judge recused herself “to avoid the appearance of impropriety” in two unrelated cases in which respondent was counsel of record. However, the respondent followed this up by filing motions in two other unrelated cases in which the respondent misrepresented the judge had recused herself because of the judge's “extreme bias” against the respondent. Making misrepresentations in court pleadings is sanctionable. The misrepresentations within the respondent's online and social media campaign and the fact that they were made by a lawyer represent- ing the mother’s custody interests are also sanction- able. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 US. 1030, 1038 (1991) (upholding the ability of a state supreme court to sanction an attorney who “knew or reasonably should have known his remarks created a substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to a ju- dicial proceeding). The misrepresentations in re- spondent’s statements justify a sanction under RuleApp. 64 3.5' for the substantial likelihood it would preju- dicially disrupt the child custody proceedings, “since lawyers’ statements are likely to be received as espe- cially authoritative.” Id. at 1074. Also, to the extent respondent maintained internet resources, such as websites and social media, directing petitions to be sent to the Louisiana and Mississippi judges, I con- strue respondent’s actions as sanctionable ex parte communications in violation of Rule 3.5.* This court's majority goes further, however, and sanctions the * Rule 3.5 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides: Alawyer shall not (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; () communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order; (c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror af- tor discharge of the jury if (2) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresenta- tion, coercion, duress or harassment; or (@)_ engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal * ‘The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from utilizing others to do what a lawyer is prohibited from doing. See Rule 8.4(a).App. 65 very acts of criticizing judges and inspiring public criticism toward judges. In so doing, the majority impermissibly sanctions the respondent for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. As the Court in Gentile explained, “[tJhere is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1034-35, 111 S.Ct. 2720. Fur- thermore, “limits upon public comment about pending cases are ‘likely to fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important topies of discussion.’” Id. at 1035, 111 S.Ct. 2720, quoting Bridges v. California, 314 USS. 252, 268 (1941). Indeed, because of the adversarial nature of our system of justice, criticism of judges is an expected part of the judicial system. Criticism of judges takes place regularly by parties who perceive they have been aggrieved by judges’ decisions. The appeals proc- ess actually requires parties — and the lawyers who represent them — to identify and criticize the aspects of judicial decisions with which they disagree. Had the respondent not peppered her criticism with mis- representations, engaged in ex parte communications, engaged in conduct designed to gain an unfair ad- vantage in on-going litigation, and broken a court- ordered seal imposed to protect confidentiality, the respondent's online criticisms of the judges’ handling of the child custody matter would likely have beenApp. 66 fully protected speech.’ As the Supreme Court ex- plained in Bridges, 314 U'S. at 270-71: ‘The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from pub- lished criticism wrongly appraises the char- acter of American public opinion. ... And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect. Here, the respondent perceived there to be mis- treatment of her client's children and looked to the judicial system to address that mistreatment. In light of her evaluation of the situation, respondent's initial efforts to invoke judicial action were both expected and appropriate, However, as an officer of the court, a lawyer must abide by the principle that cases should be decided by careful deliberation and application of the facts to the law, not by public clamor. Therefore, after the litigation was complete, the respondent would have been entitled to disseminate appropriate criticism — on the internet if she preferred — that the courts ignored the rule of law, if her representations had been true. But they were not. * Although the respondent's brief relies heavily on First Amendment protections of speech, during oral argument, the respondent's repeated comments about the possibility of losing her license to practice law tacitly recognize that a lawyer's speech is subject to regulationApp. 67 Respondent cannot even lay claim to holding a reasonable belief in the veracity of some of her most significant criticisms. As noted earlier, there was simply no evidence that the Mississippi court had ignored tape recordings, which allegedly revealed child abuse, when those recordings had never been submitted for the court's consideration. I emphasize this example, because I believe it underscores that the respondent is passionate in her belief there is a need for society to prevent child abuse. Passionate belief is usually preferable to apathy and, regarding the need for society to prevent child abuse, only an unreasonable person would argue in favor of apathy. In every given case as to whether abuse has actually occurred and must be stopped, society has chosen the courts to be the ultimate arbiters. Because respon- dent, in her privileged role as a lawyer, is an officer of the court, both society and the government serving it have a justified expectation that officers of the courts will temper their public criticisms with truthful statements. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1031 (explain- ing that lawyers “are key participants” in the justice system, “and the State may demand some adherence to that system's precepts in regulating their speech and conduet.”). Respondent certainly did not champion the rule of law in her handling of information relating to her client’s children. Respondent sought and obtained the sealing of the record in a case dealing with the chil- dren, However, respondent later released informationApp. 68 in violation of the seal that she had obtained from the judicial system, Therefore, I concur with the majority inasmuch as I find discipline is warranted for respondent's misrepresentations, ex parte communications during on-going litigation, and breaking of a court-ordered seal. I dissent, however, from the majority's inclusion of respondent's acts of online criticism (apart from the impermissible content just noted) as sanctionable conduet.* I further dissent as to the sanction. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) recognizes that “[t}here is no Louisiana Jurisprudence addressing misconduct similar to Respondent's” and relies on the jurisprudence * ‘The majority finds that the respondent's “overall conduct” constitutes misconduct by “clear and convineing evidence.” In re MeCool, No. 15-0284, slip op. at 26, 31 (La. 06/30/15). Thus, the majority sweeps both protected and un-protected speech into the category of sanctionable conduct. I certainly share the majority's concern that unfounded criticism can impede the judicial process. As one commentator also has noted, “with increasing frequency ... attacks on the judiciary ... are purely ideologically driven. This type of ‘riti- ‘ism’... undermines the rule of law by suggesting that judges are free to ignore the relevant facts or the applicable law to reach the outcome sought by a special interest group.” Steven M. Puiszis, The Need to Protect Judicial Independence, 55 No. 4 DRI For Def. 1 (Apr. 2015). Caustic though it may be, such speech even by a lawyer is protected by the First Amendment, as Tong as the speech does not, as it does here, contain misrepre- sentations or as the Supreme Court has explained, present a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to a case. Gentile, 501 US. at 1037.App. 69 of two other states’ to support the recommended sanction of one year and one day suspension. While it is true that the novelty in Louisiana of the issues in this case presents certain challenges, this court is not without guidance and that guidance does not point to the disbarment the majority now imposes. Specifically, the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions address violations of a lawyer's duties to the legal system. Respondent's violations of * ‘The ODC cited unpublished disciplinary cases. Tt cited the public reprimand ordered in The Florida Bar v. Conway, SC08-826 (Fla. 10/29/08), 2008 WL 4748577, and administered by the Florida Bar in The Florida Bar v. Sean William Conway, TFB File No. 2007-51,308(17B), available at https! www floridabar.org/DIVADM/ME/MPDisAct.nsf/daToc!OpenForm& AutoFramed&MFI=Sean%20WilliamConway&ICN=200751308& DAD=Public%20Reprimand (last visited 6/4/15). In Conway, the lawyer maintained a website entitled “Judge Aleman’s New (illegal) ‘One-Week to prepare’ policy,” and referred to the judge throughout the website as an “EVIL UNFAIR WITCH.” Conway, TFB File No. 2007-51,308(17B). ‘The reprimand stated: “although attorneys play an important. role in exposing valid problems within the judicial system, state- ments impugning the integrity of a judge, when made with reck- less disregard as to their truth or falsity, erode publie confidence in the judicial system without assisting to publicize problems that legitimately deserve attention.” The ODC also cited In re: Kristine Ann Peshek, M.R.23794 (Ill. 5/18/10), available at http://www:illinoiscourts. gov/SupremeCourt/Announce/2010/05181 pdf, and accepting the petition for discipline available at http:/iwww.iarde.org/09CH 0089CM.html (last visited 6/4/15). According to the petition in Peschek, the attorney referred to a judge as “Judge Clueless” and referred to another judge as “a total a* * *** +."App. 70 her duties to the legal system are the crux of this case, even under the majority's analysis. However, under the rubric of “Improper Communications with Individuals in the Legal Systems,” ABA Standard 6.32 provides a baseline sanction of a suspension for an ex parte “communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such com- munication is improper, and causes injury or poten- tial injury to a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.” Under the same rubric of improper com- munications, disbarment is reserved for an ex parte communication which “causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.” ABA Standard 6.31(b). However, in its prosecution of this case, the ODC did not charge respondent with violating Rule 3.6° or even allege that respondent's actions created a dan- ger of imminent and substantial harm. Thus, the baseline sanction is suspension because of the poten- tial for harm rather than a showing of actual harm. See ABA Standard 6.32; compare ABA Standard 6.310) * Rule 3.6(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from “makling] an extrajudicial statement that the Tawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”App. 71 In contrast to these standards establishing a baseline of suspension, the majority's sanction analy- sis relies on In re White, 08-1390 (La. 12/02/08), 996 So.2d 266, 274, in which this court determined a lawyer's ex parte communications fell within a base- line sanction of disbarment. The majority presently describes our analysis in In re White as turning on the fact that the ex parte communication was “about seafood pricing information.” In re McCool, No. 15- 0284, slip op. at 39 (La, 06/30/15). While it is true that seafood prices were one topic of the lawyer's ex parte communications in In re White, the majority presently fails to mention that the seafood pricing information supplied by the lawyer was stipulated to be “relatively useless” to the judge and, therefore, our finding in In re White that the baseline sanction for certain ex parte communications was disbarment ac- tually rested on the lawyer engaging in other com- munications. In re White, 08-1390 at 7, 996 So.2d at 270. To benefit his employer in a pending domestic dispute case, the lawyer engaged in ex parte commu- nications to arrange for providing lavish gifts to a judge and his family. Id, at 7-8, 996 So.2d at 270-71. Specifically, the lawyer stipulated to the following ex parte communications with Judge Bodenheimer, which were found to have been made with the intent to benefit the lawyer's client, restauranteur Al Cope- land: 14. During the course of the Copeland/Hunter domestic relations proceedings, Bodenheimer requested and respondent provided compli- mentary appetizers and refreshments at oneApp. 72 of Copeland's restaurants to Bodenheimer’s daughter for a birthday. Although it was (and is) a regular and common practice of Cope- land’s restaurants to provide complimentary food and beverages to various members of the public, respondent acknowledges that he should have declined Judge Bodenheimer’s request. 15. Additionally, on another occasion, re- spondent provided promotional gift cards For complimentary food and refreshments at a Copeland's restaurant to members of Bodenheimer’s staff during the time that the Copeland/Hunter proceedings were then pending. Although it was (and is) a regular and common practice of Copeland’s restau- rants to provide complimentary food and beverages to various members of the public, respondent acknowledges that he should have declined to furnish these promotional gift cards. In re White, 08-1390 at 7-8, 11-12, 996 So.2d at 270, 272-73. Here, and unlike In re White, there has been no allegation that the respondent engaged in ex parte communications as part of a quid pro quo exchange to curry favor with a judge during a pending case. Aside from In re White, which plainly deals with mis- conduct of a more egregious nature than the miscon- duet here, the majority’s sanction analysis relies on cases in which this court suspended lawyers who engaged in ex parte communications. In re McCool,App. 73 No. 15-0284, slip op. at 39-40 (citing In re Lee, 07- 2061, p. 11 (La. 02/26/08), 977 So.2d 852, 858 (sus- pension of 6 months, all but 45 days deferred); In re Simon, 04-2947 (La. 06/29/05), 913 So.2d 816, 819 (suspension of 6 months, all but 30 days deferred); In re Larvadain, 95-2090 (La. 12/08/95), 664 So.2d 395 (suspension of 3 months, fully deferred); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Harrington, 585 So.2d 514 (La. 1990) (suspension of 18 months); and Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So.2d 406 (La, 1983) (suspension of 1 year)). To disbar the respondent here, considering the suspensions cited by the major- ity, reveals that disbarment is not only disproportion- ate to the misconduct, but is impermissibly punitive. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173, 1177-78 (La. 1987) (noting the primary pur- poses of disciplinary proceedings are to maintain the high standards and integrity of the legal profession, protect the public, and to deter misconduct, rather than punish the lawyer). ‘The suspension of one year and one day recom- mended by the hearing committee, disciplinary board, and ODC is consistent with the baseline of suspen- sion under the ABA Standards. | would impose the recommended suspension, with one alteration. Be- cause the misconduct here is novel in that this court has never directly addressed an attorney's use of so- cial media and the internet and the ODC points to only two other states that have addressed misconduct involving improper internet postings, I would defer all but six months of the suspension subject to theApp. 74 condition that the suspension would be fully imposed if respondent were to commit misconduct during the period of active or deferred suspension. See In re Raspanti, 08-0954, p. 23 (La. 3/17/09), 8 So.3d 526, 540 (finding as a significant mitigating factor that “we are issuing a sanction for a matter for which no one has been sanctioned previously.”).’ The recom- mended suspension is also supported by the mitigat- ing factor that respondent has no disciplinary history in over 14 years as a member of the bar. Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part, with the opinion of the majority. Noting the novelty of internet blogging, one commentator suggests the rules governing the legal profession currently fail to equate blogging with an ex parte communication. See Rachel C. Lee, Symposium: Media, Justice, and the Law: Note: Ex Parte Blogging: The Legal Ethics of Supreme Court Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1535 (April 2009). Here, respon- dent's conduct, such as her online petition, went beyond the type of commentary typically associated with blogging and, as earlier noted, I have no difficulty finding that the respondent has en- gaged in communications which violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the commentary just cited underscores that this is a developing area of the law, a reality which weighs against imposing disbarment under the facts presented,App. 75 GUIDRY, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part. I concur that respondent should be sanctioned, but I dissent as to majority's imposition of disbarment and I would impose a suspension of three years. CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns rea- sons: I wholeheartedly agree with the majority opinion in this matter. I write separately, however, to touch upon what I believe to be an outrageous disregard for the sacred profession we, as well as respondent, have chosen. The majority aptly notes that holding a law license is a great privilege, As United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, then Judge on the Court of Appeals of New York, also stated almost a century ago: “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.” In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y. 1917). Those conditions are numerous, and do not come without great sacrifice. Respondent is an “‘officer of the court’ in the most compelling sense,” as the majority so correetly finds, and consequently, she is held to a higher standard than a non-lawyer member of the public, She cannot confuse a First Amendment claim of the right to free speech with a serious and intentional violation of the Rules of Gentile v, State Bar of Nevada, 501 US. 1030, 111 8.Ct. 2720 (1991) (internal citations omitted).App. 76 Professional Conduct, which are rules that apply both to her and to every lawyer. Not only did her conduct cause major disruptions in the course of litigation, it also unnecessarily put members of the judiciary at risk. But perhaps respondent's most astounding and egregious action is her complete and utter lack of remorse, and defiance in the face of her impending sanction. At oral argument of this matter, respondent admitted she did “not have any remorse for [my] conduct” and that she would “continue to speak out and advocate for change.” It is unfortunate that respondent does not seem to understand that being a zealous advocate does not equate to such repugnant disrespect for the system we are charged to honor and serve. It is for these reasons I agree with the major- ity’s decision to impose the most serious of sanctions: disbarment. CANNELLA, J.,* concurring in part and dissent- ing in part. I dissent in part as to the sanction and would impose a three year suspension, but I concur in all other respects. * Retired Judge James L. Cannella, assigned as Justice ad hoe, sitting for Hughes, J., recusedApp. 77 Supreme Court of Louisiana FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #032 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA ‘The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of June, 2015, are as follows: BY KNOLL, J.: 2015-B-0284 IN RE: JOYCE NANINE MCCOOL ‘Upon review of the findings and ree- ommendations of the hearing commit- tee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral arguments, it is ordered that Joyce Nanine McCool, Louisiana Bar Num- ber 27026, be and hereby is disbarred. Her name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expens- es in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Louisi- ana Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10. with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this Court's judgment until paid. WEIMER, J., concurs in part and dis- sents in part and assigns reasons. GUIDRY, J., concurs in part and dis- sents in part.App. 78 CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. CANNELLA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.App. 79 ORIGINAL LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD IN RE: JOYCE NANINE MCCOOL NUMBER: 13-DB-059 RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT INTRODUCTION (Filed Feb. 10, 2015) This attorney disciplinary matter arises out of formal charges consisting of one count filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against Joyce Nanine McCool (“Ms. McCool” or “Respondent”), bar roll number 27026. ODC alleges that Respondent is guilty of violating the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule(s)”), as follows: Rule 3.5(a) (seeking to influ- ence a judge by means prohibited by law); Rule 3.5(b) (having ex parte communications with a judge during the proceeding); Rule 8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and Rule 8.4(4) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the admin- istration of justice). The Hearing Committee assigned to this matter concluded that Respondent violated the * The toxt of the rules is contained in the attached Appen- dixApp. 80 Rules as charged and recommended a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law. The Committee also recommended that Respondent be required to attend Ethics School. For the following reasons, the Board adopts the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Commit tee with one exception, as described below. The Board adopts the Committee's sanction recommendation of a one year and one day suspension and recommends that Respondent be required to attend Ethics School. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ODC filed formal charges against Respondent on November 4, 2013. By letter dated November 5, 2013, the formal charges were sent to Respondent's primary registration address via certified mail.’ The charges were received and signed for on November 6, 2013. On November 20, 2013, Respondent filed her answer to the formal charges denying any misconduct, and Respondent also filed an Exception of Vagueness and a Motion for More Specific Allegations of Misconduct. On November 21, 2013, ODC filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Exceptions of Vagueness and Motion for More Specific Allegations. On Decem- ber 11, 2013, the parties participated in a status conference with the Hearing Committee Chair who heard oral argument regarding Respondent's exception * Respondent's primary registration address is 1772 New Orleans St., Mandeville, LA 70448,App. 81 and motion. On December 16, 2013, the Hearing Committee Chair issued an order denying Respon- dent's Exception of Vagueness and Motion for More Specific Allegations. On February 6, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion to Gompel Response to Discovery Request. On Febru- ary 10, 2014, ODC filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Compel Response to Discov- ery Request. On February 11, 2014, the parties par- ticipated in a telephone conference with the Hearing Committee Chair regarding Respondent's Motion to Compel Response to Discovery Request, and at the conclusion the Hearing Committee Chair denied Respondent's Motion to Compel Response to Discov- ery Request. Subsequently, the hearing on this matter was scheduled for February 27, 2014. On February 17, 2014, Respondent filed with the Louisiana Supreme Court a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and for stay of the hearing scheduled February 27, 2014. On Febru- ary 21, 2014, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the stay of the February 27, 2014 hearing and denied Respondent's Writ of Mandamus. On February 27, 2014, this matter proceeded to hearing; however, the matter did not conclude. The conclusion of this matter was held on March 27, 2014. Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Damon S. Manning appeared at the hearing. Respondent also appeared along with her attorney, Richard Ducote.App. 82 On May 2, 2014, the Hearing Committee Chair issued an Order for the parties to redact the identi- ties of the minor children mentioned in this matter. ODC filed a post hearing memorandum on May 27, 2014. Respondent filed the same on May 29, 2014, On May 29, 2014 and June 5 2014, Respondent filed a Motion, and subsequently a supplemental Motion, to reopen the Hearing. ODC filed an opposition to the Motion on June 9, 2014, and the Committee issued an Order on June 17, 2015 denying Respondent's Motion to Reopen the Hearing. The Committee issued its report on June 25, 2014, finding Respondent in viola- tion of all of the Rules alleged in the formal charges and recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day and that she be required to attend Ethics School. ODC filed a notice of no objection to the report on July 22, 2014. Respondent filed a brief in opposition to the Committee's report on August 4, 2014, and then filed a “corrected” brief in opposition on August 5, 2014. ODC filed a reply brief on August 27, 2014. Oral argument of this matter was heard on September 4, 2014, before Board Panel “C.” Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Tammy Northrup appeared on behalf of ODC. Respondent appeared with her attorney Rich- ard Ducote, * Board Panel “C” was composed of Carl A. Butler (Chair- man), Anderson O. Dotson IIT (Lawyer Member), and Linda P. Spain (Publie Member).App. 83 FORMAL CHARGES ‘The formal charges read, in pertinent part: COUNT I In September of 2011, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel received a complaint filed against Respond- ent by Judge Deborah Gambrell of the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi. The complaint was assigned Investigative File No. 0028469 and is summarized as follows. Respondent utilized the internet and social media to disseminate false, misleading and/or in- flammatory information about Judge Deborah Gambrell and Judge Dawn Amacker. Respondent solicited and encouraged others to make direct contact with these judges in an effort to influence their decisions in pending domestic litigation. Respondent also made false and misleading statements in multiple motions to recuse Judge Amacker. Underlying this complaint is the custody/ visitation matter of Michael T: Boyd versus Raven S. Boyd (Maurer), Cause No. 2006-0136 G-TH, Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi. The litigation is/was very contentious and included allegations by Raven Boyd that Michael Boyd sexually abused their minor children, John Smallwood was initially ap- pointed Guardian Ad Litem to investigate the allega- tions and apparently found no merit. Thereafter, Mr. Smallwood filed a Motion for Temporary EmergencyApp. 84 Relief seeking to prevent Raven Boyd from further subjecting the children to the same or similar allega- tions of sexual abuse, Raven Boyd did not oppose the motion. On August 13, 2007, Judge James Thomas, Jr. issued an Order Granting Motion for ‘Temporary Relief which stated in part that, “... after having been informed that the De- fendant does not oppose the petition, the Court finds that the Motion is well taken and should be and is hereby granted.” “Raven Boyd, Wanda Phillips [FN1] and any persons acting on their behalf or at their di- rection are hereby enjoined from making the same or similar allegations of sexual abuse as to the minor children of the parties here- in.” “Raven Boyd, Wanda Phillips and any per- sons acting on their behalf or at their direc- tion are enjoined from subjecting the minor children to any more medical examinations for the same or similar allegations of sexual abuse.” FNI. Wanda Phillips is Raven's mother. On June 2, 2008, Judge Thomas issued an Order to Seal File which stated in part, based upon the nature of allegations made in pleadings filed in this matter and to protect the minor children in this matter, the entire file shall be sealed by the law clerkApp. 85 and not made available to any person until further order of this Court with notice of any such request for disclosure being given to both parties and the Court appointed Guard- ian Ad Litem herein,” On September 2, 2008, an Agreed Judgment was signed stating in part that, Order No. “12” states that, “Any videotapes or other recordings made by the parties, or at their behest, or by anyone related to the mi- nor children shall not be disclosed to anyone except counsel of record and the Court, and shall not be made available to anyone except the appropriate investigatory agencies at their request.” Order No. “13” states that, “Neither the par- ties nor anyone working in concert with them shall make any audio or video record- ings of the children in an attempt to investi- gate or document alleged abuse. This does not include recordings made by a counselor for therapeutic purposes, or any recordings made by law enforcement agencies.” Judge Thomas died in or around October of 2010. On January 11, 2011, Complainant Deborah Gambrell was appointed by Mississippi Governor Haley Bar- bour to replace Judge Thomas and to serve as Chan- cellor, Place One, of the Tenth Chancery District of Mississippi. One of the cases inherited by Judge Gambrell was the custody/visitation matter of Michael T. Boyd versus Raven S. Boyd (Maurer).App. 86 Meanwhile, back on June 10, 2010, Raven Boyd filed a Motion for Contempt in the Mississippi pro- ceedings alleging that Michael Boyd failed to pay child support; and sought to terminate Michael Boyd's parental rights alleging that he failed to maintain a relationship with the children for one year, failed to pay court ordered child support for almost two years, and molested their children. On December 14, 2010, the Mississippi Court appointed a new Guardian Ad Litem to again investi- gate the allegations of sexual abuse. According to Respondent, before the Guardian Ad Litem’s investi- gation began, and while Raven Boyd's petition to terminate parental rights was still pending, the court ordered that the children be reintroduced to their father through supervised visitation. Raven Boyd and Respondent both took issue with this Order. In January of 2011, Raven Boyd’s new husband, Dustin Maurer, filed a petition for intra-family adop- tion in the 22nd Judicial District Court, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, applying to adopt the two minor children born to Raven and Michael Boyd. Respond- ent represents Dustin Maurer in the Louisiana proceedings. The matter was allotted to Judge Dawn Amacker who stayed the matter pending the outcome of the proceedings pending in Mississippi. [FN2] FN2. The Mississippi record is sealed. Ac- cording to Respondent, some or all of the Louisiana record is also sealed. As a result, much of the pro- cedural history and dates pertainingApp. 87 to the underlying litigation was tak- en from the writ application filed by Respondent on behalf of Raven Boyd (Maurer) with the Louisiana Su- preme Court in August of 2011 On July 20, 2011, Judge Gambrell held an in- chambers meeting with counsel and the Guardian Ad Litem in the Mississippi proceedings. Following the meeting, Judge Gambrell reportedly issued a Tempo- rary Order extending the father’s visitation to super- vised overnight visitation in his home, with unrestricted standard visitation every other weekend to begin in August, 2011. Raven Boyd and Respondent both took issue with this Temporary Order. Raven Boyd (Maurer) reportedly obtained addi- tional evidence of alleged sexual abuse by the chil- dren’s father. Consequently, on August 4, 2011, Respondent filed for ex parte relief on Raven's behalf in the 22nd Judicial District Court asking the Louisi- ana court to exercise immediate emergency tempo- rary custody under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. The petition also asked that the previously stayed intra-family adoption be set for hearing on the court’s next available date. Judge Amacker reportedly declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in the matter. Respondent, on behalf of Raven [Boyd] Maurer, applied for writs with the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals, who denied same. On August 31, 2011, the Louisiana Supreme Court also denied writs.App. 88 ‘The hearing on Raven Boyd's Motion for Con- tempt and to Terminate Parental Rights in Mississip- pi was scheduled before Judge Gambrell on August 16, 2011. Judge Gambrell subsequently denied the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights but found Michael Boyd in contempt for failing to pay child support. Judge Gambrell further found that Michael Boyd was entitled to a reduction in child support payments, and she ordered the parties to participate in family counseling and to undergo a forensic review regarding allegations of sexual abuse of the children. Raven Boyd (Maurer) filed a pro se appeal; how- ever, on April 9, 2013, the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding Judge Gambrell’s judgment was not a final appealable judgment. As will be discussed below, Respondent and her client, Raven Boyd (Maurer), used the internet and social media to solicit others to sign an online petition and to contact the judges in an attempt to influence their handling of the underlying cases. On August 14, 2011, two days prior to the hearing in Mississippi on Raven Boyd's Motion for Contempt and to Terminate Parental Rights, Heather Lyons [FN3] sent an email to Judge Gambrell’s staff stating, “ live and vote in Forrest county. I will be paying attention to the case filed in la su- preme court on Friday due to the fact that Judge Gambrell refused to hear evidence of abuse in the case of little girls who are likely being molested by their father. She has anApp. 89 obligation to protect our most vulnerable children, Please do not let them down judge!” FN3_— Heather Lyons is one of the people who signed the online petition. Subsequent to the August 16, 2011 hearing in Mississippi, someone sent Judge Gambrell a copy of the online petition that was created and circulated by Respondent and Raven Boyd (Maurer). Judge Gambrell was also alerted to a website http:/www.change. org/petitions/justice-for‘H” (REDACTED) and “Z” (REDACTED) containing the on-line petition entitled, “Justice for “H” (REDACTED) and “Z” (REDACTED). ‘The website instructed people to “sign this petition” and to contact Judge Gambrell and tell her what they think of her handling of the case. According to the change.org website, the online petition was “Started by Bridge to Justice Slidell, LA”. [FN4] In August and September of 2011, Judge Gambrel's [sic] staff re- ceived calls regarding the pending case; and she in- structed her staff to ignore the calls. FN4 Bridge to Justice is a website creat- ed by Respondent. On August 23, 2011, a copy of the online petition was filed with the Marion County Chancery Clerk of Court's Office. The petition states in pertinent part, “To Judge Deborah Gambrell, we, the under- signed, ask that you renounce jurisdiction in this matter to the Louisiana court because the children have lived exclusively in Louisi- ana for the past three years. Their schools,App. 90 teachers, physicians, therapists, little sister and brother and the vast majority of signifi- cant contacts are now in Louisiana, There is also an adoption proceeding pending in Loui- siana over which Louisiana has jurisdiction and in the interest of judicial economy, and the best interest of the girls, Louisiana is the more appropriate forum to ensure [that] the ‘est interest’ of the girls are protected. If you refuse to relinquish jurisdiction to Louisiana, we insist that you remove the Guardian Ad Litem currently assigned to the case, and replace him with one that has the proper training and experience in investigating al- legations of child sexual abuse in custody proceedings. We further insist that, in keep- ing with S.G. v. D.C. 13 So. 3d 269 (Miss. 2009), you specifically define the Guardian Ad Litem’s role in the suit; require the new Guardian Ad Litem to prepare a written re- port; require that the report be shared with all parties prior to a hearing; that all pro- ceedings be conducted on the record, with advance notice and opportunity to be heard, and that an evidentiary hearing be conduct- ed to review the allegations of child sexual abuse, and that no visitation be allowed until you have seen all of the evidence.” On August 18, 2011, Raven Boyd, or someone with access to Raven Boyd’s fax machine, faxed a copy of the online petition and comments directly to Judge Dawn Amacker's office fax line in Louisiana. Judge Amacker had her administrative assistant return the petition to Respondent with instructions forApp. 91 Respondent to caution Raven Boyd against ex parte communications with the judge. The petition states in pertinent part, “To Judge Amacker, we, the undersigned, in- sist that you withdraw the unlawful stay on the adoption proceedings currently pending in your court, and, in accordance with La.Ch.C. art. 1253, a hearing be set with all due speed to allow the girls’ stepfather to show why it is in the girls’ best interest that they be adopted by him, thereby terminating all parental rights of the girls’ biological fa- ther.” The website promoting the online petition con- tains information about the sealed Mississippi pro- ceedings and Louisiana proceedings. It links to audio recordings of Raven Boyd interviewing her minor children about alleged sexual abuse by their father; (FN5] and includes misleading and inflammatory statements designed to provoke outrage towards Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker, and to elicit a response from the general public, For example, the online petition refers to the audio recordings of the minor children, and other purported evidence of abuse, and states, “Now consider that no judge has ever heard those recordings. Why? Because for 4.5 years, they have simply refuse (sic) to do so. On August 16, 2011, Judge Deborah Gambrell in the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, once again refused to admit all of Raven's evidence, includingApp. 92 these recordings, and ordered that H (RE- DACTED) and Z (REDACTED) have visits with their father in the house where they both report having been molested by their fa- ther in the past.” FNS Release of the audio recording was a direct violation of the September 2, 2008 Agreed Judgment, Although Respondent claimed Judge Gambrell refused to listen to or admit the audio recordings into evidence during the August 16, 2011 hearing, Re- spondent later acknowledged that the audio record- ings were not offered into evidence on August 16, 2011. In fact, the audio recordings were not even brought to court that day. Furthermore, the audio recordings have never been offered into evidence in any proceed- ing before Judge Gambrell in Mississippi or Judge Amacker in Louisiana. ‘The online petition goes on to state, “Judge Dawn Amacker in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany in Louisiana is also refusing to hear any evi- dence or to protect H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED), even though the law requires her to have a hearing and to take evidence H (REDACTED) still loves her daddy. She just wants him to stop what he is doing to her. She does not feel safe with him alone. She said as much in her journal, but JudgeApp. 93 Gambrell refused to allow it as evidence and Judge Amacker just ignored her...” Although Respondent claimed Judge Amacker “refused” to hear any evidence, refused to protect the children, and “just ignored” the evidence, Judge Amacker actually stayed the Louisiana proceedings and declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in deference to the proceedings pending in Mississippi. Furthermore, both the Louisiana First Cireuit Court of Appeals and the Louisiana Supreme Court chose not to disturb Judge Amacker’s ruling and denied writs in this matter. After misrepresenting and spinning the facts and procedural history of the Mississippi and Louisiana cases, Respondent's online petition then tells inter- ested persons what to do about their outrage. “Sign our petition telling the judges that there can be no justice for H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED) or any child, if the law and evidence is ignored. Tell them they must look at the evidence before they make a deci- sion that will affect the rest of H (REDACT- ED) and Z (REDACTED)’s lives. Ask yourself, what if these were your daughters?” “Have questions want to do more to help? Email us at bridge2justice@gmail.com and someone will respond within 24 hours. Want to see more, go to http://db.tt/Zz2250q and read the writ submitted to the Louisiana Su- preme court on August 12, 2011App. 94 “Horrified? Call the judges and let them know.” (emphasis added) Respondent not only stirred emotions with in- formation and misinformation regarding sealed proceedings, she incited others to make direct contact with the judges in an attempt to influence their decisions in the case. To assist others in making direct contact with the judges, the website listed the contact information for Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker, their staff, and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Re- spondent admits it was “probably” her idea to list the judges’ and courts’ contact information in the online petition. [FN6] FN6 Transcript of Respondent's 3/20/2012 sworn statement, p. 46. Respondent admits the online petition was a “brainstorming” idea hatched by her, Raven Boyd (Maurer) and others. Respondent stated, “it was a group brainstorming session but I participated in it. I was there.” [FN7] Respondent and others decided to use social media to apply pressure on the judges following Judge Gambrell’s July, 2011 Order reestab- lishing the children's unsupervised visitation with their father. [FN8] The group met at either Respon- dent's house or office where they typed the petition and uploaded it to the website. [FN9] Respondent used the change.org website and the bridgetojustice website to facilitate the online petition. The bridgetojustice website was created by Respondent as a nonprofit organization to bring about change through social activity.App. 95 FN7 Id. at p. 28 FN8_ Id. at pp. 28-29 FN9 Transcript of Respondent’s 3/20/12 sworn statement, pp. 31-32 Respondent admits the online petition was intended to provide information and to elicit reaction from others and have them voice their thoughts directly to the judges. [FN10] Respondent further admits the online petition and solicitation of others to contact Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker “.. . was a campaign to influence the judges to apply the law and look at the evidence ... ” [FN11] Although Re- spondent and her client availed themselves of the appeal process in Mississippi and Louisiana, they nevertheless utilized social media to apply pressure to the judges in an attempt to expedite the achieve- ment of their goals. [FN12] FN10. Id. at pp. 51-52 FN11, Id, at pp. 78-79 FN12 Id. at pp. 56-57 As previously stated, the online petition with signatures and comments was ultimately faxed to Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker. Respondent believes the petition was faxed either by her client, Raven Boyd (Maurer), or Raven's mother, Wanda Phillips. [FN13] FN13 Id. at pp. 52-53App. 96 Respondent also used her Twitter account at www.twitter.cominaninemceool to promote the audio recordings of the minor children being interviewed by their mother about alleged sexual abuse, [FN14] as well as to promote information and misinformation about Judge Gambrell’s and Judge Amacker’s han- dling of the underlying cases. For example: On December 11, 2011, Respondent tweeted, “Judge Gambrell at it again — turned a 4 YO child over to a validated abuser - PLEASE. TELL ME WHAT IT WILL TAKE FOR EVERYONE TO SAY ‘ENOUGH.’” On August 24, 2011, Respondent tweeted to @TheLensNOLA “focus ur lens on Y Judge Amacker won't protect these girls... ” Re- spondent provided a link to the audio record- ings and the online petition. On August 24, 2011, Respondent tweeted to @RonThibodeauxTP “ask Judge Amacker why she won't listen ... ” Respondent pro- vided a link to the audio recordings and the online petition. On August 17, 2011, Respondent re-tweeted, “Make judges protect H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED) from abuse by their father! .” Respondent provided a link to the online petition, On August 16, 2011 [the day Judge Gambrell held a hearing in the Mississippi proceedings], Respondent tweeted, “Judges are supposed to know shit about ... the law ... aren'tApp. 97 they. And like evidence and shit? Due pro- cess?” Respondent provided a link to the online petition. On August 16, 2011, Respondent tweeted, “GIMME GIMME GIMME Evidence! Want some? I got it. Think u can convince a judge to look at it? Sign this petition:” Respondent provided a link to the online petition. On August 16, 2011, Respondent tweeted, “I am SO going 2 have 2 change jobs after this Grussellerowe come on! I’m risking sanctions by the LA supreme court; u could be a HUGE, help.” FN14. As previously stated, release of the audio recordings was a direct viola- tion of the September 2, 2008 Agreed Judgment. Respondent likewise participated in and/or promoted other social media activities in an attempt to influence the courts’ handling of Raven Boyd's cases. On the website http://www.thepetitionsite com/1/make-louisiana-and-mississippi-courts-protect (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED) Respondent posted and/or promoted an article entitled, “Make Louisiana and Mississippi Courts protect H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED)"”, wherein she states, “Target: LA Supreme Court, Judge Dawn Amacker, Judge Deborah Gambrell.” “Sponsored by: Bridge to Justice, LC3.”App. 98 “Insist that Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell do their jobs! If you want more in- fo, go to bridgetojustice.com and read the writ application to the LA supreme court.” “Please sign the petition, circulate it to all of your friends and families and call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Mon- day, August 15 to ask why they won't fol- low the law and protect these children. Let them know you're watching and ex- pect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe!” Respondent then listed the names and con- tact information for Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker, their staff, and the Louisiana Su- preme Court, and concluded the article stat- Ing, “Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls!” (emphasis added) “(504) 310-2300” “ask about the writ pending that was filed by attorney Nanine McCool on Friday, August 12, 2011.” On the website www.thepetitionsite.com/4/make- judges-protect-H (REDACTED)-and-Z (REDACTED)- from-abuse-by-their-father/ Respondent posted and/or promoted an article entitled, “Help get justice for H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED)!”, wherein sheApp. 99 provided information and/or misinformation about sealed Mississippi proceedings and asked readers to sign their online petition and to call the judges direct- ly to voice their outrage On the website http:/www.eyesceonline.com/, on August 17, 2011, Respondent posted an article enti- tled “Justice for H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED)” wherein, while referencing Judge Gambrell, Re- spondent stated, “|... Let's turn this around and be H (RE- DACTEDYs hero, Please sign the Care2 peti- tion and continue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwill- ing to afford H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED) simple justice.” (emphasis added) “You can sign the petition and lend your voice to this cause here. Or, you can contact directly ... ” Respondent then listed the names and contact information for Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker, their staff, and the Louisiana Supreme Court. (empha- sis added) Respondent ended the article by stating, “Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls! (504) 310-2300” (emphasis added) “Ask about the writ pending that was filed by attorney Nanine McCool on Friday, Au- gust 12, 2011.”App. 100 On the website http://sheeplessinamerica blogspot. com/, on August 25, 2011, Respondent posted a blog/ article entitled “Justice for H (REDACTED) and Z (REDACTED)’, wherein she discussed the underlying case and stated, “Horrified? Call the judges and let them know:” (emphasis added) Respondent then listed the names and contact information for Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker, their staff, and the Louisi- ana Supreme Court. On September 14, 2011, Judge Gambrell signed an Order commanding Respondent to appear before the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi on October 5, 2011 at 9:00a.m., “to show cause as to why [she] should not be held in contempt of this Court’s prior Orders by disclosing information from a ‘sealed’ Chancery Court file or in the alternative, to disclose how audio transcriptions came into {her} possession after they were placed under seal by the Chancery Court of Marion Coun- ty, Mississippi on May 22, 2008 by Court Or- der as well as an Agreed Order executed on the 2nd day of September, 2008...” “That it has come to this Court's attention that the protected audio recordings are being disseminated via social medial (sic) networks Respondent received a copy of the notice of the contempt hearing by mail; however, because she was not properly served, and because she does not believeApp. 101 the Mississippi Court has jurisdiction over her, Re- spondent chose not to appear. [FN15] FN15_ Transcript of Respondent’s 3/20/12 sworn statement, pp. 62-63. On October 6, 2011, Judge Gambrell signed an Order of Contempt stating that, ‘qT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the said Joyce Nanine McCool is in contempt of this court for having failed to appear or re- spond and is hereby placed into the custody of the Sheriff of Marion County, Mississippi for a period of ten (10) days where she shall remain until further Order of the Court.” Respondent is aware that a warrant for her arrest is reportedly pending in Mississippi, but stated she has no plans to travel to Mississippi or go to jail. (FN16] FN16. Id, at pp. 63-64. In September of 2011, Judge Gambrell filed a disciplinary complaint against Respondent. Judge Amacker has also provided information in connection with ODC's investigation. Respondent is a Louisiana licensed attorney who practices in the 22nd Judicial District where she has/had other cases pending before Judge Dawn Amacker. As a result of Judge Amacker’s “participa- tion” in ODC’s investigation, Respondent sought to recuse her from other matters wherein Respondent is counsel of record. In so doing, Respondent made falseApp. 102 statements regarding Judge Amacker’s previous orders of recusal, as follows: On May 13, 2012, Respondent filed an Expedited Consideration Requested Motion to Recuse Judge Amacker in the matter of, Elizabeth Varley Keister versus Robert Scott Keister: On June 5, 2012, in Keister versus Keister, Judge Amacker signed an Order stating, “The Court hereby voluntarily recuses itself due to the possibility that the judge may be called as a witness in the proceedings referenced by counsel, and out of an abundance of caution and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the matter shall be referred to another judge of the district court for trial through the ran- dom process of assignment in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Proce- dure Article 253.1.” (emphasis added) On June 28, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to Reeuse Judge Amacker in the matter of, Scott Ed- ward Cullen versus Kristian Marie Probst Cullen, wherein she falsely stated, “The Court has voluntarily and express- ly admitted its extreme bias and conflict in recusing itself in two other cases, which grounds are equally applicable in the case at bar.” (emphasis added) On June 28, 2012, in Cullen versus Cullen, Judge Amacker signed an Order again clearly stating,App. 103 “The Court hereby voluntarily recuses itself due to the possibility that the judge may be called as a witness in pro- ceedings in which counsel for mover is a party, and out of an abundance of cau- tion and to avoid the appearance of im- propriety, the matter shall be referred to the judge of Div. ‘K’.” (emphasis added) On January 3, 2013, Respondent filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Amacker in the matter of, Becky Nevle Russell versus Timothy Russell, wherein she again falsely stated, “The Court has voluntarily and express- ly admitted its extreme bias and conflict in recusing itself in several other cases, which grounds are equally applicable in the case at bar.” (emphasis added) Respondent disseminated false, misleading and/ or inflammatory information through the internet and social media about Judge Deborah Gambrell and Judge Dawn Amacker in pending cases wherein Respondent was counsel of record and/or had a personal interest. Respondent also made false and misleading state- ments in multiple motions to recuse Judge Amacker. Respondent's conduct violated Rule 8.4(c) (engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep- resentation). Pursuant to Rule 3.5(a), Respondent is prohibited from seeking to influence a judge by means prohibit- ed by law. Pursuant to Rule 3.5(b), Respondent is prohibited from having ex parte communications withApp. 104 a judge during the proceeding. Furthermore, pursu- ant to Rule 8.4(a), Respondent is prohibited from violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowing- ly assisting or inducing another to do so, or doing so through the acts of another. Respondent used the internet and social media to elicit outrage in the general public and to encourage others to make direct contact with judges in an effort to influence their handling of pending cases. Respondent's conduct violated Rule 3.5(a) and (b) personally, and/or violated Rule 8.4(a) by committing misconduct through the acts of others. Although Respondent and her client availed themselves of the appeal process in Mississippi and Louisiana, Respondent also utilized the internet and social media in an attempt to influence the judges and expedite achievement of her goals in the case. Respondent's overall conduct as outlined above was prejudicial to the administration of justice and violat- ed Rule 8.4(d). THE HEARING COMMITTEE'S REPORT As noted above, the Committee issued its report on June 24, 2014. The Committee found as follows: FINDINGS OF FACT Respondent represented Raven Boyd (Maurer) (“Raven”) and her current husband in certain proceedings, including an intra- family adoption proceeding in Louisiana.App. 105 Raven was also involved in a custody/ visitation battle with her former husband in Mississippi. Judge Deborah Gambrell pre- sided over the Mississippi proceedings and Judge Dawn Amacker presided over the Lou- isiana proceedings during the relevant time frame. During the course of these proceedings, there were certain rulings made by Judge Gambrell (in Mississippi) regarding the cus- tody and visitation of the minor children, (FN19] and involving allegations of sexual abuse against Raven's former husband and the children’s father. [FN20] Judge Amacker (in Louisiana) also made certain rulings, in- cluding declining to exercise subject jurisdic- tion in the adoption matter pending the outcome of the Mississippi proceedings. FN19 For the protection of the minor children, their names have been (REDACTED). FN20 Not to diminish the seriousness of the allegations, but to date no law enforcement agency or court has found Michael Boyd guilty of this alleged conduct. When Respondent disagreed with rul- ings made by Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker, she turned to the internet and so- cial media to disseminate information about Judge Gambrell’s and Judge Amacker’s rul- ings, and actively solicited the public to con- tact these judges. Respondent argues thatApp. 106 she used the internet and social media to en- courage members of the public to remind the judges to “do justice,” “apply the law,” “listen to the evidence,” and “protect children.” {FN21] First of all, the Committee Chair notes that even if the Respondent had lim- ited her conduct to encouraging the public to contact these judges and remind them to “do justice,” “apply the law,” “listen to the evi- dence,” and “protect children,” she still would likely be in violation of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct, seeking to influence a judge by means prohibited by law (Rule 3.5(a)); communicating ex parte with judges during the proceedings (Rule 3.5(b)); knowingly as- sisting or inducing another to violate the rules of professional conduct, or doing so through acts of another (Rule 8.4(a)); and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the admin- istration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). The Com- mittee, however, makes no finding on whether the Rules of Professional Conduct would have been violated by such conduct, because the Committee finds that the Re- spondent’s conduct went far beyond encour- aging the public to tell the judges to “do justice,” “apply the law,” “listen to the evi- dence,” and “protect children.” FN21__ Respondent's Post-Hearing Mem- orandum, at 2 ‘The record is clear and convincing that Respondent engaged in the following mis- conduct and rule violations.App. 107 I. Respondent's Conduct Violated Rule 3.5(a), Rule 3.5(b) and Rule 8.4(a) Respondent used the internet, an online petition and social media to spread infor- mation, some of which was false, misleading and inflammatory, about Judge Gambrell’s and Judge Amacker’s handling and rulings in pending litigation. Respondent circulated contact information for Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and solicited and encouraged others to make direct, ex parte contact with the judges to express their feelings about the pending cases, and attempt to influence the outcome of the pending cases. The clear in- tent of Respondent's online campaign was an attempt to influence the judges’ future rul- ings in the respective cases, and to do so through improper ex parte communication directed at the judges. In online petitions, blogs, articles, etc., Respondent discussed litigation pending be- fore Judge Gambrell, Judge Amacker and the Louisiana Supreme Court; posted contact in- formation for the judges, their staff and the Supreme Court; and issued the following in violation of Rules 3.5(a), Rule 3.5(b) and Rule 8.4(a): + Please sign the petition, circulate it to all of your friends and families and call Judge Amacker and Judge Gambrell during the hours of 8:30 to 5:00 starting Monday, August 15 to ask why they won't follow the lawApp. 108 and protect these children. Let them kmow you're watching and expect them to do their job and most of all, make sure these precious little girls are safe! (ODC-12A) Call the Louisiana Supreme Court and tell them you want the law to protect these girls (504) 310-2300 [Alsk about the writ pending that was filed by attorney Nanine McCool on Friday, August 12, 2011. (ODC-12A) Let's turn this around and be [H's] hero. Please sign the Care2 petition and continue to call Judge Gambrell to ask her why she is unwilling to afford [H] and [Z] simple justice (ODC-12B) You can sign the petition and lend your voice to this cause here. Or, you can contact directly. Contact infor- mation is: [provided contact infor- mation for the judges and their staff]. (ODC-12B) Sign our petition telling the judges that there can be no justice for [H] and [Z], or any child, if the law and evidence is ignored. Tell them they must look at the evidence before they make a decision that will affect the rest of [H] and [Z's] lives. Ask yourself, what if these were your daughters? ... Horrified? Call the judges and let them know. (ODC- 12C)App. 109 Il. Respondent's Conduct Violated Rule 8.4(c) Respondent also disseminated false, mis- leading and inflammatory information on the Internet and through social media about Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker and their handling of these pending domestic proceedings, and issued the following in vio- lation of Rule 8.4(c): Respondent posted an online article entitled, “Make Louisiana and Mississippi Courts protect HB and ZB!” (ODC-12A) Respondent's article alleged that the minor children were being sexually abused by their father, and stated that: In spite of overwhelming evidence that the girls have been abused by their father, the judge in Missis- sippi, Judge Deborah Gambrell, of Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, refuses to even look at the evidence, and has now ordered the girls be sent to unsupervised visitation with their father. Respondent's statement is false, mis- leading and inflammatory. Based on Re- spondent’s own views and opinion, she characterized the evidence as “overwhelm- ing” and criticized Judge Gambrell for “re- fusfing] to even look at the evidence.” As Judge Gambrell testified, she had her rea- sons (as judges usually do) for the eviden- tiary rulings made in connection with the proceeding. Respondent telling her readersApp. 110 that Judge Gambrell “refused to even look at the evidence” is a gross mischaracterization of what happened. In this same online article (ODC-12A), Respondent stated that, “Judge Dawn Amacker ... in Louisiana also refused to protect the girls, even though she has the power and authority to protect them » Again, Respondent’s statement is a mis- representation and is inflammatory. Judge Amacker did not refuse to protect the minor children, but rather she stayed proceedings in Louisiana based on the fact related pro- ceedings were already pending in Missis- sippi. On August 17, 2011, Respondent posted an online article entitled “Justice for [H] and Zl.” (OCDIsic}-12B) Respondent's article al- leged that the minor children were being sexually abused by their father, and stated the children’s mother had evidence of the abuse, including audio recording and video evidence. Respondent referenced an August, 16, 2011 hearing before Judge Gambrell, and stated: In a hearing before Judge Deborah Gambrell of the Chancery Court for Marion County in Mississippi yes- terday, all of Raven's evidence of abuse was excluded from considera- tion on one legal technicality or an- other ... Judge Gambrell’s solution to this irrefutable evidence that [H] and her sister are suffering as aApp. 111 direct result of an order she issued prematurely and without due proc- ess on July 20, sending the girls for visitation with their father in the house where he repeatedly abused them, was to exclude it as evidence. Respondent’s statement is a misrepre- sentation. While Judge Gambrell made rul- ings on evidence (again, as all judges do), these rulings were not based on her whim, nor where [sic] they made to enforce a prior unlawful order or to facilitate continued abuse, as characterized by Respondent. On August 25, 2011, Respondent posted an online blog on the “Sheep-Free Zone” enti- ted “Justice for (H] and [Z).” (ODC-12C) Re- spondent’s blog linked to audio recordings of the minor children reportedly talking to their mother, Raven, about alleged sexual abuse by their father, [FN22] Respondent's blog stated: Now consider that no judge has ever heard those recordings. Why? Be- cause for 4.5 years, the judges have simply refuse (sic) to do so. On August 16, 2011, Judge Deborah Gambrell in the Chancery Court of Marion County, Mississippi, once again refused to admit all of Raven's evidence, including these recordings, and ordered that [H] and [Z] have visits with their father in the houseApp. 112 where they both report having been molested by their father in the past. FN22 Pursuant to a September 2, 2008 Agreed Judgment in the Missis- sippi proceedings, the parties agreed and were ordered not to disclose the subject video or au- dio recordings to anyone except counsel of record and the court, and not to make said recordings available to anyone except the appropriate investigatory agen- cies at their request. Respondent's statement is false. The au- dio recordings in question were not offered into evidence on August 16, 2011; therefore, Judge Gambrell could not have “refused to admit” them. In fact, Respondent admitted these recordings were not even brought to the August 16, 2011 hearing. Furthermore, these audio recordings have never been offered into evidence at any hearing before Judge Gambrell. In this same blog (ODC-12C), Respon- dent stated: Judge Dawn Amacker in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Par- ish of St. Tammany in Louisiana is also refusing to hear any evidence or to protect [H] and [Z], even though the law requires her to have a hear- ing and to take evidence.App. 113 Respondent's statement is false and mis- leading. Due to the fact related domestic pro- ceedings were already pending in Mississippi, Judge Amacker stayed a subsequently filed intra-family adoption filed in Louisiana by Raven's new husband. Later, Raven sought ex parte immediate, emergency adoption set for hearing. Judge Amacker declined to exer- cise subject matter jurisdiction or to lift the stay at the time. Both the Louisiana First Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs, upholding Judge Amacker’s ruling. In addition to making false, misleading and inflammatory statements about Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker, Respondent also instructed others to sign and circulate an online petition, and to call the judges and let them know they are “watching” them and are “horrified” by their rulings (See Section I, discussing violations of Rules 3.5(a), 3.5(b) and 8.4(a)) Respondent also made false statements about Judge Amacker in multiple motions to recuse, Specifically, the Respondent filed mo- tions to recuse Judge Amacker in unrelated proceedings. In response, Judge Amacker signed orders stating the following: ‘The Court hereby voluntarily re- cuses itself due to the possibility that the judge may be called as a witness in the proceedings refer- enced by counsel, and out of anApp. 114 abundance of caution and to avoid the appearance of impropriety ODC-13B (Order in Keister v. Keister) and ODC-13D (Order in Cullen v. Cullen) Notwithstanding the Judge’s reasons stated for her recusal, Respondent (in filing other motions for recusal), stated: ‘The Court has voluntarily and ex- pressly admitted its extreme bias and conflict in recusing itself in two other cases, which grounds are equally applicable in the case at bar. ODC-13C (motion to recuse filed in Cullen v. Cullen) and ODC-13E (motion to recuse filed in Russell v. Russell) Respondent's statement that Judge Amacker “voluntarily and expressly admitted {her} extreme bias and conflict” in recusing herself in other cases is blatantly false. II. Respondent’s Conduct Violated Rule 8.4(d) Respondent used the internet and so- cial media in an effort to influence Judge Gambrell's and Judge Amacker’s future rul- ings in pending litigation. Respondent's con- duct threatened the independence and integrity of the court and was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice.