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Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Locus Standi
Title: OPOSA vs HONORABLE
FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083

FULGENCIO

S.

The respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to

dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim
that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Issue:

Facts:
This is a taxpayers class suit in petition for upholding the
constitutional right of the Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology. The principal petitioners were all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents praying for
the cancelation of timber license agreement.
The minors assert that they "represent their generation as well
as
generations
yet
unborn.",
particularly
invoking
intergenerational responsibility. They prayed, that judgment
be rendered to order honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and other persons acting on his behalf to:
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.

1. Do the petitioners have locus standi to file a suit against

the respondents?
2. Is the suit filed a matter of political question?
3. Would the granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. Yes, they are upholding their rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16.
The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

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Sec. 15.
The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
****
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not
take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that
the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable,
if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous
and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.

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Answer to issue # 2
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph
of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Answer to issue # 3
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, which reads:

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Sec. 10.
No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
***
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Self Executory Provision
Title: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 122156

Facts:
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under

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Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC.
Only two bidders participated Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, with a higher bid at P44.00
per share
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner sends a letter to GSIS to match the bid price
of P44.00 per share and sent a managers check as Bid
Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad but GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid petitioner filed for prohibition and mandamus.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution, since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy they should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
One of the GSIS claims is that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation.
Issue:

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Is GSIS correct when it says Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation?

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

Court Ruling:
The second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony.
***
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted
to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium..
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
provides that:

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Self Executory Provisions
Title: KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, G.R.
No. 118910
Facts:
This case is in relation to a case filed by KilosBayan against
PCSO in an allegation that public funds are being misapplied
or misappropriated in regards to the Equipment Lease
agreement between PCSO and PGMC.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the
PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries
and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any other party because of the clause "except for
the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in
paragraph (B) of 1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the
law of this case because the parties are the same and the
case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this
statutory provision.
Issues:

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

1. Do petitioners have valid grounds for motion to

reconsideration by invoking the policies and principles of
the Constitution?

2. Does Kilosbayan have legal standing to sue PCSO?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1.
We have held that because there are no genuine issues of
constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in
interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more
liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections
are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies
and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the
basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be
resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are
inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by
guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective
and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them
standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by
petitioner read:
Art. II, 5.
The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., 12.
The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency

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and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Id., 13.
The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
Id., 17.
The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts, culture, and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate
social progress, and promote total human liberation
and development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not selfexecuting. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in
the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for
charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently
with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the
PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with
respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress
to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
Answer on Issue # 2.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of
the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the
PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case,
therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of

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contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the

agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give
it the requisite personality to question the validity of the
contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State
shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right
to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged."
(Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that
only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case
may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is
limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII,
5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts
from decision-making in the political departments of the
government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
***
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be
sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit
because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for
the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to
sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Power of Judicial Review
Title: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 160261
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003
that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

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Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of

Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
Issues:

3. Does the court have judicial power of review over the

impeachment proceedings?

4. Are the new rules of procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings unconstitutional?

5. Is the 2nd impeachment filed against the Chief Justice

Davide valid?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. Yes, in the case at bar, court have judicial
power of review over the impeachment proceedings.
Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. This Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result

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thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Answer to Issue # 2. Yes, Sections 16 and 17 of of the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
are
unconstitutional.
Court held, Sections 16 and 17 of of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI. No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
***
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3)
by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of

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Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning

different meaning from filing and referral.
Answer to issue # 3. No. The 2nd impeachment complaint is
not valid.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
***
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted
to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely
the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated
when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it
by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers
the series of steps that follow.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Political Questions
Title: SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR, G.R. No. 134577

Facts:
Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and
the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
Antecedent facts:
The Senate of the Philippines, on their first regular session of
the eleventh Congress conducted an election of officers. Sen.
Marcelo B. Fernan was nominated to the position of Senate
President by Sen. Blas Ople. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was
also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago.
By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate. Also elected were Senator
Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as
majority leader.

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On July 30, 1998, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon informed the body

that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven LakasNUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.

reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed

jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify
its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue
hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect
a Senate President.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before

this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the
main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator
Tatad.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur

with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like
the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial
supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions
as well."
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Issues:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Did Sen. Fernan gravely abuse of discretion in recognizing
Sen. Guingona as minority leader?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue #1. Yes, the court assumed jurisdiction over
the petition.
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to
resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in

the upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had
echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already
involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has
created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that
solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than this
Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an
effective settlement are pinned.
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions
which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
refuse to decide them.
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not
be left unanswered.
Answer to issue # 2. No. There was no violation of the
constitution.

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While the Constitution mandates that the President of the

Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.

Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has

been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.

***

Topic: Expanded Judicial Power of Review

While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules

and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while
the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative
department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of
Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion.
Answer to Question # 3.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did
not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let
us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution
of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Title:
DR.
EMIGDIO
A.
BONDOC
vs
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, G.R. No.
97710

Facts:
Dr. Emigdio Bondoc filed a petition to annul the decision of the
House of Representatives of to withdraw and rescind the
nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Issue a writ of
prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in
place of respondent Camasura, a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and
discharge his functions as a member of HRET, and to be
granted such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Antecedent facts:
On May 11, 1987 election, Marciano M. Pineda of LDP and Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were candidates
for Representative of 4th District on Pampanga. Marciano M.
Pineda was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Bondoc filed
an election protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. Recount has been made.

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which

Bondoc won over Pineda by twenty-three (23) votes.The LDP
members in the Tribunal insisted on a recount which delayed
the finalization of the decision of the case. The recount
resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura (member of LDP Party) voted with
the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
proclaim Bondoc (from Nationalista Party) the winner and his
promulgation is scheduled on March 14, 1991.
March 13, 1991,Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, informed the Tribunal that on the basis of
the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during
its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. In effect, the
scheduled promulgation of Bondoc has to be aborted this is
because without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision
lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section
24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be
validly promulgated.
Issues:

4. Does the court have judicial power of review over Electoral

Tribunal?

5. Did HRET violated the constitution?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1.

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The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc
for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court
cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his
charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon
the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the
party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator
be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
***
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc.
***
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment,
impartiality,
and
independence
even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline,"
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the

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ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.

office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that

tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

***

Therefore, Supreme Court held, the petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and
rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the
Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No.
91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of
the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.
Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that
decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral
cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and
in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision
DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies
thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal.
Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to

security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET
as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled
to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore, Membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
Answer to issue # 2.
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative

***

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Judicial Review
Title: ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION,
G.R. No. L-45081
Facts:

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Jose A. Angara the petitioner, prayed for a writ of prohibition to

restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against
the election of said petitioner as member of the National
Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.
On November 15, 1935, Jose Angara took an oath as
member-elect of the National Assembly.
On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed the
Resolution 8 confirming the election of Jose Angara.
On December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Jose
Angara and praying that he be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified.

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notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?

Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1 . Yes. Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy.
Court ruled they have jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
***

On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a

resolution, paragraph 6 of which provide -translated in EnglishThe Commission will not consider any protest that has not
been filed on or before this date.

The court will have to determine whether the Electoral

Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of
the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.

ISSUE:

Answer to issue # 2.

1.Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral

Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy?

Supreme Court held , that the Electoral Commission was

acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the
protest filed the election of the herein petitioner

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qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

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prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.
***

***:
As per Section 17, Article 3 of the Philippine Constitution,
Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(Article 3 SECTION 17 Phil. Const). The Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating

to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
***
That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to
said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Separation of Powers

That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers

previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

Title: Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,

etc., G.R. No. 196231

That such transfer of power from the legislature to the

Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to

Facts:

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This is regarding the case filed against Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzalez for or Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in
the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.
The case against the Deputy Ombudsman ignited after the
dreadful hostage crisis in Luneta Park, Manila when the axed
Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza killed
some HongKong nationals whom he held as hostages.
Antecedent facts:
A certain Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the
Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS)
and with the Manila City Prosecutors Office against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four
others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery
extortion and physical injury.
The criminal and administrative case was against Mendoza
was dismissed. However, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for
Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO) found
Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on
them the penalty of dismissal from the service. As per IIRC
report, this have precipitated Mendoza to hostage-taking as
his desperate resort.
Due to the hostage incident, President Benigno C. Aquino III
directed the Department of Justice and the Department of
Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough
investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint
Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable
for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling
the case against Mendoza.The IIRC stated that the
Ombudsman and Gonzales failure to promptly resolve

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Mendozas motion for reconsideration, "without justification
and despite repeated pleas precipitated the desperate resort
to hostage-taking. The IIRC recommended the referral of its
findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally
charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for
Misconduct in Office.
On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged
and dismissed him from the service.21 According to the OP,
"the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendozas] Motion for Reconsideration [that spanned for nine
(9) long months] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and
"constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the
Ombudsmans own Rules of Procedure.
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
Issue:
Was the action of the Office of the President to dismiss
Gonzalez constitutional?
Court Ruling:
In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108
the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision

Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No.
196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

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considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the
powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of
any allowable interference to these powers and functions, with
the principle of checks and balances.
***

***
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of
the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses
and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No
6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
***
Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have
been expressly labeled as independent." The extent of the
independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the

Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals
that do not conform to the high standard required in
determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an
impeachable offense) and that the Presidents power of
removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate
when balanced with the constitutional principle of
independence. The mere filing of an administrative case
against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
before the OP can already result in their suspension and can
interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of
Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term
allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special
Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to
the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the
framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making
these offices independent constitutional bodies.
***

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Executive Department are subject to the prosecutorial

authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Separation of Powers
Title: JOSE O. VERA vs JOSE A. AVELINO, G.R. No.
L-543
Facts:
This is a petition initiated by Jose O. Vega, Ramon Diokno,
and Jose Romero when the Senate of the Philippines in
session assembled, decided to defer the administration of oath
and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose
Romero, pending the hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their elections. They pray for an order annulling
it, and compelling the respondent to permit them to occupy
their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
Antecedent fact:
Commission on elections submitted to the President and the
Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections
held among other things, stated that, by reason of certain

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specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will.
Based on the report, the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac,
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, had the worst terrorism during and
after the election, and that if the elections held in those
provinces were annulled as demanded by the circumstances
mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not
have been declared elected;
When the Senate convened , it approved a resolution referring
to the report and ordering that, pending the termination of the
protest lodged against their election, the herein petitioners,
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had
been included among the sixteen candidates for senator
receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.
As per Senate, it is essential, in order to maintain alive the
respect for democratic institutions among our people, that no
man or group of men be permitted to profit from the results of
an election held under coercion, in violation of law, and
contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should
underlie all elections under the Constitution;
Issue:
Does the court have jurisdiction over this case at bar?
Court Ruling:

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Constitutional law 1
we punish them for contempt? If we do, are we not thereby
destroying the independence, and the equal importance to
which legislative bodies are entitled under the Constitution?

The court has no jurisdiction.

Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case,
may this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally
be in the negative. Granting that the postponement of the
administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the
petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in
effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As
was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one
branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do
so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset
the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into
our institutional setup.
***
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should,
according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt
proceedings. If the respondents should disobey our order, can

***
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.