GENERAL LEGAL NATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Functions and legal capacity

International institutions are defined by reference to their legal functions and responsibilities,
each such institution having its own limited field of activity. The constitutions of these bodies
usually set out their purposes, objects, and powers in special clauses. For example, article 1 of
the United Nations Charter (signed 26 June 1945) defines the Purposes of the United Nations
under four heads, of which two in particular are the maintenance of international peace and
security, and the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Similarly the constitutions of other
international bodies, for example, of the International Labour Organization (see Preamble and
article 1 referring to the objects of the Organization), and of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (see Preamble and article 1 referring to the Organizations
Functions ), contain provisions defining their special objects and responsibilities.
The definition in each constitution of the international bodys particular field of activity is
analogous to the objects* clause in the memorandum of association of a limited company under
British companies legislation. In both cases, the corporate powers of the international institution
on the one hand and of the limited company on the other, are determined by the statement of
functions or objects. The analogy can be carried further inasmuch as the recent practice in the
constitutions of international organs of defining the objects in as general and comprehensive a
manner as possible resembles the present-day methods of company lawyers in drafting objects
clauses in very wide terms to preclude any doubts later arising as to the legal capacity of the
company concerned.
As international institutions are defined and limited by their constitutional powers, they differ
basically from states as subjects of international law. In their case, problems such as those raised
by the sovereignty or jurisdiction of states cannot arise, or at least cannot arise in the same way.

International institutions
Almost every activity is prima facie within the competence of a state under international law,
whereas practically the opposite principle applies to an international organ, namely, that any
function, not within the express terms of its constitution, is prima facie outside its powers. As the
International Court of Justice has said referring to the United Nations1
Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by
international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its
purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in
practice.

Thus no international body can legally overstep its constitutional powers. For example, the
International Labour Organization cannot constitutionally purport to exercise the peace
enforcement functions of the United Nations Security Council, and order (say) a cease-fire in the
event of hostilities between certain states.
Besides its express powers, an international organ may have under its constitution such functions
as are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties.13 Thus in the Advisory Opinion mentioned above on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations,14 the majority of the International Court of Justice held that
by implication from its Charter, the United Nations had the power of exercising diplomatic
protection over its agents, and could therefore sponsor claims on behalf of such agents against
governments for injuries received in the course of their official duties. In a later Advisory
Opinion,15 the Court held that the United Nations General Assembly had implied power to
create a judicial or administrative tribunal, which might give judgments binding the General
Assembly itself. There is some weight of opinion to the effect that in appropriate cases, an
international institution may possess impliedly not only such powers as are necessary for the
performance of its duties as outlined in its constituent instrument, but also powers which may be
incidental or related to such duties, or the due performance of such duties.
In relation to the corporate nature of international bodies, the question arises whether they
possess legal personality: (a) at international law; and (b) at municipal law.
In the case of the League of Nations, although the Covenant did not expressly confer juridical
personality, the general view was that the League had both international and municipal legal
personality. This was based partly on the principle that such personality was implicitly necessary
for the efficient performance by the League of its functions, and partly on its practice in
repeatedly acting as a corporate person, for example concluding agreements with the Swiss
Government, taking over property and funds, etc.

Organic structure and composition

The organic structure and composition of the specialized agencies and other international bodies
vary in the case of each institution. Nevertheless, they have some features in common:
(I) CONSTITUTIONAL SEAT OR HEADQUARTERS. The constitutions of international
institutions usually fix the location of the headquarters, but this is sometimes left by the member
states for later decision or agreement with the government of the territory of the site.
(2; MEMBERSHIP. The constitution usually provides that original signatories may become
members upon ratification or acceptance of the instrument, while other states may become

members upon admission by a special majority vote of the competent organs of the particular
international body concerned. Where a clause in a constitution defines the conditions under
which such other states may be admitted to membership, it is imperative, according to the
International Court of Justice, that such conditions be strictly adhered to. Under certain
constitutions of the specialized agencies (for example, the Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO) the privilege of admission to
membership on acceptance of the constitution is allowed to member states of the United Nations.
In the case of certain specialized agencies, too, for example, the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), territories or groups of territories
may be admitted to associate membership, a status which entitles them to participation in the
benefits of the organization without voting rights or the right to become member of an executive
organ. Under the Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO), territories may be
represented at the International Labour Conference by or through advisers appointed to the
delegation of the member state responsible for the territory or territories concerned.

(3)
CONDITIONS OF WITHDRAWAL BY, OR EXPULSION AND SUSPENSION OF,
MEMBERS. There is no uniform or coherent practice in this matter. For example, although the
constituent instruments of the majority of international organizations contain express provisions
for a right of a state to withdraw from membership, no article of the United Nations Charter
confers an express right of withdrawal upon member states. Most usually members are allowed
to give a twelve months written notice of intention to withdraw; but the provisions of the
constitutions vary as to the minimum period of time following admission to membership, when
notice may be given; and as to whether the effectiveness of the notice depends upon the prior
performance of financial or other obligations. As regards expulsion of members for failure to
fulfil obligations, less value is attached to this as a disciplinary measure than before the Second
World War; the modern tendency is to make no provision for expulsion, but to allow suspension
of a members privileges, including voting rights, for default in financial or other obligations,
until these obligations are met.
(4)
ORGANS. Here, there is a necessary distinction between principal organs and regional
and subsidiary organs.
The standard principal organs consist of:
a. A policy-making body known usually as an Assembly or Congress, representative of
all member states, with power to supervise the working of the organization, and to control
its budget, and, more frequently, also with power to adopt conventions and other
measures, and to make recommendations for national legislation (for example, the
Assembly of the World Health Organization, WHO). Variations may occur in the
frequency of sessions (varying from annual to quinquennial meetings), the number of

delegates, the range of this organs supervisory powers, and the authority which may be
delegated to the smaller executive body (see below)
A smaller executive body or council, usually elected by the policymaking organ from
among the delegate* to it, and representative of only a specific number of member states.
Sometimes it is required that the members of this body should be selected so as to be
fairly representative of the stares of most importance in the specialized field (aviation,
shipping and maritime transport, and industrial production) in which the organization is
active; this is so, for instance, with the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and with the Governing Body of the International Labour
Organization (ILO). In other instances, it is required that this body should be fairly
representative of all geographical areas, as, for example, with the Executive Council of
the Universal Postal Union (UPU). Or, also the members may be chosen from different
states, but with primary emphasis on their personal or technical qualifications, as in the
case of the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), and the Executive Committee of the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO). The degree of executive authority of this organ may vary from the
level of supreme control in regard to the member states over a particular subject matter
(as in the case of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, under
the Treaty of 18 April 1951), to the level of mere advice and recommendation as in the
case of the Council of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).