SECTION 9

ATTY. RANDY P. BARENG, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246

Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3219-RTJ)
- versus - JUDGE ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Manila,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 1, 2011
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FACTS:
Atty. Bareng is the counsel of Romulo Awingan, one of the accused for double
murder, entitled People of the Philippines v. Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Lloyd Antiporda,
Romulo Awingan and Richard Mecate. These two murder cases were consolidated
before the RTC, Manila, Branch 29 but Grulla voluntarily inhibited herself from the
case, and did not resolve the motion for reconsideration and the motion to transfer
the cases. The consolidated cases were subsequently re-raffled to the RTC, Manila,
Branch 19, presided by Judge Daguna.
In her December 9, 2005 Resolution, Judge Daguna granted the private
complainants motion for reconsideration and set aside Judge Grullas October 26,
2005 Order. Accused Awingan, through Atty. Bareng, filed a motion for
reconsideration. Judge Daguna denied the motion in her Order of February 3,
2006. Awingan, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Daguna.
During the pendency of the CA petition, Judge Daguna issued warrants of
arrest against all the accused.
The CA granted Awingans petition for certiorari and prohibition in
its November 10, 2006 Decision.[7] The CA found that Judge Daguna acted with grave
abuse of discretion because she arbitrarily and whimsically disregarded the
guidelines for acting on the Peoples motion to withdraw informations and practiced
unreasonable and inexplicable selectivity by not considering all the records available
to her in order to make her independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of
the cases before her.
Since the warrants of arrest against all the accused were still in force, Atty.
Bareng filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion, on November 15, 2006,[9] to
inform the RTC of the CA Decision and to ask for its immediate implementation. He
attached a certified copy of the CA Decision.
Judge Daguna denied the motion for lack of merit in her December 4,
2006 Order.
In the Order[18] issued, Judge Daguna stated that she resolved Atty. Barengs
motion for reconsideration on July 31, 2007, but her Order might not have been

released; hence, she directed that the Order be reprinted and the parties be
furnished with copies. Since Judge Daguna denied his motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit,[19] Atty. Bareng filed his notice of appeal[20] on May 20, 2008, after
receiving his copy of the order on May 6, 2008.[21]
On July 8, 2009, Atty. Bareng filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) his complaint-affidavit,[22] charging Judge Daguna with gross misconduct and
manifest abuse of functions of her office, based on the following allegations:
1. That Judge Daguna, in her December 4, 2006 Order, insinuated that there
was pecuniary estimation attached to the manifestation and motion filed by Atty.
Bareng; this, according to Atty. Bareng, was unfair and tainted with malice;
2. That despite Atty. Barengs explanation, Judge Daguna found him guilty of
contempt of court;
3. That he filed a motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for
reconsideration;
4. That after the lapse of almost one year, he filed his first motion to resolve;
5. That after more than one month, he filed a manifestation and second
motion to resolve;
6. That Judge Daguna claimed that she had resolved the motion for
reconsideration as early as July 31, 2007 but apparently the order had not been
released; and
7. That he filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2008 but Judge Daguna had not
acted on the appeal despite his motion to resolve and/or elevate appeal dated June
19, 2009.
In her July 31, 2009 Comment, Judge Daguna denied that the delays
attributed to her were her fault. She blamed her staff for the delay.
While the administrative case was pending, Judge Daguna applied for
disability retirement in late 2009. She was allowed to retire, but because of the two
(2) pending administrative cases against her, the amount of P50,000.00 was withheld
from her retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may
later impose on her.
In its submission dated February 24, 2010the OCA found no evidence to
sustain the charges of gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office
against Judge Daguna. The OCA, however, found Judge Daguna guilty of gross
inefficiency.
ISSUE: WON Judge Daguna is liable for gross deficiency for failing to adopt a system
of record management in her court.
HELD:
We agree with the OCAs finding that Judge Daguna is liable for gross
inefficiency for failing to adopt a system of record management in her court. Judge
Daguna violated Rule 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides:
Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions or other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09 A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

On July 31, 2007Judge Daguna also resolved Atty. Barengs motion for
reconsideration which was filed on January 31, 2007, or way beyond the required
period. There was also a delay in sending the records of the appealed case to the CA.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose
of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records
of a case;
xxx
SECTION 11. Sanctions.
xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In addition to gross inefficiency, we find Judge Daguna guilty of delay in
rendering an order, as well as delay in transmitting the records of a case. Based on
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty for a less serious charge is either
suspension or a fine. Considering Judge Dagunas retirement, we consider a total fine
of P15,000.00 to be the appropriate penalty. This fine shall be deducted from
the P50,000.00 withheld from her retirement benefits.

MARIETTA DUQUE,
Complainant,

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027

- versus JUDGE
CRISOSTOMO
L.
GARRIDO,
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
7, Tacloban City[presently
assigned as Presiding Judge, Branch
13, Carigara,Leyte],
Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 27, 2009

FACTS:
Complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation
of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond
ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo
Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the
aforementioned case. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum
submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a
Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27,
2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling
prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case
No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987
Constitution.
He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the
Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted
for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that
the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006
because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he
left for the United States.
Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity
in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling
prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the
complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the
private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during
the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the
RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of the

promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason
only known to him.
OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision
beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally,
respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 26.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is administratively liable for gross inefficiency.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge
of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as
follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court
has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the
twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay
in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right
to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking
justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005 ]. Thus, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have
been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only
on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been
submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code
of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within
the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the
prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a
disciplinary sanction.

Under Section 9(1, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the
Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as
a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such
charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 200010-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26 [24] because he
filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking
privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to
official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in
mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the
envelope used bears his station and the words FREE FROM POSTAGE. We concur with
the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY
of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is
FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.

CIRILA S. RAYMUNDO,
Complainant,

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2033MTJ)

- versus JUDGE TERESITO A. ANDOY,

Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Cainta,
Rizal,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 6, 2010

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that sometime in 2000, she filed six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) against Hermelinda Chang (accused)
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta, Rizal. The respondent judge presided
over the court.
Respondent judge declared that the accused had waived her rights to present
further evidence for repeated failure to appear in court despite due notice.
On September 2, 2004, the complainant received a notice from the MTC, setting the
cases for trial anew on November 17, 2004. The date was later moved to December
20, 2004.
On December 20, 2004, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in
court, prompting the private prosecutor to move for the reinstatement of the
MTCs August 4, 2004 order. The respondent judge granted the motion and declared
the cases submitted for decisionThe accused moved to reconsider this order; the MTC
granted the motion in its order of February 9, 2005. Accordingly, the cases were
again set for hearing on October 12, 2005.
On October 12, 2005, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in
court despite due notice. The MTC, thus, ordered the direct testimony of the accused
to be stricken off the record, and again declared the cases submitted for decision.
On June 23, 2006, the complainant filed with the MTC an urgent ex parte
motion to render decision. Almost two years later, or on March 12, 2008, the
complainant filed a second ex parte motion to render decision. The respondent judge
did not act on these motions.

Respondent judge, in his defense, stated that he had prepared his decision in
the subject cases, dated July 19, 2008, and had set the same for promulgation
on August 18, 2008, at 8:30 in the morning and that although the undersigned is
aware that heavy caseload is not considered by the Supreme Court as an excuse for
delay in rendering decisions, the undersigned humbly begs this Honorable Offices
utmost consideration, understanding and compassion in evaluating the subject IPI.
The undersigned is due to retire on October 3, 2008.
The OCA found respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision, explaining that while the Court is not unaware of the heavy caseload of
judges, nothing in the records shows that the respondent judge asked for an
extension of time to decide the subject criminal cases. In addition, the respondent
judge failed to consider that the subject cases required a quicker resolution as they
were covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
HELD:
Yes. We stress at the outset that the subject criminal cases violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 are indeed covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to A.M. No.
00-11-01-SC (Re: Amendment to the Rule on Summary Procedure of Criminal Cases).
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated by the Supreme Court to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive disposition of cases. Section 17 of this Rule
requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than thirty (30) days after
termination of trial. Trial in the present case originally ended on August 4, 2004.
From this sequence of events, we find it clear that the respondent judge failed
to observe the mandated period of time to decide cases under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Following Section 17 of this Rule, he should have rendered a decision
within 30 days from the termination of trial on August 4, 2004. His failure to meet this
deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into account and had disregarded
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
At any rate, even if we adopt a liberal approach and consider the subject
cases to be outside the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the respondent
judge still cannot escape liability.
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower
courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is
submitted for decision.
In the present case, the subject cases had been submitted for decision
since October 12, 2005. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, while the respondent
judge attributed his failure to render a decision to the heavy caseload in his sala, he
did not ask for an extension of time to decide the cases. This failure to decide within
the required period, given that he could have asked for an extension, is inexcusable;
it constitutes neglect of duty as well as gross inefficiency that collectively warrant
administrative sanction.
Under Rule 140, Section 9(1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-810-SC, the respondent judges undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a
less serious offense. It carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary

and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Since the respondent judge had been previously found guilty in Blanco v.
Andoy of gross ignorance of procedure and undue delay in the resolution of a motion
(for which he was imposed a P25,000.00 fine with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely), we impose on him the
maximum allowable fine of P20,000.00. This amount shall be deducted from
respondent judges retirement benefits as the record shows that he had already
retired from the service on October 3, 2008.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Judge Teresito A. Andoy is hereby
found GUILTY of (1) undue delay in rendering a decision and (2) violation of Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINEof twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits
SECTION 10
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO
OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, respondent.

G.

FACTS:
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband
and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The
case was raffled to the respondents court.1[2] On the same day the Complaint was
filed, the respondent immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.2[3] However, the
Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were
allegedly unknown.3[4] Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by
publication. The respondent granted the motion in his Order4[5] dated March 7, 2001,
with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice.
Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly
newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue. 5
[6]
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons
during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the 30day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing
on April 20, 2001.6[7] However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the

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respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19, 2001,
or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set
the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001. 7[8] After the scheduled
hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case
submitted for decision.8[9]
It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent
judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and
partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the abovecited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge of the
facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein. Also, he asserts
that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had
motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision9[15] is valid and prays for
the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent
judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is
that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these
administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
ISSUE: WON respondent jusge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
HELD:

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals Decision which

states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias right to due process
when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the
fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary
period, was still pending resolution.
What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural
short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by
receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,
even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor
had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the
case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving
declaration of nullity of marriage.10[23]

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In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his
investigation.11[24]
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted
is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non
for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this
procedural rule.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and
jurisprudence.12[26] When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know
it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of
either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for
more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) may be imposed.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits.

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